Anti-tank (anti-tank) artillery

76-mm regimental gun model 1927, USSR, artillery museum, Finland.
76-mm regimental gun model 1943, USSR. D-30 with crew, 1st stage of the “Master Gunsmith” competition. Regimental gun

,
Regimental gun
- an artillery gun (cannon), relying on the formation staff, that is, to enhance the firepower of rifle, infantry, motorized rifle (infantry), cavalry, airborne and other regiments in the branches of troops (forces) of the armed forces of the states of the world .

regimental artillery is also used

,
infantry gun
,
infantry escort gun
, and so on.

Story

Officially, the classification of guns into regimental, divisional, and so on existed in the army of the Russian Empire and in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

After the end of World War II, these terms gradually fell out of use. Although in the armies of other states there were examples of artillery weapons used at the regimental level (for example, the German sIG 33 gun), they were not officially called regimental.

In the Russian army, a rifle regiment was assigned a battery of light guns to qualitatively enhance its firepower. The main requirements for regimental guns were:

• A small mass that allows the gun to roll onto the field only with the help of its own crew.
• Significant power of a high-explosive fragmentation projectile to combat enemy field fortifications
• A simple device that allows the gun to be serviced not only by artillerymen, but also by unskilled infantrymen.
• Undemanding to the strength of the tractor, so as not to constrain the regiment on the march.

As a result, all these requirements were met by light short-barreled 76-mm guns, which were the basis of the regimental artillery. In 1927, the 76-mm regimental gun of the 1927 model, the first production model of Soviet artillery after the Civil War, was adopted by the Red Army.

In 1924, the Soviet military leadership decided to design a new light regimental gun, capable of becoming a massive means of fire support among the troops. The new gun was supposed to replace the outdated 76 mm gun of the 1902 model, which was used by units of the Red Army. The task to develop a new artillery system was received by a team of designers from the weapons and artillery trust under the leadership of S.P. Shukalova. The design was based on a short-barreled mountain gun from 1913, which had a similar caliber.

The regimental 76 mm gun of the 1927 model turned out to be a long-liver, being in service with units of the Red Army for 15 years. The weapon was successfully used during the armed conflict on the Khalkin-Gol River, during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-40. At the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, these guns made up half of the artillery fleet of Soviet military units.

However, the development of hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers and guided missiles led to the fact that the classic short-barreled regimental gun finally fell out of use after the Great Patriotic War. Its functions of direct support for motorized rifles on the battlefield are performed by mortars and crews of hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers.

In the Armed Forces of the USSR, the main regimental weapon was the 122-mm self-propelled gun 2S1 and the 122-mm howitzer D-30.[1]

ORGANIZATION OF ARTILLERY 1933-1941

In the 1930s, significant changes took place in the organization of central artillery control bodies. Due to the fact that in modern warfare the role and importance of artillery have increased significantly, the need arose to unite the leadership of the tactical and technical development of this most important type of military force.

The artillery inspector did not have a direct influence on the development of artillery and its combat readiness. The rapid growth of the RGK artillery required centralized control. Therefore, in 1935, the post of artillery inspector was abolished and by order of the NKO dated December 31, 1935, the post of artillery chief was restored. At the same time, the “Regulations” on the chief of artillery were put into effect, according to which all the chiefs of artillery of the districts were subordinate to him, and the regiments of the RGK OKDVA through the chief of artillery of the army. Now all changes in the organizational structure of artillery (removal from service or introduction of new systems into service) took place through the chief of artillery of the Red Army.

The chief of artillery, compared to the inspector, had a wider range of activities. He was involved in the work of the GAU and in the development of mobilization plans. Through his authorized representatives, he took part not only in military, but also in field and factory tests. The tests were carried out in the interests of the tactical feasibility of this system. In this case, the final decision belonged to the chief of artillery.

Divisional Commander N.M. Rogovsky was appointed chief of artillery in 1935. In June 1937, corps commander N.N. Voronov became the chief of artillery, under whom centralization in the management of artillery of the Red Army was further strengthened.

In mid-1940, the inappropriate merger of the Office of the Chief of Artillery and the GAU took place. The post of chief of artillery was eliminated and the post of first deputy chief of the GAU for combat training was introduced in its place. Such an organizational event was a step back compared to the organization of the central control of artillery of the Red Army in 1936-1939. Therefore, at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, a department was again created headed by the chief of artillery of the Red Army N.N. Voronov, and in November 1941 the chief of artillery was subordinated to the GAU.

In the period from 1933 to 1941, the Red Army continued to search for more expedient forms of artillery organization. The organization of artillery provided, first of all, for the convenience of its control when solving a wide variety of combat missions in all types of combat. For this purpose, artillery was consolidated into artillery units, units and formations. Artillery units included batteries and divisions, units included artillery regiments and separate divisions, and formations included artillery brigades. Artillery units, units and formations included command, reconnaissance and logistics bodies.

The artillery of the Red Army, just as in the previous period, was divided into military artillery (battalion, regimental, divisional and corps) and artillery of the reserve of the main command (ARGK).

1. Military artillery

Battalion and regimental

artillery. At the beginning of 1933, the rifle battalion included an artillery platoon armed with two 45-mm anti-tank guns and one 76-mm mortar. The rifle regiment, in addition to the indicated battalion artillery, had an artillery division (two batteries of three 76-mm cannons each) and an anti-tank artillery battery consisting of four 37-mm cannons. Then, as new material came into service, the regimental artillery division was reorganized into a six-gun battery. However, the number of guns remained the same. The regimental battery of the territorial regiment had the same organization. The anti-tank battery with outdated 37 mm guns was abolished. Instead of an artillery platoon, the battalion received a heavy weapons company consisting of two 45-mm guns and two 82-mm mortars. This strengthened the battalion in fire and anti-tank terms.

In subsequent years, the aggravation of the international situation and the threat of World War II led to a rapid increase in the share of tanks in the armies of capitalist countries. This in turn required an increase in anti-tank artillery in the troops. There is an urgent need to review the organization of military artillery in general, regimental and battalion artillery in particular. At the end of 1939, an anti-tank battery consisting of six 45-mm guns of the 1937 model and a mortar platoon consisting of four 120-mm mortars of the 1938 model were additionally introduced into the rifle regiment. A heavy weapons company was abolished in the battalion and a heavy weapons company was created in its place. an anti-tank platoon (two 45-mm guns, model 1937) and a mortar platoon (four 82-mm mortars, model 1937).

The war with Finland gave a great impetus to the development of mortar weapons in the Red Army. The proportion of mortars in battalion and regimental artillery began to increase noticeably. In the summer of 1940, the mortar platoon of the rifle regiment was transformed into a battery (four 120 mm mortars), and the battalion mortar platoon into a company consisting of six 82 mm mortars.

With such an organization of battalion and regimental artillery, our army entered the Great Patriotic War.

Divisional

During the period described, artillery also periodically changed its organization. Until the end of 1935, the organization of divisional artillery did not change. In December 1935, a fourth division of 152-mm howitzers was introduced into the division's artillery regiment, and instead of an anti-aircraft battery, a separate anti-aircraft artillery division consisting of twelve 37-mm anti-aircraft guns was introduced. This increased the weight of a division's simultaneous artillery and mortar salvo (without 37 mm and 45 mm guns) compared to 1931 from 584.6 kg to 1082 kg.

The artillery regiment of the territorial division according to the new state had the same organization, but unlike the regular artillery regiment, it consisted of a significantly smaller number of personnel. This regiment organization lasted until the liquidation of the territorial system.

By 1935, the anti-tank battery, which contained obsolete 37-mm guns, was removed from the division. The new 45 mm guns were still not enough. Therefore, there was no anti-tank unit directly subordinate to the division commander during this period. In subsequent years, in connection with the successful improvement of the 45-mm cannon of the 1932 model, the artillery industry successfully began to produce 45-mm cannons of the 1937 model. They entered service with battalion, regimental artillery and individual divisions of the rifle division. According to the staff approved on September 13, 1939, a separate anti-tank division was introduced into the division, consisting of three six-gun batteries ().

The development of tactics and operational art, the development of deep operation issues required an increase in artillery density in both offensive and defensive combat. The divisional artillery of the previous composition could not meet the increased tactical requirements. There was a need for a significant quantitative increase in the division's artillery.

In light of these requirements, the Defense Committee, in its resolution of April 22, 1937, outlined a plan for strengthening military artillery for the period 1938-1941. According to this plan, the number of divisional artillery was to be increased from 48 to 60 guns, of which 76 mm - 20, 122 mm howitzers - 28, 152 mm howitzers - 12. In accordance with this, on September 13, 1939, a new staff of the rifle division was approved, according to which the division was supposed to have two artillery regiments: the first - a three-divisional composition (76-mm guns - 20, 122-mm howitzers - 16) horse-drawn, the second - two-divisional composition (122 mm howitzers - 12, 152 mm howitzers - 12) on mechanical traction.

