Tank industry of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War

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Vadim Petrov 05/18/2019 11172

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Soviet tanks made a major contribution to our victory in the Great Patriotic War. And victory was forged at just 6 main factories. Below you will find an overview of these companies.

In the USSR, tanks were produced at the following factories:

• Plant No. 183;
• Nizhny Tagil Carriage Works;
• Kirovsky Zavod (Chelyabinsk Kirovsky Zavod);
• ;
• Ural Heavy Engineering Plant;
• Plant No. 174. Stalingrad Tractor Plant.

The most popular Soviet tanks of World War II T-70, T-34-76 and T-34-85

Plant No. 183

The largest manufacturer of tanks during the war was plant No. 183 located in Nizhny Tagil. This plant, in terms of its production capacity, occupied third place in the People's Commissariat, second only to such giants as the Kirov Plant and the famous UZTM (Ural Heavy Engineering Plant). The most important statistical information about this plant is given in the table. The plant was created as a result of the merger of the Ural Carriage Works and Plant No. 183, evacuated from Kharkov in October-November 1941. The plant produced its first products in December 1941, and in March exceeded the pre-war level.

The director of the plant, with the exception of a short period at the beginning of 1942, was Yu. E. Maksarev, an experienced tank builder and talented production organizer. He was born on July 28, 1902 in Port Arthur in the family of an officer. He studied in the cadet corps in 1912–1917. In 1920–1921 served in the Red Army. Member of the CPSU(b) since 1921. In 1921-24 he studied at the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute, in 1924-30 - at the Leningrad Technological Institute. Since 1929 he worked for. Starting as a foreman, he reaches the head of a tank workshop. In 1938, Maksarev was appointed director of the Kharkov Locomotive Plant No. 183. At the beginning of 1942, Maksarev was removed from the post of director for too slow restoration of production, and he worked for some time as chief engineer, but soon returned to his previous position. Maksarev actively introduced new production technologies at the plant, such as automatic welding and the use of automatic machines; on his initiative, the assembly of the T-34 was put on the assembly line. For his services, Maksarev was awarded the star of the Hero of Socialist Labor, seven Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, the Order of Suvorov of the first degree, the Order of Kutuzov of the second degree, and two Orders of the Red Banner of Labor.

Table. Number of employees, production capacity and production volume of the most important products of plant No. 183

Like many other NKTP plants, plant No. 183 had its own metallurgical production, melted steel, and produced steel and iron castings. In 1941, the plant produced 1.8% of the all-Union steel production, and in 1944 - even 2.4%. The foundry production of plant No. 183 had the highest volumes among all enterprises of the People's Commissariat. Thanks to its developed foundry and stamping industries, the plant made extensive use of high-performance technologies and was a pioneer in reducing the labor and material intensity of the tank. The labor intensity of the T-34 tank at plant No. 183 throughout the war was the lowest among NKTP enterprises. The plant was considered the most advanced tank building enterprise in terms of the efficiency of production organization. The plant's design bureau, led by chief designer A. A. Morozov, was the main center for improving the design and modernization of the T-34 tank. Most of the innovations in this area were developed and tested at plant No. 183.

Automatic welding of the roof of the T-34–85 tank turret to its cast armor base using Paton automatic welding machines. Plant No. 183, Nizhny Tagil.

Plant No. 183 was a plant that connected many different industries. In addition to the actual assembly of the tank, the plant produced most of its parts, armored hulls and cast turrets. In addition, the plant produced spare parts (in 1944, the plant produced spare parts for tanks worth 78.5 million rubles). The plant produced Il-2 armored hulls, armored parts for other aircraft, casings for aerial bombs, parts for rockets, and even… limbers for a 122 mm howitzer and a 76 mm regimental gun. Plant No. 183 was the most independent of external supplies in the entire NKTP system. He received V-2 diesel engines and electrical equipment from other NKTP plants. From the factories of the People's Commissariat of Armaments - tank armament, from the factories of the People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy - rolled products, including armor plates. The main suppliers of the plant were Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical plants. Another important part, on the supply of which tank production has always greatly depended, were bearings. Before the war, they were supplied by the 1st and 2nd gas processing plants in Moscow, which were then evacuated to Kuibyshev, Saratov and Tomsk.

The plant retained its leading role in tank building after the war. Thanks to its size, it was even included in the Guinness Book of Records as the largest military plant in the world.

Tank industry of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War

Introduction

The Great Patriotic War led to serious socio-economic changes in the country. During the war, the movement of production capacities and human resources of Western industrial centers to the east of the country led to the emergence of new military industry enterprises in the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia, i.e. in regions that were previously assigned only a secondary role in the production of weapons. Over the past period, many questions regarding the development of Soviet tank building during the war period have remained unsolved.

The main reasons for the lack of study of the development of tank production in the Soviet years were the closeness of archival documentation to free access and ideological dogmas that forced researchers to follow strictly within the existing ideological course. The actual ban on free scientific analysis and the mythologization of historical memory created a situation in the USSR where generalization and study of negative experience turned out to be impossible. This, in turn, led to the emergence of an illusion of the success of “Stalinist” industrialization and an overestimation of its significance for the outcome of the war. At the same time, it cannot be argued that the industrial development of the Soviet Union in the 1930s and the war period had exclusively negative results. The author of this study in no way seeks to identify and show only the negative side of Soviet tank building.

Currently, it is possible, based on a wide range of documents (contained in both federal and regional archives), to assess the development of the USSR tank industry in wartime conditions at a higher level.

During the war years, tank building changed qualitatively, when small-scale production was replaced by large-scale production of tanks and self-propelled guns. The center of these transformations was the Urals, which received the bulk of the evacuated equipment from Western tank factories and became the main center of armor production during the war. Consequently, the processes that took place at the Ural factories were of decisive importance for the entire Soviet tank building.

The main chronological framework of the study is 1939–1945. The lower limit is set by the time of adoption of new models of Soviet tanks, which became the basis of the armored forces of the Red Army in war conditions. The upper limit is the end of the Great Patriotic War. But the author deliberately expands the lower limit of the work until the end of the 1920s. In many ways, this turned out to be a necessary measure. An analysis of documents (mostly published) and literature (primarily popular science) showed that many features and problematic aspects of the development of Soviet wartime tank building arose and took shape in the pre-war period.

The study reveals in detail the results of the development of the tank industry by mid-1942, and also substantiates the crisis situation in the industry in the second half of the year, when regular disruption of the production program forced tank builders to look for ways out of the current situation. The increase in production of armored products came at the expense of its quality. Disclosure of the causes and consequences of this unprecedented phenomenon has not received adequate coverage in the literature.

The refusal of the country's leadership to reduce the inflated program for tank industry factories in the face of an increasing shortage of production resources forced tank builders to follow the path of production modernization, relying mainly on their own capabilities. The emphasis was placed on automatic electric welding and casting of armor parts, the conveyor-flow method and other methods of intensification. As a result, by the end of 1943, the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Tank Industry (NKTP) were not only able to reach the level of uninterrupted production of planned products, but also partially coped with the problem of transition to serial production of new types of armored vehicles (tanks and self-propelled guns of the IS series, tank modernization T-34 and self-propelled guns based on it).

In our study, the history of light tank building after mid-1942, when two of the three NKTP factories ceased to exist, was left outside the scope of study. As a result of the enemy's attack on the Volga in the summer of 1942, Stalingrad plant No. 264, which produced light tanks and armored hulls for the T-34, was evacuated. At the same time, Sverdlovsk Plant No. 37 became part of the Ural Heavy Engineering Plant. The third plant - No. 38 in Kirov - was transferred to Kharkov in July 1944 to develop the production of the new T-44 medium tank. However, the production of light tanks and self-propelled guns continued to exist at two factories of the People's Commissariat of Medium Engineering: Gorky Automobile (GAZ) and Plant No. 40. The latter enterprise was created in 1943 within the framework of the NKTP, but was quickly transferred to the NKSM

The division of management of light tank factories between two people's commissariats (Tankoprom and Sredmash) during the Great Patriotic War creates certain difficulties for research. To compile a complete picture of the history of the development of production processes in this sector of tank building, it is necessary to study documents, including those of the People's Commissariat of Medium Engineering.

Literature about the work of industrial enterprises began to emerge “hot on the heels” of events. These were mainly small articles and brochures, the authors of which were party and Soviet leaders, specialists and managers, publicists and writers[1]. Major works by historians appeared already in the post-war years; they were devoted to the work of the rear in 1941–1945.[2] However, the closeness of documentary sources and the strong downplaying of the difficulties of the war years did not allow the authors to conduct a deep analysis of the work of industrial enterprises in these studies. General information

on industrial production and the release of military products are given in the book of the Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR N.A. Voznesensky. He was the first to propose a concept about the origins of the economic victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany. In his opinion, it consisted in the advantages of socialism, in state ownership of the means of production and in the planned management of the national economy[3].

The historiography of the industrial development of the Urals during the Great Patriotic War is of great importance for studying the entire tank industry of the country, since it was in this region that the main enterprises of the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry of the USSR were located. One of the first to analyze the development of the Ural industry during the war was the economist K.I. Klimenko[4].

A qualitative shift in the development of issues of historiography of the Great Patriotic War has been evident since the mid-50s. XX century. Part of the archival funds, both central and local, became available to researchers, which made it possible to create a certain documentary base for the preparation of historical works.

