Complete chronicle of the events of the Great Patriotic War for 1943

Stalin vs Zhukov

The Battle of Kursk, which ended on August 23, 1943, grew - as planned in Moscow - into a general offensive of the Red Army in the south: in Left Bank Ukraine, in the Donbass, in Northern Tavria.

These regions - rich in grain, coal and human resources - were desperately needed by the country. After all, the 1943 harvest in the USSR was only 31% of the 1940 harvest2. Only the active army was able to be fed decently. In the rear units, supplied according to the notorious “second norm,” the soldiers were malnourished; and the civilians were starving...

The boilers of steam locomotives and thermal power plants were often heated with wood and peat.

The conscription contingents were gradually depleted.

Therefore, Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin rejected the idea of ​​his deputy G.K. Zhukova. I was not tempted by the fact that the front line in the south hung like a huge balcony over the German troops and a blow from Kharkov to the Sea of ​​Azov made it possible to encircle the entire Army Group South. As Stalingrad showed, the liquidation of such a large “cauldron” could take a long time.

Left-bank Ukraine and Donbass had to be occupied as quickly as possible. Moreover, otherwise the enemy would have had time to build a strong defense on the right bank of the Dnieper. And crossing the third largest river in Europe would result in hecatombs of victims.

Stalin moved the Red Army along the shortest route to the Dnieper, pushing back the enemy with frontal attacks.

The battle for the Dnieper began.

Military operations in the autumn of 1943

Military operations in the autumn of 1943

By September 1943, the front of the Eastern Army was basically a continuous line, and only one gap remained unclosed between Army Groups South and Center.
However, the strength of the newly created front left much to be desired. There were no significant reserves. The divisions were exhausted in battle, their numbers and weapons indicated that they would not be able to withstand new severe tests. On vast sections of the front, the positions were poorly equipped; the stretched front of individual formations did not allow the Germans to create a sufficient operational density of troops even in the main defense line, not to mention the construction of a deeply echeloned and well-equipped defense system. The problem of the number of units, which ran like a red thread throughout the entire Eastern campaign, began to become increasingly acute. It became quite obvious that Hitler had set the armed forces in the East a task that was beyond their capabilities. In such conditions, the conclusion naturally suggested itself that it was necessary once again, before the start of a new Russian offensive, to withdraw troops in an organized manner and occupy the least extended and well-prepared line of defense. First of all, it was necessary to withdraw troops from the Crimea, as well as from the arc jutting to the east along the Dnieper south of Kyiv. This was the only way to achieve some reduction in the front of individual formations and create at least a minimum of reserves. But Hitler did not agree to this for the political and economic reasons already partially stated above. Although Hitler, based on accurate reports and reports, was constantly aware of all matters and knew how many people and weapons were available in individual divisions, he overestimated their ability to resist, just as he underestimated the offensive capabilities of the Russians. In addition, he believed that such a wide water barrier as the Dnieper could be successfully defended with insignificant forces.

On October 7, the Russians, having previously captured a small bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper in the area south of Kyiv, which the Germans failed to liquidate, went on the offensive. They initially concentrated their main efforts between Kremenchug and Dnepropetrovsk, as well as in the area of ​​Zaporozhye and Melitopol. After heavy fighting, during which the German troops and command, realizing the decisive importance of firmly holding their occupied lines for the entire Eastern campaign, strained all their strength and persistently repelled the onslaught of superior Russian forces, the latter managed to break through the front of the 6th Army in the Melitopol area on October 23. They threw the army back across the Dnieper in its lower reaches and cut off the Crimea, blocking the Perekop Isthmus. At the same time, they landed in the eastern part of Crimea on the Kerch Peninsula. However, both near Perekop and on the Kerch Peninsula, the advance of Russian troops was temporarily stopped. The Crimean peninsula continued to remain in German hands.

On the front of the 1st Tank Army, which ran from Chigorin to Nikopol, the Russians, having failed in an attempt to liquidate the German bridgehead in the Zaporozhye region, crossed the Dnieper between Dnepropetrovsk and Kremenchug and broke through the defenses of German troops along the Dnieper on a wide front. With forces of approximately 100 divisions, including many tank units and formations, they struck in a western direction and reached Krivoy Rog. Army Group A, the right wing of which still held the defenses along the Dnieper in its lower reaches, turned from Nikopol to the west. Now the front line passed through Krivoy Rog and west of Kirovograd. Army Group South, having withdrawn the troops of the right wing of the 8th Army after the 1st Tank Army, initially continued to hold its old positions in the zone of this army. As a result of this, a new protrusion of the front formed here, strongly extended to the east.

A critical situation also developed on the front of the 4th Tank Army, which was operating as part of Army Group South. This army, during bloody battles that lasted almost four weeks, repulsed all attacks of the enemy who tried to make a breakthrough in the Kyiv area. Only in a few areas did the enemy manage to slightly push back her troops. But after these battles, the army turned out to be bloodless and unable to continue resistance.

When on November 3, Russian forces of up to 50 divisions moved from the bridgeheads they had captured on the right bank of the Dnieper to a decisive offensive, the 4th Tank Army was unable to provide sufficient resistance to the Russian strike force. On November 6, Kyiv fell. The front of the German troops was breached, and Russian tank and motorized formations, encountering almost no resistance, rushed to the west. On November 11, the advanced units of the advancing Russian troops approached Zhitomir.

At the same time, the Russians went on the offensive on the front of the 2nd Army, which was operating on the right flank of Army Group Center. Having struck south and north of Gomel, the Russians pushed the army back to the northwest. As a result of this, the gap that existed between the army groups widened even further. A desperate situation has arisen. If the Russians now began to build on the success they had achieved, then the fate of Army Groups A and South, and at the same time the fate of the entire Eastern Front, would be finally decided. The situation could only be saved by striking the left flank of the Russian troops that had broken through. Having collected all the forces that could be withdrawn from other sectors of the front, replacing them with temporary, hastily formed units from vacationers, as well as combined units of rear services, etc., and transferring here separate units from other theaters of military operations, the Germans managed to create in the area between Fastov and Zhitomir the grouping necessary to carry out this task. This strike force launched a counteroffensive against the left flank of the Russian troops that had broken through and stopped their advance to the west.

Battles for the Dnieper in the fall of 1943

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Although the Germans did not have enough strength to achieve decisive success, they nevertheless managed to eliminate the mortal danger of a deep breakthrough of Russian formations and their entry into operational space. By transferring part of their forces to the west, the Germans were able to delay the enemy approximately on the Fastov-Radomyshl-Korosten line. The Russians tried to respond to this failure with a new offensive on the front of the 8th Army and Army Group A. During heavy fighting that lasted until December 1943, they managed to achieve some local successes here: seize a bridgehead in the Kherson region and capture Chigirin and Cherkassy. But the Germans still preserved the integrity of their front. The serious danger that threatened the front in October-November has passed. However, despite this seemingly satisfactory development of events, the German troops, despite everything that was done to increase their combat effectiveness, became even weaker. The fact that during its counteroffensive the 4th Panzer Army, despite skillful leadership from the command, favorable conditions and selfless actions of the troops, was unable to develop the initial tactical success and achieve victory on an operational scale, should have been a new alarming signal for the Germans . The superior forces of the Russians, operating as part of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, threatened with a new blow to break through the thin fabric of German defense in any place they desired.

Meanwhile, the troops of Army Group Center made a systematic retreat and also took up a new defense. The front line now ran along the Sozh and Pronya rivers and, continuing further north east of Orsha and Vitebsk, connected in the area east of Nevel with the front line of Army Group North. But the troops of the army group were unable to get even a small respite at this new frontier. The large forces of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts operating here launched frequent attacks on German troops, trying to outflank them in the sector of the 2nd Army and break through the weak front of the army group. However, German troops, with the support of the small but extremely operational air units of Colonel General von Greim, successfully overcame numerous and sometimes very dangerous situations.

The situation that developed on the right flank of the 2nd Army, where the defeats suffered by Army Group South made themselves felt especially strongly, took on the most critical character. Becoming more and more exposed, this flank forced the army command to allocate part of its forces to cover it. The Russians took advantage of the difficult situation in which the army found itself and went on the offensive in the direction of Gomel. In stubborn battles, the Germans initially managed to hold their positions and prevent the enemy from breaking through their front. However, in early November, when the front of the neighboring 4th Tank Army (Army Group South) was broken and the Russians began to advance towards Korosten, the situation deteriorated significantly. Now the enemy has also launched an offensive against the completely unprotected junction of Army Groups “South” and “Center”. After fierce fighting, the Russians broke through the front of the 2nd Army, which threw its last reserves into battle, and, then turning to the northwest, began to advance towards Rechitsa and Mozyr. As a result of this, the formations operating on its right flank south of the Pripyat River were cut off from the army, and a threat was created to the main communications of the Germans, the Minsk-Mozyr railway. Communication with the 4th Tank Army, which had been maintained for quite a long time only by mobile units, was completely lost. The enemy went deep to the rear of the troops of the right flank of the 2nd Army in the Ovruch area. The small southern group, cut off from the main forces of the army, found itself under the threat of encirclement, which it managed to avoid only as a result of a quick breakthrough in the northwest direction. The breakthrough was successful, and the group again linked up with the main forces of the army in the area southeast of Mozyr. But the gap that existed between the army groups "widened to more than 100 km

. A serious threat arose for the troops defending on the eastern ledge of the front in the Gomel region. Despite this, Hitler rejected the proposal to withdraw these troops to new positions. As a result, the situation worsened even more. On November 17, Rechitsa was surrendered, and after this the Russians reached the Mozyr-Zhlobin railway and thereby cut the last communication linking the troops defending Gomel with the main German forces.

Now the Russians went on the offensive and, in the sector of the front north of Gomel, in the Propoisk region, during heavy fighting they broke through the German defenses to a considerable depth. The enemy's advance was stopped approximately only at the Chausy-Bykhov line. German troops operating in the Gomel region were under threat of encirclement. The created situation forced the German command to withdraw its troops from the front ledge they occupied at the very last moment. By mid-December, the troops occupied new positions along the Dnieper, and their position was somewhat strengthened. The gap that formed during the fighting between the main forces of the army group and the 2nd Army was eliminated as a result of the counteroffensive launched here. Thus, by the end of the year, the troops of the right wing of Army Group Center again occupied a more or less strong position, and only the gap that existed at the junction of the army groups in the area south of Mozyr was still not closed. Since the beginning of winter, the Pripyat swamps became relatively passable, at least it was now possible to conduct military operations here, and this forced the Germans to allocate additional forces to cover the swamps.

In front of the central section of the army group's front, the Russians concentrated their main efforts on the Smolensk-Orsha-Minsk direction. Here they tried several times to launch an offensive with large forces in order to break through the front of the 4th Army on its right flank. Thanks to the exceptional resilience of the troops, the skillful actions of the commanders of units and formations, as well as the presence of a deeply echeloned and well-equipped defense here, the Germans managed to repel all attacks by significantly superior enemy forces that they launched until December 1943. The Russians suffered great damage here.

