Admiral Kuznetsov: biography, awards, memory. Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov

May 11, 2019
State
Oleg Petrov

The biography of Admiral Kuznetsov is an example of what should be the fate of an outstanding domestic officer who devotes his entire life to serving the Motherland. He was the head of the Soviet fleet and has the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. During the war against the Nazi invaders, he played a huge role, which was kept silent for a long time; the public learned about it only years later. We will talk about the admiral’s career and the memory kept by his descendants after his death in this article.

early years

It is necessary to tell the biography of Admiral Kuznetsov since 1904, when he was born in the village of Medvedki, Vologda province. Today it is a settlement on the territory of the Kotlas region, which now belongs to the Arkhangelsk region.

His father was a state-owned peasant. His name was Gerasim Fedorovich.

Already at the age of 13, the hero of our article began working as a messenger at the local port.

In 1919 he became a sailor in the North Dvina River Military Flotilla. Thus began his service to the Motherland, to which he remained faithful until his very last days. It is known that initially they did not want to accept the boy into the service, since he was too small. Then he simply credited himself with two years to overcome this bureaucratic obstacle. It is noteworthy that the erroneous year of birth of 1902 in the biography of Admiral Kuznetsov can still be found in some sources.

On duty

Service in the navy completely absorbed him. During the Civil War, his military career began, which as a result reached incredible heights.

In 1921, Kuznetsov found himself as part of a combat naval crew. Later he served in Petrograd.

It was obvious that in order to continue his upward trajectory in his career, he would need to obtain an education. Therefore, in 1923, Nikolai entered the naval school, which is named after Marshal Frunze. Three years later, he graduates from this institution with honors, becoming a full-fledged officer.

As one of the excellent students of the course, Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov is given the opportunity to independently choose where to go next to serve. He stops at the Black Sea Fleet, which at that time seemed to him one of the most promising areas.

Perhaps this was indeed the case, because Kuznetsov chose the cruiser Chervona Ukraine as the place for his service. It was a unique ship; its peculiarity was that it was the first cruiser built in the Soviet Union. Therefore, serving on it was considered a great honor.

At first, Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov was the battery commander. Then he headed the company, eventually becoming a senior watch commander.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, he devoted another three years to studying at the Naval Academy. And he graduated from this educational institution with honors, demonstrating outstanding abilities.

For about a year he served as a senior assistant commander on the cruiser "Red Caucasus", and then returned to the ship "Chervona Ukraine", but no longer as an ordinary officer, but as the ship's commander. He led it until 1936.

It is known that during this time Kuznetsov managed to bring the combat training of one individual vessel to perfection.

Readiness No. 1, or Substitution of concepts

— It’s no secret that our generals traditionally perceive sailors as aliens. But how did the Wehrmacht interact with the Kriegsmarine?

— The Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) did not permanently direct either the fleet, the Luftwaffe, or the ground forces; in fact, the OKW was engaged in conducting combat operations against the allies in the west. At a time when the main command of the ground forces (OKH) held the entire eastern front on its shoulders. This is the “division of labor,” although the OKW is vertically higher. But the last word always belonged to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - Hitler.

Hitler usually met with the sailors once a month to listen to the report and set tasks.

Usually once a month the Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine met with the Fuhrer - he reported on the completion of assigned tasks and talked about existing problems. Unfortunately, in our country there was no system of meetings between Kuznetsov and Stalin. If in six months in 1941 they met forty times, then in 1943 only six. Therefore, the People's Commissar of the Navy was not always able to convey the problems of the fleet to senior management.

- And what explains such inattention?

— Apparently, Stalin believed that there were more important matters and more important tasks, in accordance with which the distribution of resources was carried out. Sometimes in the comments they remark to me with sarcasm: “Now, if we directed all the resources to the Navy, would the Navy be able to win the war? After all, Berlin is not located on the seashore!..” But I never talked about allocating to the fleet all the resources that were spent on the Red Army. The size of the Navy during the war was about 6 percent of the total number of Soviet armed forces. If it had been not 6 percent, but, say, 9 percent, the combat effectiveness of the Red Army would not have changed significantly, but for the fleet it would have been an increase of one and a half times!

“However, not only Marshal Zhukov has fans, but also Admiral Kuznetsov, who believe that Zhukov, as Chief of the General Staff, missed the war, and only the fleet was in full combat readiness. We are talking, as you understand, about readiness No. 1, which, at his own peril and risk, Kuznetsov announced in the Navy earlier than in the army.

- This is a substitution of theses. Operational readiness No. 1 (OG-1), which was determined by instructions dated November 15, 1939, and combat readiness No. 1 (BG-1), adopted after the war in the Soviet Armed Forces, as they say in Odessa, are two huge differences. This is an attempt to play on consonance, and first of all, it must be said that the fleet was transferred to operational readiness No. 1 not on Kuznetsov’s initiative, but on the basis of a general directive. There could be no initiative.

In his memoirs, Nikolai Kuznetsov argued that, thanks to the readiness of No. 1, the fleet was the only one to repel the enemy in the first hours of the war.

- However, Nikolai Gerasimovich wrote in black and white in his memoirs that, thanks to the readiness of No. 1, the fleet was the only one that met the enemy with dignity in the first hours of the war. It turns out that he also played the accord?

- He acted more cunningly. The fleet actually switched to OG-1 before the ground forces, it’s true. But the fact is that in the navy there was a table of conditioned signals, so it was enough to pick up the HF receiver and say, say, the word “grain” for certain measures to begin to be carried out.

There was no such system in the ground forces. In fact, OG-1 can be considered an analogue of modern high readiness, when 30 percent of the forces are ready for immediate action, and the rest are on normal readiness, but at the same time vacations and layoffs are prohibited and ship repairs are being completed. The operational readiness instructions did not provide for automatic permission to use weapons; in such a case there should have been additional instructions. But they did not act immediately, although the Germans had already begun bombing.

— Who made the decision to open return fire—the local commanders?

“That’s what happened in Sevastopol; the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral Ivan Eliseev, took responsibility. But in the Baltic no one dared to take responsibility...

- Why do you think Stalin chose Nikolai Kuznetsov, then still a very young man, for the post of People’s Commissar of the Navy, if he had more experienced admirals in his “clip” - Lev Galler, Ivan Isakov?

Admirals Ivan Isakov (left) and Lev Galler.

