Anti-tank artillery of the Red Army. Part 2

Home » Real story » History of Wars » Divisional artillery of the Red Army and Wehrmacht

History of WarsLiterature on the history of artillery

Dmitry Yu 06.26.2019 13270

19

in Favoritesin Favoritesfrom Favorites 13

This post is dedicated exclusively to real history and shows the path of development of artillery regiments as part of Soviet rifle divisions.

Here I am correcting my own mistakes in understanding what role 76mm cannons, 122mm howitzers and 152mm howitzers played in defending the Motherland from Nazi aggression.

Red Army

In August 1926

The staff of the light artillery regiment consisted of three mixed divisions. The first and second divisions each had three three-gun batteries. Moreover, the first two batteries were armed with 76-mm cannons, and the third battery was armed with 122-mm howitzers. The third division consisted of four batteries; of these, the first and second batteries were armed with 76-mm cannons, and the third and fourth were armed with 122-mm howitzers. So, the division received only 30 guns, of which 18 76 mm guns and 12 122 mm howitzers:

In June 1929

The staff of the artillery regiment of the rifle division retained its previous structure (3 divisions, two of them with 3 batteries and one with four batteries. Each battery has 3 guns) and the total number of artillery guns is 30 units. But the ratio of guns and howitzers has changed - now the regiment has eighteen 122 mm howitzers and twelve 76 mm guns:

In December 1935

The organization of the artillery regiment changed. Firstly, all batteries began to consist of two firing squads of 2 guns each, for a total of 4 guns per battery. By the way, the four-gun composition of the artillery battery was retained for divisional artillery regiments in the future. Secondly, the artillery regiment now included three light artillery divisions (each with 2 batteries of 76mm cannons and one battery of 122mm howitzers) and one heavy artillery division (which had 3 batteries of 152mm howitzers). The total number of guns was 48, of which there were 24 76mm cannons, 12 122mm howitzers and 12 152mm howitzers:

April 22, 1937

The Defense Committee outlined a plan for strengthening military artillery for the period 1938-1941. According to this plan, the number of divisional artillery was to be increased from 48 to 60 guns, of which 76 mm - 20, 122 mm howitzers - 28, 152 mm howitzers - 12. In accordance with this, on September 13, 1939, a new staff of the rifle division was approved, according to which the division was supposed to have two artillery regiments: the first - a three-divisional composition (76-mm guns - 20, 122-mm howitzers - 16) horse-drawn, the second - two-divisional composition (122 mm howitzers - 12, 152 mm howitzers - 12) on mechanical traction. In addition to divisional artillery, the division had standard regimental guns - 6 regimental 76mm guns in each rifle regiment (18 regimental 76mm guns per division)

By the beginning of the war with Finland, some of the divisions had one artillery regiment. Meanwhile, the experience of the Soviet-Finnish war confirmed the advisability of having two artillery regiments in the division. Therefore, after the war, the division retained two artillery regiments with a total number of 60 guns, but with a changed ratio of guns and howitzers in favor of the latter.

June 10, 1940

The division was to have one light and one howitzer artillery regiment. A light artillery regiment consisting of two divisions of three batteries, four guns in each battery. Each division has two cannon batteries (76-mm cannons, model 1939) and one howitzer battery (122-mm howitzers, model 1938). The howitzer artillery regiment consisted of three divisions, with three four-gun batteries in each division. Of these, the first two divisions were 122 mm howitzers and the third were 152 mm howitzers. In addition to divisional artillery, the division had standard regimental guns - 6 regimental 76mm guns in each rifle regiment (18 regimental 76mm guns per division)

In the battles with Nazi Germany in the summer and autumn of 1941, the USSR lost, in particular, 5516 divisional 76mm guns, 4937 divisional 122mm howitzers, 2030 units of 152mm howitzers. Supplies from industry during this period amounted to approximately 30% of the number of lost guns. Approximately the same fate befell the regimental guns, as did other components of the USSR’s combat power. As a result, the Red Army, on the one hand, faced the need to increase the number of rifle divisions, and on the other hand, faced a significant (about two-fold) drop in the number of available divisional artillery systems.

August 11, 1941

Due to the need to bring the staff of artillery regiments into line with the actual reserves of divisional artillery systems in the country and with the required number of rifle divisions, the staff of divisional artillery guns is being significantly reduced. Instead of two artillery regiments, there remains one in the rifle division, namely a light artillery regiment according to the 1940 staff. The light artillery regiment consisted of two divisions of three batteries, with four guns in each battery. Each division has two cannon batteries (76-mm cannons, model 1939) and one howitzer battery (122-mm howitzers, model 1938). At the same time, the number of regular regimental guns decreased: instead of 6 regimental 76mm guns, each rifle regiment had 4 guns left (12 regimental 76mm guns per division)

March 18, 1942

A third division was added to the artillery regiment of the rifle division, consisting of one battery of 76-mm cannons (4 USV guns) and one battery of 122-mm howitzers (4 howitzers). Introduce 15 tractors as means of traction for 122 mm howitzers. Thus, the Light Artillery Regiment in 1942 consisted of three divisions: two three-battery divisions and one two-battery division. In total, the regiment had 32 guns, of which 20 were 76mm guns mod. 1939 and 12 units of 122mm howitzers of the 1910/1930 model.

In addition to the rifle divisions, which victoriously completed hostilities in May 1945 with the above-mentioned staff of the divisional artillery regiment, the formation of guards rifle divisions began in December 1942.

December 10, 1942

The staff of the Guards Rifle Division is approved to number 10,670 people. Guards divisions had 32% more automatic weapons than regular rifle divisions, and their artillery regiment consisted of not 8, but 9 batteries (36 guns).

December 18, 1944

An artillery brigade was introduced into the guards rifle divisions, which included a howitzer (20 howitzers of 122 mm caliber), light artillery (20 guns of 76 mm caliber) and mortar (24 mortars of 120 mm caliber) regiments, as well as a separate anti-tank fighter (12 guns of 76 caliber mm) and anti-aircraft (6 guns of 37 mm caliber and 16 machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber) divisions. In addition, two batteries of 76-mm and 57-mm guns and a battery of 120-mm mortars were introduced into the staff of rifle regiments, and rifle battalions received a battery of 45-mm or 57-mm guns (4 units) and a mortar company (9 mortars of caliber 82 mm). The combat power of some guards divisions was increased by including a separate self-propelled artillery division (12 SU-76M) into their composition.

Thus, the dynamics of changes in the number of artillery pieces of various calibers in the artillery regiments of rifle divisions looks like this:

As you can see, since 1929, the Red Army has taken a course towards increasing the share of 122mm howitzers and reducing the share of 76mm divisional guns in the range of divisional artillery systems: the share of 76mm divisional guns in 1926 was 60%, starting from 1929 it was 40%, and since 1935 - 29%. However, the situation changed radically in August 1941.

In the period from August 1941 to May 1945, in all Soviet rifle divisions, except for the Guards, 76mm divisional guns accounted for 62%..67% of the total range of divisional artillery systems, and even in the Guards divisions their share was not less than 50%.

The consumption of ammunition in 1942, 1943 and 1944 emphasizes the same fact of the decrease in the howubization of divisional artillery: the consumption of ammunition for 76mm divisional guns was 70%..75% of the total ammunition consumption of divisional artillery systems.

Classification and purpose of artillery

Having talked a little about artillery shells, let's now move on to talking about the direct organization of artillery units , their purpose and structure. This classification is no less extensive and it is easy for an unprepared person to get confused in it, so we will try to present the material in as much detail as possible.

Divisional 76-mm gun ZIS-3

Division of artillery by design

• Howitzer artillery.
• Cannon artillery.
• Rocket artillery.
• Mortars.
• Anti-tank artillery.
• Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM),
• Artillery reconnaissance.

In this case, anti-tank artillery units can also be used to destroy its fire weapons, primarily anti-tank weapons, including those located in fortifications, destroy armored caps and fire at the embrasures of defensive structures. Artillery reconnaissance units are designed to obtain intelligence data about the terrain and the enemy in the interests of defeating him, as well as to serve artillery fire.

