Strangle Paulus: how Soviet tank crews tore to pieces the airfield that supplied the Germans in Stalingrad

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Data are approximate* Last updated: 04/04/2017 09:59:00

Forced improvisation of the Southern Front

The summer of 1942 is not the most popular period for authors writing about the war. After winter setbacks, the Germans managed to recapture the strategic initiative, and those who in July 1942 tried to stop the German machine rolling east had no choice. One of the desperate attempts to stop the Germans was the counter-offensive of the tank group of Major General Alekseev on the western approaches to the Don.

From what was

The preparations for the July offensive against parts of the Southern Front were carried out by the Germans without special precautions. The concentration of German units was revealed by air and ground reconnaissance, and was also confirmed by other data - in particular, the testimony of prisoners and defectors:

“Worthy of attention, but requiring verification, is the testimony of a defector about the alleged 07/07/1942 offensive by units of Kleist’s army from the Debaltsevo-Ordzhonikidze area, which will allegedly be launched from the area occupied by the Italian expeditionary force, in cooperation with the Slavic-Kramatorsk enemy group.”

But even in the Soviet and German headquarters it was clear that the rifle divisions were unlikely to be able to withstand the blow of the 1st Panzer Army of Colonel General Ewald von Kleist. To parry enemy attacks, they needed their own mobile units.

Diagram of the combat route of the 15th Tank Brigade

The corps and armies created in the spring were no longer enough for this; they had to be hastily created “from what was available.” One of these “homemade” tank corps was the group of Major General V.M. Alekseeva.

“To the Deputy Commander for Automotive Armored Forces, copies to the Head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, Deputy Commander for Logistics, Head of the Communications Directorate. Combat order No. 0336/OP. Southern Front Headquarters, 07/01/1942, 14:30, map 200000.

The front commander ordered:

1) To ensure the operation of the tank brigades of the front reserve, form a tank group consisting of the 5th Guards, 15th, 140th tank brigades and a motorized regiment.

2) Appoint Major General of Tank Forces Alekseev as commander of the tank group.

3) The Deputy Commander for Automotive Armored Forces to form a command center for a tank group, providing it with vehicles and two RSB radios.

4) The Head of the Front Communications Directorate to allocate one telephone platoon at the disposal of the tank group commander.

5) The Deputy Commander for Logistics is assigned to the group management for all types of allowances.

6) Readiness 07/02/1942.”

The mentioned 15th and 140th tank brigades (tbr) were completely fresh units. The first, after participating in the battles near Kharkov from June 5 to July 1, was in Voroshilovgrad (now Lugansk), where it was replenished with equipment and personnel. In total, the 15th Tank Brigade received nine heavy KVs, 20 medium T-34s and 20 light T-60s. Since July 5, the brigade was commanded by Major V.S. Savchenko. The 140th Tank Brigade was formed in the spring of 1942, and as of June 29 it consisted of nine KVs, 20 T-34s and 18 T-60s.

Things were noticeably worse for the motorized infantry, especially with transport. Their trucks were taken over by the headquarters of the Southern Front, so the prefix “moto-” in the name of the 41st Motorized Rifle Brigade (MSBR) was purely formal - the brigade performed all marches on foot. I had to walk a lot.

As can be seen from the order, the creation of a tank group was exclusively a “managerial” decision for introducing brigades into battle, and even then it was quite hasty. But there was practically no time to achieve at least some kind of coherence and coordination between the brigades of Alekseev’s group.

Alekseev's group goes into battle

«To the Deputy Commander for Automotive Armored Forces, copies to the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, Deputy Commander for Engineering Troops, Chief of Air Defense, Commander of a Tank Group, Commander of the 24th Army, Head of the Communications Directorate. Combat order No. 0370/OP. Southern Front Headquarters, 07/11/1942, 18:00, map 200000.

The front commander ordered:

1. The tank group of Major General Alekseev, consisting of the 5th Guards Tank Brigade, 15th Tank Brigade, 140th Tank Brigade and Motorized Rifle Brigade, should be concentrated in the area of ​​Kayukov, Krasnovka, Chebotovka by the morning of 12.7. The group headquarters is Kayukov. Communication with the headquarters of the Southern Front through the
Tarasovka
telephone and telegraph 2. The group moves only at night. The main route: Luganskaya, Nizhnyaya Olkhovaya, Mozhaevka, Chebotovka. The group headquarters should be located on the main route of movement.

3. By 20:00 on July 11, 1942, the Deputy Commander for Engineering Troops should prepare crossings for combat vehicles in the Mozhaevka, Sizy area.”

Tank brigades traveled 160 km to the front under their own power, “ in conditions of continuous rain and muddy roads.”

" Meanwhile, the command of the Southern Front was once again deciding how best to use its tank reserve. From July 7 to July 11, the troops of Lieutenant General R.Ya. Malinovsky retreated in relative order, hiding behind the rear guards. It must be understood that this order was precisely relative - for example, things were much worse for neighbors from the South-Western Front who were caught up in the German offensive. In practice, in later documents, many harsh words were said - both about the lack of preparation for the withdrawal earlier, and about the process of organizing the withdrawal itself, which noticeably reduced the combat effectiveness of the units retreating from prepared positions.