“They had incriminating material on them.” And I’m surprised that Lev Haller, with such an extensive “dossier,” was not shot during the purges of the 1930s. Haller was convicted of the fact that during the First Russian Revolution, with the rank of midshipman, he volunteered to lead a punitive team that shot more than twenty people who participated in revolutionary uprisings. Judging by the materials of the Party Control Commission, he, firstly, hid the fact that he was a volunteer, and secondly, he insisted on the fact that he had not received awards - the top officials decided that it was inappropriate to reward for punishing one’s own people, and those who distinguished themselves were rewarded with a ceremonial breakfast with the sovereign emperor. Well, Admiral Isakov was convicted of the fact that, as a graduate of the Naval Cadet Corps, he was a member of some underground counter-revolutionary organizations. Then he made excuses: he was young and not yet a convinced communist, so he didn’t realize that he needed to break with the conspirators. In other words, Isakov was accused of non-reporting. When everything was revealed, the admiral wrote a repentance letter.

Military experience

We had to move from theory and teachings to practice in 1936. It was sent to the civil war in Spain. During these hostilities, Kuznetsov was the chief adviser to the Republican government on naval issues.

To hide his participation in a military conflict on the territory of a foreign state, he acted under a pseudonym. Interestingly, he called himself Don Nicholas Lepanto. He chose the pseudonym not by chance, taking as his surname the name of the most famous naval battle in which Spain was victorious. The Battle of Lepanto was a battle that took place in the Ionian Sea in 1571. It brought together the Holy League, which included Spain, and the Ottoman Empire. The result was a convincing victory for the Allies.

During the Civil War, Kuznetsov was directly involved in organizing and directing the combat operations of the Republican fleet, and resolved issues of ensuring the reception of transports from his homeland. Having successfully returned from a dangerous business trip, he was awarded the Orders of the Red Banner and Lenin.

In 1937 he received a promotion. Kuznetsov was awarded the rank of captain of the first rank. From the beginning of 1938 until the spring of 1939, he headed the Pacific Fleet as commander. During this period, he receives the rank of flagship of the second rank.

The ships that were part of the Pacific Fleet, under the control of Kuznetsov, took part in the battles near Lake Khasan. They carried out the task of supporting ground forces.

After the hero of our article was transferred from the Far East, he was sent to the People's Commissar of the Navy, taking the post of Deputy People's Commissar.

“In such cases he was not even vindictive.”

In 1948, he, along with a group of other naval commanders, was put on trial on charges of issuing secret military drawings and maps to the United States and Great Britain. The accusation was made up - some of the “secrets” were published in popular science magazines, others were discovered during the war, when the USSR and Western countries were allies, and the exchange of such information was approved by the highest Soviet leadership.

Despite this, all defendants were found guilty. Kuznetsov was the only one who, taking into account his previous merits, was left free. Demoted by three ranks, he was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Far East for naval forces.

And in the summer of 1951, Vice Admiral Kuznetsov would be appointed Minister of the Navy of the USSR.

In his memoirs, the naval commander will say this about Stalin: “He treated people like chess pieces and mainly pawns. He could remove any piece from the chessboard and place it again if the game required it. In such cases, he was not even vindictive, and the repression that swept over the person on his own order did not serve as an obstacle to complete trust in him in the future.”

Leadership of the Soviet Fleet

An important moment in the biography of Admiral Kuznetsov was 1939, when he actually headed the Soviet Navy, taking the post of People's Commissar.

This was an unexpected personnel decision, since the officer was only 34 years old at that time. It is not surprising that Kuznetsov turned out to be the youngest people's commissar in the country. In addition, he became the first sailor in this position, since before him the Soviet fleet was led by state security officer Mikhail Petrovich Frinovsky and army commissar of the first rank Pyotr Aleksandrovich Smirnov.

Both earned a bad reputation among their subordinates, as they became organizers of mass repressions. Moreover, a change of leadership invariably occurred after the execution of the previous leader.

Modern historians call Smirnov one of the main organizers of repression in the armed forces. He was the initiator and personally sanctioned the arrests of many political workers and Red commanders.

As a result, he himself was arrested in June 1938. The court sentenced him to death for participating in a fascist conspiracy. The sentence was carried out on the same day.

He was replaced by Mikhail Frinovsky, also considered one of the organizers of the Great Terror. He was appointed People's Commissar of the Navy in September, and already in April 1939 he was dismissed from all posts in connection with accusations of a fascist and Trotskyist conspiracy in the NKVD. He confessed to the crime and was also executed. It is noteworthy that Frinovsky, unlike most victims of Stalin’s repressions, was not rehabilitated.

Having become People's Commissar instead of Frinovsky, Kuznetsov began to restore order in the army. His merit lies in strengthening the fleet before the war, which was virtually decapitated as a result of purges by the security officers. Nikolai Gerasimovich organized several large-scale exercises, personally visited a large number of ships, resolving personnel and organizational issues.

As People's Commissar of the USSR Navy, he initiated the opening of maritime special schools and colleges, which still operate today. They are known as Nakhimov schools.

Through his efforts, the scientific and pedagogical engineering school in Leningrad was preserved. Moreover, the marine engineering faculty was returned to it. The Scientific and Pedagogical Engineering School in Nikolaevsk was restored as the Military Engineering and Technical University.

Under the close leadership of the admiral, ship and disciplinary regulations for the Navy were developed and adopted.

In July 1939, it was he who initiated the celebration of Navy Day. This holiday has survived to this day. It is still celebrated on July 24th.

During the reform of the Soviet army in 1940, the ranks of admiral and general were introduced among the senior command staff. This is how Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov became admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union.

Realizing that war could soon begin, he did everything possible to ensure that the Soviet fleet met it fully armed. For example, in 1941, on his orders, a special purpose company was created, which became the first special diving unit in the Soviet Union.

Army and navy: “dialogue” in different languages

- It turns out that the educated among the military leaders are too tired?.. Then how can one fight not with numbers, but with skill?

— If you remember, the founder of the Soviet military school, Mikhail Frunze, said that you need to teach what is necessary in war. His idea was “creatively” simplified: teach only what is necessary in war. In accordance with this postulate, in the 1920-1930s, unnecessary things were not taught in educational institutions of the Red Army.

But the root cause of the conflict between the naval and army leadership, in my opinion, was not a clash of intellects, but the fact that, for objective reasons, the fleet did not represent a serious fighting force for a long time, so the sailors were allowed to stew in their own juice. The fleet was like a state within a state. And when he got stronger, and they paid attention to the fleet, it turned out that the dialogue was taking place in different languages.

Who, for example, should be responsible for the defense of naval bases - the army or the navy?

— At lectures on the history of naval art, Admiral Kuznetsov was given credit for the fact that the Germans did not take a single Soviet naval base from the sea. This is true, but everyone was successfully taken from the shore. I don’t understand the nature of naval pride in this case.

