"Mutsu" - Battleship of the Imperial Japanese Navy
Mutsu is a Nagato-class battleship of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Named after the historical province of Mutsu located in the north of the island of Honshu.
Design
On June 12, 1917, when Mutsu had not yet been laid down, the Marine Technical Department decided to make changes to the project. According to the new project, which received the index "A-125", it was proposed to reduce the number of mine weapons from twenty to sixteen, reduce the number of steam boilers to twelve, change the ship's reservation system and add anti-torpedo boules. However, due to the fact that these changes significantly delayed the battleship's entry into service, the project was rejected.
Service
On December 1, 1917, the battleship Mutsu was assigned to the 1st Battleship Division. During the Prince of Wales's visit to Japan, the prince visited the battleship on April 12, 1922. On September 4, the ship took on supplies for victims of the Great Kanto Earthquake. During firing training on September 7, 1924, which took place in Tokyo Bay, together with the battleship Nagato, the target ship Satsuma sank. On December 1, 1925, the battleship was put into reserve. During naval maneuvers in 1927, Mutsu served as Emperor Hirohito's flagship. On March 29, 1929, the battleship, along with three light cruisers, was included in the 3rd Battleship Division.
In 1932, the battleship's anti-aircraft weapons were modernized. After completion of the work, "Mutsu" was assigned to the 1st Division of the 1st Fleet. During naval exercises and ship reviews in 1933, the battleship remained the Emperor's flagship. On November 15, the ship was put into reserve and began a major reconstruction. After the reconstruction was completed on December 1, 1936, Mutsu was re-assigned to the 1st Division of the 1st Fleet.
In August 1937, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, together with the battleship Nagato, she transported infantry units from Shikoku to Shanghai. On August 24, before leaving for Sasebo, the seaplanes of the battleships Mutsu and Nagato attacked targets in Shanghai. From December 15, 1938 to November 15, 1939 he was in reserve. During Japan's preparation for the Pacific War in 1941, repair work was carried out on the battleship, during which the protection of the barbettes of the main caliber turrets was strengthened.
At the start of the war for Japan on December 8, 1941, "Mutsu" together with the battleship "Nagato" were transferred to strengthen the 2nd division of battleships and were in the area of the Bonin Islands, to provide remote support to the withdrawing 1st Air Fleet attacking Pearl Harbor . Six days later the unit returned to Japan.
On January 18, 1942, the battleship towed the obsolete cruiser Nisshin, which acted as a target ship for the newest battleship Yamato. After direct hits from the main caliber guns, the target ship quickly sank.
In June 1942, the battleship was included in the Main Force of the 1st Fleet during the Battle of Midway. The main force also included the battleships Nagato, Yamato, the aircraft carrier Hōshō, the light cruiser Sendai, nine destroyers and four auxiliary ships. After the loss of all four aircraft carriers of the 1st Air Fleet, Yamamoto wanted to lure Western American forces within the range of Japanese air forces in the area of \u200b\u200bWake Island and engage his ground forces under cover of darkness, but the American forces retreated and Mutsu did not undertake no action. On June 6, after joining the remnants of the fleet, half of all survivors from the sunken aircraft carriers of the 1st Air Fleet went aboard the battleship Mutsu. The battleship arrived at Hashirajima on June 14.
On July 14, 1942, the battleship was assigned to the 2nd Battleship Division. On August 11, Mutsu, accompanied by the cruisers Atago, Takao, Maya, Haguro, Yura, Myōkō and an escort of destroyers, departed for Yokosuka to provide support in the Battle of Guadalcanal. The unit arrived in Truk on 17 August. On August 20, while sailing from Truk to rendezvous with the 3rd Fleet's Main Force, Mutsu, the heavy cruiser Atago, and an escort of destroyers attempted to locate the aircraft carrier USS Long Island to no avail.
During the Battle of the Solomon Islands, the battleship was part of the support force; during the battle, the battleship fired four shells at reconnaissance aircraft, this was the ship's first and only action in the war. On September 2, Mutsu returned to Truk.
