By the mid-60s. XX century The geopolitical military situation was finally established in the world, remaining largely unchanged until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The outbreak of the arms race forced the two most powerful states at that time - the USSR and the USA - to compete in the speed of developing new types of weapons.
MANPADS "Strela"
It turned out that almost simultaneously the armies of these countries received at their disposal the latest infantry weapons - anti-aircraft missile systems. And although the Soviet development was several years late, its better tactical and technical characteristics quickly restored the balance in the infantry armament of the armies of the two states.
In 1966, the development of the first Soviet MANPADS, carried out by the Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau (KBM) under the leadership of the famous designer B.I., ended. Shavyrin in Kolomna, Moscow region. The thermal homing head was developed by a group of engineers from OKB-357 of the Leningrad Economic Council (later it became part of the Leningrad Optical-Mechanical Association - LOMO), as well as the State Optical Institute, headed by chief designer Pikkel. The developed missile system, designated 9K32 "Strela-2" (NATO designation - SA-7 "Grail"), was adopted by the Soviet Army in 1968. The self-propelled version, designated "Strela-1", was subsequently used to a limited extent. The main advantage of the portable Strela over its American competitor, the Redeye MANPADS, was the ability to hit a target on a collision course, which, however, was very limited in the first models of the Soviet complex. The Strela MANPADS became a battalion weapon, initially in service with anti-aircraft gunners of missile companies from a motorized infantry (tank) battalion.
The Strela-2 MANPADS was a fairly effective weapon for its time. Its superiority over its then only American-made competitor has already been mentioned. This superiority was consolidated in 1970 with the development of the new 9K32M Strela-2 M MANPADS by the Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau. This weapon was developed in accordance with the government decree of September 2, 1968 and tested from October 1969 to February 1970 at the Donguz test site (head of the test site M.I. Finogenov) under the leadership of a commission headed by N.M. Orlov.
Significant modernization of the electronic part of the Strela complex has significantly increased the effectiveness of this weapon. For the first time, it became possible for a shooter-operator to select a moving target against a background of interference. The firing range and target engagement height have increased. Thanks to the automation of aiming and target acquisition by the homing head, the work of the shooter-operator has been significantly simplified. The new missile defense systems of the complex ensured the defeat of targets flying at a speed of 150 m/s on a collision course, and on catch-up courses at a speed of 260 m/s.
MANPADS "Igla"
In 1974, the next KBM development, the Strela-3 MANPADS (NATO designation SA-14 Gremlin), was adopted by the Soviet Army. The modernization this time affected mainly the missile defense system. The new 9M36 missile was equipped with a highly sensitive noise-proof homing head (for this purpose, deep cooling technology for the homing sensor was used) designed by the Kyiv Design Bureau (chief designer of the head - I.K. Polosin) and improved engines that increased the height and range of the missile's affected area. The Strela-3 MANPADS ensured the destruction of actively maneuvering targets on catch-up courses flying at a speed of 310 m/s, and on oncoming courses at a speed of 260 m/s. American developers of missile systems were able to achieve such efficiency only by 1978. Tests of the Strela-3 complex took place at the Donguz test site from November 1972 to May 1973 (test site head O.K. Dmitriev) under the leadership of a commission headed by D. .A. Smirnov.
Experts assessed all modifications of the Strela MANPADS as effective, easy to maintain, cheap and easy to transport weapons. Combat launches of Strela-type missiles are carried out from the shoulder, even from unprepared positions, as well as from combat and transport vehicles of any type moving on flat terrain at speeds of up to 20 km/h. In the stowed position, the Strela-3 is carried on a shoulder strap behind the back of the shooter-operator. The calculation of MANPADS is 1 person.
In the Soviet Army, portable air defense systems began to be widely used in the Airborne Forces and Marine Corps, at Air Force field airfields, on surface ships, in coastal troops and at naval aviation airfields, in border troops, and in operational formations of internal troops.
Mass-produced at the Kovrov plant named after V.A. Degtyarev, this complex is in service with the armies of more than 50 countries and managed to take part in almost all armed conflicts of the second half of the twentieth century. The complex was supplied to the armed forces of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Benin, Burkina Faso, Hungary, Vietnam, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, East Germany, Egypt, Zambia, Zimbabwe, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Cuba, Cyprus, Kuwait, Laos, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, UAE, Peru, Poland, North Korea, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Syria, Somalia, El Salvador, Slovakia, Tanzania, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, South Africa, Yugoslavia. Strela-2 M models are produced in Egypt (under the designation “Ayn as Saqr”), Pakistan (ANZA MKI) and China (HN-5, “Hongying-5”). The Strela-2 is also used by the Navy - both from a conventional launcher and in a special naval version (SA-N-5 “Grail” according to NATO designation).
In the early 1970s. Engineers of the Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau, in accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated February 12, 1971, began creating a new generation of MANPADS to replace the Strela complex in service with the Soviet Army. The general name of the new Soviet development is “Igla”. The developers were tasked, first of all, with increasing the protection of the missile homing system from light traps, increasing the range and effectiveness of hitting a target, and also achieving better interaction between anti-aircraft gunners and air defense control points at the tactical level.
The main developer of the Igla MANPADS was the Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau (chief designer - S.P. Nepobedimy). LOMO (the creation of a thermal seeker led by designer O.A. Artamonov), the Research Institute of Measuring Instruments (the development of a ground-based radar interrogator led by Yu.V. Moiseev) and the Central Design Bureau of Apparatus Engineering (the creation of a portable electronic tablet) took part in the development led by designer V.G. Rosenthal).
However, such an impressive list of design bureaus responsible for the development did not help speed up the creation of weapons. The work dragged on for ten years, which was mainly due to difficulties in creating a highly sensitive and noise-resistant thermal seeker. The appearance of new MANPADS among NATO member countries (English “Blowpipe”, Swedish RBS70), as well as the accelerated replacement by the US Army of the “Redeye” complex with “Redeye-2” (later designated “Stinger”), forced the leadership of the Soviet Army to reconsider the development timeline MANPADS. Since 1978, Kolomna KBM engineers have been developing a simplified Igla-1 MANPADS, which received the index 9K310.