However, it should be noted that the transition of divisions to new states was slow. By the beginning of the war with Finland, some of the divisions had one artillery regiment. Meanwhile, the experience of the Soviet-Finnish war confirmed the advisability of having two artillery regiments in the division. Therefore, after the war, the division retained two artillery regiments with a total number of 60 guns, but with a changed ratio of guns and howitzers in favor of the latter. The staff, adopted on June 10, 1940, provided for the division to have one light and one howitzer artillery regiment. A light artillery regiment consisting of two divisions of three batteries, four guns in each battery. Each division has two cannon batteries (76-mm cannons, model 1939) and one howitzer battery (122-mm howitzers, model 1938). The howitzer artillery regiment consisted of three divisions, with three four-gun batteries in each division. Of these, the first two divisions were 122 mm howitzers and the third were 152 mm howitzers.

However, the nature of the combat operations of the initial period of the Second World War in the West and the experience of maneuvers and exercises of the Red Army in military districts showed the cumbersome and inactive nature of the division. Therefore, in April 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense approved a new staff for the rifle division, according to which mainly rifle and service units were reorganized. The division's artillery underwent minor changes ().

So, the development of the organizational structure of divisional artillery in the period from 1933 to 1941 followed the path of increasing the number of guns in the division in accordance with the requirements of modern combat. By mid-1941, the division's artillery had significantly increased capabilities. At the same time, the division was quite saturated with anti-tank artillery. It consisted of 54 anti-tank guns. In addition, each regiment had one 76-mm six-gun battery. In total, the three regiments had 18 76-mm guns. Batteries of 76-mm cannons of the light artillery regiment (16 guns) were also used to fight the tanks. Consequently, the division had 88 guns to combat tanks. When defending a 10 km zone, the division could create a density of anti-tank weapons of 8-9 guns per 1 km of front. In combination with anti-tank obstacles and mine-explosive barriers, the division could successfully create a fairly stable anti-tank defense with its own means. If we assume that one gun is capable of disabling up to three tanks, then the division was capable of repelling an attack of up to 250 enemy tanks.

It should be noted that the very distribution of anti-tank weapons in the division was more appropriate than in a number of foreign armies. Thus, in the rifle division of the Red Army, anti-tank guns were distributed between battalions, regiments and divisions. In the German infantry division, the battalions did not have anti-tank artillery, and in the Japanese infantry division, almost all anti-tank guns were concentrated in battalions and regiments; The division itself (in the reconnaissance detachment) had only two guns. The experience of the Second World War confirmed the correctness of the views on the distribution of anti-tank artillery in divisions that existed in the Red Army.

Hull

By the beginning of 1933, artillery already had a fairly mature organizational structure in the form of a corps artillery regiment. On July 13, 1935, the government approved a plan for organizational measures and reorganization of the Red Army. These measures also affected the corps artillery. First of all, the number of peacetime rifle corps was increased to 25. In 15 of them it was planned to create second high-power artillery regiments. They were to receive 152 mm and 203 mm howitzers. The total number of guns in the two regiments of the corps was supposed to be increased to 54. The first eight regiments according to this plan were formed by October 1, 1936. The formation of the remaining seven regiments was envisaged as new material was received (six of them were formed in 1937).

The first artillery regiment of the rifle corps (KAP) consisted of three divisions: the first and second divisions—107- and 122-mm guns, the third division—152-mm howitzers. All divisions have three batteries, each battery has 4 guns. There are 36 guns in the regiment.

The second regiment (KAP BM) also consisted of three divisions (the first and second divisions—152 mm howitzers, the third—203 mm howitzers of the 1931 model). All divisions have three batteries, each battery has two guns. There are 18 guns in the regiment.

But soon the Defense Committee, by its resolution of April 22, 1937, demanded to increase the number of corps artillery guns in the rifle corps to 66 and to have: in the first artillery regiment - 36 guns (122- or 107-mm cannons - 24, 152-mm howitzers - 12 ) and in the second regiment - 30 guns (152 mm howitzers - 24, 203 mm howitzers - 6). By 1938, such regiments were formed ().

In addition to changing the organizational structure of corps artillery regiments and increasing the number of guns in them, in 1938 an anti-aircraft artillery division of three four-gun batteries was introduced into the corps, armed with 76-mm anti-aircraft guns of the 1938 model.

Meanwhile, the international situation became increasingly tense. The armies of aggressive countries grew rapidly. Europe was on the verge of the Second World War. Therefore, the Soviet government outlined a plan of organizational measures for the Red Army for the period 1938-1941, aimed at increasing the defense capability of our Motherland. During these years, there was a process of increasing all branches of the military separately and the Red Army as a whole. In the field of corps artillery, additional formations of heavy artillery regiments and anti-aircraft artillery divisions were envisaged. By the beginning of the war with Finland, the existing diversity in their organizational structure had been largely eliminated in the corps artillery.

After the Soviet-Finnish War, minor changes occurred in the organizational structure of corps artillery regiments. The first corps regiment retained its entire organization; it began to be called the corps artillery regiment of the first type or simply KAP. The second corps regiment, named the corps heavy artillery regiment (KTAP), underwent a slight reorganization. His third division, armed with 203-mm howitzers, turned out to be very heavy, and the systems themselves were cumbersome. The experience of the war with Finland showed that not all rifle corps operated in areas where such a division could be used and that it was more expedient to have such divisions in the ARGC units. and, as necessary, strengthen with them those formations that need such systems to carry out their combat mission. Therefore, at the end of the war with Finland, the 203-mm howitzer was removed from service with the corps artillery and transferred to the artillery of the RGK. The third division received 152-mm howitzer guns. The number of guns in the division doubled. The regiment began to be called a corps, artillery regiment of the second type.

So, during the period under review, the organization of the corps’ artillery changed periodically. These changes went both along the path of a quantitative increase in new artillery units, and along the path of introducing new artillery units and subunits into the corps organization. On the eve of the war, corps artillery had a stable organization, more modern than in the armies of capitalist countries, and consistent with the views on its combat use.

Horse artillery. Military artillery of cavalry formations in 1933-1936. consisted of divisional and regimental artillery. The divisional artillery of the personnel cavalry division was represented by a horse artillery regiment (see Fig. 46). The organization of the horse artillery regiment of the territorial cavalry division was the same and differed only in the reduced number of personnel. The regimental artillery of the cavalry regiment was represented by an artillery battery of 76-mm cannons with three guns. This organization of horse artillery remained until the end of 1936.

At the end of 1936, the horse artillery regiment was radically reorganized. The regimental battery also underwent changes. It began to consist of three 76-mm cannons and two 45-mm anti-tank guns. Organization of regimental and divisional artillery

Subsequently, after the resolution of the Defense Committee of April 22, 1937 on strengthening the artillery of the Red Army, a new reorganization of artillery was carried out in cavalry units and formations. As a result of its implementation in the division, instead of an artillery regiment, there were two divisions of the same type, subordinate directly to the division artillery chief. The number of guns remained unchanged.

At the same time, the regimental batteries switched to a four-gun composition.

Consequently, starting in 1937, a four-regiment cavalry division began to have two artillery divisions and four regimental batteries, for a total of 40 guns. In addition, an anti-aircraft division of 12 small-caliber guns was introduced into its composition. For that time this was of great importance. The division began to have standard anti-aircraft weapons, which significantly increased its ability to cover its combat formations.

In the period between the Soviet-Finnish and World War II wars, changes occurred again in the organization of horse artillery. In the cavalry division, instead of two artillery divisions, one division was formed consisting of four four-gun batteries (two batteries of 76-mm cannons and two batteries of 122-mm howitzers). There have also been changes in the anti-aircraft division. Instead of 12 small-caliber anti-aircraft guns, eight 76-mm anti-aircraft guns of the 1938 model (two four-gun batteries) were adopted for service. In a cavalry regiment, the regimental battery, instead of two fire platoons, began to have three fire platoons, of which: two platoons of 76-mm guns of the 1937 model and one platoon of 45-mm guns of the 1937 model.

In this regard, the number of guns in the battery increased from 4 to 6. In addition, to organize air defense, an anti-aircraft battery was introduced into the regiment's staff, consisting of a platoon of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns (3 guns) and a platoon of complex anti-aircraft installations (3 installations).

Consequently, on the eve of the war, the cavalry division had the necessary ground and anti-aircraft artillery, which, in its organization and quality composition, did not reduce the maneuverability of the division and could provide the necessary support to its units.

2. Artillery of the reserve of the main command (ARGK).

In parallel with the growth and improvement of the organizational structure of military artillery, the artillery of the RGK grew and became organizationally formalized. After the disbandment of the artillery division, the organization of the RGK artillery began to develop along the path of creating artillery regiments and separate artillery divisions for various purposes. The number of such regiments and divisions continuously increased. Thus, for the second five-year plan, in accordance with the artillery weapons system, it was planned to create 47 artillery regiments, including:

howitzer - 24, mortar - 9, cannon - 8 and high power - 6. In addition, the same plan provided for the creation of four separate high-power divisions and 58 anti-aircraft divisions.