On January 7, 1943, the battleship left Truk and headed for Japan via Saipan, accompanied by the aircraft carrier Zuikaku, the heavy cruiser Suzuya and four destroyers. On April 13, Mutsu arrived at Kure and began preparing to depart for the Aleutian Islands to reinforce the garrison in response to the Battle of the Commander Islands. The next day the operation was canceled and the battleship continued training.
On June 8, 1943, Mutsu was moored at the ship's anchorage at Hashirajima with forty instructors and 113 cadets on board. At 12:13 p.m., the ammunition of the main caliber turret No. 3 detonated, the explosion destroyed a nearby structure and split the battleship in half. Through the formed 150th. a hole in the engine room, sea water poured in, the front part of the battleship turned over on the starboard side and sank almost instantly. The stern part of the 45th battleship capsized and remained afloat. On June 9 at 02:00 she sank several hundred feet south of the scene of the tragedy.
The battleship Fuso, located near the scene of the tragedy, immediately launched two boats, along with the destroyers Tamanami and Wakatsuki, and the cruisers Tatsuta and Mogami. They managed to bring aboard 353 survivors of Mutsu's 1,474 crew and visitors; 1,121 people died as a result of the explosion. Only 13 visitors were among the survivors.
After the tragedy, when rescue efforts began, the fleet was put on alert and the area was examined for the presence of American submarines, but no traces of their presence were found. To avoid a drop in morale due to the death of the battleship and recent failures in military operations, the death of the battleship Mutsu was declared a state secret. To prevent rumors from spreading, the survivors were assigned to serve in a military garrison in the Pacific Ocean. Some of the survivors were sent to Truk in the Caroline Islands. The remaining 150 were sent to Saipan in the Mariana Islands, where most of them died during the Battle of Saipan in 1944.
At the time of the explosion, the battleship was carrying 410 mm shrapnel shells (Type 3), which several years earlier had caused a fire due to improper storage conditions in the Sagami arsenal. Since they could have caused the tragedy, it was decided to remove them from all ships until the investigation into the death of the battleship was completed.
A commission to investigate the sinking of the battleship Mutsu was convened on June 11, 1943. The commission considered several possible reasons, namely:
- Sabotage of the ship by an enemy secret agent.
Due to the lack of evidence of the involvement of allied forces and the presence of strong security at the anchorage where the battleship died, this version was rejected.
- Sabotage of the ship by a crew member.
The commission's final report did not name any names, but concluded that the explosion was most likely caused by a sailor from the No. 3 main gun turret, who had recently been accused of theft.
- American submarine attack.
Immediately after the tragedy, the area was searched for traces of submarines, but to no avail. Eyewitnesses also spoke of a reddish-brown fireball, which also indicates an explosion of ammunition; this was confirmed after inspection of the destruction by divers.
- Accidental detonation of ammunition.
There were different types of shells on board the Mutsu at the time of the sinking, but the 410mm shrapnel shells attracted attention as they had previously caused fires due to improper storage conditions. Divers managed to retrieve several undamaged shells from the main caliber turret No. 3. Testing of these types of projectiles took place at the Kamegakubi naval range. For the test, salvaged shells and shells from the previous and subsequent batches were taken. For the experiment, a model of tower No. 3 was specially built and shells were placed. After a series of experiments, it was not possible to cause the detonation of shells under normal storage conditions.
On June 25, the commission gave a preliminary opinion on the cause of the death of the battleship before divers had time to complete an investigation of the damage, ruling that the explosion was the result of an offended crew member.
Historian Mike Williams does not agree with the official version of the commission and put forward his own theory of the death of the battleship. According to his theory, immediately before the explosion, observers noted smoke in the area of Tower No. 3 and the seaplane area. Despite wartime, Japanese ships carried a large amount of flammable materials: wooden flooring, furniture, insulation, cotton and wool bedding. Although the electrical wiring was replaced after the Mutsu was modernized in the 1930s, some of the original wiring may still remain. While fire in the protected artillery magazines was unlikely, fire around the No. 3 main caliber turret magazine could cause the temperature inside to rise to the point of spontaneous combustion of the sensitive black powder in the primers stored inside, causing the explosion.
