List of Japanese Navy ships and war vessels in World War II

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• 1 Aircraft carrier 1.1 Heavy aircraft carriers
• 1.2 Light aircraft carriers
• 1.3 Escort of carriers
• 1.4 Seaplane tenders

Japanese battleships: babies and giants.

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Alternative shipbuilding - Fleets that never existed

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Japanese battleships: babies and giants.

This material is another version of “pocket battleships of Japan” and “small battleships of Japan”. I understand that three materials on one topic are, in principle, “butter and butter” - and here, without interruptions, for about six months (so that colleagues would forget what they were talking about). In many ways, this material is created for the sake of one (or rather, three) drawing. Namely, the alternative cruiser "Tone". The toad did not allow us to remove the kindly drawn ship, and we had to come up with material. More precisely, it turned out that this was already the third or fourth material - in the previous alternatives, the plot turned so that there was nowhere to stick the drawing.

Then I remembered that someone recommended that Shinano be completed as a battleship and hit the USA (and earlier, colleague Andrei described approximately the same thing). In principle, it can be considered a kind of continuation of “small battleships”, and a kind of alternative when it comes to the world of 4-gun ships.

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Realizing that the desire to make ships as light as possible leads to a decrease in their combat qualities (as demonstrated by the experience of the Aoba and Furutaka), Hiraga in the next series of heavy cruisers fully used the displacement limit allocated by Washington standards for each ship - 10 thousand tons. But before the ink had dried on the Myoko project, Hiraga realized that 10 guns, even 203 mm, would not be enough. The problem is that the Navy abandoned the project with 12 203 mm guns. But even 12 8-inch guns might not be enough in battle. After all, a Japanese cruiser will need to not only be individually stronger than any European or American cruiser, but also possibly resist two enemy ships at the same time. In other words, the ship must be armed with weapons that guarantee an advantage in battle. The choice fell on the 254 mm caliber.

If you install 6 (2*3) 254 mm guns, the Japanese ships will gain superiority in battle over any enemy cruiser.

But 6 guns were not enough for the cruiser in terms of rate of fire. In an attempt to correct the situation, i.e. to increase the rate of fire, it was decided to install 9 254 mm guns.

However, the third tower is additional weight. So how many guns are needed, and where is the reasonable ratio: 6 guns - in 2 three-gun turrets or 9 in 3 three-gun turrets. In the first case, the firepower is reduced, but the weight is light; in the second case, the firepower is high, but the weight is high.

Pondering over a complex problem, the designers chose the golden mean: install 2 turrets on the cruiser, but three-gun, and four-gun! The firepower in this version dropped slightly (from 9 to 8 guns, but more if there were 6 guns), and the weight was not so great.

Realizing that with 254 mm artillery, Japanese cruisers would be weak at close range (due to the low rate of fire of these guns), it was decided to strengthen the auxiliary weapons - by installing a stern and bow installation with 120/127 mm guns)

The installation of additional auxiliary guns gave rise to the idea of ​​“camouflage” weapons. After all, a turret with 254 mm guns, no matter how you disguise it, will still be noticeable. And since it is noticeable, it means that we are not far from realizing the fact that Japan did not care about the Washington Treaty. Therefore, we remove the main battery turrets with 254 mm guns, and in their place we install 2 installations of the ___ type. Or better yet, create a double, or rather quadruple, installation.

Unfortunately, things didn’t go beyond sketch work. Future “small battleships” / “pocket battleships” / heavy cruisers were equipped with a camouflage turret with 152 mm guns.

The camouflage tower presented another problem - training of sailors. More precisely, the teaching of sailors, but so that it remains a secret.

Since it was not possible to train sailors on the Miok (and later Takao, Tone, Mogami) in servicing a 4-gun turret with 254 mm guns (after all, the turrets would be installed only just before the war), Japan decided train sailors on special ships. These special ships turned out to be "Mishima" and "Okinoshima" (formerly "Admiral Senyavin" and "Admiral General Apraksin"), suitably modernized - i.e. received a new (for each ship) tower. The training of sailors, by the way, had one more hidden nuance - the turrets on the Japanese cruisers turned out to be identical.

At the beginning of 1930, Japan took part in the London Conference, as a result of which it was forced to sign the London Naval Treaty of 1930. According to this document, the number of heavy cruisers in the Japanese fleet was limited to 12 units. By that time, two heavy cruisers of the Furutaka and Aoba types were already in service. There were also four Myoko types and four Takao type units, formally light cruisers, were under construction. But the heavy Furutaki and Aoba with 203 mm guns were inferior in displacement to the Myoko and Takao with 152 mm guns. However, since the letter of the Treaty has been observed, then it must be fulfilled - after all, the American and European “Washingtonians” also did not quite fit into the limit. Moreover, it was not light cruisers with 152 mm guns that did not fit into the limit, but rather heavy cruisers with 203 mm artillery. Thus, even though Japan violated the rules (i.e. displacement), its “severity” was less compared to those who violated the rules (still the same - displacement) Great Britain and the USA.