- It’s a little different here. You probably noticed that wounded naval pride runs like a red thread through Nikolai Gerasimovich’s memoirs. Including the issue of defense of naval bases. Kuznetsov believed that the naval commander should lead, to whom the land commander responsible for ground defense should report. In turn, the naval commander is subordinate to the fleet commander, and there is a certain logic in this, because only through the fleet can the supply of the naval base be established. Here's an example. While Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky was not responsible for the defense of Sevastopol, from the moment the Germans broke through the Ishun positions in Northern Crimea, he only removed property from the city. But when on November 7, 1941, he was appointed commander of the Sevastopol defensive region and was told that he was personally responsible for the defense of the city, Oktyabrsky immediately became interested in what resources the Black Sea Fleet had in the Caucasian bases and how the city’s defense could be strengthened. I believe that such a revaluation of “values” played a huge role in the fact that Sevastopol was not abandoned back in 1941.

Defense of Sevastopol.

Admiral Kuznetsov argued that the Libavsk naval base, for the defense of which the commander of the 67th Infantry Division, Major General Nikolai Dedayev, was responsible, would not have been surrendered five days after the start of the war if the naval command had been responsible for the defense of the base. Here, in his opinion, the point was that the ground forces, in the chaos of the retreat, were primarily thinking about how not to break away from their own, and not about the defense of naval bases.

— Is it not a secret that the capabilities of the fleet were not always used even in obvious situations?

“In my opinion, the overwhelming majority of generals had little understanding of the fleet’s combat capabilities, which People’s Commissar Kuznetsov repeatedly drew attention to in his memos. The land commanders could not think of any other tasks other than landing troops or shooting from ships along the shore. But how, for example, can you make sure that the enemy fleet is unable to support its ground forces?

— Are you hinting that combat missions for the fleet were not formulated to such depth?

— They didn’t formulate it. Here's a classic example. At the beginning of October 1944, the 1st Baltic Front, which was unsuccessfully advancing on Riga, was given the task of “turning the shafts” ninety degrees and advancing to the Baltic Sea coast towards Memel in order to finally cut off Army Group North from Germany. Do you think the main command of the Navy or the command of the Baltic Fleet received a copy of the directive to conduct the Memel offensive operation?

- I suspect not.

- That's it. The First Baltic Front aims to reach the Baltic Sea, and the enemy promptly sends to the coast a group of artillery support ships consisting of heavy cruisers, which in five days fired 3,200 shells, half with a caliber of more than 200 millimeters, and Memel was held.

Soldiers of the Leningrad Front land on the Moonsund Islands. 1944

At the same time, the Baltic Fleet was not tasked with counteracting enemy ships. Headquarters ordered the Baltic Fleet, together with the Leningrad Front (not even the 1st Baltic Front!) to capture the Moonsund Islands. It got ridiculous: torpedo bombers fly out on a free hunt, Soviet submarines operate in the same areas, and no one seems to see the enemy fleet, which is disrupting a front-line operation right before our eyes...

- There is an opinion that Zhukov’s hostile attitude towards the Navy was formed on a professional basis - due to the fact that the fleet allegedly did not play the role in the war that it should have played. And this is the “merit” of Kuznetsov.

“I don’t think Zhukov could formulate it that way, because “role” is not a military concept. Military concepts are “setting a task” and “performing a task.” And the navy carried out the tasks assigned to the Navy. Defended naval bases? Defended. The main task of the Baltic Fleet was the defense of Leningrad, was it completed? Was. For example, the main task of the Northern Fleet was to ensure the movement of northern sea convoys, and the fleet coped with it. Here I gave an example of the Memel offensive operation... But the fleet couldn’t come up with tasks for itself in the interests of the ground forces, if they sit under fire from German cruisers for five days and don’t ask for anything, don’t report on anything?

War against fascism

When Hitler's troops invaded the USSR, the Navy was ready to fight the enemy much better than just a few days before. Kuznetsov managed to strengthen its combat power and significantly increase the combat readiness of the forces and means of combat ships.

These measures were urgently taken shortly before Germany attacked the USSR. On that very night of June 22, the order was given to go into full combat readiness. It was this decision of the hero of our article that made it possible to prevent significant losses of naval aviation and warships.

During the war, Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov was appointed a member of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters. He regularly visited the front, went to ships that fought on the front line, and carried out important and responsible combat missions. He himself supervised the process of their preparation.

The Soviet fleet, trained by Kuznetsov, did not allow a German landing in the Caucasus from the sea, which Adolf Hitler really counted on. The submarine fleet and naval aviation played an invaluable role in resisting the enemy.

Soviet ships regularly provided assistance to the allies and escorted ships received under Lend-Lease. Kuznetsov himself always paid a special role to maritime education.

At the beginning of 1945, he became a member of the State Defense Committee and took part in the delegation of the Soviet Union that worked at the Potsdam and Crimean conferences.

After the defeat of the Nazi invaders, his role in the overall success was difficult to underestimate. Kuznetsov's rank was equal to that of marshal. He received shoulder straps of the appropriate type.

For his contribution to the victory over fascism, on September 14 of the same year he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. For Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, this award became one of the most important in his life.

War and Navy

However, he himself had no time for the holidays. Before the start of the war, the Navy was most prepared for conflict. Kuznetsov was not shy - he gave the order to shoot down German intruder aircraft invading the airspace of the USSR in the area of responsibility of the fleet. They reported to Stalin that Kuznetsov, they say, was provoking a war. The leader demanded that the order be cancelled. The People's Commissar, who by that time held the newly introduced rank of admiral, obeyed, but issued another order - to forcefully land violating aircraft.

Already from June 18, 1941, the Navy of the Soviet Union was in state of readiness No. 2. At the end of June 21, by order of Kuznetsov, readiness No. 1 was introduced. As a result, on June 22, Nazi aviation failed to destroy a single Soviet ship.

The capabilities of Soviet ships during the war were severely limited - the Baltic Fleet was blocked in the Leningrad area, the Black Sea Fleet lost its main base, and the Pacific Fleet found itself far from the European theater of operations. Only the Northern Fleet had relative operational freedom. His forces were concentrated on securing supplies from the Lend-Lease allies.

Sailors actively participated in land battles as part of combined detachments formed on the orders of Admiral Kuznetsov. Thanks to the Black Sea Fleet, it was possible to prevent the Nazis from invading the Caucasus from the sea.

It was also naval aviation that was involved in preparing and carrying out air strikes on Berlin in the summer of 1941.

Opal

Despite the successes during the war, soon after its end the hero of our article found himself in disgrace. Even the numerous awards of Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov did not help.

In February 1946, the People's Commissariat of the Navy was dissolved. Stalin decided to include the Navy into the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Kuznetsov became deputy people's commissar, who then began to be called minister.

At the beginning of 1947, an unpleasant conversation took place between the admiral and the generalissimo, which revealed numerous differences between them. The reason was the program for the further development of the Navy.

The result was Kuznetsov's removal from command. He was deprived of a high-ranking position, having been appointed to the leadership of the management of naval educational institutions.

His problems didn't end there. A few months later, Nikolai Gerasimovich was handed over to the so-called Court of Honor, organized by the Ministry of the Armed Forces. Together with Kuznetsov, admirals Alafuzov, Galler and Stepanov were called to account. The trial was conducted by Marshal Govorov.

