Battle of Cambrai (1917)
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After failures using small tank formations, the British command decided to carry out an offensive using a large number of tanks. Since the tanks had previously failed to live up to expectations, many considered them useless. One British officer, Fr. According to the British command, the upcoming offensive was supposed to begin without traditional artillery preparation. For the first time in history, tanks themselves had to break through enemy defenses. The offensive at Cambrai was supposed to take the German command by surprise. The operation was prepared in strict secrecy. Tanks were transported to the front in the evening. The British constantly fired machine guns and mortars to drown out the roar of tank engines. A total of 476 tanks took part in the offensive. The German divisions were defeated and suffered heavy losses. The well-fortified Hindenburg Line was penetrated to great depths. However, during the German counter-offensive, British troops were forced to retreat. Using the remaining 73 tanks, the British managed to prevent a more serious defeat.
FactsRoom
The Second World War was marked by a series of fierce battles. For the first time in the history of mankind, large mechanized forces were involved in war, primarily the main striking force - armored forces.
Armored troops at that time played a primary role in battles: they acted as a powerful armored fist that broke into enemy defenses and paved the way for armies to advance. It is reasonable to assume that the one who has this armored fist is stronger, he should definitely win.
It turns out that we won the war due to the fact that we had an advantage in the quantity and quality of tanks? To answer this question, let’s look at the two largest, and therefore most significant, tank battles of World War II. Both of them took place on the Soviet-German front.
The first battle began on June 23, 1941 and lasted a week. The troops of the German Army Group South with the forces of the 1st Panzer Group, which included 4 tank divisions (11th, 13th, 14th, 16th), broke through the border defenses and rapidly moved inland. To stop them, the Soviet command decided to launch a counterattack and moved 5 mechanized corps (8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd) to the area of the village of Brody.
In the Lutsk - Rivne - Brody area, a tank battle began with the participation of about 2,500 tanks and almost all types of armored vehicles available to both sides. In terms of the number of tanks in that battle, the Red Army had a complete advantage: 2000 combat vehicles against 450 German ones. The quality of German technology was also inferior to Soviet technology.
For example, our heavy tank KV-1 initially caused panic among the Germans because it seemed absolutely invulnerable: for German tanks its frontal armor was impenetrable, so the Germans tried not to engage the KV in a counter battle and tried to pull it into anti-tank artillery positions.
The KV-2 tank also took part in the battle (later discontinued due to the siege of Leningrad, where it was produced), which had not only armor of about 10 cm, but also a howitzer gun of 152 mm caliber, which literally tore enemy combat vehicles to pieces . There was even a unique five-turret T-35 and, of course, the famous “thirty-four”, which combined high combat qualities, speed and maneuverability.
On the German side, the best example was the Pz IV, but it was much inferior to most of our tanks both in the thickness of the armor and in the caliber of the gun, which was more intended for fighting infantry. The remaining models - Pz III, Pz II, and even more so Pz I and the commander's BefPz, armed only with machine guns, could not compete with our armored forces.
And yet, in the battle of Brody, the Soviet troops suffered a heavy defeat: only about 25% remained of the tank fleet of the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front that participated in the battle. Why did it happen?
Did we really fight so mediocrely? Let's put aside the answer to this question for now and consider the second battle - the famous battle of Prokhorovka station . It took place in July 1943 on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. According to the plan of the German command, it was supposed to “cut off” the Kursk ledge with a simultaneous attack from the north and south.
Large forces were concentrated for this operation, and the southern group was more numerous and also included, in addition to the 48th Panzer Corps and the Greater Germany division, which in themselves represented a formidable force, also the elite 2nd SS tank corps, as well as a special battalion of new Pz V “Panther” tanks, which did not participate in the battle of Prokhorovka.
During the offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, the German tank group managed to wedge itself into the location of Soviet troops to a depth of more than 30 km. Realizing that the Germans were about to break through, the Soviet command brought the reserve 5th Guards Tank Army into battle. Near the Prokhorovka station, German and Soviet vehicles entered into the largest oncoming tank battle in history. More than 800 tanks took part in it on both sides. This time the Red Army also had a numerical advantage, but was greatly inferior in the quality of equipment.
German tanks were much stronger: the Germans modified the old models, equipped them with better armor and weapons (replacing short-barreled guns with long-barreled ones, as in the Pz IV G and F2 series tanks), additional armor plates (Pz III L), equipped with cumulative shells and used them in battle A miracle of technology at that time was the Pz VI “Tiger” tank, which not only had almost impenetrable frontal armor (more than 10 cm), but also an 88 mm caliber gun that penetrated any type of tank armor of that time.
However, the battle ended with a turning point victory for the Soviet troops and a large-scale offensive that ended with the capture of Berlin. So why such a difference in results? Why, being in more favorable conditions, did we lose, but in an equal confrontation we emerged victorious?
The fact is that at the beginning of the war, Soviet troops had to face a powerful enemy, who built their victories on discipline, training and interaction of all branches of the military. By 1943, our troops had adopted all the best aspects of the German military machine and developed them, learned to conduct reconnaissance, maneuver, use tactical tricks and calculate the enemy’s actions in advance.
And when all this was combined with the heroic fighting spirit of our soldiers, the Red Army became truly invincible. Technology, of course, plays an important role in combat operations. But we won that war thanks to a combination of technology, tactics and heroism of our soldiers and officers who fought for the Motherland.
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Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody (1941)
In the first days of the war, a large-scale tank battle took place in Western Ukraine. The most powerful group of the Wehrmacht, “Center,” was advancing to the north, to Minsk and further to Moscow. The not so strong Army Group South was advancing on Kyiv. But in this direction there was the most powerful group of the Red Army - the Southwestern Front. Already on the evening of June 22, the troops of this front received orders to encircle and destroy the advancing enemy group with powerful concentric attacks from mechanized corps, and by the end of June 24 to capture the Lublin region (Poland). It sounds fantastic, but this is if you don’t know the strength of the parties: 3,128 Soviet and 728 German tanks fought in a gigantic oncoming tank battle. The battle lasted a week: from June 23 to 30. The actions of the mechanized corps were reduced to isolated counterattacks in different directions. The German command, through competent leadership, was able to repel a counterattack and defeat the armies of the Southwestern Front. The defeat was complete: Soviet troops lost 2,648 tanks (85%), the Germans lost about 260 vehicles.
Losing is the key to victory. The largest tank battle of the first days of the war
It is no secret that the science of history sometimes turns into a kind of political instrument.