Consequently, already in the years of the second Five-Year Plan, the artillery of the RGK included howitzer and cannon regiments, high-power howitzer regiments and separate artillery divisions. In subsequent years, new artillery formations appeared: heavy cannon artillery regiments, high-power cannon regiments, and special-power artillery regiments and divisions.

All artillery regiments were provided for the same type of organization. Each regiment consisted of three divisions, a division consisting of three batteries with three guns. Such a uniform organization for regiments for different purposes turned out to be inappropriate. Therefore, in subsequent years, some changes were made to the organization of the RGK regiments. Already during the years of the second Five-Year Plan, a tendency appeared in organizing regiments in accordance with their combat missions.

In the previous period, the weak point in the organization of the RGK artillery was the lack of modern heavy guns. To eliminate this shortcoming in the artillery armament system, several new systems for the RGK artillery were provided for the second five-year plan. Therefore, as industry produced new material and it entered the troops, the organizational structure of the regiments gradually changed in the direction of increasing firepower and increasing their mobility.

By the beginning of the war with Finland, the artillery of the RGK of the Red Army had an already formed organizational structure. It consisted of howitzer and cannon artillery regiments, high-power howitzer regiments, heavy cannon regiments, artillery regiments and separate divisions of special power of different systems.

Howitzer artillery regiments were of three types: four divisions with three four-gun batteries each (a total of 48 howitzers in the regiment) and three divisions of two types. Moreover, in some three-divisional regiments, the divisions consisted of three four-gun batteries (36 howitzers), in others, of four four-gun batteries (48 howitzers).

The cannon regiments were of three and four divisions, each with three four-gun batteries. Accordingly, each regiment had 36-48 guns. The regiments were armed with 122-mm cannons of the 1931/37 model and 152-mm howitzer guns of the 1937 model. The regiments were intended to reinforce long-range artillery groups (LAR) of rifle divisions and corps.

The heavy cannon regiments consisted of four divisions of three three-gun batteries each. In total, the regiment of such an organization had 36 guns. These regiments were armed with 152-mm guns of the 1935 model (Br-2).

High-power howitzer regiments were intended mainly for the destruction of long-term structures. Such regiments had 24 and 36 guns. The organization of the first is shown

The 36-gun howitzer regiment also consisted of four divisions. Each division consisted of three batteries with three guns. There were few such regiments and they turned out to be unviable. Therefore, they were soon reorganized into 24-gun regiments. The regiments were armed with 203 mm howitzers of the 1931 model.

Artillery regiments of special power were of the same type in organization. They consisted of two divisions. Each division had three two-gun batteries. In total, the regiment of special power had 12 guns. The regiments were armed with either 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model or 280-mm mortars of the 1914/15 model.

In addition to the artillery regiments, the RGK artillery included separate artillery divisions of special power and simply separate artillery divisions. A separate howitzer division in peacetime consisted of three batteries of four 152-mm howitzers each. There are a total of 12 howitzers in the division. Separate artillery battalions with special power of 305 mm and 280 mm howitzers; mortars had the same type of organization. Each of them consisted of three two-gun batteries.

All of the listed artillery units and subunits included headquarters, command and control, reconnaissance and logistics units.

After the war with Finland and before the start of the Great Patriotic War, minor changes occurred in the organization of the RGK artillery. There was no longer a need to have regiments of special capacity in the artillery of the RGK. The three-divisional cannon regiments were converted into four-divisional ones with three four-gun batteries each. The first two divisions were armed with a 122-mm cannon, the second two were armed with a 152-mm howitzer-gun of the 1937 model (). The heavy cannon regiments were converted into high power cannon regiments. They consisted of a RAD and four fire divisions of 152-mm cannons (three-battery divisions, two-gun batteries). There are a total of twenty-four 152 mm guns in the regiment.

The experience of the war with Finland also showed that a four-division structure for organizing howitzer regiments is the most appropriate. Such a regiment was a powerful weapon of fire in the hands of the command. Therefore, a similar organization of howitzer regiments was preserved until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War (). Howitzer regiments of three divisions were liquidated.

The high-power howitzer regiments underwent internal reorganization. So, instead of three divisions of four batteries, the regiment now had four divisions of three batteries with the same number of guns.

The internal organizational structure of the special power divisions remained unchanged, but the material part was almost completely updated. For example, the outdated 152-mm howitzer of the 1909/30 model was replaced by a 152-mm howitzer of the 1938 model. With the entry into service of 210-mm guns at the end of 1940-beginning of 1941, separate divisions of special power 210-mm guns began to be created. mm guns (three two-gun batteries).

The rapid growth of tank and motorized formations in the bourgeois armies and their massive use in the Western European theater in the Second World War, already unleashed by aggressive countries, required the creation of RGK and large maneuverable anti-tank artillery formations as part of the artillery. Therefore, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense dated April 26, 1941, five anti-tank artillery brigades were created in the Kiev Special Military District, three in the Western and two in the Baltic. All brigades were created on the basis of rifle divisions. The brigade management was formed from the headquarters of the division artillery chiefs. The anti-tank brigade included two artillery regiments of the same type, a mine-sapper battalion and a separate motor transport battalion. Each artillery regiment consisted of six divisions. The first and second divisions consisted of three four-gun batteries of 76 mm cannons, the third division consisted of three four-gun batteries of 107 mm cannons, the fourth and fifth divisions consisted of three four-gun batteries of 85 mm anti-aircraft guns, and the sixth air defense division consisted of eight 37 mm anti-aircraft guns of the 1939 model and six 12.7-mm anti-aircraft machine guns. In total, the first five divisions had 60 guns. Thus, the artillery anti-tank brigade consisted of 120 anti-tank guns and was a formidable formation for repelling massive enemy tank attacks. Such a brigade could create a strong anti-tank defense in a zone 4-5 km wide with a density of 24-30 guns per 1 km of front. The presence of a mine-sapper battalion in the brigade provided the necessary combination of anti-tank fire with a system of anti-tank obstacles. In the very first days of the war, anti-tank brigades showed high combat capability and effectiveness in the fight against tanks. They were a good start for the creation of anti-tank destroyer units and formations during the war.

In general, changes in the organization of the artillery of the RGK mainly followed the path of reducing the diversity of organizational forms of artillery units and subunits, increasing their firepower both by increasing the number of guns and by introducing new artillery systems. A peculiarity in the organization of the artillery of the RGK was the presence in its composition of anti-tank artillery brigades. No bourgeois army of that time knew such large formations of anti-tank artillery.

3. Artillery instrumental reconnaissance (AIR).

In the 1930s, the process of improving the organizational forms of the AIR continued. In 1935, the photogrammetric service was reorganized. In it, instead of photogrammetric laboratories of intelligence service divisions (DRS), photogrammetric batteries of individual reconnaissance artillery divisions (ORAD) and platoons of reconnaissance batteries (RazB) were created.

By 1936, the system of organizing units and subdivisions of the AIR had already a fairly harmonious design. The basis of this system was separate reconnaissance artillery battalions, which included four batteries—topographic, sound, optical and photogrammetric reconnaissance batteries. For comparison, it should be recalled that the first RAD in the USA was created only in 1939, the second in 1940, and in 1941 four more RADs were formed.

In the cannon artillery regiments, reconnaissance batteries were created, which consisted of four platoons: topographical, sound, photo reconnaissance platoon and measuring and sighting platoon.

Computing departments (WOD and VOB) were created in fire divisions and batteries. Later, the computing departments of divisions and batteries were combined into top computing platoons (TCP). In addition, the divisions had conjugate observation departments (SSD).

The Artillery Meteorological Service was an integral part of the AIR. The tasks of the artillery meteorological service were carried out by: artillery meteorological posts (AMP), which were located in all artillery regiments, and the meteorological service (OMS) departments of sound reconnaissance platoons (VZR).

Artillery meteorological posts (AMP) were intended for meteorological service for artillery firing. The AMP was armed with primitive means of only wind sounding of the atmosphere, which could not satisfy the increased requirements for the accuracy of firing preparation. In this regard, the artillery committee, back in 1936, raised the issue of creating more powerful units of the artillery meteorological service in the form of divisional and corps AMPs equipped with modern technical means. The war's experience with Finland showed even more clearly the weakness of the regimental AMP. Therefore, a reorganization of the meteorological service in the artillery was planned. For this purpose, at the beginning of 1941, the position of chief of the artillery meteorological service was introduced into the staff of the Office of the Chief of Artillery of the Red Army. However, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, this reorganization was only in its initial stage.

The branches of the meteorological service (OMS) had the task of providing meteorological services for sound reconnaissance, which was successfully improved. Already in 1936, the completely modern station SCHZM-Z6 entered service with sound measuring units.