They were accused that in the period from 1942 to 1944, without permission from the authorities, they handed over secret drawings to the Americans and British, which, in particular, included descriptions of a remote grenade, a high-altitude parachute torpedo, fire control circuits, artillery systems, as well as a significant number of nautical charts that were considered secret.

By a decision of the Court of Honor, all four accused were found guilty of the crime. It was decided to appeal to the Council of Ministers to transfer the officers' case to the Military Collegium for further consideration.

In February 1948, the Military Collegium found the admirals guilty. Considering Kuznetsov’s case, his outstanding merits were separately noted, which is the only reason it was decided to free him from criminal punishment. We limited ourselves to a petition for demotion to rear admiral. All other defendants received real prison sentences.

Kuznetsov, having found himself in disgrace, does not resign. He is appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces in the Far East. He then becomes commander of the Navy in the Pacific.

In the early 1950s, Kuznetsov gradually began to restore his position in the leadership of the Soviet army. At the beginning of 1951, he was awarded the rank of vice admiral, and in July he was even appointed Minister of the Navy. He remained in this post until March 15, 1953.

On May 13, that is, a few months after Stalin's death, he was returned to the rank of admiral. Then they announced that his criminal record had been vacated.

Admiral and Master

The admiral was one of those few Soviet military leaders who, while defending the interests of the cause, allowed themselves to object to Stalin himself. Soon after the victorious end of the Great Patriotic War, the shipbuilding program for the next decade was discussed in the office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Even before the war, Stalin dreamed of building a large ocean-going fleet, equipped with battleships and heavy cruisers. The Secretary General had an undisguised weakness for ships with large displacement, which were supposed to personify the naval power of the state, and he was not embarrassed by their high price. “We’ll raise money for a penny and build it”1.

That’s exactly how, emphasizing every word, the Boss instructively remarked to the newly appointed People’s Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov in response to his perplexed question about why the Soviet Union needed huge and expensive battleships in the closed Black and shallow Baltic seas. Kuznetsov realized that there was no point in continuing further conversation on this topic. This was before the war, and then the young people’s commissar remained silent. Stalin's authority was indisputable for him. Back in 1938, on the personal instructions of the leader, several battleships of the Sovetsky Soyuz type and light cruisers of the Chapaev type were laid down on the slipways. They were supposed to surpass similar foreign ships. But soon their construction was curtailed: the USSR had neither the resources nor the time to implement this ambitious shipbuilding program. None of the ships of this class were ready for the outbreak of war. During the war, unfinished ships laid down on stocks in Nikolaev were blown up during the retreat so that they would not fall to the Germans. Enormous funds were wasted. The Second World War irrefutably proved that the time of battleships was irrevocably gone. Battleships with their powerful long-range artillery ceased to be a threat to the seas and actually lost their combat significance. They didn't fight so much as they stood at the wall of the pier. Each of the warring parties was wary of sending them into battle: these huge, formidable ships, although they were strong by the very fact of their existence, on the high seas could become easy prey for enemy aircraft and submarines. But the leader did not forget about his dream.

In December 1944, at a reception in honor of the French delegation, he approached the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and said: “Admiral Kuznetsov! Not everyone knows enough about what our fleet does. Patience! In time we will dominate the seas!”2.

After the Great Patriotic War, Stalin abandoned the construction of battleships, but continued to insist on the need to have heavy cruisers with powerful artillery weapons. The Generalissimo unquestionably stated that they should become the main striking force of the Soviet navy in the future. On January 21, 1947, at a meeting on military shipbuilding, Stalin said: “We need several heavy cruisers. It would be nice to have 2 heavy cruisers with 12-inch guns in the Black Sea. Then the Turks would tremble even more than they do now.”3 The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov, who remained at the head of the fleet throughout the war, dared to object to the one-sided development of the fleet and made a number of critical comments about the obsolete and expensive project.

In a war-ravaged country, money for the construction of heavy cruisers would indeed have to be collected “by the penny.” In 1946 prices, the cost of one heavy cruiser was estimated at 1,200 million rubles, and a large submarine at only 45 million4. The plan provided for the allocation of 13.8 billion rubles for the construction of 4 heavy and 30 light cruisers and a little more than 8 billion for the construction of 352 submarines of all types. By 1955, none of the planned heavy cruisers had even been laid down at the shipyard. The first post-war ten-year shipbuilding program was less than 50% completed.

The Commander-in-Chief advocated for a balanced fleet and believed that the future belonged to large and small aircraft carriers and ships equipped with jet and missile weapons. Stalin said to him, even jokingly: “Why, Kuznetsov, do you quarrel with me all the time? After all, the authorities have been asking me for permission to deal with you for a long time..."5.

The Admiral did not heed this warning from the Master. Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov was born into a family of state-owned peasants, whose ancestors had long lived in the Arkhangelsk province. The Russian North knew neither the horrors of the Mongol-Tatar yoke, nor the servile awe of the master: there was never serfdom there, and the peasants bore duties in favor of the state, not the landowner. That is why the admiral’s memory did not know servility: it had an age-old sense of self-esteem, but the genetic feeling of fear of the powers that be was completely absent. Several generations of Nikolai Gerasimovich's ancestors, among the stock of impressions stored in their minds, did not have the sad experience of having their ass whipped. The Admiral was organically alien to servility and did not consider it necessary to agree with the Master in everything. Indeed, Stalin was right. This was not the first time Kuznetsov “quarreled” with him. Immediately after the end of the war, he strongly objected to the leader’s idea to divide the Baltic Fleet into two independent ones - the 4th and 8th. From an operational point of view, this was pointless, although it made it possible to “catch up” with America in the number of fleets. Kuznetsov spoke about what happened next years later in his memoirs. “I was subjected to far from polite reprimand. I couldn't stand it:

- If I am not suitable, then I ask you to remove me... Everyone was stunned. Deathly silence reigned in the office. Stalin stopped, glanced in my direction and said separately: “We’ll remove it when necessary.”6

(Looking ahead, I will note in parentheses that life itself confirmed Kuznetsov’s correctness. In January 1947, the Baltic Fleet was divided into the 4th and 8th Navy, and in January 1956 they returned to the original organization.)