The six-volume “History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–1945”[5] had a decisive influence on the topic of research. A significant place in it is devoted to the development of industry in the USSR, and for the first time it talks about tank building. The main postulates of this work formed the basis for the logic of presentation and value judgments of Soviet historians (and even some modern ones) for the following decades[6]. The admission of researchers to archives and the publication of wartime directive documents created opportunities for an expanded study of the history of the war at the all-Union and regional levels.

An important direction of Soviet historical science was the coverage of the history of the working class during the war, its labor feat. A particularly large contribution to the development of the topic was made by the works of A.V. Mitrofanova, G.G. Morekhina, S.L. Sinyavsky, B.B. Telpukhovsky[7]. A generalizing work on the history of the working class of the USSR in the pre- and post-war periods was published in 1984[8].

A large place is given to the tank industry in special studies by economists, of which the works of G.S. stand out. Kravchenko, Ya.E. Chadaeva, G.I. Shigalina. The work of G. S. Kravchenko contains generalized material on the development of the USSR economy in the pre-war and war years. The author points to an increase in the share of military products in industrial production and highlights the share of the Urals in the tank industry[9]. In regional historiography, a tendency has emerged towards comprehensive analysis and overcoming sectoral and local narrowness. In this regard, we especially note the monograph by A.V. Vasiliev [10].

The first studies on the history of the tank industry began to appear only in the 1980s. In 1982, a joint work by A.A. Antufiev and U.A. Batyrov[11], and in 1982 the latter’s dissertation was defended[12]. It gave primary attention to the work of party organizations to mobilize teams of tank enterprises to combat constantly emerging problems, to organize socialist competition, and labor initiatives. The author had the opportunity to familiarize himself with some documents from the party archives. However, the limitations of the Source base did not allow him to sufficiently reveal the problems of organizing tank production in the Urals.

The study of the history of the Ural industry and the working class has become traditional for regional historiography. In the monograph by A.A. Antufiev presents a comprehensive analysis of industrial enterprises in the Urals that were of national importance. The consideration of tank production in this study does not differ in the depth of analysis. Only a general picture of tank production during the war years is given, without identifying the development features and, what is very important, without the problems of the Ural tank enterprises[13].

In the 1990s, the process of opening previously classified documents to a wide range of researchers began, which served as the beginning of the publication of many popular scientific works devoted to the creation and use of Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns on the battlefield[14]. Their authors, as a rule, do not use direct links to materials, which does not allow their data to be considered completely representative. At the same time, these works examine in detail the history of the creation of experimental and serial models of domestic armored vehicles and are rich in factual data. The authors carefully and scrupulously reproduce the history of the creation of Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns. But the production process, working and living conditions for them, as a rule, are of secondary importance.

In recent years, the process of scientific research in the field of the history of the military industry has intensified. The authors, based on newly published data, try to reconstruct the development process of the Soviet military industry of the pre-war and war periods[15]. Significant factual material is contained in a descriptive work on the history of the Ural Heavy Engineering Plant[16]. M.N. is involved in the study of evacuation processes. Potemkin[17]. Works appear that directly relate to the history of the tank industry.

In 2013 A.Yu. Ermolov published the monograph “Public Management of the Military Industry in the 1940s: Tank Industry,” which describes in sufficient detail the work of the Soviet tank industry during the Great Patriotic War[18]. The author examined various aspects of its activities: the organization of evacuation, the struggle to increase labor productivity, the organization of mass production of military equipment, the struggle for quality, the development of new weapons, the functioning of industry management bodies, the daily life of tank building workers.

Vas devoted his research to the history of Ural tank building in the 1940s. V. Zaparii. In 2015, his monograph “Tank Industry in the Urals in the 1940s” was published [19], in which the researcher studied production processes and the social sphere of the tank industry. You. V. Zapariy claims that the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry initially functioned in conditions of an extremely undeveloped social sector. But by 1943, the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Tank Industry began to pay more attention to the household sector[20]. The publications of A.V. Speransky and S.M. Tyushnyakov reveal the history of the Ural artillery production in the 1930-1940s[21].

Much work has been done by researcher S.V. Ustyantsev. He acted as a co-author in a number of monographs devoted to the history of individual enterprises and types of armored vehicles[22]. It is necessary to note his author’s study “Essays on the history of domestic industrial culture of the 20th century.” The second part of this work is entirely devoted to the history of the Ural Carriage Works during the Great Patriotic War. It was this enterprise, called the Ural Tank Plant, that became the main manufacturer of the T-34 medium tank[23].

The source base of our research was made up of unpublished archival documents extracted from the central Russian State Archive of Economics (RGEA), the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), four regional archives of the Urals: State Archive of the Sverdlovsk Region (GASO), United State Archive of the Chelyabinsk Region (OGACHO) , Nizhny Tagil City Historical Archive (NTGIA), Documentation Center for Public Organizations of the Sverdlovsk Region (CDOOSO). The funds of these archives contain extensive documentary material reflecting a wide range of problems in tank production. Some of the information on the industrial development of the Ural region was taken from the State Archive in Irbit.

The orders of the People's Commissars of the Tank Industry V.A. became a valuable source of information. Malysheva and I.M. Zaltsman. These documents are contained both in the central archive (RGAE. F. 8752) and in local archives (GASO. F. R-262, R-1930; OGACHO. F. R-792, R-1396, R-1444; NTGIA F. 417). They characterize the management system of the tank industry and the relationship between the center and enterprises. These documents give an idea of ​​the process of restructuring production at tank factories, the main production difficulties, etc.

The study widely uses documents from regional, city and district committees of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk regions (OGACHO. F. P-288; TsDOOSO. F. 4, 10, 161, 1270). Here (along with documents on the activities of party organizers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, primary party organizations of tank enterprises) contains information about the internal problems of workshops and enterprises as a whole, about the features of production processes, employee relations, labor organization and personnel training.

A variety of factual material is contained in the collections of museums of machine-building plants that produced tank products during the war: Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), Ural Turbine Plant, Ural Heavy Engineering Plant (UZTM), Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (ChTZ). There are collections of documents, memories of enterprise workers, photographs and much more. A number of factory museums have handwritten books about tank building during the war. Their origin is as follows. On May 25, 1945, the People's Commissar of the Tank Industry of the USSR V. A. Malyshev issued order No. 254c on the creation of a book dedicated to tank building in the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War. According to this order, at all tank, hull and engine factories (the list of enterprises also included NII-48), editorial boards were created consisting of directors, chief designers, chief engineers and other responsible employees, under whose leadership a book should be made detailing the features of production of this enterprise during the war period[24].

The existing manuscripts discuss in sufficient detail the production and technological processes for the manufacture of the main products of this enterprise, show cooperation relations with other factories, design ideas, reveal the difficulties and problems overcome during the development of the production of new products and many other points. Due to the fact that the chief editor of the book was always the director of the enterprise, and the materials were prepared by his subordinates, they could not objectively reflect all the processes, including negative ones, that existed at the plant.

In this sense, the history of the development of production processes at UZTM is largely supplemented by two manuscripts (one-volume and extended versions), which were prepared by representatives of the military acceptance department of the Self-Propelled Artillery Units Directorate at the plant (the manuscripts are stored in the Uralmash Museum)[25]. Unfortunately, such work could only be found for one enterprise.

Of great importance for describing the process of formation of the tank-building complex of the USSR during the first Soviet five-year plans are collections of documents from the series “History of the creation and development of the military-industrial complex of Russia and the USSR. 1900–1963.”[26]. Thanks to these works, it was possible to reconstruct the main events of the late 1920s and 1930s, when industry began to develop its own tank building program. Collection of documents “Politburo and “saboteurs””, prepared by O.B. Mozokhin, made it possible to trace the connection between the authorities’ attempts to establish control over the developing tank industry and mass repressions against designers and engineers of the entire military industry[27].

Valuable information about the specific technical characteristics and performance qualities of Soviet armored vehicles was obtained from employees of the vehicle repair shop of the Ural Mining and Metallurgical Company (UMMC, Verkhnyaya Pyshma). The author talked with senior mechanic A.V. Viktorov and vehicle repair mechanic N.P. Kobylin, servicing the vehicles of the UMMC Museum of Military Equipment. The museum regularly organizes a festive procession of armored vehicles and vehicles from the Great Patriotic War on May 9 in honor of Victory Day[28].

Thus, the available documents (both published and unpublished) make it possible to reveal the main features of the development of the USSR tank industry on the eve of and during the Great Patriotic War.

The book represents an expanded and expanded version of a previously published monograph[29].

Kirov plant

The Kirov plant ranked first in the People's Commissariat in terms of the number of employees and the number of machines. The plant also had a significant fleet of forging and pressing equipment. Basic statistical data about the plant are given in the table.

The Kirov Plant in Chelyabinsk was created on the basis of the evacuated part of the Leningrad Kirov Plant and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant. In addition to equipment from the Leningrad Kirov plant, a significant part of plant No. 75 from Kharkov, and plant No. 7 (grinding machines) also came to Chelyabinsk. This is how the famous “Tankograd” appeared. Judging by the fact that it was in Chelyabinsk that the bodies of the Central Administration of the People's Commissariat were initially created, it was on Tankograd that the leadership of the NKTP placed its main hopes.

The director of the Kirov plant, I.M. Zaltsman, enjoyed great influence and fame. From July 1942 to June 1943, he was the People's Commissar of the tank industry, and the plant was led first by S. N. Makhonin, then by A. A. Goreglyad, and finally by M. E. Dlugach. In the summer of 1943, I.M. Zaltsman again became director of the plant. One can make many claims against Zaltsman, as a person and a leader, but one thing could not be taken away from him - he was excellent at organizing production.