And therefore, sometimes, through strange social manipulations, the significance of important historical episodes is significantly underestimated and even leveled out. And, on the contrary, from insignificant events, experienced social engineers are able to inflate a grandiose bubble of significance, extolling to the skies a fairly minor historical fact in favor of one or another political interest. For example, many Russians - Soviet and even post-Soviet upbringing - are quite sincerely confident that the largest tank battle in history took place near Prokhorovka as an episode of the battle on the Kursk Bulge between armored units of the German and Soviet armies.
However, for the sake of objectivity, it should be recalled that the grandest tank mega-battle took place during the Great Patriotic War two years earlier and much to the west of the Kursk Bulge: on the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody section, where a total of almost 4.5 thousand armored vehicles fought in an armored mortal battle for a week .
Tank counterattack June 23, 1941
In fact, the start of the battle on the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody line, which historians also call the Battle of Dubno, was the second day of the Great Patriotic War - June 23, 1941.
It was on that day that the mechanized corps of the Red Army of the Kyiv Military District carried out their famous grandiose counterattack against the advancing German troops, which not only broke the enemy’s plans, but also significantly influenced the entire course of that war.
The idea of the counteroffensive belongs to the representative of the Supreme High Command, Georgy Zhukov. He insisted on it.
The very first to strike the flanks of Army Group South were the first-echelon mechanized corps - the 4th, 15th and 22nd. Then the second echelon of the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps entered the battle.
The Soviet command strategically correctly planned a strike on the extremities of the German 1st Panzer Group, which was part of Army Group South aimed at Kyiv, as well as its encirclement and destruction.
The prerequisite for believing in the success of the implementation of this plan were reports from the first day of the war that some Soviet divisions stopped superior enemy detachments (for example, the 87th division of Major General Philip Fedorovich Alyabushev, which by the end of the day on June 22 threw back the fascist troops by 6 –10 km west of Vladimir-Volynsky).
Plus, the Red Army troops had an impressive advantage in armored vehicles on this particular section of the front.
Indeed, at that time, among the Soviet military districts, Kiev was the most powerful. Therefore, in the event of a treacherous attack by the enemy, in fact, first of all, they counted on him as the organizer of the main and decisive retaliatory strike of the Red Army.
Therefore, as a priority, equipment was sent there in significant quantities, and the training and education of troops was organized there at a high level.
According to reports, the troops of this district (at that time of the Southwestern Front) had a total of 3,695 tanks. At that time, the enemy had approximately 800 self-propelled guns and tanks involved in the offensive, which was almost five (4.6) times less.
However, almost such a poorly prepared and hasty order for a counteroffensive turned into the largest tank battle that the Red Army troops lost.
Tanks against tanks?
So, tank formations of the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps went to the front line on June 23, 1941 and began a counter battle right from the march.
Thus began the first grandiose tank battle in the Great Patriotic War. This battle was unique and here's why.
Military historians emphasize that the concept of war in the mid-twentieth century itself did not provide for this kind of battle. At that time, it was generally accepted that tanks were a tool for breaking through enemy defenses, and also contributed to creating a situation of chaos on enemy communications.
The postulate generally recognized by military experts, which was an axiom for the armies of that period, was formulated quite straightforwardly:
"Tanks don't fight tanks."
Then it was believed that anti-tank artillery, as well as thoroughly entrenched infantry, should fight against tanks. So, the battle of Dubno once and for all broke and tore to smithereens all these theoretical calculations. Here tank companies and battalions of the Red Army clashed with German armored vehicles head-on.
And they lost. According to military analysts, for two reasons.
The first reason was the significantly different level of communication, coordination and management. The Germans were much more advanced in this regard: they more effectively used the capabilities of both communication and coordination between military branches, experts say.
In the Battle of Brody, the lag in this parameter led to the fact that the tanks of the Red Army actually fought without support, haphazardly and headlong.
Infantry units simply did not have time to provide support to tanks against artillery, since foot riflemen simply could not catch up with armored vehicles. It is reported that tank formations (above a battalion) fought in virtually the absence of any systemic coordination, that is, in isolation and in isolation from each other.
It even happened that in the same place a mechanized corps broke through into the depths of the German formations, that is, to the west, and the one located nearby (instead of supporting the attack of the first) unexpectedly moved on to abandon its occupied position and began to retreat to the east.
Battle of Dubno. T-34 is on fire. Source: bild.bundesarchiv.de
Harmful concept
The second reason for the defeat in the battle of Dubno is the above concept.
Let us repeat, our troops were not ready to fight tanks due to the widespread paradigm at that time that “tanks do not fight tanks.” Most of the tanks that took part in that battle on the Soviet side were created either in the early or mid-thirties. These were mainly light tanks for direct infantry support.
To be more precise, experts indicate that by June 22, 1941, 5 mechanized corps (8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd) had a total of 2,803 armored vehicles deployed. This is 171 (6.1%) medium tank (T-34). 217 (7.7%) - heavy tanks (KV-2 - 33, KV-1 - 136 and T-35 - 48). That is, the total of medium and heavy tanks at that time in these formations was 13.8%. The rest (or 86.2%), that is, the overwhelming majority, were light tanks. It was light tanks that were considered the most modern and in demand at that time. There were 2415 of them (these are T-26, T-27, T-37, T-38, BT-5, BT-7).
It is also reported that the 4th mechanized corps participating in the battle a little west of Brody then had almost 900 tanks (892 units), but slightly more than half of them were modern (53%). There were 89 KV-1s. or 10%, but T-34 - 327 units. (37%).
Our light tanks, in view of the tasks assigned to them, had bulletproof and anti-fragmentation armor. Undoubtedly, such armored vehicles were perfectly suited for a variety of actions behind enemy lines and on enemy communications. However, they were much less suitable for breaking through enemy defenses.
German armored vehicles were weaker than ours in both armament and quality, but the Wehrmacht took into account both the weak and strong sides of its tanks and preferred to use them in defense. This tactic reduced to almost zero all the existing technical advantages and superiority of the Red Army tanks.
In addition, Hitler’s field artillery played an important role in the battle of Dubno. It is known that for the KV and T-34 this is for the most part not dangerous, but for light tanks it was very sensitive.
What can we say about the fascists’ 88-mm anti-aircraft guns then firing at direct fire? Only our heavy vehicles could resist them: T-35 and KV. But light Soviet tanks are not. This not only stopped them. Reports indicate that they
“as a result of being hit by anti-aircraft shells, they were partially destroyed.”