In 1981, after successful tests carried out from January 15 to July 9, 1980 at the Donguz test site under the leadership of a commission headed by Yu.I. Tretyakov, the new complex was adopted by the Soviet Army. In NATO countries, this weapon was designated SA-16 “Gimlet”. MANPADS "Igla-1" was intended to destroy actively maneuvering air targets flying at speeds of up to 320 m/s on catch-up courses and up to 360 m/s on head-on courses. Compared to the Strela-3 MANPADS, the characteristics of the range and altitude of hitting targets have significantly improved. According to some reports, the probability of hitting high-speed American F-4 fighters with the Igla-1 MANPADS compared to the Strela has increased from 7–9% to 44–59%. All this was achieved thanks to significant processing of the electronic equipment of the Strela-3 MANPADS.
To ensure greater mobility of the complex's rocket, post-launch turnaround equipment was installed on it. In addition, the Igla-1 missile defense system (type 9M313) was equipped with a flight mode switch “towards - after”. For the first time in the practice of designing MANPADS, the mode of detonating the remaining fuel of a rocket when it hits a target was used. Together with the use of high-action explosives, this led to a significant increase in the lethality of missiles.
A significant disadvantage of the design of the Igla-1 missile defense system was its low protection from active types of artificial interference (for example, fired thermal missiles) - this was due to the acceleration of work on the creation of this weapon. Therefore, in development of the general theme “Igla”, engineers of the Kolomna KBM in 1983, having actually returned to the original ideas, completed the development of the 9K38 “Igla” man-portable missile system, which received the Soviet designation 9K38 and the Western designation SA-18 “Grouse”. The main innovation of the MANPADS is the 9M39 missile, equipped with the latest highly sensitive homing head, which has a target selection circuit against the background of interference. This modernization allowed the complex to ensure the destruction of actively maneuvering targets defending themselves by shooting away thermal interference.
In this case, the power of thermal radiation of interference is allowed to be greater than that of the target itself. The probability of hitting heat-protected targets with a 9M39 missile is 24–31%, despite the fact that the Igla-1 complex is practically unsuitable for combat under such conditions. Several versions of the Igla MANPADS are produced, differing slightly:
— “Igla-E” — export modification; — “Igla-M” — a model for use in the navy (NATO designation — SA-N-10); - “Igla-D” - a model for paratroopers and special forces with a launch tube and rocket divided into two parts, connected before combat use, which made it possible to increase the compactness of the complex; - “Igla-V” - an aerial modification in the form of a block of two missiles in launch tubes, used for installation mainly on combat helicopters; — “Igla-N” is a model with a heavier warhead, the missile has a slightly lower speed and range, but due to the power of the warhead, the probability of hitting targets is increased by 25–50% compared to standard models; — “Igla-S” is the latest version, which has a missile defense system with modified engines with a longer flight range, a more advanced and noise-resistant guidance and search system and a heavier warhead.
To increase the combat characteristics of the Igla complex, Kolomna KBM developed the Dzhigit launcher, consisting of two Igla or Igla-1 MANPADS on a turret installation, in which the anti-aircraft gunner is placed in a rotating chair and manually aims the launcher at target. The massive design of the complex requires a lot of time for combat training and wheeled transportation. However, by using any combination of Igla and Igla-1 MANPADS, Dzhigit increases the probability of hitting a target by an average of 1.5 times when launching missiles in one salvo.
MANPADS "Igla" and "Igla-1", serial production of which is carried out at the Kovrov plant named after. V.A. Degtyarev, were exported to more than 30 countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Malaysia, Finland, India, Iraq, Poland, Singapore, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, South Korea and Syria. Several partisan and terrorist organizations are known to be armed with Russian Iglas. In 2003, the cost of one complex was approximately $40,000.
The Strela and Igla complexes were very actively used during numerous conflicts in the Middle East.
In 1969, Strela-2 appeared in service in Egypt and then in Syria. There is information that these weapons were also used by Soviet air defense units that arrived in Egypt in 1970.
But regarding the effectiveness of the Soviet complex, mutually exclusive evidence was received. According to Arab sources, in August 1969, in one day, ten Strela-2 missiles shot down 6 Israeli Air Force Phantom aircraft, while all other air defense systems shot down only 4. Israel claimed that for the entire August 1969. on the Egyptian front, the Air Force lost only one aircraft - an A-4 Skyhawk, shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire, and at the end of 1969 (October-December) there were no losses at all.
By the beginning of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Arab armies had up to 2000 Strela-2 complexes. Arab sources claim that between November 6 and November 23, 1973, these MANPADS shot down 23 Israeli aircraft and another 8 during the Battle of Hermon (April 8 - May 30, 1974).
Israel confirms the loss of only six of its aircraft (Phantom and Skyhawk). According to another source, during the war, up to 35 hits from the Strela-2 complex missiles were recorded on Israeli Air Force aircraft, 4 of these hits were lethal to combat vehicles, 3 aircraft were seriously damaged, and the remaining 28 were quickly returned to service. Moreover, according to some reports, the Arabs fired about 5,000 of these missiles!
During the next Arab-Israeli war of 1982, on June 5, an AH-1 “Cobra” combat helicopter was shot down by an “Arrow” (pilots Amichai Spektor and Yossi Koehler were killed), on June 6, an A-4 “Skyhawk” attack aircraft (pilot, captain Aaron Akhiz was captured) and a Bell 212 helicopter (5 crew members were killed). The Israelis noted the fact that up to 50 Strela-2 missiles were fired at Akhiz’s plane, but only one hit. Until the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon in 2000, there were numerous cases of Strela-2 missiles being launched at Israeli planes and helicopters, but there were no more losses from them.
In general, according to Israeli estimates, from 1973 to 1988, Arabs and Russians used 6,825 Strela-2 M missiles, while only 10 Israeli planes and helicopters were shot down (2 F-4 E “Phantom”, 5 A-4 "Skyhawk" and "Super-Mister", 3 helicopters). The probability of a hit, taking into account damaged vehicles, was 0.15%.
Read: 130 mm installation SM-4-1
Such blatant, according to Israeli calculations, ineffectiveness of the Strela-2, explained by the low sensitivity of its seeker and the low weight of the warhead, nevertheless did not prevent the introduction of a large number of captured Soviet MANPADS into service in Israel. For a long time, this complex was the only type of MANPADS in Israel, and only by 1979 did the American Redeye complexes appear in service, and in 1989, the Stinger.