Division of artillery according to organizational characteristics

According to organizational characteristics and intended purpose, artillery units are divided into military units, the reserve of the High Command in the theater of operations, and the reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVPC). Artillery, organizationally part of combined arms formations, units and subunits, constitutes military artillery :

• army
• hull
• divisional.
• brigade.
• regimental
• battalion

Military artillery is intended to carry out tasks in the interests of combined arms formations, formations, units and subunits of which it is a part, as well as to strengthen combined arms formations, units and subunits operating in the main direction.

Artillery formations and units that are not part of the military artillery constitute the RVPS artillery . It is intended for quantitative and qualitative strengthening of combined arms formations and units operating in the main direction.

Self-propelled artillery mount "Msta-S", 152 mm

Division of artillery by mode of movement

• self-propelled artillery.
• towed artillery.

Self-propelled artillery, compared to towed artillery, has higher maneuverability on the battlefield. increased protection from weapons and requires less time to prepare for firing, however, according to their intended purpose, all types perform the same tasks, and are used:

a) for defeat:

• means of nuclear and chemical attack.
• elements of precision weapon systems.
• artillery, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles.
• anti-tank and other fire weapons.
• manpower.
• helicopters on landing pads.
• air defense means.
• control points.
• radio-electronic means.

b) destruction of enemy fortifications.

c) remote mining of the area.

d) lighting provision.

e) setting up aerosol (smoke) screens and performing other tasks.

Structural division of artillery formations

The main fire and tactical unit of artillery is the battalion .

The division, as a rule, operates as part of an artillery group (unit). A division from a regimental artillery group can be assigned to support a battalion, and a division from a divisional artillery group can be assigned to support a first-echelon regiment. During an offensive, a division may be attached to a battalion operating in the first echelon, in an advanced or raid detachment. In an offensive to overcome the enemy's support zone, the division can be assigned to a battalion acting as a vanguard (advanced detachment).

artillery battery

As an artillery fire unit, the division is capable of hitting various targets with high accuracy, which can be open and covered, stationary and moving, observed and unobserved, ground and surface, and perform other fire missions. The ability of an artillery battalion to quickly mix and carry out continuous interaction with combined arms units fighting at a high tempo characterizes it as a tactical artillery unit.

Another fire and tactical artillery unit is the battery . The battery, as a rule, operates as part of a division. It can be assigned to support a company, and during the offensive it can be attached to it. The battery can remain at the disposal of the division commander. The battery can also perform fire and tactical tasks independently.

The fire unit of artillery is the fire (anti-tank) platoon . He performs fire missions as part of a battery or independently.

The control platoon is designed to conduct reconnaissance and provide communications.

A weapon (mortar, combat vehicle, ATGM installation) in combat operates, as a rule, as part of a platoon and performs fire missions from an open or closed firing position. A gun crew is the smallest firing unit of artillery. The composition of the gun crew varies and is determined depending on the gun system.

Source: compilation from an artillery textbook

Wehrmacht, 1941 - 1945

In 1941

The artillery regiment of a German infantry division during the Second World War included: a regimental headquarters with a headquarters battery, three light divisions (a total of 36 light field howitzers lFH 18) and one heavy division (12 heavy field howitzers sFH 18). Each battalion consisted of four batteries, one of which was the headquarters battery, and three firing batteries consisting of four guns each.

In 1943

The heavy division with 12 heavy field howitzers sFH 18 reduced its composition to 9 guns.

The increased effectiveness of Soviet troops since 1943 led to a decrease in the number of German artillery. In the photo, the T-34 tank irons a German battery in 1943:

In 1944, the artillery regiment of a German infantry division was left with a light division (a total of 24 light field howitzers lFH 18) and one heavy division (4 heavy field howitzers sFH 18).

MILITARY REVIEW AND POLITICS

Introduction

In historical literature, the weapons of rifle divisions of the 1941 model are often compared and discussed. I also wondered what artillery weapons would be optimal for infantry divisions at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. I want to immediately explain that the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of forty-one was not in the area of ​​the quality or quantity of weapons. Therefore, ideal artillery weapons would not have helped the Red Army much in the early stages of the war, but in the future it would undoubtedly have helped to defeat the enemy more quickly and with fewer losses.

Criteria for selecting ideal divisional artillery

Ideally, if we take a break from reality, the optimal weapon for an infantry division would be a self-propelled gun with an elevation angle of up to eighty degrees, caliber 152 millimeters, firing in bursts. But this is all a utopia; for a real weapon, many factors need to be taken into account. The main ones are the development of industry, the method of transporting the gun and the impact of the projectile on the target.

Divisional gun

Everything is learned by comparison, so I will compare my virtual weapon with our legend ZIS-3 divisional gun. Divisional guns were transported by horse-drawn vehicles, so their combat weight should not exceed one thousand three hundred kilograms. We must not forget that the horses also pulled the front end with shells, which added at least half a ton of weight. The caliber of the gun is selected based on the maximum destruction of infantry positioned in the open. It is known that shells of one hundred and twenty millimeter caliber have the maximum fragmentation effect, but they have separate loading and a low rate of fire. Why am I focusing on the rate of fire? Because openly positioned infantry can happen in three cases. The first case is when infantry in a column moves towards the front line. The second case - the infantry accumulates for the offensive and the development of the previous option - the infantry goes on the offensive in a chain. In any case, infantry coming under fire will not wait for complete destruction and will escape the attack or disperse. Therefore, in the first minute the rate of fire should be maximum. Most of all, the criterion of a large fragmentation effect and a sufficient rate of fire corresponds to a caliber of one hundred millimeters. Before the war, one hundred millimeter caliber guns were used in the navy and had a unitary cartridge. Accordingly, there were machines and measuring tools for the production of one hundred millimeter barrels and projectiles. In terms of rate of fire, the 100 mm cannon is not much inferior to the ZIS-3, but in terms of the amount of TNT in the projectile it is almost three times greater. Accordingly, the fragmentation effect and the radius of complete destruction are much greater. One of the best pre-war artillery theorists, Upornikov, almost completely agrees with me. He proposed a ninety-five millimeter caliber for the divisional gun. True, the gun was designed with a high initial projectile velocity and it turned out to weigh more than two tons. When shooting at a defense site, a hundred millimeter caliber is not optimal, but in any case it is better than a 76.2 millimeter caliber. The only thing in which the 100 mm cannon is inferior to the ZIS3 is its firing range. It is not possible to make a cannon weighing one thousand three hundred kilograms that can fire further than ten kilometers. Here we need to make a small lyrical digression - shooting far away is pleasant but very expensive. Many people read with pride about naval and railway guns of one hundred thirty and one hundred eighty millimeter calibers with an enormous firing range. But the authors modestly forget to mention how much the barrel of such a gun costs and what an insignificant number of shots it can fire before it is destroyed. With an increase in the initial velocity of the projectile and, accordingly, the firing range, the efficiency of the gun tends to zero. All developers of long-range guns must wear a sign - waste of public property. The one-hundred-millimeter divisional cannon I proposed with a low initial velocity has a very steep projectile flight path. This makes it possible, even with a barrel elevation angle of no more than thirty-seven degrees (the same as on the ZIS-3), to hit the enemy in ravines and on reverse slopes. The anti-tank qualities of a one hundred millimeter divisional gun in the summer of '41 would not have been much lower than that of the ZIS-3. The fact is that German tank armor of high hardness was designed for small-caliber shells flying at high speed; massive shells flying at low speed simply broke through it. When using cumulative projectiles, the thickness of the armor penetrated would increase by one and a half times compared to the ZIS-3.

The photographs show an Italian mountain howitzer caliber one hundred and five millimeters. According to its parameters, it fully matches the description of my virtual one hundred millimeter gun. All that remains is to install a one hundred millimeter caliber barrel and simplify the design by limiting the vertical aiming angle. If we discard weight restrictions (secretly hoping for the Allied Studebakers), then the ideal divisional gun would be a weapon surprisingly reminiscent of the one hundred and five millimeter L-118 howitzer. Weight one thousand eight hundred kilograms. The firing range is seventeen kilometers. The initial speed of the projectile is seven hundred meters per second. I don’t know what kind of tank armor a projectile weighing sixteen kilograms penetrates at a speed of seven hundred meters per second, but clearly no less than a projectile weighing nine kilograms from an eighty-five millimeter anti-aircraft gun flying at a speed of eight hundred meters per second. In this case, the anti-tank gun could not be made at all, which would greatly simplify the supply of divisions with ammunition and spare parts.