And if you consider that the Germans used more than just anti-aircraft guns against us in this sector of anti-tank defense...
Loss as a prologue to victory
No matter what analysts think, the tankers of the Red Army fought in their, albeit not ideal, armored vehicles, in those first days desperately and even won battles.
Of course, since there was no protection from the sky, enemy planes destroyed up to half of the column right on the march. Alas, their low-power armor could be penetrated by a heavy machine gun. And in the absence of radio communication, our fighters went into battle, as they say, at their own peril and risk. It was in these conditions that ours fought and even achieved their goals.
When the counteroffensive began, the first two days the advantage constantly passed to one side, then to the other. And by the fourth day, the Red Army tankers, even taking into account all the difficulties they had, were able to achieve significant success. In a number of battles they managed to drive away the Nazis 25 or 35 kilometers.
Moreover, by the evening of June 26, 1941, our tankers even managed to drive the Germans out of the city of Dubno, and the Fritz had to flee and retreat. Now it’s to the east.
Destroyed German tank PzKpfw II. Source: waralbum.ru
Nevertheless, the superiority of the Germans in infantry formations, and at that time tankers could do without them almost only in raids in the rear, had an effect. On the fifth day of the battle, by the end of the day, the Soviet advanced detachments of the mechanized corps were simply completely eliminated. Some of the formations found themselves surrounded and went on the defensive in all directions. And tank detachments began to experience shortages of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and combat-ready armored vehicles. Sometimes, when retreating, our tank crews were forced, due to their haste, to leave, as they say, entire tanks to the enemy.
Now sometimes voices are heard that, if at that time the front command had not ordered a transition to defense (although Georgy Zhukov’s order was for an offensive), then supposedly in this case, our people would have fought back and driven the Germans from Dubno to the west.
Alas, the opinion of competent experts is that they would not have gone ahead.
That summer, Hitler’s army had an advantage - German tank formations had extensive experience in real interaction with various military groups and fought more actively.
However, the most important significance of the battle of Dubno was the disruption of Hitler’s Barbarossa plan.
After all, in fact, it was our tank counterattack that forced the leadership of the German army to recall and use in battle those very reserves from Army Group Center that the Nazis planned to use precisely during the attack on Moscow.
And it was precisely this very direction - to Kyiv, from that very battle that became paramount for the Wehrmacht.
All of the above was not at all part of Hitler’s plans. This all ruined the harmonious and well-thought-out scheme of “Barbarossa”. And all the Fritz’s dreams of a blitzkrieg were crushed so much that the pace of the German offensive itself slowed down to the extreme, so that it was time to call them catastrophic.
Despite the fact that the Red Army faced a very difficult autumn and winter of 1941 at that time, the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War had already played its gigantic role.
Experts are confident that in the battles of both Kursk and Orel, it was this battle near Dubno that echoed powerfully. And in the Salute on Victory Day, the echoes of this most significant tank battle from the very first days of the Great Patriotic War echoed loudly.
Battle of El Alamein (1942)
The Battle of El Alamein is a key episode of the Anglo-German confrontation in North Africa. The Germans sought to cut the Allies' most important strategic highway, the Suez Canal, and were eager for the Middle Eastern oil that the Axis countries needed. The main battle of the entire campaign took place at El Alamein. As part of this battle, one of the largest tank battles in World War II took place. The Italo-German force numbered about 500 tanks, half of which were rather weak Italian tanks. The British armored units had over 1000 tanks, among which were powerful American tanks - 170 Grants and 250 Shermans. The qualitative and quantitative superiority of the British was partly compensated by the military genius of the commander of the Italian-German troops, the famous “desert fox” Rommel. Despite the British numerical superiority in manpower, tanks and aircraft, the British were never able to break through Rommel's defenses. The Germans even managed to counterattack, but the British superiority in numbers was so impressive that the German strike force of 90 tanks was simply destroyed in the oncoming battle. Rommel, inferior to the enemy in armored vehicles, made extensive use of anti-tank artillery, among which were captured Soviet 76-mm guns, which had proven themselves to be excellent. Only under the pressure of the enemy’s enormous numerical superiority, having lost almost all of its equipment, did the German army begin an organized retreat. After El Alamein, the Germans had just over 30 tanks left. The total losses of the Italo-German troops in equipment amounted to 320 tanks. The losses of the British tank forces amounted to approximately 500 vehicles, many of which were repaired and returned to service, since the battlefield was ultimately theirs. ×
Death March. Tank battle in the Dubno-Brody area
Destroyed T-26 tanks of various modifications from the 19th Tank Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps on the Voinitsa – Lutsk highway.
June 24, 1941 The tank battle in the Dubno-Brody area became one of the largest during the Great Patriotic War. However, it did not gain as much popularity as the Battle of Kursk. The battle involved 5 mechanized corps of the Soviet Southwestern Front and the German 1st Tank Group.
The mechanized corps entered the battle separately, in parts, at different times, were defeated and suffered huge losses. However, Soviet mobile units were able to delay the enemy, who was unable to break through to Kyiv on the move, which made it possible to avoid encirclement of the three armies of the Southwestern Front (SWF) in the Lvov direction.
This became one of the prerequisites for the breakdown of Hitler's blitzkrieg.
General situation
On June 22, 1941, the war and the offensive of the German Army Group South began.
The Germans delivered the main blow in the Sokal-Ustilug section. The Nazis, overcoming the heroic resistance of border guards, bunker garrisons and suitable rifle formations of our armies, quickly developed an offensive.
Soviet rifle divisions marching to the border came under attack from German aviation, artillery and ground forces. The divisions marched in dense columns, which initially made it possible to repel enemy attacks. But the divisions’ flanks were open, and the Germans had a numerical and qualitative advantage, which meant outflanking and encircling the enemy.
In addition, in the afternoon the Germans began to introduce mobile formations into battle. Therefore, already on the first day of the war, the regiments of the 87th and 124th rifle divisions of Potapov’s 5th Army faced the threat of encirclement.
The German 4th Air Fleet bombed Soviet airfields. In comparison with other border districts, air divisions located in Ukraine offered the greatest resistance to the German Air Force.
This was due to several factors.
Firstly, the balance of forces between the German and Soviet air forces was the best.
Secondly, the command of the Soviet Air Force of the district, represented by E. S. Ptukhin, paid a lot of attention to camouflaging airfields.
Thirdly, the air force base system of the Kyiv Military District was echeloned to a great depth, and not all air force bases came under attack by the Luftwaffe on the first day of the war.