Mutsu. Battleship financed by Japanese schoolchildren
In 1907, the Imperial Japanese Navy first adopted the 8-8 program, according to which for the defense of the country a fleet was required, the backbone of which was to be eight modern battleships and eight battlecruisers. The fleet, consisting of sixteen large artillery ships no more than eight years old, could repel any enemy. In 1915 the program was half completed. The construction of four more dreadnoughts was required. After the US President announced plans to build 10 new battleships, the construction of the missing battleships under the program was approved. One of them was the future "Mutsu". The main feature of the new ships was the “all or nothing” armor scheme, according to which all the vital compartments of the ship were protected by powerful armor. They were also the first battleships to be entirely designed and built in Japan.
Exterior view of IJN Mutsu for 1941
"Mutsu" was laid down in June 1918, part of the money for the construction of the ship was collected by subscription among schoolchildren. The ship was enlisted in the Japanese fleet in November 1921 and immediately its fate hung in the balance. In November 1921, a conference on the limitation of naval armaments opened in Washington. The US delegation presented lists of battleships of all countries to be destroyed. Among them was "Mutsu". However, the Japanese delegation, as an argument for replacing this modern ship with an older one, cited the fact that it was built, among other things, with the money of children. After much debate, the American delegation made concessions and agreed to leave Mutsu.
Construction of the battleship IJN Mutsu
In 1934-1936, at the naval arsenal in Yokosuka, the ship underwent a major modernization, which significantly increased its combat capabilities and also changed the appearance of the battleship.
After commissioning, Mutsu was assigned to the Sasebo naval base and, after completing a combat training course, became part of the 1st Battleship Division of the First Fleet. Until 1927, the ship's service took place on campaigns and exercises. In October 1927, a parade of ships of the Imperial Navy took place in Yokohama Bay, which was watched by Emperor Hirohito from aboard the Battleship Mutsu. One more time the monarch climbed onto the deck of a battleship in 1933. In the summer of 1937, Mutsu took part in the Sino-Japanese War, guarding transports and transporting troops to the Chinese coast. The battleship's deck aircraft took part in the attack on the positions of Chinese troops near Shanghai.
By the end of the 1930s, Japan's relations with the United States had deteriorated significantly and war in the Pacific became almost inevitable. The ship met Japan's entry into World War II as part of the First Fleet of the Main Forces of the Japanese Navy. The period from December 1941 to the Battle of Midway for the battleship was spent in maneuvers and training firing in the waters of the Metropolis.
Battleship Mutsu, February 1937, Yokosuka
In May-June 1942, the ship took part in the Battle of Midway as part of the main invasion force under the command of Isoroku Yamamoto. After the defeat in this battle, the battleship was transferred to the 2nd squadron of battleships and spent the rest of the summer engaged in combat training.
In August 1942, Mutsu was transferred to the 2nd Fleet and departed to participate in operations in the Guadalcanal area. The battleship took part in the battle of the Eastern Solomon Islands, covering the carrier force of Admiral Nagumo, and then returned to the waters of the Metropolis.
On the last day of spring 1943, the ship was in Hashirajima. The battleship was moored on the flagship barrel two miles southwest of the base. The four Mutsu magazines contained 960 main-caliber shells, including 200 special incendiary air defense shells. On the morning of June 8, cadets and instructors from the air training group arrived on the battleship to familiarize themselves with the ship. After breakfast, the deck crew of the Mutsu began preparations for remooring the ship to barrel No. 2, as information was received that the flagship of the Second Battleship Division, the battleship Nagato, had arrived at the base and its place had to be vacated. In the morning there was thick fog, which by noon had not cleared; visibility was only 500 meters. Nevertheless, they prepared to make progress on Mutsu.
At 12:13 p.m., the commander of the First Fleet was standing on the bridge of the battleship Nagato approaching Hashirajima when, straight ahead at a distance of several miles, he saw a blinding white flash that pierced the veil of fog. Half a minute later the roar of an explosion was heard. While the Nagato was wondering about the cause of the incident, a coded telegram arrived: “Mutsu” exploded!”