Consequently, by the beginning of the war with Finland, half of the divisions and parts of the Air Force had a coherent and expedient organization. The Soviet-Finnish war was a good test for intelligence units. Although the AIR units had to operate in the difficult conditions of the northwestern theater of military operations, they successfully completed the tasks assigned to them. This is evidenced by the final figures of the war with Finland. Thus, the enemy’s artillery batteries were 65% reconnoitred by sound reconnaissance, 16% by means of conjugate surveillance, 10% by artillery aviation, 5% by measuring and sighting platoons, and 4% by observation balloons. As can be seen from the above, sound measuring units took a leading role in the fight against enemy artillery. Therefore, in the early 40s, a second sound reconnaissance battery was introduced into the ORAD organization.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the AIR had developed methods and good equipment for instrumental reconnaissance of ground artillery. However, the development of new ground artillery reconnaissance devices (infrared and radar technology) was still in its infancy. Therefore, during the war, ground artillery used mainly already well-known and mastered instruments of aerial photogrammetric, optical and sound-metric artillery reconnaissance services.

Source: “History of Russian Artillery” Volume III. Book 8, “Soviet artillery in the period between the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars (1921-June 1941)”

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Combat use

In the early 1930s, an armor-piercing projectile was introduced into its ammunition, which fully allowed the gun to fight tanks with bulletproof armor. However, the single-beam carriage, already outdated at the time of its creation, significantly limited the mobility and horizontal aiming angle of the gun - which is very important for a regimental gun located close to the front line. A modern regimental gun was created in 1943 based on the carriage of the 45-mm M-42 anti-tank gun. The 76-mm regimental gun of the 1943 model had high mobility, a good horizontal aiming angle, and at close ranges it could very successfully fight enemy tanks using the new cumulative projectile. However, combat experience has shown that the firing range of regimental guns (about 4 km) no longer meets the requirements of the time, and compared to 120-mm regimental mortars, their firepower and fire lethality are much worse. As a result, the only reason that allowed regimental guns to remain in service was their ability to destroy tanks with cumulative shells.

Anti-tank artillery of the Red Army. Part 1

Soviet anti-tank artillery played a vital role in the Great Patriotic War, accounting for about 70% of all German tanks destroyed. Anti-tank warriors, fighting “to the last”, often repelled Panzerwaffe attacks at the cost of their own lives.

The structure and equipment of anti-tank units were continuously improved during combat operations. Until the fall of 1940, anti-tank guns were part of rifle, mountain rifle, motorized rifle, motorized and cavalry battalions, regiments and divisions. Anti-tank batteries, platoons and divisions were thus interspersed into the organizational structure of the formations, being their integral part. The rifle battalion of the pre-war state rifle regiment had a platoon of 45 mm guns (two guns). The rifle regiment and motorized rifle regiment had a battery of 45 mm cannons (six guns). In the first case, the means of traction were horses, in the second - specialized Komsomolets tracked armored tractors. The rifle division and the motorized division included a separate anti-tank division of eighteen 45 mm guns. The first anti-tank division was introduced into the staff of a Soviet rifle division in 1938. However, maneuvering with anti-tank guns was possible at that time only within a division, and not on the scale of a corps or army. The command had very limited capabilities to strengthen anti-tank defense in tank-dangerous directions.

Shortly before the war, the formation of anti-tank artillery brigades of the RGK began. According to the staff, each brigade was supposed to have forty-eight 76-mm guns, forty-eight 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, twenty-four 107-mm guns, sixteen 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. The brigade's staff strength was 5,322 people. By the beginning of the war, the formation of the brigades was not completed. Organizational difficulties and the general unfavorable course of hostilities did not allow the first anti-tank brigades to fully realize their potential. However, already in the first battles, the brigades demonstrated the wide capabilities of an independent anti-tank formation.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the anti-tank capabilities of the Soviet troops were subjected to severe tests. Firstly, most often rifle divisions had to fight while occupying a defensive front that exceeded the statutory standards. Secondly, Soviet troops had to face the German “tank wedge” tactics. It consisted in the fact that a tank regiment of a Wehrmacht tank division was striking in a very narrow sector of defense. At the same time, the density of attacking tanks was 50–60 vehicles per kilometer of front. Such a number of tanks on a narrow section of the front inevitably saturated the anti-tank defenses.

Large losses of anti-tank guns at the beginning of the war led to a decrease in the number of anti-tank guns in the rifle division. The July 1941 state rifle division had only eighteen 45-mm anti-tank guns instead of fifty-four in the pre-war state. According to the July staff, a platoon of 45-mm guns from an infantry battalion and a separate anti-tank division were completely excluded. The latter was restored to the staff of the rifle division in December 1941. The shortage of anti-tank guns was to some extent compensated for by the recently adopted anti-tank guns. In December 1941, an anti-tank rifle platoon was introduced into the rifle division at the regimental level. In total, the division had 89 anti-tank rifles throughout the state.

In the field of artillery organization, the general trend at the end of 1941 was to increase the number of independent anti-tank units. On January 1, 1942, in the active army and reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters there were: one artillery brigade (on the Leningrad Front), 57 anti-tank artillery regiments and two separate anti-tank artillery divisions. As a result of the autumn battles, five VET artillery regiments received the rank of guards. Two of them received the Guard for the battles near Volokolamsk - they supported the 316th Infantry Division of I.V. Panfilov. 1942 became a period of increasing the number and consolidation of independent anti-tank units. On April 3, 1942, the State Defense Committee issued a decree on the formation of a fighter brigade. According to the staff, the brigade had 1,795 people, twelve 45-mm guns, sixteen 76-mm guns, four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 144 anti-tank guns. By the next decree of June 8, 1942, the twelve formed fighter brigades were united into fighter divisions, each with three brigades.

A milestone for the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army was the order of the USSR NKO No. 0528, signed by I.V. Stalin, according to which: the status of anti-tank destroyer units was increased, personnel were given a double salary, a cash bonus was established for each damaged tank, all command and personnel anti-tank artillery units were placed on special registration and were to be used only in the specified units.

The distinctive insignia of the anti-tank fighters was a sleeve insignia in the form of a black diamond with a red border and crossed gun barrels. The increase in the status of anti-tank fighters was accompanied by the formation of new anti-tank fighter regiments in the summer of 1942. Thirty light (twenty 76 mm guns each) and twenty anti-tank artillery regiments (twenty 45 mm guns each) were formed. The regiments were formed in a short time and immediately thrown into battle on threatened sectors of the front.

In September 1942, ten more anti-tank fighter regiments of twenty 45-mm guns were formed. Also in September 1942, an additional battery of four 76-mm guns was introduced into the most distinguished regiments. In November 1942, part of the anti-tank fighter regiments was united into fighter divisions. By January 1, 1943, the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army consisted of 2 fighter divisions, 15 fighter brigades, 2 heavy anti-tank fighter regiments, 168 anti-tank fighter regiments, 1 anti-tank fighter division.

The improved anti-tank defense system of the Red Army received the name “Pakfront” from the Germans. RAK is the German abbreviation for anti-tank gun - Panzerabwehrkannone. Instead of a linear arrangement of guns along the defended front, at the beginning of the war they were united in groups under a single command. This made it possible to concentrate the fire of several guns on one target. The basis of anti-tank defense were anti-tank areas. Each anti-tank area consisted of separate anti-tank strong points (PTOPs), located in fire communication with each other. “Being in fire communication with each other” means the ability of neighboring anti-tank missile launchers to fire at the same target. PTOP was saturated with all types of fire weapons. The basis of the PTOP's fire system were 45-mm guns, 76-mm regimental guns, partly cannon batteries of divisional artillery and anti-tank artillery units.

The finest hour of anti-tank artillery was the battle on the Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943. At that time, 76-mm divisional guns were the main weapon of anti-tank units and formations. "Sorokapyatki" made up about a third of the total number of anti-tank guns on the Kursk Bulge. A long pause in hostilities at the front made it possible to improve the condition of units and formations due to the receipt of equipment from industry and the addition of personnel to anti-tank regiments.

The last stage in the evolution of the Red Army's anti-tank artillery was the consolidation of its units and the appearance of self-propelled guns in the anti-tank artillery. By the beginning of 1944, all fighter divisions and separate combined arms fighter brigades were reorganized into anti-tank fighter brigades. On January 1, 1944, the anti-tank artillery included 50 anti-tank brigades and 141 anti-tank regiments. By order of NKO No. 0032 of August 2, 1944, one SU-85 regiment (21 self-propelled guns) was introduced into fifteen anti-tank destroyer brigades. In reality, only eight brigades received self-propelled guns.

Particular attention was paid to the training of personnel of anti-tank brigades; targeted combat training of artillerymen was organized to combat new German tanks and assault guns. In anti-tank units, special instructions appeared: “Memo to an artilleryman who destroys enemy tanks” or “Memo on fighting Tiger tanks.” And in the armies, special rear training grounds were equipped, where artillerymen trained in shooting at mock-up tanks, including moving ones.

