List of the most successful American submarines in World War II CONTENTS and Total tonnage[edit]

Wikipedia listing article
Size of the Japanese merchant fleet during World War II
(all figures in tons) [1]

date	Add-ons	Losses	Net change	Total at the end of the period	Index
July 12, 1941	6 384 000	100
12/1941	44 200	51 600	−7 400	6 376 600	99
1942	661 800	1 095 800	−434 000	5 942 600	93
1943	1 067 100	2 065 700	-998,600	4 494 400	77
1944	1,735,100	4 115 100	-2,380,000	2 564 000	40
1/45 — 8/45	465 000	1 562 100	−1 097 100	1,466,900	23

In World War II, the US Navy used submarines heavily. In total, 263 American submarines flew war patrols, [2] requiring 1,392 ships and 5,583,400 tons during the war. [3] US Navy submarines sank 540,192 tons, or 30% of the Japanese fleet, and 4,779,902 tons of shipping, or 54.6% of all Japanese ships in the Pacific theater.
Submarines delivered 18,553 mines. [4] [5] At the beginning of the war, Japanese merchant ships had a carrying capacity of approximately six million tons. By the end of the war, in August 1945, the capacity was two million, of whom only 320,000 could carry cargo. [6] Submarine warfare began on December 7, 1941, when the Chief of the Navy ordered the Navy to "wage unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan." [7] The policy appears to have been carried out without the knowledge or prior consent of the government. [5] The London Maritime Treaty, to which the United States was a signatory, [5] required submarines to comply with prize rules (commonly known as "cruising rules"). It did not prohibit arming merchant ships, [5] but by arming them or forcing them to report contacts with submarines (or raiders), they de facto

naval auxiliaries and removed the guards from the cruiser according to the rules. [8] [9] This made restrictions on submarines effectively moot. [5] US Navy submarines also conducted reconnaissance patrols, special forces and guerrilla landings, and search and rescue operations. [10] The submarines were so successful that by early 1944 they were struggling to find targets. [11] The War on Shipping was the most decisive factor in the collapse of the Japanese economy, and the Japanese Cabinet reported to the National Diet after the war that "the greatest cause of defeat was the loss of shipping." [7] [12]

Beginning in 1941, U-boats patrolled the American Theater, hunting German submarines and protecting shipping lanes. Submarine Squadron 50, formed in 1942, served in the European Theatre. The squadron took part in several invasions and hunted blockade runners, first in Spain and then in Norway. The ships scored several hits, but due to a lack of targets, they were returned to the United States. [eleven]

Total tonnage[edit]

USS Tang

During World War II USS Tang

sank 116,454 tons, the largest shipping tonnage for the United States.
Her tonnage was revised based on the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC) report, which initially stated that Tang
had suffered fewer dives.
(93,824 tons and 24 ships) In 1980, the corresponding JANAC section was officially replaced and updated. [13] Tang
sank over 16,000 tons over the second largest submarine,
USS Lighter
(100231).
All 23 submarines sank between 99,901 ( USS
Rasher
)
and 59,800 (
USS Archerfish)
tons.
Fourteen submarines were Gato-class, six were Gato-Balao-class, four were Tambor-class and one was Sargo-class. The best American submarines of World War II by tonnage were sunk

Boat	Type	Total capacity [14]	Link(s)
Tang	Balao class submarine	116 454 [b]	[15] [16]
Flasher	Gateau-class submarine	100 231	[15] [17]
Rusher	Gateau-class submarine	99 901	[15] [18]
Barb	Gateau-class submarine	96 628	[15] [19]
Silverside	Gateau-class submarine	90 080	[15] [20]
Spadefish	Balao class submarine	88 091	[21] [22]
Trigger	Gateau-class submarine	86,552	[21] [23]
Drum	Gateau-class submarine	80 580	[21] [24]
Jack	Gateau-class submarine	76 687	[21] [25]
A long nose	Gateau-class submarine	75 473	[21] [26]
Tautog	Tambor class submarine	72 606	[21] [27]
Sea Horse	Balao class submarine	72 529	[21] [28]
Guardfish	Gateau-class submarine	72 424	[21] [29]
Sea wolf	Sargo-class submarine	71 609	[21] [30]
Gudgeon	Tambor class submarine	71 047	[21] [31]
Sea lion	Balao class submarine	68 297	[21] [32]
Bowfin	Balao class submarine	67 882	[21] [33]
Thresher	Tambor class submarine	66 172	[21] [34]
Tinoza	Gateau-class submarine	64 655	[21] [35]
Grayback	Tambor class submarine	63 835	[21] [36]
Pogy	Gateau-class submarine	62 633	[21] [37]
bone fish	Gateau-class submarine	61 345	[21] [38]
Wahoo	Gateau-class submarine	60 038	[21] [39]
Sunfish	Gateau-class submarine	59 815	[21] [40]
Archerfish	Balao class submarine	59 800	[21] [41]

American Tambor class submarines

Tambor submarines were the next logical step in the development of American submarines. 12 boats of this type had increased striking power, although they retained some design features of their predecessors, the Salmon-class submarines. The submarines had a fairly large range, which allowed them to reach the coast of Japan, and their weapons were strong enough to inflict significant damage on the enemy at such a distance. TDC-equipped Tambor-class submarines have successfully interacted with surface forces.

Submarines of the Tambor type were developed on the basis of the Salmon/Sargo submarines. Otherwise, in terms of design, the new submarines were close to the prototype, but had a more durable hull and increased armament - 10 torpedo tubes instead of eight for the Salmon and Sargo submarines. The new double-hulled boat could dive to a depth of 90 meters (the design depth of hull destruction was 150 meters). Diesels with direct transmission to the propeller shafts served as the power plant.

Tambor-class submarines were built under the fiscal year 1939 (SS-198-203) and fiscal year 1940 (SS-206-211) programs. The submarines entered service in 1939-1941.

During the war in 1942-1943, submarines of this type underwent modernization - the wheelhouse was replaced with a lower one, having sponsons to accommodate 40-mm Bofors and 20-mm Oerlikons.

However, there was one “but”... By accepting the Tambor submarines into service, the leadership of the submarine forces was forced to agree to the production of two clearly unsuccessful and not consistent with the strategic concept of the use of small M submarines. This concession was much regretted in December 1941, so as there were not enough submarines with a long range.