The force of the explosion broke the ship in half and sank. The commission to investigate the cause of the battleship explosion worked for about two months, but could not name the exact cause of the tragedy. Among the versions there were also exotic ones, such as an attack by a midget submarine or a single torpedo bomber. However, most experts were inclined to believe that the cause of the explosion was self-ignition from the heating of special main-caliber air defense incendiary shells. In September 1943, the ship was removed from the lists of the Imperial Navy.
Battleship Mutsu in the game World of Warships
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LC Yamato.
LK Musashi. Painting by Takeshi Yuko.
Explosion of the Civil Code cellars on Yamato.
In the 60s, when Japanese technical archives were studied and detailed research on the history of the Pacific War was published, the battleships of the Yamato series acquired fame as the most remarkable ship of the United Fleet, almost a symbol of the former Japanese naval power. Western sources call them "giants" and "armored monsters."
A few years after the end of the First World War, the naval departments of different countries started talking about battleships. It was believed that these warships were still the main force of any fleet. The battleship is designed for battle in close combat formation. It is armed with offensive and defensive combat weapons, concentrated to the most rational extent: artillery, armor and unsinkability are in the first place, speed and range are in second place. The requirement for the maximum possible simultaneous strengthening of offensive and defensive means is all the more easily fulfilled the larger the warship, since on a larger ship a significant percentage of the total mass can be allocated to all these means: this explains the increase in the displacement of battleships in the course of their evolution.
Taking a course to strengthen its armed forces, Japan in 1934 decided to no longer adhere to the 1930 London Agreement on the Limitation of Naval Arms and adopted the so-called Marusai Program, according to which it was planned to build a number of new warships for the Imperial Navy, including several battleships , and paramount importance was attached not to quantity, but to the quality of new military equipment.
The development of new battleships was based on the idea of superiority over similar American ships, which, according to Japanese experts, due to the mandatory condition of passing through the Panama Canal, should have limited tactical and technical data: a displacement of no more than 63,000 tons, armament of guns with a caliber of no more than 406 mm and speed up to 23 knots. The lead ship was to be the battleship Yamato.
The abandonment of weight discipline played a cruel joke on Japanese designers. Quite often, not the most effective, but the most difficult decisions were chosen. The depth of the PTZ is only 3.5 meters. With such a complete formation of the body, it was not difficult to make 5.5-6 meters.
The armor of the towers was 600 mm. which, taking into account the angle of inclination of the armor, gave more than 1000 mm. Naturally, such protection did not break through. nothing. The ships sank to the bottom, keeping the main battery intact.
One, albeit thick, armored deck. The Japanese themselves on Nagato and Mutsu tore the armored decks into three parts - the first was intended for arming fuses and removing armor-piercing caps, the second represented the main position of resistance, and the third caught fragments.
As the war in the Pacific Ocean showed, the main disadvantage of these battleships was the lack of radars (primitive radars were installed only in 1943) and the lack of centralized control of anti-aircraft fire. 25mm anti-aircraft guns only made it possible to “distract” the team. I note that in the battles for Guadalcanal (battle of Santa Cruz) during a massive attack by Japanese carrier-based aircraft, LK Washington claimed 32 downed Japanese aircraft (he was credited with 26). LK Washington, like the American aircraft carriers, was armed with 40-mm anti-aircraft Bofors and 20-mm Oerlikons. And most importantly, they already had radars and centralized control of anti-aircraft fire.
The combat career of battleships of this class is not particularly eventful. The battleship Yamato, being the flagship of Admiral I. Yamamoto, during the battle at Midway Atoll, having received a message about the defeat of the Japanese carrier forces, left the battle without using its huge guns. The battleship Musashi carried the flag of Admiral M. Koga, who became commander of the United Fleet after the death of I. Yamamoto. Both warships were near Truk Island almost all the time.
On December 25, 1943, while north of the island, the battleship Yamato was hit by a torpedo from the American submarine Skate. This incident prompted improvements in mine protection on ships of this type.