Less successful were the actions of the 3rd Tank Army, defending on the right wing of the army group. At the beginning of October, the Russians broke through it to the Nevel front in the area of ​​​​the junction with the 16th Army (Army Group North). The inner flanks of both armies had to be bent back. It was not possible to close the increasingly widening gap, and since Hitler this time rejected the proposal to withdraw troops located on the flanks of both armies and who were under threat of envelopment, the danger gradually arose that the Russians would go to the rear of the left wing of the 3rd Panzer Army from the north and northwest. Since both army groups did not have the strength to close the gap by counterattack, as Hitler had repeatedly demanded, enemy pressure against the exposed left flank of Army Group Center became increasingly sensitive. Gradually, a great threat arose to the main communications of the 3rd Tank Army passing through Polotsk. On December 13, the Russians launched a decisive offensive. They launched a series of attacks in converging directions from the east, north and northeast. The division defending on the left flank of the army was defeated; its remnants managed to break through the encirclement, but all the material was lost. The tank army was thrown back to Vitebsk, but here it managed to gain a foothold and hold a bridgehead on the right bank of the Western Dvina. All enemy attacks trying to break through the front of the army were repulsed. The gap between Army Group Center and Army Group North, covered by only minor forces, continued to exist and posed a serious danger, since the Russians could use it to advance along the Western Dvina to the north-west with the aim of deep enveloping Army Group North "

On the Army Group North front, the Russians limited themselves to a slight increase in activity. However, this allowed them to pin down significant forces of the army group, which because of this was unable to find means to eliminate the crisis at Nevel, which also posed a serious danger for it.

Neighbors on the march

August 26 Central Front (Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky)

rushed to the southwest, driving a wedge between Army Groups Center and South.

(Army General Nikolai Vatutin) moved to the Left Bank Ukraine.

and Stepnoy
(Army General Ivan Konev).
On September 1, Steppe’s left neighbor, the Southwestern Front (Army General Rodion Malinovsky), which had been advancing since August 13, finally went forward to the Donbass.

And since August 18, having broken through the “Mius Front” - on the Mius River, near the Sea of ​​Azov - the Southern Front (Colonel General Fedor Tolbukhin)

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If only I could go out onto the field, into a good open space, and already Zaporozhye is close to Chaplino. Tanks have driven over crooked beams, and Kyiv is not far from Nezhin. […]

Retreat, weakling, from the gunfire! As planned in Moscow, so it will be!3

— Semyon Kirsanov will write. But it was easy to reach Nezhin and Chaplino station by September 15 only with the poet’s pen.

Historical events (phenomena, processes)

1.Battle of Stalingrad (07/17/1942-02/02/1943) - Operation Uranus

In the early summer of 1942, German troops broke through the front line on the Don, which created a threat to Stalingrad. The capture of the city by the Germans would lead to the isolation of the North Caucasus, thereby depriving Soviet industry of sources of oil. On July 12, the Southwestern Front was transformed into the Stalingrad Front. The evacuation of residents began and defensive lines were built.

, the Battle of Stalingrad began . The city was defended by the 62nd Army of General V.I. Chuikov. By the beginning of October, almost the entire city was taken by the Germans, Mamayev Kurgan was occupied, from which the 62nd division was clearly visible. Fights were fought for every street, every house. By November, the German units were exhausted, the Red Army received reinforcements, surpassing the German army in technology. And the KV and T-34 tanks were significantly superior to the German ones in their technical characteristics. On November 19, the Red Army’s counter-offensive, Operation Uranus, began. During the battle, the army of F. Paulus and many other groups of German troops were surrounded and captured. At the beginning of February 1943, the battle ended in victory for the USSR. Its significance was simply colossal: the Germans evacuated troops from the North Caucasus, and confidence in victory over Germany strengthened. November 19, 1942 is called the beginning of a radical turning point in the war, when the initiative passed to the Red Army.

History preserves many names of the defenders of Stalingrad. Eternal memory to them for their courage and heroism. General Chuikov V.I. received an order from the command: to defend Stalingrad at any cost. Determined, firm, courageous, he, it believed, could complete this task. A high sense of responsibility, awareness of his duty, extensive experience in military work - this is what distinguished this general. He successfully used street fighting tactics, which allowed his division to hold the city for 6 months. Close combat tactics were also actively used, because enemy tanks were sometimes within throwing distance of a grenade. Chuikov V.I. created special assault teams that were distinguished by surprise, speed in completing tasks, and the desire to take the enemy by surprise. Underground communications were widely used. All this made it possible to keep the Germans in constant fear - it was unknown where and where Soviet soldiers would appear. Chuikov was even popularly called the “assault general,” and his tactics were widely used during the capture of Berlin. The result was a great victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, which marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the war, the Division was renamed the 8th Guards, and Chuikova V.I. awarded the Order of Suvorov, 1st degree.

1. Tehran Conference (November 28-December 1, 1943)

During the Second World War, three conferences were held between the USSR, the USA and England - allied countries. The first was the Tehran Conference in November-December 1943. The USSR was represented by Stalin I.V., Great Britain by W. Churchill, and the USA by F. Roosevelt. The conference was held at a time when Soviet troops liberated half of the occupied territory and the superiority of the USSR's forces became obvious. The main purpose of convening the conference was to resolve the issue of opening a second front in the North of France. The operation to open a second front was called “Overlord”; it was planned to open it at the end of May. Issues of post-war peaceful cooperation were also resolved, the Polish question - the USSR advocated the revival of Poland, the question of granting independence to Iran. In addition, the USSR pledged to start a war with Japan.

The consequence of this conference was cooperation with the USSR, Great Britain and the USA, and a willingness to jointly fight fascism.

A great role was played in the positive results of the conference by Stalin I.V., who was distinguished by his firmness and desire to clearly move towards achieving the goal - the opening of a second front. The Allies were constantly playing for time, the negotiations even reached a dead end, and only Stalin’s firmness, his reluctance to engage in empty talk, forced the heads of the United States and Great Britain to agree to open the front in May 1944. Defended by Stalin I.V. and position towards Poland, advocating its sovereignty. He also defended his point of view on the post-war structure of Germany; he did not agree to divide it into 5 autonomous states, proposing that the European Advisory Commission look into this issue. All this testifies to the increased authority of Stalin, his foresight, a clear understanding of both the strategy and tactics of military operations, and most importantly, the growing authority of the USSR. All decisions on the conference were made in the version advocated by the USSR.

The cause-and-effect relationship between the two events described is obvious: the reasons for both the Battle of Stalingrad and the conference were the desire to quickly break the enemy and free the USSR and Europe from German aggression. The results speak for themselves: victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of a large territory of the USSR, a radical turning point in the war, cooperation between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain.

Scorched earth

“All incoming reinforcements were immediately “grinded” in battles for the dead and wounded”4 (former chief of staff of the rifle regiment Alexander Lebedintsev)

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“Still, one cannot help but be surprised at the German’s tenacity. For the 3rd day now we have been hitting one point - the village of Mikhailovka and the railway section. d. canvas - and we can’t knock it out. We hammer away from dawn to dusk, and there is no effect”5 (chief of communications of the air corps Fyodor Smolnikov, diary for September 6)

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Only on September 15, Hitler allowed Army Group South to be withdrawn beyond the Dnieper, where fortifications of the Eastern Wall had been erected along the right bank since August 11.

The Red Army began pursuit.

“We’ve never walked so much. We go and go without stopping. […] My legs were bleeding. Foot wraps with rags of skin were torn off, and along the column they shouted: “Rise!” March again. I saw soldiers fall as they walked, their noses bleeding, their eyes rolling back in their heads. The orderlies drag them onto a cart and give them a glass and a half of water. And we are stomping, only dreaming about water”6 (former rifle squad commander Fyodor Lapshin)

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And the German soldier dreamed of “protection and security beyond the Dnieper. He saw the meaning of all the heavy battles that had been fought in recent months in crossing the Dnieper and finally finding peace there.”7 (former corps commander Nikolaus von Formann)

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And the battles - even if only with barriers and ambushes - did not stop! “[...] We did not fight to take a city or region, but to avoid a catastrophe. Everyone knew and felt this”8 (former infantryman Guy Sayer)

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“Once I saw ten or eleven burnt-out “thirty-fours” at once. A terrible sight. Almost all the corpses lying nearby were badly burned. And it’s better not to tell what’s left of those who were inside. Firebrands, lumps of coal"9 (former regimental intelligence officer Ivan Melnikov)

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“We are driving the German, the hated German, but not yet to the tail and mane - he leaves in order, takes everything away”10 (Fedor Smolnikov, diary for September 29)

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According to the directives of the leaders of the Wehrmacht and the SS, Left Bank Ukraine and the Donbass were turned into “scorched earth” - with destroyed buildings, with sleepers torn out by a special machine, rails taken away, wells poisoned, population driven away...

“The city [Stalino, now Donetsk. - Auth.

] in the flames of fires: the Germans, retreating, set fire to hundreds of buildings in the central part of the city.
Along the streets, illuminated by the flames of fires, hundreds of people stand, they warmly welcome us. I especially remember the gray-bearded old man who continuously crossed himself and made prostrations to the liberators”11 (former fire platoon commander Isaac Kobylyansky)
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“It’s a strange feeling to suddenly find yourself alone in an abandoned area. Dogs and cats howl because they are dying of hunger, and hens and chicks roam. We slaughtered all the hens and cockerels. There were even too many of them. […]

The civilian population can take only crumbs of their property with them. All the roads are already clogged with them. Part of the population is hiding in the corn; they don’t want to leave. […] The suffering of the civilian population is very great. Far away you can hear the moans of women and the crying of children. They cry and at the same time sing monotonously plaintive songs”12 (chief of the regimental convoy Karl Friedrich Brand, diary for September 8 - 9)

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That’s why the “Fritz” was pursued “quickly, stopping for short overnight stays and daytime rests of fifteen to twenty minutes. The fighters' boots were falling apart. The soles were tied with wire. Despite the fact that it was the end of September, it was warm like the south, almost hot. The fighters walked wet from sweat, some fell from fatigue. At the same time, the nights were cold and there was nowhere to sleep. Almost all villages and individual houses were burned by the Germans during their retreat. Believe me, at a temperature of plus 6 - 8 degrees, and even on bare ground, it is almost impossible to sleep”13 (Ivan Melnikov)

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Kiev offensive operation 1943 (November 3 - 12)

During the autumn offensive of the Red Army in 1943, the main direction remained Kiev. The main role was assigned to the 1st Ukrainian Front1 (Army General N.F. Vatutin), and Ukraine became the main theater of military operations, where the warring parties retained the largest groupings of troops.

At the end of September 1943, front troops crossed the Dnieper and captured bridgeheads on its right bank north and south of Kyiv. They twice (October 12-15 and October 21-23) attempted an offensive from the Bukrin bridgehead in order to liberate Kyiv, but were unsuccessful. The German command concentrated 10 divisions in the bridgehead area, including five tank divisions and one motorized division, and created a strong defense here.

Soviet troops in the offensive from the Bukrin bridgehead encountered great difficulties: the small territory of the bridgehead and the lack of large-capacity crossing facilities did not allow the active use of the bulk of the artillery on the right bank of the river, and artillery fire from the left bank was ineffective. In addition, the rugged terrain made it difficult for troops to maneuver, especially for the tank army. Therefore, on October 24, the Supreme Command Headquarters canceled the decision of front commander N.F. Vatutin to carry out a third attempt at an offensive from the Bukrin bridgehead at the end of October. The Supreme High Command gave instructions to regroup the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front and deliver the main blow from the Lyutezh bridgehead. This bridgehead, despite its smaller size compared to the Bukrinsky one. compared favorably with the latter. From the north, it dominated the Kyiv enemy group, and its terrain allowed tank formations to advance unhindered.

Having received a directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters. Front headquarters began intensive preparations for the operation. The 3rd Guards Tank Army (Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko), the 23rd Rifle Corps, the 7th Breakthrough Artillery Corps and other formations and units were secretly transported to the Lyutezh bridgehead. During this regrouping, the troops crossed the Dnieper twice, once the Desna River, and in conditions of impassable autumn roads and muddy roads, they secretly made an almost two-hundred-kilometer march along the front line.