Simultaneously with the increase in the skill of the artillerymen, tactics were improved. With the quantitative saturation of troops with anti-tank weapons, the “fire bag” method began to be used more and more often. The guns were placed in “anti-tank nests” of 6-8 guns within a radius of 50-60 meters and were well camouflaged. The nests were located on the ground to achieve flanking at long distances with the possibility of concentrating fire. Missing the tanks moving in the first echelon, fire opened suddenly, on the flank, at medium and short distances.

During the offensive, anti-tank guns were quickly pulled up after the advancing units in order to support them with fire if necessary.

The history of anti-tank artillery in our country began in August 1930, when, as part of military-technical cooperation with Germany, a secret agreement was signed, according to which the Germans pledged to help the USSR organize the gross production of 6 artillery systems. To implement the agreement, a front company was created in Germany (limited liability company “Bureau for Technical Work and Research”).

Among the other weapons proposed by the USSR was a 37 mm anti-tank gun. The development of this weapon, bypassing the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, was completed in 1928. The first samples of the gun, which received the name Tak 28 (Tankabwehrkanone, i.e. anti-tank gun - the word Panzer came into use later) entered testing in 1930, and in 1932 deliveries to the troops began. The Tak 28 gun had a 45-caliber barrel with a horizontal wedge breech, which ensured a fairly high rate of fire - up to 20 rounds/min. The carriage with sliding tubular frames provided a large horizontal aiming angle - 60°, but the chassis with wooden wheels was designed only for horse traction.

In the early 30s, this weapon penetrated the armor of any tank, and was perhaps the best in its class, far ahead of developments in other countries.

After modernization, having received wheels with pneumatic tires that could be towed by a car, an improved carriage and an improved sight, it was put into service under the designation 3.7 cm Pak 35/36 (Panzerabwehrkanone 35/36). Remaining until 1942 the main anti-tank weapon of the Wehrmacht.

The German gun was put into production at the Moscow region plant named after. Kalinina (No. 8), where she received the factory index 1-K. The enterprise mastered the production of a new gun with great difficulty; the guns were made semi-handicraft, with parts being manually fitted. In 1931, the plant presented the customer with 255 guns, but did not deliver any due to poor build quality. In 1932, 404 guns were delivered, and in 1933, another 105.

Despite problems with the quality of the guns produced, the 1-K was a fairly advanced anti-tank gun for 1930. Its ballistics made it possible to hit all tanks of that time, at a distance of 300 m, the armor-piercing projectile normally penetrated 30 mm armor. The gun was very compact; its light weight made it easy for crews to move it around the battlefield. The gun's shortcomings, which led to its rapid removal from production, were the weak fragmentation effect of the 37-mm projectile and the lack of suspension. In addition, the guns produced were of low build quality. The adoption of this weapon was considered as a temporary measure, since the leadership of the Red Army wanted to have a more universal gun that combined the functions of an anti-tank and battalion gun, and the 1-K, due to its small caliber and weak fragmentation projectile, was poorly suited for this role.

1-K was the first specialized anti-tank gun of the Red Army and played a big role in the development of this type of weapon. Very soon it began to be replaced by a 45-mm anti-tank gun, becoming practically invisible against its background. At the end of the 30s, 1-K began to be withdrawn from the troops and transferred to storage, remaining in service only as training ones.

At the beginning of the war, all the guns in stock were thrown into battle, since in 1941 there was a shortage of artillery to equip a large number of newly formed formations and make up for huge losses.

Of course, by 1941, the armor penetration characteristics of the 37-mm 1-K anti-tank gun could no longer be considered satisfactory; it could only confidently hit light tanks and armored personnel carriers. Against medium tanks, this weapon could only be effective when fired at the side from close (less than 300 m) distances. Moreover, Soviet armor-piercing shells were significantly inferior in armor penetration to German shells of a similar caliber. On the other hand, this gun could use captured 37 mm ammunition, in which case its armor penetration increased significantly, even exceeding the similar characteristics of the 45 mm gun.

It was not possible to establish any details of the combat use of these guns; probably, almost all of them were lost in 1941.

The very great historical significance of 1-K lies in the fact that it became the founder of the series of the most numerous Soviet 45-mm anti-tank guns and Soviet anti-tank artillery in general.

During the “liberation campaign” in western Ukraine, several hundred Polish 37-mm anti-tank guns and a significant amount of ammunition for them were captured.

Initially they were sent to warehouses, and at the end of 1941 they were transferred to the troops, since due to heavy losses in the first months of the war there was a large shortage of artillery, especially anti-tank. In 1941, the GAU published a “Brief Description, Operating Instructions” for this gun.

The 37-mm anti-tank gun, developed by Bofors, was a very successful weapon, capable of successfully fighting armored vehicles protected by bulletproof armor.

The gun had a fairly high initial projectile velocity and rate of fire, small dimensions and weight (which made it easier to camouflage the gun on the ground and roll it onto the battlefield by crew forces), and was also adapted for rapid transportation by mechanical traction. Compared to the German 37 mm Pak 35/36 anti-tank gun, the Polish gun had better armor penetration, which is explained by the higher muzzle velocity of the projectile.

In the second half of the 30s, there was a tendency to increase the thickness of tank armor; in addition, the Soviet military wanted to get an anti-tank gun capable of providing fire support to infantry. To do this, it was necessary to increase the caliber. The new 45-mm anti-tank gun was created by placing a 45-mm barrel on the carriage of a 37-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1931. The carriage was also improved - wheel suspension was introduced. The semi-automatic shutter basically repeated the 1-K scheme and allowed 15-20 shots per minute.

The 45-mm projectile had a mass of 1.43 kg and was more than 2 times heavier than the 37-mm. At a distance of 500 m, the armor-piercing projectile normally penetrated 43-mm armor. At the time of adoption, the 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 penetrated the armor of any existing tank at that time. When exploded, a 45-mm fragmentation grenade produced about 100 fragments, which retained their destructive power when scattered along the front at 15 m and at a depth of 5-7 m. When fired, grapeshot bullets form a damaging sector along the front at up to 60 m and at a depth of up to 400 m Thus, the 45-mm anti-tank gun had good anti-personnel capabilities.

From 1937 to 1943, 37,354 guns were produced. Shortly before the start of the war, the 45-mm cannon was discontinued, since our military leadership believed that the new German tanks would have a thickness of frontal armor that would be impenetrable for these guns. Soon after the start of the war, the gun was put into production again.

45-mm cannons of the 1937 model were assigned to anti-tank platoons of rifle battalions of the Red Army (2 guns) and anti-tank battalions of rifle divisions (12 guns). They were also in service with separate anti-tank regiments, which included 4-5 four-gun batteries.

For its time, the “forty-five” was quite adequate in terms of armor penetration. Nevertheless, the insufficient penetration ability against the 50-mm frontal armor of the Pz Kpfw III Ausf H and Pz Kpfw IV Ausf F1 tanks is beyond doubt. This was often due to the low quality of armor-piercing shells. Many batches of shells had technological defects. If the heat treatment regime in production was violated, the shells turned out to be too hard and, as a result, split on the tank’s armor, but in August 1941 the problem was solved - technical changes were made to the production process (localizers were introduced).

To improve armor penetration, a 45 mm sub-caliber projectile with a tungsten core was adopted, which penetrated 66 mm armor at a distance of 500 m, and 88 mm armor when fired at a dagger fire distance of 100 m.

With the advent of sub-caliber shells, the later modifications of the Pz Kpfw IV tanks, the thickness of the frontal armor of which did not exceed 80 mm, became too tough for the “forty-five”.

At first, new shells were specially registered and issued individually. For unjustified consumption of sub-caliber shells, the gun commander and gunner could be court-martialed.

In the hands of experienced and tactically skilled commanders and trained crews, the 45 mm anti-tank gun posed a serious threat to enemy armored vehicles. Its positive qualities were high mobility and ease of camouflage. However, to better destroy armored targets, a more powerful weapon was urgently required, which was the 45-mm cannon mod. 1942 M-42, developed and put into service in 1942.

The 45-mm M-42 anti-tank gun was obtained by modernizing a 45-mm gun of the 1937 model at plant No. 172 in Motovilikha. The modernization consisted of lengthening the barrel (from 46 to 68 calibers), strengthening the propellant charge (the mass of gunpowder in the cartridge case increased from 360 to 390 grams) and a number of technological measures to simplify mass production. The thickness of the shield cover armor was increased from 4.5 mm to 7 mm to better protect the crew from armor-piercing rifle bullets.

As a result of modernization, the initial velocity of the projectile increased by almost 15% - from 760 to 870 m/s. At a distance of 500 meters normal, an armor-piercing projectile penetrated -61mm, and a sub-caliber projectile penetrated -81mm of armor. According to the recollections of anti-tank veterans, the M-42 had very high shooting accuracy and relatively low recoil when fired. This made it possible to fire at a high rate of fire without correcting the aiming.