Once Stalin already had to face resistance and hear a similar response to his scolding. In 1941, when the fate of the state was at stake, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General Zhukov, hearing from the Boss that he, Zhukov, was “talking nonsense,” flared up, asking to be relieved of his post and sent to the front. Then Zhukov, who organically hated staff work, was sent to command the front. The general organized and brilliantly carried out a counterattack near Yelnya. The Soviet Guard was born in these battles. But what one could get away with in the tragic 1941 was completely impossible in the post-war 1946. It was this year that Marshal Zhukov’s fall from grace began, and Kuznetsov lost his post as People’s Commissar of the Navy (the People’s Commissariat was abolished “as unnecessary”). During the war, generals and military leaders became accustomed to a certain amount of freedom. They had to not only carry out the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but also defend their opinion before Headquarters. For some time, Stalin had to come to terms with the fact that his point of view could not always be considered the only correct one. The military noticed this. In the last days of March 1944, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky at the front near Melitopol, left alone with Marshal Voroshilov in his salon carriage, spoke with the former People's Commissar of Defense about the character of the leader and asked in confidence: “Was it really impossible to express your own opinions to Stalin in necessary cases?” objections? After some thought, Voroshilov replied: “Stalin was not like that before. The war probably taught him a lot. He apparently realized that he could make mistakes and his decisions might not always be the best, and that the knowledge and experience of others could also be useful. The years also took their toll on Stalin: before the war he was younger and more self-confident...”7 After the war, the Boss decided to end it all.

The flywheel of new repressions began to spin in the country. On December 14, 1945, Air Marshal Khudyakov was arrested. And in March 1946, the USSR Ministry of State Security was formed. Less than two months later, Minister Merkulov, who was Beria's nominee, lost his post. On May 7, 1946, 38-year-old Colonel General Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, who during the war headed the Main Counterintelligence Directorate SMERSH, became the new minister. This was Stalin’s personal choice, who began to play out a multi-step combination of shuffling senior command cadres. It was Abakumov who presented Stalin with a top secret report, in which he detailed the numerous attempts of opposition-minded German officers to “remove” Hitler, whom they hated. Viktor Semenovich knew how to expose enemies of the people and catch spies, but was absolutely not experienced in the intricacies of political intrigue. The suspicious leader decided to launch a preemptive strike and protect himself in the future from any attempts by the military to push him, Stalin, out of power. Abakumov was given the task of eradicating the “Zhukov spirit” in the army. “Feeling that he was right in this or that controversial issue, Georgy Konstantinovich could quite sharply object to Stalin, which no one else dared to do.”8.

Abakumov asked Stalin for permission to arrest Zhukov and Kuznetsov, but did not receive it.

The majority of military personnel associated high professionalism and self-esteem, perhaps without sufficiently compelling reasons, primarily with the name of Marshal Zhukov. He was a symbolic figure for them. Admiral Kuznetsov was the same for fleet officers. And although Zhukov and Kuznetsov never maintained close relations and were in many ways antipodes, in the eyes of the authorities their names became linked together for a number of years, which immediately affected the life and fate of both the commander and the naval commander.

Abakumov, who at the age of 12 graduated from four classes of a city school in Moscow and completed his education, took the order literally and asked Stalin for permission to arrest Zhukov and Kuznetsov, but did not receive it.

Telephones in Marshal Zhukov's apartment on Granovsky Street have been tapped since the war. And when, at the very end of the victorious year of 1945, Air Chief Marshal Alexander Aleksandrovich Novikov called Zhukov’s apartment, this call was immediately reported to the Owner. Novikov was outraged by Stalin’s persistent desire to award his son Vasily the rank of general and spoke impartially about the Supreme Commander. Zhukov did not discuss this sensitive topic and diplomatically advised Novikov to sign Vasily Stalin’s proposal for the rank of major general of aviation.

Several months have passed. On March 4, 1946, the commander of the Air Force, Chief Marshal of Aviation twice Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Aleksandrovich Novikov, a week earlier elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, was removed from his post, and on the night of April 22-23 he was arrested (deputy immunity did not help). Let's think about this fact. One of the main creators of victory, a man who had exceptional services to the Fatherland, was repressed less than a year after the end of the war! European civilization has not known such tyranny for several centuries. The flywheel of new repressions began to spin. Already on May 11, by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, Novikov was stripped of his military rank and all awards and sentenced to 5 years in prison. Abakumov’s bonebreakers obtained testimony from him that could be used against Zhukov.

On June 1, 1946, Stalin convened the Supreme Military Council, at which the testimony of the now former Air Chief Marshal Novikov against Zhukov was read out. And although the marshals and generals criticized Zhukov, none of them declared the need for his arrest. Moreover, Marshal of the Armored Forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Pavel Semenovich Rybalko, boldly stated that Novikov’s testimony was obtained as a result of biased interrogations, and that the authorities are able to force anyone to sign any absurdity. For the first time, the leader encountered not yet military opposition, but corporate interests that had already clearly formed in the military environment. He chose to refrain from the expected arrest of the commander and was forced to content himself with his removal from the post of Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and moving from Moscow first to Odessa and then to Sverdlovsk.

At the end of February 1947, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Marshal Zhukov was removed from the list of candidates for membership of the Central Committee. In the same month, Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov was removed from his post as Deputy Minister of the USSR Armed Forces - Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and sent to serve in a tertiary position in Leningrad. On March 3, 1947, a completely civilian Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin was appointed to the post of Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, which had previously been held by the General Lissimo himself. And although he was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union, this did not make him a military man. Bulganin was awarded the marshal rank on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the October Revolution, and this was done on Stalin’s initiative: “I think that the motives for my proposal do not need comment - they are already clear”9. Indeed, comments were not needed by Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Andreev and Beria, who voted for Stalin’s proposal. However, the modern reader needs such comments.

Let's give the floor to Lieutenant General Sudoplatov: “He was unable to cope with the serious problems of mobilization and changes in the structure of the Armed Forces. I ran into him several times in the Kremlin during meetings of the heads of intelligence services. His incompetence was simply amazing. Bulganin did not understand such issues as the rapid deployment of forces and means, the state of combat readiness, and strategic planning. ...Bulganin tried by all means to avoid responsibility for making decisions. Letters requiring an immediate response remained unsigned for months. The entire secretariat of the Council of Ministers was horrified by this style of work... Having appointed Bulganin, whom the military did not respect, as Minister of the Armed Forces, Stalin achieved his goal and became the arbiter of the destinies of both the real commanders... - and Bulganin himself. Bulganin would never take responsibility for any serious decision, even one within his competence, although no one could do anything without his resolution. Thus, neither side - neither the true leaders nor the fake figure - could act independently of each other. This encouraged hostility and rivalry between the military."10

To consolidate and strengthen enmity and rivalry, Comrade Stalin made another appointment. In November 1948, Army General Sergei Matveevich Shtemenko was appointed deputy minister and chief of the General Staff. Before the war, from the post of commander of a tank battalion, he was sent to study at the Academy of the General Staff: his tenure in this position was limited to his command practice. He met the war with the rank of lieutenant colonel of the General Staff, where he served throughout the war, ending it as a colonel general. The famous commanders and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War were forced to come to terms with these appointments, which were absolutely impossible a year or two earlier. The senior command staff was reined in. “Now they have lifted their tails,” the Generalissimo said disdainfully about the military11. The leader brilliantly carried out a campaign to strengthen his own power. This time he did without mass repressions, as had happened ten years earlier, and for some time limited himself to the moral humiliation of those who were in the habit of “quarreling” with him. The wife of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General Gordov, talking with her husband face to face, noticed that all the military men had calmed down. Even Marshal Zhukov was no exception. “What a mighty spirit they broke,” concluded General Gordova, who did not suspect that her confidential conversation with her husband would be tape-recorded by MGB officers, and its contents reported to Stalin. The general's wife was right. In fact, her words saved the marshal’s freedom, and the hero of the Battle of Stalingrad, General Gordov, was arrested, tortured and shot. Marshal Zhukov, in a conversation with the officers of his headquarters, spoke about the disgrace that befell him with soldierly directness: “I got into shit - don’t tweet!”