However, Great Britain and the USA equated the Takao and Myoko with heavy cruisers. From such an equation, Japan was neither hot nor cold. Pretending that it was developing light cruisers, the Land of the Rising Sun was developing super-heavy cruisers.

The first “seemingly light, but actually heavy” cruiser was the Mogami-class cruiser (improved Takao). By standardly reducing weight wherever possible (and at the same time maintaining a significant reserve that exceeded displacement), the Japanese presented the world with another light cruiser.

The last “small battleships”, “pocket battleships” of Japan were the Tone-class cruisers. The type was significantly different from Japan's previous cruisers/small battleships/pocket battleships.

The peculiarity of the Tone type was that both main caliber turrets were concentrated in the bow of the ship, due to which the stern was freed up for aircraft to take off. The presence of 8 seaplanes to some extent compensated for the lack of 2 universal artillery installations.

On the other hand, Japan received “neither this nor that”, namely a heavy hydrocruiser (in principle, we need to develop this idea: W.K. Alex22 when do you have a DR there? - that will be a present)

Designing and building very powerful cruisers/small battleships/pocket battleships, designer Hiraga was influenced by his own work. Therefore, when designing a super-dreadnought (Yamato type), Hiraga took advantage of cruising developments.

Thus, the Yamato-class battleships generally had a similar silhouette and features to the “small battleships”. Two main caliber turrets with 4 guns, two turrets with universal artillery (127 mm) behind the turrets. That's where the similarities ended.

The Yamato's two-turret design made it possible to shorten the length of the battleship and increase the length of the armored belt (although it was able to cover only 2/3 - but still more than in the original), while the firepower (weight of the salvo) did not decrease by much: from 13140 kg at 9 guns, up to 11680 kg with 8 guns.

It is worth noting that in fact the Yamato type was designed to carry 12 guns (3*4) - the weight of a salvo would exceed 17 tons. The real reason was different. A battleship with a displacement of 60 thousand tons and with 460 mm guns (with the permitted 35 thousand tons and 406 mm guns) was already considered by the Japanese as not strong enough. Projects for the next generation of battleships, with guns with a caliber of at least 510 mm, were drawn up on the drawing boards. In these circumstances, there was no particular need to build a super battleship - after all, the next type was even more powerful.

The first two superbattleships, Yamato and Musashi, entered service in the first half of 1942. The third battleship of this series, Shinano, was 60% ready in December 1941 when its construction was frozen. In the summer of 1942 (after the Battle of Muday), it was decided to complete the construction of the battleship. But battleship No. 111, which was 40% ready, was decided to be completed as an aircraft carrier; At the same time, there were plans to complete the Shinano as an aircraft carrier, but they were too expensive.

All four Yamato-class ships (3 battleships and an aircraft carrier) took part in the famous Battle of the Philippines where the American fleet was defeated. Despite the success, strategically the situation for Japan has not changed.

Aircraft carrier

Heavy aircraft carriers

Light aircraft carriers

Carrier support

Seaplane tenders

The last success of the Japanese fleet

By March 1942, following the fall of Singapore and the destruction of ABDA's naval forces during the Battle of the Java Sea, the Japanese Navy took control of all waters surrounding Southeast Asia. The only threat here remained the British Eastern Fleet, based in Ceylon, Addu Atoll and East African harbors. At the same time, the Japanese needed the Carrier Strike Force of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo for the upcoming struggle for the central part of the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, the Japanese fleet had only two months to defeat the enemy in the Indian Ocean - March and April.

Goals and objectives of Operation “C”

The operation of the Japanese fleet in the Indian Ocean, designated “C” (that is, “Ceylon”), was in fact not a campaign to establish dominance in a specific naval theater, but a time-limited raid. It had to be completed on time, regardless of the result achieved.

On March 9, 1942, the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, assigned the commander of the Southern Expeditionary (2nd) Fleet, Admiral Nobutake Kondo, two tasks at once: to attack Ceylon, destroying all enemy naval forces located there, and to provide sea cover for the Burma operation.

Operations of Japanese forces in the Indian Ocean in the first half of 1942

The latter task was especially important: from January to May 1942, the Japanese 15th Army under Lieutenant General Iido Shojiro fought in Burma, with the goal of securing Indochina from land and reaching the borders of India. Until the construction of the Burma Railway, the supply of Japanese troops here had to be carried out by sea, and this route had to be secured from the British fleet.

The operation against Ceylon was entrusted to the 1st Air (Carrier) Fleet of Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, operationally subordinate to Kondo. Kondo took on the second task, selecting for this the Malayan formation of Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa: the light aircraft carrier Ryujo, accompanied by five heavy and one light cruiser, as well as eight destroyers.

Nagumo's powers

Under the command of Admiral Nagumo there were five aircraft carriers: Akagi, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku, organized into three carrier divisions - the 1st, 2nd and 5th. At the same time, the 1st division consisted of one flagship “Akagi” - its constant partner “Kaga” was sent to the metropolis on March 2 due to a malfunction in the vehicle. In total, the aircraft carriers carried 342 aircraft: 105 A6M2 Zero fighters, 114 D3A1 Val dive bombers and 123 B5N2 Kate torpedo bombers.