The Tambor submarines were the last American submarines to enter service before the United States entered the war. With the outbreak of hostilities, these submarines represented the main striking force until they began to be replaced by Gato-class submarines at the end of 1942. Despite this, Tambor boats continued to remain in the first line until the end of 1944, only after which they were transferred to secondary directions and training centers. Of the 12 Tambor boats built, 7 were lost. The SS-199 “Toutog” boat became the leader in the number of sunk ships and enemy ships.

Tambor class submarine service history

USS Tambor (SS-198). Laid down on December 20, 1939. Scrapped in 1959.

USS Toutog (SS-199). Laid down on January 27, 1940. Scrapped in 1959.

USS Thresher (SS-200). Laid down on March 27, 1940. Scrapped in 1948.

USS Triton (SS-201). Laid down on March 25, 1940. Died on March 15, 1943 - sunk by Japanese ships north of the Admiralty Islands.

USS Trout (SS-202). Laid down on May 21, 1940. Died on February 29, 1944 - sunk southeast of Okinawa.

USS Tuna (SS-203). Laid down on October 2, 1940. Sunk on September 25, 1944.

USS Gar (SS-206). Laid down on November 7, 1940. Scrapped in 1959.

USS Grampus (SS-207). Laid down on December 23, 1940. Before the US entered World War II, the boat was based in New London. During 1942-1943, the submarine USS Grampus completed five combat campaigns, of which the first, fourth and fifth were considered successful. This submarine sank six Japanese ships with a total tonnage of 45.4 thousand tons. Awarded three battle stars. SS-207 went to the Solomon Islands on its sixth trip in February 1943 and went missing.

USS Grayback (SS-208). Laid down on January 31, 1941. She died in February-March 1944 in the East China Sea.

USS Grayling (SS-209). Laid down on September 4, 1940. She went missing in August-September 1943, most likely sunk off the island of Luzon.

USS Grenadier (SS-210). Laid down on November 29, 1940. On April 21, 1943, she was seriously damaged by Japanese aircraft in the Strait of Malacca. Died on April 22, 1943 - scuttled by her crew off Penang.

USS Gudgeon (SS-211). Laid down on April 21, 1941. She died in April - May 1944 in the Mariana Islands.

Technical characteristics: Surface displacement - 1475 tons. Underwater displacement - 2370 tons. Length - 93.6 m. Width - 8.3 m. Powerplant - 2 diesel engines with a power of 5400 hp / 2 electric motors with a power of 2740 hp. Speed 20/8.8 knots Scuba diving range is 60 miles at 5 mph. Surface cruising range is 10,000 miles at 10 mph. The duration of autonomous navigation is 75 days. Crew - 60 people. Armament: Torpedo tubes - 10 (6 bow, 4 stern) 533 mm caliber. Ammunition - 24 torpedoes. 76.2 mm caliber gun.

Prepared from materials: lib.rus.ec shipwiki.ru commi.narod.ru

Ships sunk[edit]

USS Tautog

USS Tang

sank 33 ships, making it the largest tonnage of US ships sunk in World War II.
Its tonnage was revised based on the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC) report, which originally stated that the Tang
had suffered fewer casualties.
(93,824 tons and 24 ships) In 1980, the corresponding JANAC section was officially replaced and updated. [13] Tautog
had the second largest sinking
,
with 26. The remaining submarines sunk ranged from 23 (
Silverside)
to 14 (
Kingfish
).
Seventeen ships were of

Gato
class , four
of

Balao
class , and three
of

Tambor
class .
The best American submarines of World War II by number of ships sunk

Boat	Type	Ships sunk [14]	Link(s)
Tang	Balao class submarine	33	[15] [16]
Tautog	Tambor class submarine	26 year	[21] [27]
Silverside	Gateau-class submarine	23	[15] [20]
Flasher	Gateau-class submarine	21 years old	[15] [17]
Spadefish	Balao class submarine	21 years old	[21] [22]
Sea Horse	Balao class submarine	20	[21] [28]
Wahoo	Gateau-class submarine	20	[21] [39]
Guardfish	Gateau-class submarine	19	[21] [29]
Rusher	Gateau-class submarine	19	[21]
Sea wolf	Sargo-class submarine	18	[21] [30]
Trigger	Gateau-class submarine	18	[21] [23]
A long nose	Gateau-class submarine	17	[21] [26]
Barb	Gateau-class submarine	17	[15] [19]
Thresher	Tambor class submarine	17	[21] [34]
Bowfin	Balao class submarine	16	[21] [33]
Stronger	Gateau-class submarine	16	[21]
Tinoza	Gateau-class submarine	16	[21] [35]
Pogy	Gateau-class submarine	16	[21] [37]
Sunfish	Gateau-class submarine	16	[21] [40]
Drum	Gateau-class submarine	15	[21] [24]
Flying fish	Gateau-class submarine	15	[21]
Grinling	Gateau-class submarine	15	[21]
Jack	Gateau-class submarine	15	[21] [25]
Grayback	Tambor class submarine	14	[21]
Kingfish	Gateau-class submarine	14	[21] [36]

The failures of American submariners

Let’s start our analysis of accident rates in the nuclear submarine fleet with the US Navy, the pioneers in the development of this type of weapon.
The first tragic event in the US Navy dates back to 1954, when four people died as a result of a main power plant accident.

In June 1960, an explosion occurred on board the Sargo while loading oxygen, causing a fire. To prevent its spread, the boat was scuttled right at the pier. After being lifted, she was placed in dry dock and repaired.

In 1961, an increase in radioactivity was noted on board the submarine missile carrier Theodore Roosevelt, caused by improper actions of personnel when servicing the primary circuit of the reactor. As a result, the missile carrier had to be removed from combat duty and decontaminated.

In October 1962, a fire broke out on the nuclear submarine Triton at the Groton shipyard, causing significant damage.

The first disaster befell American submariners on April 10, 1963: two days after leaving the base for deep-sea testing, the Thresher boat (translated from English as a sea fox, a type of herring shark) with a crew of 129 people sank in the Atlantic. The shock that the nation experienced upon receiving this news was comparable to that caused by the death of the Challenger many years later.