Such a phrase was impossible in Kuznetsov’s mouth, so they dealt with him more harshly.

In February 1948, in the “case of four admirals,” he was tried first by the court of honor, and then the case was transferred to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The former Commander-in-Chief and his subordinates were accused of passing on the secret of the parachute torpedo to the Allies and kowtowing to the West. The admirals tried to prove to the judges that there was no corpus delicti in their actions, because there was no secret in nature and the torpedo drawing was even published in a popular magazine. The judges did not heed the obvious facts. Kuznetsov was sentenced to be reduced in military rank to rear admiral - three steps down,

and his accomplices received various prison terms. During the trial, the former Commander-in-Chief was offered a loophole: he was asked to confirm that he did not give written permission to transfer the drawings. Nikolai Gerasimovich did not take advantage of this opportunity, stating with dignity that he was responsible for everything that happened in his People's Commissariat. So, Rear Admiral Kuznetsov was left free and sent to serve in the Far East.

The rabble of thin-necked leaders never recognized him as theirs

The professionalism of the naval commander, obvious to everyone, and the well-known personal independence of Nikolai Gerasimovich associated with it, were associated in the eyes of the Master with disloyalty towards him personally: after all, the Admiral of the Fleet owed his entire previous brilliant career only to him. At the age of less than 35, Kuznetsov received a red package, which contained a government decree on his appointment as People's Commissar of the Navy. “I read this document with a mixed feeling of joy and anxiety. Rapid ascent is dangerous not only for divers. Such a rapid rise through the ranks is also fraught with many dangers. I understood this well even in my young years, that’s why after the academy I asked to be appointed to the ship as a first mate in order to move up the service consistently. I dreamed, of course, of commanding a ship. I didn't think about anything else. But in recent years my progress has become very rapid. It could be explained at that time only by a stormy wave of forced displacement..."12. Among Stalin's people's commissars, Kuznetsov stood out sharply for his education. “A rabble of thin-necked leaders” - this is not said about him. He completed not only the full course of the Leningrad Naval School. M.V. Frunze, but also the Naval Academy in Leningrad. (Now the Academy is named after N.G. Kuznetsov.) In 1932, after graduating from the Academy, Kuznetsov, at his request, was appointed senior assistant to the commander of the newest Black Sea cruiser "Red Caucasus", which was modernized with the latest technology. The cruiser even had a catapult and two planes. “This made it possible to detect the enemy as early as possible in order to strike him at the limit of the firing range of our guns”13. Was it not then that the future Commander-in-Chief of the Navy realized that without naval aviation it was impossible to gain supremacy at sea? In November 1933, Kuznetsov was appointed commander of the cruiser Chervona Ukraine. He commanded the cruiser for about three years. This time became the most serene and happiest period of his service in the navy. Kuznetsov successfully commanded the ship, which very soon became the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet. “Commanding a ship is like the crown of ship service. Having passed this stage and becoming a formation commander, moving further in the service, the officer begins work of a different nature. Purely ship service ends here. But the experience gained by an officer on ships continues to serve him, no matter how high he rises through the ranks.”14 Members of the government loved to visit Chervonnaya Ukraina and remembered Captain 1st Rank Kuznetsov well. It was he who was appointed naval attaché and chief naval adviser in Republican Spain in August 1936. There Nikolai Gerasimovich acquired invaluable combat experience. In August of the tragic year of 1937, Kuznetsov was appointed deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet, and already in March 1938 he became the head of this fleet. Exactly a year later, the young commander was appointed deputy people's commissar of the Navy, and a month later - people's commissar. “A stormy wave of forced displacement” picked up the recent commander of the cruiser and lifted him to the very top. His two predecessors as People's Commissar of the Navy were arrested and shot as enemies of the people. No one could guarantee that Kuznetsov would not suffer the same fate.

The “rabbit of thin-necked leaders” never recognized him as one of their own. When on September 17, 1939, in accordance with the secret articles of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Red Army troops crossed the state border and entered the territory of Poland, the People's Commissar of the Navy learned about this “liberation campaign” from the newspapers. Believing that he, as a member of the government, should have been informed in advance about this decision, he made a sharp protest to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov. Molotov was the second person in the party and the state and was perplexed by the demarche of a man who had become people's commissar less than four months ago. He saw in Kuznetsov a degree of internal freedom that was absolutely unacceptable for those who were part of Stalin's inner circle. This was something that these people did not take to heart.

Shortly before the start of the war, Kuznetsov ruined his relationship with the all-powerful Lavrentiy Beria. Having learned that German planes were brazenly conducting reconnaissance in the territorial waters of the USSR and photographing naval bases, the People's Commissar, with his authority, gave the order to shoot down the intruder aircraft. He could have paid for this with his life: Beria reported to Stalin about this order of the People's Commissar and, intriguingly, began to argue that Kuznetsov could provoke a war with Germany. Stalin summoned Kuznetsov and, in the presence of Beria, demanded that the order be cancelled. The People's Commissar obeyed, but showed character. Having forbidden the shooting down of violators, he ordered the fleet aviation to force them to make an emergency landing at Soviet airfields.

On the first day of the war, the fleet did not lose a single warship

Nikolai Gerasimovich persistently prepared the fleet for a future war. He ensured that the sailors learned to hit the enemy at the maximum distance and with the first salvo, because in battle there may simply not be time for a second salvo. He developed three forms of fleet operational readiness, and by the time the war began, all fleets were already able to quickly move to a higher level of combat readiness. At readiness No. 3, it was assumed that within 6 hours the combat core of the fleet should be formed and the supply of fuel and ammunition should be replenished. Readiness No. 2 assumed that the combat core would be formed in 4 hours, and readiness No. 1 - in one hour. This made it possible to prevent a surprise attack by the Germans on Soviet warships. On June 18-19, 1941, by order of the People's Commissar of the Navy, fleets and flotillas were put on alert No. 2, and at the end of June 21, at 23:37, he gave the order to switch to readiness No. 1, which was completed by 00:00 on June 22 . As a result, on the first day of the war, the fleet did not lose a single warship: fascist air raids on naval bases were ineffective. On the same day, 1,200 Soviet aircraft were destroyed at airfields and in the air. So the day of June 22, 1941 - this tragic day in Russian history - became the finest hour in the life of the naval commander.