T-34 on the march. Southern Front, summer 1942

However, the main events took place in the zone of the neighboring front. According to the plans of the German command, the main forces of the Southwestern Front of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko was supposed to be surrounded, where they would be destroyed by the joint efforts of the 1st and 4th tank armies. It was not possible to fully accomplish this: part of the divisions of Colonel General Hermann Hoth found themselves pinned down by Soviet counterattacks to the north. Only a few formations managed to achieve a “clean breakthrough” - in particular, the XL Panzer Corps of General of the Panzer Forces Leo Geir von Schweppenburg. But this was enough to close the ring around the 9th and 38th armies together with Kleist’s tankers. By this time, both of them had been transferred from Timoshenko’s front to the Southern Front, so their salvation, as well as the problems associated with this section of the front, now became Malinovsky’s headache.

“Recording of direct wire conversations between the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff with the command of the Southern Front, July 12, 1942. Voroshilovgrad, at the Malinovsky and Korniets apparatus. Moscow, at the apparatus of Stalin and Vasilevsky.

Stalin. Hello.

Malinovsky. Hello. Let's report the situation.

Stalin. Keep your report short.

Malinovsky. 1) Today at 11:30 am, enemy tanks occupied Chertkovo, our division of armored trains fought with them, retreating along the line to Millerovo.

2. Just now a radiogram has just arrived from the 37th Army that 65 enemy tanks are attacking from Shevchenko, Marinovka (this is 20 km south of Mostki) and from Kamenka in the general direction of Novo-Aidar; in total there are over 100 tanks in both groups. At 20:00, units of the right flank of the 37th Army fought with them. I have no information about the position of units of the 9th and 38th armies. I have had no contact with these armies since yesterday evening. Wired communication with the 37th Army was broken today at 10 o'clock in the morning, radio communication is maintained and live. The 37th Army has the task of withdrawing to the Novo-Alexandrovka, Novo-Aidar, Grechishkino line by the morning of July 12 and then on the morning of July 13 to the line (excluding) Belovodsk, Svyato-Dmitrievka, Trekhizbenka.

3. With great tension, units of the 24th Army are transferred to the line Millerovo, Rogalik, Vishnyaki (73rd Infantry Division - Millerovo, 335th Infantry Division - Rogalik, 218th Infantry Division - Vishnyaki). The 261st Infantry Division will approach Petropavlovka on the morning of July 12th. A consolidated tank corps under the command of the headquarters of the armored department headed by Major General Alekseev is already on the move to the Verkhne-Tarasovka, Krasnovka, Nizhne-Mityakinsky area (by the morning of July 12). The tank corps and the divisions mentioned above will be united by the commander of the 24th Army with the task of defeating the enemy tank group advancing from Chertkovo, preventing it from reaching Millerovo and throwing it back to the line Chertkovo, Belovodsk...

6. The general decision is to stabilize the front at all costs on the line Millerovo, Petropavlovka, Cherkasskoye and, with the successful development of battles, advance to the line Chertkovo, Belovodsk, Trekhizbenka. I am concerned about the space to the east and northeast of Millerovo. I have no information about the advance and actions of the 7th Reserve Army from Stalingrad. I have no connection with the SWF or information about its events. In the current situation, a strong blow from the Southwestern Front from the area of ​​Pavlovsk, Novaya Kalitva, Boguchar in the general direction of Kantemirovka, Novomarkovka with the task of jointly defeating the enemy's 40th Tank Corps in the area of ​​Kantemirovka, Chertkovo is urgently needed. I am in dire need of significant reinforcement with aviation. Tanks are very much needed, since losses of the combined tank corps are expected, and they will need to be replenished. We need another tank corps in order to once and for all discourage the enemy from moving between the Don and the Donets to my deep rear in the general quest for Stalingrad. We have everything."

"Bridge of Colonel General Kleist"

24th Army of Lieutenant General I.K. Smirnova, to which General Alekseev’s tank group was subordinated, looked quite serious on paper even without them: four rifle divisions, a Katyusha regiment, two artillery regiments. Immediately before the battle, Alekseev’s group looked like this:

• By 14:00, after the march from Olkhovaya, the 5th Guards Tank Brigade concentrated in the Krasnovka area. Tanks in service: KV - 6, T-34 - 14, T-60 - 17. T-34 - 5, T-60 - 3 remained on the road due to technical faults;
• The 15th Tank Brigade concentrated in Kayukov. Tanks in service: T-34 - 15, T-60 - 10. KV on the way - 9, T-34 - 5, T-60 -5;
• The 140th Tank Brigade was concentrated in Dyachkino. Tanks in service: KV - 8, T-34 - 16, T-60 - 16. KV - 2, T-34 - 4, T-60 - 4 on the way.