Serial production of 45 mm guns mod. 1942 was started in January 1943 and was carried out only at plant No. 172. During the busiest periods, the plant produced 700 of these guns monthly. In total, 10,843 model guns were manufactured between 1943 and 1945. 1942. Their production continued after the war. New guns, as they were produced, were used to re-equip anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades that had 45-mm anti-tank guns mod. 1937.

As it soon became clear, the armor penetration of the M-42 to combat German heavy tanks with powerful anti-shell armor Pz. Kpfw. V "Panther" and Pz. Kpfw. VI "Tiger" was not enough. More successful was firing with sub-caliber shells at the sides, stern and chassis. Nevertheless, thanks to well-established mass production, mobility, ease of camouflage and low cost, the weapon remained in service until the very end of the war.

At the end of the 30s, the issue of creating anti-tank guns capable of hitting tanks with projectile-resistant armor became acute. Calculations showed the futility of the 45-mm caliber from the point of view of a sharp increase in armor penetration. Various research organizations considered calibers of 55 and 60 mm, but in the end it was decided to settle on a caliber of 57 mm. Guns of this caliber were used in the tsarist army and navy (Nordenfeld and Hotchkiss guns). A new projectile was developed for this caliber - a standard cartridge case from a 76-mm divisional gun was used as its case, with the barrel of the case recompressed to a 57 mm caliber.

In 1940, the design team headed by Vasily Gavrilovich Grabin began designing a new anti-tank gun that met the tactical and technical requirements of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU). The main feature of the new gun was the use of a long barrel of 73 calibers. At a distance of 1000 m, the gun penetrated armor 90 mm thick with an armor-piercing projectile

A prototype of the gun was manufactured in October 1940 and passed factory tests. And in March 1941, the gun was put into service under the official name “57-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1941" In total, about 250 guns were delivered from June to December 1941.

57-mm cannons from experimental batches took part in combat operations. Some of them were installed on the light tracked tractor “Komsomolets” - this was the first Soviet anti-tank self-propelled gun, which, due to the imperfections of the chassis, was not very successful.

The new anti-tank gun easily penetrated the armor of all German tanks that existed at that time. However, due to the position of the GAU, production of the gun was stopped, and the entire production base and equipment were mothballed.

In 1943, with the advent of heavy tanks by the Germans, production of the gun was restored. The 1943 model gun had a number of differences from the 1941 model guns, aimed primarily at improving the manufacturability of the gun's production. However, the restoration of mass production was difficult - technological problems arose with the manufacture of barrels. Mass production of a gun under the name “57-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1943" ZIS-2 was organized by October - November 1943, after the commissioning of new production facilities provided with equipment supplied under Lend-Lease.

From the moment production resumed until the end of the war, more than 9,000 guns were delivered to the troops.

With the restoration of production of the ZIS-2 in 1943, the guns were supplied to anti-tank artillery regiments (iptap), 20 guns per regiment.

Since December 1944, ZIS-2s have been introduced into the staff of guards rifle divisions - into regimental anti-tank batteries and into the anti-tank fighter division (12 guns). In June 1945, regular rifle divisions were transferred to a similar staff.

The capabilities of the ZIS-2 made it possible, at typical combat distances, to confidently hit the 80-mm frontal armor of the most common German medium tanks Pz.IV and StuG III assault self-propelled guns, as well as the side armor of the Pz.VI Tiger tank; at distances less than 500 m, the frontal armor of the Tiger was also damaged. In terms of cost and manufacturability of production, combat and service characteristics, the ZIS-2 became the best Soviet anti-tank gun during the war.

Based on materials: https://knowledgegrid.ru/2e9354f401817ff6.html Shirokorad A. B. The genius of Soviet artillery: The triumph and tragedy of V. Grabin. A. Ivanov. USSR artillery in the Second World War.

Tactical and technical characteristics of the Soviet light regimental 76 mm gun of 1927

• Calculation: 4-7 people.
• Combat weight - 0.920 tons.
• Loading is unitary.
• The initial speed of an armor-piercing projectile is 387 m/s.
• Rate of fire: 10-12 rds/min.
• The maximum firing range is 7100 m.
• The range of a direct shot with an armor-piercing projectile is 470 m.
• Armor penetration by an armor-piercing projectile: at a range of 500 m - 25 mm, at a distance of 1000 m - 23 mm.
• Main types of ammunition: armor-piercing, cumulative, high-explosive fragmentation shells, buckshot, shrapnel.
• The weight of the armor-piercing projectile is 6.3 kg.
• Transfer time from traveling to combat position: 1-2 minutes.
• Method of transportation: transported by horse-drawn vehicles, trucks, tractors such as “Komsomolets” and “Pioneer”.

Photo | THE USSR. Artillery and gunners

Artillerymen at a 122-mm howitzer of the 1910/30 model during the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River. August 1939

The crew of a 107-mm cannon model 1910/30 during the battles in the Khalkhin Gol River area. 1939

180-mm B-1-K naval guns on the cruiser "Red Caucasus". 1939

152 mm howitzers model 1909/30. on the Karelian Isthmus. 1940

Calculation of a 76-mm anti-aircraft gun of the 1931 model (3-K). Karelian Isthmus, February 1940

203-mm howitzer B-4 in a firing position on the Karelian Isthmus. February 1940

37-mm anti-tank gun model 1930 (1-K). 1940

Cadets of the Tambov Artillery School during fire training classes. 1940

Crew of a 50-mm company mortar. 1940

Crew of a 120-mm regimental mortar of the 1938 model. 1940

152-mm mortar model 1931. 1940

210-mm gun model 1939 (Br-17). 1940

Br-17 guns on parade. Moscow, 1940

Anti-tank guns 45-mm model 1937 at the parade. 1940

76-mm cannons of the 1902/30 model in the back of ZIS-22 all-terrain vehicles at the parade. Chisinau 1940

280-mm mortar Br-5 model 1939. 1940

406-mm/50 B-37 cannon in a single-barrel MP-10 range mount at the Scientific Test Naval Artillery Range (NIMAP), 1940.

76 mm regimental gun. 1941

Artillerymen have lunch near the 76-mm F-22 divisional guns on the Western Front. July 1941

A battery of Soviet 76.2 mm mountain guns abandoned near Tarnopol. July 1941

Soviet tractor with a 122 mm howitzer model 1909/37. in the Gomel region. August 1941

Anti-aircraft 85-mm guns abandoned in the Uman area. Ukraine, August 1941

An abandoned 152 mm howitzer, model 1938 (M-10). August 1941

122-mm hull guns of the 1931 model (A-19), abandoned by the Red Army near Luga. August 1941

Captured Red Army soldiers near a Soviet 45-mm 53-K anti-tank gun. August 1941

The Germans have a Soviet 130/55-mm naval gun captured in the port of Nikolaev. September 1941

A two-gun deck-turret artillery mount of 130 mm caliber (B-2LM), captured by German troops in the port of Nikolaev. September 1941

85-mm anti-aircraft gun 52-K on the defense lines of Tula. October 1941

A broken 180-mm gun of the 412th coastal defense battery of the Odessa naval base. October 1941

Crew of a 152-mm gun of the 1935 model (Br-2) on the approaches to Moscow. October 1941

Transportation of a camouflaged F-22 cannon. Leningrad Front, November 1941

Finns near an abandoned Soviet tractor with a 122-mm M-30 howitzer in Medvezhyegorsk. December 1941

A 152-mm howitzer model 1909/30 is firing. December 1941

Crew of a 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun model 1939 (61-K) as part of a military echelon. 1941

37-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun 61-K on the roof of a library in Moscow. 1941

A Soviet 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K broken in a combat position. 1941

45-mm 53-K anti-tank guns mounted on horseback. 1941

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Stanovoy ridge of the Wehrmacht artillery

These guns started World War II by being captured by cameras during
the storming of the post office in Danzig . They were the main ones in the field artillery of the Wehrmacht during the Second World War, they were supplied to Germany’s allies, and after the war they were distributed to “hot spots” around the world - some examples can still be seen today in footage from the Middle East and Africa. Reproduced in many modifications, the 105 mm leFH 18 howitzer was a modern, effective weapon that was easy to maintain and could be mounted on a variety of carriages and tracked vehicles. Let's try to understand the history of its creation and serial production.

History of the leFH 18

To begin with, we immediately need to discuss one extremely common mistake that many military history buffs make, who believe that the number “18” in the designation leFH 18 is the year the howitzer was put into service. This is wrong. The index was assigned in order to hide the new model of weapon from Western observers of compliance with the Versailles restrictions - in fact, the leFH 18 was put into service on July 27, 1935. Production began a little earlier, in 1934.

Above, howitzer FH 98/09 (https://www.landships.info), below howitzer leFH 16 (https://commons.wikimedia.org)

The impetus for the creation of the leFH 18 was the desire of the Reichswehr command to modernize the leFH 16, which had proven itself in the battles of the First World War - a 105-mm light field howitzer of the 1916 model, another weapon from the line of howitzers.