Vice Admiral Nagumo history.navy.mil

The aircraft carriers were accompanied by the 3rd squadron of battlecruisers: Kongo, Hiei, Haruna and Kirishima. These ships from the First World War were radically modernized in the 30s and now reached speeds of up to 30 knots. But their weak side armor (203 mm) did not give them any chance in battle with “real” battleships. In practice, these ships were considered as a kind of “super-heavy” cruisers to impart stability to high-speed formations, and in this capacity they were very actively used throughout the first year of the war. In addition to them, Nagumo had the 8th squadron of cruisers - heavy Tone and Chikuma, as well as the 1st squadron of destroyers (9 units) led by the light cruiser Abukuma:

• 17th Division - “Urakaze”, “Tanikaze”, “Isokaze”, “Hamakaze”;
• 18th Division - “Kasumi”, “Arare”, “Kagero”, “Shiranui”, “Akigumo”.

British forces

Nagumo's opponent was to be the Eastern Fleet of Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville, one of the best British naval commanders. Somerville replaced Geoffrey Layton in this post on February 12, 1942, even before the surrender of Singapore, but arrived at the theater only at the end of March. By this time, the British Indian Ocean fleet had been strengthened and now consisted of five battleships, two heavy and one light aircraft carriers, two heavy and five light cruisers, and fourteen destroyers.

Thus, the British were superior to the Japanese in battleships, cruisers and destroyers, but seriously inferior to them in aviation. The three British aircraft carriers had only 95 aircraft, including 37 fighters - 9 Sea Hurricanes, 12 Fulmars, 16 Wildcats (the British designated them as Martlets), as well as 45 Albacore biplane torpedo bombers. and 13 old Swordfish. True, some of the torpedo bombers, including the Swordfish, were equipped with radars and theoretically could carry out night attacks. In addition, the base aircraft located at Ceylon airfields should be taken into account: at Colombo and Trincomalee airfields there were a total of 82 fighters - 54 Hurricanes and 28 Fulmars (Paul S. Dall claims that there were also 14 Spitfires). In addition, the island had 11 high-speed twin-engine Blenheim bombers from the 11th Squadron of the Royal Air Force and 12 Catalina reconnaissance seaplanes as part of several units. Different researchers name very different numbers of aircraft - perhaps the reason for the discrepancies lies in different degrees of combat readiness. In any case, the Japanese had approximately a twofold superiority in the number of vehicles - decisive, but not crushing.

General diagram of bases and ports of the Indian Ocean in 1942 naval-history.net

The most difficult problem for the British Eastern Fleet was the problem of basing. The ports of Colombo and Trincomalee in Ceylon, which after the fall of Singapore and Java found themselves in the role of forward bases, had good berthing capacity and fuel reserves, but were poorly covered from sea and air. Bombay on the western coast of Hindustan had an excellent harbor, but was located away from the main theater, the same can be said about Aden at the entrance to the Red Sea. In fact, the main base of the Eastern Fleet became the Kilindini harbor in Kenya (on the other side of the Indian Ocean).

Secret "Base T"

To bridge the gap between the bases, since August 1941, the British began building a naval base on Addu Atoll in the southern part of the Maldives (600 miles southwest of Ceylon). A ring of reefs and islands formed a well-protected and deep-water anchorage here, where four passages led. From February 1942, construction of the base was accelerated.

Addu Atoll in 1976 legacy.lib.utexas.edu

The 1st Royal Coastal Defense Regiment was stationed on the atoll, and coastal and anti-aircraft batteries began to be built. Huge fuel tanks were installed on the islands of Hittadhoo and Gan, and piers were built on Gan. Construction of an airfield began here, which was supposed to be operational by the summer of 1942. However, it was completed only in 1943, and before that only seaplanes could operate from the lagoon. By the end of the war, part of the islands of the western arc was connected by dams along which a field railway ran. Service on the atoll was considered difficult due to the humid and hot climate. With the exception of fuel and ammunition, all supplies were stored on board civilian transport ships and refrigerators stationed in the lagoon.

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Addu Atoll during the war. A bird's eye view of the western island of Hithadhoo, where the RAF communications station is being built. The lagoon is on the right, the white stripe in the sea is the northern reef covering it Imperial War Museums

Airfield on Gan Island, post-war photo Imperial War Museums

An important advantage of Base T was its secrecy: the Maldives had very little contact with the outside world. The atoll's 5,600 residents were either relocated to other islands or mobilized as base support personnel. The Japanese began to suspect the existence of the base only after the Nagumo raid, and received more detailed information from the submarines only in the summer of 1942.