It was mainly the air divisions that were located directly near the border that came under attack. The problem was that the Germans knew all our airfields, and most air units did not have alternate landing sites.
In addition, in the spring the construction of new concrete strips began, and by the beginning of the war, a significant part of the airfields could not receive aircraft. Therefore, the destruction of Soviet aircraft on the ground was a matter of time. The Germans had the initiative and acted methodically. The first blow, the second, the third and so on until the bitter end.
As a result, the Germans broke through the front at the junction of the 5th and 6th Soviet armies.
German tanks were moving in the direction of Radekhov (Radzekhov) and Berestechko.
Soviet intelligence at this time underestimated the enemy's forces in the Lvov-Dubna direction.
In particular, the appearance of the 11th Panzer Division was not noticed on the first day.
And in auxiliary directions, where the enemy did not have much superiority, there were even successes for our troops. The Soviet command at this time tried to stop and defeat the enemy with the help of counterattacks.
On the evening of June 22, Directive No. 3 arrived, it noted that the enemy “having suffered heavy losses, achieved little success,” and ordered a decisive offensive. The General Staff decided to encircle and defeat the main enemy strike force in the south with strikes in the Lublin direction. It was then possible to provide assistance to the Western Front by threatening the right wing of Army Group Center. The operation was to involve two armies and mobile formations of the Southwestern Front, supported by aviation.
At the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, where they assessed the situation more soberly, they realized that a large-scale encirclement operation with access to Lublin was impossible.
Therefore, they decided to launch two counterattacks with the aim not of encircling, but of defeating the main enemy forces in this direction. On the left flank, from the Radekhov - Rava-Russkaya line to Krasnostav, three mechanized corps (15th, 4th and 8th) were to advance; on the right, from the Verba - Vladimir-Volynsky area to Krasnostav, one corps (22nd ).
On the evening of July 22, a representative of the Headquarters, G.K. Zhukov, arrived at the front headquarters. He approved the plans adopted by the front commander M.P. Kirponos.
In general, as historian A. Isaev notes (“From Dubno to Rostov.” M., 2004), the decision was reasonable. Mobile formations of the front are advanced towards the direction of the enemy's main attack in order to put pressure on the flanks and the tip of the enemy wedge.
The problem was that the Germans did not stand still, the initiative was in their hands, they had more experience.
Our mobile formations were newly formed, “raw”, with a lack of command personnel, personnel, new tanks, anti-tank and air defense equipment, etc.
German soldiers inspect the Soviet command (radio) tank T-26, knocked out on the Vladimir-Volynsky - Lutsk highway. In the background, on the side of the road, a damaged BA-10 armored car, a T-26 tank with a conical turret and another BA-10 are visible. Soviet equipment from the 19th Tank Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps
A German soldier-traffic controller directs the movement of a convoy on the street of the city of Lutsk, standing next to the destroyed Soviet BT-7 light tanks.
Strengths of the parties
On the Wehrmacht side, at the forefront of the attack was Kleist's 1st Panzer Group: 3rd, 14th and 48th Motorized Corps (5 tank and 4 motorized divisions), 29th Army Corps), 6th and 17th Infantry Divisions th field armies.
According to various estimates, the strike group consisted of more than 720 to 800 tanks. At the same time, some of the tanks were command tanks (without serious weapons) and light T-1 and T-2 tanks with 20-mm cannons and machine guns.
The Southwestern Front (formerly the Kiev Special Military District) was the most powerful in the western direction.
Of the 20 Soviet mechanized corps, 8 were located here. 5 mechanized corps took part in the battle: the 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, 22nd and 8th tank divisions of the 4th corps, rifle corps of the 5th 1st and 6th armies.
According to various sources, the mechanized corps were armed with from 3.4 to 3.6 thousand tanks. However, a significant part of the combat vehicles were BT and T-26 light tanks. The corps also had more than 400 heavy KV and medium T-34s, the appearance of which was an unpleasant surprise for the Germans. These Soviet tanks were superior to German models. However, the Germans were able to fend off the threat with artillery, including 88 mm anti-aircraft guns.
It is worth noting that for the most part, Soviet tank crews, compared to German ones, had no experience of such battles. In connection with the process of reform and modernization, the creation of mechanized corps, training was minimal. There was no high-quality standard radio communication between tank groups and individual vehicles, and there was either no or a shortage of armor-piercing shells.
The motor resources of a significant part of the equipment were running out, they simply broke down on the march. The command made a number of mistakes, which worsened the position of the Soviet mobile formations.
A damaged Soviet T-26 tank and a dead Red Army soldier on the street in Dubno
Death March
It was especially difficult for the mechanized corps of the 5th Army, which had a great lack of vehicles.
Maneuvering mobile units was difficult even in peacetime, and during war the situation worsened sharply. These are columns of tanks, armored vehicles, cars, tractors and motorcycles stretching for tens of kilometers. The scorching sun, traffic jams and inevitable accidents in the hustle and bustle. Broken and lagging transport. Carts, horses, cattle and masses of refugees.
The columns were easy targets for enemy aircraft. It was difficult to knock out tanks from the air. But the Germans were smashing the rear with all their might. Trucks carrying ammunition and fuel were burning. Also, Luftwaffe raids reduced the speed of movement. The command “Air!”, and the car drivers run away. Then you need to clear out the rubble of debris and burning cars. The engine life of many tanks was running out and they had to be left at bases along the way. A fuel shortage quickly developed.
The strongest mechanized corps of the front, the 4th Corps of Andrei Vlasov (at that time he was one of the most promising commanders of the Red Army), was stationed in the Lvov area.
The corps included the 8th, 32nd tank and 81st motorized divisions. The corps consisted of 28 thousand people and was best equipped with equipment - 979 tanks (including more than 400 T-34 and KV-1), 175 armored vehicles, more than 180 guns and mortars.
The corps was part of the 6th Army of Ivan Muzychenko, and from June 22 they began to use it piecemeal in defensive battles. The army commander used the mobile formation to strengthen the army's defense, although there was nothing catastrophic in its zone. On June 24, Fotchenkov's 8th Tank Division was allocated to participate in a counterattack against the enemy. She was sent to cooperate near Radekhov with the 15th Mechanized Corps.
The 8th mechanized corps of General Dmitry Ryabyshev (12th, 34th tank and 7th motorized divisions) from the Stryi, Drohobych area through Lviv was advanced to the Brody area in order, together with the 15th corps, to strike the 46th the enemy's motorized corps (11th and 16th tank divisions), which was advancing on Dubno.