In numerous anti-colonial, ethnic and civil conflicts in Africa, Soviet MANPADS were also used very intensively, and here, too, statistical data on the effectiveness of Strels also sometimes differ by an order of magnitude. In the civil war in Angola, which has lasted since 1975, Strela MANPADS of various models (as well as the later Igla) were used by almost all warring parties: government and Cuban troops, as well as Namibian guerrillas of the SWAPO organization, on the one hand, and as trophies — formations of the UNITA movement and South African troops, on the other. Moreover, UNITA fighters, in addition to the Soviet Strels, also used Chinese analogues of the HN-5 C, as well as American Redeye and Stinger MANPADS.
According to South Africa, from 1978 to the beginning of 1988, 255 launches of Strela-2 MANPADS were recorded on aircraft of the Air Force of this country, 65% of which were on helicopters. 5 hits noted. An Impala attack aircraft was shot down, several Mirage aircraft and one Dakota transport aircraft were damaged. According to other sources, 450 missiles were fired and 9 aircraft were shot down. According to the UNITA organization, its air defense forces (mainly through the efforts of missile fighters) in the period from 1985 to 1986 alone shot down about 200 Cuban and government aircraft (MiG-21, MiG-23, An-26) and helicopters (Mi- 8, Mi-25, “Aluett III”), both military and civilian. And currently the number of MANPADS in UNITA formations is estimated at about two dozen.
During the guerrilla war of 1968–1979. In the former Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), rebels fighting against the white minority regime actively used Soviet MANPADS to fight Rhodesian civil aviation aircraft. So, on September 3, 1978, in the area of Kariba airport, a twin-engine passenger aircraft was shot down (out of 56 passengers, only eight survived), on February 12 of the following year, in the area of the same airport, another aircraft was shot down by two missiles five minutes after takeoff (5 were killed). crew members and 54 passengers). These losses forced the airline's management to remove turboprops from the line and instead use DC-3s with piston engines, the weak exhaust of which was not so attractive to the homing heads of the Soviet Strels.
In February-March 1990, the troops of the once great friend of the Soviet Union, Ethiopian ruler Mengistu Haile Mariam, suffered a heavy defeat from Eritrean rebels in the battles for the Eritrean capital, Asmara. The Ethiopian Air Force lost 3 aircraft from MANPADS launches: on February 28, a MiG-21, and on March 2, two MiG-23s.
In all cases, the pilots died. In the spring of 1991 (March 30 and May 14), on the eve of the collapse of the Mengistu regime, the rebel Strela shot down two more MiG-23s. After the collapse of Yugoslavia and the start of a series of numerous wars on its territory, the Strela-2 M and Igla MANPADS (and later the French Mistral and American Stinger) became the basis of the Croatian air defense, which at first had neither fighter aircraft nor an air force at all. With the help of these means (as well as anti-aircraft cannon artillery), by November 1991, 41 planes and helicopters were shot down (the Yugoslavs admitted the loss of only 30 flying assets by mid-1992). Oddly enough, Serbian MANPADS, which also countered the nascent Croatian Air Force, had practically no success at first: the first improvised Croatian squadron was formed at the Osijek airfield on the basis of a dozen An-2 agricultural biplanes, whose weak piston engine could not be reliably detected by the Soviet homing head rockets. Thus, unsuccessful launches of eight MANPADS missiles were recorded at one of the Croatian An-2s.
In 1992, the war engulfed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Bosnian Serbs, unlike the Croats, had a fairly respectable air force - several dozen combat aircraft and helicopters. The Croats stated that by mid-1992, with the help of anti-aircraft artillery and various types of MANPADS, five enemy planes and helicopters were shot down, as well as their own MiG-21 by mistake.
Soon, the losses of NATO forces were added to the losses of the warring parties. On September 3, 1992, an unknown person fired an “Strela” that was landing on a cargo plane of the Italian Air Force “Aeritalia” G-222, killing 5 crew members. And that was just the beginning. On April 11, 1994, an Arrow hit the nozzle and damaged the French reconnaissance aircraft Etendard IV (the plane managed to land safely at one of the Italian air bases). A similar incident occurred on April 15, only in this case the Strela damaged the right stabilizer of the Etendard, which managed to reach the deck of its aircraft carrier Clemenceau. On April 16, while trying to strike Serbian tanks in the Karlovac area, a British Sea Harrier attack aircraft was shot down by an Arrow (the pilot managed to eject).
On June 2, 1995, a US Air Force F-16C fighter was shot down by a Soviet-made air defense system in the Banja Luka area. The ejected pilot, Captain S.O. Grady, a pair of CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters arrived to rescue. Fleeing from the Yugoslav "Arrows", they had to shoot thermal traps. On May 2, 1995, a Croatian Air Force MiG-21 was shot down near Stara Gradiska. The loss of the Mi-8 helicopter, destroyed by a Serbian missile on May 28 near the city of Cetingrad, caused great international resonance. Among those killed in this accident were the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Muslim government, three persons accompanying him, as well as three Russian contract workers from the crew.
Many aircraft were shot down by Soviet and Russian-made missiles in 1999 during the air operation of thirteen NATO countries against Yugoslavia, including the most modern Jaguars, F-16s and Mirage 2000s.
By the beginning of Operation Decisive Force, Yugoslav troops had relatively large numbers (850 units) of MANPADS of the Strela-2, Strela-2 M, Strela-3 and Igla-1 types. According to the then President of Yugoslavia Milosevic, during three weeks of air raids, 36 aircraft and 119 cruise missiles were shot down by the combined means of the country's air defense and air forces. The NATO command estimated its losses at 37 air targets, while Soviet systems were unable to save the country from defeat: during the first 14 days of the active phase of the air operation, many basic elements of Yugoslavia’s military infrastructure were suppressed. Nevertheless, based on the available facts, it can be argued that throughout the years of the war in the former Yugoslavia, the Strela-2/2 M and Igla MANPADS proved to be quite effective weapons and accounted for a fairly significant portion of the downed aircraft. There is also no doubt that the cost of even wasted missiles is incomparably small in relation to the losses caused. During Operation Desert Storm, according to some reports, Iraqi air defense forces shot down four Harrier fighter jets of the British Air Force, as well as an A-10 Thunderbolt attack aircraft and a Super Cobra helicopter using missiles from the Strela-2 M complex.