Thrasher was the lead boat in a series of 30 units in the construction plan. It marked the entry into service of anti-submarine nuclear-powered ships with high speed (30 knots), great diving depth (up to 360 m), a duplicated nuclear power plant (before that, American submarines had only one reactor) and 20–40 Sabrok-type missile torpedoes. Construction of the ship, which cost $60 million, lasted 38 months. On August 3, 1961, the boat was transferred to the US Navy under the command of Lieutenant Commander D. Harvey.

American shipbuilding companies establish a warranty period of 9–12 months. In the summer of 1962, Thresher was delivered to the Portsmouth shipyard to eliminate defects noticed. During the year of navigation, it was possible to identify and eliminate 875 faults and deficiencies, the vast majority of which turned out to be insignificant and related to everyday life and ease of use. However, 130 design defects were discovered, five of which were related to the safety of the ship.

The search for the sunken boat began immediately. The next day, an investigative commission was created, which included experienced submariners and shipbuilders. At that time, the US Navy did not have search forces to ensure effective operations at a depth of 2500 m, and the operation was entrusted to the oceanographic vessel Atlantis II and the bathyscaphe Trieste. Several dozen warships (including nuclear submarines), as well as other vessels and special equipment, took part in the search operations.

The discovered objects, sets of spare parts, pieces of pipelines with the numbers of the Thresher boat and the name of the worker who performed the installation made it possible to reliably determine the place of its death. The boat sank at coordinates 41°43'N. w. and 64°57'W. etc. However, the causes of death, as in most cases when it comes to disasters on submarines, could not be established with accuracy.

The commission, which published its conclusions a year and a half later, stated the following probable reasons:

- act of sabotage or sabotage;

— water entering the pressure hull due to damage to communications;

- destruction of the durable hull at a depth close to the maximum (although during operation during the year, Thrasher dived to the maximum depth forty times);

- failure of a submarine beyond the maximum depth due to incorrect actions of personnel.

The commission's materials place moral blame for the disaster on senior US military leaders. In the context of the arms race, the quality of equipment faded into the background; preference was given to increasing combat power. In addition, the delivery of the submarine on time was encouraged by awards, promotions and bonuses to both the designers and senior Navy employees.

The very next day after the death of the boat, reproaches began to fall on the Navy command - before going to sea, many crew members had doubts about the preparedness of the boat for the upcoming voyage.

The disaster with the American nuclear submarine was repeatedly analyzed in the USSR. In this regard, we can note the serious and very useful research for submariners conducted by engineers G. Lisov and A. Narusbaev (“The Mystery of the Death of the Thresher”). The USSR Navy Institute published a special brochure with the eloquent title “The death of the Thresher submarine was inherent in its design.” Of course, both books are quite politicized.

Let's continue the list of accidents that occurred on American nuclear submarines.

In 1963, a fire broke out on the production boat "Flesher" ("Thresher" type) under construction. Three workers were killed and two suffered severe burns.

Five years after the death of the Thresher, in 1968, the nuclear submarine Scorpion sank, and none of the 99 crew members managed to escape.

A nuclear-powered ship with a displacement of 3,100 tons under the command of F. Sletteri left the Norfolk naval base to participate in the exercises of the 6th American Fleet. On the way back, the Scorpio deviated 27 miles from course and ended up southwest of the Azores. The commander reported this by radio on May 21, 1968. There were no further messages from the boat.

Her arrival in Norfolk was expected on May 27, but she never showed up. An investigative commission was created under the chairmanship of Vice Admiral B. Austin, who participated in the investigation into the causes of the death of the Thresher. The commission completed its work in mid-July, interviewing 65 witnesses. Her conclusion: the nuclear-powered submarine exceeded the maximum diving depth and sank “for an unknown reason.”

However, the experts participating in the investigation noted that due to a lack of funds, significant alterations were not carried out on the Scorpion, which had to be implemented after the death of Thresher. In particular, the emergency blowing system for the main ballast tanks was not repaired. In addition, the Scorpion did not have an emergency radio beacon installed, which automatically pops up when the maximum diving depth is exceeded.

A few months later, the bathyscaphe Trieste 2 managed to discover and photograph the remains of the Scorpion. As after the death of the Thrasher, lifting the boat was not planned due to the significant depth of the flooding - 2500 m.

The death of this boat was the last in the US Navy, although serious accidents occurred later. So, a ballistic missile launched from it crashed onto the boat "Patrick Henry". The George Washington, following in a submerged position at periscope depth, rammed the Japanese cargo ship Nisshiomaru, sank it and disappeared without providing assistance to the sailors in distress.

For the sake of objectivity, it should also be noted that in the US Navy the main striking force is not submarines, as in the USSR Navy, but aircraft carriers. It is with these ships, and since 1942, 187 of them have been built, that the largest accidents in the American fleet are associated. Suffice it to say that between the explosion on the USS Bennington in 1953 and the recent accident on the Iowa, about five hundred people died. After the death of the Scorpion, the US Navy command took organizational and technical measures, including stopping Arctic expeditions for almost five years as the most dangerous. These measures must be considered effective, since for a quarter of a century American submariners have been able to avoid disasters.

Notes[edit]

In the Pacific Theater. Figures vary for American and European theaters.
^ a b O'Kane 1989, p. 458. Her commander, Lieutenant Commander Richard O'Kane, explains that the Joint Army and Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC) report originally stated that the Tang was
responsible for fewer sinkings.
(93,824 tons and 24 ships). In 1980, the corresponding JANAC section "was officially replaced by credits in patrol reports." These figures do not include Tang
, who was accidentally sunk by her own torpedo in October 1944.