During the war in the Pacific, when aviation began to convincingly prove its leading role in military operations at sea, the huge guns turned out to be useless, and both Japanese battleships were soon sunk by American carrier-based aircraft.
The Musashi was killed in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Sunk by US carrier-based aircraft. (Battle in the Sibuyan Sea). From November 23, 1944, the battleship Yamato was based in Japan, from where it set out on its last voyage in April 1945. He took part in Operation Tenichigo. The goal of the operation is to reach the American landing site on the island of Okinawa, where American troops invaded on April 1. During the collision with American aircraft, three torpedoes hit the battleship. The auxiliary steering gear was damaged. The battleship Yamato shot down one torpedo bomber. Some time later, two more torpedoes hit the warship, causing damage to electrical equipment, causing part of the artillery to be disabled. The ship's position had not yet become critical, but its reserves of survivability and stability were on the verge of exhaustion. Then the final attack began, during which at least four torpedoes hit the ship. At that time, only one propeller shaft was working on the battleship Yamato, and soon all the boiler rooms were flooded and abandoned by the personnel. The ship immediately lost speed. The roll to the left side reached 15-16 degrees. When the battleship Yamato lay on board with a list of about 80 degrees, there was a monstrous explosion that was heard for many miles around. The reflection of this explosion was seen on the ships of the American unit located several tens of miles from the scene of the tragedy on the island of Kagoshima. A column of smoke rose above the warship to a height of 6 km and looked like a “nuclear mushroom”. The flames of the explosion rose 2 km. Undoubtedly, only the explosion of the cellars (approximately 500 tons of explosives) could produce a similar effect, but what caused the explosion is unknown. Some American experts believe that the explosion occurred due to an armor-piercing bomb hitting the tower and through it into the main cellars. The explosion resulted in terrible casualties among the crew of the battleship Yamato. Of the 2,767 crew members, 2,498 people died, including the formation commander and the ship's commander. In total, in the battle, in addition to the battleship Yamato, a battle cruiser and four destroyers were destroyed, on which 3,665 people died or drowned. In her last battle, the battleship Yamato shot down only five and damaged twenty aircraft, and the formation destroyed ten aircraft in total: four dive bombers, three torpedo bombers and three fighters. This was the price for the most powerful battleship in the world, a light cruiser and a couple of destroyers. The fee is more than reasonable.
The two most powerful battleships in the world never used their main guns for their intended purpose!!!!
Yamato and Musashi were built in such secrecy that the Americans only learned after the war how huge the ships were sunk by their aircraft. From a tactical point of view, such secrecy had some basis, but from a psychological point of view it was a major mistake. For example, in November 1942, it would have been much more difficult for Nimitz and Halsey to send the newest LCs Washington and South Dakota to Guadalcanal, knowing, albeit purely theoretically, that their ships could collide with monsters with a displacement of more than 72 thousand. tons, armed with 460 main battery artillery and protected by 410mm GBP.
Technical characteristics of the battleship Yamato: Length - 263.0 m; Height - 38.9 m; Draft - 10.6 m; Displacement - 72800 tons; Cruising range - 7200 miles; The ship's power plant is a four-shaft steam turbine; Power - 150,000 hp; Crew: Total - 2300 people; Speed - 27 knots; Armament: Main caliber gun 460 mm - 9; Anti-mine gun caliber 155 mm - 12; Universal caliber gun 127 mm - 12; Anti-aircraft gun 25 mm - 24; (until the end of the war, at least 140 barrels). Seaplanes - 7;
Friday the 13th: sinking of the battleship Hiei
By the morning of November 13, the American squadron, having lost half of its ships and both admirals, left the Guadalcanal area. The Japanese squadron retreated to the north and prepared to carry out its main task - shelling the Henderson Field airfield. However, Admiral Abe's flagship, the battleship Hiei, was seriously damaged in a battle with American ships and was now slowly retreating north.
At dawn on November 13, the battleship Hiei with Admiral Abe on board was north of Savo Island. Only the light cruiser Nagara remained with him. The remaining Japanese ships, led by the battleship Kirishima, managed to move even further north.