Anti-tank gun

Unfortunately, for 1941, neither the caliber nor the initial speed of anti-tank guns mattered. Ninety-eight percent of the anti-tank guns were simply abandoned during the retreat. The Germans fought with our guns until 1945 and even started producing shells of our caliber. The trouble was not that our guns could not penetrate German tank armor, but that the Germans threw tanks into places where these guns were not present. Therefore, the anti-tank gun must be eighty-five millimeters in caliber. This caliber made it possible to fight German tanks until the end of the war. The barrels and shells were already in production and used in the anti-aircraft gun. Yes, and there were samples of guns weighing one thousand six hundred kilograms before the war. The question may arise: why not ZIS-2? It is lighter and penetrates armor up to one hundred millimeters at a distance of five hundred meters. The fact is that the ZIS-2 was only virtual before the war. Before the war, we didn’t know how to make seventy-caliber barrels. More precisely, one barrel took up to nine damaged blanks. The eighty-five millimeter barrel was also not a gift, but the length was only fifty-five calibers and the hole of a larger diameter was still easier to process.

The photographs show anti-tank guns BL-25 (box-shaped frames) and ZIS-S-8 (tubular frames). Both use an anti-aircraft gun barrel, but both are not accepted for service. Well, for general development, I recommend an article about the T-34 tank.

Divisional howitzer

First I want to justify the choice of caliber. The one hundred and twenty-two millimeter howitzer has always surprised me. It has maximum fragmentation effect but low rate of fire - not optimal. When firing at a defense site, it has the minimum permissible projectile weight for reliable destruction of shelters - not optimal. That is, it turns out to be a typical swan - it swims and runs, but it swims worse than a fish and runs worse than a horse. Therefore, the ideal divisional howitzer is the D-1. Before the war, a similar, but slightly heavier M-10 howitzer was in production. The weight of four tons seems like a lot, but given the small number of them in the division, it was quite possible to find a sufficient number of tractors.

Lyrical digression

In order to show how little the technical characteristics of a gun influence its popularity, I want to compare the D-1 and M-10 howitzers. Both have the same barrel and the same projectile ballistics. The D-1 howitzer is five hundred kilograms lighter. This was achieved by installing a jet muzzle brake. That is, the muzzle brake deflected the powder gases back, thereby reducing recoil and at the same time concussing the personnel. The military did not want to accept such a weapon into service, but its chief designer Petrov stood holding the wheel while testing the howitzer. By doing this, he proved that artillery crews could survive fire from his howitzer. Thus, everything ended well - the howitzer was accepted into service, and the designer lost only eighty percent of his hearing. The M-10 howitzer had lower specific ground pressure and, accordingly, better maneuverability. But nothing comes for free - the horizontal guidance angle (and therefore the ability to maneuver fire) of the D-1 was significantly less than that of the M-10. The M-10 was produced before the war in the amount of 1058 copies and another 271 units in the forty-first year. D-1 was produced in the amount of 1053 copies, with seventy percent in the forty-fifth year. As a result, everyone knows D-1, but only specialists know M-10. Look carefully at the photographs, they show that most of the M-10 was not killed in battle, but was abandoned on roads and in ditches. This once again confirms that the reason for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941 should not be sought in the technical characteristics of the guns and their quantity.

If we compare the sizes of craters of different shells, it turns out that shells from 76.2 to 122 millimeters produce craters that are similar in size. But shells of one hundred and fifty-two millimeter caliber produce a much larger crater. If we take the area of ​​the crater as the zone of one hundred percent destruction of infantry located in a shelter or trench, then the following arithmetic is obtained. Two projectiles of one hundred and fifty-two millimeter caliber, with a total weight of eighty kilograms, provide a kill zone of thirty-eight square meters. And five shells with a caliber of one hundred and twenty-two millimeters, with a total weight of one hundred and five kilograms, provide a destruction zone of thirty-five square meters, using three extra fuses. By the way, the Germans had two light one hundred and fifty millimeter howitzers in each regiment.

conclusions

These three guns would constitute ideal divisional artillery. A hundred millimeter cannon would be ideal for defense and maneuver warfare. An eighty-five-millimeter anti-tank gun would actually fight tanks and not just scare them like the forty-five in 1943. To destroy individual defense units, a D-1 howitzer would be ideal. And when storming a heavily fortified defense line, the division is usually supported by corps artillery.

Dynamics of changes in the number of divisional artillery of the Red Army

In addition to one or two artillery regiments, in different years the division also included other units (usually separate divisions) armed with other types of divisional artillery and mortar weapons and military equipment. All of them together made up the divisional artillery of the Red Army.

For example, in December 1942 , all types of artillery were fully represented in the organizational structure:

• battalion artillery - anti-tank platoon (2 45 mm guns) and mortar company (6 82 mm mortars); mortar platoons of rifle companies (3 50-mm mortars each);
• regimental artillery - artillery battery (4 76.2 mm regimental guns), mortar company (7 120 mm mortars (8 in the guards division), anti-tank battery (6 45 mm anti-tank guns), anti-aircraft machine-gun company ( 6 Maxim anti-aircraft machine gun installations of 7.62 mm caliber or DShK 12.7 mm caliber);
• divisional artillery - light artillery regiment: three mixed divisions (in two divisions there are 8 76.2 mm guns and 4 122 mm howitzers, in the third division - 4 76.2 mm guns and 4 122 mm howitzers; in guard divisions all three divisions had 12 guns each), the total artillery regiment consisted of 20 76.2 mm divisional guns (24 in the Guards division) and 12 122 mm howitzers;
• anti-tank artillery division - three batteries (12 45-mm guns);
• anti-aircraft artillery battery - 6 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft guns.

Dynamics of changes in the number of divisional artillery of the Wehrmacht

Anti-tank artillery of the Red Army. Part 2

Soviet divisional 76-mm guns, intended for a wide range of tasks, primarily fire support for infantry units, suppression of firing points, and destruction of light field shelters.
However, during the war, divisional artillery guns had to fire at enemy tanks, perhaps even more often than specialized anti-tank guns. In the initial period of the war, in the absence of armor-piercing shells, fire on tanks was carried out with shrapnel, setting their fuses “on strike.” Armor penetration was 30-35 mm. In the late 20s and early 30s, our military leadership was carried away by the idea of ​​​​creating a universal artillery system that combined the functions of an anti-aircraft and divisional gun. One of the apologists of this trend in the field of artillery weapons was M. N. Tukhachevsky, who since 1931 held the post of chief of armaments of the Red Army, and since 1934 - the post of deputy people's commissar of defense for armaments. Energetic, but without proper education in the field of design and technology of artillery systems (and, therefore, incompetent in this matter), he actively promoted his personal ideas into their practical implementation. The entire divisional artillery became a testing ground for the concept of universalism promoted by Tukhachevsky and a number of other high-ranking officials.

Such a weapon, designated F-22, was created by V.G. Grabin, then unknown to anyone. In April 1935, the first prototypes were assembled. The new guns had a muzzle brake and an extended chamber chambered for a new cartridge. New projectiles weighing 7.1 kg were specially developed for the F-22, which it fired at an initial speed of 710 m/s. On May 11, 1936, the F-22 was put into service under the name “76-mm divisional gun model 1936.” For serial guns, the muzzle brake was eliminated (according to the customer, it greatly unmasked the gun with the rising clouds of dust), and a chamber for the 1900 model cartridge case was also adopted. At that time, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) was not ready to switch to a different cartridge case (or another caliber) for divisional guns, since very large stocks of 76 mm rounds with cartridge case mod. 1900

Due to the universalism requirements imposed on the new weapon, it turned out to be unsuccessful. As an anti-aircraft gun, the F-22 was absolutely flawed. It did not have all-round fire, which is unacceptable for an anti-aircraft gun, and a low initial speed of about 700 m/s. In practice, this meant a short reach in height and less shooting accuracy. When firing at elevation angles greater than 60°, the automatic shutter refused to work, with corresponding consequences for the rate of fire. As a divisional unit, the F-22 did not satisfy the military. The gun had very large dimensions (especially in length) and weight (a ton more than the ZIS-3). This greatly limited its mobility, in particular, the possibility of its movement by calculation forces. In terms of firing range and armor penetration, the F-22 did not have major advantages over the older divisional gun model 1902/30. The use of the F-22 as an anti-tank gun was complicated by the fact that the sight and vertical guidance mechanism were located on opposite sides of the barrel, and, accordingly, guidance the gun could not be operated by the gunner alone. The gun had a lot of flaws, was difficult to manufacture and capricious to operate.