In 1909, the German army adopted the 105-mm field howitzer 98/09 (Feldhaubitze 98/09), which was produced, which, in turn, was a modernization of the field howitzer of the 1898 model (Feldhaubitze 98). This gun had a box-section carriage with fixed frames, an earthen coulter and a shield, the barrel was short in length - 1.68 m. In addition to the German army, this howitzer was supplied to the allied Turkey and Bulgaria. By the beginning of the First World War, the German army had 1,144 FH 98/09 howitzers, and by the end of the war, 1,260. However, the firing range of this weapon was small, only a little more than 6,000 m. The troops demanded a longer range, this became especially important after the start of hostilities.

The use of a carriage from the 12 cm Haubitze 12, developed by order of Switzerland, and lengthening the barrel to 20 calibers, which resulted in an increase in the mass of the gun by 275 kg, made it possible to increase the initial velocity of the projectile by 130–150 m/s and increase the firing range to 10 km. This gun was designated leFH 17; a total of 294 of these howitzers were produced. However, changes were made only by 1917 and were late - she developed her own model, which turned out to be more successful.

leFH 18: front view, maximum barrel elevation angle (MAE)

At the beginning of 1914, Rheinmetall, based on the FH 98/09, created its own howitzer that met the requirements of the artillery test commission, in the summer of 1916 the first experimental battery was prepared, and in September of the same year, production of the gun, designated leFH 16, was launched. The gun was supposed to completely replace the outdated FH 98/09. By 1918, 3,004 leFH 16 howitzers were in use on all fronts.

Due to martial law, the leFH 16 carriage was unified with the FH 98/09. When creating it, we tried to use as many parts as possible from the howitzer carriage. The shells, charging cartridges and powder charges were also identical. The barrel was longer than that of the FH 98/09 - its length was 2.29 m, and the weight in the firing position was 120 kg less. The firing range of the upgraded FHGranate 98 projectile (“cigar-shaped”, C-Geschoss) reached 9700 m.

Howitzer leFH 18 in combat position. The beds are clearly visible (TsAMO)

In fact, leFH 16 was not a new design, it was rather a temporary solution that served to quickly achieve results using available means and worked well. Until the end of the 20s, experts considered the leFH 16 an excellent weapon with excellent ballistic characteristics, effective and quite maneuverable. These estimates were achieved through a number of small changes, which were embodied in the gun, which received the designation 10.5 cm leFH 16 nA (neuer Art - a new model). Before the adoption of the leFH 18, it was the standard howitzer of divisional artillery and was widely used until 1945.

In 1933, the Reichswehr had only 28 leFH 16 light howitzers, in 1934 - 496, in 1935 - 568, in 1936 - 728, and in 1937 - already 980. The basic structure of the Wehrmacht divisional artillery was formed taking into account the production of leFH 16 .

In June 1927, the testing department of the Army Weapons Directorate requested the development of a new light field howitzer. The project was assigned the second degree of priority - “priority work/primary work”. In 1928, preparation of calculations and projects began - first for a barrel length of 25 calibers, then 28 calibers. In the early 1930s, Rheinmetall began production of the leFH 18.

Howitzer LeFH 18M on wooden wheels. Gun manufactured in 1934

Almost all the main characteristics of the leFH 16 have been significantly improved:

• the barrel length was increased by 6 calibers (63.1 cm) - up to 294.1 cm;
• the initial velocity of the projectile increased by 79 m/s - up to 470 m/s;
• the maximum firing range increased by 1400 m – up to 10,675 m.

Finally, we managed to go beyond the military requirements of the required firing range - 10 km. To achieve this, the weight of the projectile was reduced by almost 1 kg with a slightly increased weight of the explosive - up to 1.845 kg. The price of all the improvements, which were carefully calibrated and thought out, was an increase in weight of approximately 500 kg compared to the leFH 16 - the weight of the leFH 18 in the combat position was just over 2000 kg.

device leFH 18

Fundamentally new, different from the leFH 16, was a carriage with sliding frames with a wedge-shaped bolt locking and large folding coulters, as well as a carriage suspension. The combat axle was equipped with springs, and in case of failure in an emergency, it could be secured and used for slow marching at a speed of no more than 8 km/h.

Wheels leFH 18: left cast light alloy, right wooden with rubber tires

Thanks to three points of support, the carriage with sliding frames became much more stable, which was important when the initial velocity of the projectile increased. The horizontal firing angle has increased significantly - by 28° on each side, which has become a great advantage when firing directly.

In 1936, easier-to-manufacture cast light alloy wheels with a diameter of 130 cm, a rim 10 cm wide and steel ball bearings were introduced into production. Previously, wheels with wooden spokes and rubber tires were used. The new wheels were stronger and provided ease of movement. Instead of the previously used cable brake, a more efficient brake with internal pads and brake drums was introduced. During mechanical traction, due to the increased speed and traction force, an additional air brake was used. However, the troops continued to use wooden wheels; in some cases, wooden wheels from the leFH 16 could be installed.

At the top is the leFH 18, towed by a tractor, with a rubber tire on a light alloy wheel (https://www.warrelics.eu), at the bottom is the leFH 18, horse-drawn (https://historywarsweapons.com)

The use of mechanical traction had significant advantages over horse traction: the daily travel range in the first case was 6–10 times greater, the speed of movement was up to 40 km/h, the mobility during battle was higher, there was no need for fodder for horses, and fewer people were required. During transportation, the gun was attached directly, without a limber, to a light or medium-sized half-track tractor-transporter.

The shield cover of the new howitzer was no longer rectangular, but acquired a complex trapezoidal shape with an uneven large base at the top. A folding shield was attached to the bottom of the carriage, which was used in the combat position to protect the crew’s legs from bullets and shrapnel. What was new was the barrel knurl, located on top of the barrel, which, with the help of compressed air, returned the barrel to the firing position after recoil. The device consisted of a pneumatic cylinder, a compression cylinder and a piston with a rod.

Howitzer leFH 18M. Gun, modernized from leFH 18, used in the Finnish army

The upper machine in the carriage cradle had a recoil brake with a casing and a hydraulic compensator containing 6.2 liters of fluid for the recoil brake. A knurl was installed on the top of the barrel, filled with 3 liters of compressed air and 5.4 liters of liquid under a pressure of 55 atmospheres, which immediately after the shot returned the barrel to the firing position. The guide runners/ribs of the cradle were extended back - primarily to increase the vertical firing angle to 42°. At maximum load on the barrel during a shot, the guides periodically “fly out.”

The prismatic wedge bolt with a crank on the breech was equipped with a locking mechanism/safety and an ejection mechanism.

Howitzer leFH 18/40 (https://hobby-games.com.ua)

The gunner was located on the left and aimed horizontally; vertical aiming of the sight was not rigidly connected to the barrel: the 2nd crew number carried out vertical aiming and was responsible for firing the shot. The sighting device with this method of aiming the gun would have a complex design, but was simplified by introducing an indicator sight with an indicator of distance scales of the sight and a gun arrow, which allowed the gunner to set vertical aiming independently of the barrel, and the 2nd crew only needed to align the arrows on indicator by rotating the vertical aiming handwheel. It was also possible to quickly target moving targets, including tanks, which made it possible to effectively use the leFH 18 with a trained crew at direct fire.

The monoblock barrel could withstand from 8,000 to 10,000 shots.

Modifications of leFH 18 on a wheeled carriage

By order of the government of the Netherlands in 1939, an export version of the leFH 18 was produced in Essen, which differed from the German one in the barrel and in minor design differences: with a slightly lower weight of the gun, the vertical (+45°) and horizontal (60°) firing angles were increased. The barrel was adapted to fire projectiles used by the Dutch army. In 1940, after the capture of the Netherlands, about 80 export howitzers became trophies of the Wehrmacht and were adopted by the German army as leFH 18/39.

Howitzer leFH 18 in a combat position. The gun is camouflaged (TsAMO)

In 1941, another modernization was proposed: a replaceable liner began to be installed on the howitzer, which improved the characteristics of the barrel and increased the firing range by 1,700 m (up to 12,325 m). A 60 cm long muzzle brake was also installed, which prevented the barrel from rolling back. When fired, the flow of gases entered the two chambers of the muzzle brake and dissipated sideways and backwards, which extinguished a significant part of the recoil energy, and thus the recoil of the barrel was reduced. The initial velocity of the projectile increased by 70 m/s. This modification became designated leFH 18M.

In March 1942, Hitler personally demanded that the leFH 18 be combined with a 7.5 cm Pak 40 carriage. On the same day, Rheinmetall-Borsig was given the task of working on this modification. Already on October 15 it was ready to go into production. After the first 10 howitzers were accepted by the Wehrmacht in March 1943, their mass production began in April 1943, and from September 15 of the same year, systematic delivery to the troops began. This hybrid was designated leFH 18/40.

By the time of the Battle of Kursk, the number of leFH 18/40 had reached 418, and in total the production of this modification accounted for more than half of the entire production of light field howitzers over the entire period.