Of course, they would hardly have been able to defeat the enemy tank corps, but the Soviet tankers were able to slow down the German mobile units that had rushed forward.

“To the commander of the tank group, Major General Alekseev, copy to the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, commander of the 24th Army. Combat order No. 0378/OP .
Southern Front Headquarters, 07/13/1942, 04:00, map 200000.
The front commander ordered:

1. On the morning of July 13, 1942, destroy the enemy group moving from the Krivorozhye, Aleksandrovka area to Kamensk.

2. Upon completion of the task, reach the line Gorny, Ekaterinovka, firmly covering the direction to Kamensk.

3. To secure the flank, have a strong lateral detachment in the Sharpayevka area.

4. Report any movement from the concentration area immediately. Report task completion every hour.

Chief of Staff of the Armored Directorate of the Southern Front, Colonel Bazhanov.”

Soviet armored train “For the Motherland!”, destroyed by German aircraft on July 15, 1942 in the Voroshilovgrad area

However, in 1942, there were problems, sometimes quite significant, with the correct introduction of units into battle. Here, for example, is what the entry into battle of the 15th Tank Brigade looked like:

“Thus, before reaching the brigade’s deployment line, which was located 10 km from the concentration point, only one hour was allotted to prepare for the attack. Consequently, during this time the brigade could reach the deployment line with a forced march, without being able to organize reconnaissance and coordinate actions.”

At the same time, as can be seen from the above order, by the time Alekseev’s group entered the battle, the Millerovo line, as was in Malinovsky’s original plan, was no longer discussed - the main battle of the 24th Army unfolded to the south.

A pair of T-34 tanks in attack, 1942

The battle itself was remembered by the tankers of the 15th Tank Brigade mainly for the collision with a column of “up to 30 tanks”, which, following in the tail of the 5th Guards Tank Brigade, attacked the village of Verkhnyaya Tarasovka together with another column of “up to 20 tanks” that attacked that the same village from the north. At the same time, the headquarters of both Alekseev’s group and the 24th Army were located in the village. They were rescued by motorized riflemen of the 15th Tank Brigade, an anti-tank division and four T-34s that were being repaired. Then the battalions of the brigade caught up with the enemy and destroyed him - at least the claim for 27 destroyed tanks and 34 vehicles can hardly be called otherwise. The victorious battle had to be stopped due to “the enemy’s numerical superiority in forces, the lack of fuel and lubricants for tanks, and the absolute absence of infantry”

.

The brigade's losses in equipment on July 13 amounted to eight T-60s and two "forty-fives", and in people - 35 killed and wounded. At that time, they did not have time to include two HF lieutenants S.V. in the loss count. Konovalov and G.F. Gauzov, abandoned for technical reasons when the brigade retreated. Judging by the available data from German documents, these tanks subsequently covered the retreat of the infantry units, delaying the advance of the motorcycle battalion of the German 3rd Panzer Division for several hours until a light howitzer was delivered to the battlefield.

A Wehrmacht tank column advances to the front line. Southern sector of the Soviet-German front, 1942

Other brigades of Alekseev’s group suffered even more. So, on July 14, the 5th Guards Tank Brigade tried to take that same Verkhnyaya Tarasovka, and in the future it was necessary to break through to Millerovo and connect with the 73rd Infantry Division. For this task, nine T-34s of the 2nd company of the 1st battalion were allocated, of which six were on the move. On the evening of July 14, these “thirty-fours” reached the southern outskirts of Tarasovka. At about 03:00, a new order was received from Alekseev - to send one tank to Millerovo with the same task of searching for the 73rd Infantry Division, and to return the rest to Kamensk.

These tanks never reached Kamensk, having started a battle with the enemy near the Gluboky village. Two T-34s were knocked out and left on the battlefield, one tank burned down, as did one German tank. The crews of the remaining two "thirty-fours" were forced to explode in Glubokoye due to burst high-pressure pipes. Lieutenant Kravtsov’s T-34, which left in the direction of Millerovo, did not survive its comrades for long: at Tarasovka, the “thirty-four” came under fire from German tanks and artillery, after which it turned back. By the time Kravtsov’s tank appeared in Kamensk, the bridges across the Donets had been blown up, and by order of the commander of the 14th Tank Tank, Major General N.N. Radkevich, Kravtsov’s crew sank their tank in the river.

Tank landing on T-34 tanks of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Brigade is preparing to attack enemy positions

The main opponent of the 24th Army units in these battles was the 14th Tank Division. Her documents constantly contain reports of heavy fighting, repeated tank attacks, artillery shelling and salvos of rocket launchers. During the night battle, the attackers managed to get within 50 meters of the division command post. However, the Germans managed to hold the bridgehead they had captured at Tarasovka, while reporting 50 tanks destroyed or captured.

The counterattack of the 24th Army cannot be called a complete failure. Although it was not possible to destroy the advancing German corps, its attacks allowed at least part of the forces of the encircled 9th and 38th armies to break out of the encirclement. At that time it was already very, very much.