Links[edit]

Parillo, Mark (1993). Japanese merchant fleet during the Great Patriotic War
. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-677-1.
Gruner, 2012 p.3
Gruner, 2012 p.6
JANAC, 1947 p.vi
^ abcde Holwitt, Joel Ira (April 1, 2009). "Execution Against Japan": The US Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 978-1-60344-083-7- via Project MUSE.
"US Pacific Submarines in World War II". Association of Historic Naval Ships
. Archived from the original on February 27, 2022. Retrieved June 10, 2018.
^ ab "US Pacific Submarines in World War II". Association of Historic Naval Ships
. Archived from the original on February 27, 2022. Retrieved June 10, 2018.
Dönitz Karl (21 March 1997). Memories, Ten Years and Twenty Days
. Da Capo Press. ISBN 978-0-306-80764-0.
Jump up
↑ Milner, Marc (1985).
Running the North Atlantic: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle of the Convoys
. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
Jump up
↑ Blair, Clay (March 1, 2001).
Quiet Victory: US Submarine Warfare against Japan
. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-55750-217-9.
^ a b "Silent Victory 1940-1945." . www.public.navy.mil
. Archived from the original on January 26, 2022. Retrieved November 18, 2018.
↑
Poirier, Michelle Thomas (October 20, 1999).
"Results of German and American submarine campaigns of World War II". Submarine division
. Archived from the original on April 9, 2008. Retrieved January 13, 2012.
^ a b O'Kane 1989, p. 458
^ ab "Japanese maritime and merchant shipping losses during World War II from all causes". Joint Army-Navy Review Committee
. 1947. Archived from the original on June 12, 2022. Retrieved June 8, 2018.
^ abcdefgh i Friedman, Norman (1995). US Submarines to 1945: An Illustrated History of the Design
. Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute. pp. 285–304. ISBN 1-55750-263-3.
^ ab "Tan I (SS-306)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Command. September 25, 2015
^ ab "Flasher (SS-249)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. April 21, 2016
"Rusher (SS-269)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. January 19, 2016
^a b "Barb I". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. June 22, 2015.
^ ab "Silverside I (SS-236)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. September 9, 2015.
^ abcdefghijklmnopqrstu vwxyz aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao Friedman, Norman (1995). US Submarines to 1945: An Illustrated History of the Design
. Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute. pp. 285–304. ISBN 1-55750-263-3.
^ ab "Spadefish I (SS-411)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. September 15, 2015.
^ a b "Trigger I (SS-237)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. September 30, 2015
^ a b "Drum (SS-228)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. February 21, 2022.
^ ab "Jack I (SS-259)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. July 22, 2015.
^ ab "Snook I (SS-279)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. September 10, 2015.
^ a b "Tautog I (SS-199)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. September 25, 2015
^ ab "Seahorse I (SS-304)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. September 8, 2015.
^ ab "Guardfish I (SS-217)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. July 13, 2015
^ ab "Seawolf I (SS-197)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. January 8, 2022.
"Gudgeon I (SS-211)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. July 13, 2015
"USA Naval Aircraft Carrier (SS-315)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. September 8, 2015.
^ a b "Bowfin (SS-287)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. April 21, 2016.
^ ab "Thresher I (SS-200)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. September 30, 2015
^ ab "Tinosa I (SS-283)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. September 30, 2015
^ ab "Grayback I (SS-208)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. July 13, 2015
^ a b "Pogy I (SS-266)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. April 24, 2015
"Bonefish I (SS-223)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. June 26, 2015.
^ ab "Wahoo I (SS-238)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. October 23, 2015
^ ab "Sunfish I (SS-281)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. September 24, 2015.
"Archer-Fish (SS-311)". Dictionary of American Naval Combat Ships
. Naval Bureau, Naval History and Heritage Bureau. February 2, 2016

American military experts named the five best submarines in history

The five best submarines built in the 20th century were chosen by experts from the American military analytical magazine The National Interest (NI). To compile its rating, the publication asked experts the following questions: whether this or that submarine was the best for its time in terms of efficiency-cost criteria and how innovative the design was.

German predators in the Atlantic

NI puts German submarines of the U-31 type from the First World War in first place. The construction of these boats was carried out at the Germania shipyard in Kiel (11 units in total). The submarines were laid down in 1912–1913 and launched in 1914.

Boats of this type actively participated in hostilities. During service, of the 11 boats built, eight were lost. At the same time, the U-31 submarines themselves damaged or sent to the bottom 856 ships with a total tonnage of more than 2 million tons. These boats changed the understanding of the importance of the submarine fleet and became a formidable weapon capable of paralyzing shipping with the mere news that they were setting out on another voyage.

"Bulava" did not reach the target

On September 27, during a check of the fleet’s combat readiness, the nuclear submarine Yuri Dolgoruky fired two salvos...

28 September 18:12

Among this series of submarines, the three best known are U-35, commanded by Lothar von Arnaud de la Perrière, the most successful submariner of all time, U-39 by Walter Forstmann, and U-38 by Max Valentiner.

The undisputed leader is the submarine U-35, which destroyed 224 merchant ships with a total displacement of more than half a million tons.

However, submarines of the U-31 type were more of an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary stage in underwater shipbuilding. They were not fundamentally different from their predecessors and successors. Nevertheless, the U-31 boats brought Britain to the brink of exiting the First World War. Only the entry of the United States into the conflict, coupled with the development of innovative convoy tactics for the United Kingdom Navy, created difficulties in German submarine warfare. The three surviving U-31 class boats were captured by the Allies after the end of the First World War.

Surviving Americans in the Pacific

Experts place American Balao-class submarines in second place among outstanding submarines. These submarines were built between 1942 and 1947. In total, the US shipyards delivered 122 such submarines to the country's Navy. They fought during World War II in the Pacific against the Japanese Empire.

At the time, Japanese industry was highly dependent on access to the natural resources of Southeast Asia. Stopping the delivery of these materiel to the Japanese islands meant effectively winning the war in the Pacific. And although the US military submarine fleet was relatively small, operated without a clear understanding of the great future of submarines in this theater of war, and was armed with poor torpedoes, ultimately the submarines built during the war destroyed almost the entire Japanese merchant fleet.

The war in the Pacific Ocean required submarines to have a long range and, accordingly, better living conditions for the crew than in the relatively small North Atlantic. Like their Gato-class predecessors, the Balao submarines were less maneuverable than the German VII series submarines, but they made up for this deficiency with hull strength and generally very high quality construction. But most importantly, compared to the German submarine of the VII series, Balao-class submarines had a greater range, larger-caliber artillery, a larger number of torpedo tubes and a higher surface and underwater speed. On the other hand, Balao boats operated in much more favorable conditions than German submarines. The Japanese anti-submarine defenses were weaker.

Balao's biggest victory in the Pacific Ocean was the sinking of the Japanese aircraft carrier Shinano with a displacement of 58 thousand tons by the Archerfish submarine.

Only 11 of the 122 Balao boats were lost during the Pacific War, two as a result of accidents and disasters in the post-war period. After World War II, submarines of this class were transferred to several navies friendly to the United States and continued to serve for many decades. One of them, the former American Tusk, is still partially used by Taiwan under the name Hai Pao.