Howitzer leFH 18 in a combat position, front view (TsAMO)

The leFH 18/40 modification was one of the forced decisions made under the pressure of wartime conditions. Due to the large number of carriages available for the 7.5 cm Pak 40 from Rheinmetall-Borsig and the high demand for the leFH 18, engineers and production technologists combined the howitzer's upper mount with a slightly modified lower mount from the Pak 40 in order to simplify and unify. This change redistributed the roles leFH 18/40 crew numbers: the lifting mechanism and descent (for the leFH 18 they were on the right) moved from the right side to the left, towards the gunner.

The gun received double suspension of the combat axis due to the use of torsion bars, which were automatically disconnected when the frames were moved apart (bringing the gun into a firing position). The effectiveness of the muzzle brake was increased (due to a modified design) and cross-country ability was improved by increasing the width of the wheel rim (the leFH 18/40 weighs more than the Pak 40). Since the weight of the gun in firing position was reduced by 240 kg (compared to the leFH 18), the stability of the gun also decreased, despite the fact that the height of the firing line was reduced. The horizontal firing angle was increased to 60°. However, the carriage frames turned out to be too weak and bent at high elevation angles and maximum charge.

LeFH 18 howitzer at direct fire. NIZAP, August 20, 1942 (TsAMO)

In addition, Krupp and Skoda developed several improved projects and prototypes before 1945, which were primarily aimed at increasing the maximum firing range and transitioning from the previous wheeled carriage to a carriage on a rotating platform.

The leFH 18/42 howitzer produced with a barrel length of 31 calibers was in fact an improved model of the leFH 18M howitzer with a 28 caliber barrel, due to which the firing range increased to 12,700 m.

The leFH 42 howitzer was an improved example of the leFH 18/40 howitzer with an initial maximum firing range of 13,000 m, but with a 170 kg lighter weight (1630 kg), an electric trigger and a knurling under the barrel in the cradle, which made it possible to reduce the profile of the gun, and a wide rim wheels.

On the left is the gunner's workplace, on the right is an extension for a sight for shooting over the shield (TSAMO)

The truly revolutionary projects, designated leFH 43 and Skoda, used a carriage with a cross-shaped base similar to the 8.8 cm Flak and 8.8 cm Pak 43 for all-round firing, and were used in France and Sweden after the war. Sample I with a barrel length of 28 calibers and an initial projectile speed of 720 m/s showed a maximum firing range of 15,000 m in field tests. Sample II had a barrel length of 35 calibers, which brought the barrel closer to the barrel of a 100-mm cannon, and fired rockets at range 16,500 m.

Production leFH 18

In 1939, the German army had 4862 leFH 18 howitzers. Number of wheeled leFH 18s adopted for service from September 1939 to February 1945. was 6933 units, the maximum number was accepted in 1940 and 1943.

From March 1943 to March 1945 10,245 leFH 18/40 howitzers were adopted, of which 7,807 were delivered in 1944. In addition to wheeled carriages, leFH 18 were installed on various self-propelled chassis, so when calculating the total number of howitzers produced, they must be taken into account.

Lower mounting of howitzer leFH 18 (TsAMO)

The leFH 18/2 modification guns mounted on the Vespa (Panzerhaubitze Wespe, Sd.Kfz. 124, Geschützwagen II für le.FH18/2 (Sf.) Wespe) were produced from February 1943 to May 1944. 662 units. From March 1943 to March 1945 1,264 Sturmhaubitze 42 (StuH 42, 105 mm self-propelled howitzer model 1942) were also produced.

Rheinmetall and Krupp did not have enough of their own production capacity to fulfill other contracts, so in 1942 they transferred all production of the leFH 18 to six companies in Pilsen, Altona (Hamburg area), Elbląg, Magdeburg, Dortmund and Borsigwald.

A total of 19,104 leFH 18 howitzers were adopted from industry in 24 different versions, with the leFH 18 remaining the Wehrmacht's standard weapon until 1945.

Study of captured leFH 18 in the USSR

The first samples of the leFH 18 were captured by the Red Army at the beginning of the war, but it was not until 1942 that it was fully studied at the training grounds of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU). From the surviving archival documents it is clear that the study was carried out on unmodernized leFH 18 early editions on light alloy wheels. The research took place independently of each other at the Gorokhovets Artillery Research Site (ANIOP) and at the GAU Research Anti-Aircraft Artillery Test Site (NIZAP).

In NIZAP documents, the howitzer is designated as a “105-mm light field howitzer, model 1934” - i.e., the gun was named after the year of production, not adoption. During the research, the guns were disassembled down to the screw and described. The result of the research was a research report and a brief description of the weapon. The research report is of greatest interest: it notes design details that attracted the attention of Soviet artillerymen, while some of the technical solutions were subsequently applied in Soviet artillery systems.

Howitzer leFH 18, view from the crew side (TsAMO)

The conclusions based on the results of the study of leFH 18 at NIZAP indicate that the howitzer, defined as a divisional one, can be transported by both horse and mechanical traction, while its cross-country ability and maneuverability are assessed as satisfactory. The overall layout and design of the system was also found to be satisfactory and of interest. The design of the system, disassembly and assembly were considered simple, and the howitzer should also be simple in production. No substitutes or critically scarce metals were noted in the system; the use of welding, riveting and casting was assessed as uniform. It is noted that stamping is widely used.

The design of the barrel aroused interest in terms of the front grip and mounting of the pipe in the breech, which was characterized by significant ease of processing. Due to the considerable simplicity of processing the pipe and disassembling the barrel, in the event of a breakdown, lining was not required - it was noted that it was cheaper to replace the pipe. It was indicated that the shutter is convenient to use, its disassembly and assembly are simple. The design of the combat tiles and the insert bushings that were used to make holes with complex configurations aroused interest.

The design of the cradle included its welded trunnion holder, the fastening of the front end of the knurl to the cradle, and the design of the indicator ruler.

In recoil devices, the compensator and water cooling of the recoil brake are mentioned as worthy of study. It was noted that the compensator is very simple in design and much simpler than the spring compensators used in Soviet artillery. In addition, sealing devices in places of hermetic connections, the design of plugs, and the location of the valve in the knurl aroused interest.

The upper mounting of the gun aroused interest due to its simplicity and lightness, and the sight – due to the design of the panorama basket and its extension, which allows aiming over the shield cover.

The lower machine received close attention - the chassis, automatic switching on and off of the suspension and bringing the gun to three points of support, fastening the beds in a combat manner, connecting the beds in the stowed position, and summer folding openers were carefully studied.

Based on the results of research at the GAU training grounds, the following tactical and technical characteristics of the gun were obtained:

• barrel length - 28 calibers;
• number of grooves - 32;
• cutting steepness – 15°;
• rollback length – 1150 mm;
• length of the system in combat position - 5750 mm;
• system width in combat position – 4800 mm;
• height of the system in combat position (aiming angle 0/40°) – 1800/2850 mm;
• height of the firing line – 1180 mm;
• ground clearance - 390 mm;
• stroke width – 1560 mm;
• system weight in combat position - 1980 kg;
• weight of the system in the stowed position (for horse traction) – 3265 kg;
• vertical firing angle – from −5 to +40°;
• horizontal firing angle – 56°;
• projectile weight - 14.81 kg;
• gun crew – 6–7 people;
• rate of fire – 4–6 rounds per minute.

It is important that the leFH 18 arrived at the GAU testing grounds with only one charge, and they learned only a little later that the charge is variable and the firing range and initial velocity of the projectile depend on it. In total, the gun was equipped with five main charges and one special one. A wide range of projectiles (more than 20 types) were developed for the leFH 18: high-explosive fragmentation, armor-piercing, cumulative, propaganda, training and practical.

Conclusion

The leFH 18 howitzer was intended to destroy and suppress manpower located openly or behind light cover, to suppress firing points and destroy light field shelters, to act against tanks or armored vehicles, to combat artillery. This article does not pretend to be complete - it only talks about the history of the appearance and creation of the leFH 18. The number of modifications and options for installing the gun on different carriages and self-propelled chassis opens up enormous opportunities for study. This weapon turned out to be very successful, technologically advanced in production and easy to maintain and repair, and can rightfully be considered one of the achievements of German weapons thought.

Follow the link to see a detailed photo review of an early example of a howitzer from the exhibition of the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War on Poklonnaya Gora in Moscow.

Sources and literature:

1. Documents of the State Agrarian University Foundation, TsAMO
2. Joachim Engelmann. Deutsche Leichte Feldhaubitzen 1935–1945. Arbeitspferde der Divisionsartillerie – Podzun Pallas Verlag, 1990
3. Joachim Engelmann. German light field artillery 1935–1945 – Schiffer Publishing, 1995
4. Handbook of German artillery - M.: Voenizdat, 1945
5. Artillery ammunition of the former German army. Directory of the GAU USSR Armed Forces - M.: Voenizdat, 1946