The development of the gun in production was difficult, both because of its significantly more complex design compared to previous guns of a similar class, and because the gun had a lot of defects and was constantly being improved. In 1936, 10 guns were delivered, in 1937 - 417, in 1938 - 1002, in 1939 - 1503. Production of the gun was discontinued in 1939.

In addition to being used as a divisional F-22, they were part of anti-tank defense artillery brigades (24 guns), and since 1942 - 16 guns (anti-tank fighter brigades). During 1941 - 1942. These guns suffered heavy losses, but were seen in small numbers until the end of the war. In particular, 2 artillery regiments armed with these guns (40 pieces) took part in the Battle of Kursk. The gun was mainly used as a divisional gun, less often as an anti-tank gun (naturally, having a higher initial speed, the F-22 had greater armor penetration than the ZIS-3) and never as an anti-aircraft gun.

In 1937, the ideas of universalism, like many other ill-conceived experiments and campaigns, were put to rest; their apologists lost their positions, and in some cases, their lives. The country's military leadership realized that the army, before the impending world war, did not have a satisfactory divisional gun, since the 76-mm divisional gun of the 1902/30 model was clearly outdated, and the new 76-mm divisional gun of the 1936 model (F-22) had a number of major shortcomings . The simplest solution in this situation was to create a new, modern weapon with the ballistics of a gun mod. 1902/30, which made it possible to use huge reserves of ammunition for this gun. V.G. Grabin urgently began designing a new gun, to which, for some reason, he assigned the index F-22 USV, meaning that the new gun was only a major modernization of the F-22. In fact, structurally it was a completely new weapon.

From June 5 to July 3, 1939, military tests of the gun took place, and in the same year it was put into production. In 1939, 140 guns were produced, in 1940 - 1010. At the beginning of 1941, the USV was discontinued. This decision was explained by two reasons: firstly, the mobilization plan for divisional guns was fully implemented (the mobilization reserve on June 1, 1941 was 5,730 guns, but there were 8,513 guns in stock), and secondly, it was planned to switch to divisional guns of a larger caliber .

With the beginning of the war, according to the mobilization plan, the production of SPM was again launched at. In 1941, 2616 guns were fired, in 1942 - 6046 of these guns. Production of the USV was discontinued at the end of 1942 due to the adoption of the new divisional gun ZIS-3, which had a number of advantages over the USV. It is worth noting that the displacement of the USV from production occurred gradually, in particular, plant No. 92 continued to produce the USV in 1942 (706 guns were produced), although at the end of the summer of 1941 the ZIS-3 was already produced at this plant. On June 1, 1941, the Red Army had 1,170 such guns. The gun was used as a divisional and anti-tank gun. In 1941-1942. These guns suffered significant losses, the remaining ones continued to be used until the end of the war.

Compared to the F-22, the new USV gun was certainly more balanced. However, for a divisional gun, the USV had too large dimensions, especially in height. Its mass was also quite large, which negatively affected the mobility of the gun. The placement of the sight and guidance mechanisms on opposite sides of the barrel made it difficult to use the gun as an anti-tank weapon. The gun's shortcomings led to its replacement with the more successful and technologically advanced ZIS-3 gun.

Structurally, the ZIS-3 was a superposition of the swinging part of the previous model of the F-22USV divisional gun on the light carriage of the 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank gun. The significant recoil force was compensated by the muzzle brake, which was absent on the F-22USV. Also on the ZIS-3, an important drawback of the F-22USV was eliminated - the placement of the aiming handles on opposite sides of the gun barrel. This allowed the crew of four people (commander, gunner, loader, carrier) to perform only their functions. The design of the new weapon took place in close collaboration with specialist technologists; the design itself was immediately created for mass production. Operations were simplified and shortened (in particular, high-quality casting of large parts was actively introduced), technological equipment and requirements for the machine park were thought through, requirements for materials were reduced, their savings were introduced, and unification and continuous production of components were provided for. All this made it possible to obtain a weapon that was almost three times cheaper than the F-22USV, but no less effective.

The development of the gun was started by V. G. Grabin in May 1941, without an official assignment from the GAU in May 1941. This is due to the rejection of divisional artillery by the head of this department, Marshal G. I. Kulik. He believed that divisional artillery was unable to fight heavy German tanks (which Germany did not have in 1941). After Germany’s attack on the USSR, it turned out that German tanks were successfully hit by guns of 45-76.2 mm caliber, and already at the beginning of the war, due to heavy losses, a shortage of guns of these types began to be felt, and the production of divisional guns was restored. The Privolzhsky plant, where the Grabin design bureau was located, and the Stalingrad plant received orders to produce 76.2-mm cannons.

A certain number of ZIS-3s were manufactured back in 1941 - these were experimental guns and materiel for two artillery divisions sent for military testing. In the battles of 1941, the ZIS-3 showed its advantage over the heavy and inconvenient F-22USV for the gunner.

Mass production of the ZIS-3 began in 1941; at that time, the weapon was not officially adopted for service and was produced “illegally.” Grabin, in agreement with the director of the Volga plant, Elyan, made the bold decision to launch the ZiS-3 into production under his own responsibility. The work was organized in such a way that parts F-22-USV and ZiS-3 were manufactured in parallel. The only clearly “wrong” part—the ZiS-3 muzzle brake—was manufactured in a pilot workshop. But representatives of the military acceptance refused to accept “illegal” guns without the permission of the GAU, whose head was then already N.D. Yakovlev. A request was sent to the GAU, which remained unanswered for a long time, new ZiS-3 guns were accumulated in the workshops, and in the end the head of military acceptance at the plant, I.F. Teleshov gave the order to receive them. As a result, this allowed V.G. Grabin to present the ZIS-3 personally to I.V. Stalin and receive official permission to produce the weapon, which by that time was already being produced by the plant and was actively used in the army. At the beginning of February 1942, official tests were carried out, which were more of a formality and lasted only five days. Based on their results, the ZIS-3 was put into service on February 12, 1942 with the official name “76-mm divisional gun mod. 1942"

The troops received three types of 76-mm guns mod. 1942, which differed in elevation angles, riveted or welded frames and bolt. Thanks to its high manufacturability, the ZiS-3 became the first artillery gun in the world to be put into mass production and assembly line. It is also the most popular gun of the Great Patriotic War - a total of 103 thousand were produced between 1941 and 1945 (another 13,300 guns were mounted on the SU-76 self-propelled gun).

Since 1944, due to a decrease in the production rate of 45-mm guns and a shortage of 57-mm ZIS-2 guns, this weapon, despite its insufficient armor penetration for that time, became the main anti-tank gun of the Red Army. The guns sent to the anti-tank artillery were equipped with PP1-2 or OP2-1 direct fire sights.

Shells for 76-mm divisional guns: 1. UBR-354A round with BR-350A shell (Blunt-headed with a ballistic tip, tracer). 2. UBR-354B shot with a BR-350B projectile (Blunt-headed with a ballistic tip, with localizers, tracer). 3. UBR-354P shot with a BR-350P projectile (Sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile, tracer, “coil” type). 4. UOF-354M shot with an OF-350 projectile (Steel high-explosive fragmentation projectile). 5. USh-354T shot with Sh-354T projectile (Shrapnel with T-6 tube).