During the first Chechen war, there were cases of the use of Strela-2 M MANPADS in Chechnya by illegal armed groups. At the end of 1999, a Su-24 bomber was shot down by a Strela-2 M missile, one pilot was killed, and the second was captured, but was soon released. After the collapse of the USSR, the latest weapons almost uncontrollably found their way into the hands of various types of armed groups around the world. Quite significant numbers of Strela MANPADS are also used by Palestinian militants in their war with Israel. Thus, among the shipment of smuggled weapons intercepted by the Israeli Navy on May 6, 2001 on the Santorini ship, there were also 4 Strela-2 MANPADS.
According to news agencies, on November 28, 2002, 1.5 minutes after takeoff from the airport in Mombasa (Kenya), an Israeli Boeing 757 aircraft was fired from the ground, heading to Israel (Ben Gurion International Airport, Lod ) with 261 passengers and 10 crew members on board.
At the time of the attack, the plane was at an altitude of approximately 914 m above the ground. An explosion was felt on board, but they mistook it for a collision between the plane and a small bird.
Since all systems were working normally, the flight crew decided to continue the flight to Israel. Soon, the Kenyan police discovered two used Strela-2 M MANPADS 400 m from the fence of the Mombasa airfield. At 12 o'clock the Boeing landed safely at the airport.
Design of the Strela MANPADS
MANPADS "Strela-2" (9K32) consists of a homing anti-aircraft guided missile 9M32, placed in a transport and launch container 9P54 with a power source docked to it, and a launcher 9P53.
MANPADS "Strela-2 M" (9K32M) consists of a 9K32M missile defense system, a 9P58 transport and launch container, a 9V17 power source and a trigger mechanism.
The Strela-3 (9K34) MANPADS includes a 9P59 transport and launch container with a 9P58M launcher and a 9M36 (or 9M36-1) missile defense system, a 9S13 passive direction finder designed for early detection of air targets at ranges of at least 12 km, a ground-based radar interrogator 1RL247 (equipment for identifying “friend or foe” at ranges of 7–8 km and altitudes up to 5 km, identification time is no more than 3 s), radio station R-147 for the squad commander and receiver R-147P for anti-aircraft gunners.
The launch tube is made of fiberglass and is intended for storing the rocket, aiming and launching the rocket. It can withstand up to 5 launches.
The almost one and a half meter long rocket consists of 4 parts: head, steering, combat and propulsion. The head of the missile contains a thermal passive homing head (TPHS), designed to lock onto a target and point the entire missile at it. The rocket flight control equipment is mounted in the steering compartment. The missile warhead has a total mass of 1170 g and contains a high-explosive fragmentation-cumulative explosive projectile with a self-destruct mechanism. The fuse is designed to detonate an explosive projectile weighing 350 g located in the warhead of the rocket. The propulsion system contains ejection and sustainer engines that fire at different times during the missile's flight to the target.
When preparing a rocket, the launch power supply is first turned on. The homing head is powered up, and after 5 seconds the MANPADS is ready for battle. As soon as the target’s thermal radiation enters the seeker’s field of view, a warning sound is heard. And when the head goes into automatic tracking mode, the shooter will see a light signal that can be used to launch.
After the rocket leaves the pipe, it is given a rotational movement at a speed of 15–20 rpm, while the rudders open under the action of springs. This achieves stabilization in flight and increases the flight range of the missile defense system. At a distance of 5–6 m from the shooter, the main engine fires.
The self-destruction time of the missile if the target is not detected is 14–17 s, the preparation time for the missile launch is 10 s.
Development of air defense of troops in the Great Patriotic War
Major General M. TUR
One of the most powerful means of suppressing the enemy in the operations of the Second World War was aviation. Its dominance in the air and the ability to carry out massive strikes were one of the important conditions for the troops to successfully solve problems in both defensive and offensive operations.
The creation of an effective air defense capable of repelling massive enemy air strikes and thereby ensuring freedom of maneuver for one’s troops on the battlefield was, for a number of reasons, an extremely difficult problem in the first half of the war. The study of some issues of this problem is the purpose of this article. It examines the state of air defense of troops at the beginning of the war, the development of air defense systems and its organizational forms during the war[].
***
Anti-aircraft installation guarding a column of Soviet troops
Our pre-war theory of operational art correctly defined the role and importance of air defense of troops in operations. Much attention was paid to the development of air defense systems and its organization in the pre-war period. But for a number of reasons, in the operations of the first period of the war, the air defense of the troops did not meet the requirements for it, which had a very serious impact on the combat operations of formations and units and was one of the serious reasons for our failures in this period.
By the beginning of the war, the ground forces did not have the necessary means of combating enemy aircraft. The rifle division had an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, and each rifle regiment had an anti-aircraft machine gun company. In total, the division had 8-37 mm and 4-76.2 mm anti-aircraft guns, 9 large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns and 24 quad anti-aircraft machine gun installations. The rifle corps had an anti-aircraft artillery division of 12-76.2 mm or 85 mm anti-aircraft guns. Thus, the rifle corps, consisting of three rifle divisions, had 48 anti-aircraft guns, 27 large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns and 72 quad anti-aircraft machine gun installations[].
When defending a corps on a front of 20-25 km, even the standard amount of firepower made it possible to have only two anti-aircraft guns, one heavy machine gun and 3 quad anti-aircraft guns on a 1 km front, which, of course, was very little.
Fighter aviation, like all aviation in general, was organizationally dispersed among the armies, which did not allow it to mass its efforts to cover troops in decisive directions. The fighter aviation was armed with mostly obsolete types of aircraft (I-15, I-16 and others), which were significantly inferior in speed, flight ceiling and armament to the main fighter of the Nazi aviation, the Me-109.