Arrival of Somerville

Admiral Somerville arrived in Trincomalee on the aircraft carrier Formideble only on March 24, 1942. It took him two more days to receive business at the headquarters of the Eastern Fleet and get acquainted with the entrusted ships, of which there were 29. At the same time, only a part of them were in the ports of Ceylon - for example, the battleships Royal Sovereign and Ramilles conducted artillery training on Addu , the aircraft carrier Indomitable also stayed here. On March 26, Somerville transferred his flag to the battleship Warspite and officially took command of the Eastern Fleet.

Vice Admiral Sir James Somerville and Captain J. N. Oliver aboard the battleship Warspite History of the Second World War. II. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956

While all Japanese ships could maintain a speed of at least 30 knots, the old British R-class battleships were only capable of 21 knots according to specification, and in reality even less. Only Warspite, which belonged to the previous series, underwent modernization in the 30s with increased deck armor and replacement of the power plant. According to the specifications, it could produce 23.5 knots, but in 1944 18 knots was already considered high speed for it. Therefore, Somerville decided to divide his ships into two formations - high-speed and low-speed.

B high-speed Connection A

, which Somerville left under his direct command, included the new aircraft carriers Indomitable and Formidable, the battleship Warspite (flagship), the heavy cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall, the light Enterprise and Emerald, as well as destroyers Napier, Nestor, Paladin, Panther, Hotspur and Foxhound.

In low-speed Compound B

Under the command of Rear Admiral Algernon Willis, the battleships Revenge, Resolution, Ramilles and Royal Sovereign, the old light aircraft carrier Hermes, the old light cruisers Caledon, Dragon and the Dutch Jacob van Heemskerk remained under the command of Rear Admiral Algernon Willis. , as well as the destroyers Griffin, Norman, Arrow, Wild, Fortune, Scout, Vampire and the Dutch Isaac Sweers. This division was carried out only at the first assembly of the entire fleet on the evening of March 31st.

Light aircraft carrier Hermes in China, 1931 collections.naval.aviation.museum

Intelligence data

The problem on both sides was the almost complete lack of information about the enemy. Only on March 28, Somerville's headquarters received an intelligence report from the Far Eastern Combined Bureau (FECB), where they were able to read the Japanese JN-25B code. From the decoded conversations it followed that the enemy was preparing to carry out an air attack on Ceylon around April 1.

Somerville decided that the Japanese would attack Colombo and Trincomalee simultaneously. The launch point for the aircraft was to be located 180-200 miles from both ports, that is, approximately 100 miles southeast of Ceylon. The admiral ordered Catalina reconnaissance seaplanes to begin searching for the enemy at a distance of 420 miles from Colombo in the 110-154º sector, from where the Japanese were expected to approach.

Somerville considered dawn to be the most likely time of attack, so he set a rendezvous for his ships on March 31 at 16:00 off the southern tip of Ceylon. He did not know the composition of the enemy forces, but was sure that the main striking power of the Japanese would be aircraft carriers. They should have been attacked with all forces immediately after discovery, and the British commander placed a special emphasis on the twin-engine Blenheims from Colombo.

In a linear battle, Somerville counted on the superiority of his battleships, so at night both formations had to search for the enemy southeast of Ceylon, during the day moving north of the island, where the battleships would be relatively safe from air attacks.

Fruitless search

Somerville searched for the enemy for two nights (April 1 and 2), but reconnaissance planes reported that the sea was clear. On the afternoon of April 2, it became clear that the R-class battleships were running out of fresh water for their boilers, although there was still enough fuel. Therefore, at 9 pm, the commander gave the order to the Eastern Fleet to move to Addu Atoll. He decided that the intelligence had been mistaken, or that the Japanese had discovered the concentration of British forces and abandoned the strike.

The next morning, Somerville divided his formation: the heavy cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall were sent to Colombo (the first to resume repairs, the second to escort troop convoy SU4 to Australia), and Hermes, accompanied by the destroyer Vampire, went to Trincomalee to prepare for Operation Ironclad (landings in Madagascar).

At 16:30, an hour and a half after the entire fleet arrived at Adda, Somerville received the long-awaited message: the Catalina patrol from the 413th Canadian squadron had discovered a large enemy formation southeast of Ceylon. It was located 360 miles from the southern tip of the island and 600 miles from Addu Atoll. The composition of the formation remained unknown, since immediately after discovery the Catalina was shot down by Japanese carrier-based fighters.

Nagumo raid. Maneuvering Japanese and British formations ibiblio.org

Admiral Somerville's Difficult Choice

Somerville found itself in an extremely difficult situation: due to the lack of oil tankers, the ships of Force A at that time had time to take only half of the fuel, and Force B had not yet started bunkering and could not finish it until the next morning. Meanwhile, there was no doubt that at dawn Japanese planes would attack Ceylon bases.

The British commander found himself in a terrible position: he saw the situation, understood the enemy’s intentions, but could do nothing. The situation could not be saved even by the immediate dispatch of the high-speed Compound A with an incomplete complement (without the cruisers Emerald and Enterprise). Somerville therefore decided to wait until all ships were refueled and engage the enemy the following night, assuming that by this time the bomber attacks from Ceylon would have inflicted some casualties on the Japanese. As he wrote in his report, “ the only opportunity to inflict an effective blow on the enemy was the use of carrier-based aircraft, preferably at night.”