With good effectiveness of the high-explosive fragmentation projectile against manpower, it gave about 870 lethal fragments when exploded with the fuse set to fragmentation action, with an effective radius of destruction of manpower of about 15 meters. The armor penetration of the armor-piercing projectile, which penetrated 75 mm armor at a distance of 300 meters, was not enough to combat the medium German Pz.IV tanks. As of 1943, the armor of the heavy tank PzKpfW VI "Tiger" was invulnerable to the ZIS-3 in the frontal projection and weakly vulnerable at distances closer than 300 m in the side projection. The new German tank PzKpfW V "Panther", as well as the modernized PzKpfW IV Ausf H and PzKpfW III Ausf M or N, were also weakly vulnerable in the frontal projection to the ZIS-3; however, all these vehicles were confidently hit on the side by the ZIS-3. The introduction of a sub-caliber projectile since 1943 improved the anti-tank capabilities of the ZIS-3, allowing it to confidently hit vertical 80 mm armor at distances closer than 500 m, but 100 mm vertical armor remained too strong for it. The relative weakness of the anti-tank capabilities of the ZIS-3 was recognized by the Soviet military leadership, but until the end of the war it was not possible to replace the ZIS-3 in anti-tank units - for example, 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank guns were produced in 1943-1944 in the amount of 4,375 pcs., and ZIS-3 for the same period - in the amount of 30,052 pcs., of which about half were sent to anti-tank destroyer units. Powerful 100-mm BS-3 field guns reached the troops only at the end of 1944 and in small quantities. The insufficient armor penetration of the guns was partially compensated by tactics aimed at hitting the vulnerable spots of armored vehicles. In addition, against most types of German armored vehicles, the armor penetration of the ZIS-3 remained adequate until the end of the war. This was partially alleviated by the decrease in the quality of armor steel of German tanks in the second half of the war. Due to the lack of alloying additives, the armor turned out to be fragile and, when hit by a projectile, even if not pierced, it gave dangerous chips on the inside.

In the spring of 1943, V.G. Grabin, in his memorandum addressed to Stalin, proposed, along with the resumption of production of the 57-mm ZIS-2, to begin designing a 100-mm cannon with a unitary shot, which was used in naval guns. When creating this gun, design bureau designers under the leadership of V.G. Grabin widely used their accumulated experience in creating field and anti-tank guns, and also introduced a number of new technical solutions. To ensure high power, reduced weight, compactness and high rate of fire, a semi-automatic wedge bolt and a two-chamber muzzle brake with an efficiency of 60% were used for the first time on a gun of this caliber. The wheel problem was solved in an original way; for lighter guns, wheels from GAZ-AA or ZIS-5 were usually used. But they were not suitable for the new weapon. The wheels from the YAZ five-ton truck turned out to be too heavy and large. Then a pair of wheels from GAZ-AA was taken, which made it possible to fit into the given weight and dimensions. The guns equipped with these wheels could be transported by mechanical traction at fairly high speeds.

A year later, in the spring of 1944, the BS-3 was put into mass production. Until the end of the Great Patriotic War, industry supplied about 400 guns to the Red Army. The 100-mm BS-3 turned out to be a very effective anti-tank weapon. The heavy 100-mm field gun BS-3 entered service in May 1944. For its excellent armor penetration, which ensures the defeat of any enemy tank, front-line soldiers gave it the name “St. John’s Wort.”

Due to the presence of a wedge bolt with a vertically moving wedge with semi-automatic operation, the location of the vertical and horizontal aiming mechanisms on one side of the gun, as well as the use of unitary shots, the gun’s rate of fire is 8-10 rounds per minute. The cannon fired unitary cartridges with armor-piercing tracer shells and high-explosive fragmentation grenades. An armor-piercing tracer projectile with an initial speed of 895 m/s at a distance of 500 m at an impact angle of 90° penetrated armor 160 mm thick. The direct shot range was 1080 m. However, the role of this weapon in the fight against enemy tanks is greatly exaggerated. By the time of its appearance, the Germans practically did not use tanks on a massive scale. The BS-3 was produced during the war in small quantities and could not play a big role. For comparison, the SU-100 tank destroyer with a gun of similar caliber D-10 was produced in wartime in quantities of about 2000. The creator of this gun, V.G. Grabin never considered the BS-3 an anti-tank system, which is reflected in the name.

BS-3 had a number of disadvantages that made it difficult to use as an anti-tank weapon. When firing, the gun jumped strongly, which made the gunner’s work unsafe and confused the sighting mounts, which, in turn, led to a decrease in the practical rate of aimed fire - a very important quality for a field anti-tank gun. The presence of a powerful muzzle brake with a low height of the line of fire and flat trajectories characteristic of firing at armored targets led to the formation of a significant smoke and dust cloud, which unmasked the position and blinded the crew. The mobility of a gun with a mass of more than 3500 kg left much to be desired; transportation by crews to the battlefield was practically impossible.

If the towing of 45-mm, 57-mm and 76-mm guns was carried out by horse teams, GAZ-64, GAZ-67, GAZ-AA, GAZ-AAA, ZIS-5 vehicles or Dodge semi-trucks supplied from the middle of the war under Lend-Lease WC-51 ("Dodge 3/4"). Then to tow the BS-3, tracked tractors were required, or, in extreme cases, all-wheel drive Studebaker US6 trucks.

At the final stage of the war, 98 BS-3s were assigned as a means of strengthening five tank armies. The gun was in service with light artillery brigades of 3 regiments (forty-eight 76 mm and twenty 100 mm guns). As of January 1, 1945, the RGK artillery had 87 BS-3 guns. At the beginning of 1945, in the 9th Guards Army, one cannon artillery regiment of 20 BS-3s was formed in three rifle corps.

Mainly, thanks to its long firing range of 20,650 m and a fairly effective high-explosive fragmentation grenade weighing 15.6 kg, the gun was used as a hull gun to combat enemy artillery and suppress long-range targets.

Anti-aircraft artillery played a significant role in the fight against tanks, especially in the initial period of the war. Already at the end of June 1941, a decision was made to form separate anti-tank artillery regiments of the RGK. These regiments were armed with twenty 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. In July - August 1941, 35 such regiments were formed. In August - October, a second wave of formation of anti-tank regiments of the RGK followed. These regiments were armed with eight 37 mm and eight 85 mm anti-aircraft guns. 37-mm anti-aircraft machine gun mod. 1939, even before the war, it was created as an anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon and had a proven armor-piercing projectile. An important advantage of anti-aircraft guns was also the carriage, which ensured circular rotation of the gun. To protect the crew, anti-aircraft guns reclassified as anti-tank guns were equipped with an anti-fragmentation shield.

At the end of 1941, 37-mm machine guns were removed from anti-tank artillery. 85 mm anti-aircraft guns were used for this purpose for at least another two years. 15 anti-tank artillery divisions of twelve 85-mm guns each took part in the Battle of Kursk. This measure, of course, was forced, since anti-aircraft guns were much more expensive, had less mobility, and were more difficult to camouflage.

Captured German guns were actively used in anti-tank artillery. The 75-mm Pak-40, which had high armor penetration rates and a low silhouette, was especially valued. During the offensive operations of 1943-1944, our troops captured a large number of these guns and ammunition for them.

Several anti-tank divisions equipped with captured guns were formed. There were divisions, both with captured guns and of mixed composition. Some of the captured anti-tank guns were used by the troops overtime, which was not reflected in the reporting documents.

Characteristics of anti-tank guns

The saturation of troops with anti-tank artillery occurred by mid-1943. Prior to this, the lack of anti-tank guns was partially compensated by the mass production of anti-tank rifles (ATR). The quantitative saturation of troops with guns was not always sufficient to ensure anti-tank defense. So the use of the divisional ZIS-3 was largely a forced measure. Even a 76-mm sub-caliber projectile did not reliably penetrate the armor of heavy tanks. The cumulative 76-mm projectile was used only in short-barreled regimental guns, due to the imperfection of the fuse and the possibility of rupture in the barrel of a divisional gun. Due to the position of the GAU, before the war the opportunity to create an effective 76-mm gun was lost. What the Germans later did, capturing and modernizing hundreds of captured Soviet F-22s and USVs. For some unknown reason, an 85-mm anti-tank gun was not created. Such a weapon was designed by F.F. Petrov and adopted under the designation D-44 after the war.

It was anti-tank artillery that destroyed 2/3 of German tanks, despite the shortcomings and omissions, the Soviet soldiers of anti-tank artillery, showing steadfastness and mass heroism, often sacrificing themselves, managed to break the steel fist of the Panzerwaffe.

Based on materials from: https://www.tvoyrebenok.ru/zis3.shtml Shirokorad A. B. The genius of Soviet artillery: The triumph and tragedy of V. Grabin. Shunkov V.N. Weapons of the Red Army.

New in blogs

In the first half of the 20th century, the First World War became a huge stage for this formidable type of weapon, which actually determined the further development of most types of military equipment. But it was the role of artillery that grew many times over, and it itself changed a lot.