The air surveillance, warning and communication system (VNOS) did not provide a successful solution to the tasks assigned to it. By the beginning of the war, the troops did not have their own standard means of air surveillance, warning and communications. It was believed that the task of monitoring and warning troops about air danger would be successfully carried out by non-staff observers of units and subunits, and in the army and front-line rear, also by non-staff observers of rear facilities and the air surveillance, warning and communications network (VNOS) of the country's air defense. In the event that hostilities were transferred beyond our territory, it was planned to reinforce the fronts and armies with VNOS radio companies. The VNOS system did not have any long-range detection means. Visual observation ensured the detection of enemy aircraft at a distance of only 10-12 km, which the aircraft covered in 1-2 minutes.
Before the Great Patriotic War, our theory was based on the fact that air defense, no matter how strong it may be, cannot completely exclude the flight of small groups and individual enemy aircraft to the intended targets. Therefore, the main goal of military air defense was to provide its troops with freedom of maneuver at all stages of the operation by repelling massive air raids. This task was supposed to be carried out by the joint efforts of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft, covering troops and rear facilities, as well as anti-aircraft machine gun installations, which were given a significant place in the air defense of troops.
The entire front-line area was divided into three air defense zones: military - 30-50 km deep (from the front line to the border of the military rear); the army rear zone and the front rear zone. The military air defense zone, in turn, was divided into corps, divisional and regimental areas.
The military zone was covered mainly by ground-based air defense systems. Fighter aircraft operated only sporadically in this zone. The first line of meeting enemy aircraft with our fighter aircraft was established in the army rear at a depth of 50-60 km from the front line. However, even here, enemy aircraft could meet resistance only from fighter shifts on duty. The massive use of front fighter aircraft against invading enemy air forces was envisaged only at a depth of more than 100 km from the front line, i.e. in the front rear area. Thus, the bulk of the troops operating in the first echelon, in the absence of air cover and the lack of anti-aircraft weapons, turned out to be very poorly protected from attacks by enemy air forces.
Controlling the air defense system was quite complex. The USSR army ground air defense systems were dispersed into units and formations. Fighter aviation was subordinate to the commander of the Air Force. In order to unite the efforts of all means and organize their best interaction, the field command of the front (army) had an air defense department subordinate to the commander of the front forces (commander). However, the head of this department could, to some extent, influence the use of only ground-based air defense systems. In relation to fighter aircraft, he had no rights. All this led to the scattering of the already limited air defense assets that our troops had at the beginning of the war, and did not contribute to the creation of reliable military air defense.
From the above, we can conclude that by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the organization of air defense of troops, as well as air defense systems, did not provide effective combat against enemy air and reliable air cover for troops.
***
During the war, air defense of troops developed depending on the quantitative and qualitative growth of air defense systems, especially anti-aircraft artillery and aviation.
In the first months of the war (June - October 1941), a significant part of the anti-aircraft artillery, which was part of the air defense forces of the country, was included in the fronts due to the general retreat of our troops. This to some extent compensated for the lack of anti-aircraft artillery in the troops, but could not radically improve their air defense. In addition, we were forced to conduct fierce battles with the air enemy in conditions when a significant number of anti-aircraft units were not completely mobilized, and the aviation of the border districts, located at stationary airfields near the border, suffered heavy losses in the very first days of the war and was unable to carry out reliable cover for troops. The air surveillance, warning and communications system was also disrupted. The troops retreated and fought defensive battles in conditions of complete air supremacy of enemy aircraft, which carried out systematic attacks on troop battle formations, loading and unloading areas, military echelons, control posts, airfields, railway junctions, crossings and other objects in groups of 3 to 40 bombers with altitudes 1000-3000 m.
Due to the large losses of aviation and the impossibility of massing it, the air defense of the troops was carried out mainly by anti-aircraft artillery and small arms adapted for firing at air targets. During operations, the air defense troops suffered heavy losses in material. In addition, a significant amount of anti-aircraft artillery weapons were used to equip anti-tank fighter units. The production of anti-aircraft artillery weapons decreased due to the beginning of the evacuation of industrial enterprises. All this led to a large shortage of firepower in air defense units. For example, by the end of the second month of the war, the Southwestern Front had only 232-76.2 mm and 176-37 mm anti-aircraft guns, which amounted to 70 and 40 percent, respectively. the front's standard requirement for this artillery.
After the disbandment of the rifle corps, their anti-aircraft artillery divisions were turned to complement the anti-aircraft divisions of the rifle divisions and air defense divisions of the country. However, this event did not seriously affect the manning of anti-aircraft artillery units, as material losses continued to increase. For example, the staffing level of anti-aircraft artillery units of the same Southwestern Front on September 1, 1941 was about 40 percent with anti-aircraft guns, and approximately 66 percent with anti-aircraft machine guns. regular needs.
Due to the impossibility of replenishing material, the anti-aircraft artillery battalions of the rifle divisions were reorganized in December 1941 into anti-aircraft artillery batteries consisting of 6-37 mm anti-aircraft guns. From that time on, cover for military groups was provided, as a rule, only by individual batteries of small or medium caliber anti-aircraft artillery.
One of the most significant shortcomings of the air defense of troops in the operations of 1941-1942 was the exceptionally weak fighter-aviation cover. The small fighter aviation covered mainly rear facilities, reserves, second echelons, and command posts. There were very few forces left to cover the battle formations of the first echelon troops. Thus, out of 4,451 sorties carried out by the air forces of the Western Front in November 1941, only 325 sorties were carried out to cover the combat formations of the troops, i.e. 7.3 percent, while the enemy front line at the same time made 2,500 sorties. During the seven days of the defensive battle (August 17-23, 1942), the 8th Air Army of the Stalingrad Front carried out 596 sorties (an average of 85 per day) to cover the troops, while enemy aviation made up to 1000-1500 sorties per day. day. Due to the insufficient number of fighter aircraft and the remoteness of our airfields (up to 100 km or more), the air cover of the troops of the first operational echelon was very weak, which, given the air supremacy of enemy aircraft, had an extremely heavy impact on their actions.
In the defensive battle of the Stalingrad Front from July 23 to August 7, fighter aircraft covered the concentration of reserves and the unloading of troops and equipment at railway stations. Coverage was provided from the position of “duty on the ground”, in readiness No. 1, and by periodic air patrols of groups of 4-6 fighters. Fighter aircraft often engaged in air battles with escort fighters, and enemy bombers were able to strike our troops with impunity.