The presence of radars gave hope for the success of these attacks. At the same time, the presence of battleships made it possible to count on victory in a direct meeting with the enemy, so the British admiral sought to keep his low-speed formation close to the high-speed one. He ordered the heavy cruisers to leave Ceylon: according to the timing, they were supposed to meet the main forces at 16:00 the next day.

The cruisers left Colombo at 23:00, Force A left Addu at 00:15, moving on a course of 70 degrees at a speed of 18 knots. By dawn on April 6, Somerville expected to be at a point located 250 miles south of Ceylon.

Colombo attack

Admiral Nagumo's 1st Air Fleet, accompanied by the fleet tanker Shikoku Maru, left Staring Bay on the island of Sulawesi on March 26. Having passed through the Timor Sea, he slowly moved towards Ceylon along the southwestern coast of Sumatra.

On April 4, at 19:30 Tokyo time (that is, at 15:30 Indian time), a reconnaissance Catalina suddenly appeared above the Japanese ships, stretched out in a long wake column. Instantly, 18 duty fighters took off from the aircraft carriers (6 from Hiryu, 3 each from the others), and the flying boat under the command of Australian Leonard Birchall was shot down, having only managed to transmit the coordinates of the Japanese formation. Six of the nine crew members were picked up by the destroyer Isokaze.

During the night, British Catalina patrols once again saw enemy destroyers, but only at 7:02 did they discover the main Japanese force (battleship, 2 cruisers and 4 other ships) 110 miles from Dondra Head in the direction of 195º.

Admiral Somerville made a slight mistake in his calculations: Nagumo did not rush, but took off his planes shortly after dawn. The pilots were ordered to pay special attention to attacking port facilities (primarily oil storage facilities). At 6:25 a.m. local time, 127 Japanese carrier-based aircraft (36 Zeros, 38 Vals and 53 Keiths) appeared over Colombo on the west coast of Ceylon. A ground radar station located in Colombo detected the enemy in advance, but its message reached the airfield only 20 minutes before the raid. However, all 42 British fighters were scrambled: 28 aircraft from the airfield and 14 Hurricanes from a temporary site at the racecourse.

Auxiliary cruiser Hector in Melbourne, 1940 clydeships.co.uk

The first wave of Japanese bombers attacked the harbor and port facilities from high altitude. The second wave, arriving at low altitude, struck the railway station and airfields. The Kates of the third wave bombed ships in the harbor, sinking the destroyer Tenedos and the auxiliary cruiser Hector, converted from a turbine liner (11,198 GRT, 15 knots, six 152 mm guns). In addition, the Lucia submarine base was seriously damaged, and the fleet's repair shops on the shore were destroyed. A total of 55 British sailors were killed, 33 of them on the Tenedos.

The air raid lasted only half an hour, the British lost 27 aircraft - 15 Hurricanes, 4 Fulmars, 2 Catalinas and 6 Swordfish, the Japanese - 5 or 7 aircraft. Nine Blenheims were sent from Colombo to attack enemy ships, but they did not find a target.

The death of Dorsetshire and Cornwall

Immediately after reporting the attack, Somerville sent an air patrol ahead. In addition, four Fulmars were sent from Indomiteble to search for the enemy in the sector between 55º and 105º to a depth of 215 miles. They did not find any enemy ships, but at 08:55 they spotted an enemy seaplane 150 miles from Force A on a heading of 76º. Somerville believed that the enemy was conducting reconnaissance in a southwestern direction using an aircraft from a cruiser or aircraft carrier. However, at 7:20, new messages about enemy ships began to arrive from base reconnaissance officers. It became clear that they were maneuvering in one place, clearly waiting for their planes. "Dorsetshire" and "Cornwall" at that time were 150 miles from the Nagumo connection, between it and Somerville, going west at a speed of 27.5 knots.

Soon the British cruisers were actually discovered by a seaplane from the cruiser Tone 200 miles southwest of Ceylon. 53 Val dive bombers took off from Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu. Between 12:38 and 13:00 local time, the cruisers were overtaken and sunk: 234 sailors died on the Dorsetshire, 190 on the Cornwall, the rest of the crews were rescued by the British destroyers the next day. The anti-aircraft fire of the cruisers turned out to be ineffective, and the Japanese had no losses.

The sinking of the British heavy cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall, as seen from a Japanese aircraft, April 5, 1942 wwiiarchives.net

Somerville didn't even know where the cruisers were, so he couldn't send fighters to provide air cover. He received data about their location from a reconnaissance plane after their death. One of the destroyers was urgently sent forward, but it was soon recalled when news began to arrive from deck and base reconnaissance officers about the appearance of enemy ships, in different numbers and in different places. Apparently, the insufficient experience of British reconnaissance pilots affected this.