If during the Russo-Japanese War artillery fire still accounted for no more than 15% of manpower losses, then in 1914 - already up to 75, and in 1918 (despite the development of combat aviation, the emergence of chemical weapons and the improvement of field fortification) - up to 68%. At the same time, when it comes to the First World War, they usually remember heavy artillery. Indeed, the opponents trembled under the fire of 280-mm or 305-mm howitzers, 420-mm mortars or 380-mm railway guns, which threw huge shells from their muzzles, nicknamed “suitcases”. But the main daily combat work in that war was carried out by more modest, but also more numerous military artillery.

By the beginning of the war, Russia was almost completely provided with both guns and ammunition. But the campaign's needs exceeded estimates by 12-15 times. Whatever theories the parties put forward on the eve of the collision, reality significantly corrected them: it was necessary to increase artillery not only quantitatively, but also to multiply the types and models of guns, change their ammunition, and introduce new services.

Even the first maneuverable period of hostilities required more guns and shots than expected. With the transition to trench warfare, the needs increased manifold. On the one hand, it was necessary to create artillery for the Reserve of the High Command, including high-power guns (in Russia they constituted “heavy artillery for special purposes”). On the other hand, it “went down” through the links of the military organization. Brigades, regiments and even battalions needed their own constant firepower.

3-inch mountain gun mod. 1909 Caliber - 76 mm. Barrel length - 15.3 calibers, gun weight in firing position - 626.6 kg, grenade weight - 6.5 kg, muzzle velocity - 381 m/s, grenade firing range - 7500 m, rate of fire - 10 rounds/min

Changes at the divisional level

In 1914, artillery, which would later be called “divisional”, included light field, horse and mountain artillery. It consisted of 3-inch (76 mm) guns - the 1900 and 1902 models, a lightweight "mounted" version of these field guns and mountain guns of the 1904 and 1909 models. Then, for its effective flat shrapnel fire, the German infantry nicknamed the Russian field gun “the scythe of death.”

But soon the enemy stopped attacking in dense, full-length chains across open space, and instead began to actively use folds in the terrain, burrow into the ground, hide behind wire barriers, build fortifications, and scatter hidden machine-gun points around the position. The artillery's tasks became more and more difficult. The main thing was still the fight against manpower. But now the question was not so much about its destruction - this could no longer be achieved - but about the suppression of it and fire weapons in the most important direction of the division's operations. In the manual “Properties of guns and brief instructions for their use” dated August 1916, 3-inch field guns were also assigned tasks such as shelling trenches, fighting machine guns and artillery in trenches, and making passages in wire fences.

By the middle of the war, the depth of the defensive front of the infantry division had increased from 1-1.5 to about 10 kilometers. The maximum firing range of the “three-inch”—6.4 kilometers—was no longer enough, and it turned out to be impossible to increase it using the excellent ballistic properties of the gun, but without radically changing the design. The artillerymen themselves found a way out: by digging up the ground at the position under the trunk of the gun, they increased the elevation angle of the barrel and reached a range of up to 8.6 kilometers. The introduction of a 34-second tube made it possible to shoot shrapnel over the same distance. True, the shrapnel had already left the battle scene. Previous advantages turned into disadvantages - with a flat trajectory and small angles to the horizon, at which cannon shrapnel exploded, sheaves of bullets were easily intercepted by embankments, parapets and trench canopies. The Russo-Japanese War also forced the urgent introduction of a high-explosive grenade into the ammunition load of a field gun, and now its role was continuously growing. Already in the fall of 1915, the share of high-explosive grenades in field artillery ammunition increased from 15 to 50%.

But a 76-mm grenade also turned out to be weak against dugouts and firing points with visors, especially since at a low angle of impact of the projectile, a significant part of the explosion energy was simply lost, and a fair share of fragments went up and into the ground. Most of the fortifications buried in the ground were “horizontal” targets; to defeat them, the projectile had to fall as vertically as possible and carry a larger explosive charge. In addition, guns with a sloping, flat trajectory could not fire over the heads of their troops. Howitzers were urgently needed.

37-mm Rosenberg trench gun mod. 1915 Barrel length - 22.8 calibers, gun weight - 180, grenade weight - 0.68 kg, muzzle velocity - 435 m/s, grenade firing range - 3200 m, rate of fire - 8 rounds/min

"Howubization" of artillery

A steeper (overhead) firing trajectory requires not only a larger barrel elevation angle, but also a significantly lower initial projectile velocity, and, accordingly, a shorter relative barrel length and a lower loading density (the ratio of the mass of the powder charge to the volume of the charging chamber). Therefore, a howitzer can have a significantly larger caliber than a cannon, with similar weight and mobility. The mass of the projectile increases cubed as the caliber increases, and the lower pressure of the powder gases in the barrel allows the thickness of the projectile walls to be reduced. All this gives great “destructive power”. Another characteristic feature of howitzers is the variable powder charge, which allows you to vary the initial velocity of the projectile. As a result, the howitzer turns out to be a very flexible weapon in choosing the trajectory and range of the projectile. True, separate loading reduces the rate of fire, and several charges significantly increase the weight of the ammunition being transported. Nevertheless, the “howubization” of field artillery became one of the characteristic features of the First World War.

At its beginning, Russian artillery, unlike French, for example, was armed with field howitzers. They occupied by no means as important a place as in the German one, but they turned out to be very promising.

Russian artillerymen took up the light field howitzer based on experience from the same Russian-Japanese one. The Main Artillery Directorate determined for it a caliber of 48 lines (122 millimeters) - I must say, it turned out to be successful and has lived successfully for a century. Although a domestic design was developed, after testing in 1908-1909, 122-mm howitzers of the German (with a horizontal wedge breech) and French (with a piston breech) systems were adopted. The ammunition included a high-explosive shell with a fuse, shrapnel with a 45-second tube and five charges in cartridge cases. Along with other field guns, howitzers received armored shields - they became a mandatory element of field guns and were used for several decades.

Even howitzer shrapnel could “look” into the enemy’s trench from above, but the main thing here, too, was a high-explosive shell (bomb). Compare the effect of a high-explosive 122-mm bomb, carrying an explosive charge of 2 kilograms, with a 76-mm grenade (charge of 0.8 kilograms): the explosion of the first formed a crater in the ground with a diameter of 2.0-2.5 meters and a depth of 0.8-1 .0 meters, the last - 1.25-1.5 meters and 0.5-0.7 meters, respectively. At the same time, the weight of the 1910 model howitzer in combat position (1.33 tons) is comparable to the weight of the 1902 field gun - 1.01 tons. True, the Russian field gun, with excellent ballistic qualities, was heavier than the French, German and Austrian. And the 122-mm field howitzer also exceeded the German 105-mm in mass.

By 1914, 122-mm howitzers were available in the corps, and during the war they “went down” to the divisions. Moreover, if at first the field light artillery included 5480 field guns, 452 horse guns, 346 mountain guns and 512 howitzers, then by 1917 there were already 6524 field guns, 570 horse guns, 600 mountain guns and 1054 howitzers. Howitzer artillery grew faster than others. And yet she was missing. As with other types of weapons, we had to resort to foreign orders and, of course, use trophies. In 1916, the field and mountain guns of the Russian army included: French 90-mm cannons, Japanese 75-mm Arisaka field and mountain guns of 1898 (Type 31), 12-cm Krupp howitzers (also delivered from Japan) , English 114-mm (45-line) field howitzers, Austrian 76.5-mm M.05 guns and 10-cm M.99 howitzers, German 7.7-cm nA96 guns. True, the Russian army was supplied mainly by domestic factories with field guns - during the war years they produced 8529 guns of the 1902 model against 650 French and Japanese guns that arrived during the same time. But 1289 122-mm howitzers of both models were manufactured in Russia, so 400 English 114-mm howitzers played a significant role.

Shells, give me shells!

The leitmotif of Russian liberals’ accusations against the military department, and then a red thread in popular science and fiction literature about the First World War, became “shell famine.” In fact, the pre-war reserves of artillery shells melted away in the very first months, and by the beginning of 1915 this famine at the front truly broke out. In the summer of that year, the monthly requirement alone was determined to be 3 million shells, although in 1914 they planned to fight to the end with 5.6 million. We had to take urgent measures to increase production in Russia and order abroad. The commission of Major General Vladimir Ipatiev and the Chemical Committee of the State Agrarian University did a lot for this. And through the efforts of a special commission of Major General Semyon Vankov, the production of 76- and 122-mm rounds by 1916 had almost reached the required volume. This was achieved thanks to the transition to the production of solid-body grenades “according to the French model” from ordinary and steel cast iron. Moreover, Russian-made surrogate shells turned out to be much safer than French ones (in the sense of premature explosions). But the transition to simplified fuses led to many accidents - after the war this had to be taken into account when developing new tubes and fuses. (Designer Vladimir Rdultovsky worked effectively in this direction in the 1910–1930s.)