Another equally significant drawback was the incorrect distribution of air defense assets among objects, which led to their excessive dispersion. For example, when organizing the air defense of the troops of the Western Front in May 1942, 59 percent was allocated to cover the troops. anti-aircraft artillery, supply stations - 21 percent, airfields - 12 percent, bridges and crossings - 8 percent. This distribution of air defense assets did not ensure the massive use of anti-aircraft artillery to provide reliable cover for the 1st echelon troops, against which the bulk of enemy bombers usually operated.
The disadvantages also include the weak interaction of ground-based air defense systems with aviation, as a result of which there have been cases of shelling of friendly aircraft or air strikes on friendly troops; unclear operation of the air surveillance, warning and communication system; lack of centralized control of anti-aircraft artillery when repelling enemy air raids; and finally
lack of unified management of all air defense systems.
By the summer of 1942, in order to improve the management of mainly ground-based air defense systems, a number of measures were taken. By order of the People's Commissar of Defense of June 2, 1942, all anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft machine guns and air surveillance, warning and communications equipment were subordinated to the commander of the artillery of the Soviet Army and, accordingly, to the commanders of the artillery of the fronts and armies. By the same order, the leadership of the air defense departments of the armies and fronts was entrusted to the corresponding artillery commanders and the position of deputy commander of the front (army) artillery for air defense was introduced. At the same time, the formation of army air defense regiments began, consisting of 4 batteries of four 37-mm anti-aircraft guns in each and one anti-aircraft machine gun company of heavy machine guns (16 machine guns).
In the most important operations of the second half of 1942, the armies operating on the main direction of the front already had several army anti-aircraft artillery regiments. For example, the 33rd Army of the Western Front in the offensive operation southwest of Gzhatsk in August 1942 had five regiments. With the end of the operation, one regiment was left in the army, and four were transferred to other armies of the front. In the offensive operation in November 1942, the 5th Tank Army of the Southwestern Front had five anti-aircraft artillery regiments, and the 21st Army had four regiments.
Despite a number of measures taken to improve the air defense of troops, the massing of anti-aircraft artillery on the scale of the front and army continued to remain weak. The NKO order of October 22, 1942 indicated that the incorrect distribution of military air defense assets, resulting in their scattered use, does not provide the necessary cover for troops and rear facilities in decisive directions. As a result of this, enemy aviation, acting in large numbers, systematically attacks our troops with almost impunity. The order required the use, in addition to aviation, of anti-aircraft artillery groups, consisting of army anti-aircraft artillery regiments, anti-aircraft batteries and anti-aircraft machine gun companies, to cover the main group. The anti-aircraft artillery group was required to include from half to two-thirds of all military anti-aircraft assets of the front (army). The army anti-aircraft group was to be led by the deputy commander of army artillery for air defense. Thanks to the creation of anti-aircraft artillery groups, the anti-aircraft cover of troops improved somewhat, but only by changing the organization of control of ground-based air defense systems could not solve the entire problem of increasing the effectiveness of air defense. Along with this, it was necessary to sharply increase the number of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft in the troops.
In the fall of 1942, a turning point occurred in the country's military production. Troops began to receive military equipment in increasing quantities. For example, if in 1942 the troops received 3499 - 37 mm and 2761 - 85 mm anti-aircraft guns, then in 1943 there were 5472 and 3713, respectively.
The quantity and quality of ground-based air defenses increased throughout almost the entire war, as can be seen from the following table.
Receipt of anti-aircraft artillery from industry during the war
The expansion of the production of anti-aircraft artillery weapons made it possible to begin in November 1942 the formation of large anti-aircraft artillery formations - anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the reserve of the Supreme High Command. Initially, they were created as part of four small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery regiments (like an army anti-aircraft artillery regiment). In total, the division had 64-37 mm anti-aircraft guns and 64-12.7 mm anti-aircraft bullet guns. The absence of medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery excluded the participation of such divisions in the fight against enemy aircraft at altitudes above 3000 m and was a serious disadvantage. In addition, the divisions did not have their own rear units, which was one of the reasons for frequent interruptions in the supply of ammunition to units.
From the second half of February 1943, a control battery was included in the anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and one of the small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery regiments was replaced by a medium-caliber artillery regiment, which made it possible to fight enemy aircraft at altitudes of more than 3000 meters.
In March 1943, instructions for the combat use of an anti-aircraft artillery division were approved, which stated that the division could cover troops over an area of 63 square meters. km (9 km along the front and 7 km in depth) with a density of 1.5 guns per 1 sq. km or 9 guns per 1 km of front.
In order to ensure greater massing of anti-aircraft artillery in decisive directions, in the first half of 1943, individual anti-aircraft artillery batteries were excluded from the staff of the rifle division and transferred to staff the anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the reserve of the Supreme High Command. At the same time, part of the already created army anti-aircraft artillery regiments and individual anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the reserve of the Supreme High Command are also turning to the formation of anti-aircraft artillery divisions.
Thus, from May 1943, almost all anti-aircraft artillery was included in the reserve of the Supreme High Command and was organizationally included in anti-aircraft divisions, separate divisions of the reserve of the High Command and army anti-aircraft artillery regiments. Anti-aircraft divisions, as a rule, covered the troops; separate divisions of medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery - rear targets; army regiments were used to cover troops and the rear of the army. It became possible to use anti-aircraft artillery en masse in decisive directions.
Due to the significant quantitative growth of anti-aircraft artillery, the effectiveness of air defense of troops has increased. This was also explained by the sharp change in the conditions in which air defense had to be carried out. The Soviet Air Force, including fighter aircraft, grew significantly in quantity and quality, while the air force of the Nazi troops was significantly weakened. The supply of fighter aircraft increased from year to year. In 1942, the aviation industry produced 9,844 fighters, in 1943—14,607, and in 1944—17,872. The balance of forces quickly changed in favor of the Soviet Air Force. In the struggle for air supremacy, which reached its highest tension in the first half of 1943, the Soviet Air Force emerged victorious.
The operations of our troops from the Battle of Kursk until the end of the war took place under the dominance of our aviation, which made it much easier to carry out air defense tasks. Now the troops were often covered by large forces of fighters. In a number of cases, ground-based air defense systems have already been relatively boldly massed in decisive directions of the front.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, our Air Force had a significant numerical superiority over the enemy, especially in fighter and attack aircraft.