Receiving contradictory and scattered information about the enemy, in addition often very late, Somerville decided that the Japanese were heading to Addu Atoll and were going to strike at it the next morning. Therefore, he ordered his formations to turn back and go southwest to avoid detection by the Japanese.

At 16:55, two reconnaissance Albacores from Indomiteble discovered the enemy, although one of them was immediately shot down by Japanese fighters. This happened 120 miles ahead of the British formation at a heading of 20º. But Somerville received information about this only at 6 p.m. In addition, at 18:17, the commander of the aircraft carriers reported to Warspite that the group of ships discovered at 16:00 consisted of 2 aircraft carriers and 3 unidentified ships, and was heading northwest.

Somerville immediately turned northwest, towards the enemy, while simultaneously sending out scouts with radars from the Indomiteble. He hoped to discover Japanese aircraft carriers at night so that he could be the first to attack them early in the morning.

Night reconnaissance aircraft from the Indomitable failed to detect the Japanese ships: Nagumo turned to the southwest, in turn, allowing reconnaissance aircraft to search for the main enemy forces. On the evening of April 5, the enemy formations were closest to each other, but almost simultaneously turned in different directions. Early in the morning of April 6, Force B also approached the British aircraft carriers. Now the Eastern Fleet was together again, but it had lost the enemy.

Departure of the Eastern Fleet

Somerville still assumed that the Japanese were going to attack Adda. He hoped to be the first to find the enemy or at least intercept him on his return from the attack. At 13:00, the admiral sent the light cruiser Enterprise, along with the destroyers Panther and Paladin, to the site of the death of Dorsetshire and Cornwall to search for survivors. From the air, the ships were covered by an escort of carrier-based fighters. In total, 1,122 people were picked up from the water.

A circular search by deck scouts over a distance of 200 miles for the whole day yielded nothing, but at 14 o'clock a message arrived from the reconnaissance department in Ceylon that a strong Japanese fleet was still located somewhere between Addu Atoll and Colombo. Therefore, Somerville decided to stay away from the Addu area - at least until dawn on April 7.

On the afternoon of April 7, British deck reconnaissance continued to search for the enemy, but found nothing. At 16:00, ships with those rescued from the cruisers joined the squadron. On the night of April 8, there was no longer any air search with radars, but in the morning reconnaissance planes were again scrambled from aircraft carriers. At 11:00 the fleet entered Addu Harbor and immediately began refueling.

In the afternoon, Somerville convened a meeting of his commanders on board the Warspite, where he announced an order had arrived from London to cease active operations. The slow-moving formation was supposed to go to the shores of Africa, the high-speed one was supposed to head to Bombay, where it arrived on the morning of April 13. The British Eastern Fleet was effectively disbanded.

Trincomalee attack

Meanwhile, Nagumo did not go anywhere, continuing to act according to the original plan, receiving planes and refueling. By the morning of April 9, the 1st Air Fleet described a huge arc and was east of Ceylon, 200 miles from its second target - the port of Trincomalee.

Knowing that they might be waiting for him, Nagumo now acted much more carefully. Deck planes began to take off before dawn, at 5 a.m. local time. These were 91 Kate torpedo bombers and 41 Zero fighters.

The British radar in Trincomalee detected the enemy air group at 6:35, so the attack was met by all the aircraft available here - 17 Hurricanes and 6 Fulmars. During the fierce battle, 8 Hurricanes and 1 Fulmar were shot down, Japanese pilots reported another 14 aircraft destroyed on the ground. The Japanese themselves lost 5 vehicles, and one of the Keiths purposefully rammed fuel tanks, the fire in which then continued for a week.

However, the Trincomalee harbor turned out to be almost empty: the patrol Catalina discovered the Japanese squadron the night before, and the local command ordered all ships to go to sea if possible. Therefore, the Japanese managed to hit only two ships - the monitor Erebus and the turbine transport Sagaing (7994 gross tons), which delivered a cargo of ammunition, beer and whiskey from England, as well as four dismantled Hurricanes.

Sinking aircraft carrier Hermes cas.awm.gov.au

The monitor was damaged, the transport caught fire, and some of the ammunition on it exploded, but the monitor itself remained afloat, was towed to the shore and subsequently sunk as a breakwater. In addition, the shipyard and hydroairfield buildings, coastal warehouses and structures were seriously damaged.

History repeated itself again on April 5: at about 7 o'clock local time, the reconnaissance seaplane E8N2 "Dave", launched from the battleship "Haruna", discovered the aircraft carrier "Hermes" (10,850 tons) 65 miles south of Trincomalee. An hour later, a new strike group of 85 Val dive bombers, accompanied by 9 Zeros, was lifted from the aircraft carriers. From 9:35 to 14:02 (13:35-14:02 Tokyo time) they overtook and sank the old aircraft carrier, as well as the accompanying Australian destroyer Vampire (1188 tons) and the corvette Hollyhock (1170 tons) - despite that 12 Fulmars arrived from Ceylon to cover the ships. The Japanese lost four Vals, the British two Fulmars. 307 people died on the Hermes, 8 on the Vampire, including the commander (the rest were picked up by the hospital ship Vita).