The main ones are high-explosive shells, and the main explosive for their equipment is TNT (trinitrotoluene). Although melinite, ammotol, ammonal, xylyl were also used, in France - schneiderite, and in Austria-Hungary - ekrasite and other substances.

So, the “shell starvation” of Russian field artillery was largely overcome by the beginning of 1916. According to the testimony of the former head of the GAU, General Yevgeny Barsukov, this caused the other extreme. Infantry commanders, having little understanding of the properties of artillery, demanded “hurricane”, “drum” and similar fire from it, and the artillerymen, in order to “calm down” them, developed such a rate of fire that sometimes they quickly and almost uselessly disabled the guns themselves.

To be fair, we note that in general, during the war, the Russians greatly improved their shooting methods. The previously proven method of firing from closed positions was widely used (where there were appropriate sights with protractors for this purpose), and methods of shooting and concentration were refined. An important innovation was the barrage fire, which was carried forward as the infantry advanced (a movable fire shaft).

The role of special shells—smoke, incendiary, and illumination—has increased. The war also gave rise to a fundamentally new type of them - “chemical”, filled with toxic substances. In Russia, since 1916, for example, 76-mm asphyxiating (chloropicrin) and poisonous (phosgene, vensinite) shells have been produced, and since 1917, chemical mines for mortars. By the end of the war, their use was no longer considered “exotic”, and after it it was widely believed that the next world massacre would be “chemical”.

48-line light howitzer mod. 1910 Caliber - 122 mm. Barrel length - 12.8 caliber, gun weight in firing position - 1331 kg, grenade weight - 23 kg, muzzle velocity - 335 m/s, grenade firing range - 7700 m, rate of fire - 2 rounds/min

From the trenches

In trench warfare, when opponents settled in one place for a long time, often a couple of hundred meters from each other, it was not easy for divisional artillery to provide constant fire support to the infantry. Even with reliable communication between the branches of the military (which usually did not exist), the inevitable dispersion of shells created the danger of hitting their own.

So, both in defense and in attack, the infantry needed guns that could constantly accompany it on wheels, placed in trenches in camouflaged positions, so that the fire range would not exceed 300-500 meters. These close-combat weapons were called “trench artillery.” Back in 1910, during the reorganization of the Russian army, the question of light “escort” artillery was raised, but then this was considered unnecessary, assuming that such tasks could be solved by 3-inch horse guns. But they turned out to be too bulky for the trenches; crews could barely roll them across the battlefield. The Hotchkiss naval 47 mm gun was also difficult to pull manually. The old 57-mm Nordenfeld coastal and caponier guns also did not perform very well. So the most popular caliber of “trench” guns was the 37 mm caliber that came from naval artillery (one can recall, for example, the French 37-mm Mle 1916 TR “Puteaux” infantry gun, which was later installed on Renault FT tanks).

In Russia, a lightweight 37 mm trench gun was developed by Artkom member General Mikhail Rosenberg. His Model 1915 gun had a short barrel, a piston breech, an easy-to-make carriage made of wooden parts, a rubber recoil buffer and an armor shield sufficient to protect against German bullets. Ammunition included grenades and buckshot. The gun could easily be disassembled into three parts, carried along trenches or “travelled” across the field, and for installation it required a platform slightly larger than a heavy machine gun. However, by the beginning of 1917, only 137 Rosenberg guns were delivered to the troops, so 218 37-mm McClane automatic guns supplied from the United States played an equally important role in trench artillery.

Finally, for direct infantry support, the 3-inch Schneider rapid-fire anti-assault gun, adopted in the same 1910 for arming fortresses, was very useful - now it was armed with “individual assault batteries”. And already during the war, they began to organize the production of a “short cannon” of the 1913 model at the Putilov plant with the ammunition and ballistics of a mountain cannon, the ability to fire shrapnel or a grenade, including from closed positions.

47-mm mortar of Captain Likhonin, Russia. Mine caliber - 180 mm, gun weight - 90 kg, mine weight - 21-23 kg, initial speed - 60 m/s, firing range - 320 m

Along a mortar trajectory

Even during the defense of Port Arthur, midshipman Sergei Vlasyev and captain Leonid Gobyato created the first mortar, which successfully disrupted the siege work of the Japanese. But this experience was appreciated only in Russia and Germany. True, in Russia they preferred the new 6-inch rifled mortar; in Germany, the developed mortars were “given” to sappers. But at the positional stage of the First World War, bombs and mortars gained great popularity - guns with a very steep (mortar) trajectory fired from the bottom of the trenches and from behind cover, sending heavy explosive shells into the enemy trenches several hundred meters away. Their shells, falling vertically, destroyed field buildings and killed a lot of people around. For the most part, these guns were muzzle-loading with a caliber mine or, according to the Gobyato-Vlasyev scheme, with an over-caliber mine, which was inserted into the barrel with a tail-rod.

These new weapons were created hastily and with a fair amount of improvisation, which gave rise to a wide variety of designs and designs. The troops also showed a “creative approach” - they used anything from spring catapults for throwing hand grenades to homemade firearms from pipes and gun casings.

The Russian army received 6-dm (152-mm) mortars from the Petrograd and Putilov factories, 6-dm bomb throwers of the 1915 model of the Obukhov plant system, 89-mm bomb throwers from the Izhora plant, 38-line (95-mm) bomb throwers of Lieutenant Vasilevsky, 3, 5-dm (88-mm) - Aasen, 20- and 47-mm mortars of captain Likhonin. Foreign models were also copied: our version of the French 58-mm Dumezil mortar No. 2 was called F.R. (“Franco-Russian”), and the captured German 90 mm - G.R. The most portable (though it was produced in small quantities) was the Rdultovsky 8-line bomb launcher with a firing range of up to 300 meters. Among the largest is the 9.45 inch (240 mm) English Battignolle with a firing range of 1280 meters and a weight of 1.64 tons.

A promising scheme emerged on the other “edge” of the world war. Towards its end in England, Captain Stokes developed a mortar with a caliber mine, which is lowered along with the propellant charge into the barrel, falls along it under its own weight and is fired by impaling the primer in the breech. This provided such a weapon with a rate of fire of up to 25 rounds per minute, and the “imaginary triangle” design with a support plate under the breech and a bipedal support for the barrel - stability when firing with relative lightness. After the war, the French modified the system, giving the mine a streamlined shape, and the mortar itself was made collapsible. This is how the Stokes-Brandt scheme appeared - the basis for the further development of mortars.

How to “land” a plane

In those same formidable years, a special type of artillery, such as anti-aircraft artillery, which was so important for the entire subsequent century, arose. And here again we have to talk about the divisional gun. Although the 76-mm anti-aircraft (anti-aircraft) gun was created by Franz Lander and Vasily Tarnovsky back in 1914, its production during the war did not reach an industrial scale. It fell to field and naval guns to fight enemy aircraft, for which they developed many variants of pit (designers Matveev, Myagi and others) and pedestal (Gvozdev, Rosenberg, Herzenschweig, Rekalov, Myagi) installations suitable for manufacturing directly in the troops. Moreover, 3-dm guns of the 1900 model were used on such installations more often than of the 1902 model - the latter were simply more necessary for solving basic problems. The best installation was B.I. Ivanov for a field gun - it was included in artillery manuals until the early 1930s. The 76-mm Hartz “shrapnel with capes” was used for firing at air targets, as well as for tearing apart wire barriers, but Rosenberg’s “stick” shrapnel, a projectile with ready-made rod fragments, turned out to be more effective.