Table. Number of employees, production capacity and production volume of the most important products of the Kirov plant in Chelyabinsk

Initially, it was assumed that the Kirov Plant would produce only heavy KV tanks. But in 1942, it turned out that the army needed the T-34 more, and the KV, in terms of its characteristics, did not fully meet its requirements. Therefore, the plant began producing medium tanks in parallel with the KV. The fragmentation of the plant's efforts into the simultaneous production of two types of tanks had a negative impact on the efficiency of using equipment and labor. It was necessary not to reduce the production of heavy tanks, but, since the previous option no longer satisfied the military, to create a new one and increase its production. This is what they ultimately did in 1943, creating the heavy IS tank. But maintaining the production of the T-34 until the second quarter of 1944 had a negative impact on the supply of the heavy tanks it needed to the army. At the same time, in 1943, the plant began production of heavy self-propelled guns SU-152, armed with a 152-mm gun capable of penetrating the armor of any German tank and destroying any bunker or bunker. Later, instead of these self-propelled guns, ISU-152 and ISU-122 based on the IS tank began to be produced.

The Kirov Plant, sometimes called the “Heavy Tank Combine,” combined a variety of production within its walls. It assembled tanks, produced a wide range of parts for them, with almost no need for cooperative supplies, and also produced tank diesel engines, occupying first place in the NKTP in terms of the volume of this important product. The plant's share in the diesel production of the People's Commissariat reached two thirds. Diesels from the Kirov plant were installed not only on tanks of its own production, but also on tanks from other plants. All produced diesel engines were various modifications of the V-2 diesel engine. The Kirov Plant also produced spare parts for tanks (worth 545 thousand rubles in 1944), castings for 76 mm shells and 120 mm mines, and parts for rockets. The plant did not produce hulls for heavy tanks, the production of which was carried out by plant No. 200.

Assembly shop of KV-1 tanks at the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant. It is clearly visible that all the hulls are of a “simplified” type with a straight stern plate, and the turrets are both welded and cast. Spring 1942

Pilot production at the plant was organized in workshop OP-2. In 1942, this workshop was separated from the plant and turned into plant No. 100, which also included the former experimental tractor plant and the plant named after. Molotov. The new enterprise was headed by J. Ya. Kotin. The production base of Plant No. 100 made it possible to produce almost any tank parts.

Ready for World War III: production of armored vehicles of the USSR and NATO in 1945-1959

Home » Real story » Mysteries of the history of the distant past » In readiness for the Third World War: production of armored vehicles of the USSR and NATO in 1945-1959

Mysteries of the history of the distant pastControversial history

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A small analytical material for the 23rd.

All three major victorious powers ended World War II with at least one fully modern medium tank in service and in production:

— T-44 for the USSR, produced from 1944 to 1947 in the amount of 1823 units

— M26 “Pershing” for the USA, produced in 1945 in the amount of 1436 units

- A41 "Centurion" for Great Britain, produced since 1945. About 800 vehicles of the Mk-1, Mk-2 and Mk-3 models were ready by 1947.

Of these vehicles, only the American M26 “Pershing” took part in the hostilities of World War II (very limited), which managed to fight a little in Europe at the final stage of the conflict.

In addition to these modern vehicles, all countries also had a huge fleet of military-made tanks, no longer quite modern, but still reliable: T-34-85, T-34-76, M4 Sherman, Comet. These tanks, although inferior to “modern type” vehicles, were in service in huge quantities - which is why, in the first post-war years, tank building in the USSR and the USA was significantly limited.

The only exception was Great Britain: its most modern wartime tank, the Comet, was produced in insufficient quantities. Only about 1,500 of these vehicles were in service; the rest of the British tanks were already outdated, both technically and morally. Therefore, back in 1945, Britain began mass production of the new A41 "Centurion" to rearm its tank forces.

Production of medium tanks in 1945-1959

For a more convenient consideration of the conflict, I divided the time period 1945-1959 into several periods:

1947-1951

— The US military industry “awake” from hibernation only in 1949, when the first new post-war tank, the M46 “Patton,” entered service. During 1949-1951, the United States produced 1,168 such machines.

— The USSR in 1947 replaced the previous T-44 with a new modern medium tank T-54. During the period 1947 to 1951, 3340 T-54 tanks of the basic modification were manufactured in the USSR.

— Great Britain produced about 500 Centurion Mk-3 tanks between 1947 and 1951.

1951-1953

— In 1951, a new American modern medium tank, the M47 Patton II, entered production. In a short period of 1951-1953, almost 8676 cars rolled off the assembly line.

- During the period 1951-1953, the USSR produced only 3854 T-54 tanks of the basic modification, i.e. almost 52% less than in the USA

— Great Britain produced about 1000 Centurion Mk-3 tanks between 1951 and 1953

1953-1959

— In 1953, the previous models were replaced by the new American modern medium tank M48 “Patton III”. Production of this new vehicle began back in 1952, and by 1959 the production totaled 11,703 tanks.

— In the USSR, the production of modern medium tanks in 1953-1959 amounted to 9581 vehicles of the T-54, T-54A and T-54B modifications and 2412 T-55 tanks. Those. in total - 11993 tanks.

— In Great Britain, by 1959, about 1,200 Centurion Mk-3 tanks and 221 Centurion Mk-5 tanks were manufactured. The total production of British Centurions from 1946 to 1959 was (not counting the decommissioned Mk-1 and Mk-2 vehicles) 2833 Mk-3 tanks and 221 Mk-5 tanks.

Thus, it is easy to see that during the period 1947-1959, the USA and Great Britain together produced 24,601 modern medium tanks. The production of modern medium tanks T-54 and T-55 in the USSR during the same time amounted to 19,187 tanks, i.e. was inferior to NATO's total production by almost 32%. This already clearly indicates that statements about the “hypertrophied” production of tanks in the USSR in 1945-1959 do not correspond to reality .

Production of light tanks in 1945-1959

The United States had the largest fleet of modern light tanks after the end of World War II. In 1944-1945, the US industry introduced the M24 Chaffee light tank. Production of the car continued until 1945, and a total of 4,731 cars were produced. By the standards of the time, the tank fully corresponded to the idea of ​​a reconnaissance and patrol combat vehicle.

In 1951-1959, the United States also received 3,729 modern M41 Walker Bulldog light tanks, which had a relatively high combat potential.

The USSR built 2,006 PT-76 amphibious light tanks in 1951-1959. During this period, the USSR no longer produced light tanks in the classical sense and did not have modern light tanks of military construction.

France built about 1,000 AMX-13 light tanks in the 1950s, armed with a 90mm cannon and capable of at least limited resistance to medium and heavy combat vehicles.

Thus, the total production of modern NATO light tanks was approximately twice the production of their analogues in the USSR.

Production of heavy tanks in 1951-1959

After the end of World War II, the USSR had the largest fleet of heavy tanks. There were approximately 2,000 military-built IS-2 heavy tanks and 2,311 IS-3 heavy tanks built in 1945-1946. This tank fleet at that time was the most powerful in the world, since neither the USA nor Great Britain had modern heavy tanks in the full sense of the word.

Since the IS-2 heavy tanks were becoming obsolete, and the IS-3 suffered from a number of technical defects, the USSR made great efforts to replace the fleet. In 1947-1949, production of a new heavy tank, the IS-4, began. About 219 cars were produced, but due to a number of significant shortcomings of the new car, it was never put into mass production.

The main heavy tank was the T-10 (formerly IS-8), launched into production in 1954. Modern data allows us to assert that the previously existing absurd rumors about the release of supposedly 8,000 heavy tanks are not true, and the actual production of the T-10 was much more reasonable, amounting to about 1,500 units.

https://www.k2x2.info/transport_i_aviacija/tjazhyolyi_tank_t_10/p7.php

The figure of 8,000 cars is probably an example of extremely successful disinformation.

In 1953-1954, the United States produced about 300 M103 heavy tanks, powerful but suffering from many shortcomings. Ultimately, these heavy tanks were not even accepted by the US Army, and were transferred to the Marine Corps.

In 1955, Great Britain produced 185 heavy Conqueror tanks, which entered service with the Rhine Army.

It should immediately be noted that the production of heavy tanks in the USSR seems significant only against the background of the almost complete absence of such production in the USA and Great Britain. In fact, it was not the USSR that produced many heavy tanks, but NATO countries that produced few. The USA and Great Britain were practically not interested in heavy tanks, since in their arsenal they had a much more effective means of breaking through any fortified line of defense - the M65 atomic cannons and the MGR-1 “Honest John” atomic missiles.

Production of armored personnel carriers in 1945-1959

The role of armored personnel carriers on the battlefield was well understood by the Soviet command, which during the war did not have its own vehicles of this class, and was forced to operate only those supplied under Lend-Lease. Significant measures have been taken to quickly correct this deficiency. In 1949-1959, the USSR produced a significant number of armored personnel carriers, including the BTR-40 and BTR-152. In total, about 14,000 of these armored personnel carriers were produced.

However, both the BTR-40 and the BTR-152 were already vehicles of a relatively outdated design - wheeled, open design, no longer fully consistent with the conditions of modern warfare. To solve this problem, in 1954-1959 the USSR produced about 3,000 BTR-50 tracked amphibious armored personnel carriers on the chassis of the PT-76 light amphibious tank.