At the beginning of the operation, the 16th Air Army of the Central Front included seven fighter aviation divisions, of which three divisions covered the front troops, and the rest covered the actions of bomber and attack aircraft. The 2nd Air Army of the Voronezh Front had five fighter aviation divisions. Covering the troops at the beginning of the operation was carried out by two fighter divisions. Thus, 40-43 percent was intended to cover the troops. all fighter aviation of the Central and Voronezh fronts.
The Central and Voronezh fronts had a large amount of anti-aircraft artillery. The Central Front had five anti-aircraft artillery divisions, ten separate army anti-aircraft artillery regiments and four separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions. The Voronezh Front had four anti-aircraft artillery divisions, eleven separate anti-aircraft artillery regiments and two medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery divisions of the Supreme High Command reserve. To combat low-flying and diving enemy aircraft, small arms were used in significant quantities. Fronts and armies had separate companies of air surveillance, warning and communications.
Ground-based air defense assets in the Central Front zone were massed in the decisive direction. Thus, of the total number of all anti-aircraft artillery of the front, covering the troops of the first echelon, 50 percent were concentrated in the 32 km wide zone of the 13th Army (slightly more than 10 percent of the total width of the front defense zone). anti-aircraft artillery medium and 40 percent. small caliber. This made it possible to create an average density of anti-aircraft artillery in the decisive direction of about 5 guns per 1 km of front. In total, the main group of front troops (48, 13 and 70 armies) included 100 percent. medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery and about 90 percent. small caliber artillery.
Anti-aircraft artillery, allocated to cover the main army groupings, in a number of cases was consolidated into one anti-aircraft artillery group, which was headed by the commander of an anti-aircraft artillery division or the deputy commander of artillery for air defense.
The air surveillance, warning and communications service has also been improved. Non-standard posts were created in the rifle regiments; in the divisions, at the expense of the army air surveillance, warning and communications company, two posts were created, of which one was located at the front line of defense, and the other in the area of the division command post. VNOS army company posts were created at corps headquarters, at airfields, in air ambushes and at army headquarters. At the front, VNOS posts provided warning services in the area of army and front command posts, at airfields and at front-line facilities. Regimental and divisional posts used only military telephone communications to transmit air raid signals. The posts of the army and front-line companies were connected by radio with fighter aviation airfields, and when enemy aircraft appeared, the airfields were alerted first of all.
Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the air defense of the troops was undoubtedly better organized than in previous operations. Despite this, the combat operations of the air defense forces in the first days of the battle were characterized by exceptional tension. The lack of long-range reconnaissance of enemy air continued to significantly reduce the combat capabilities of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft.
The unfolding defensive battles of the Central and Voronezh fronts revealed a number of shortcomings in the organization of air defense of troops, mainly in terms of fighter-aviation cover. Both fronts provided cover for troops by patrolling with large groups of fighters at the same altitude. Due to the lack of reserve fighters on duty at the airfields, the strength of fighter aircraft in the air was weakly built up; control of aviation by radio from the ground and its interaction with ground-based air defense systems were not sufficiently stable. A significant drawback of air defense was poor notification of troops. The widely developed warning system, which included a large number of non-staff and poorly prepared posts that did not have their own means of communication, turned out to be insufficiently stable. With the start of the defensive battle it was broken. However, the main reason for the weakness in alerting troops was the lack of early warning systems for aircraft.
Despite the availability of a large number of means, the air defense of the troops, due to the indicated organizational deficiencies in the first days of the battle, was unable to repel massive enemy air strikes. Our troops suffered serious losses.
In order to increase the effectiveness of air defense, a number of urgent measures were taken already during the defensive battle: almost all fighter aircraft of the fronts were brought in to cover the troops; combat formations of fighters began to be echeloned in height; the control points of the commanders of fighter aviation divisions were close to the front line and there were guidance radio stations at them; An anti-aircraft artillery maneuver was carried out, as a result of which its density in the directions of the main enemy attacks was increased to 9-12 guns per 1 km of front. The organization of interaction between ground and air defense systems has also improved. Anti-aircraft artillery began to fire at enemy aircraft before our fighters attacked them, and ceased fire when the latter entered the attack course.
In conditions of increasing air defense resistance, enemy aviation suffered heavy losses; its activity began to decline sharply from the second day of the offensive and by the end of the battle it was limited to the flights of only individual aircraft. Air supremacy was won by our aviation in the Oryol-Kursk direction by the end of the third, and in the Belgorod-Kursk direction by the end of the sixth day of the defensive battle. The losses of enemy aircraft in both directions during the defensive battle amounted to over 1,700 aircraft, of which about 1,400 (more than 80 percent) were shot down by our fighter aircraft.
The most important factors that influenced the improvement of the air defense of our troops in the offensive operations of 1943 were: a further increase in the quantity and quality of air defense systems, the conquest and maintenance of air supremacy by our aviation, as well as the growth in the skill of the command staff.
The most important feature of air defense in the operations of 1944 and 1945 was the increase in the effectiveness of warning and fighter air cover. From the second half of 1943, aviation and anti-aircraft artillery of the fronts began to be equipped with radar stations, with the help of which it was possible to detect enemy aircraft at a distance of up to 80-120 km, which made it possible to significantly expand the range of action of our aviation and meet aircraft at distant approaches to the front line of our troops . For example, in the Berlin operation of the 1st Belorussian Front, three zones of operation of our fighter cover aircraft were organized: fighter-hunters; fighter patrols on the approaches to the battlefield; fighter patrols directly above the combat formations of the advancing troops. Groups of hunter aircraft patrolled over German airfields, fought against taking off enemy aircraft, with reconnaissance, searched for and destroyed small groups of aircraft in the air and reported the approach of large groups of enemy aircraft. The zone of fighter patrols on the approaches to the battlefield extended to a depth of 15 km from the front line, between the front line and the free hunting zone.
Along with the increase in the effectiveness of fighter aircraft, the anti-aircraft cover of troops also noticeably improved. Skillful maneuvering and redistribution of anti-aircraft artillery, decisive massing of assets in the most important directions formed the basis for the combat use of anti-aircraft artillery in offensive operations of 1944-1945.