Ryabyshev's corps (Don Cossacks who fought in the First World War and the Civil War) consisted of more than 30 thousand people, 932 tanks and 172 armored cars. The almost 500-kilometer march was difficult, along congested roads, under bombing. Therefore, it was completed only after noon on June 25. The corps along the way lost almost half of its equipment due to breakdowns and lack of fuel.
In general, if the front had remained in place, this equipment could have been returned to service. But during the retreat it was lost.
As noted in A. Drabkin’s work “I Fought on a T-34”:
“For T-34 tanks in 1941, a 500-kilometer march would have been almost fatal. In June 1941, the 8th Mechanized Corps under the command of D.I. Ryabyshev, after such a march from its permanent deployment sites to the Dubno area, lost almost half of its equipment on the road due to breakdowns.”
Soviet light tank BT-5, damaged and burned in Dubno.
Soviet medium tank T-34 with L-11 cannon, manufactured in October 1940, knocked out near the road near the south-eastern entrance to Dubno. The vehicle belonged to the 12th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps. According to the autograph on the right side, the tank was hit by soldiers of the 111th Infantry Division and the Hermann Goering regiment.
First fights
The 15th mechanized corps of Ignatius Carpezo (10th, 37th tank and 212th motorized divisions) was located in the Brody area.
It consisted of over 33 thousand people, more than 730 tanks (including about 130 T-34 and KV) and 150 armored vehicles. On June 23, the corps, without the 212th division left to defend Brod, was advanced to Radekhov.
On June 22, the advance detachment of the 10th Panzer Division (one tank and one motorized rifle battalion) occupied the settlement. In the morning, troops of the German 11th Panzer Division arrived. A battle ensued that lasted until mid-day. For the first time, German tank crews felt the impact of the 76-mm guns of T-34 tanks.
But the forces were unequal, and ammunition began to run out. Ours retreated, the Germans occupied Radzekhov.
Developing an attack on Berestechko, the Germans ran into a combined T-34 detachment.
Non-commissioned officer of the 11th Panzer Division, later historiographer of the formation, Gustav Schrodek recalled:
“Our hearts clench: fear, horror, but perhaps also joy, because finally we can show ourselves. Did they see us? Do they accept us as their own? Our forces are equal... And as soon as they approach a distance of about 100 m from our guns, the “dance” begins. We send them the first shell. Rumm-mm! First hit in the tower. Second shot and another hit. The lead tank, which I hit, calmly continues its movement. The same goes for my platoon comrades. But where is the superiority of our tanks over Russian tanks, which has been proclaimed for so long?! We were always told that all we had to do was “spit” from our guns!”
At 15:00 Radekhov was attacked by the 20th tank and 10th motorized rifle regiments of the 10th tank division. All other parts of the corps were still on the march. And the 37th Division, which was already reaching the battlefield, turned in the other direction, towards Adam, because of rumors that enemy tanks had appeared there.
The chaos was caused by Corps Commander Carpezo himself. It is clear that part of the 10th division, without artillery, was unable to recapture Radekhov.
The Germans had against our T-34s several dozen howitzers of 105–150 mm caliber, firing from closed positions, guns from 50 mm anti-tank guns to 88 mm anti-aircraft guns.
The 22nd mechanized corps of Semyon Kondrusev (19th and 41st tank, 215th motorized divisions) consisted of 24 thousand people, 650–700 tanks, 50–80 armored vehicles. Most of the vehicles were light BTs and T-26s. The corps was in the process of formation and was “raw”. Due to the lack of command personnel and equipment, some units were not combat ready. The corps marched more than 200 km north of the city of Rivne.
On June 24, the 19th and 215th divisions began an offensive north of the Vladimir-Volynsky - Lutsk highway. Semenchenko's 19th Tank Division, which consisted of only light tanks (according to various sources, approximately 160–225 vehicles), lost a significant part of its tanks during the march due to bomb attacks and breakdowns. Then it ran into the anti-tank defenses of the German 14th Panzer Division in the area of the villages of Voinitsa and Alexandria. The division lost most of its vehicles. Kondrusev was killed and Semenchenko was wounded.
The remnants of the Soviet troops retreated to Rivne.
The 41st Tank Division of the 22nd Corps did not participate in this battle. She received the task of going to the Kovel area. On the way, she came under fire, got stuck in a swampy area, then retreated to the river line. Stokhod.
The 9th mechanized corps of Konstantin Rokossovsky (20th and 35th tank, 131st motorized divisions) consisted of about 300 light tanks T-26, BT and T-37/38, 70 armored vehicles. At the start of the war, the corps was stationed in the area of Novograd-Volynsky, 200–250 km from the border.
On June 24–25, the 131st Motorized Division took up defensive positions in the Lutsk area. The division was reinforced by a motorcycle regiment of the 22nd Mechanized Corps and two artillery battalions of the 19th Tank Division of the same corps.
On the 26th, Rokossovsky’s troops fought heavy battles in the Lutsk area with units of the German 13th Panzer Division. The Germans took Lutsk and tried to break through to Rivne.
The 19th mechanized corps of Nikolai Feklenko (from the 40th and 43rd tank and 213th motorized divisions) consisted of 22 thousand people (about 2/3 of the staff), about 450 tanks and 26 armored vehicles. The corps headquarters was located in Berdichev.
On the evening of June 22, the corps began moving and was aimed at the Dubna direction. Feklenko's corps, together with Rokossovsky's 9th corps, was supposed to defeat the enemy in the Mlynov and Dubno area. The units moved to the Rivne region under attacks from German aircraft.
On the morning of June 25, the leading elements of the 40th Division entered into battle with the 11th German Panzer Division.
German soldiers look at the Soviet T-34 medium tank of the 1940 model with the L-11 cannon from the 12th Panzer Division, abandoned in the Dubno area.
German soldiers inspect a Soviet T-34-76 tank captured on the streets of Dubno.
To be continued…
Battle of Prokhorovka (1943)
The tank battle near Prokhorovka took place on July 12, 1943 as part of the Battle of Kursk. According to official Soviet data, 800 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns and 700 German ones took part in it on both sides. The Germans lost 350 units of armored vehicles, ours - 300. But the trick is that the Soviet tanks that took part in the battle were counted, and the German ones were those that were generally in the entire German group on the southern flank of the Kursk Bulge. According to new, updated data, 311 German tanks and self-propelled guns of the 2nd SS Tank Corps took part in the tank battle near Prokhorovka against 597 Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army (commander Rotmistrov). The SS lost about 70 (22%), and the guards lost 343 (57%) armored vehicles. Neither side managed to achieve its goals: the Germans failed to break through the Soviet defenses and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group. A government commission was created to investigate the reasons for the large losses of Soviet tanks. The commission's report called the military actions of Soviet troops near Prokhorovka "an example of an unsuccessful operation." General Rotmistrov was going to be put on trial, but by that time the general situation had developed favorably, and everything worked out.