In the United States, approximately 1,729 M79 tracked armored personnel carriers were produced from 1952 to 1959. These vehicles were considered too expensive, and 6,300 of the cheaper, lighter M59 tracked armored personnel carriers were produced between 1953 and 1959.

In addition, for the Marine Corps, in the United States, from 1951 to 1957, 1124 amphibious landing craft LVTP-5, similar in characteristics to armored personnel carriers, were produced.

The UK has produced around 1,000 Alvis Saracene closed wheeled armored personnel carriers, and France has produced a number of AMX-VCI tracked armored personnel carriers since 1957.

Summary:

The presented data clearly indicate that the allegations about the supposedly “absurdly huge” production of tanks in the USSR 1945-1959 are not true. In fact, the USSR produced even fewer modern medium tanks than the United States alone. The production of heavy equipment in the USSR was in full accordance with the requirements of the time and an adequate response to the large-scale tank building programs of the USA and Great Britain. The situation changed only in the 1960s.

It should be especially noted that the significant pace of production of heavy military equipment in the USSR had a completely logical justification. US tank divisions in Europe, even small ones, were deadly opponents. NATO's critical advantage of being able to launch tactical nuclear strikes—using M65 nuclear artillery and Onest John missiles—gave its divisions a unique breakthrough capability.

In fact, the presence of tactical nuclear weapons at NATO guaranteed that the Soviet defense would be broken through a priori , regardless of the balance of forces on the front. The only way to avoid heavy defeats from American counterattacks was for the USSR to launch counter-attacks with its own mechanized units against NATO groups breaking through to the rear.

This enterprise, also known as the Sormovo plant, was located in the city of Gorky. Before the war, it belonged to the People's Commissariat of Shipbuilding. In 1941, the director of the plant was D. V. Mikhalev, and the chief engineer was G. I. Kuzmin. Since 1942, E. E. Rubinchik became the director of the plant.

E. E. Rubinchik was born in 1903. In 1922 he joined the CPSU (b). In 1929 he graduated from the Communist University. Y. M. Sverdlova. Then in 1927–1938. held a number of party posts. Since 1941 - director of the Kolomna Machine-Building Plant. Since 1942 - director of plant No. 112. He was awarded four Orders of Lenin, the Order of Kutuzov, first degree, the Order of the Patriotic War, first degree, three Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, and the Order of Friendship of Peoples. The chief metallurgist of plant No. 112 N. N. Smelyakov gave Rubinchik the following description:

“His energy, enormous capacity for work, colossal memory, dedication to the task, ability to force everyone to work in the right direction, change the style of work, and carry out the task under any difficulties were very useful to the plant.”

But at the same time he could not resist making a rather ambiguous comment:

“All these advantages more than compensated for his insufficient knowledge of specific technology, design and other subtleties of engineering science.”

The plant had a solid fleet of equipment and had 4 rolling mills with an estimated productivity of 88,900 tons of rolled products per year. In reality, such performance has never been achieved. In 1942, 61 thousand tons of rolled steel were rolled, in 1943 - 63.8 thousand tons, in 1944 - 64.7 thousand tons, and in the first half of 1945 - 31.4 thousand tons. The plant played a prominent role in the metallurgical production of the USSR. In 1942, its rolled product production amounted to 1.5% of the all-Union total.

Table. Number of employees, production capacity and volume of production of the most important products of plant No. 112

It was one of the few factories of the People's Commissariat that did not survive the evacuation disaster. Having no experience in the production of tanks, like Plant No. 183, and having an average fleet of equipment, by the scale of NKTP, it still made a significant contribution to the production of tanks. At the end of 1941 - beginning of 1942, due to a shortage of diesel engines, the M-17 carburetor engine was installed on tanks produced at plant No. 112. In addition to tanks, the plant produced T-34 hulls, cast turrets for the T-34, produced spare parts (in 1944 for 25.1 million rubles), processed 76-mm shell casings, manufactured parts for aerial bombs, assembled rockets, etc. d. He also did not forget his former occupation - the production of submarines.

Throughout the war, especially in 1941, Plant No. 112 experienced great difficulties associated with a shortage of certain types of equipment necessary for tank production. For this reason, he was heavily dependent on cooperative supplies, which often, especially in the first period of the war, were disrupted. The plant's products were considered low quality for a long time; in 1943, I.V. Stalin even named the tanks of plant No. 112 in a letter to V.A. Malyshev

“a Sormovo freak that our tank crews are afraid to fight on.”

However, the People's Commissar of the Tank Industry heeded the leader's advice and found a way to improve the quality of the vehicle. Since 1944, negative reviews about the tank from factory No. 112 have disappeared.

Expert Union

PJSC Kirov Plant , formerly Putilov Plant, is one of the oldest and largest engineering and metallurgical enterprises of the Russian Empire, the USSR and modern Russia. The plant's birthday is considered to be April 3 (March 21), 1801, when the first cannonball was cast in its workshops. In 1868, the shareholders did not fulfill the statutory conditions, and the creditors sold the plant to entrepreneur N.I. Putilov, after whose death (in 1880) the construction of destroyers and naval turret guns began at the plant. In the 1890s. The plant produced guns, shells, machine tools, excavators, locomotives, carriages, etc.

In 1917, the plant was nationalized, in 1922 it was renamed “Krasny Putilovets”, and the company began designing and producing tractors. Until 1941, the plant produced about 200 thousand Fordson-Putilovets and Universal tractors - the predecessors of the legendary Kirovets tractor.

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, more than 10 thousand plant workers submitted applications with a request to be sent to the active army. In June 1941, the first rifle regiment of the 1st Kirov People's Militia Division was formed at the enterprise. In July, Kirov militias blocked the enemy’s path at the Luga line. The plant created fighter and tank battalions, 10 partisan detachments, a battalion of NKVD troops, sabotage and reconnaissance groups, an artillery division, which was transferred from the walls of the plant to the Pulkovo Heights and later fought in Berlin.

At the beginning of September 1941, the front line approached the Kirov plant, the enemy was stopped just three kilometers from its walls. From among the specialists, three mobile repair brigades were formed (PRB 21, 22, 23), intended to repair tanks on the front line: two went to the Leningrad Front, one to the Western Front. On the territory of the plant and around it, 512 rifle loopholes, 115 machine gun nests in factory buildings, 37 rifle trenches, 17 artillery pillboxes and bunkers, 1050 meters of metal barricades with loopholes, 650 anti-tank hedgehogs were built. The plant was defended by three work detachments, three companies to fight enemy airborne troops, and air defense soldiers were on duty around the clock.

During the blockade, the plant was under an air raid warning signal for 752 hours, 4,423 shells, 78 high-explosive and hundreds of incendiary bombs were dropped on the Kirov plant, several workshops and more than 150 industrial and domestic buildings were destroyed. On the territory of the plant, 2.5 thousand Kirov residents died of hunger, 139 died from shell fragments, 788 were injured.

For the Kirov Plant, the main supplier of tanks in the country, the priority task was to increase the rate of their production: in the first three months of the war, 492 KV tanks (Klim Voroshilov) were assembled.

In the most difficult conditions, the Kirov Plant continued to provide combat vehicles to the front. Even when German troops approached Leningrad, in conditions of constant bombing and artillery shelling, the plant continued to produce tanks. They went into battle straight from the factory floors.

The KV tank leaves the factory

Due to the approach of the front, from September to December 1941, a large-scale evacuation of tank and main artillery production to the Urals took place. Over 15 thousand Kirov residents and members of their families were transported from the blockaded city to Chelyabinsk and Sverdlovsk, along with equipment. In the Urals, the production of KV tanks of several modifications was increased; in 1943, a new heavy tank, the IS (Joseph Stalin), was developed, and the production of self-propelled artillery units (self-propelled guns) began.

Tank IS-1

In Chelyabinsk, weapons were put on the assembly line, which in their characteristics and manufacturability were superior to German models. The plant also won a grandiose battle of combat vehicles: “IS” - heavy breakthrough tanks - not only surpassed the latest German tanks, but also crushed heavily fortified enemy positions with their armor, tracks and fire.

The new model, the IS-2, soon became a threat to German tank crews. A powerful vehicle with strong armor and strong weapons invariably emerged victorious in all battles with German tanks. The IS-2 heavy tank had the following characteristics:

• weight - 46 tons;
• gun – 122 mm;
• armor – up to 90 mm;
• crew – 5 people.

IS-2 tanks also took part in the liberation of European cities from fascist invaders and in the victorious Berlin operation on April 16-May 8, 1945. A modernized version of the IS-2 served the Soviet and Russian armies until 1995.

IS-2 tank in Berlin

During the war, the Kirov Plant supplied the front with 18 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, over 48 thousand tank engines, 85 thousand sets of fuel equipment, more than 17 million shell blanks, developed and put into serial production 13 types of combat vehicles and 6 types of tank engines, repaired hundreds of tanks .

During the Great Patriotic War, 11 Kirov residents were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the end of the war (in 1947), the Kirov plant team received an order to produce a working design and samples of a skidder. In the post-war years, work was carried out to create heavy tanks T-10, T-10M and self-propelled tracked launchers for missiles. The Penguin tracked vehicle was also developed for Soviet Antarctic expeditions and the powerful Kirovets wheeled tractor, which was widely used in agriculture and various industries.

In order to train practitioners and skilled workers for heavy engineering enterprises after the Great Patriotic War, the Leningrad Mechanical Engineering College (in 1944) and the Nevsky Mechanical Engineering College (in 1956) were created in Leningrad. As a result of the merger of these educational institutions, 27 April 2022, the St. Petersburg State Budgetary Professional Educational Institution “ Academy of Mechanical Engineering named after Zh.Ya. Kotina" (AMK).