Advanced submarines of the Third Reich

American experts put German submarines of the XXI series in third place. It was a submarine with a revolutionary design for its time, which had a significant influence on all post-war submarine shipbuilding.

Between 1943 and 1945, 134 submarines of this type were launched at the shipyards of Blohm & Voss in Hamburg, AGWeser in Bremen and F. Schichau in Danzig. Of these, the shipyards delivered 119 to the fleet, and another 15 remained unfinished.

Some of the innovations of this project were revolutionary.

Submarines XXI were the first in the world to receive an electromechanical system for loading torpedo tubes, a sonar system that allows them to attack without visual contact, larger batteries, a rubber hull coating that impedes the operation of enemy sonars, and a bubble curtain device.

For the first time, the frames of these boats were moved outside the durable hull, which made it possible to increase the space inside the boat and simplify all kinds of communications and placement of equipment. For the first time, submarines were designed for scuba diving throughout the entire autonomous voyage.

The ocean-going submarine of the XXI series was the first submarine capable of achieving a higher underwater speed than surface speed. She abandoned the deck gun in exchange for speed and stealth. The XXI series boats developed underwater speeds of up to 17.5 knots - almost twice as fast as conventional submarines. It was planned that they would operate almost exclusively while submerged.

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24 September 20:43

A boat of this type could go at full speed underwater for four hours at a time, covering 65–70 miles (instead of 12 miles in 1.5 hours underwater on eight knots of the IX series boats). This was quite enough to attack an enemy convoy and reliably break away from the pursuit of anti-submarine defense ships.

Allies in the anti-Hitler coalition captured the surviving German XXI series boats, using them both as models for their own projects and in order to develop more advanced technologies and methods of anti-submarine warfare.

The German submarine of the XXI series became the basis for the Soviet submarine Project 613.

It also became the basis for a large fleet of Chinese submarines.

Washington's Atomic Arguments

Experts put the American George Washington class submarines in fourth place among the outstanding submarines of all times. This is the first project in history of nuclear submarines equipped with ballistic missiles. Five submarines of this type were commissioned by the US Navy from 1959 to 1961.

When creating the George Washington boats, the design of the Skipjack nuclear torpedo boat was taken as a basis. This approach to converting a submarine from one class to another, which also took place in the Soviet submarine fleet, made it possible to reduce construction time and save financial resources. A 40-meter missile compartment was inserted into the submarine's hull behind the wheelhouse, in which 16 missile launch silos were located.

Today it is taken for granted that the most common form of modern nuclear deterrence is a nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles capable of hypothetically destroying a dozen cities on any continent. These SSBNs form the most secure part of the nuclear deterrent triad, as it is very difficult to find and destroy a submarine before it launches its ballistic missiles.

Until 1967, the George Washington submarines and American submarines of the same type were the only ones in their class. “Their lumbering Soviet counterparts carried only three missiles and were forced to surface to fire the missiles,” writes The National Interest.

The general layout of the George Washington type boats with vertical shafts located behind the wheelhouse turned out to be extremely successful and became a classic design for underwater strategic missile carriers.

Based on this scheme, Project 667A was built in the USSR, which, by analogy with the “prototype,” was called “Ivan Washington” in the Soviet Navy.

The lead submarine of Project 667A entered service in 1967. The first British submarine of the same class, Resolution, was delivered to the fleet in 1968, and the French Redoutable in 1971. China eventually followed the lead of other nuclear powers, although the first truly modern missile submarines were only recently introduced into the Chinese fleet. India's first missile submarine Arihant is scheduled to be delivered to the navy next year.

Hollywood Special Operations Boats

In fifth place, experts placed the US Navy multi-purpose nuclear submarine Los Angeles. These nuclear submarines were built in the most massive series. A total of 62 submarines of this type were transferred to the American fleet. The first of its series entered service on November 13, 1976, the last (USS Cheyenne) on September 13, 1996. The ships were built by Newport News Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Electric Boat Division.

There are currently 41 Los Angeles-class submarines in service. They still form the backbone of the US submarine fleet. The Los Angeles boat is immortalized in Tom Clancy's novels The Hunt for Red October and the film of the same name with Sean Conerry.

Obama submarine

The new fourth-generation Virginia-class nuclear submarine was transferred to the US Navy. Construction…

29 August 15:45

Among the list of tasks of these multi-purpose submarines are the fight against enemy submarines and surface ships, strikes, mining, search and rescue operations, reconnaissance and special operations, including the transfer of special forces.

In 1991, during the Gulf War, two Los Angeles-class boats fired a salvo of sea-launched cruise missiles at enemy coastal targets for the first time in history. The submarine, by firing Tomahawk missiles, demonstrated a completely new means of war at the disposal of the United States.

The last of the Los Angeles-class boats are expected to be retired from service in the 2020s, although the date could be delayed. By that time, the new submarines will significantly surpass the Los Angeles class boats in their capabilities. Nevertheless, these nuclear-powered ships formed the basis of the submarine forces of the most powerful navy for almost five decades.

Consolation prizes for the USSR

In addition to the five prizes, American experts decided to establish incentive prizes. The nominees included three Soviet submarines, two American, two British, one Japanese and one German.

First of all, the Soviet nuclear submarine Project 941 “Akula”, a heavy strategic missile submarine, deserved attention. These are the largest submarines in the world.

American specialists and Soviet nuclear-powered submarines of projects 705, 705K "Lira" - small high-speed boats with a titanium hull - did not ignore them. These submarines had no analogues in speed and maneuverability and were designed to destroy enemy submarines.

We also remembered the modern Russian diesel-electric submarines of Project 636 Varshavyanka, one of which last year was marked by a salvo of Caliber missiles from the Mediterranean Sea, as well as its predecessors - the Soviet Project 877 Halibut boats.

Among the consolation nominations are the American Ohio-class missile carriers, a series of 18 American third-generation strategic submarines that entered service from 1981 to 1997. Since 2002, this is the only type of missile carrier in service with the US Navy. Each boat is armed with 24 Trident intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with multiple warheads with individual guidance.

At the end of the list are the Japanese Type I-201 submarines, also known as the Sen Taka, a series of fast Japanese diesel-electric submarines from World War II. Designed in 1943–1944, they became one of the fastest submarines of their time. A total of 23 boats were planned to be built in the series, the first of which was laid down in March 1944, but the construction of most of them was cancelled. Construction of only eight ships of this type began, of which three were completed before the end of the war. Due to their late appearance, none of these submarines saw action.