The success of the regrouping was facilitated by the strict measures taken by the command to camouflage its troops and skillfully misinform the enemy. The movement of units took place only at night, it was forbidden to light fires at rest stops, tanks and vehicles could only advance with darkened headlights. At the direction of the front headquarters, on the Bukrinsky bridgehead, instead of tanks and guns transported to another area, their camouflaged models were displayed, the radio stations of the 3rd Guards Tank Army continued to operate, and the preparation of a front offensive on its right wing in the 13th Army zone was simulated. Thanks to this, the regrouping was not noticed by the enemy and the Soviet command achieved a surprise attack from the Lyutezh bridgehead.

By the beginning of the Kyiv offensive operation, the 1st Ukrainian Front included the 13. 60. 38. 40. 27, 47 combined arms, 3rd Guards Tank and 2nd Air Armies. The front troops numbered 671 thousand people, 7 thousand guns and mortars. 675 tanks and self-propelled guns, 700 aircraft.

In the direction of the main attack, the front command managed to create superiority over the enemy: in people - 3 times, in guns and mortars - 4.5 times, in tanks - 9 times.

The 1st Ukrainian Front was opposed by the 4th Tank and 8th Armies of Army Group South (Field Marshal E. Manstein) and the 2nd Army of Army Group Center (Field Marshal E. Bush). They were supported from the air by part of the forces of the 4th Air Fleet. In total, the enemy group numbered up to 500 thousand people, up to 6 thousand guns and mortars, about 400 tanks and assault guns, and over 660 aircraft. The defense of German troops in the Kiev direction consisted of three defensive lines equipped with trenches, communication passages, dugouts, machine gun platforms and positions for guns and mortars, and a defensive contour around Kyiv using the preserved pre-war structures of the Kyiv fortified area.

The idea of ​​the Kyiv offensive operation was to strike the 38th Army (Colonel General K.S. Moskalenko) and the 3rd Guards Tank Army (Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko) bypassing Kiev from the west to defeat the enemy group and liberate the capital of Ukraine. Then the command planned to go deep into the rear of Army Group South and create conditions for the liberation of the entire Right Bank of Ukraine. North of the Lyutezh bridgehead, the 60th Army (Lieutenant General I.D. Chernyakhovsky) was supposed to advance to the southwest. The 13th Army (Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov), located on the right flank of the front, initially had the task of firmly holding the occupied line, since the most active actions of the Germans were expected in its zone, misled by misinformation about the upcoming offensive of Soviet troops here. Subsequently, using the success of the main forces, it had to go on the offensive with the left flank on Ovruch and cover the right flank of the 60th Army.

The troops of the 40th (Lieutenant General F.F. Zhmachenko) and 27th (Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko) armies were to launch an offensive from the Bukrin bridgehead. The ground forces were supported by aviation of the 2nd Air Army (Lieutenant General of Aviation S.A. Krasovsky). The protection of crossings across the Dnieper, which were of particular importance for the offensive, was provided by air defense units of the troops, and subsequently by the Kyiv Corps Air Defense District of the country. Ukrainian partisans were tasked with disrupting enemy transportation in the Kiev direction, intensifying military operations at the railway junctions of Kovel, Korosten, Shepetivka, Zdolbunov, Sarny, Rovno, Kazatin, etc.

After the liberation of Kyiv, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front had to develop an offensive against Zhitomir. Novograd-Volynsky, Rivne and in a south-west direction to Kozyatin. Zhmerinka.

On November 1, the 40th and 27th armies launched an offensive from the Bukrin bridgehead. Their goal was to divert the attention of the German command from the direction of the main attack of the front and not allow the Germans to transfer the troops defending the bridgehead to the north, where the outcome of the battle for Kyiv was being decided.

The fighting immediately became fierce. The enemy repeatedly launched a counteroffensive. Despite the fact that the troops of the 40th and 27th armies were unable to break through the front, they pinned down up to 10 enemy divisions and disrupted the timely transfer of three tank divisions and one motorized division to the Lyutezh bridgehead.

On the morning of November 3, after a powerful artillery barrage, the main group of the 1st Ukrainian Front, consisting of the 60th and 38th armies and part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Corps, struck the enemy from the Lyutezh bridgehead. Aviation of the 2nd Air Army, as soon as the weather improved, flew 1,150 sorties and provided great assistance to the attackers. The German resistance was extremely stubborn, but thanks to the courage of the Soviet fighters, the strike force managed to advance 5-12 km by the end of the day.

The Supreme High Command headquarters demanded that the front command not delay the operation. In a telegram dated November 3, signed by I.V. Stalin and First Deputy Chief of the General Staff A.I. Antonov, the task was set to cut the Kyiv-Korosten railway no later than November 5 and capture Kiev no later than November 5-6.

On November 4-5, the 3rd Guards Tank Army, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, and the second echelons of the 38th and 60th armies were brought into the battle for Kyiv, which allowed the attackers to rapidly advance south. On the night of November 5, the tanks, advancing with their headlights on, to the roar of sirens, firing intensely from cannons and machine guns, reached, and by the morning they cut the Kiev-Zhitomir highway, which was the main communication route feeding the Kyiv group of Germans from the west.

The fascist German command understood the seriousness of the situation. The defeat at Kiev could have been decisive for the entire Eastern Front. Fearing the encirclement of their troops in Kyiv, the Germans began to hastily withdraw them in a southwestern direction and at the same time transfer units from the Bukrin bridgehead to the Kyiv area.

Already in the afternoon of November 5, units of the 5th Tank Corps reached the northwestern outskirts of Kyiv to the Bolshevik. The 38th Army was moving towards the city from the north and northwest. The 60th Army, which provided the right flank of the front's strike group, achieved significant success. Throughout the night of November 6, Soviet troops fought fierce battles. Soldiers of the 38th Army and the 20th Guards Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel S.F. Shutov) showed high military skill and heroism in battles on the city streets. By the morning of November 6, the capital of Ukraine was liberated from the invaders.

The German command took unprecedented measures to localize the breakthrough of Soviet troops in the Kyiv area. It canceled the operation to unblock the Crimean group and Crimea. Large forces were urgently transferred to Kyiv: from the Velikiy Bukrin area - the SS tank division "Reich", the 3rd tank and 10th motorized divisions; from near Kremenchug - parts of the 198th Infantry Division: from France - parts of the 25th Tank Division. The 1st Panzer Division advanced to Bila Tserkva, and units of the SS Panzer Division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” moved to Kozatin and neighboring stations.

In order to prevent the approach of German reserves to Kyiv, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Army General N.F. Vatutin decided to continue the pursuit of the retreating enemy in the Zhitomir, Kazyatinsky and Belotserkovsky directions and go to his rear. Thus, the front’s overall offensive zone and its tasks expanded significantly; the 3rd Guards Tank Army had to liberate the cities of Fastov and Vasilkov on the move. On the night of November 7, the northern part of Fastov was captured. At the same time, the advanced units of the 6th Guards Tank Corps entered the city. By morning, Fastov was completely liberated, which made it possible for Soviet troops to develop an offensive against Kazatin and Bila Tserkva. At the same time, the 38th Army achieved major successes, advancing 60 km along the Zhitomir highway.

The German command understood that with the loss of Kyiv and Fastov and the advance of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front to Zhitomir, a real threat was created for the northern wing of Army Group South. Already on November 8, the Nazis launched counterattacks in the Fastov area, trying to recapture the city at any cost, and at the same time counterattacked along the right bank of the Dnieper.

The position of the Soviet troops operating here was complicated by the fact that the onset of rains made the roads impassable. The troops moving away from the crossings began to lack ammunition. Due to deteriorating weather, aviation combat activity decreased sharply. However, the front forces, repelling fierce attacks, continued the offensive in the Zhitomir direction and liberated Zhitomir on November 12. To strengthen the 38th Army, the main forces of the 40th Army were withdrawn from the Bukrin bridgehead and transported to the north.

Having discovered a concentration of large enemy villages south of Fastov, the Supreme High Command Headquarters on November 12 gave orders to the troops of the center and southern wing of the front, which by this time had reached the line of Volchkovo, Chernyakhov, Zhitomir, Germanovka. pause the offensive and temporarily go on the defensive. The troops of the 13th and 60th armies continued their offensive to the west.

The Kiev offensive operation, carried out by forces of one front, was of strategic importance. Soviet troops defeated nine enemy infantry, two tank and one motorized divisions, destroyed and captured about 1.2 thousand guns and mortars, 600 tanks and assault guns, and 90 aircraft. The capital of Ukraine was liberated, a bridgehead of strategic importance was created with a length of 230 km along the front (along the Dnieper line) and up to 145 km in depth, which played a significant role in the liberation of Right Bank Ukraine. An important result of the operation was the disruption of the counteroffensive being prepared by the fascist German command in the Kirovograd direction, since the troops intended to carry it out were transferred to the Kiev direction.

At the same time, during the Kyiv offensive operation there were also miscalculations, in particular, it was not possible to destroy the main forces of the enemy, which allowed the enemy to launch a counter-offensive to the west of Kiev in the second half of November and delay the advance of the front forces for some time (until December 22). The losses of Soviet troops in the operation were: irrevocable - 6,491 people, sanitary - 24,078 people. More than 90 units and formations received the honorary names of Kyiv, Zhitomir, Fastov, Vasilkov, Ovruch.

Crossing of the Dnieper

The enemy blew up the bridges across the Dnieper, and the last “Hans” were transported to the right bank using improvised means. The same means - fishing boats, rafts made of logs, barrels, gates, doors - had to be used by those Soviet units that were the first to reach the Dnieper on September 21-25. After all, pontoon parks are lagging behind...

It was later that pontoon bridges, footbridges, ferry crossings were built... “The speed with which the Russians transported their own forces across the Dnieper surprised us”14 (former corps commander Erhard Routh)

.

This is how Soviet bridgeheads appeared on the right bank of the Dnieper - near Lyutezh, near Velikiy Bukrin and others. At the same time, the main efforts were concentrated in the Kiev direction, and they planned to take Kyiv with a strike from the Bukrinsky bridgehead (about 75 kilometers southeast of the “mother of Russian cities”).

To help the troops that would advance from there, on the night of September 25, the 3rd Airborne Brigade and part of the 5th were thrown behind enemy lines.

“Like now I see the faces of the guys from my plane, a second before the third buzzer for the jump. There was determination on these faces, readiness for battle”15 (former radio operator Matvey Likhterman)

.

But the training of the Li-2 (“Douglas”) crews turned out to be depressing. Part of the landing party was dropped at the location of their troops, part - in the Dnieper, and part - in an area literally filled with German troops...

“Before this, I had a fair amount of military hardship: I was wounded twice, fought in Stalingrad, but I had never experienced anything like this—falling towards the sparkling paths of bullets, through the flames of my comrades’ parachutes burning in the sky”16 (former communications platoon commander Grigory Chukhrai).

“Dozens of burning torches immediately appeared in the sky. This is how our comrades died, not having time to take the fight on the ground... We saw everything... How two damaged "Douglas" fell, from which the fighters had not yet managed to jump. The guys fell out of the planes and fell like stones, unable to open their parachute. […] The entire space around us was covered in white spots of parachutes. And corpses, corpses, corpses: killed, burned, crashed paratroopers... And an hour later a total raid began..."17 (Matvey Likhterman).

News and events

November 1, 1941. 133rd day of the war

Battle for Leningrad.

Tikhvin defensive operation . The German command regrouped the troops of the XXXIX Motorized Corps and resumed the attack on Tikhvin. At the same time, the enemy’s I Army Corps, reaching deep into the rear of the 54th Army, intensified the attack on the units of the 4th Separate Army covering Volkhov. The enemy sought to reach Lake Ladoga and encircle the troops of the 54th Army.