Nevsky Mechanical Engineering Faculty AMK (Babushkina St., 119)

Leningrad Mechanical Engineering Faculty AMK (Stachek Ave., 47)

In 2022 - the Year of Memory and Glory - St. Petersburg State Budgetary Educational Institution "Academy of Mechanical Engineering named after Zh.Ya. Kotin" celebrates the 40th anniversary of its naming after Zh.Ya. Kotin Leningrad Mechanical Engineering College (now the Leningrad Mechanical Engineering Faculty of the Academy) by Order of the USSR Ministry of Defense Industry dated April 22, 1980.

The name of the legendary Soviet designer, Colonel General of the Engineering and Technical Service, Doctor of Technical Sciences Joseph Yakovlevich Kotin (1908–1979) is inextricably linked with the history of the Kirov Plant.

J.Ya. Kotin

J.Ya. Kotin began his career as a mechanic's assistant at. While working at the factory, Kotin made his first invention - a bench vice, which was distinguished by an original technical solution. At the same time, Kotin studied at the workers' faculty (evening workers' faculty), from which he graduated in 1927. After the workers' faculty, Kotin entered the automotive department of the Kharkov Institute of Technology, from where in August 1929, from the 3rd year of recruitment by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he was sent to Leningrad to continue his studies at the Military Technical Academy. F.E. Dzerzhinsky at the Faculty of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army.

On May 23, 1937, at the age of 29, military engineer 2nd rank Zh.Ya. Kotin headed the tank design bureau at the Kirov plant. From this day on, the history of the development of Soviet heavy tank building began. A well-coordinated team, a real team of like-minded people, has gathered around Kotin. Both engineers and workers worked on the development of the heavy tank. It was necessary to reduce production time as much as possible. During the production of the experimental sample in the workshops, on the advice of the workers, the methods of processing parts and technologies were changed. Kotin was always present at the tests and listened carefully to the opinions of his subordinates.

Members of the Government and personally I.V. Stalin demanded that the Kotin Design Bureau obtain results in tank building in the shortest possible time. Kotin used world experience in tank building, saying: “We have no right to neglect capitalist technology.” At the same time, party self-awareness did not allow Kotin to name a single tank by his own name. The design bureau did not have time to create a tank from scratch, so work was carried out to modernize existing models. Prototypes of heavy tanks were ready at the start of the Soviet-Finnish War, and experimental tanks entered battle on January 17, 1940.

The Great Patriotic War found Zh.Ya. Kotin as chief designer of the Kirov plant. Under his leadership, by that time heavy KV tanks had been created and put into mass production. While remaining the chief designer of the plant, Kotin was appointed deputy people's commissar of the tank industry.

From a book by a team of authors led by N.S. Popov “Designer of combat vehicles”:

“On June 22, 1941, only continuous production shops and repairmen worked at the Kirov plant. By noon, as soon as the radio message about the treacherous attack of the Nazis on our country was heard, workers, engineers, and designers began to come to the plant without being called. […] Zh.Ya. Kotin, like all plant managers, moved to a barracks position and rarely left the design bureau. One of the tasks was to organize a tank training center at the Kirov Plant to train driver mechanics of KV tanks and retrain drivers of T-26 and BT light tanks for new vehicles. […] On September 12, 1941, on the initiative of the party committee, the defense headquarters of the Kirov plant was created. Zh.Ya was appointed chief of staff of one of the defense sections of the Kirov plant. Kotina. Joseph Yakovlevich carefully studied the entire area entrusted to him - he examined every ravine, stream, and thought about how best to adapt the area for defense.”

In October 1941, when the Leningrad enterprise moved to the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant, a group of designers, which included Zh.Ya., was also evacuated there. Kotin.

October 6, 1941, by decision of I.V. Stalin, the Chelyabinsk plant was renamed Kirovsky, and I.M. was appointed its director. Zaltsman (director of the Kirov plant since 1938), chief designer - Zh.Ya. Kotin.

The entire tank-building complex was named “Tankograd”. Many years later, Kotin recalled:

“Now, perhaps, you can’t say who first named the Chelyabinsk giant with utmost precision - Tankograd. Just as the battles with the Nazis continued at the front, so our daily, hourly struggle against Hitler’s designers continued” (from the book “Designer of Combat Vehicles”).

In 1941, the director of the Kirov plant I.M. Zaltsman and chief designer of the tank design bureau Zh.Ya. Kotin was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

Kirov plant in 1941

“In Chelyabinsk Zh.Ya. Kotin proved himself to be a talented organizer, recalls one of his closest collaborators G.N. Moskvin. – The tasks were completed in a fantastically short time. A particular difficulty was that there was no time to carry out lengthy tests - the series was started straight from the sheet. This placed great responsibility on the designer, because the drawing he completed immediately went into work” (from the book “Designer of Combat Vehicles”).

On February 1, 1946, the Chelyabinsk Worker newspaper published an article in which the following was written:

“Talking about Comrade Kotin means talking about the entire history of the development of Soviet heavy industry. Created under the leadership of comrade. Kotin heavy tanks KV and IS are the result of a lot of creative work […] After the KV tank became the favorite vehicle of Soviet tankers, in the second period of the Great Patriotic War, an experimental design bureau under the direct leadership of Comrade. Kotina creates a new powerful heavy tank in record time, which is put into mass production at the Kirov Plant within 56 days. The front received a new Joseph Stalin tank. […] This tank victoriously ended the liberation war against the Nazi invaders: it crossed the Oder, stormed Berlin and thundered through the streets of the fascist capital with its steel tracks. […] The history of the Great Patriotic War, the glorious history of the victories of the Red Army, will include the name of the creator of heavy tanks, Joseph Yakovlevich Kotin.”

Newspaper "Chelyabinsk Worker" (02/01/1946)

(From the collection of the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Signal Corps)

Under the leadership of Zh.Ya. Kotin intensive design work was carried out. During the Great Patriotic War, 13 types of new tanks and self-propelled guns were developed. And the chief designers Kotin and Dukhov designed models of the KV-1S, KV-85, IS-1, IS-2, IS-3 tanks, as well as the SU-122 and ISU-152 self-propelled guns - self-propelled artillery units (self-propelled guns) created at tank base of the "IS" series, the famous "St. John's worts", about which Stalin himself said: “With these weapons we will end the war.”

The first worker-student newspaper “Nevsky Mashinogstroitel” wrote in its issue on May 1, 2018:

“The development of a new heavy tank, the IS Joseph Stalin, to replace the KV, in the spring of 1942, became the first government task of the Experimental Plant. Under the leadership of Zh.Ya. Kotin and chief designer A.S. Ermolaev, a group of eight designers and other specialists worked on the IS tank. All design and calculation work was carried out in great secrecy. […] At that time, not a single tank in the world had such weapons; Western countries transferred their heavy tanks to 120 mm guns only 30–40 years later. […] At the Kirov plant in Chelyabinsk, the continuous production of heavy tanks was established, where, for the first time in the practice of world tank building, such vehicles began to be produced in a conveyor manner.”

Newspaper "Nevsky Mashinostroitel" (05/01/2018)

Memory of Zh.Ya. Kotine at the Kirov plant is sacred. On May 6, 1985, on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, a monument to the chief designer was unveiled on the territory of the plant.

Monument to Zh.Ya. Kotin

In Chelyabinsk, on the house where Kotin lived, a memorial plaque was installed. Chelyabinsk secondary school No. 86 has been named after Zh.Ya. since 1980. Kotin and is located on the street of the same name. The school has created the only museum in Russia named after Zh.Ya. Kotina.

The memory of the outstanding designer is carefully preserved by his fellow Pavlograd residents. Materials about the life and work of Zh.Ya. Kotin are widely represented in the Pavlograd Museum and in the halls of military glory of local schools. In 1986, climbers from Dnepropetrovsk climbed an unnamed peak in the Turkestan range of the Tien Shan and assigned the name “Kotina Peak” to the 4820-meter peak they conquered.

Kotina Peak

Today PJSC Kirov Plant (the group of companies has had this name since 2002) is one of the largest Russian industrial engineering companies with a developed metallurgical base. In 2009, it was included in the list of strategic enterprises of the Russian Federation. The property complex of PJSC Kirov Plant includes about 400 hectares of land and about 1.5 million sq. m of buildings and structures. The company's production and infrastructure facilities are located in St. Petersburg on an area of ​​about 200 hectares, in the Leningrad region and in the south of Russia. The Kirov plant employs about 6,000 employees. Finished products of the Group of Companies are exported to more than 30 countries around the world.

JSC "Petersburg Tractor Plant" (part of the Group) is the only Russian manufacturer of powerful wheeled agricultural tractors "Kirovets" - one of the leading brands in St. Petersburg and Russia, known not only in the Russian Federation and the CIS countries, but throughout the world.

CJSC Metallurgical , also part of PJSC Kirov Plant , has been a member of the St. Petersburg regional branch of the Union of Mechanical Engineers of Russia since September 19, 2022.

On October 29, 2022, a cooperation agreement was signed between the St. Petersburg regional branch of the Union of Mechanical Engineers of Russia and the Academy of Mechanical Engineering named after Zh.Ya. Kotina . Today, the Academy trains mid-level specialists in 12 specialties, including the only specialty in the North-West region, “Special machines and devices,” as well as in 2 blue-collar professions.