IllustrationsThe leadership of the Ukrainian SSR at the May Day parade in Kyiv. From left to right: 1st Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine N. S. Khrushchev, Commander of the Kyiv Special Military District, Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel General M. P. Kirponos, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR M. S. Grechukha. May 1, 1941
Member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, Corps Commissar N. N. Vashugin. Committed suicide on June 28, 1941
Commander of the 8th Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General D.I. Ryabyshev. Photo from 1941
Caponier with a 76.2 mm gun. Similar engineering structures were installed on the Stalin Line. Even more advanced structures were built in Western Ukraine in the Molotov Line fortification system. USSR, summer 1941
A German specialist examines a captured Soviet flamethrower tank XT-26. Western Ukraine, June 1941
German tank Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.G (tactical number “721”), advancing through the territory of Western Ukraine. 1st Panzer Group Kleist, June 1941
Soviet tank T-34-76 of early series destroyed by the Germans. This vehicle was produced in 1940 and was equipped with a 76.2 mm L-11 cannon. Western Ukraine, June 1941
Vehicles of the 670th tank destroyer division during the march. Army Group South. June 1941
At the field kitchen of the 9th Mechanized Corps of the Red Army under the command of Sergeant Major V.M. Shuledimov. From left to right: foreman V. M. Shuledimov, cook V. M. Gritsenko, bread cutter D. P. Maslov, driver I. P. Levshin. Under enemy fire and bullets, the kitchen continued to operate and delivered food to the tankers in a timely manner. Southwestern Front, June 1941
Abandoned during the retreat of the T-35 from the 8th Mechanized Corps of the Red Army. Southwestern Front, June 1941
A German medium tank Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.J, knocked out and abandoned by its crew. Four-digit tactical number: “1013.” Army Group South, May 1942
Before the attack. The commander of the 23rd Tank Corps, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General E. Pushkin and regimental commissar I. Belogolovikov set tasks for the units of the formation. Southwestern Front, May 1942
A column of ZiS-5 model trucks (registration number of the vehicle in the foreground is “A-6-94-70”) is carrying ammunition to the front line. Southern Front, May 1942
Heavy tank KV from the 6th Guards Tank Brigade. The commander of the vehicle, political instructor Chernov, and his crew knocked out 9 German tanks. On the KV tower there is the inscription “For the Motherland.” Southwestern Front, May 1942
Medium tank Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.J, knocked out by our troops. Spare track tracks, suspended at the front of the vehicle, also served to strengthen the frontal armor. Army Group South, May 1942
An improvised OP, set up under the cover of a destroyed German Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf.H/J tank. The symbols of the tank battalion and communications platoon are visible on the wing of the tank. Southwestern Front, May 1942
The commander of the troops of the South-Western direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, is one of the main organizers of the Kharkov offensive operation of the Soviet troops in May 1942. Photo portrait 1940–1941
Commander of the German Army Group South (during the battles near Kharkov), Field Marshal von Bock
Abandoned American-made M3 medium tanks (M3 General Lee) from the 114th Tank Brigade of the Consolidated Tank Corps. The tactical numbers “136” and “147” are visible on the turrets. Southern Front, May-June 1942
Infantry support tank MK II "Matilda II", abandoned by the crew due to damage to the chassis. The registration number of the tank is “WD No. T-17761”, the tactical number is “8-P”. Southwestern Front, 22nd Tank Corps, May 1942
Stalingrad "thirty-four" shot down by the enemy. A triangle and the letters “SUV” are visible on the tower. Southwestern Front, May 1942
Abandoned during the retreat was a BM-13 installation based on the STZ-5 NATI tracked high-speed tractor from the 5th Guards Rocket Artillery Regiment. The car number is “M-6-20-97”. South-Western direction, end of May 1942
Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, who led the troops of the Bryansk Front from April to July 1942. Photo from 1942
Assembly of T-34–76 tanks at Uralvagonzavod. Judging by the technological features of the combat vehicles, the photograph was taken in April-May 1942. This modification of the "thirty-four" was first used en masse in battles as part of the tank corps of the Red Army on the Bryansk Front in the summer of 1942
The StuG III Ausf.F assault gun changes its firing position. The self-propelled gun has camouflage in the form of yellow streaks applied to the base gray paint, and a white number “274”. Army group "Weichs", motorized division "Grossdeutschland", summer 1942
The command of the 1st Grenadier Regiment of the motorized division "Gross Germany" at a field meeting. Army Group "Weichs", June-July 1942
The crew of a 152-mm ML-20 gun-howitzer, model 1937, fires at German positions. Bryansk Front, July 1942
A group of Soviet commanders monitors the situation from an OP located in one of the houses in Voronezh, July 1942
The crew of the KV heavy tank, on alert, takes their seats in their combat vehicle. Bryansk Front, June-July 1942
The new commander of the 40th Army defending Voronezh, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov at the command telegraph. On the right is the “bodist” of the guard, Corporal P. Mironova, summer 1942
The command of the 5th Tank Army before the start of hostilities. From left to right: the commander of the 11th Tank Corps, Major General A.F. Popov, the commander of the 5th Tank Army, Major General A.I. Lizyukov, the head of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army, Lieutenant General Ya. N. Fedorenko and regimental commissar E S. Usachev. Bryansk Front, July 1942
The T-34–76 tank, released at the beginning of the summer, is moving to the line for an attack. Bryansk Front, presumably the 25th Tank Corps, summer 1942
The Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.F2 medium tank and the StuG III Ausf.F assault gun attack Soviet positions. Voronezh region, July 1942
A BM-8-24 rocket launcher abandoned during the retreat of Soviet troops on the chassis of a T-60 tank. Similar systems were part of the guards mortar divisions of the Red Army tank corps. Voronezh Front, July 1942
The commander of Panzer Army Africa, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (right), awards the Knight's Cross to grenadier Günter Halm from the 104th Panzergrenadier Regiment of the 15th Panzer Division. North Africa, summer 1942
British military leadership in North Africa: on the left is Full General Alexander, on the right is Lieutenant General Montgomery. The photo was taken in mid-1942
British tank crews unpack armored vehicles that arrived from the United States. The picture shows a 105 mm M7 Priest self-propelled howitzer. North Africa, autumn 1942