The 4th separate army launched a counterattack in the direction of Budogoshch and Gruzino.

Battle for Moscow.

Kalinin Front. Kalinin defensive operation. Front troops fought to restore the situation in certain sectors of the 22nd and 29th armies and continued attacks against the enemy’s Kalinin group.

The 22nd Army continued fighting to restore the situation in the Terentyevo, Perlevo, and Erunovo sectors.

The 29th Army under the command of a native of the Chalykla station in the Saratov region, Lieutenant General of the NKVD troops I.I. Maslennikova, holding back the enemy in positions along the northern bank of the Rachina River and the Zaborovye - Izbrizhye section, continued the counter-offensive against units of the 6th German Infantry Division in the Strenevo - Lipiga - Polomenitsy area.

The 31st Army, defending along the Volga River, in the Izbrizhye - Stepankov - Cherkasovo sector, part of its forces continued to fight for the capture of the northwestern part of the city of Kalinin (Tver).

The 30th Army continued fighting in the northeastern part of Kalinin (Tver) and on the approaches to the city from the southeast.

The attacks of the 256th Rifle Division, which aimed to capture the Zatveretsky Bridge, were unsuccessful.

The offensive of the 5th Infantry Division with the aim of capturing the Bortnikovo area and the hippodrome was also unsuccessful.

Bryansk front. Tula defensive operation. Front troops under the command of a native of the village of Shilovo, Saratov region, Major General G.F. Zakharov, fought stubborn battles with units of the 2nd German Tank Army in the area of ​​​​the city of Tuoa, occupied the main defensive lines on the left wing and continued to concentrate units in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city of Efremov.

The 50th Army repelled repeated attacks by formations of the 2nd German Tank Army advancing on Tula.

The German 2nd Army reached the northern outskirts of Kursk. The XXIV Motorized Corps of the German 2nd Tank Army reached the area west of Dedilovo.

Southwestern Front. Sumy-Kharkov defensive operation . The front troops completed their retreat to a new defensive line. The right-flank formations of the front had no contact with enemy units.

Southern front. Donbass defensive operation. The front troops fought stubborn battles with the enemy advancing in the Artyomovsk, Gorlovka and Voroshilovgrad directions.

Units of the 12th Army fought defensive battles with the enemy in the area of ​​Artyomovsk and Gorlovka. Units of the 97th German light infantry division pushed back units of the 15th and 230th rifle divisions and captured Artyomovsk. The enemy's offensive in the Gorlovka area was repelled by army units.

Units of the 18th Army repelled attacks by large enemy forces. By the end of the day, the army troops, holding their occupied lines, fought a street battle in the village of Knyaginevka.

Units of the 9th Army fought fierce battles with the enemy in the Kuibyshev direction. The enemy, with up to 100 tanks and a motorized infantry division, pushed back units of the 30th and 136th rifle divisions and began to develop an offensive in the northeastern and eastern directions.

Crimean defensive operation . The troops of the 11th German Army occupied Simferopol.

November 1, 1942 . 498th day of the war

Battle of Stalingrad.

Stalingrad defensive operation.

Stalingrad Front . Front troops with part of their forces repulsed all attacks by infantry and tanks of the 6th German Army in Stalingrad (Volgograd), which were especially fierce in the area of ​​Mezenskaya and Umanskaya streets and in the territory; the other part of the forces fought unsuccessful offensive battles in the area southwest of the village of Kuporosnoye.

The 64th Army, remaining in its previous positions, part of its forces continued to conduct offensive battles in the area southwest of Kuporosnoye, but, encountering strong fire resistance from units of the 4th German Tank Army, it was not successful.

In Stalingrad (Volgograd), the command of the 6th German Army transferred significant forces of infantry and tanks in the direction of Latoshanka, and partly to the sector of the 64th Army. In the morning, the Nazis launched a series of fierce attacks, which in some places turned into bayonet fighting.

Battle for the Caucasus.

Transcaucasian Front . Northern Group of Forces . Nalchik-Ordzhonikidze defensive operation. The troops of the group under the command of Saratov resident, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov, continued to conduct holding battles with units of the III Tank Corps of the 1st German Tank Army, advancing in the defense zone of the 37th Army and the 10th Rifle Corps.

On a sunny morning, the Nazis occupied Digora, abandoned at night by Soviet units. The German 1st Battalion of the 126th Motorized Infantry Regiment, in a bold attack, broke into Ardon, captured the bridge and provided the enemy 23rd Panzer Division with an advantageous springboard for the offensive. After this, the 23rd Panzer Division turned south and, overcoming the stubborn defense of units of the 10th Rifle Corps, attacking from two directions, captured the city of Alagir. Along the long mountain flank, the Romanian mountain riflemen advanced step by step and replaced the guard units of the 23rd Panzer Division.

The 13th German Panzer Division, standing in front of Ardon, passed through the city, abandoned at night by Soviet units, which was under heavy artillery fire. While security was being provided to the north, Colonel von Hacke's battle group with light infantry guns passed through numerous defensive positions of the Soviet troops, crossing a large number of streams and small rivers. The battle group of von Hacke, rapidly advancing in a south-easterly direction along the western bank of Fiagdon, sought to find a ford to ensure a crossing. It was assumed that a suitable location would be found south of the village of Fiagdon, but even there the Soviet defense turned out to be very strong. By evening, von Hacke's battle group had created a strong bridgehead south of the settlements of Fiagdon and Rassvet.

Enemy aircraft carried out a strong bombing attack on Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz), dropping up to 650 high-explosive bombs of various calibers on the city. As a result of the air raid, numerous fires started in the capital of North Ossetia, killing many civilians. A group of leading front workers also became victims of the bombing. The chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General I.P., was mortally wounded. Bodin and member of the Front Military Council, State Security Commissioner of the 3rd rank A.N. Sajaya. The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic A.S. was killed. Zodelava.

Black Sea group of forces. Tuapse defensive operation. The group's troops, developing an offensive along the Pshish River valley, in the Perevalny, Goytkh sector, completed the encirclement and destruction of the Semashkh group of the 17th German Army. In the area of ​​Sosnovaya Shchel, Kirkorovo, units of the 56th Army repelled enemy attempts to break through to Sadovoye.

Units of the 18th Army reached the northern bank of the Pshish River, continuing to slowly move forward in some areas.

November 1, 1943. 863rd day of the war

1st Baltic Front. The forces of the front, with the forces of the right-flank formations of the 4th Shock Army, continued to fight to improve their positions and, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, by 19:00 they captured 15 settlements, including Pogoreloye and Khmelinets.

Battle of the Dnieper.

1st Ukrainian Front. North of Kyiv, the 38th, 3rd Guards Tank Army, 5th Guards Tank and 7th Artillery Breakthrough Corps and a large number of artillery units and other types of troops were concentrated on the Lyutezh bridgehead.

South of Kyiv, the 27th and 40th armies went on the offensive from the Bukrinsky bridgehead. The enemy, relying on a developed network of defensive structures, offered strong fire resistance to the advancing army units. In addition, the German command urgently transferred to this direction the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich", which was in reserve, and parts of two infantry divisions of the 8th Army, which had previously operated against the 2nd Ukrainian Front. As a result of stubborn battles, formations of the 27th and 40th armies moved forward slightly and captured the village of Canada.

2nd Ukrainian Front. Pyatikhat operation. The troops of the left wing of the front continued to engage in fierce battles with a large enemy tank group, which was trying to break through in a northern and northeastern direction.

The enemy delivered the main blow in the defense zone of the 37th and 5th Guards Tank Army, where up to 120 tanks and up to the enemy infantry division operated. As a result of fierce battles, the enemy, having lost 42 tanks, was thrown back to their original position.

3rd Ukrainian Front. Dnepropetrovsk operation. Front troops continued to conduct offensive battles in the same directions. Having met stubborn resistance from the enemy, and having repelled repeated counterattacks by his infantry and tanks, the advancing units made little progress only on the right flank of the 46th Army.

Units of the 12th Army continued to conduct heavy battles with the counterattacking enemy in the area of ​​​​the village of New Kichkas.

4th Ukrainian Front. Melitopol operation. Front troops continued the offensive in all directions, part of the forces crossed the Sivash ford and fought on the Perekop Isthmus south of the Turkish Wall. By the end of the day, the advancing units had advanced from 4 to 26 kilometers and captured 96 settlements.

Formed in the fall of 1941 in the Volsky district of the Saratov region, the 346th Rifle Division of the 10th Rifle Corps of the 51st Army crossed the Sivash and captured 4 settlements on the southern shore of the bay. The soldiers of the formation crossed the Sivash ford, waist-deep in icy water.

Having overcome the fortifications of the Turkish Wall, part of the forces of the 4th Guards Cavalry and 19th Tank Corps broke through to the city of Armyansk.

During the day, the front troops lost 319 people killed and 1,367 people wounded.

North Caucasus Front. Kerch-Eltigen landing operation At night, the landing force of the 18th Army (318th Infantry Division, battalion of the 255th Marine Brigade, 386th Separate Marine Battalion) crossed the Kerch Strait and began to land in the Eltigen area (south of Kerch). The units that reached the Crimean coast quickly attacked the enemy. On the first night they captured a bridgehead 6 kilometers along the front and 2 kilometers in depth.

Since the landing of the troops of the 56th Army did not take place that night, the enemy threw all his reserves against the Eltigen landing force at dawn. Enemy infantry and assault guns rushed towards the paratroopers. Thanks to the support of artillery and aviation, the Soviet landing force repelled the attacks, although the enemy had to narrow the captured bridgehead to 1.5-2 kilometers in depth and 4-5 kilometers along the front. With the onset of darkness, subsequent echelons began landing. It took place with considerable losses, but still 2,370 people landed during the night.

November 1, 1944. 1229th day of the war

4th Ukrainian Front. The front troops partly conducted offensive battles in certain directions, but having encountered stubborn resistance from fresh enemy units, they had no success in advancing.

2nd Ukrainian Front. Budapest operation . Front troops continued to advance. The right-flank formations of the front, having reached the Zagony-Yalapar sector on the eastern bank of the Tissa River, fought to take possession of the crossings and, in certain directions, completed clearing the eastern bank of this river from the enemy. The left-flank 46th Army, repelling counterattacks by enemy infantry and tanks, advanced up to 30 kilometers in certain directions by the end of the day.

During the day, front troops captured 210 settlements, including a large junction of highways and railways - the city of Kecskemet.

Soviet troops captured up to 2 thousand German-Hungarian soldiers and officers, including the former Chief of the General Staff of the Hungarian Army, Colonel General J. Veres.

Sources:

Materials from the Internet sites “Wikipedia”, “Memory of the People” (Journals of combat operations of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts for November 1941; Transcaucasian Front for November 1942; 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts for November 1943; 2nd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts for November 1944).

Battle of Moscow. Chronicle, facts, people.: In 2 books. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2001. - Book. 1.

Battle of Stalingrad . Chronicle, facts, people.: In 2 books. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002. - Book. 1.

Guide to the liberation of cities during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1985.

Tike V. March to the Caucasus. The battle for oil. 1942/1943. - M.: Eksmo, 2005.

November 2, 1941. 134th day of the war

Battle for Leningrad.

Tikhvin defensive operation . Marine battalions of the Ladoga Military Flotilla took up defensive positions 30 kilometers south of Volkhovstroy.

Battle for Moscow.

Kalinin Front. Kalinin defensive operation. Front troops on the right wing and in the center fought local battles in individual sectors and held back the advance of the VI German Army Corps between the Darkness and Volga rivers.