Materials provided by the Academy of Mechanical Engineering named after Zh.Ya. Kotin and the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineering Troops and Signal Corps.

Additional sources: https://kzgroup.ru/, https://academykotin.ru/, https://warspot.ru/

Photo: https://www.pomnite-nas.ru/, https://opengorod.rf/, https://www.innovatione.ru/, https://yandex.ru/, https://www. mountain.ru/, https://www.pinterest.es/

Ural Heavy Engineering Plant

The fourth largest number of tanks and self-propelled guns produced among NKTP enterprises was the Ural Heavy Engineering Plant (UZTM). Initially, the plant produced only hulls for T-34 tanks. On June 28, 1942, the plant was instructed by the State Defense Committee to start producing T-34 tanks. At the same time, plant No. 37 was attached to UZTM to help in the production of tanks. True, in 1943 this plant was again withdrawn from its composition.

The director of the plant during the war was B. G. Muzrukov (1904–1979), one of the outstanding figures in the Soviet defense industry. He graduated from the Leningrad Technological Institute in 1929. After that he worked as an engineer at the Kirov plant, and then as its chief metallurgist. In 1938 he joined the CPSU (b). In 1939 he became director of UZTM. B. G. Muzrukov was awarded two stars of the Hero of Socialist Labor, four Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, the Order of Kutuzov of the first degree, the Order of the Patriotic War of the first degree, and three Orders of the Red Banner of Labor. Plant workers remember their director as an exceptionally caring leader who is attentive to the needs of people. In the future, Muzrukov will play a big role in the development of the Soviet nuclear industry.

In Soviet literature it was stated that UZTM switched to the production of tanks on the initiative of the workers and the party organization of the plant. However, it is doubtful that the leadership of the party organization, much less ordinary workers, could assess the capabilities of the plant from the point of view of organizing such complex production, with which most of them were familiar only through the manufacture of armored hulls.

In the second half of 1942, the plant first launched the production of T-34 tanks, and then SU-122 self-propelled guns. A distinctive feature of the T-34 produced by UZTM was the original stamped turret. This technology turned out to be excessively resource-intensive and generally did not justify itself. Its use was caused by a shortage of equipment for large castings. Gradually, the plant focuses exclusively on the production of medium self-propelled guns, ceasing the production of tanks. This avoids a bottleneck in tower production. In 1943, the plant stopped production of the SU-122, designed to combat bunkers, bunkers and anti-tank guns, and completely switched to anti-tank self-propelled guns. In 1944, he mastered the production of SU-100 anti-tank self-propelled guns, which were highly valued by our troops for their low silhouette and powerful gun.

Table. Number of employees, production capacity and production volume of the most important products of UZTM

UZTM united many different industries. In addition to tanks and self-propelled guns, during the war the plant produced metallurgical equipment, blanks for artillery guns, including D-5 and D-25 tank guns, M-30 howitzer, blanks for V-2 diesel engine, aerial bombs, rockets . UZTM had the most powerful steel production of all NKTP plants and was the leader among NKTP plants in steel smelting. In 1942, steel production at the plant amounted to 2% of all-Union production.

New in blogs

Some time ago I wrote an article about the contribution of industrial power to the cause of Victory. I tried to explain the idea through economic indicators, but it seems that not everyone understood what economic power was and how it directly influenced the course of the war. I became interested and started collecting data on the production of aircraft, tanks and warships. The so-called “patriots” somehow readily “forget” that that war was not limited to the Soviet-German front and even the European theater of operations. The war was truly global and covered virtually the entire globe. In fact, the Pacific theater of operations was many times larger than the European one in terms of area covered. If in doubt, look at the globe. And if on land you can march on foot and cross rivers by swimming, even on tunics inflated with a bubble, then this does not work on the ocean expanses. The USSR did not have to wage a naval war, except for individual local submarine attacks. The USSR had no need for a large and powerful surface fleet. But for the United States this was a matter of paramount importance.

Speaking of ground armies, it’s good to note what the USA and the USSR approached the start of the war with. As of June 22, 1941, the Red Army had about 27 thousand armored vehicles in its arsenals. Of these, about 2 thousand were T-34, KV-1 and KV-2. The US Army had 400 light tanks in the summer of 1940. That is, in the USSR, before the start of the war, mass production of armored vehicles was created and debugged: from light armored vehicles and tankettes to heavy tanks. Dozens of factories were operating. In the USA there were automobile factories that produced a huge number of cars, but there was virtually no specialized tank production.

When Germany attacked the USSR, the disaster of 1941 consumed almost all the armored vehicles available before the war and the USSR lost 80% of its tank industry, which actually had to be created anew, beyond the Urals.

Let's see how much the USSR and the USA produced during their participation in the war. I warn you in advance that the quantity excludes what was produced before the start of the war and after September 2, 1945.

Production of armored vehicles in the USSR

Production of armored vehicles in the USA

From these 2 tables we see that, firstly, the production structure was significantly different: the United States produced a lot of armored personnel carriers and amphibious vehicles, which is explained by the large number of amphibious operations, including landings in Sicily, Italy, Normandy and Southern France. And the USSR produced more tanks and self-propelled guns, including heavy ones (7852 units), which the Americans did not produce at all. They successfully used artillery and self-propelled guns to fight enemy tanks. Thus, during the battle at Arracourt, M18 (Witch) self-propelled guns effectively knocked out Panthers in the frontal armor. Out of 110 Panthers in 2 armored grenadier brigades, only 3 left the battle. The Witches accounted for at least a third of the Panthers' losses.

Secondly, we see that the US produced 2.5 times more armored vehicles. It is interesting that during the war, Soviet factories produced 44,702 “legendary” T-34 tanks of all modifications, and the Americans, having started production of Sherman M4s in February 1942, managed to produce 49,234 vehicles of all modifications. 4.5 thousand more.

Let's move on. Aircraft production.

Aviation production in the USSR during the war

I did not find data on the production of PS-84 transport vehicles during the war. Sorry.

US aircraft production during the war

Here, too, we see a different structure of aviation. First of all, the USSR did not produce certain types of aircraft. Such, for example, as carrier-based aviation - there are no aircraft carriers, there is no need to make carrier-based aircraft.

Secondly, there is a strong bias in bombers: the Americans produced 35,893 strategic 4-engine bombers against 93 Soviet Pe-8 (TB-7).

In terms of airfield-based fighters, there is approximate parity. The Americans produced only 3 thousand more than the USSR. But there were also night and deck fighters - about 34 thousand. But the Americans did not produce anything like the Il-2 attack aircraft. Actually, no one except the USSR produced this. The plane was extremely ineffective and suffered huge losses.

The very large number of transport aircraft on the American list is also noticeable. 15,109 transport workers are both airborne assaults and a consequence of enormous distances.

6800 seaplanes - this was in great demand in the USA and England. But for the USSR this class of aviation was almost unnecessary. We made 44 Beriev cars and received several Catalinas under Lend-Lease. No more was required.

But the USSR produced a lot of U-2 (Po-2). About 23 thousand aircraft of this type were produced during the war years.

Well, then... There will be no comparison. There is simply nothing to compare with. Production of US combat and main transport ships.

For the United States, the start of the war was very unfortunate, if not catastrophic. On December 7, 1941, with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese virtually disarmed the US Pacific Fleet. But defending the land of the islands without cover from the sea is a disastrous proposition. The Japanese very quickly captured Guam and the Philippines, taking control of almost the entire Pacific Ocean, and began preparations for the capture of New Zealand and the landing in Australia. The year 1942 passed in fierce battles between the remnants of the American fleet and the powerful Japanese imperial fleet. Gradually, the American fleet seized the initiative, but by the end of 1942 the United States had only one operational aircraft carrier left in the Pacific Ocean.

As soon as the United States entered the war, the mighty American shipyards began to work at full capacity. It took a year for new ships to join the fleet. The table that I provide below shows only ships that entered the fleet's operational composition after December 7, 1941 and before September 2, 1945. For example, the aircraft carrier Midway was built from 43 to 45, but became part of the fleet after the surrender of Japan and therefore is not in the table.

My father-in-law spent almost his entire work experience at the Nikolaev Shipyard. When I showed him this list, he, as a person who understands, simply collapsed... It’s impossible to imagine...

From the very beginning of the war in the Pacific theater of operations, it became obvious that the main force of the fleet was now squadron aircraft carriers, and not battleships. The United States commissioned only 8 battleships, but twenty-four Essex-class aircraft carriers , which had no equal in the world.

These are simply incredible numbers. 24 aircraft carriers with a displacement of 37 thousand tons and a speed of 33 knots! Each aircraft carrier is about 100 aircraft.

This is a force that cannot be stopped. Throughout 1943, the US Pacific Fleet rapidly grew and developed, filling itself with both strike forces and transport ships. In 1944, all this power really fell on the head of the Japanese, quickly liberating territories on land and completely seizing control of the ocean.

Maybe the thesis about industrial power is now clear?

Plant No. 174

Tank plant No. 174 in Omsk arose due to the merger of several enterprises: Leningrad plant No. 174, Voroshilovsky locomotive building and Omsk locomotive repair plants. In the 1930s, Leningrad Plant No. 174 occupied a leading position in tank building thanks to the simple and well-developed T-26 tank. But the Omsk plant during the war was unable to occupy a similar place. Its machine park and the number of workers at the new location in Omsk were relatively small by the standards of the NKTP, and the production technology was considered the least efficient. People's Commissar Malyshev openly called the plant backward.