Light cruiser Nagara. tokkoro.com
Night shooting was carried out at extremely short distances in 15-20 cabs, and the Hiei was hit by more than 130 American shells with a caliber of 127 mm or more - including three dozen 203 mm from heavy cruisers. None of the shells managed to penetrate the armored citadel of the battleship, and only one 203-mm shell penetrated the 76-mm belt in the stern. But this hit turned out to be extremely successful, causing flooding of the tiller compartment and disabling the electric steering motors. As a result, control of the rudders was restored only using a manual drive.
Some sources claim that the battleship's rudder was jammed in the starboard position, and it was possible to steer the ship with difficulty and exclusively by machines. This is refuted by the Japanese scheme for maneuvering the battleship, which described large arcs to the right and to the left. In any case, the ship did not stay on course well and greatly reduced speed. The reasons for the decrease in speed are not entirely clear, since there is no evidence of damage to the power plant in a night battle; This may have been due to a general disruption of the ship's control systems, as well as the injury of most of the senior officers.
Battleship Hiei in 1940. S. Breyer. Schlachtschiffe und Schlahtkreuzer 1905-1970. Munchen, 1993
A hail of small and medium caliber shells caused enormous damage to superstructures and fire control systems. Due to damage to electrical equipment, the main caliber turrets were immobilized for some time. The directors of the main caliber were smashed, the ship's radio station was out of order, and the bow tower-like superstructure of the battleship was engulfed in flames, so the ship's commander, Captain 1st Rank Nishida, was forced to move his control center to the third tower.
Theoretically, none of these damages threatened the survivability of the battleship; it also retained its combat capability - the second and third towers had individual 8-m rangefinders and could control the fire of other towers. This was confirmed by an incident at dawn, when at about 6 a.m. American ships were discovered in the southeastern sector of the horizon. It was the destroyed destroyer Aaron Ward and the tugboat Bobolink that had just picked it up (later he also tried to save Atlanta). There were 140 cabs ahead of the enemy, at 6:07 the Hiei opened fire with its stern turrets and achieved coverage with the third salvo. Perhaps the destroyer would have been sunk - but then American planes appeared in the sky.
Bobolink tugboat. ibiblio.org
Air attacks
Six (according to other sources, five) SBD-3 Dauntless dive bombers from the 142nd Naval Reconnaissance and Bomber Squadron (VMSB-142) arrived from the Henderson Field airfield, which was only fifty kilometers away, to the aid of the American ships. The planes attacked at 6:15 and managed to hit one 450 kg bomb near the side of the battleship. The battleship's anti-aircraft gunners said they had shot down one plane.
An hour later, four TBF Avenger torpedo bombers from the 131st Squadron (VMSB-131) from Henderson Field appeared over the Hiei. They were attacked by three Zero fighters patrolling over the battleship from the aircraft carrier Zunyo; the Japanese managed to damage one bomber. The Americans reported that one torpedo hit the battleship (the Japanese deny this). There is no information about the damage received by the battleship at this time, but it can be assumed that the close gap affected its speed and controllability - otherwise it is not clear why the Hiei did not move north, but remained near Savo Island. Moreover, according to the Japanese report card, just at this time the Hiei sharply went to the left, described an almost complete circulation and set on a course to the west.
SBD-3 Dauntless dive bomber. collections.naval.aviation.museum
Immediately after the air raid, the destroyer Yukikaze, the flagship of the 16th destroyer division, approached the battleship. Over the next two hours, the destroyer Teruzuki arrived here, as well as the 27th division of destroyers - Shigure, Shiratsuyu and Yugure, which did not participate in the night battle. At the same time, six more Zero fighters appeared above the battleship, hovering over it for a little over an hour.
Since the Hiei radio station did not work, at 8:15 Admiral Abe and his headquarters moved to the destroyer Yukikaze and transferred his flag to it. At the same time, he contacted the Kirishima via the destroyer's radio and ordered the battleship to return to Savo Island to take the damaged Hiei in tow. This was a belated decision - help needed to be provided much earlier, even at night.