The 29th Army under the command of a native of the Chalykla station in the Saratov region, Lieutenant General of the NKVD troops I.I. Maslennikov, restrained the advance of the enemy VI Army Corps in the direction of Zaborovye, Mikheevo, Mednoye. By 17 o'clock the enemy occupied Mikheevo, Shepelevo and advanced units reached the Darkness River in the Golykhino area.

The 31st Army on the right flank held back the advance of the German 161st Infantry Division, which crossed the Volga River, and on the left flank it launched attacks on the northwestern part of the city of Kalinin (Tver).

Bryansk front. Tula defensive operation. Front troops under the command of a native of the village of Shilovo, Saratov region, Major General G.F. Zakharov, fought stubborn battles with the enemy in the areas of Tula and Kursk.

Units of the 50th Army repelled attacks by the XXIV Motorized Corps of the 2nd German Tank Army on Tula.

The 13th Army took up defensive positions on the main defensive line, waging a stubborn battle with the enemy for Kursk

The 2nd Guards Rifle Division, together with units of the people's militia, fought street battles in the city of Kursk with units of the 9th Tank and 95th Infantry Divisions of the XLVIII Motorized Corps of the 2nd German Army, advancing on the city from the north. As a result of the battle, the enemy captured the northern outskirts of Kursk and the armored train at the Glazunovka station. In the Popovka and Sapogovo area, up to 2 German infantry battalions crossed the Tuskar River. Army units blew up all the bridges across Tuskar in the city and burned the communications center.

The 3rd Army, defending the Efremov area with part of its forces, concentrated in the Troitskoye - Efremov - Stanovaya area.

Southern front. Donbass defensive operation. Front troops fought with the enemy in the Pervomaisky, Gorlovsky and Shterovsky directions.

Formations of the 12th Army defended the occupied lines and fought with the enemy east of Artyomovsk, Gorlovka, Verovka, Ordzhonikidze.

Units of the 18th Army fought stubborn battles with the enemy, who was advancing with up to 3 infantry divisions with tanks, in the Andreevka, Dmitrievka sector. By the end of the day, the battle continued in the Knyaginevka area and in the area of ​​​​height 158 ​​(8 kilometers northeast of Dmitrievka), where the enemy managed to push back the right flank of the motorized group of Colonel M.V. Kolosova.

November 2 , 1942 . 499th day of the war

Battle of Stalingrad.

Stalingrad defensive operation.

Stalingrad Front . Front troops continued to hold their previous positions and partly repelled several attacks by infantry and tanks of the 6th German Army in the Spartakovka, , .

The 62nd Army repelled repeated attacks by infantry and tanks of the German 6th Army in the northern and central part of Stalingrad (Volgograd) and held its positions. The enemy, having pulled up new forces from the depths and poured reinforcements into the active units, from 7 o'clock in the morning went on the offensive on the northern sector of the front on Spartakovka with more than an infantry regiment with tanks and 2 infantry divisions with 35-40 tanks in the central sector. Bringing reserves into battle, the enemy in some areas launched attacks up to 5 times, leading to hand-to-hand combat. All day long, enemy aviation continuously bombed the offensive zone with groups of planes, and in some cases stormed the battle formations of army troops in groups of up to 30 planes at a time. Enemy artillery and mortars fired heavily at the battle formations of Soviet units and crossings. In the middle of the day, the approach from the west to the area and “Red October” of convoys with troops and cargo in the amount of 100 vehicles was noted. At the same time, infantry groups were observed advancing from the village of Krasny Oktyabr to the plant.

The rifle brigades of the Northern Group of the 62nd Army fought a hard battle all day with enemy infantry and tanks advancing on the southern and northwestern outskirts of Spartakovka; during the battle, 5 fierce attacks were repulsed. The group held its lines.

The 138th Rifle Division repelled four enemy attacks from the STZ along the Volga bank to the south. The division held its positions.

During the day, the 193rd Rifle Division repelled repeated fierce attacks by the Nazis in the direction of the pier, which remained the only equipped pier in the entire army.

The 45th Rifle Division, having launched a counterattack on its left flank, somewhat improved its position. The enemy attacks were repulsed.

The 39th Guards Rifle Division launched a counterattack and by the end of the day was fighting at the line of the workshops; iron foundry, blooming, gauge and finished product warehouse. In the sectors of the remaining parts of the army, Soviet troops, repelling attacks by small groups of the enemy, continued assault operations in groups and detachments.

Battle for the Caucasus.

Transcaucasian Front . Northern Group of Forces. Nalchik-Ordzhonikidze defensive operation. In the morning, units of the 1st German Tank Army broke through the outer perimeter of the Ordzhonikidze fortified area and advanced units reached the suburbs. By the end of the day, they captured the village of Gizel, located 8 kilometers west of Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz). Further advance of the German troops was stopped by the approaching reserves of the Northern Group, commanded by a native of the Chalykla station in the Saratov region, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov.

At 6 o'clock in the morning the Nazis resumed their offensive in the Darg Koch area. A group of the XIII Anti-Tank Battalion and the 5th Company of the Brandenburg Regiment, after the capture of Ardon, headed in a north-easterly direction to capture the railway and highway bridges at Darg Koch and, if necessary, repel an attack from the Soviet units from the flank.

After careful preparation, the enemy combat group captured the railway bridge on the move. The Soviet units, taken by surprise, came to their senses after some time and launched a counterattack. From the commanding heights, the Germans, holed up on the railway bridge, came under systematic fire from heavy artillery. Her firing positions, located for firing in a northern direction, were turned to the left and entered the battle. The raid of German dive bombers only briefly brought relief to the Nazis. The 370th Infantry Division, which was supposed to advance from its positions near Elkhotovo in a southern direction in order to reach the bridges on the eastern bank of the Terek, was unable to move forward. Therefore, the German group that captured the bridge was forced to leave it. However, she managed to cover the bridge with machine gun fire.

The Hake battle group of the 13th German tank division also resumed the offensive, which, after a stubborn battle, captured the village of Gisel and broke through the outer perimeter of the Ordzhonikidze fortified area.

The enemy's 23rd Panzer Division continued its offensive to the east. While Brückner's battle group was guarded at Alagir, Burmeister's battle group captured Khataldon almost unopposed, crossed the undestroyed bridge over Fiagdon and, bypassing Dzaurikau, reached a fork in the roads east of it.

Units of the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps, carrying out a raid to the rear of the Mozdok group of the 1st German Tank Army, in the Achikulak area, met stubborn resistance from units of the enemy’s special corps “F”.

Black Sea group of forces. Tuapse defensive operation. The group's troops, repelling counterattacks by units of the 17th German Army, consolidated on the northern bank of the Pshish River, in the Perevalny, Goytkh sector, and continued to fight to destroy the remaining enemy groups in the area of ​​Mount Semashkho, east of Mount Indyuk and Procheva Gully.

November 2 , 1943. 864th day of the war

1st Baltic Front. Front troops with the right-flank formations of the 4th Shock Army continued the offensive and, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, advanced 2-5 kilometers and liberated 27 settlements.

Battle of the Dnieper.

Belorussian Front. The troops of the left wing of the front fought stubborn battles with the enemy, who attacked the positions of units of the 61st and 65th armies. By 18 o'clock all enemy attacks were repulsed. 250 corpses of German soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield.

1st Ukrainian Front. Front troops with the forces of the 27th and 40th armies resumed the offensive on the Bukrinsky bridgehead. The enemy, having met the advancing units with powerful fire from all types of weapons, repelled the attacks of the Soviet troops.

3rd Ukrainian Front. Dnepropetrovsk operation. Front troops continued to conduct offensive battles in the same directions. Having met stubborn resistance from the enemy, and having repelled repeated counterattacks by his infantry and tanks, the advancing units made little progress only on the right flank of the 46th Army.

4th Ukrainian Front. Melitopol operation. Front troops continued the offensive in all directions, advanced in the center and on the left wing from 4 to 42 kilometers, and captured 61 settlements, including Kakhovka and Skadovsky.

During the day, the front troops lost 278 people killed and 969 people wounded.

North Caucasus Front. Kerch-Eltigen landing operation . At 2 p.m., the landing of the 1st Guards Rifle Regiment of the 2nd Guards Taman Rifle Division and the 369th Marine Battalion was completed in Temryuk. 5 detachments consisted of small ships: boat minesweepers, small hunters, seiners. Detachments of landing ships followed 4 assault groups of armored boats. At 21:45 they arrived at the start line. By this time, the aviation intended to support the landing was also ready for action. A little later, 28 ships with landing troops approached the tactical deployment line. The rest were still on the way when 420 guns, 2 guard mortar regiments of the 56th Army and aircraft of the 4th Air Army began processing the landing areas near Kerch.

In the Eltigen area, the enemy launched up to 20 counterattacks.

November 2 , 1944. 1230th day of the war

1st Baltic Front. Baltic operation. Front troops with the forces of the 4th Shock, 61st and 5th Guards Tank armies continued the offensive and, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, advanced from 5 to 10 kilometers.

Formations of the 6th Guards and 51st Army repelled attacks by enemy infantry and tanks. As a result of repeated attacks, the enemy managed to push back units of the 1st Guards Rifle Corps of the 51st Army and capture the village of Ratynieki.

2nd Belorussian Front. In the Ostrow-Mazowiecki direction, front troops under the command of a native of the village of Shilovo, Saratov region, Army General G.F. Zakharov, expanded the Ruzhansky bridgehead on the Narev River to 43 kilometers along the front and up to 20 kilometers in depth.

The Lomza-Ruzhany offensive operation ended. The irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 11,771 people, 7.6% of the initial number of troops, totaling 57,621 soldiers and officers.

1st Belorussian Front. The Serock offensive operation ended. The irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 23,090 or 8.6% of the initial number of troops, totaling 101,445 soldiers and officers.

1st Ukrainian Front . The military operations of the front forces to expand the bridgehead on the Vistula River in the Sandomierz area have ended. The irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 5,279 people or 2.6% of the initial number of formations and units, the total losses were 26,023 soldiers and officers.

2nd Ukrainian Front. Budapest operation . The front troops continued their offensive. On the right flank of the front, Soviet troops, having cleared the eastern bank of the Tissa River from the enemy, fought for crossings and regrouped; on the left flank, developing a rapid offensive, mobile formations advanced up to 40 kilometers and by the end of the day they began fighting on the near approaches to Budapest.

As a result of the battles, front troops captured 126 settlements, including the city of Nadkeres. During the day, Soviet troops captured 500 German-Hungarian soldiers and officers.

Sources:

Materials from the Internet sites “Wikipedia”, “Memory of the People” (Journals of combat operations of the Southern Front for November 1941; Transcaucasian Front for November 1942; 1st Baltic, 1st, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts for November 1943; 1st Baltic and 2nd Ukrainian fronts for November 1944).

Battle of Moscow. Chronicle, facts, people.: In 2 books. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2001. - Book. 1.

Battle of Stalingrad . Chronicle, facts, people.: In 2 books. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002. - Book. 1.

Guide to the liberation of cities during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1985.

Tike V. March to the Caucasus. The battle for oil. 1942/1943. - M.: Eksmo, 2005.

November 3, 1941. 135th day of the war

Battle for Moscow.

Western Front. Front troops continued defensive work on the occupied lines, repelling repeated attacks by enemy infantry and tanks in the Mozhaisk direction.

The 5th Army on the right flank was consolidated on the line it occupied and in the center repelled repeated attacks by enemy infantry and tanks.

The 50th Rifle, 82nd Motorized Rifle Divisions and 22nd Tank Brigade, having repulsed enemy attacks, occupied the previous line of defense.

The 49th Army on the right flank, with units of the 5th Guards and 60th Rifle Divisions, held back the Nazi counterattacks, as a result of which parts of the divisions were pushed back by the enemy 1-1.5 kilometers from the Voronino-Senyatino-Maleevo line.