During the war, Kuznetsov was not afraid to come into conflict with Army Commissar 1st Rank Mehlis, who was called Stalin’s second self. One of the initiators of the Great Terror, Lev Zakharovich Mehlis, had long belonged to the country’s party elite and, taking advantage of the boundless trust of Stalin, who he fanatically revered, allowed himself to categorically interfere in the affairs of the military command. He could give the order to shoot a general in front of the line without trial and was able to personally shoot an officer he suspected of cowardice. In 1942, after leaving Crimea, Mehlis demanded that Kuznetsov bring to trial one rear admiral who headed the Kerch naval base, threatening that otherwise he, Mehlis, would order the culprit to be shot with his own authority. “You don’t dare do that,” Kuznetsov answered him firmly. The rear admiral's life was saved, but relations with Mehlis were hopelessly damaged.

After the war, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Kuznetsov entered into confrontations with Bulganin, Khrushchev and even Brezhnev on various fundamental issues. He sharply belittled Khrushchev in the presence of Stalin, when Nikita Sergeevich allowed himself to make incompetent remarks during the Commander-in-Chief’s report on the shipbuilding program: they say that you are talking about something you don’t understand. The future author of "Malaya Zemlya", with the rank of lieutenant general, appointed to the post of head of the political department of the Navy without the consent of the Commander-in-Chief, Kuznetsov stated to his face that he, Brezhnev, had never served in the navy and did not know the specifics of naval service. There are probably enough examples.

The naval commander's competence was so high, and his reputation was so impeccable, that even such a power could not ignore it. Another circumstance gave Kuznetsov an additional degree of freedom: Stalin’s inner circle preferred not to interfere in the affairs of the fleet, because those who were part of it did not understand anything about naval affairs and were afraid of embarrassment. Therefore, Kuznetsov’s life and destiny could and was always controlled only by the Master himself. By the beginning of the 1950s, Stalin was convinced of the unconditional loyalty of the highest command staff. Colonel General Abakumov completed the task assigned to him. The Moor has done his job, the Moor can leave. On July 14, 1951, the Minister of State Security was arrested, and on July 20, Kuznetsov was again appointed Minister of the Navy of the USSR. Subsequently, the admiral spoke about Stalin’s attitude towards his associates:

“He treated people like chess pieces and mainly pawns. He could remove any piece from the chessboard and place it again if the game required it. In such cases, he was not even vindictive, and the repression that swept over a person on his own order did not serve as an obstacle to complete trust in him in the future.”15

About Admiral Yumashev, Kuznetsov’s predecessor as minister, Stalin said, not without irony, that the state, which spends billions on the construction of the fleet, “cannot wait until the minister stops drinking”15. However, Yumashev’s drunkenness in the eyes of the leader was still a lesser sin than Kuznetsov’s human dignity. Admiral Yumashev retained his military rank, while Kuznetsov, returned to Moscow, was not restored to the rank of Admiral of the Fleet and (a unique case!) became a minister with the rank of vice admiral, which was awarded to him in 1951 while he was in the Far East. The minister remained in this rank until Stalin's death.

The Commander-in-Chief continued to advocate for the construction of aircraft carriers, believing that without them the Soviet Navy would forever remain a coastal fleet and, far from its shores, would not be able to withstand the fleets of a potential enemy. Kuznetsov promptly realized what new opportunities nuclear energy had for creating an ocean-going submarine fleet. On his initiative, the development of a project for a new generation submarine - with a nuclear power plant - began. It was precisely these submarines that later became the basis of the country's ocean power. Kuznetsov insisted on the need to design and build special landing craft and cruisers with jet and missile weapons. In order for these visionary plans to become flesh and blood, a new state military shipbuilding program was needed.

After Stalin's death, Kuznetsov persistently raised the issue with the government about the need to adopt a new ten-year shipbuilding program. Both the program itself, which required huge capital investments, and Kuznetsov’s persistence caused undisguised irritation of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Khrushchev. “The fleet will never forgive you for this!” — the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy threw in the First Secretary’s face after the approval of the shipbuilding program was once again postponed. Khrushchev could not forget this to him. Only the irony of history can explain the fact that the admiral, who suffered from Stalin’s tyranny, was perceived by Khrushchev as Stalin’s protege and personified in his eyes the Bonapartist sentiments of the military. Kuznetsov and Zhukov were for Khrushchev the most striking embodiment of these trends. Even before Khrushchev declared a course to overcome the cult of personality and began an extremely unpopular campaign in the army to reduce the Armed Forces by 1 million 200 thousand people, he decided to rein in the military by arranging an “exemplary flogging” for the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. He managed to do this with the hands of Zhukov. Through a simple apparatus intrigue, it was brought to the attention of Zhukov, who was appointed in February 1955 to the post of Minister of Defense of the USSR, that Kuznetsov allegedly objected to this appointment. The vindictive marshal said that he would never forgive him for this. The admiral's resignation was a foregone conclusion. Kuznetsov understood this very well and himself wrote a report asking to be relieved of his position. The commander-in-chief, whose health was already failing, did not suffer from ambition and asked the minister to give him a less responsible and calmer position. This act only infuriated Zhukov, who interpreted the report as Kuznetsov’s unwillingness to serve with him. Not only Khrushchev, but also Zhukov, it was not enough for Nikolai Gerasimovich simply to resign. They wanted to deal with him. The authorities needed a suitable reason - the reason presented itself. On October 29, 1955, an explosion occurred on the battleship Novorossiysk, killing over 600 people. By this time, Kuznetsov had already been in the hospital for several months, but it was he who was blamed for the death of the ship. The renowned naval commander was removed from his post, reduced in military rank to vice admiral and dismissed without the right to reinstatement and work in the fleet. This is what they did to the man on whose initiative the USSR Navy Day was established, the orders and medals of Ushakov and Nakhimov were established, and the Nakhimov schools were created...

It’s hard to imagine what Nikolai Gerasimovich had to go through! Not only was a man who had done so much for the country expelled from service in disgrace, he also had to endure the virtual destruction of the fleet, demonstratively undertaken by Khrushchev immediately after his resignation. The completion of 7 light cruisers was stopped, the construction of which had already cost 1.5 billion rubles17. Khrushchev decided to beat swords into plowshares. After a few years, the unfinished ships turned into piles of rusty metal and were cut into scrap metal. At the same time, unfinished battleships and heavy cruisers were scrapped. Yes, these were the same heavy cruisers that Stalin dreamed of. The fleet suffered irreparable damage.