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Royal Australian Navy destroyer Vampire viewer.slv.vic.gov.au

Hollyhock Corvette hmshollyhock.com

In addition, the naval tankers Etelstein (5,571 brt, 7,000 tons of fuel oil) and British Sargent (5,868 brt, empty), as well as the Norwegian merchant ship Norviken (2,924 brt), were discovered and destroyed at sea after leaving the harbor in the morning.

At 9:50 local time, the Japanese ships received an unexpected response: 11 twin-engine Blenheims attacked the aircraft carrier Akagi, approaching from the bow corners. The pilots reported three close explosions, but all the bombs missed. Contrary to Somerville's hopes, in order to get into the ship from horizontal flight, pilots had to have special training. While retreating, the bombers were attacked by belatedly raised Zeros, 5 of them were shot down, the rest were seriously damaged.

On the afternoon of April 9, the Japanese ships turned east and moved towards the entrance to the Strait of Malacca. On the evening of April 13, they passed Singapore and entered the South China Sea, heading for the waters of the mother country.

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Tanker "Ethelstein" hmshollyhock.com

Tanker British Sargent photoship.co.uk

Failure or success?

The results of Nagumo's raid into the Indian Ocean are difficult to assess unambiguously. On the one hand, the outfit of forces (4 battleships, 5 aircraft carriers, 342 carrier-based aircraft) looks unreasonably excessive for an attack on two ports. On this basis, some researchers tend to assess the outcome of the raid as a failure.

At the same time, the Japanese were opposed by a powerful naval group, inferior in aircraft carriers, but superior in battleships. As a result of the operation, the British Eastern Fleet was forced to retreat without a fight, ensuring the enemy dominance in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean. Thus, the task assigned to Nagumo was brilliantly completed. Moreover, British losses were heavy. A light aircraft carrier, two heavy and one auxiliary cruisers, two destroyers and a corvette were sunk, as well as a high-speed transport, two naval tankers and a bulk carrier with a total capacity of 22,357 GRT were destroyed or completely disabled. In addition, British aviation lost about fifty aircraft.

The British Eastern Fleet suffered its second defeat in five months and was forced to retreat again. If the price of the first defeat was Malaya and Singapore, then the price of this was Burma.

Literature:

1. S. Roskill. Fleet and war. Volume II. M.: Voenizdat, 1970
2. [Paul] Stephen Dull. The battle path of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Ekaterinburg: Sphere, 1997
3. Neil McCart. HMS Hermes 1923 & 1959. Cheltenham, UK: Fan Publications, 2001
4. Jürgen Rohwer. Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945: The Naval History of World War Two (Third Revised ed.). Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2005
5. Christopher Shores, Brian Cull, Yasuho Izawa. Bloody Shambles: The Defense of Sumatra to the Fall of Burma. II. London: Grub Street, 1993
6. Service histories of Royal Navy warships in World War 2 by LtCdr Geoffrey B. Mason, RN (Rtd) (c) 2003. HMS Warspite https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-01BB-Warspite.htm
7. Report of Proceedings (ROP) of the Eastern Fleet - 1942. Transcribed by Don Kindell - https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWD-EF1942-Introduction.htm
8. Eastern Theater Operations, the Diaries of Adm Layton, C-in-C, China Station - November 1941 to March 1942 https://www.naval-history.net/xDKWD-EF1941ChinaStation.htm
9. Anthony P. Tully and Gilbert Casse. IJN Akagi: Tabular Record of Movement https://www.combinedfleet.com/Akagi.htm
10. https://www.hmshollyhock.com/

Armored ships

Battlecruisers

Battleships

Heavy cruisers

Light cruisers

Japanese Ise-class battleships of World War II

American air attack on the battleship Ise

When launched from the stocks in 1914, the Fuso and its sister ship, the Yamashiro, completed in 1915, were the most powerful battleships of the Japanese Navy. In 1916 and 1917 To the first two, two more ships of the same class were added, Ise and Hyuga. In terms of firepower, they were superior to most large ships of the US Navy and were approximately equal to the Pennsylvania-class battleships. The appearance of warships of this class in Japan meant a loud statement of the country about itself as a major maritime power. 14-in. (356-mm) Fuso main caliber guns were manufactured in Japan; the layout of the gun turrets was atypical: two were installed in front, two in the rear, and two more in the middle of the ship.

Damaged battleship Ise – video

By the time a military storm broke out in the Pacific Ocean, the Ise and battleships of the same type had undergone several modernizations. Between 1935 and 1937, the Ise was equipped with a composite foremast and a 3.1-in. (77 mm) anti-aircraft guns. Fuso underwent a major overhaul between 1930 and 1935, when the forward funnel was replaced by pagoda-style masts, the main mast was extended, and the ship's armor protection was significantly increased, including on her deck and underwater. As a result, the hull in the aft part was somewhat lengthened, and the weight of the vessel increased by 3,500 tons. The completely updated engine room housed more powerful Kampon turbines instead of Brown-Curtis turbines. The arsenal of light weapons gradually increased, in addition, the Fuso could carry up to three seaplanes (usually Nakajima Type 95). Apart from providing support to its troops seizing the islands at the beginning of the Pacific War, Japan's capital ships did not play a major role in the fighting in this theater of war.