In 1941, back in Leningrad, the plant produced 102 T-26s and 48 T-50s. In 1942, the T-50, of which 15 were produced, was finally abandoned. The plant began to master the production of T-34, which it produced until the end of the war. In addition to producing tanks, the plant was also involved in the production of armored hulls, spare parts for tanks (in the amount of 19.7 million rubles in 1944), 122-mm shells and parts for rockets.

Table. Number of employees, production capacity and volume of production of the most important products of plant No. 174

As the table shows, in 1942 the plant's fleet of machines and equipment increased significantly, apparently due to the continued removal of property from Leningrad. In 1944–1945, on the contrary, it decreased, which is apparently due to the return of some equipment to the restored factories. The director of the plant since 1942 was K. E. Zadorozhny, former director of STZ.

Stalingrad Tractor Plant

During the first period of the war, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant (STZ) occupied an important place in the system of NKTP enterprises. On January 1, 1942, it was a giant with 2,968 metal-cutting machines and 15,464 workers. In the winter of 1941/1942, it became the main producer of the T-34 in the USSR, while Plant No. 183 struggled with the consequences of the evacuation. In 1941, the plant produced 1256 tanks, and in 1942 - 2520. The director of the plant from September to November 1941 was A. A. Goreglyad, and from November 1941 until the death of the plant - K. A. Zadorozhny.

The evacuation of this plant was extremely unsuccessful. The decision to start it was late, and the plant continued to produce tanks until the start of fighting on its territory. It was not possible to carry out an organized evacuation. A significant part of the workers died in the battles for the city.

After the liberation of Stalingrad, restoration work began at the plant, but it was no longer involved in the production of tanks. In 1943–1945 he was engaged in the repair of armored vehicles. Its main task again became the production of tractors.

Before its destruction, STZ was engaged in the production of V-2 tank diesel engines (thanks to the evacuation of the diesel production of the Kharkov Tractor Plant on its site). In 1941 it produced 197 diesel engines, in 1942 - 2553 diesel engines. Diesel production was resumed after the liberation of Stalingrad. In 1943, the plant produced 40 diesel engines, in 1944 - 551 diesel engines, in the first half of 1945 - 428 diesel engines.

Before the war, STZ had significant metallurgical equipment - 21 electric furnaces. In 1942, despite the fact that already in September the plant was not able to operate normally, it produced 54,780 tons of steel. After the liberation of Stalingrad, metallurgical production was again created at the restored plant. On January 1, 1944, he already had two electric furnaces, and on January 1, 1945, even six electric furnaces. However, steel production at the plant never reached pre-war volumes.

Frontal projection of the KV-1 tank

Frontal projection of T-34

Literature and sources:

Ermolov A. Yu. Tank industry of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. M., 2009. Here and further in the tables, all data on the number of workers at factories are given according to: RSAE. F. 8752. Op. 4. D. 728. L. 105-106; data on the number of metal-cutting machines in factories are given from: Ibid. L. 27-29; data on forging and pressing equipment are given from: Ibid. L. 50-52; data on the production of tanks and self-propelled guns are given according to; Right there. L. 158-164; data on metallurgical production are given from: Ibid. L. 90-102. https://tankfront.ru/ussr/industry/predpriyatia.html

Factory War

People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry of the USSR against a united Europe “The storm of the twelfth year has arrived - who helped us here? The frenzy of the people, Barclay, winter or the Russian God? This is how A.S. Pushkin determined the origins of the victory of the Russian state in the Patriotic War of 1812. We were unable to find an equally brief “victory formula” in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 in Russian literature. The translator at the headquarters of the 3rd Shock Army, E. Rzhevskaya, who, as part of her duty, sought during interrogations from German soldiers and officers a truthful description of our Armed Forces, among the advantages, as a rule, received the same phrase: “T-34 tank, endurance of soldiers, Zhukov."

"Thirty-four" always came first. And it’s not just about the excellent tactical and technical characteristics of the Soviet medium tank. Almost all foreigners who had the misfortune of ending up on the Eastern Front as part of the troops of the Third Reich and its allies had to experience unforgettable impressions from communicating with him. There were many T-34 tanks. So many. Against the backdrop of countless "thirty-fours", German soldiers no longer remembered the heavy Soviet KV and IS tanks, magnificent for their time, the terrifyingly powerful self-propelled guns SU-152, ISU-152 and ISU-122, the constant companions of the Russian infantry, the SU-76 self-propelled guns, and even more so light tanks T-60 and T-70.

In total, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, from July 1, 1941 to June 1, 1945, Soviet industry built 95,252 tanks and self-propelled guns against the enemy’s 40,380 combat vehicles. True, these figures are somewhat disingenuous and take into account only those classes of armored vehicles that were produced in our country. Meanwhile, the range of armored vehicles in Germany was noticeably wider than in the USSR, and also included all-wheel drive armored vehicles with cannon weapons and half-track armored personnel carriers. And this is still more than 25 thousand units. By the way, the Soviet command took them very seriously. A memo issued in 1943 for tank destroyers indicated that the destroyed armored car corresponded to a light tank; for three pieces the fighter was entitled to the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree. The same award was given for two heavy or medium tanks. In other words, two Tigers were equivalent in combat value to three armored cars.

27 vs 150

But still, even taking into account armored cars and armored personnel carriers, German industry lost the competition to the Soviet Tank Industry. This is especially obvious if we compare the number of factories opposing each other: 27 on the Soviet side (as of the end of 1944 - beginning of 1945) and about 150 on the German side.

“Domestic industry leaders, scientists and engineers have created more efficient large-scale production of military equipment.” At one time, in the Soviet historiography of the Great Patriotic War, a red thread ran through the idea of ​​the USSR confronting not just Germany, but with the united forces of Western Europe, with the exception of perhaps Great Britain. In the 90s, for reasons of political correctness and impending integration with the West, this idea was somehow forgotten, but by no means lost its historical content.

The Third Reich began mass production of tanks later than the Soviet Union, but first-class enterprises were immediately involved in the matter. The first to master the serial production of tanks (Essen), Rheinmetall-Borzig (Berlin), Daimler-Benz AG (Berlin) and Henschel and Son AG (Kassel), a little later they were joined by Krupp (Magdeburg). According to the British researcher J. Forti, these were the real flagships of the German industry, having everything necessary for the independent production of most of the main tank units and components. Subsequently, several more factories were built that dealt exclusively with armored vehicles: Alkett (Berlin), MIAG (Braunschweig). It was built especially for the assembly of the Panther.

In addition, the German Empire connected enterprises of the annexed countries to the tank industry. At first it was the Austrian, then the Czech “ČKD” (“BMM” in German designation) and “Skoda”. At the Warsaw United Machine-Building Plants, the assembly of Pz.Kpfw II tanks began shortly after the conquest of Poland. French tank factories were used by the Germans mainly for the production of components, but there is information about the assembly of a number of tanks of French models - S-35, B-2, R-35 and N-35, possibly from the old stock of parts and mechanisms. The German administration did not disdain the Soviet enterprises that fell into its hands: tanks, engines, steam locomotives, cars were repaired at Kharkov plant No. 183, and aircraft components were assembled.

German specialists perfectly understood the value and significance of the industrial “trophies” they received. Let us cite the opinion of tank general F. Zenger und Etterlin: “The French military industry was forced to work with all its might to arm Germany... Without the industrial potential of France, Hitler would not have been able to continue the war for so long.” Or another statement by Colonel G. Ritgen: “... without the Czech military industry and Czech tanks, we would not have four tank divisions, which would make an attack on the Soviet Union impossible.”

In total, the Germans involved 34 large industrial associations in the production of armored vehicles. True, only German, Austrian and Czech enterprises operated at full capacity, and the rest suffered equally from the sabotage of local personnel and from the greed of the Germans themselves, who were exporting the most valuable equipment. Nevertheless, the tank building potential of the Third Reich was very impressive.

This is especially obvious against the backdrop of Soviet industry. During 1941, the USSR, due to defeats at the front, was forced to evacuate almost all pre-war tank-building enterprises; only the Stalingrad Tractor Plant remained in place. But in the summer of 1942 it too came under attack and was almost completely destroyed. Everything had to be created anew in the Urals, Volga region and Siberia.

As a result, at the turn of 1944–1945, the following tank assembly enterprises operated as part of the NKTP:

- Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant (IS-2 tanks, ISU-152, ISU-122 self-propelled guns); -Ural Tank Plant No. 183, Nizhny Tagil (T-34-85 tanks); -Ural Heavy Engineering Plant, Sverdlovsk (self-propelled gun SU-100); -plant No. 112, Gorky (T-34-85 tanks); -plant No. 174, Omsk (T-34-85 tanks); -plant No. 75, Kharkov (T-44 tanks).

In addition, two plants (No. 38 and No. 40) plus the Gorky Automobile Plant, which was not a member of the NKTP, produced light SU-76s, and another 18 enterprises produced various tank components, components and spare parts for repair shops. And all this against 150 German and German-controlled other European factories.

Or maybe they were missing something?

Of course, limitations in materials, equipment, personnel and attention from the authorities can tie the hands of the most powerful industry.

Let's start with the most obvious: the government order for armored vehicles. The German leadership, euphoric from continuous victories at the beginning of World War II, began to mobilize industry too late. The first major defeat near Moscow was considered an unfortunate misunderstanding, especially since in the summer of 1942 the kettledrums began to sound again about a grandiose offensive towards the Volga and the Caucasus. And only the Battle of Stalingrad made us think seriously about the prospects. In January 1943, Hitler issues an order to sharply increase tank production.