At 9:15, a powerful raid began: the Hiei attacked nine Dauntlesses and three Avengers under the cover of seven F4F-4 Wildcat fighters. With the Japanese fighters already gone, Wildcats stormed the battleship, attempting to suppress its anti-aircraft guns. Nevertheless, the Americans did not achieve a single hit.
Admiral Abe's order
At 10:10 a.m., seven Avengers appeared over Hiei from the Henderson Field airfield, and a few minutes later another nine of the same aircraft appeared from the aircraft carrier Enterprise. One of the Enterprise's torpedo bombers managed to hit the bow of the battleship. The damage was minor, but it was at that moment that Admiral Abe lost his nerve. Apparently, he was also influenced by the message that the Kirishima was attacked by an unknown submarine and was hit by two torpedoes (later it turned out that they did not explode).
Abe decided not to tempt fate any longer and ordered the Kirishima to turn north again, and the commander of the Hiei, Captain 1st Rank Nishida, to direct the battleship to Guadalcanal and beach itself at Kamimbo. Nishida objected, saying that the damage to the battleship was not fatal, it was still floating and could be saved. This time Admiral Abe relented.
TBF Avenger torpedo bombers. pacificeagles.net
At 11 o'clock, the battleship was unsuccessfully attacked by three Avengers from Henderson Field, and 10 minutes later 14 B-17 Flying Fortresses from the 11th Heavy Bomber Group from Espiritu Santo Island appeared over the Hiei. The planes flew at an altitude of over 4000 m - it was very difficult to get into the ship from there, but the “Flying Fortresses” had a lot of bombs, in addition, the battleship at low speed was a convenient target. One of the 56 bombs weighing 227 kg still hit the Hiei - it did not cause much damage, but water again began to flow into the aft compartments of the battleship.
At 11:20, the battleship was attacked by six Dauntlesses of the 132nd squadron, their pilots reported three hits with 453 kg bombs - however, the reliability of these reports is questionable. Another 10 minutes later, two Dauntless from the 132nd squadron and four Avengers from the 8th torpedo bomber squadron from the aircraft carrier Saratoga simultaneously appeared over the Hiei. It was the latter who achieved serious success, hitting the battleship with two torpedoes: one hit the middle part of the ship, another hit the bow on the port side. The torpedo bomber raid had to be repelled by fire from the main caliber guns - the very same Type 3 shells prepared for shelling the Henderson Field airfield and actually intended for firing at air targets.
Last chance
Around noon, six Zero fighters arrived at the Hiei - they patrolled the sky above the ship for an hour and a half. By this time, the battleship was finally able to correct the steering and for some time give a speed of 15 knots. Two-thirds of the water had been pumped out of the tiller compartment.
By half past two, the aft compartments had been drained almost completely, and the fire in the area of the bow tower-like superstructure began to go out. It seemed that now the ship could be saved. True, the upper deck of the battleship was seriously damaged, and three of the eight boilers were out of action due to the bombing.
Battleship Hiei before the war. IJN Warship Album Battleships & Battle Cruisers. Tokyo, 2005
However, at about half past three, immediately after the Zero fighters left, the battleship was again attacked by a large group of aircraft. Descriptions of this attack are extremely contradictory. According to Japanese data, it took place after 14:30 - this time dates back to the entry in Admiral Abe’s journal that the fire was under control, the rudder control was established, and there was a chance to save the ship. According to this magazine, the battleship was attacked by 12 torpedo bombers, which managed to score two hits. One torpedo hit the central part of the hull on the starboard side, the other hit the stern.
According to American data, there were two raids. At 14:00, the Hiei was attacked by 14 aircraft from Henderson Field (eight Dauntless and six Avengers), under the cover of 14 Wildcat fighters. They claimed two accurate and two suspected torpedo hits. At 14:35, four more Avengers appeared from the aircraft carrier Enterprise - their pilots reported two torpedo hits.
F4F-4 Wildcat fighters. airandspace.si.edu
One way or another, Hiei received at least two torpedoes. Captain Nishida gave maximum speed, trying to evade the attacks, but either from a sharp shift of the rudder, or from a torpedo hit, the newly corrected steering failed again. In addition, water began to flow into the engine room, the battleship tilted to starboard and sank noticeably to the stern. The chance to save the ship was lost.