The 238th Rifle Division fought with enemy reconnaissance groups in the Panskoye area, pushing them back from the Boloto and Danilovka areas.

Bryansk front. Tula defensive operation. Front troops under the command of a native of the village of Shilovo, Saratov region, Major General G.F. Zakharov, fought with units of the enemy’s 2nd Tank and 2nd Field Armies in the areas of Tula and Kursk.

The 50th Army, holding the city of Tula, fought with units of the 2nd German Tank Army at crossings across the Upa River in the Pavshino-Voskresenskoye sector.

The 194th Rifle Division, holding the line Pavshino - Bredikhino station, repelled enemy attempts to cross the Upa on the Pavshino - Voskresenskoye section.

The 3rd Army continued to defend itself in the Efremov area.

The 13th Army, fighting with units of the 2nd German Army in the Kursk area, continued to gain a foothold on the main defensive line.

The 2nd Guards Rifle Division, after stubborn battles with formations of the XLVIII Motorized Corps, left the city of Kursk.

Southern front. Donbass defensive operation. Front troops fought with the enemy in the Gorlovka, Artyomovsk and Shterovsky directions.

Units of the 12th Army repelled repeated attacks by the enemy's advanced and reconnaissance detachments in the areas of Reznikovka, Zvonovka, Gorlovka, and Verovka.

Units of the 18th Army fought stubborn battles with the enemy in the areas of Knyaginevka, Novo-Pavlovka, height 158 ​​(10 kilometers northeast of Dmitrievka).

As a result of a counterattack by units of the 395th Infantry Division, the German 13th Mountain Jaeger Regiment of the 4th Mountain Division was driven out of Novo-Pavlovka and retreated in disarray across the Glukhaya River.

Crimean defensive operation . The troops of the 11th German Army occupied Feodosia.

Coastal Army. Defense of Sevastopol . Advancing from the direction of Simferopol, the advanced units of the German LIV Army Corps of the 11th Field Army came into contact with the Soviet marines, who took up defense at the forward line of the Sevastopol fortified area, running along the Arapchi - Duvankoy - Chorgun line - east of Balaklava.

November 3, 1942 . 500th day of war

Battle of Stalingrad.

Southwestern Front . The representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Army General G.K. Zhukov, held a meeting at the headquarters of the 5th Tank Army to work out the main issues of operational interaction between the fronts and armies according to the plan for the offensive operation “Uranus”.

Stalingrad defensive operation.

Stalingrad Front . The front troops, holding their positions, part of their forces continued to repel attacks by infantry and tanks of the 6th German Army in the Red October and Red October areas; the other part of the forces fought unsuccessful offensive battles in the Kuporosnoye area.

During the day, the 62nd Army held its previous defense lines in Stalingrad (Volgograd) and repelled enemy attacks.

Units of the Northern Group repelled two attacks by units of the 6th German Army.

The 138th Rifle Division repelled the attack to an enemy infantry company in the direction of the Derevensk area and to an infantry battalion with tanks from the southeastern corner towards Taimyrsk.

The 95th Rifle Division repelled an enemy attack launched by forces up to an infantry battalion along Stalnaya Street.

The 39th Guards Rifle Division repelled an attack by a German infantry battalion in the area.

The right-flank formations of the 64th Army fought offensive battles with units of the 4th German Tank Army in the Vitriol Balka area.

Units of the 96th and 97th Rifle Brigades of the 7th Rifle Corps fought offensive battles with the goal of capturing the Kuporosnaya Balka area and the Kvadratnaya grove (2 kilometers west of Kuporosnaya Balka), but, encountering strong enemy fire resistance, were unsuccessful.

Battle for the Caucasus.

Transcaucasian front. Northern Group of Forces. Nalchik-Ordzhonikidze defensive operation. The troops of the group under the command of a native of the Chalykla station in the Saratov region, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov, having stopped the retreat, stopped the further advance of units of the III Tank Corps of the 1st German Tank Army, continued to fight west of Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz), repelling enemy attacks in the area of ​​Kardzhin, Nart, Nogir, Gizel.

The losses of the German 13th Panzer Division were 67 killed, 159 wounded and 6 missing.

Units of the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps fought fierce battles with units of the Special Corps “F” for the capture of the village of Achikulak.

Black Sea group of forces. Tuapse defensive operation. The group's troops repelled a counterattack by units of the 17th German Army in the Perevalny area and consolidated their position on the occupied lines.

November 3 , 1943. 865th day of the war

1st Baltic Front. Front troops with the forces of the right-flank 60th Rifle Corps of the 4th Shock Army continued the offensive and, overcoming fierce enemy resistance, by the end of the day occupied 25 settlements, including Dudchino, Bolshoye Pushkaryovo, Glinovka, Bordino, Filiptsevo.

Battle of the Dnieper.

1st Ukrainian Front. The Kiev offensive operation began, which lasted until November 13, 1943.

In the morning, the 38th Army launched an attack on Kyiv from the Lyutezh bridgehead. Soviet units broke through the first enemy defense position and slowly continued to advance forward. The fighting took place mainly in forests, which stretched for many kilometers near Kyiv. The enemy put up stubborn resistance, throwing the 20th Panzer-Grenadier Division into battle against units of the 38th Army.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, attaching great importance to the offensive that had begun from the Lyutezh bridgehead, in the evening ordered the front commander “not to delay the operation begun on the right wing of the front, since every extra day only gives an advantage to the enemy, allowing him to concentrate his forces here, using good roads, whereas in our country the roads destroyed by the enemy make maneuver difficult and limiting.” Headquarters demanded that Kiev be captured no later than November 5-6. The directive stated that the Kiev bridgehead is the most important and most advantageous bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper River, which is of exceptional importance for the expulsion of the Germans from Right Bank Ukraine.

3rd Ukrainian Front Dnepropetrovsk operation. The troops of the right wing of the front continued their offensive in the southwestern direction and captured 7 settlements with the forces of the 46th Army.

4th Ukrainian Front. Melitopol operation. The troops of the right wing repelled enemy counterattacks in certain areas and fought on the same lines. In the Kherson direction, Soviet troops, overcoming the resistance of the rearguard units of the 6th German Army, continued to reach the Dnieper River.

In the Perekop direction, units of the 51st Army overcame the defenses of units of the 17th German Army on the Turkish Wall and linked up with units of the 19th Tank Corps that had previously been surrounded in the Armyansk area.

During the day, the front troops lost 310 people killed and 1,137 people wounded.

North Caucasus Front. Kerch-Eltigen landing operation . On the night of November 3, units of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps of the 56th Army landed in the area of ​​​​Gleika, Zhukovka, Opasnaya. The command of the 17th German Army had to transfer part of its forces here. This made the situation a little easier for the Eltigen landing party. In total, 9,418 people were already fighting on the bridgehead in the Eltigen area by the end of the day.

November 3 , 1944 1231st day of the war

1st Baltic Front. Baltic operation. Front troops with the forces of the 14th Rifle Corps of the 4th Shock Army, the 61st, 5th Guards Tank and part of the forces of the 51st Army continued the offensive in the Libau direction. Having encountered fierce resistance from formations of Army Group North, Soviet troops made little progress.

The front troops fought particularly stubborn battles to hold the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Shtärvelis and Zelda rivers, in the Drunka area.

4th Ukrainian Front. Front troops with the forces of the 107th Rifle Corps of the 1st Guards Army and the 18th Rifle Corps of the 18th Army resumed the offensive in the general direction of Mikhalovets. The advancing units, meeting stubborn enemy resistance, made little progress.

2nd Ukrainian Front. Budapest operation. The troops of the left wing of the front continued the offensive, advanced up to 25 kilometers and fought on the immediate approaches to the city of Budapest.

As a result of the battles, Soviet troops captured 67 settlements and captured up to 1 thousand German-Hungarian soldiers and officers.

Sources:

Materials from the Internet sites “Wikipedia”, “Memory of the People” (Journals of combat operations of the Southern Front for November 1941; Transcaucasian Front for November 1942; 1st Baltic, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts for November 1943; 1 of the Baltic, 4th and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts for November 1944).

Battle of Moscow. Chronicle, facts, people.: In 2 books. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2001. - Book. 1.

Battle of Stalingrad . Chronicle, facts, people.: In 2 books. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002. - Book. 1.

Guide to the liberation of cities during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1985.

Tike V. March to the Caucasus. The battle for oil. 1942/1943. - M.: Eksmo, 2005.

Bukrin

Accumulating forces on the Bukrinsky bridgehead took time. And the enemy threw large forces of tanks and especially aviation there.

“[...] 60 - 70 kilometers from the front line we saw a black cloud. The Nazis were accelerating, it was clear when they were flying”18 (former fighter pilot Sergei Gorelov)

.

“Fate gave me happiness - I avoided the bombing of the checkpoint by German aircraft with a force of up to 250 aircraft. Major Kravtsov was torn in half at the waist, another was torn into small shreds and mixed with the ground... At the time of the raid, I was driving into the 206th Rifle Division. - Auth.

] and watched this terrible sight.
Apparently, it’s not time to die yet”19 (Chief of Corps Staff Alexey Chichin, diary entry)
.

“The ground literally shook. The glow of explosions evenly covered the entire area occupied by the troops on the bridgehead. […] Ahead is the command post [command observation post. - Auth.

] an inaccessible tank ravine, from where two commands were heard: “forverts” [“forward” -
Author.
] and "foyer" ["fire".
- Author]
.
But the enemy infantry also did not come under machine-gun fire”20 (Alexander Lebedintsev)
.

However, Soviet attempts to advance from the Bukrin bridgehead were also thwarted by skillfully controlled artillery fire and tank counterattacks.

“The attack of the Russian infantry is a terrible sight: long gray chains of wildly screaming soldiers are approaching you […] And again, wave after wave of Russian infantry stubbornly rushed to the attack, but each time they rolled back, suffering huge losses”21 (former corps chief of staff Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin)

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Events of November 7–8, 1943 near Fastov: “with great difficulty they managed to break away from the Russians...”

According to the documents of the 9th MK and the memoirs of Corps Commander Malygin, the advance detachment of the 69th Mechanized Brigade (1st Motorized Infantry Battalion armored with tanks of the 47th Guards Tank Regiment) on the night of November 7-8 passed along the Chervona-Bertniki route and did not meet anyone . But the main forces of the brigade were fired upon from the forest area northwest of Chervona by units of the 146th Civil Aviation Regiment. Due to a lack of fuel, worn-out equipment, and the road muddy from rain, initially only a few lead tanks and 70 motorized infantry entered the battle with the Germans. However, deciding that some half-dead retreating Germans had settled in the forest, the tank crews and soldiers of the 69th brigade went on the attack, but were met with heavy fire. The situation was changed by the approach of the remaining forces, especially the tanks of the 47th Guards, at 16.00 on November 8. ttp.

According to our data, the following were hit and destroyed: 3 anti-tank missiles, 12 armored vehicles, 10 motorcycles, 30 armored personnel carriers and up to 2 infantry companies. Captured: 5 guns, 10 motorcycles and 20 armored personnel carriers. The report especially highlighted the fact of the capture of the headquarters of the 146th airborne regiment.

47th Guards TTP then advanced even further to the Kozhanka station, engaging in battle with an " infantry battalion with tanks and a battery of" Ferdinands

" The habit of seeing terrible “Ferdinands” in every self-propelled gun with a rear wheelhouse (and often without it) took root in Soviet units after Kursk and flourished until the very end of the war. However, since the heavy tank destroyers that survived the “fiery arc” were at that moment fighting on another sector of the front, for the 47th Guards. ttp everything ended well.