Nevertheless, tank building had previously been the focus of attention for the leaders of the Reich. Already at the beginning of 1942, Albert Speer, who had just been appointed to the post of Minister of Armaments, set his first task: “... to pay primary attention to the production of tanks.” And by the way, not without success. The production of tanks, self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers and cannon armored vehicles increased in the Third Reich compared to 1941; in 1942 - by 75 percent, in 1943 - by 3.9 times, in 1944 - by 5.6 times. In absolute numbers, in 1944, German production of armored vehicles was almost equal to Soviet production - 28,862 and 28,983 units, respectively.

Equalized, but not surpassed. Maybe this happened due to a lack of material and human resources?

Of course, in a country that started a world war, there is no complete prosperity, especially since Germany is not the richest state in terms of mineral resources. But this does not mean at all that the tank industry could not fully operate due to a shortage of metals. Let us recall only the most general figures: steel production in Germany and controlled countries in 1940–1944 amounted to 162.6 million tons, and in the USSR - 63.7 million. Our own iron ores, coupled with supplies from Sweden and other countries, turned out to be quite enough for the full operation of the German metallurgy.

The situation with alloying substances was somewhat worse, but supplies from obvious and hidden allies, as well as trophies acquired during the “blitzkrieg”, helped here. For example, the mines of Finland supplied German armor with nickel. Krupp's managers controlled the Balkan chrome mines and French tungsten deposits. The manganese and chromium ores of occupied Ukraine, together with its metallurgical plants, were under the tutelage of the German Eastern Mining and Metallurgical Company, whose administrative council was personally headed by Alfried Krupp. He perfectly mastered the technology of industrial robbery: in the first 13 months of the occupation alone, 438 thousand tons of manganese ore were exported to Germany, which covered more than 30 percent of the needs.

So we can only talk about replacing some materials with more affordable ones. Sometimes this was accompanied by losses in quality (for example, armor steel), but by no means a reduction in volumes. According to Speer's calculations, even with the maximum output of military products, the most scarce metal for Germany - chromium - would be enough until the fall of 1945. Manganese and nickel reserves made it possible to work even longer.

Regarding the German machine park: back in 1941 it was 2.5 times larger than the Soviet one, which did not stop the Germans from exporting any machine they liked from the occupied countries. In the occupied part of the USSR, they found and sent to them 175 thousand machine tools of various types and purposes.

A special Anglo-American commission that examined tank-building enterprises in Germany spoke only in superlatives about the quality of German equipment itself, with special mention being made of the successes in the creation of special high-performance machines. The volume of production of new equipment in Germany during the Second World War not only did not decrease, but even doubled.

The USSR, on the contrary, in order to recreate the tank industry after the losses of 1941, sacrificed most of its already not very powerful machine tool industry, the enterprises of which became part of tank factories as machining units. Of course, the best equipment was assembled here, but there was a decided lack of special and high-precision equipment. According to data from the summer of 1943, all enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Tank Industry had only 29 coordinate boring machines.

What this led to is illustrated by a fragment from the memoirs of the director of plant No. 183, Yu. E. Maksarev: “The GABTU requirements included a point to switch to a 5-speed gearbox and this requirement was correct. But we were connected by a special boring machine, which immediately gave coaxial, precise holes for the side bearings and the main shaft, and also ensured strict perpendicularity of the boring for the drive shaft bearing from the main clutch. This machine was obtained for the BT-5 variable gearbox and was the “Procrustean bed” that determined all subsequent BT-7, A-20, A-32 and T-34 gearboxes. Designers Comrade Baran Yakov Ionovich and Comrade Speichler worked on the new gearbox, who managed to preserve the dimensions between the shafts in the design of the 5-speed gearbox and thereby save the machine and the accuracy of boring.”

Of course, some equipment was supplied by the American and British allies, for which we thank them very much. However, let's not forget that many months passed between the request for help and delivery from overseas. The American machine tool industry was overloaded with domestic orders and transportation took a lot of time.

***

Maybe German tank factories suffered from a shortage of labor, especially qualified ones? And here the answer is negative.

There is no doubt about the skills of German machine builders of the 40s, and on the eve of the Great Patriotic War they were one and a half times larger than their Soviet colleagues. The mobilization almost did not affect the workers of the German military industry: in the winter of 1940–1941, the main plants and factories received the status of special enterprises, completely exempt from conscription. At the beginning of 1942, a more individual approach was introduced: the entire working population was divided into specialists, auxiliary workers, apprentices, retrainers and unskilled workers. The young and inexperienced were sent to the front, while skilled older workers, on the contrary, returned from the army to . In addition, professional differentiation was introduced: the conscription rate for miners working underground was five percent, while hairdressers and cooks were 65 percent. The mobilization of all other working professions was between these boundaries. To perform heavy unskilled work, the labor of prisoners of war and forcibly mobilized “contingents” from conquered countries was widely used. In 1944, their number reached seven million people; in tank factories they accounted for up to 50 percent of the total workforce. As for the most qualified German engineers and workers, by the beginning of 1945, approximately five million men of military age continued to work in industry and transport. Major General A. Weideman later wrote: “The High Command willingly yielded to the demands of the war economy, despite all the difficulties with reserves, because even the simple front-line soldier with his limited outlook understood that the military industry ultimately served his own vital interests.”

All of the above, combined with the redistribution of labor between industries, led to an increase in the staff of German tank factories by 2.7 times during the period from 1940 to 1944.

In the USSR the situation was almost the opposite. The number of workers and employees employed in industry decreased from 11 million in 1940 to 7.2 million in 1942. Let us remember that 40 percent of the country’s population lived in the occupied territory. Despite all the mobilization efforts and the strictest control over labor resources, even in 1945 there were 1.5 million factory workers short of the pre-war level.

An excellent illustration is the history of the staff of the Kharkov Tank Plant No. 183: in the first months of the war, the number of workers fell from 41 to 24 thousand. The bulk of the workers and foremen of the responsible foundry and mechanical assembly shops lived in the vicinity of Kharkov and were mobilized into the army at their place of residence. A group of factory testers had to be sent to the army to train tank crews. A considerable number of workers and engineers volunteered for a tank brigade equipped with above-plan tanks. And finally, many workers refused to go to the Urals: having received travel documents, they did not show up at the trains. As a result, out of 12,140 people subject to evacuation, only 5,234 actually went to Nizhny Tagil, mainly engineers and office workers.

Amazingly, in Nizhny Tagil in the fall of 1941, the mindless mobilization of specialists who had been so laboriously brought into the army continued. The local military registration and enlistment office, having exhausted the human resources of Uralvagonzavod, began to take care of the evacuees. The outrage was stopped only after the intervention of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, People's Commissar of Tank Industry V. A. Malyshev.

The shortage of labor had to be compensated by evacuated workers from other industries (for example, the same machine tool industries, mobilized as labor conscription. A comprehensive description of the latter was given in his memoirs by N. A. Sobol (in 1941–1943 - the head of one of the workshops of the UTZ): “Field farmers, beekeepers, grooms, weighers, watchmen, accountants, accountants, they had no idea about a large engineering plant and its production.”

But even in this way, the average number of employees at plant No. 183 could not be brought to pre-war levels. In December 1942, it amounted to only 32,520 people and only decreased in subsequent years.

Did the allies interfere?

We can recall another problem of German tank building - attacks by Anglo-American strategic aviation. There is no doubt that the rain of high-explosive and incendiary bombs did not contribute to the productive work of tank factories. However, the impact of the bombings should not be overestimated either.

The first raid on enterprises that had any noticeable consequences was carried out in January 1943; on November 26, one of the large tank factories of the Alkett company was seriously damaged. Then, throughout 1944, the Allies continuously increased the power of air strikes.

The Americans themselves estimated the losses they caused to the Reich's production capacity at nine percent. In fact, it’s unlikely. Speer claims that the damage was more than compensated for by the commissioning of new workshops and the re-equipment of existing ones. After the war, W. Schlicker, the third most important person in the German Ministry of Armaments, told the amazed experts of the US Air Force: “As the bombing intensified, German production also increased, so that at the very moment of defeat, when everything was collapsing in Germany, The Ruhr produced more products than ever before.” And he continued his explanation as follows: “The Ruhr... ultimately fell not because plants, factories and mines were bombed, but because the railways leading to it were paralyzed as a result of the destruction of the tracks and clogged with burnt out steam locomotives and there simply were no there was no way to export 30 thousand tons of finished products that the Ruhr factories produced every day. In the end, in January and February 1945, the Ruhr was strangled by its own products - it did not stop the conveyor due to the roar of bombs."

It only remains to add that the paralysis of transport occurred after not only thousands of heavy strategic aircraft bombers hovered over Germany, but also tens of thousands of light bombers, attack aircraft and fighters. In other words, German industry stopped after it entered the front-line zone.

***

As a result, we inevitably come to a single conclusion: the system of the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry of the USSR demonstrated during the Great Patriotic War a higher level of technology and production organization than the mechanical engineering of Germany, which was considered unsurpassed. Domestic industry leaders, scientists and engineers made better use of the scarce material and human resources at their disposal and created more efficient large-scale production of military equipment.

This “tank factory war” is still little known to the general public, and its lessons have not lost their value over time. Therefore, the series of articles that will be published on the pages of “VPK” until May 2015 can be given the general name “NKTP: lessons from the Great Victory.”