The German Type VII submarines of World War II became the largest production type of submarine in history. Of the 1,050 submarines ordered, 703 boats of seven modifications entered service.

Bibliography[edit]

Alden, John D.; McDonald, Craig R. (2009). Submarine successes of the United States and its allies in the Pacific and Far East during World War II
. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Co. ISBN. 9780786442133.
Gruner, William P. (2012). "US Pacific Submarines in World War II". San Francisco: Marine Parks Association. Retrieved June 8, 2022.
"Japanese maritime and merchant shipping losses during World War II from all causes". Joint Army-Navy Review Committee
. 1947. Retrieved June 8, 2022.
Blair, Clay (1975). Quiet Victory: US Submarine Warfare against Japan
. New York: Bantam. pp. 988–989. ISBN 9780553010503.
O'Kane, Richard H. (1989) [1977]. Clear the Bridge!: Military Patrols of the USS Tang. Presidio Press. ISBN 978-0-89141-346-2.

American “nukes” and our “butterheads”: the “inner kitchen” of US and Russian submarines

A staff meeting at which one of the NUBs receives “dolphins.” Submarine USS Rhode Island

On June 16, 2022, in The Drive magazine, under the heading The War Zone, an article by former sonar from a US Navy nuclear submarine, Aaron Emick, was published,
“Nukes, Nubs And Coners: The Unique Social Hierarchy Aboard A Nuclear Submarine
. We will give a translation of the name a little later, after translating the slang names of positions, specialties and statuses of submariners that are mentioned in this title. The article itself is devoted to the informal hierarchy among American submariners.

Service in the US Navy submarine is not fun at all. For Russian readers, for example, it will be news that some American submariners experience post-traumatic disorders after service. In general, accidents with casualties do happen there, they are just usually kept secret, military operations against countries with which America is not officially at war also happen. Often, boats return from combat service with pieces of the sound-absorbing hull coating torn off.

There is no need to laugh, this is the result of the widespread use of large passages during submarine transitions, due to the fact that the US Navy simply does not have enough of them (and those that exist, and their crews, are often used for wear and tear). Well, the Russian reader, in general, knows about the fact that on their boats they sleep on bunks in turns in several shifts.

But Emik, already a retiree, like all retirees, remembers mostly good and funny things, and it’s simply impossible to write to him about truly interesting things, so first - a humorous, cheerful look at the American submarine.

"Useless bodies" and other interesting people

So, any newcomer on an American submarine is called a NUB, or Non-Usable Body, which translates as “useless body.”
It doesn't matter whether it's an officer or a sailor. Any newcomer is a NUB (read and pronounced as “N-U-B”, spelled out). NUBs are treated with undisguised disdain: after all, they waste space, water and air on themselves, giving nothing in return. The life of a noob is somewhat easier if he is a “Hot runner”, that is, “undermined” to carry out simple tasks that are assigned to him, and is generally proactive.

The NUB has about a year to master the knowledge necessary for him and begin to serve for real. At the first stage, when a newcomer gets acquainted with the boat, the crew can “eat him” - simply not help him and not give the officers positive feedback.

In the future, the NUB will learn to navigate on board, master actions in the event of an accident, learn to fight for survivability without prompting from other crew members, constantly demonstrating his knowledge to experienced colleagues and commanders.

In the end, the NSA, often dressed in full firefighting equipment and breathing apparatus, walks across the entire boat and gives an experienced sailor an oral exam on absolutely any system he encounters along the way, showing where, what and how it is turned on, as it should be. to act in the event of a particular emergency, what to turn off and shut down.

Then NUB needs to ensure that officers and sailors who, by their position, can test newcomers, find time for him and take exams from him. This is also not easy; even organizing such an exam for yourself requires a lot of effort and time. Often, NUBs “sign up” to the commission by buying various cakes and cookies for the duration of the exam, but this is more of a tribute to tradition.

After a five-hour “interrogation,” the NUB, if successful, becomes human. If he fails the exam, he will have one more attempt, after failure in which the NUB will be fired from the submarine. But this is rare; basically everyone passes this selection.

The last stage is a personal conversation with one of the senior officers of the boat, who decides whether this person is finally fit for service or not. If so, then the boat commander personally presents him with “dolphins” - the badge of a submariner. Now he is no longer a NUB, he has become one of his own and, as a distinguishing feature, he no longer has to wear a uniform cap while on board.

Now he will be assigned to one of the large crew groups of “Nukes” or “Coners”.

“Nuke” comes from the word “Nuclear” - “nuclear”, this is a slang word that can mean anything nuclear - a bomb, for example. “Nuclear” are those who are responsible for the movement of the boat, the officers and sailors who service the reactor, turbines, turbo-gear units and, in general, everything that makes the boat move. Emik jokes that those who decided to bring the Star Trek series into reality go to Nyuki. They are up to their necks in mathematics and data sets and eat at the same table as the Chief Petty officers.

The “nukes” who service reactors, the “nukes” who are electricians and the “nukes” who are mechanics are different “nukes.” The first of them look like “geeks”, obsessed with technology and computers, the second are like chameleons, they can even get lost in the photo of the crew, and the third are hefty thugs that smell of machine oil, standing their six-hour watches in the hot and noisy compartments in the stern.

"Nyuki" study the diagram of the submarine's systems

The space of the “nukes” ends in the same place where the compartments with their equipment end, usually this is the reactor compartment. Next begins a space that, regardless of its actual shape and number of compartments, is called “Cone” (apparently this name originated on old US Navy boats, the hull of which tapered towards the bow more or less evenly along the length of the boat). “Coners” live in the “cone”. All submariners are included in this group, regardless of specialty, except, of course, “nukes”.

The world of “Cone” is America in miniature, a cross-section of society. But since those who theoretically may not fit into it are “eaten up” by the crew at the stage of the “submariner larva” - NUB, then everyone gets along well with each other and interacts normally. In the world of “cones” we find “torpedo guys”, acousticians, and navigators, just like on any submarine in the world.

Typical “nukes” check the functionality of the equipment of the Central Submarine Post

There are also radio operators, the only people, besides the boat commander, who have at least sometimes some personal space. Acousticists are the most free people on the boat; during their watch, they can simply sit silently and analyze noise spectra or simply listen to the world around them through headphones. No one else has this level of freedom on a boat. In “revenge” they have to bear the nickname “sonar girls” (“sonar” is a submarine’s hydroacoustic station).