«As a result of the battle, the enemy retreated 2 km into the forest. northwestern st. Kozhanka, having lost 2 tanks, 1 Ferdinand and up to two companies of infantry. Trophies of the regiment - 1 tanks, 2 armored personnel carriers, 14 vehicles... The regiment lost 11 people killed, 5 people wounded, tanks - T-34 -2, MK tanks .3 –3».

It is curious that the combat report of the headquarters of the 9th MK for November 8 indicated that up to 12 tanks were destroyed during the day of fighting, of which three were Tigers (one was taken in good condition). The seizure of staff documents of the 146th Civil Regiment is also mentioned.

The next contender is the 55th Guards Tank Brigade of Colonel Dragunsky. According to the order on November 7, 1943, the 55th Guards Tank Brigade with the SU-85 battery of the 1442nd SUP and the advance detachment of the 54th Guards Tank Brigade had the task of capturing the village of Povoloch (route Palyanichentsy - Malopolovetskoye - Noveselitsa - Povoloch). Moreover, the colonel’s version exists in two, and if you count the memoirs, then in three forms. According to the combat report transmitted on November 8, the brigade by the evening of November 6 had 19 T-34s and two SU-76s (the attached SU-152s lagged behind). It is further indicated that during the day of November 7, the brigade fought “ with the main forces of the fresh 25th TD

“, while she did not encounter any tanks in battle, and it was mainly motorized infantry that was destroyed - in total more than 200 different vehicles, 15 armored personnel carriers, 3 self-propelled guns.

In the team's later report, the "sturgeon" had grown substantially and mutated. According to him, on November 7, the 55th Guards Tank Brigade in the Pilipovka-Korolevka area defeated the forward detachment of the 25th Tank Division, destroying “ up to 35 armored personnel carriers, 2 tanks, 2 guns

", then in the Trilesa area, the reconnaissance brigade met the main forces of the 25th Panzer Division, bypassed them from the south and, going out on its route, crushed the remnants of the retreating 75th Infantry Division in the Malopolovetskoye area. The very next day, the 55th Guards Tank Brigade collided on the march with the regiment of the 25th Tank Division in the Yakhna-Novoselitsa area and dispersed it within an hour, capturing four hundred captured soldiers and officers alone, and also... defeating the headquarters of the 146th pgp with all documents. But the brave colonel didn’t stop there either; at 10 a.m., at the crossroads of the road from Popelnaya to Skviry, he set up the headquarters of the 25th TD itself and the “aviation group.”

Finally, the third contender is the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade. Everything here is generally very strange. According to the report of the 6th Guards Tank Corps, no battle with the 25th Tank Division is reflected in the documents. According to the report of the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade, on the morning of November 8, the brigade fought “with the approaching advanced enemy reserve units” in the Bertniki area and sought to advance in a southern direction, but there are no details in the report about this.

This is best described in Arkhipov’s memoirs. It states that on the afternoon of November 7, the advance detachment of the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade under the command of Lieutenant Yuri Shabrov was 10-12 km away. south of Fastov, he defeated the reconnaissance patrol of the 25th TD (according to the award sheet, he destroyed 18 vehicles and 45 soldiers, although it is not indicated there that these were units of the 25th TD). Based on his data, the 53rd Guards Tank Brigade ambushed the Germans and on the evening of November 7, first defeated the reconnaissance battalion of the 25th Tank Division (200 prisoners and captured 30 armored personnel carriers), and then early in the morning at about 3.30 or 4.00 on November 8 the brigade was ambushed 146th urban police station. where he was destroyed. At the same time, 72 units of armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles were burned.

It must be said that this claim looks most dubious - such a victory could not have been mentioned in a short combat report, but certainly it should have been described in a report compiled later and in a calmer environment. However, Arkhipov’s “application” to participate in the defeat of the 146th airborne regiment appeared only in his memoirs.

In general, it turns out that German units entered the gap between the 9th MK and 6th Guards Tank between the settlements of Trilesy and Kozhanka, and advanced reconnaissance units apparently reached the southwestern outskirts of Fastov. It is problematic to use the report of the 25th TD to describe events, since many settlements are not indicated in it. In addition, he apparently had to whitewash General Schell, who did nothing but rush around in an armored personnel carrier between units of the division and supposedly put them in order, withdraw them, force them to dig in and hold the line. As a result, the general abandoned this thankless task and found himself again in Bila Tserkva before the eyes of the commander of the XLVIII Panzer Corps, General Otto von Knobelsdorff. Most likely, the advanced units represented by the Ederman combat group, assembled on the basis of the 1st “armored personnel carrier” battalion of the 146th airborne regiment, were defeated in the Kozhanka-Trilesy area, and the 2nd battalion, traveling on trucks, was defeated in the area Lesser Polovtsian

To understand what happened, let’s look at the loss figures for the 25th TD, reflected in various reports. Let’s make a reservation right away - unfortunately, for November 7, there are no losses of the 25th Panzer Corps in the documents of the XLVIII Tank Corps, since it has not yet come under its subordination. According to the authors, the losses amounted to about 150 people. According to the XLVIII Tank Corps, as of November 8, 1943, the losses of the 25th Panzer Division included 16 killed, 52 wounded and 10 missing.

Thus, the defeat of the advanced units of the 25th TD on November 7–8 cost the division 220–230 people. According to Paul Carell, the main losses were suffered by the 6th and 9th companies of the 146th airborne regiment. The hundreds of prisoners described in the memoirs of Soviet authors during the defeat of the 25th TD are most likely the losses of the retreating defeated Luftwaffe units and various rear troops leaving from near Kyiv. According to the field gendarmerie, scattered groups of defeated units of the 25th TD later reached the Skvira-Belaya Tserkov line. As of November 7–8, the 146th Civil Regiment was indeed defeated and fled in panic, but later, due to the beginning of the defensive battles of the Soviet troops and the temporary static state of the front of the XLVIII Tank Corps, those who fled were collected and put in order.

It is impossible to estimate German losses in materiel for the period November 7-8, but according to the report of the XLVIII Tank Corps, compiled at 19:50 on November 8, the corps admitted that the advance detachment of the 25th Panzer Division fell into a trap and suffered heavy losses from Russian tank fire missing, as well as huge losses in vehicles. According to the division's data, it was Captain Ederman's motorized battalion that came under attack.

Nevertheless, even after the defeat of one of its regiments, the 25th Panzer Division was a very serious force, which, moreover, did not act alone.

To be continued:

Hold Fastov: the battle for the right bank of the Dnieper

Lutezh

Nevertheless, the Soviet command was no longer the same as in 41 and 42.

Stalin and Zhukov became more flexible. They changed the original plan, deciding to strike from the Lyutezh bridgehead (about 15 kilometers north of Kyiv). And Vatutin’s headquarters (since October 30, his front was called the 1st Ukrainian) managed to transfer an entire tank army and a lot of heavy artillery from Bukrinsky to Lyutezhsky in just a week. The army had to be transported twice across the Dnieper and once through the Desna, and the length of the column of only one breakthrough artillery corps reached 70 kilometers...

At the same time, the scale of the transfer was hidden from the enemy!

November 3, 38th Army (Colonel General Kirill Moskalenko)

struck from the Lyutezh bridgehead, bypassing Kyiv from the north-west.

The artillery fist was assembled in such a way that the enemy’s defense collapsed within a day.

“Herman pulled a dictionary out of his bag, frantically rummaged through it until he found the right word and repeated it several times with a desperate look in his eyes:

- Horrible! Horrible! Understand? Wow!

From the entire flow of words, I caught the general meaning: that France or Africa are a resort compared to today's battle. The Russians are firing Katyusha rockets. The roar and earthquake in the morning were mostly Katyushas. […] German units were crushed and destroyed. The forest is burning, the earth is burning. They themselves do not understand how they remained alive”22 (future writer, and then 14-year-old Kiev resident Anatoly Kuznetsov).

“I don’t know how to convey the feeling of excitement, almost delight, when you gallop, catching up with a regiment or squadron, across newly liberated territory. […] Horsemen, chaises, and artillery teams rush across the field, on roads and without roads, and loaded Studebakers roar on the hills. And this movement is not some random, at random, but purposeful: forward, forward to the west! […]

The population greets us joyfully. There are many Ukrainians in the battery, and Ukrainian words can often be heard. But during this victorious march, almost the entire battery personnel switches to the Ukrainian language, mercilessly distorting Russian words (almost like in Bulgakov’s play: “I’m thinking”)23 (former radio operator Alexey Rodin)

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This day in history: 1943 - Soviet troops liberated Kyiv

On November 6, 1943, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Army General Nikolai Vatutin liberated the city of Kiev from Nazi troops during the Kiev offensive operation.

The capital of Soviet Ukraine was captured by German troops in the third month of the Great Patriotic War. On September 26, 1941, the last soldiers of the Red Army defending the city left it. On the same day, units of the 6th Wehrmacht Army entered the city.

Soviet troops managed to return to Kyiv only two years later. At the end of September 1943, troops of the Voronezh Front (renamed the 1st Ukrainian Front at the end of October) captured bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper north and south of Kyiv and twice tried to liberate the city. The main blow was delivered from the Bukrinsky bridgehead, the auxiliary one - from the Lyutezhsky bridgehead.

On October 24, by order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the main efforts of the front were transferred to the Lyutezhsky bridgehead, where the 3rd Guards Tank Army, 23rd Rifle Corps, 7th Artillery Corps and other formations and units were secretly transferred from the Bukrinsky bridgehead. Thanks to the secrecy of the maneuvers, the enemy did not detect the regrouping of Soviet troops.

Thus, the Soviet command managed to secure a decisive advantage in the direction of the main attack. In the offensive zone of the Soviet troops was the German 4th Tank Army, which included 11 badly battered infantry divisions. In its reserve there were only 2 tank divisions, which also did not have time to be replenished after losses in the summer battles.

Kyiv itself was defended by units of the 7th Army Corps of the Wehrmacht. To cover the city from the north, the enemy built three fortified defense lines with a developed system of engineering fortifications. After capturing the city, the Soviet command planned to launch an offensive from the southern side, where they intended to introduce a powerful strike force into battle. In its first echelon alone there were up to 20 rifle divisions, 3-4 tank corps and 1 cavalry corps.

On November 1, the offensive began from the Bukrin bridgehead, the main goal of which was to pin down the enemy forces. On the morning of November 3, the main group of the front struck. After a 40-minute artillery barrage, Soviet troops advanced 1-2 km unhindered. By the end of the day, the troops of the 38th Army, together with the 5th Guards Tank Corps and formations of the 60th Army, advanced 5-12 km. At the same time, the 60th Army advanced from two neighboring bridgeheads near the villages of Kazarovichi and Glebovka and near the village of Yasnogorodka, covering the right, open flank of the 38th Army from the north and northwest.

The plan of the Soviet command was fully executed on time, which almost never happens in war conditions. By the end of the first day of the operation, the 240th Infantry Division, which directly attacked Kiev and was supported by units of the 7th Artillery Corps, was already in the Kiev suburb of Pushcha-Vodice. Even fierce German counterattacks, in which units of the 20th Motorized Division took part, could not prevent this.

By the end of November 4, units of the 38th Army, with the support of the 5th Guards Tank Corps and the 3rd Guards Tank Army, overcoming the fortified enemy defense line, advanced 5-6 km towards Kyiv from the north, reaching the suburb of Priorka and the northern border of the city. On November 4-5, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and the 3rd Guards Tank Army entered the battle, cutting the Kyiv-Zhitomir highway on the western outskirts of Kyiv.