The armies accumulated experience in providing anti-aircraft cover for mobile troops with powerful anti-aircraft artillery groups. For example, in the Iasi-Kishinev operation, the 6th Tank Army had an anti-aircraft artillery group consisting of an anti-aircraft artillery division and three separate anti-aircraft artillery regiments. .
85-mm anti-aircraft gun, model 1939, against the backdrop of St. Isaac's Cathedral in besieged Leningrad
However, along with the general improvement of the situation in the air, the air defense of the troops still had a number of shortcomings. During offensive operations, there were frequent cases of significant lag of anti-aircraft artillery and airfields behind the troops. As a result, the front troops carried out the final stage of most operations with weakened anti-aircraft and fighter-aviation cover. Enemy aircraft were able to strike our troops in large groups, delay their advance, and thereby assist their troops in stabilizing the front. This was the case at the final stage of the Belarusian operation, when enemy aircraft launched massive attacks on the troops of the 1st Baltic Front in the area of Jelgava, Siauliai, on the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts at the turn of the Neman River and on the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front on the Vistula River. On July 29, enemy aircraft in groups of 4 to 30 aircraft attacked the 69th Army in the Pulawy area and the 2nd Tank Army of the 1st Belorussian Front east of Warsaw, carrying out about 300 sorties. Our 6th Air Army, which supported the offensive of the left wing of the front, was able to make only 95 sorties that day. On August 1, enemy aviation in groups of 6-8 and up to 40 aircraft repeatedly bombed the Vistula crossing areas in the zone of the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, making about 340 sorties, while the 6th Air Army was only able to do 98 sorties. In the last days of July 1944, enemy aircraft, for the reason stated above, attacked with impunity the battle formations of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps and the 51st Army of the 1st Baltic Front in the Siauliai region. During the Budapest operation, enemy aircraft on some days attacked the troops of the 6th Guards Tank Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in groups of 4 to 30 aircraft.
In the vast majority of operations of the Great Patriotic War, the air defense of troops was strengthened at the expense of the forces and means of air defense of the country's territory. This measure played a particularly important role in the operations near Leningrad, Moscow, in the Battle of the Volga and in the Berlin operation. Carrying out extremely important tasks of covering large objects outside the front line and objects of strategic importance in the front line, the air defense forces of the country at the same time very often also provided cover for front rear facilities, and in some cases, front reserves. For example, in the Berlin operation, 1203 anti-aircraft guns of the Western Air Defense Front were used to defend rear facilities and crossings of the 1st Belorussian Front.
This is, in brief, the development of air defense of troops in the operations of the Great Patriotic War.
***
The experience of air defense of troops acquired during the Great Patriotic War largely retains its significance in modern conditions. The massing of air defense forces and means in decisive directions, the maneuver of these forces during the operation, the clear interaction of all air defense systems and their centralized control - all this still underlies the organization of air defense.
At the same time, the further development of air attack means poses increasingly complex tasks for air defense and requires further improvement of air defense means and methods of their use. An in-depth study and generalization of the experience of air defense of troops in the Great Patriotic War will help to more correctly determine the ways for the further development of forms and methods of air defense in modern conditions.
Military history magazine No. 1/1962
NOTES
- When developing the article, the author used some provisions and digital material from the manuscript of the late Major General A.M. Shumikhin on the development of the organization of anti-aircraft artillery during the Great Patriotic War. - M.T. []
- The indicated number of anti-aircraft guns and machine guns was provided for by state, but in fact there were significantly fewer of them due to the lack of materiel in the anti-aircraft units. []
Design of MANPADS "Igla"
MANPADS "Igla" (9K38) consists of a 9M39 anti-aircraft guided missile, a 9P39 transport and launch container, a 9P516 launcher with a built-in 1L14 ground-based radar interrogator. A mobile control point is used for control.
The Igla-1 complex includes a 9M313 missile, a 9P322 launch tube, a 9P519 launcher with a 1L14 ground-based radar interrogator, a 1L15-1 portable electronic tablet and a mobile control point.
The 1L14 interrogator provides target identification and automatic blocking of a missile launch against its aircraft.
In addition to the traditional equipment for identifying the nationality of a target for MANPADS, the Igla electronics contains non-traditional components. These include the 1L15-1 portable tablet, which is a development of the Research Institute of Moscow Region. This electronic equipment interacts with stationary target detection points that are part of the air defense system of the Russian Federation. On the tablet screen, the operator-gunner can observe all flying targets detected in a 25-25 km square, which significantly increases the combat effectiveness of the rifle crew. Field tests of the Igla-1 MANPADS indicate that the probability of detecting a target within the tablet’s operating area is about 95% (tests were carried out with the number of targets up to 50).
The squad commander, having discovered the display of the target on the tablet, uses the R-147 radio station or directly transmits the data to the shooters equipped with R-147 P radio receivers. The dimensions of the tablet are 345 × 240 × 170 mm, weight is about 7 kg, the transfer time from the traveling position to the combat position - about 3 min.
The feat of the scouts
When it became clear that there was no way for V-1 cruise missiles to get through the air defense barriers to Leningrad, Berlin attempted to fire at the city with ballistic V-2s with a launch range of up to a thousand kilometers. On February 26, 1944, aviation from the Leningrad Front struck an enemy airfield near the Estonian city of Rakvere and disabled the airfield.
But no one suspected the V-2 launch site near the airfield until six months later, in the same area, when a reconnaissance group from the reconnaissance department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, led by Petty Officer 2nd Article Vladimir Fedorov, landed by parachute.
During operations behind enemy lines, intelligence officers transmitted 120 radiograms with valuable data to the Center, including a message about the construction of a launch pad in the Rakvere-Vergi area, from where the Nazis were going to fire V-2 ballistic missiles at Leningrad. One day, at dawn, two air regiments of Soviet bombers, whose crews had experience in bombing Berlin, carried out a raid on the identified object, after which all attempts to use the V-1 and V-2 on the eastern front ended.
And soon, under the bombs of allied aviation, the special center on the island of Usedom, where the Third Reich’s missile program originated, ceased to exist. And the creator of the V-family rockets, Wernher von Braun, moved to new employers overseas.