A special zone is the “Sherwood Forest”: a missile compartment with ballistic missiles, where rocket technicians work, constantly monitoring the microclimate parameters in the missile silos and generally monitoring the main weapon of the boat.

"Sherwood Forest" from the missile silos of an American SSBN

Standing apart are the “A-Gangers” (“A-Gangers”, roughly “Atomic Fast Horse”), the technicians responsible for ventilation, air regeneration, diesel generators and other support systems, including latrines. This is in some way the “black labor” of the submarine, as Emick writes, “a mixture of “nuclear waste,” that is, a sailor who did not survive the training school for sailors in the reactor compartment, and a diesel mechanic from some seedy place.” Well, or like an unevolved “nuke” mechanic, but with a “smell.”

There are also people who are completely unusual for Russians - yeomen. Yeomen is a kind of scribe, a person trained to quickly type commands and texts on a keyboard. All US Navy paperwork hangs on them. Usually the yeoman is the “right hand” of senior officers, relieving them of routine and freeing up time for command.

Yeoman 2nd Class Tara Spencer. She's not from a submarine, but we couldn't resist. Photo from the SSBN tender USS Frank Cable, Apra Harbor Naval Base, Guam

The most popular and respected by all crew members is, of course, the ship’s cook. There is hardly any need to explain anything here.

Now the title of Emik’s article “Nyuki, NUBs and cones: a unique social hierarchy on board a nuclear submarine” becomes clear.

This is what the informal division looks like in the American submarine. What about us?

And with us, oddly enough, it’s very similar.

“Luxes”, “maslopups” and the whole depth of our depths

If the American submarine is divided into “nyuks” and “cones” (NUBs are not submariners, but their larvae, we will not count them), then ours is divided into “mechanics” and “luxuries”.
“Mechanics” are the personnel of the BC-5 (electromechanical warhead). On diesel-electric submarines, due to the specifics of the main power plant and the side effects of working with it, the personnel of the warhead-5 are often referred to by a much more colorful name - “oil pumps”. However, on the one hand, on some diesel engines they can still be mechanics, on the other hand, on some nuclear submarines they were oil pumps. These traditions are alive, they evolve, and over the years everything changes, and there are differences in different fleets.

Warhead-5 on nuclear submarines is divided into divisions: 1st propulsion, 2nd electrical and 3rd bilge.

The word “maslopup” is funny, as are jokes about “bilge people,” but these people directly determine whether the boat will return from the trip or not. Situations when the reaction of the officers, midshipmen and sailors of the BC-5 depended on whether the boat would perish or not were, alas, not uncommon in our submarine fleet. Including in modern times.

There were also tragic cases when sailors from the BC-5 died saving their ships and comrades. These are the “butterheads”.

Everyone else on the submarine is a “suite.”

In the bow of the boat (or closer to the bow, if it is, for example, “Yasen” or “Yasen-M”) in the torpedo compartment, the personnel of the BC-3, a mine-torpedo warhead, serve.

It includes sailors of different ranks, but in any case, for the rest they are “miners.” And they are also commanded by “Miner”, just with a capital letter. They may have cruise missiles, anti-submarine missiles, guided torpedoes in their ammunition, but they may not have mines, it doesn’t matter. “Miners” - that’s it. By the way, underwater “miners” are not called “Romanians”; this is a nickname for sailors from surface ships.

The grandiose economy of the “miners” and their commander “Miner” on the submarine pr. 941

The BC-1, the navigator's combat unit, also has its own hierarchy. For example, the boatswain and the boatswain's team of helmsmen and signalmen are the “rudders,” and young and inexperienced navigating officers are the “navigators.” In general, the BC-1 is a “navigator”.

Missile warhead-2 is often “Chinese”. According to legend, this nickname arose due to the terrible cramped space of the missile compartments on the first diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines. It must be said that this nickname is not used everywhere.

Presenter of the TV channel “Zvezda” in the abode of the “Chinese” from aboard the RPLSN pr. 955

BC-4 (communications) and 7 (situation coverage and control), as well as services (for example, supply or chemical), cannot boast of such specific nicknames (however, this is unlikely to upset anyone). But intelligence, OSNAZ, is always “canaries”. I must say that this name contains a rather dark irony, but that’s how things are done with us. And the command of the “Canaris” is, of course, “Canaris”.

You don't choose fate.

Do we have analogues of American NUBs? No, the process of “inclusion” of a submariner in service on our boats is structured differently. And this is where you should stop laughing. You need to look at some things from a serious angle.

Initial clearance and continued service

Despite training in schools and training centers (junior personnel) and naval schools (officer personnel), upon the arrival of a new crew member on a submarine, he is given credit cards in the specialty and design of the ship and training in combating survivability.
Note: according to current regulatory documents, a specialty test sheet without a closed test sheet for ship design has no legal force. However, this provision is often violated in the Russian Navy, and, as a rule, in relation to the officers. The junior crew is under severe pressure - both from their low status (persons without clearance), and from the fact that while the unauthorized person is on staff, other crew members perform watches and duties for him.

There could have been problems with training with the younger personnel due to an insufficient level of education, but this is already in the past, now there is no conscript service left in the submarine force, and since the mid-2000s, while they were still there, they began to be selected for the submarine force, and their level education has grown noticeably. In addition, in a good crew with a proven personnel training system, a young sailor of the level of a “village tractor driver” became a fully trained submariner in about a couple of months. True, he did not study for this only when he was sleeping and “waving a spoon” in the galley; the rest of the time it was continuous and rigorous preparation.

By the way, the transition to crewing with contract sailors eliminated another unofficial hierarchy - the anniversary-hazing.

Note: training of personnel on the structure of the ship and the fight for survivability is carried out not only by “their bosses”, the training of the duty and watch service on the ship plays a very important role

With the officer corps, until recently it was quite a common situation when an officer could be a group commander, a lieutenant commander, but still not complete the record sheet for the ship.

This is largely the origin of the division between the “mechanics” and the “luxuries” in our submarine (in relation to the latter, it was understood that for them “the screws begin behind the galley”).