American-made M4A1 Sherman medium tank awaiting the start of a counterattack. North Africa, 8th Army, 30th Army Corps, 10th Armored Division, 1942–1943
Field artillery of the 10th Tank Division is on the march. A Canadian-made Ford four-wheel drive tractor tows a 94 mm (25 pound) howitzer gun. North Africa, October 1942
The crew rolls a 57-mm anti-tank gun into position. This is the British version of the "six pounder". North Africa, November 2, 1942
The Scorpion minesweeper tank, created on the basis of the obsolete Matilda II tank. North Africa, 8th Army, autumn 1942
On November 4, 1942, General of the Wehrmacht Panzer Forces Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma (in the foreground) was captured by British troops. The picture shows him being taken for questioning at Montgomery's headquarters. North Africa, 8th Army, autumn 1942
A 50-mm German Pak 38 cannon left in position. For camouflage, it is covered with a special net. North Africa, November 1942
An Italian 75-mm self-propelled gun, Semovente da 75/18, abandoned during the retreat of the Axis troops. In order to increase armor protection, the self-propelled gun cabin is lined with tracks and sandbags. North Africa, November 1942
The commander of the 8th Army, General Montgomery (right), surveys the battlefield from the turret of his M3 Grant command tank. North Africa, autumn 1942
Heavy tanks MK IV "Churchill III", received by the 8th Army for testing in desert conditions. They were armed with a 57 mm cannon. North Africa, autumn 1942
Prokhorovsky direction. In the photo: Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov - commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army (left) and Lieutenant General A.C. Zhadov - commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army (right). Voronezh Front, July 1943
Operational group of the 5th Guards Tank Army. Voronezh Front, Prokhorov direction, July 1943
Scout motorcyclists at the starting position for the march. Voronezh Front, forward unit of the 170th Tank Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, July 1943
The Komsomol crew of the Guard Lieutenant I.P. Kalyuzhny studying the terrain of the upcoming offensive. In the background you can see the T-34-76 tank with the individual name “Komsomolets of Transbaikalia”. Voronezh Front, July 1943
On the march, the advanced unit of the 5th Guards Tank Army is scouts in BA-64 armored vehicles. Voronezh Front, July 1943
Self-propelled gun SU-122 in the area of the Prokhorovsky bridgehead. Most likely the artillery self-propelled gun belongs to the 1446th self-propelled artillery regiment. Voronezh Front, July 1943
Soldiers of a tank-destroying motorized unit (on Willys with anti-tank rifles and 45-mm cannons) awaiting the start of the attack. Voronezh Front, July 1943
SS "Tigers" before the attack on Prokhorovka. Army Group South, July 11, 1943
A half-track Sd.Kfz.10 with the tactical designations of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Reich" moves past a damaged British-made Soviet tank MK IV "Churchill IV". Most likely this heavy vehicle belonged to the 36th Guards Breakthrough Tank Regiment. Army Group South, July 1943
A StuG III self-propelled gun from the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" knocked out by our troops. Army Group South, July 1943
German repairmen are trying to restore an overturned Pz.Kpfw.III tank from the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Reich". Army Group South, July 1943
150-mm (actually 149.7-mm) self-propelled Hummel guns from the 73rd artillery regiment of the 1st Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht at firing positions in one of the Hungarian villages. March 1945
The SwS tractor is towing an 88-mm heavy anti-tank gun Pak 43/41, which was nicknamed “Barn Gate” by German soldiers due to its clumsiness. Hungary, early 1945
Commander of the 6th SS Panzer Army Sepp Dietrich (in the center, hands in pockets) during the celebration of awarding the l/s 12 TD "Hitler Youth" with Reich awards. November 1944
Panther tanks Pz.Kpfw.V from the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend" are advancing to the front line. Hungary, March 1945
Infrared 600-mm searchlight "Filin" ("Uhu"), mounted on an armored personnel carrier Sd.Kfz.251/21. Such vehicles were used in the Panther and StuG III units during night battles, including in the area of Lake Balaton in March 1945
Armored personnel carrier Sd.Kfz.251 with two night vision devices mounted on it: a night sight for firing from a 7.92 mm MG-42 machine gun, a device for night driving in front of the driver’s seat. 1945
The crew of the StuG III assault gun with the tactical number “111” loads ammunition into their combat vehicle. Hungary, 1945
Soviet specialists inspect the destroyed German heavy tank Pz.Kpfw.VI "Royal Tiger". 3rd Ukrainian Front, March 1945
German tank "Panther" Pz.Kpfw.V, hit by a sub-caliber shell. The vehicle has the tactical number "431" and its own name - "Inga". 3rd Ukrainian Front, March 1945
Tank T-34–85 on the march. Our troops are preparing to strike the enemy. 3rd Ukrainian Front, March 1945
Quite a rare photo. A fully combat-ready fighter tank Pz.IV/70(V), belonging to one of the German tank divisions, most likely an army one. A crew member of a combat vehicle poses in the foreground. Army Group South, Hungary, spring 1945
Table of contents
Battle of Dubno: a forgotten feat
When and where did the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually take place?
History, both as a science and as a social instrument, is unfortunately subject to too much political influence. And it often happens that for some reason - most often ideological - some events are extolled, while others are forgotten or remain underestimated. Thus, the overwhelming majority of our compatriots, both those who grew up during the USSR and in post-Soviet Russia, sincerely consider the Battle of Prokhorovka, an integral part of the Battle of Kursk, to be the largest tank battle in history. But in fairness, it is worth noting that the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War actually took place two years earlier and half a thousand kilometers to the west. Within a week, two tank armadas with a total number of about 4,500 armored vehicles converged in the triangle between the cities of Dubno, Lutsk and Brody. Counterattack on the second day of the war
The actual beginning of the Battle of Dubno, which is also called the Battle of Brody or the Battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, was June 23, 1941. It was on this day that the tank corps - at that time they were usually called mechanized - corps of the Red Army, stationed in the Kiev Military District, launched the first serious counterattacks against the advancing German troops. Georgy Zhukov, a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, insisted on counterattacking the Germans. Initially, the attack on the flanks of Army Group South was carried out by the 4th, 15th and 22nd mechanized corps, which were in the first echelon. And after them, the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which advanced from the second echelon, joined the operation.