"Three-inch long-lived"

So, what were the requirements for artillery revealed during those great campaigns? Both traditional ones - increasing the firing range and power of projectiles, and new ones - increasing the firing sector without changing the position of the gun, increasing maneuverability, speed of occupation and change of position. The combination of greater range and horizontal guidance angle made it possible not only to hit targets at greater depths, but also to concentrate the fire of several batteries scattered along the front and in depth on one group of targets. A battery on one flank of the division was able to provide support to a unit on the other, as well as fire at moving targets. The width of the front and the depth of infantry penetration were now directly determined by the “range of action” of the supporting artillery. If before the war the horizontal pointing angle of artillery guns did not exceed 8 degrees, then soon after it there was a need to increase it to 30-60. All this required a new generation of weapons.

However, the creation (and most importantly, mass production!) of new systems required time and expense. The domestic industry, the insolvency of which became apparent during the First World War, was in dire need of reconstruction. It was yet necessary to re-equip old factories and build new ones, to introduce industrial principles and technologies. Under the regime of total austerity in the mid-1920s, the Red Army artillery had to be urgently rearmed in a less expensive way - by modernizing old systems. And so, in 1930, improved models of almost the entire range of artillery and small arms weapons were put into service - from a revolver to a 152-mm howitzer.

90 mm bomb launcher G.R. Gun weight - 68.9, bomb weight - 3.3 kg, initial speed - 101 m/s, firing range - 430-500 m

In this row, of course, was the “three-inch” - the most widely used military artillery weapon. Most attention was then paid to increasing the firing range. The barrels were lengthened by 10 calibers at once, the charge of gunpowder in the cartridge was increased, a cartridge with a more aerodynamically advantageous “long-range” projectile was introduced, and the barrel elevation angle was increased to 37 degrees. As a result, the range increased to 13,200 meters, although with the small horizontal guidance angle remaining, this did not significantly increase fire maneuverability... However, the “three-inch” guns still saw quite a bit of war in the Great Patriotic War. It was even proposed to increase the caliber of the divisional gun to 85 millimeters, but the industry would not have been able to afford such a significant rearmament with ammunition, and 76 millimeters remained its caliber until the very end of the 1940s.

The divisional guns of the 1936 (F-22) and 1939 (USV) models that replaced the “three-inch” were guns of a different generation. And a new “height” was already looming ahead - a 76-mm cannon of the 1942 model - the legendary ZIS-3 by Vasily Grabin...

In the meantime, in the same 1930, the 122-mm field howitzer of the 1910 model was modernized, and in 1937 (since the adoption of the new howitzer was delayed) the howitzer of 1909 was also modernized. By increasing the volume of the charging chamber, introducing new charges and a “long-range” projectile, the designers achieved a firing range of 8940 meters. Corresponding changes were made to the carriage and recoil devices. The howitzers also received a normalized panoramic sight. Finally, in 1938, the new M-30 howitzer of the Fedor Petrov system entered the troops - later one of the best weapons of the Second World War. The 122 mm caliber turned out to be beneficial for fragmentation action (explosion above the ground) and is minimally necessary for the effective high-explosive action of a divisional howitzer projectile.

The new guns were distinguished by another characteristic feature - carriages with sliding frames. Such carriages were proposed by the engineer Depor in France at the end of the 19th century; shortly before the First World War they began to be introduced in Italy. But then they looked more at the shortcomings of the design - the increase in the weight of the carriage, the time of transition from the traveling to the combat position, how difficult it is to choose a suitable site for its installation (providing support for four points - two wheels and two beds - is more difficult than three).

However, for guns of the new generation, such carriages have become urgently necessary - with them, the horizontal guidance angle, for example, of the 76-mm divisional gun of the 1936 model was 60 degrees, and the 122-mm howitzer of the 1938 model was 49. For comparison: the howitzer sample 1910 - less than 5 degrees.

89-mm bomb launcher from the Izhora plant. Mine caliber - 250 mm, gun weight - 737 kg, mine weight - 79.9 kg, firing range - 850-1070 m

Battalion and regimental

The experience of using “close combat weapons” has shown that they should become an inseparable part of infantry units, follow them everywhere, and be constantly “at hand” of commanders. This gave birth to battalion artillery - the more complex field organization required it to be divided into units of military organization (corps, division, and so on). In the Red Army in the 1920s, battalion artillery was equipped with 37-mm Rosenberg, McClen and Grüzonwerk cannons, as well as 58-mm F.R. mortars. - the set, of course, is temporary, no longer in the spirit of the times. The 45-mm “battalion howitzer” of the 1929 model of the Franz Lender system did not solve the problem either. In conditions of rapid mechanization of armies, a battalion gun could not help but be anti-tank - the need to fire at “armored vehicles, tanks, armored trains” was emphasized already in the mid-1920s. The first of these was the 37-mm anti-tank gun of the 1930 model - a licensed copy of the German Rheinmetall. The basis of the battalion artillery was 45-mm anti-tank guns of the 1932 and 1937 models - “forty-fives”. One of the reasons for the transition to the 45 mm caliber was precisely to give the anti-tank gun the properties of a battalion gun - with a more powerful fragmentation projectile in the ammunition load. The horizontal guidance angle of 60 degrees made it easier to shoot at moving targets.

However, light artillery of this level alone was not enough. Its shells could not cope with the destruction of field fortifications, which the infantry would inevitably “run into” in the offensive. They were also not suitable for stopping suddenly attacking large groups of the enemy. A caliber of no less than a “divisional caliber” was required, but with more mobile guns. Thus began the revival of regimental artillery, abolished in the Russian army 100 years earlier. In 1923, it was reintroduced into the staff of the rifle regiment, temporarily armed with the same 37-mm guns of the 1915 model and McClen, as well as field guns of the 1902 model. Only at the beginning of 1928, the 76-mm regimental gun of the 1927 model, developed at the design bureau of the Arms and Artillery Trust under the leadership of Sergei Shukalov, entered service with the troops. This descendant of the “short gun” of the 1913 model became the only artillery piece adopted in the USSR for mass production in the 1920s, which in itself speaks of the importance of the issue. Note also that the gun was officially called “76 mm” - since 1927, the metric system in our country has become mandatory and the only one.

The advantages of the gun included its relatively low weight, which allowed the crew to roll it in their hands and quickly pick it up. The “Colonel” was destined to become a real “workhorse” of field artillery, although, of course, it could not replace the “divisions” and anti-tank guns.

The regimental cannon of the 1927 model, together with 45-mm cannons, also formed the basis of the artillery of the airborne troops in the 1930s, since the size and weight of these guns made it possible to transport them by plane - light cars served as tractors for them on the ground. In general, the war acutely raised the issue of traction for artillery pieces. The need for motorization was obvious, but the lack of funds forced us to limit ourselves to introducing tractors primarily into heavy artillery. And although light tractors were created and even went into production, and carriages were designed for towing at high speeds, the main “propulsion vehicle” for battalion, regimental and divisional artillery remained an ordinary horse. More precisely, a six-horse team for divisional guns and howitzers, a four-horse team for “regiments” and anti-tank guns...

Mortars are back in action

...Both of them fired along a flat trajectory. Meanwhile, the task of hitting hidden targets with mounted fire at the regiment and battalion level was no less acute than at the division level.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the idea of ​​universal tools that solve diverse problems gained popularity. The divisional artillery tried to introduce “ground-based anti-aircraft” guns, but the systems turned out to be complex and cumbersome, and nothing came of it. The escort artillery came up with guns that would fire both as a cannon and as a howitzer (mortar), but these experiments did not produce a positive result. The solution lay in supplementing the guns with battalion and regimental mortars. As a matter of fact, in the Red Army back in the 1920s, the 58-mm F.R. mortar was included in the battalion artillery, and soon research work on new models began, although the attitude towards smooth-bore mortars was then ambiguous. The very simplicity, together with the poor accuracy of their samples from the past wartime, gave rise to the opinion that these are, they say, only “surrogates” of real guns. On the other hand, the rapid spread of Stokes-Brandt mortars in different armies spoke for itself.

Eventually, in 1927, Nikolai Dorovlev's group developed a smooth-bore mortar in the form of a 76-mm "battalion mortar" MB. And then - whole families of mortars with calibers from 60 to 240 millimeters, including chemical 107 mm and battalion 82 mm (Stokes-Brandt type). Later, the main developer was the design bureau of Boris Shavyrin, where they came up with an 82-mm battalion mortar of the 1937 model, a 107-mm mountain pack mortar and a 120-mm regimental mortar of the 1938 model. They formed the basis of the new mortar weapons of the Red Army.

Semyon Fedoseev