After suffering losses in the Battle of Midway Island in 1943, the Ise and Hyuga were converted into some kind of “hybrids” - battleships-aircraft carriers. Towers “X” and “Y” were dismantled, replacing them with catapults for seaplanes, which, upon returning from a mission, were lifted on board using a crane. The ships could carry up to 22 seaplanes, but the converted battleships were not particularly successful. The number of air defense guns kept increasing until the number of 25-mm automatic anti-aircraft guns exceeded 100 barrels, despite the fact that at the beginning of its history the Ise had only 16 units of air defense weapons. At the same time, all medium-caliber guns were removed from the ship. The aircraft of the Ise aviation group did not have the range or firepower to have a serious impact on battles in the skies over sea and land, and towards the end of the war the catapults were removed, and in Leyte Gulf the Ise operated without aircraft. On July 18, 1945, not far from Kure, the Ise was sunk to the bottom by carrier-based combat aircraft from American aircraft carriers. Hyuga followed six days later. Since both sank in shallow waters after the end of the war, the battleships were raised in 1945 and cut up for scrap.

Tactical and technical characteristics of the battleship “Ise”

Photos of Ise-class battleships

Source

Destroyers

Destroyers

Torpedo boats

Escort destroyers (Kaibkan)

Submarine

Tactical and technical characteristics of the battleship Yamato

Commissioned…………………December 16, 1941 Status…………………sunk April 7, 1945 north of Okinawa

Displacement…………………standard 63,200 t; total 72,810 t Length………………………243.9/256/263 m Beam………………………36.9 m Draft………………………10.4 m

Reservation side……………………410 mm traverses…………………300 mm main deck…………………200…230 mm upper deck…………………35…50 mm main battery turrets……………………650 mm (front), 250 mm (side), 270 mm (roof) main battery barbettes…………………up to 560 mm turrets of 155 mm guns………… …………25…75 mm barbettes for turrets 155 mm…………………guns—75 mm deckhouse…………………500 mm (side), 200 mm (roof)

Engines ……………………4 TZA Kampon Power……………………150,000 l. With. (110 MW) Speed………………………27.5 knots (51 km/h) Cruising range………………………7200 nautical miles at 16 knots

Crew…………………2500 people

Armament of the battleship Yamato

Artillery…………………3 × 3 - 460 mm/45; 4 × 3 - 155 mm/60; (later reduced to 2 × 3) Anti-aircraft artillery…………………6 × 2 - 127 mm/40 (later increased to 12 × 2); 8 × 3 - 25 mm (later - 52 × 3); 2 × 2 - 13.2 mm machine guns Aviation group…………………2 catapults, 7 seaplanes

Underwater tender

Gunboats

Anti-mine ships

Battleship Yamato video of the last battle

Armed with a giant 18-in. (457-mm) guns (rubbed in the turret), with its 1,460-kg Yamato shells could destroy targets at a distance of 42,000 m, while the rate of fire of its main artillery reached from one and a half to two rounds per minute. In turn, according to calculations, the battleship was supposed to withstand an 18-inch hit. (460-mm) projectile from a distance of 20,100 to 30,170 m. The armor that protected the Yamato from aircraft bombs looked no less impressive, although the anti-torpedo protection turned out to be surprisingly unfinished. However, in battles this flaw did not become the most fatal for the giant. Yamato was laid down on November 4, 1937, launched on July 8, 1940, and completed on December 16, 1941. In 1942, after Yamato, the second super battleship, Musashi, entered service, while the third of the same type The ship, Shinano, due to the changed nature of the war at sea, it was decided to convert into a heavy aircraft carrier. Construction of the fourth ship in the series was never completed.

The Yamato-class battleships looked impressive on the water - like no other warship in the Imperial Navy. However, they came into action only when the initiative that Japan held in the Pacific Ocean began to gradually pass to the US Navy. Lacking their own air cover, the Yamato and similar ships were vulnerable to the carrier-based aircraft of American aircraft carriers, and as a result, the Japanese command, not wanting to take risks, used super-battleships rarely and with great reluctance. Both ships—the most precious in the entire Japanese Navy—eventually sank to the bottom, although their destruction was not easy for the Americans. The Musashi probably took at least 19 torpedoes and 17 direct bomb hits before it sank in Leyte Gulf in October 1944. The Yamato was luckier, but it was also intercepted on April 7, 1945, in the East China Sea, when it made a suicide mission to the rescue of Japanese troops besieged on Okinawa. In total, at least 386 US Navy aircraft took part in the attacks on the Yamato, which took 11 to 15 torpedoes and another seven direct bomb hits to sink.

Auxiliary vessels

Food supply ship

Repair ship

Research vessel