Exactly two years after Kuznetsov’s resignation, Khrushchev removed Marshal Zhukov from the post of Minister of Defense, accusing him of Bonapartism. A few years later, he remembered Nikolai Gerasimovich and complained that the former Commander-in-Chief never tried to meet with him and explain himself: “It’s not for me to go to bow to him.” When Kuznetsov was told the words of the First Secretary, his answer was as follows: “I go with my wife and children to the Bolshoi and Art Theaters, to concerts and exhibitions. But going to Nikita Sergeevich is not part of my plans.”18

I have been removed from service in the navy, but it is impossible to remove me from service in the fleet.”

Vice Admiral Kuznetsov was given a regular, albeit general, pension, and not the personal pension that was due to former people's commissars and ministers, and was deprived of all benefits. Burdened with a family, the pensioner, in order to make ends meet, independently learned English and began translating. In addition, he began to work on his memories. He was not allowed to work in the archives, and Nikolai Gerasimovich wrote his memoirs from memory. He wrote himself, without resorting to the services of journalists or literary editors. His books “On the Eve” and “Combat Alert in the Fleets” were published during the author’s lifetime, were a huge success and are still in demand among readers. Kuznetsov was offered to become a member of the USSR Writers' Union. He only grinned in response, because he did not consider himself a writer. After the death of the naval commander, the only evening in his memory was held by the Writers' Union. “I have been removed from service in the fleet, but it is impossible to remove me from service in the fleet.”

The Admiral is out of favor again

It seemed that after Stalin's death, Kuznetsov's position should finally be restored. At first, everything really was like that.

Until 1955, the hero of our article held the post of First Deputy Minister of Defense, being the de facto Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In March 1955, his military rank was again equal to that of a marshal, for which he received the corresponding star.

During this period, he paid increased attention to the development of aircraft carriers and the technological re-equipment of the fleet.

However, even here disgrace soon awaits him. This time he fails to build a relationship with the Minister of Defense. This post at that time was occupied by the legendary Marshal of Victory Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. It is known that conflicts between them occurred even before the war.

In December 1955, Kuznetsov was removed from his post. Formally, he was accused of the explosion that occurred on the battleship Novorossiysk, although the admiral himself was on leave for health reasons at that moment. Two months later he was demoted again to the rank of vice admiral and sent into retirement. Moreover, they do this with the wording “without the right to work in the fleet,” which is humiliating for an officer of his level.

“We’ll remove it when necessary”

The Soviet fleet and its people's commissar made a great contribution to the victory over Germany and Japan. In September 1945, Nikolai Kuznetsov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

But the People's Commissar thought about the future. Studying the actions of the fleets of different countries, he learned lessons. For example, Kuznetsov believed that the Soviet Navy was too tied to the coastal zone, and this situation could only be changed by the construction of new types of ships, primarily aircraft carriers. In addition, he considered it pointless to maintain a large group of ships in the Baltic, and planned a serious redistribution of forces and assets between the fleets.

Stalin also spoke about the need to strengthen the fleet. But he and Kuznetsov did not agree on how to do this. When once again the admiral, having spoken unflatteringly about Stalin’s ideas, received a rude answer, he said: “If I am not suitable, then I ask you to remove me...”.

“When it’s necessary, we’ll remove it,” Stalin replied.

In January 1947, Kuznetsov was removed from his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and appointed head of the Directorate of Naval Educational Institutions.

Memoirs

Finding himself in forced retirement at the age of 49, the admiral takes up writing his memoirs. Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov writes a lot about the Great Patriotic War and Stalin’s repressions. True, most of these works were published only after his death, when the regime changed in the country.

In these works, he sharply criticized the party's interference in military affairs, noting that in the USSR the law does not rule the state, as it should be.

One of the most famous books by Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov is a collection of memoirs “On the Course to Victory.”

Many noted that, unlike most officer memoirs, Kuznetsov’s memoirs were written in clear literary language and were distinguished by an excellent style.

At the same time, in official Soviet history, his role in the Victory over the Nazi invaders was intensively retouched for many years. The authorities did not want to admit how important the disgraced admiral was to the victory.

After the resignation of Zhukov and Khrushchev, an initiative group of Navy veterans repeatedly appealed to the government with demands to restore Kuznetsov to his rank. He was proposed to be included in the Department of Defense Inspector General Panel, which would allow him to receive significant material and symbolic advantages. All these initiatives were desperately resisted by the new fleet commander, Sergei Gorshkov.

Only in 1965, when Brezhnev named Kuznetsov among the outstanding Soviet military leaders during the Victory Day celebrations, did he gradually begin to return to public life.

All these years, it was only thanks to the support of his family that Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov continued to remain in service. Despite his rehabilitation by the country's top leadership, his military rank was not returned to him.

In 1974, Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov died at the age of 70. The cause of death was not officially disclosed; it was known that in recent years he had been seriously ill.

It was not possible to restore his rank while Gorshkov remained alive. This was only done in 1988. The hero of our article was posthumously returned to the rank of fleet admiral.

The children of Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov could only calm down then, since their father’s honor was restored. The admiral raised three sons - Victor, Vladimir and Nikolai.

The death of Novorossiysk and Khrushchev’s revenge

Kuznetsov did not change during his disgrace. He continued to push through the aircraft carrier construction program, initiated work on the project of the first Soviet nuclear submarine, and spoke about the need to create missile-armed cruisers.

After Khrushchev came to power, Kuznetsov’s criminal record was cleared and he was again awarded the rank of admiral. But he stubbornly did not want to rest on his laurels, and continued to insist on the approval of a new ten-year shipbuilding program. When Nikita Sergeevich once again refused to approve it, Kuznetsov threw the phrase at the beginning of our story in his face.

That Stalin, Khrushchev... Nikolai Kuznetsov devoted his life to the fleet, and in the name of its interests he was ready to sacrifice personal comfort and safety.

Nikita Sergeevich was not distinguished by courage and directness, like the admiral, but he ate more than one dog in court intrigues. After another reform in the army, Kuznetsov served as First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR - Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Georgy Zhukov became Minister of Defense , whom Khrushchev managed to pit against the admiral.

The right moment to strike at the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy appeared in the fall of 1955, when the battleship Novorossiysk exploded and sank in the Sevastopol roadstead. Kuznetsov was ill at that moment and could not even formally bear responsibility for this story, which they cannot fully understand to this day. However, he was made a scapegoat, removed from his post, and then dismissed, demoted to vice admiral.

Memory

The memory of Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov is kept in many cities of Russia. For example, in Arkhangelsk a street is named after him. In 2010, a monument to Admiral Kuznetsov was erected. It is located on the central square of Arkhangelsk. The officer is depicted in full height.

There are monuments to Admiral Kuznetsov in some other cities of Russia. A bust was erected in Sevastopol.