The crew leaves the battleship
In eight hours, the Hiei was attacked by a total of about 70 aircraft. The battleship was still afloat, the engines were working, but the ship had completely lost control, and there was no one nearby who could take the 30,000-ton giant in tow. At 15:30, Vice Admiral Abe again ordered Captain Nishida to leave the ship. This time the order was given in writing and sent to the battleship by boat. Nishida obeyed and began transferring the battleship's crew to the destroyer Yukikaze. However, he was in no hurry - apparently hoping for a miracle and the approaching night.
Maneuvering the battleship Hiei at night and during the day on November 13, 1942. Campaigns of the War in the Pacific. Materials of the commission to study the strategic bombing of United States aviation
No miracle happened. At 17:45, six Dauntlesses from Henderson Field reappeared over Hiei. This time the Americans did not hit the battleship, but placed one bomb next to the side of the Yukikaze, which they mistook for a light cruiser. At the same time, Nishida received news that the engine room was completely flooded. Only then did he give the final order to abandon ship. At 6 p.m., Nishida left his control post in the third tower and went down to the destroyer Teruzuki, having previously taken with him a portrait of the emperor. The rest of the crew was taken off by destroyers of the 27th Division. Abe ordered the destroyer Shigure to sink the empty battleship with torpedoes.
At 18:38, the Yukikaze received an order from Admiral Yamamoto: under no circumstances should the Hiei be sunk! Some historians interpret this order as a last attempt to save the battleship, others believe that Yamamoto simply wanted the ship remaining on the water to distract the enemy’s attention for some time.
At 19:00, the destroyers, having completed the reception and redistribution of the rescued, left the battleship and headed east. By this time, the Hiei had a list of 15° to starboard, and its stern sank into the water almost to the quarterdeck deck. Apparently, the seacocks were not open, and the ship sank only six hours later - at one in the morning on November 14. This happened five miles north of Savo Island.
The destroyer Yukikaze after entering service in 1939. Admiral Abe transferred his flag to this ship. Japanese Naval Warship Photo Album: Destroyers. Kure Maritime Museum
Hiei was the first Japanese battleship sunk in World War II. In total, 188 people died on it, and another 151 sailors were injured. The long “Friday the 13th” ended with the victory of the American fleet. This victory was very costly for the Americans: they lost two light cruisers and four destroyers, and two more heavy cruisers were seriously damaged. Approximately 1,560 American sailors were killed or drowned (the Japanese lost about 600 permanent casualties).
Investigation
Having received a message about the death of the Hiei, Admiral Yamamoto removed Abe from the post of commander of the 11th battleship division on November 14. Following this, Vice Admiral Abe Hiraoke and Captain 1st Rank Nishida Masatake were recalled to Japan, where they appeared before a special commission that investigated the reasons for the loss of the battleship Hiei. Both were found innocent, but were dismissed from their combat positions: 53-year-old Abe was transferred to clerical work at the Naval General Staff, and on March 10, 1943, he was dismissed. Nishida was first transferred to the reserve, but then called up again for service: he commanded aviation units, but never served on ships again.
The fighting on November 13 ended, but 12 Japanese transports with units of the 38th Division and 8th Marine Brigade were still heading towards Guadalcanal. Despite the loss of one of the battleships, Vice Admiral Kondo was determined to continue the operation and attack Henderson Field. Over the next two days, a new naval battle broke out northwest of Guadalcanal.
To be continued
Sources and literature:
- Campaigns of the War in the Pacific. Materials of the commission to study the strategic bombing of United States aviation. M.: Voenizdat, 1956
- Stephen Dull. The battle path of the Imperial Japanese fleet. Ekaterinburg: Mirror, 1997
- E. Tully. The sinking of the battleship Hiei: shelling or air raid? // FlotoMaster, 2003, No. 3
- Imperial Japanese Navy ship Hiei. Chronicle // FlotoMaster, 2003, No. 2
- https://www.history.navy.mil
- https://www.combinedfleet.com
- https://www.ibiblio.org