The liberation of the capital of Ukraine was also helped by the crossing of the Dnieper on November 4 by the forces of the 237th Infantry Division in the area of ​​​​Kazachiy Island, which is opposite the villages of Vita-Litovskaya and Pirogovo, located 15 km south of Kyiv. At Vita-Litovskaya, Soviet units were able to seize the highway leading to Kyiv along the banks of the Dnieper.

Thus, the Germans could not transfer reinforcements to Kyiv from the Bukrinsky bridgehead area. Under these conditions, the German command considered further holding positions in the Kyiv area dangerous. There was a risk of repeating the fate of the Soviet group, which two years ago was surrounded here, executing the order of Headquarters to hold Kyiv “at any cost.”

To avoid the cauldron, on the morning of November 5, the enemy began a general retreat along the highway to Vasilkov. By the morning of November 6, Soviet units entered the city - Kyiv was liberated.

The operation to liberate Kyiv is characterized by important strategic and political results and quite logically chosen directions of attacks bypassing Kyiv (cutting two highways leading from the city to the south and west). To carry out the operation, the required number of troops were allocated, which completed all assigned tasks.

In addition, the timing of the operation was chosen very wisely. Thanks to intelligence data, the Soviet command knew that in early November the command of Army Group South could not use its mobile reserves in the form of tank and motorized divisions near Kiev. The fact is that at this time the Germans were planning a counterattack in the lower reaches of the Dnieper - near Krivoy Rog, Apostolovo and Nikopol. This was one of the important factors why the battles for the liberation of Kyiv for the German side generally degenerated into passive withdrawal and a series of holding battles.

Building on their success, Soviet troops liberated Fastov on November 7, and Zhitomir on November 13. Units of the German 7th Army Corps stopped their retreat only 50 km south of Kyiv. The 60th and 13th armies, which continued the offensive, reached the line north of Narovlya, Yelsk, Ovruch, and east of Korosten by the end of the month.

Also on this day:

1923 - armed uprising of workers in Krakow

1860 - Abraham Lincoln elected President of the United States

Kyiv is ours!

“The night was illuminated by fires, and the further we went from the western outskirts of Kyiv, the higher the almost motionless glow rose above it. Hitler’s torchbearers were in a hurry to burn the city”24 (former tank brigade commander Vasily Arkhipov)

.

Back at the end of October, the people of Kiev were “announced: the city of Kyiv is being evacuated to Germany, the city will no longer exist. It was eerily similar to the Jewish march in 1941. Masses of people walked - with howling children, with the elderly and the sick, bundles intercepted by rope, shabby plywood suitcases, wallets, boxes with tools... Some grandmother carried a wreath of onions thrown over her neck. Infants were carried several at a time in a stroller, the sick were carried on their backs”25 (Anatoly Kuznetsov)…

The memories of Kyiv teenager Tolik Kuznetsov about the last days of the occupation are difficult to quote. You need to read them in their entirety...

On November 6, 1943, in order not to fall into the “cauldron”, the Germans left Kyiv.

ACCOUNT OF THE MOTHERLAND

General characteristics of the era

The period from November 1942 to the end of 1943 is called a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War. During this period, such important events took place as the Battle of Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk, the famous tank battle of Prokhorovka, Kharkov was liberated during Operation Commander Rumyantsev, and the Tehran Conference was held to open a second front. I will focus on two of them.

EXPLODED ICONS, BOOKS, NOTES

• Before leaving Kyiv, the Germans destroyed:

• Assumption Cathedral of the Kiev Pechersk Lavra

• city ​​public library

• conservatory

• building of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR

• university

• Zoo museum

• power plant

• plumbing

• all bridges

• all overpasses

• most medical institutions

• 140 schools

• 940 buildings of state and public organizations

• over 800 enterprises

• the best cinemas and clubs

PS

“The main units of the advancing army entered the city through Kurenevka. […]

They were dirty, sooty, tired, amazingly dear, familiar, amazingly the same ones who left in 1941. They walked out of step, baggy, with prosaically clanking bowler hats. Some, apparently having broken their legs to pieces, walked barefoot, carrying their boots over their shoulders and heavily stepping with their red feet on the ground, already frozen from the November frosts”26 (Anatoly Kuznetsov).

1. Karpov A.Yu. Yaroslav the Wise. M., 2001. P. 155. 2. History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945. T. 6. M., 1965. P. 67. 3. Kirsanov S. Passing song // Kirsanov S. Favorites. M., 1949. S. 160-161. 4. Lebedintsev A.Z., Mukhin Yu.I. Fathers-commanders. M., 2004. P. 159. 5. Smolnikov F. We are fighting! Diary of a front-line soldier. Letters from the front. M., 2000. pp. 182-183. 6. Pershanin V. “We plowed half of Europe on our bellies...” M., 2010. P. 121-122. 7. Vormann N., von. Tscherkassy. Heidelberg, 1954. S. 11. 8. Sayer G. The Last Soldier of the Third Reich. M., 2002. P. 259. 9. Pershanin V. Decree. Op. P. 412. 10. Smolnikov F. Decree. Op. P. 187-188.\ 11. Kobylyansky I.G. Direct fire at the enemy. M., 2005. P. 128. 12. Diary of a German officer // Military History Journal. 1991. N 8. P. 22. 13. Pershanin V. Decree. Op. P. 416. 14. Routh E. Tank battles on the Eastern Front. M., 2005. P. 366. 15. Drabkin A.V. In war it’s like in war. M., 2012. P. 475. 16. Cited. by: Fedyaev O.M. Dnieper landing // Military historical magazine. 1994. N 8. P. 33. 17. Drabkin A.V. In war it’s like in war. P. 470. 18. Drabkin A.V. I fought in a fighter jet. Those who took the first blow. 1941 - 1942. M., 2007. P. 352. 19. Cited. by: Shlykov A. Once upon a time in Breslau // Around the world. 2002. N 5. P. 138. 20. Lebedintsev A.Z., Mukhin Yu.I. Decree. Op. pp. 303-304. 21. Mellentin F. Armored fist of the Wehrmacht. Smolensk, 1999. pp. 362-363. 22. Kuznetsov A.V. Babi Yar. A novel-document. M., 1967. S. 266-267. 23. Rodin A. “Volga! Volga! I am Oka! // Banner. 1984. N 2. P. 145. 24. Arkhipov V.S. Time for tank attacks. M., 1981. P. 146. 25. Kuznetsov A. Decree. op. pp. 240-241. 26. Ibid. P. 284.

Historical essay

"Stalingrad". Painting by artist M.I. Samsonov

November 1942-end 1943

List of events that can be described in a historical essay:

• Battle of Stalingrad (07/17/1942-02/02/1943) - Operation Uranus
• Battle of Kursk (07/05/08/33/1943) - Operation Citadel
• Tank battle near Prokhorovka (July 12, 1943)
• Operation “Commander Rumyantsev” (August 3, 1943) - liberation of Kharkov
• Tehran Conference (November-December 1943)

11/13/43 - beginning of the Kyiv defensive operation

In the first half of November, during the Kiev offensive operation of 1943, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Army General Nikolai Vatutin reached the line Chernobyl - Malin - Zhitomir - Fastov - Stayki, wedged deeply into the enemy’s defenses at the junction of army groups, “creating a large bridgehead (over 500 km long) on ​​the right bank of the Dnieper.

The position of the parties at the beginning of the German counteroffensive. November 15, 1943.

The German command, having been late in transferring reserves before the loss of Kiev, began to pull large forces, mainly tanks, into the area southwest of Kiev, which were transferred from the Bukrin bridgehead, from near Kremenchug and from France. On November 6, the transfer of the SS division "Reich" from the Bukrinsky bridgehead near Fastov and the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" from the Kirovograd area by rail to Bila Tserkva began for action in the Fastov direction. The last units of the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and parts of the 1st Panzer Division arrived near Fastow on November 14.

The Germans decided to restore the defenses along the Dnieper with a counteroffensive and, for this purpose, planned the encirclement and destruction of the Zhytomyr group of Red Army troops and further develop the offensive against Kyiv. The main blow was delivered from the south, from the area southwest of Fastov to Brusilov, the second - from the area northwest of Zhitomir to Radomyshl. 15 divisions (including seven tank and one motorized) of the 4th Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht were involved in the counteroffensive.

Combat operations during the Kyiv defensive operation from November 10 to 25, 1943.

The headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief promptly revealed the enemy's plan. Having established the concentration of the main enemy tank group south and southwest of Fastov, on November 12, she ordered the front commander to temporarily suspend the offensive west of Zhitomir and prevent the enemy from breaking through in the Fastov-Kyiv direction. From November 13, the front troops carried out a defensive operation with their center and left wing, while the right wing (13th and 60th armies) continued the offensive. Already on November 8, the enemy launched strong counterattacks in the directions Trypillya - Fastov - Kornyn, and on November 15, when Soviet troops had not yet completed preparations for defense, the enemy launched a counteroffensive on a wide front from Zhitomir to Fastov, trying to reach the Zhitomir - Kyiv highway.

German tanks are again in Zhitomir. November 1943

Under pressure from German troops, units of the 38th Army were forced to retreat north. The left flank of the 60th Army was under threat of encirclement. On November 17, German troops cut the Kiev-Zhitomir highway east of the city of Korostyshev and turned their tanks towards Kyiv. The next day, with attacks from the south and west, enemy troops managed to encircle part of the forces of the 60th Army in the Zhitomir region. On November 20, they broke out of the encirclement, leaving Zhitomir. On November 23, the 38th Army, whose flanks were deeply encircled by the enemy, by order of the front commander, left the city of Brusilov and retreated to a prepared line 8-10 km east of the city. The 3rd Guards Tank Army, which had withdrawn from Fastov, was regrouped in the area north and east of Brusilov, and the rifle corps of the 1st Guards Army, transferred to the front from the Headquarters reserve, was concentrated. On November 15-17, the 40th and part of the forces of the 27th armies were transferred from the Bukrinsky bridgehead to the Fastov-Trypillia sector; the maneuver was carried out by separate rifle, tank, artillery, and engineering formations and units. The main forces of the 2nd Air Army acted against enemy tanks and infantry in the main directions.

Soviet troops on the defensive.

On November 25, front troops with the forces of three rifle corps launched a counterattack from the Raevka-Borovka area in a southern direction to the flank of the Brusilov group of German troops advancing along the highway to Kyiv. For several days there were fierce oncoming battles, as a result of which the enemy was forced to abandon attempts to break through to Kyiv by the shortest route along the Zhytomyr highway. By November 30, the front had stabilized at the Chernyakhov-Radomyshl-Stavishche-Yurovka line. In December, the enemy's 4th Tank Army twice tried to break through to Kyiv in the 60th Army's defense zone with tank divisions: December 6-14 through the Chernyakhov area and December 19-22 through the Korosten area. Both of these attempts ended in failure: the front troops successfully repelled the enemy onslaught. At the Ignatpol-Meleni-Stavishche line the Germans were finally stopped.

As a result of almost a month and a half of offensive operations, German troops advanced 35-40 km in the Kiev direction. The Wehrmacht strike force was exhausted and bleeding. As a result of defensive battles, the Red Army lost 26 thousand people killed and 61 thousand wounded. German losses amounted to 3.5 thousand killed, 15.5 thousand wounded, and 1.7 thousand missing.

On December 24, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, reinforced by Headquarters reserves, began the Zhitomir-Berdichev operation (December 24, 1943 - January 14, 1944). During the 22 days of the offensive, he pushed back the troops of the left wing of Army Group South (4th Tank Army and part of the forces of the 1st Tank Army) 80-120 km to the west. Radomyshl, Zhitomir, Novograd-Volynsky, Bila Tserkva, and Berdichev were liberated.

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THE USSR. Berdichev during the war Share in: