150-mm six-barreled rocket mortar Nb.W 41 mod. 1941 (Germany)

150-mm six-barreled rocket mortar Nb.W 41 mod. 1941 (Germany)

Text of the book “Wehrmacht Artillery”

Andrey Ivanovich Kharuk

Wehrmacht artillery

Wehrmacht artillery

Artillery was one of the main elements of the Nazi military machine, however, it often remains out of sight of modern researchers, who focus their attention on the Panzerwaffe - the armored fist of the Wehrmacht, and the Luftwaffe - its air force. This book is an attempt to give a comprehensive description of German ground artillery during the Second World War, including such types as field artillery (divisional and RGK), infantry artillery (including mortars), as well as mountain, rocket, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery artillery.

The book examines the organization of artillery of the Wehrmacht and SS troops, provides basic information about the organizational structure of artillery units and formations, and the tactics of their use. The material part of ground artillery has been analyzed. The main emphasis is on towed artillery systems, which, unlike self-propelled ones, have received virtually no coverage in domestic publications.

Brainchild of Versailles

(Reichswehr artillery, 1919-1935)

Germany's defeat in World War I led to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. The victorious states, and first of all France, tried in every possible way to protect themselves from future shocks caused by the military power of Germany, and in the provisions of the treaty they tried to limit as much as possible the number and armament of the Reichswehr - the so-called armed forces of the Weimar Republic. They could not go so far as to completely ban Germany from having an army - this would mean depriving a large European state of one of the indispensable attributes of sovereignty. But the German army, cut down to “Versailles” sizes, certainly could not pose a threat to its neighbors. Germany was completely prohibited from having entire types of weapons, such as combat aircraft or tanks. With regard to artillery, the Treaty of Versailles was not so radical - a handful of artillery systems were allowed to be retained. But at the same time, not only such parameters as the caliber of the guns were severely limited, but also even the supply of shells per barrel.

The Reichswehr field artillery consisted of seven artillery regiments, equal to the number of infantry divisions.

Each artillery regiment consisted of three divisions of three batteries - two cannon and one howitzer. In addition, the 3rd and 6th artillery regiments had, respectively, two and one mounted artillery divisions - for the three cavalry divisions of the Reichswehr. Howitzer divisions were armed with 105-mm light field howitzers leFH 16 - in total, the Reichswehr could have 84 such howitzers with ammunition of 800 rounds per barrel. The cannon divisions were armed with 77-mm FK 16 cannons. The exception was the 9th batteries of each artillery regiment, armed with self-propelled 77-mm VAK anti-aircraft guns on a vehicle chassis. In addition, the 4th and 7th batteries of the 7th artillery regiment were armed with 75-mm GebK 15 mountain guns. Thus, there were 204 guns in the artillery regiments. The permitted ammunition was 1000 shells per barrel (for mountain anti-aircraft guns - only 400 shells per barrel).

The Reichswehr was prohibited from having heavy artillery. The only exception was the Koenigsberg fortified area. Here it was allowed to preserve 22 heavy artillery systems, incl. six 105 mm K 17 cannons, two 150 mm K 16 cannons, 12 150 mm sFH 13 howitzers and two 210 mm mortars. Also in Konigsberg it was allowed to have heavy anti-aircraft guns - 12 88 mm and four 105 mm.

Strict restrictions were also introduced on the production of artillery systems. The production of field guns was not completely prohibited, but its volume should not exceed 14 units per year. But the production of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns was prohibited. But the Germans skillfully circumvented these restrictions. Although the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission operated on German territory, its representatives were often, as they say, fooled. There are known cases when, on the eve of the arrival of inspectors at a plant producing weapons, the equipment necessary for this was transported to another enterprise located on... the opposite side of the street! Naturally, after the departure of the commission, all the machines returned to their places. And many machine-building enterprises that switched to producing civilian products retained a machine park that made it possible to launch weapons production in the shortest possible time. The permission of the Inter-Allied Commission to retain several weapons design bureaus (KB) was important. In particular, Krup and Rheinmetall (from 1930 - Rheinmetall-Borsig) worked in the field of artillery. Their activities were also controlled, but this did not bother the resourceful Germans. In particular, in 1921, the Rheinmetall concern began at its design bureau in Berlin the development of new heavy artillery systems prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles. When inspectors discovered this fact, the design bureau was closed. But in reality, most of the specialists simply moved to the town of Luneburger Heide, away from the eyes of the control commission, where they continued their work. And Krup generally transferred the development of heavy guns outside of Germany, collaborating, in particular, with the Swedish one. When the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission completed its work (and this happened on February 28, 1927), the further activity of the German military industry was constrained only by “moral” restrictions. The reserves accumulated during the work “underground” made it possible to create and introduce into production a whole range of new artillery systems in the shortest possible time. Technologists also worked in parallel with the designers, introducing advanced production methods, and above all, the continuous assembly of tools.

German military specialists also did not particularly bother themselves with observing the “spirit and letter” of the Treaty of Versailles. Already in 1924, information about the exercises of a battery of 210-mm mortars leaked to the press - i.e. guns that the Reichswehr was forbidden to have. Military sailors provided significant assistance. The coastal artillery units retained heavy artillery systems - as of 1926, there were six coastal artillery divisions with a total of 187 guns (68 on the Baltic coast and 119 on the North Sea coast). In addition, the fleet managed to hide 185 heavy field guns in the fortresses of Pillau and Swinemünde from inspectors. Subsequently, these systems were transferred to the army. Thus, taking into account the guns of the Koenigsberg fortified area in the late 20s. The Reichswehr had two hundred heavy artillery systems - more than the armies of Belgium and Holland combined. The training of ground forces artillerymen was carried out, among other things, in coastal artillery units - here they acquired the necessary experience in handling heavy guns. In general, the Reichswehr was distinguished by a very high level of personnel training. Since universal conscription was prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles, the army was recruited under contract, and the terms of service were quite long. This made it possible to train privates at the level of non-commissioned officers, and to give non-commissioned officers training like officers. Subsequently, it was thanks to the presence of such a personnel core that a rapid numerical increase in the German army became possible.

At the turn of the 20-30s. qualitative changes will become noticeable in the Reichswehr artillery. In particular, an experimental battery for firing chemical shells was formed in the 4th artillery regiment in Dresden. In 1930 in Ulm, and in 1932 in Königsberg, motorized batteries of 150-mm howitzers were formed, using new half-track tractors as a means of traction.

Hitler's rise to power on January 20, 1933 marked a sharp turn in the fate of the German army (and not only the army, but all of Germany and the whole world...). On October 1, 1934, it was announced that the strength of the Reichswehr would be tripled - to 21 infantry divisions. This led to the “budding” of artillery units, as a result of which each of the seven artillery regiments formed two more. Thus, on the basis of the 1st AP, the 11th and 21st artillery regiments were created, the 2nd - the 12th and 20th, the 3rd - the 8th and 18th, the 4th - the 13th and the 14th, 5th - 9th and 15th, 6th - 16th and 19th, and finally, 7th - 10th and 17th artillery regiments. After the occupation of the Rhineland, 12 more artillery divisions were formed. At the same time, work was carried out to develop more advanced organizational structures for artillery. The 2nd Infantry Division (ID), stationed in Stettin, became a kind of “testing ground”. As part of its artillery regiment, they formed a horse-drawn division and a motorized battery of 150 mm howitzers, as well as a battery of 105 mm guns. In August 1934, the headquarters of the second artillery regiment appeared within the division, intended to control heavy artillery units. And in the IV (Dresden) Military District, the formation of 210-mm mortar divisions began. The Reichswehr was only waiting for the official denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles - in order to turn into the Wehrmacht...

Organization of Wehrmacht artillery

Field artillery

Depending on the organization and goals, the Wehrmacht field artillery can be divided into divisional artillery and RGK artillery. Special mention should be made of rocket artillery units.

Divisional artillery

When forming their artillery units, the German military tried to take into account the experience of the First World War to the maximum extent possible. By the beginning of that war, the field artillery of the German divisions (as well as the French and Russian) consisted mainly of light guns, ideal for maneuver warfare. But the transition of hostilities to the positional phase revealed all the shortcomings of these artillery systems, primarily the flat trajectory of fire and the low power of the projectile, which together did not allow them to effectively hit field fortifications. The German command quickly learned its lessons, quickly saturating the troops with field howitzers. If the ratio of the number of guns to howitzers in 1914 was 3:1, then in 1918 it was only 1.5:1. The Treaty of Versailles meant a rollback not only in the absolute number of howitzers, but also in the relative weight of these guns in the Reichswehr artillery fleet. Naturally, after the denunciation of the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles, measures were taken to saturate the artillery units with howitzers. In addition to purely military ones, there were also economic prerequisites for this - howitzers were much cheaper than guns, and the labor intensity of their production was less. For example, the 105-mm howitzer leFH 18 cost the treasury 16,400 marks, and the labor intensity of its production was 3,200 man-hours. The 75-mm leFK 18 cannon cost 20,400 marks, and the labor intensity of its production was a thousand man-hours higher. It should be noted that the decision to “gaubize” seemed by no means uncontroversial. There was a heated debate on this issue in the pages of the specialized press. Supporters of cannons cited, in particular, the argument that, with the same caliber, howitzer shells are significantly more expensive than cannon shells. The opinion was also expressed that with the removal of guns, divisional artillery would lose tactical flexibility. Nevertheless, the leadership listened to the opinion of the “howitzer faction”, trying to standardize weapons and avoid diversity in production and in the troops. A significant argument in favor of howitzers was the desire to provide a fire advantage over the armies of neighboring countries - in most of them, the basis of divisional artillery was 75-76 mm cannons.

According to the peacetime states, the Wehrmacht infantry division had two artillery regiments, fully armed with howitzers - that is, it had no guns at all. One regiment had three three-battery battalions of horse-drawn 105 mm leFH 18 howitzers - a total of 36 guns. The second regiment was armed with heavy 150 mm sFH 18 howitzers and had two three-battery divisions - one horse-drawn and one motorized (24 guns in total). This organization was convenient for administrative needs in peacetime, but in combat conditions it led to limited maneuverability of artillery at the corps and army level. Therefore, on the eve of the outbreak of World War II, divisions for heavy artillery regiments within infantry divisions were abolished. Their horse-drawn divisions were included in the light artillery regiments, and their motorized divisions were transferred to the RGK artillery.

Thus, by September 1939, the regular composition of the artillery regiment of the infantry division included three divisions of light and one heavy howitzers, and a total of 48 guns (36 105 mm leFH 18 and 12 150 mm sFH 18). All artillery was only horse-drawn - even the developed German automobile industry could not keep up with the growing needs of the Wehrmacht by leaps and bounds. The battery of 105-mm horse-drawn howitzers consisted of 171 people. personnel (four officers, 30 non-commissioned officers, 137 privates), there were 153 horses and 16 carts. The battery of 150-mm howitzers, oddly enough, was smaller in composition - 163 people. personnel (three officers, 29 non-commissioned officers, 131 privates), 125 horses, 26 carts, and in addition - two cars. It should be taken into account that the mass introduction of the new 105-mm leFH 18 howitzers began only in 1937, and before that the basis of the divisional artillery was the old leFH 16 howitzers: in 1934 there were 496 of them, and in 1937 – already 980.

Howitzer le.FH18M. This gun was manufactured in 1937 and subsequently upgraded to le.FH18M. Photo from the Polish Army Museum (Warsaw)

It was not always possible to maintain the nominal number of artillery units. In the Wehrmacht, divisions were formed in so-called waves. And even the 35 divisions of the first wave could not be fully staffed - instead of the required 140 artillery divisions, they only had 135. The 16 divisions of the 2nd wave lacked 11 artillery divisions - mainly heavy ones. And in the divisions of the 3rd and 4th waves, acceptable strength of artillery regiments was achieved by the beginning of the Polish campaign only by transferring to them the artillery of the former Czechoslovak army.

The organization and armament of the artillery regiments of the four motorized divisions available in the Wehrmacht on September 1, 1939 (2nd, 13th, 20th and 29th) corresponded to the staff of the infantry divisions - three light and one heavy divisions, 36 105-mm and 12 150 mm howitzers. But all the artillery in these divisions was mechanized. Naturally, the artillery regiments of the tank (and light) divisions were also motorized. But their composition was much weaker. A typical artillery regiment of a tank division (TD) had only two motorized divisions of 105 mm howitzers - a total of 24 guns, half as many as in infantry or motorized divisions. There were exceptions. The 74th artillery regiment of the 2nd TD included one division of light howitzers and a mixed heavy division (one cannon and two howitzer batteries) - a total of 12 105 mm and eight 150 mm howitzers, as well as four 105 mm guns. The 10th Panzer Division did not have an artillery regiment at all, but only one division with a dozen 105 mm howitzers. Finally, the Kempf Panzer Division was given a motorized SS artillery regiment with three light howitzer battalions (36 105 mm howitzers). The number of personnel in motorized batteries was significantly less than in horse-drawn batteries. For example, the sFH 18 motorized howitzer battery, according to the 1943 staff, consisted of 125 people. personnel (three officers, 25 non-commissioned officers, 97 privates), 27 tractors and cars, two motorcycles.

The only cavalry unit existing in the Wehrmacht on September 1, 1939, the 1st Cavalry Brigade, had one division of 75 mm guns (12 units).

In the interval between the end of the Polish campaign and the beginning of active hostilities on the Western Front, some changes occurred in the structure of the Wehrmacht divisional artillery. First of all, measures were taken to strengthen the artillery of the tank divisions - some of them included a heavy division in the artillery regiments. And if in the 10th TD such a division has the same composition as in the 2nd (two batteries of 150-mm howitzers and one 105-mm sK 18 cannon), then in the 1st TD the heavy division had three howitzer batteries (12 sFH 18). The motorized divisions underwent a serious reorganization - instead of three motorized infantry regiments, they were left with two. Accordingly, one light howitzer division was removed from the artillery regiments of these divisions (24 105 mm and 12 150 mm howitzers remained).

By the end of 1940, six mountain divisions were formed within the Wehrmacht. They included mountain artillery regiments, the organization and armament of which met the requirements for conducting combat operations in the mountains. Such a regiment consisted of four divisions: a light howitzer standard organization (12 105 mm howitzers), a two-battery heavy howitzer (eight 150 mm howitzers) and two two-battery mountain artillery divisions (eight each 75 mm GebG 36 or older GebK 15 mountain guns) – a total of 36 guns. Light infantry divisions, called chasseurs since June 1942, had the same organization of artillery regiments as the mountain divisions. The exception was the 164th Light African Division, whose artillery regiment had two three-battery divisions - 105 mm howitzers and 75 mm mountain guns. Since 1942, supplies of 105-mm GebH 40 mountain howitzers, produced by the Austrian company, began to the mountain divisions. But there were very few such weapons.

In the fall of 1940, the only Wehrmacht cavalry brigade was deployed into the 1st Cavalry Division. It formed an artillery regiment that had two three-battery divisions of horse-drawn 105-mm howitzers (24 guns). In May 1941, the regiment included the 7th battery, also armed with 105-mm howitzers, but mechanized.

The existing 22nd Airborne Division within the ground forces was reorganized from the infantry division and retained its organization - including an artillery regiment with three light and one heavy divisions. However, units of this division were used only once as a landing force - in May 1940, and then the 22nd division was used as a regular infantry division. At the same time, the 7th Air Division, which was a parachute formation within the Luftwaffe, had very weak artillery - by May 1940 it had only one four-gun battery, armed with 75-mm GebG 36 mountain guns. By May 1941 g., i.e. , by the time of the landing on Crete, the battery was deployed into a three-battery division, which received 75 mm and 105 mm recoilless rifles. And already in the fall of the same year, an artillery regiment (two divisions) was formed as part of the 7th division.

By the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, all tank divisions received a heavy division as part of their artillery regiments. In most cases it had three batteries of 150 mm howitzers, but in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th and 14th divisions it had two batteries of howitzers and one 105 mm guns. A similar mixed composition was received by the heavy divisions of the artillery regiments of the 16th and 60th motorized divisions (MD), and a little later by the 14th, 18th and 20th MD. The remaining motorized divisions retained purely howitzer weapons. At the same time, in the spring of 1941, part of the artillery of the RGK (9 heavy howitzer and 8 mixed divisions) had to be used to recruit the heavy divisions of the artillery regiments of the divisions. The 5th Light Division, formed at the beginning of 1941 for operations in Africa, stood apart. This improvised formation, instead of an artillery regiment, had only one division of 105-mm howitzers, but when reorganized in the summer of 1941 into the 21st tank division, it received an artillery regiment of a standard composition. In the fall of 1941, the 90th Light African Division was formed as part of the Afrika Korps, which included only one light artillery division, initially with two batteries (in December 1941, a light anti-aircraft battery was introduced into its composition, and in February of the following year - third battery of 105 mm howitzers).

Special mention should be made of the SS troops. By the time the war against the USSR began, the Reich, Totenkopf and Viking divisions had artillery regiments corresponding to the Wehrmacht infantry divisions - three light and one heavy howitzer divisions. The SS Mountain Brigade "Nord" in the artillery regiment had two divisions of 105 mm howitzers (24 guns) and a heavy division (eight 150 mm howitzers and four 105 mm Czech guns). Finally, the motorized division (formally a brigade) “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” had two divisions in the artillery regiment: a standard 105-mm howitzer (12 guns) and a mixed one, which included two batteries of 150-mm howitzers and two 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. Subsequently, some differences in the organization of the artillery of the SS troops compared to the Wehrmacht divisions continued to persist. For example, the 7th Mountain Division "Prinz Eugen" had two mountain divisions (eight 75 mm guns each), one light howitzer (eight 105 mm guns) and one mixed heavy (eight 150 mm howitzers and four 105 -mm Czech guns).

Newly created divisions received, as a rule, a weaker artillery component. For example, the infantry divisions of the 15th wave formed in April 1941 (their numbers began with 700) instead of an artillery regiment received only one division of light howitzers. True, most of these divisions did not reach the front, and until 1944 they were used as occupation troops in Norway, France and the Balkans. Security divisions formed to fight partisans also received one light howitzer division. Field training divisions might not have artillery units at all - at best, one division. The occupation forces included reserve and stationary divisions. Their weak artillery units, as a rule, were armed with captured guns.

The protracted war against the USSR led to such Wehrmacht losses that no one in the German leadership expected. The industry did not have time to make up for the losses, so it was necessary to resort to extraordinary measures. In April 1942, it was allowed to send infantry divisions to the front with a “reduced” composition of artillery - three guns per battery instead of four. True, it was prescribed at the first opportunity to complete the artillery regiments to full strength.

In October 1942, the formation of 22 air field divisions began, subordinate to the command of the Luftwaffe (in reality, however, only 21 were formed). In terms of their composition and combat capabilities, airfield divisions were more likely to correspond to brigades, and their artillery was also very weak. Each division had only one artillery division, the composition and armament of which differed somewhat in different divisions. For example, the 1st, 2nd, 7th and 8th airfield divisions had only two four-gun batteries of horse-drawn Czech 75-mm GebK 15 mountain guns. The artillery divisions of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th and 10th divisions each had two batteries of 150 mm six-barreled Nebelwerfer 41 rocket launchers, usually called "rocket-propelled mortars" in Russian-language literature ( a total of 12 installations). Most divisions also had one battery of StuG III assault guns per artillery battalion. Only with the transfer of airfield divisions on October 31, 1943 to the command of the ground forces, their artillery was somewhat strengthened, and their artillery divisions were reorganized into artillery regiments. At the same time, the equipment remained outdated, mainly captured. For example, the 12th and 21st airfield divisions operating as part of the 18th Field Army of Army Group North were armed mainly with French guns. As of April 1944, the 12th Division had 22 75 mm guns and three German 105 mm howitzers, and the 21st Division had nine 105 mm howitzers and 31 French guns - 19 75 mm guns and 12 155 mm howitzer

Self-propelled gun "Hummel"

Important changes in the composition of artillery regiments of tank divisions were associated with the introduction of self-propelled artillery units (self-propelled guns) into their arsenal. At the end of 1942, units began to receive two types of such systems - the 105-mm self-propelled gun Sd.Kfz.124 "Vespe" (with the artillery part of the leFH 18 howitzer) and the 150-mm Sd.Kfz.165 "Hummel" (with the artillery part howitzers sFH 18). They were brought into the staff of the 1943 model tank division. Its artillery regiment, now called not motorized artillery, but panzer-artillery, included three divisions. Two of them - light (12 105-mm howitzers) and mixed heavy (eight 150-mm howitzers and four 105-mm cannons) - retained towed artillery systems. But the third division received self-propelled guns - two Vespe batteries (12 self-propelled guns) and one Hummel (six guns). Thus, according to the staff, the panzer-artillery regiment had 42 guns, of which 18 were self-propelled. This staffing structure remained until the end of the war. As of May 1944, self-propelled divisions were in the artillery regiments of the 22nd tank divisions (however, in the 21st TD, such a division, instead of standard self-propelled guns, was armed with self-propelled guns on captured French chassis, and in the 8th TD there were no Hummels, and the self-propelled artillery division was fully armed with Sd.Kfz.124). By 1944, the standard Wespe/Hummel divisions also had seven Waffen SS TDs.

SS divisions were generally distinguished by significantly stronger artillery compared to Wehrmacht divisions. In particular, in October 1942, a fourth division was introduced into the artillery regiments of the motorized divisions “Reich”, “Totenkopf” and “Viking”. This division consisted of three batteries. One of them - heavy - had four 88-mm and three 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. The other two were armed with self-propelled anti-aircraft guns on half-track tractor chassis: one had 9 37-mm guns, the other had 10 20-mm guns (eight single-barreled and two quadruple). The anti-aircraft division of the artillery regiment of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler division was even stronger. It had three heavy and two light batteries, and in total - 12 88-mm, 18 37-mm and 9 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. In addition, in the light howitzer divisions of this artillery regiment, one of the batteries had 150 mm howitzers instead of 105 mm (thus, taking into account the heavy division, there were 16 105 mm and 20 150 mm howitzers). Finally, the artillery regiment had a separate battery of 150-mm rocket launchers (six units). The elite Wehrmacht division Grossdeutschland had the same organization of the artillery regiment as in the Leibstandarte. And as of December 1944, the artillery regiment of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler division had self-propelled and mixed heavy divisions of a standard organization, a light howitzer (18 leFH 18), a Nebelwerfer division (18 150 mm and six 210 mm PU) and an anti-aircraft division (18 88-mm and 18 37-mm anti-aircraft guns).

Self-propelled artillery batteries had a rather complex structure. For example, Vespe batteries were formed according to KStN 431(tG), approved in January 1943. The battery consisted of a headquarters and three platoons - control, supply and fire. The headquarters had one Panzerbeobachtungswagen surveillance vehicle on the chassis of a Pz.KpfW tank. II or Pz.KpfW. III, the commander's "Kubelwagen" (passenger car) and motorcycle.

The control platoon had two sections - communications and artillery measurements. He had six vehicles - four light and two trucks (including one mobile radio station Kfz.17 or Kfz.31). The supply platoon consisted of one Sd.Kfz.3 “Maultir” half-track tractor (a variant of the famous Opel “Blitz” truck) or, less commonly, an Sd.Kfz.7, one “Kubelwagen” and six trucks. The fire platoon included two firing sections of three self-propelled guns and one ammunition transporter. In addition, the platoon had a control vehicle based on the half-track armored personnel carrier Sd.Kfz.250/4 or Sd.Kfz.251/6, two or three light vehicles and one or two motorcycles - regular or half-tracked Sd.Kfz.2 (“kettenk- raftrad").

On November 1, 1943, the changed personnel levels of the battery of light self-propelled howitzers were approved. The number of units has not changed, but their structure and strength have undergone some changes. The battery now included:

– headquarters (2 officers, 5 non-commissioned officers, 2 privates; two Kubelwagens and one Kettenkraftrad);

– control platoon (a total of 6 non-commissioned officers, 18 privates; two Panzerbeobachtungswagen (Sd. Kfz.143) based on the Pz.III tank, three half-track armored personnel carriers - one each Sd.Kfz.250/2, Sd.Kfz.250 /5 and Sd.Kfz.251/11, two Kubelwagens);

– supply platoon (7 non-commissioned officers, 23 privates; one 1-ton Sd.Kfz.10 half-track tractor, 8 3-ton trucks, one Kubelwagen);

- a fire platoon consisting of two sections: fire and ammunition (in total one officer, 16 non-commissioned officers, 49 privates; six self-propelled guns, two ammunition transporters, 4 3-ton trucks, 4 Kubelwagens, one Kettenkraftrad).

Thus, the November 1943 battery consisted of 129 personnel, six self-propelled guns, 7 other armored vehicles, and 24 unarmored vehicles. The staffed battery of self-propelled howitzers was a fairly strong artillery unit, also possessing significant autonomy - the battery controls generally corresponded to the divisional level for towed artillery.

The composition of artillery regiments of infantry divisions, in contrast to elite formations, continued to deteriorate in 1943. First of all, it was almost never possible to staff the artillery regiments according to the staff. Often the number of guns in a battery was reduced to three, or with the standard number of guns in the division there were only two batteries. Thus, the howitzer division, instead of the required 12 guns, had only 8-9. Many artillery regiments had only three instead of four divisions - one of the light divisions was missing, or (much more often) the heavy one. Captured systems, previously only allowed for rear units, increasingly appeared in front-line divisions. French 155 mm guns, Czech 150 mm and Soviet 122 mm howitzers replaced standard sFH 18 howitzers, and instead of 105 mm leFH 18 howitzers, captured guns were introduced - Soviet 76.2 mm or 75 mm, of which a great number were taken many in European countries - from Poland to France. Many divisions retained the old 105 mm leFH 16 howitzers - such guns were even included in the infantry divisions operating on the main line in Operation Citadel. Another “ersatz option” was the replacement of some leFH 18 howitzers with six-round Nebelwerfer 41 rocket launchers. Already at the beginning

In 1942, two Nebelwerfer batteries were introduced into the artillery regiments of the infantry divisions of the 18th and 19th waves that were being formed at that time. Later they appeared in other divisions, and there was no single organization for rocket artillery units. For example, in the 9th Infantry Division in one of the light divisions, two batteries were armed with Nebelwerfers (six units each), while the third retained four leFH 18 howitzers. In the 45th and 383rd Infantry Divisions, one of the light divisions was completely re-equipped with rocket launchers (according to the state - 18 units). Sometimes the jet division had two batteries (for example, in the 336th PD). Finally, there was an option when in each light howitzer division one of the batteries received “Nebelwerfers” instead of leFH 18 (as in the 111th PD).

The history of the creation of the 150-mm six-barreled rocket mortar Nb.W 41 mod. 1941

Rocket mortars of the USSR and Germany

Work on the creation of rocket mortars was carried out in the USSR and Germany in parallel, starting from the second half of the 1920s. However, if the USSR took as a basis the stabilization of a rocket in flight using wings, the Germans took a different path and sought to stabilize rockets using rapid rotation in flight.

The result was two “rocket schools” of the 1930s. The “Soviet school” involved launching feathered projectiles from long beam guides, while the “German school” relied on non-feathered projectiles launched from relatively short tubular guides or barrels.

As a result: Soviet “missiles” had a greater range of destruction, while German ones were more accurate. Accordingly, the methods of combat use also differed - Soviet missiles were supposed to be used for massive attacks on areas (which was later brilliantly demonstrated by the BM-13, the well-known Katyushas), and German missiles were supposed to be used for targeted destruction of targets, which, logically, was more consistent with the concept of “ mortar".

150-mm six-barreled rocket mortar Nb.W 41 mod. 1941

German jet "Vanyusha"

At the end of the 1930s The German engineer Nebel designed a 150-mm rocket and a six-barrel tubular installation for it, which the Germans called a six-barrel mortar. Testing of the mortar began in 1937. The system was named 150-mm smoke mortar type “D” .

In 1941, the mortar was renamed 150-mm Nb.W 41 (Nebelwerfer) , that is, “150-mm smoke mortar mod. 1941”, and a little later, from Soviet soldiers, he received the nickname “Vanyusha”, by analogy with the Soviet rocket mortar “Katyusha”.

Interesting fact: the main purpose of the “smoke mortars” was not to set up smoke screens or even to fire high-explosive mines. The true meaning of “Vanyusha” was to fire chemical ammunition, that is, filled with chemical warfare agents. That’s why the 150-mm Nb.W 41 (Nebelwerfer) was in the pay not of the “linear” army, but of the so-called. “smoke troops” (Nebeltruppen).

And only to ensure the possibility of using these troops in war in the event that there is no chemical war as such, the “smoke troops” also received shells for rocket launchers with a conventional explosive charge.

The crew loads a 150-mm six-barrel rocket mortar Nb.W 41 mod. 1941. Please note that the electric igniter cables are clearly visible on the side of the mortar

German rocket artillery during the war. Part 1

Multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) created before the Second World War in Germany were initially intended to fire projectiles filled with chemical warfare agents and projectiles with a smoke-forming composition for setting up smoke screens. However, in fairness it is worth noting that the Soviet MLRS BM-13 (the famous Katyusha) was created with similar goals. This is reflected in the name of the first German serial 150-mm MLRS - Nebelwerfer or “D-type smoke mortar”. The literal translation of the name "Nebelwerfer" from German is "Fog Thrower".

15cm Nebelwerfer 41

During World War II, Germany, although inferior to its allies in terms of total reserves of accumulated chemical weapons, had a significant qualitative superiority in this area. The traditionally high level of development of the German chemical industry and the presence of an excellent theoretical basis allowed German chemists to make a breakthrough in the field of chemical warfare agents in the late 30s. During research into the creation of insect control agents, the deadliest type of toxic substances in service was discovered—nerve poisons. Initially, a substance was synthesized that later became known as “Tabun”. Later, even more poisonous ones were created and produced on an industrial scale: Sarin and Soman.

Fortunately for the Allied armies, the use of toxic substances against them did not take place. Germany, doomed to defeat the war by conventional means, did not try to turn the tide of the war in its favor with the help of the latest chemical weapons. For this reason, German MLRS used only high-explosive fragmentation, incendiary, smoke and propaganda mines for firing.

Testing of the six-barreled 150 mm mortar began in 1937. The installation consisted of a package of six tubular guides mounted on a converted carriage of a 37-mm 3.7 cm PaK 36 anti-tank gun. Six 1.3-meter-long barrels were combined into a block using front and rear clips. The carriage was equipped with a lifting mechanism with a maximum elevation angle of 45 degrees and a rotating mechanism that provided a horizontal firing angle of up to 24 degrees. In the combat position, the wheels were hung out, the carriage rested on the bipod of the sliding frames and the folding front stop.

The combat weight in the loaded position reached 770 kg, in the stowed position this figure was 515 kg. The installation could be rolled over short distances by crew forces.

150-mm turbojet mines (missiles) were used for firing. The warhead was located in the rear, and in the front was a jet engine equipped with a perforated bottom with 26 inclined holes (nozzles inclined at an angle of 14 degrees). A ballistic casing was put on the engine. Stabilization of the projectile in the air occurred due to inclined nozzles, providing rotation at a speed of about 1000 rps.

The main difference between German missiles and Soviet ones was the method of stabilization in flight. Turbojet missiles had higher accuracy, since this method of stabilization also made it possible to compensate for the eccentricity of the engine thrust. In addition, it was possible to use shorter guides, since, unlike fin-stabilized missiles, the effectiveness of stabilization did not depend on the initial speed of the missile. But due to the fact that part of the energy of the escaping gases was spent on spinning the projectile, its flight range was less than that of a projectile with fins.

When loading rocket mines from the breech, the shells were fixed with special holders, after which an electric fuse was stuck into one of the nozzles. After pointing the mortar at the target, the crew went into cover and, using the launch unit, fired in series of 3 mines. When starting, the electric igniter is ignited remotely, from the battery of the vehicle towing the unit. The volley lasted about 10 seconds. Reload time is up to 1.5 minutes (ready for the next salvo).

Initially, black powder compressed at high temperatures (at the melting point of sulfur) was used as jet fuel. The low strength of the gunpowder bar and the presence of a significant amount of voids in it led to the formation of cracks, which led to frequent accidents during launch. In addition, the combustion of this fuel was accompanied by abundant smoke. In 1940, black powder bars were replaced with tubular bombs made from smokeless deglekol powder, which had better energy qualities. As a rule, seven powder bombs were used.

The maximum flight range of the rocket weighing 34.15 kg (smoke - 35.48 kg) was 6700-6800 meters with a maximum flight speed of 340 m/s. The Nebelwerfer had very good accuracy for an MLRS of that time. At a range of 6000 m, the dispersion of shells along the front was 60-90 m, along the range - 80-100 m. The dispersion of fragments of a high-explosive fragmentation mine was 40 meters along the front and 13 meters forward from the explosion site. In order to achieve maximum destructive effect, firing was prescribed only by battery or sub-battalion.

The first units armed with six-barreled mortars were formed at the beginning of 1940. This weapon was first used by the Germans during the French campaign. In 1942, after the 28/32 cm Nebelwerfer 41 MLRS entered service, the installation was renamed 15-cm Nb.W. 41(15-cm Nebelwerfer 41).

In 1942, three regiments (Nebelwerferregiment), as well as nine separate divisions (Nebelwerfeabteilung), were deployed as part of the German army. The division consisted of three 6 launchers each, the regiment consisted of three divisions (54 Nebelwerfers). Since 1943, batteries of 150-mm rocket launchers (6 launchers each) began to be included in light battalions of artillery regiments of infantry divisions, replacing 105-mm field howitzers in them. As a rule, one division had two MLRS batteries, but in some cases their strength was increased to a three-battery division. In addition to strengthening the artillery of the infantry divisions, the Germans also formed separate units of rocket mortars. In total, German industry managed to produce 5283 six-barreled 150-mm Nebelwerfer 41 installations and 5.5 million missiles for them.

Relatively light, with high firepower, the Nebelwerfer MLRS performed well during the landing on Crete (Operation Mercury). On the Eastern Front, being in service with the 4th Special Purpose Chemical Regiment, from the first hours of the war they were used to shell the Brest Fortress, firing over 2880 high-explosive rocket mines.

Due to the characteristic sound of flying shells, the Nebelwerfer 41 received the nickname “donkey” from Soviet soldiers. Another colloquial name is “Vanyusha” (by analogy with “Katyusha”).

The big disadvantage of the German 150-mm six-barreled mortar was the characteristic, clearly visible smoke trail when firing, which serves as an excellent reference point for enemy artillery. Given the low mobility of the Nebelwerfer 41, this flaw often became fatal.

To increase the mobility and security of the crew, in 1942, on the basis of the Opel Maultier half-track truck, the self-propelled MLRS 15cm Panzerwerfer 42 Auf.Sf or Sd.Kfz.4/1 with a combat weight of 7.25 tons was created. The launcher consisted of ten barrels arranged in two rows, connected into one block by two clips and a casing.

15cm Panzerwerfer 42 Auf.Sf

Panzerwerfer 42 was protected by 6-8 mm anti-fragmentation armor. For self-defense and shooting at anti-aircraft targets, there is a bracket above the driver’s cabin for installing a 7.92 mm MG-34 machine gun. The crew consisted of four people: the vehicle commander (also a radio operator), a gunner, a loader and a driver.

During serial production in 1943-1944, 296 combat vehicles were produced, as well as 251 ammunition carriers for them at the same base. Panzerwerfers were actively used by German troops until the end of the war.

In addition to the Opel chassis, the self-propelled MLRS version was produced on the basis of a standard 3-ton army tractor (3-ton schwerer Wehrmachtschlepper), a half-track armored personnel carrier used by the army to transport ammunition. Serial production has been carried out since 1944 by Tatra. It continued until the very end of the war. The vehicle, protected by 15 mm armor, turned out to be poorly maneuverable and slow-moving, since the combat weight reached 14 tons.

The 150-mm self-propelled MLRS was also produced on the basis of the captured French half-track tractor SOMUA MCG/MCL.

In order to increase the destructive effect of rockets, a six-barreled 28/32 cm Nebelwerfer 41 installation was put into service in 1941. A two-tier barrel truss was attached to a wheeled carriage with a fixed frame frame. The guides accommodated both 280 mm high-explosive and 320 mm incendiary rockets. The weight of the unloaded installation reached only 500 kg (the guides had a lattice rather than tubular design), which made it possible to freely roll it onto the battlefield by crew forces. Combat weight of the system: 1630 kg for a mortar equipped with 280 mm ammunition, 1600 kg for 320 mm ammunition. The horizontal firing sector was 22 degrees, the elevation angle was 45 degrees. A salvo of 6 missiles took 10 seconds, reloading was carried out within 2 and a half minutes.

28/32 cm Nebelwerfer 41

When creating 280 mm and 320 mm rockets, a well-proven engine from the 158 mm 15cm Wurfgranete rocket was used. Since the mass and drag of the new missiles were significantly greater, the firing range decreased by approximately three times and amounted to 1950-2200 meters with a maximum speed of 149-153 m/s. This range made it possible to fire only at targets on the line of combat contact and in the immediate rear of the enemy.

The 280-mm high-explosive rocket was loaded with 45.4 kg of explosives. When ammunition directly hit a brick building, it was completely destroyed.

The warhead of the 320-mm incendiary rocket was filled with 50 liters of incendiary mixture (crude oil) and had an explosive charge weighing 1 kg.

During the war, the Germans removed 320 mm incendiary rockets from service due to their insufficient effectiveness. In addition, the thin-walled casings of 320-mm incendiary shells were not very reliable; they often leaked the fire mixture and broke during launch.

280-mm and 320-mm rockets could be used without launchers. To do this, it was necessary to dig a starting position. Mines in boxes of 1-4 pieces were located on leveled sloping areas of soil on top of a wooden flooring. The rockets of the first releases often did not come out of the closures at launch and were fired along with them. Since wooden boxes greatly increased aerodynamic drag, the firing range was significantly reduced and there was a danger of hitting friendly units.

The frames, located in stationary positions, were soon replaced by “heavy throwing devices” (schweres Wurfgerat). The guide closures (four pieces each) were installed on a light frame metal or wooden machine, folded out like a stepladder. The frame could be positioned at different angles, which made it possible to give the PU elevation angles from 5 to 42 degrees. The combat weight of the wooden sWG 40, loaded with 280 mm rockets, was 500 kg, with 320 mm ammunition - 488 kg. For steel sWG 41 these characteristics were 558 and 548 kg, respectively.

The salvo was fired within 6 seconds, the reload speed was about 2.5 minutes. The sights were very primitive and included only a regular protractor. There were no permanent crews assigned to maintain these simple installations: any infantryman could fire from the sWG 40/41.

The first mass use of 28/32 cm Nebelwerfer 41 launchers took place on the Eastern Front during the German summer offensive in 1942. They were especially widely used during the siege of Sevastopol.

There was also a “self-propelled” version of the 28/32 cm Nebelwerfer 41. On the sides of the tracked armored personnel carrier Sd.Kfz.251.1 Auf.D, mounts were mounted for hanging all three wooden launch container frames (three on each side, two on the commander’s) .

The armament of the armored personnel carrier - two 7.92-mm machine guns (aft on the anti-aircraft turret) - was completely preserved. Next to the machine gun, a primitive sight was mounted on a rod for rough aiming. Such “self-propelled” MLRS were supplied mainly to the SS troops.

Caps with large-caliber missiles were also installed on other chassis. Thus, in 1943, several dozen two-seat armored Renault Ue tractors, captured by the Germans as trophies in 1940, were converted into self-propelled MLRS.

Guides for containers with rocket-propelled mines were mounted in the rear of the vehicle, and in front of the front plate, on a forward rod, a primitive sight was attached for rough aiming of weapons. The missiles could be launched from inside the tractor. Crew: two people. The speed of the tractor dropped to 22 km/h, but overall the vehicle turned out to be quite reliable and unpretentious. The entire complex was named 28/32 cm Wurfrahmen 40 (Sf) auf Infanterieschlepper Ue 630.

Also, launch frames with 280/320 mm rockets were mounted on captured French Hotchkiss H39 tanks.

During the war, the warring sides repeatedly copied individual models of equipment and weapons from each other.

At the beginning of 1942, in besieged Leningrad, the production of rocket mines was launched, the design of which repeated the German 28 cm Wurfkorper Spreng and 32 cm Wurfkorper Flam. The warheads of high-explosive shells, which were perfectly suited for the conditions of the “trench warfare” of the Leningrad Front, were equipped with a surrogate explosive based on ammonium nitrate. Incendiary mines were filled with oil refinery waste; the combustible mixture was ignited by a small explosive charge placed in a glass of white phosphorus. But several times fewer incendiary 320-mm rocket mines were produced than 280-mm high-explosive mines.

M-28 rocket mine

In total, more than 10,000 280 mm rocket mines were fired. Being a product of the blockade, the M-28 mine ended its existence with the blockade.

Based on materials from: https://forum.guns.ru/forummessage/42/73.html https://ussrlife.blogspot.ru/2012/10/blog-post_3526.html https://fs.nashaucheba.ru/docs /270/index-1543563.html https://strangernn.livejournal.com/892595.html

Combat operation and production of the 150-mm six-barreled rocket mortar Nb.W 41 mod. 1941

During practical firing of rocket-propelled mortars, it quickly became clear that both the Soviet and German versions had a very relative concept of accuracy - it was sometimes quite difficult to guess where exactly the mine would hit (even taking into account the good accuracy of the German mortars). All hope remained in salvo fire and the number of divisions participating in the salvo.

And according to this indicator, the Germans were already significantly inferior to the Soviets. Moreover, the Wehrmacht command took the main trump card out of the hands of Germany's rocket mortar gunners - in battle they were ordered to fire without sighting, so as not to unmask their positions, accordingly, the accuracy of the mines was no longer important - it makes no difference how close the explosions will occur if the fire is conducted according to the principle "Whoever God sends."

The firing range of the 150-mm Nb.W 41 (Nebelwerfer) high-explosive fragmentation mine was 6900 m, while the radius of scattering of fragments of this mine was 40 m to the sides and 13 m forward. Under favorable weather conditions, a smoke mine was capable of forming a smoke cloud with a diameter of up to 100 m, maintaining a high density for 40 seconds.

A better shot of the right side of the Nb.W 41 model rocket mortar. 1941

Fire from a six-barreled mortar was carried out in volleys of 6 shots over 10 seconds. Thus, a division of these mortars, consisting of three batteries of 6 mortars each, could fire 108 mines within 10 seconds. A rate of fire of 3 salvos every 5 minutes was practically ensured, but long-term firing from the same position was not usually used due to the unmasking of the position by an almost three-hundred-meter smoke trail of rocket mines.

From the beginning of the opening of fire, shooting was carried out to kill in areas, since due to the large dispersion of mines, the mortar could not be used to fire at single targets near the location of its own troops.

Throughout the Second World War, 150-mm six-barreled mortars mod. 41 were a very effective means of increasing the firepower of German troops and were produced until May 1945, performing functions similar to the Soviet “Guards mortars” and being used by the Wehrmacht and SS troops in the directions of the main attacks or at critical moments of the battle.

Only the design of the Vanyusha high-explosive fragmentation projectile was considered not very successful: due to its too thin walls, it produced few fragments, and due to the low weight of the explosive charge, its high-explosive effect was greatly reduced.

After the end of World War II, the 150-mm Nb.W 41 rocket launchers ended their combat career, although they were used to a limited extent by Korean and Chinese troops during the Korean War of 1950-1953.

150-mm rocket mortar Nb.W 41 mod. 1941 fires

MISSIONS ON THE EASTERN FRONT

The Wehrmacht successfully used this system until the end of the war. Several sWS MLRS were captured by the Allies and Soviet troops, but there is no information that any of the captured vehicles were restored.

Another base vehicle for the Panzerwerfer 42 self-propelled launcher was the captured French half-track tractor SOMUA MCG/MCL. In 1943, many of them were equipped with an armored hull for use as SPW S307(f) armored tractors. The multi-barrel self-propelled mortars Leichter Reihenwerfer (16 Rohre) auf SOMUA MCG/MCL S 307 (f) were created on their chassis. To do this, a double-row package of 16 barrels of French 81-mm mortars was mounted in the rear of the vehicle on a special frame.

German packages of 10 Nebelwerfer 41 barrels were also installed on these chassis. Such mortars had the index 15-cm Panzerwerfer 42 auf m.gep Zgkw.

In the autumn of 1941 The Germans managed to capture several Soviet rocket launchers and hundreds of shells for them - 82 mm M-8 and 132 mm M-13. At that time, the Wehrmacht command believed that their rocket mortars with tubular guides were better than Soviet ones with wing stabilization. However, the SS leadership became interested in these shells, entrusting the development of drawings to the Waffenfabrik Brunn plant in Brunn (former Ceska Zbrojovka factories in Brno), where by the end of 1943 they developed a modified sample of a finned rocket projectile (PC) with a caliber of 80 mm.

A number of documents from the war years indicate that the Brünn plant was only a place for pilot production of PCs - the design bureau of the Skoda factories in Příbram was responsible for their development and testing. In 1943 - 1945 this center was headed by Rudolf Engel, who, by order of the Reich Minister of Armament and War Industry A. Speer, took charge of the entire complex. Before this, Engel had his own company, VA Grossendorf, in Grossendorf for the design of jet engines.

In Příbram, Engel worked on the 8 cm R.Spreng rocket project, an analogue of the Soviet M-8 PC. In contrast, the Germans installed the stabilizer feathers obliquely, at an angle of 1.5° to the longitudinal axis, due to which the rocket rotated in flight. This rotation eliminated the thrust eccentricity of the single-nozzle rocket engine, which was the main reason for the low accuracy of the Soviet M-8 and M-13 missiles. The design of the rocket's head section has also undergone changes. The electric fuse was moved forward, which had a positive effect on its reliability. In general, the German 80-mm rocket turned out to be more successful than its Soviet prototype.

8 cm R-Vielfachwerfer S303(f)

The missile had a length of 705 mm, a mass of 6.6 kg, and 0.68 kg of explosive in its head. A powder charge weighing 1 kg provided the rocket with a maximum range of 6000 m at a flight speed of 335 m/s.

The launcher for it was actually simply copied from a captured Soviet system with rail-type guides that were unusual for the Germans. Due to the large mass of the launcher, which had 48 beam guides in four tiers, it was mounted on a captured French medium tank SOMUA S35 (in the Wehrmacht - designation PzKpfw 35s or 739 (f), removing the turret from it for this purpose. In the army, the system was designated as Sd.Kfe .303, common name - 8 cm R-Vielfachwerfer auf m.gep. Zgkw. S303(f).

The guide package had a mass of 1290 kg. The projectiles were launched using an electric ignition element. A salvo of 48 shells ensured the defeat of manpower and equipment on a terrain area 162 m along the front and 265 m in depth of the enemy’s defense.

A lightweight version of the system with 24 guides arranged in two tiers was installed on the basis of Opel Maultier half-track armored personnel carriers or French SOMUA MCG/MCL half-track tractors (Zugkraftwagen S303 (f).

Skoda also carried out work on captured Soviet M-13 PCs, which underwent major changes. Thus, their caliber was increased from 130 mm to 150 mm. To enhance the fragmentation effect, the explosive charge, previously placed in an insulated container, was extended and “pulled” directly into the combustion chamber. Particular attention was paid to the rocket engine, especially stabilization of combustion, for which they began to use progressively burning granular powder Krantzpulver, and further reducing the eccentricity of thrust. A significant part of the screw connections was replaced by welding.

80-mm self-propelled launcher RV S303(f) based on the SOMUA MCL half-track armored vehicle

In battles, our troops captured several samples of German 8-cm shells, and on their basis, Soviet designers modified their own RS. The M-13 and M-31 missiles with oblique tails were adopted by the Red Army in 1944, they were assigned the indices TS-46 and TS-47.

Note that the use of rocket launchers was atypical for the Wehrmacht; they were more often used by the SS troops. Probably, several dozen armored MLRS would have been lost among thousands of German armored vehicles. But they entered service with the 21st Panzer Division, which, after the defeat and surrender in North Africa, was reorganized on French territory. There was not enough equipment for the division, so it was replenished with these self-propelled guns. At the end of May 1944, about a week before the Allied landings, E. Rommel inspected the 21st Division and was present at an exercise when the 8 cm R-Vielfachwerfer auf m.gep.Zgkw division. S303(f) performed live firing.

On the day the Allies landed in Normandy, it was this division that had to strike a counter-attack on the Anglo-American troops, so that already on June 6, 1944, the Allies felt for themselves what it was like to be under MLRS fire. The impressions turned out to be so strong that they ended up in many descriptions and post-war publications.

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