Strategically, the plan of the Soviet command was correct: to strike the flanks of the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht, which was part of Army Group South and was rushing towards Kyiv in order to encircle and destroy it. In addition, the battles of the first day, when some Soviet divisions - such as the 87th division of Major General Philip Alyabushev - managed to stop the superior forces of the Germans, gave hope that this plan could be realized.
In addition, the Soviet troops in this sector had a significant superiority in tanks. On the eve of the war, the Kiev Special Military District was considered the strongest of the Soviet districts, and in the event of an attack, it was assigned the role of executing the main retaliatory strike. Accordingly, the equipment came here first and in large quantities, and the training of the personnel was the highest. So, on the eve of the counterattack, the troops of the district, which by that time had already become the Southwestern Front, had no less than 3,695 tanks. And on the German side, only about 800 tanks and self-propelled guns went on the offensive - that is, more than four times less.
In practice, an unprepared, hasty decision on an offensive operation resulted in the largest tank battle in which Soviet troops were defeated. Tanks fight tanks for the first time
When the tank units of the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps reached the front line and entered the battle from the march, this resulted in an oncoming tank battle - the first in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Although the concept of wars of the mid-twentieth century did not allow such battles. It was believed that tanks were a tool for breaking through enemy defenses or creating chaos on his communications. “Tanks do not fight tanks” - this is how this principle was formulated, common to all armies of that time. Anti-tank artillery, as well as carefully dug-in infantry, had to fight the tanks. And the battle of Dubno completely broke all the theoretical constructions of the military. Here, Soviet tank companies and battalions went literally head-on into German tanks. And they lost.
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the German troops were much more active and smarter than the Soviet ones, using all types of communications, and the coordination of the efforts of various types and branches of troops in the Wehrmacht at that moment was, unfortunately, head and shoulders above that in the Red Army. In the battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody, these factors led to the fact that Soviet tanks often acted without any support and at random. The infantry simply did not have time to support the tanks, to help them in the fight against anti-tank artillery: the rifle units moved on their own and simply did not catch up with the tanks that had gone ahead. And the tank units themselves, at the level above the battalion, acted without general coordination, on their own. It often happened that one mechanized corps was already rushing west, deep into the German defense, and the other, which could support it, began to regroup or retreat from occupied positions...
Burning T-34 in a field near Dubno.
Source: Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F016221-0015 / CC-BY-SA Contrary to concepts and instructions
The second reason for the mass death of Soviet tanks in the Battle of Dubno, which needs to be mentioned separately, was their unpreparedness for tank combat - a consequence of those same pre-war concepts "Tanks don't fight tanks." Among the tanks of the Soviet mechanized corps that entered the battle of Dubno, light tanks accompanying infantry and raid warfare, created in the early to mid-1930s, were the majority.
More precisely - almost everything. As of June 22, there were 2,803 tanks in five Soviet mechanized corps - the 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th and 22nd. Of these, there are 171 medium tanks (all T-34), 217 heavy tanks (of which 33 KV-2 and 136 KV-1 and 48 T-35), and 2415 light tanks such as T-26, T- 27, T-37, T-38, BT-5 and BT-7, which can be considered the most modern. And the 4th Mechanized Corps, which fought just west of Brody, had another 892 tanks, but exactly half of them were modern - 89 KV-1 and 327 T-34.
Soviet light tanks, due to the specific tasks assigned to them, had bulletproof or anti-fragmentation armor. Light tanks are an excellent tool for deep raids behind enemy lines and operations on his communications, but light tanks are completely unsuited for breaking through defenses. The German command took into account the strengths and weaknesses of armored vehicles and used their tanks, which were inferior to ours in both quality and weapons, in defense, negating all the advantages of Soviet equipment.
German field artillery also had its say in this battle. And if, as a rule, it was not dangerous for the T-34 and KV, then the light tanks had a hard time. And against the Wehrmacht’s 88-mm anti-aircraft guns deployed for direct fire, even the armor of the new “thirty-fours” was powerless. Only the heavy KVs and T-35s resisted them with dignity. The light T-26 and BT, as stated in the reports, “were partially destroyed as a result of being hit by anti-aircraft shells,” and did not simply stop. But the Germans in this direction used not only anti-aircraft guns in anti-tank defense. The defeat that brought victory closer
And yet, Soviet tankers, even with such “inappropriate” vehicles, went into battle - and often won it. Yes, without air cover, which is why German aircraft knocked out almost half of the columns on the march. Yes, with weak armor, which was sometimes penetrated even by heavy machine guns. Yes, without radio communication and at your own peril and risk. But they walked.
They went and got their way. In the first two days of the counteroffensive, the scales fluctuated: first one side, then the other, achieved success. On the fourth day, Soviet tankers, despite all the complicating factors, managed to achieve success, in some areas throwing the enemy back 25-35 kilometers. In the evening of June 26, Soviet tank crews even took the city of Dubno in battle, from which the Germans were forced to retreat... to the east!
Destroyed German tank PzKpfw II. Photo: waralbum.ru
And yet, the Wehrmacht’s advantage in infantry units, without which in that war tankers could only operate fully in rear raids, soon began to take their toll. By the end of the fifth day of the battle, almost all the vanguard units of the Soviet mechanized corps were simply destroyed. Many units were surrounded and were forced to go on the defensive on all fronts. And with each passing hour, the tankers increasingly lacked serviceable vehicles, shells, spare parts and fuel. It got to the point that they had to retreat, leaving the enemy with almost undamaged tanks: there was no time or opportunity to put them on the move and take them with them.
Today you can come across the opinion that if the leadership of the front, contrary to the order of Georgy Zhukov, had not given the command to move from offensive to defensive, the Red Army, they say, would have turned back the Germans at Dubno. I wouldn't turn back. Alas, that summer the German army fought much better, and its tank units had much more experience in active cooperation with other branches of the military. But the Battle of Dubno played its role in thwarting Hitler’s Barbarossa plan. The Soviet tank counterattack forced the Wehrmacht command to bring into battle reserves that were intended for an offensive in the direction of Moscow as part of Army Group Center. And after this battle the direction to Kyiv itself began to be considered a priority.
And this did not fit into the long-agreed German plans, it broke them - and broke them so much that the tempo of the offensive was catastrophically lost. And although the difficult autumn and winter of 1941 lay ahead, the largest tank battle had already spoken its word in the history of the Great Patriotic War. This, the battle of Dubno, echoed two years later on the fields near Kursk and Orel - and was echoed in the first volleys of victorious fireworks...