At the same time, the requirements for knowledge of the ship for “luxury specialties” in some cases were no lower than for “mechanics”, and this primarily concerned officers of the watch officer category (usually assistant commander, commander of mine-torpedo and missile combat units and commander of a torpedo group) and the ship's duty officer (or his assistant) - from any category of officers who passed the tests and were admitted by order.

The very fulfillment of these duties required good knowledge of not just “mechanical issues”, but also leadership and the fight for survivability, incl. in the “stern” (mechanical compartments). The situation when “luxuries” find themselves in an emergency party working in the compartments where the submarine’s power plant is located is quite normal. This also applies to the reactor compartment.

"Suites" in their natural habitat. Central post of a nuclear submarine

Closing the ship's record sheet (and admission to duty) is a very important “status” issue in the crew, and a direct “application” for the officer for a future career. This is not only and so much an exam as the ability and willingness to take and bear responsibility not only for oneself, subordinates, but also the entire ship.

For example, the last question during admission to the ship of one of the authors of the article was the first mate’s question about “emergency exit of the ship from a cruise missile attack on the base.” Submariners will be able to evaluate the issue (which goes far beyond the “required knowledge” and “permitted by the docs” for a young lieutenant, even the officer on duty on the ship). He answered successfully and unconventionally, and most importantly, he was ready to act this way in a real situation.

All this was subject to very stringent requirements of the State Supervision Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (IGN for NRS), introduced after a number of severe nuclear accidents on submarines of the USSR Navy.

For example, one of the authors of this article, having arrived on his first submarine, did not have time to reach his 1st compartment when he was called to the central post and sent to practical training in the hardware enclosure of a nuclear reactor, and the next day he “delved into” at the squadron headquarters nuclear accidents of the Navy (with a good “piece” of nuclear physics theory).

Here it is necessary to talk about the officer corps - the legacy of mass conscript service on our ships earlier and the often weakness of the midshipman corps.

The officer was trained as a narrow specialist, and often from the first days of service he needed broad knowledge of related issues, the in-depth study of which was not provided for in the school programs.

Separately, it is necessary to note the problem of training acousticians, where experience is very important, but the very fact of career growth of acoustic officers made it difficult to obtain (and further devalued this experience). There was a frequent situation when a “cool acoustician” was a “stray” who was not expelled from the RF Armed Forces just because he was a great acoustician and did amazing things at sea.

It is also necessary to highlight one staff unit that the US Navy does not have.

"Zampolity"

Two illustrative quotes from experienced and respected submarine officers.
One:

When I was a submarine commander, 70% of the political officers in our division were drunkards and womanizers, including those on my boat. All the heads of political departments that I knew can be characterized as drunkards, womanizers, thieves, careerists and major bastards.

Second:

...different people met. I remember one of our deputy. He came to us from Bechevinka. From “Warsaw” (diesel-electric submarine, in this case project 877. - Author). Didn't enter the Academy. Lenin. Well, they sent him from diesel engines to steamships. We were standing in the plant, in Seldeva. What was he one of the first to do? I organized an excursion for families on the submarine, which at that time was docked, with a subsequent trip to Paratunka, to the springs. Winter, beauty. But that's not the main thing. Carrying out the duties of the CFSP, in the evening at the dock, on the second factory shift, in the central control room, I observe the following picture. Pomdezh stands on the submarine, the foreman of the bilge crew. And so the deputy calls him and asks him to show and tell him about the main drainage line. With all the pumps and pumps, Gogol and the auditors are resting, there is a silent scene in the central office. The sergeant major shows him, he crawls with him and writes everything down in the submarine officer’s workbook. It turns out later that he is teaching the ship... and not only D-3, but also communicating with officers and midshipmen D-1 and D-2 (BCh-5 divisions. - Author). Further - more, the ship is driven, exits the factory, and upon arrival at the division, the ship is handed over to a horseless line crew, and we fly to the training center, to Komsomolsk. Well, of course... but at the CBD, the deputy begins to draw a picture of the submarine’s maneuvering and the target assigned by the commander in order to have a visual picture. Yeah... it looks like a fairy tale... in a tavern, over a glass, it turns out that the officer began his service in Magadan, using old diesel engines. I don’t remember, but, apparently, the 613th project. And there he became like an officer. Plus, he participated in the transfer of these submarines to Vladivostok for cutting. In short, omitting the details of Aivazovsky, at this transition, they drank more than one 9th wave. As for the fact that he didn’t enter the academy, according to him, when he was asked, there are different questions. He told us what to do for the good of the Fatherland and the good of the cause. I don’t remember it verbatim, but that’s the meaning. Well, they turned him away from the academy and sent him to the ships... Yeah, and also, in the division, when the nachpo (chief of the political unit) found out about his zeal in studying iron, they called him and told him. That all the animals in the forest are equal, but some animals are more equal... Mikhail Removich, study the brains of l/s, and do not study the structure of the ship. I don’t know how it ended with him, but we went to Primorye...

Of interest is the American experience with the attempt to introduce “political officers” into the crews of the US Navy submarines, described by the first commander of the Nautilus submarine Andersen: having decided that due to the long stay under water the crew “will have problems,” the command placed a “specialist in such problems ”(psychologist), in the end the only person with “problems” turned out to be... the psychologist himself - the only slacker on board.

To sum it up, it is necessary to answer the obvious question: who has a better level of training - us or the US Navy? In our opinion, “on average” the US Navy has created a much more optimal system for training submarine forces, but this is true for the “average level”.

An unjustified emphasis on “mechanical” issues (often at the expense of “tactical”) often leads to stereotyped actions of US Navy submarines (or even erroneous ones in a complex tactical situation). A simple example: in order to become the commander of an American nuclear submarine, you need to undergo special training in working with a nuclear reactor, which takes a lot of time and turns the officer into practically an engineer for the maintenance and repair of nuclear power plants. This is commendable, but the commander first of all needs to learn to fight. When will he do this?

While the Americans “ride on technology,” their superiority is technical; they rely on technology that is simply eons ahead of the enemy. They do not have any extraordinary level of tactical skills.

We, despite all the problems with the “average level of training,” had outstanding crews, commanders who, even with the worst equipment, were able to quite adequately resist US submariners.

True, it was often not possible to realize all the capabilities of our personnel due to inferior equipment to that of the enemy, and in a real war the gap in weapons (torpedoes) would become extremely acute. But that, as they say, is a completely different story...