T-34 with a Ural character: how the world's first tank conveyor appeared

History of T-34-85

By the second half of 1943, the most important Soviet tank, the T-34, began to be significantly inferior to enemy tanks. Although the Red Army managed to win the Battle of Kursk, this was done mostly due to numerical superiority and personal courage, but not due to technical advantage. The victory was very costly for the Soviet troops, and it was obvious that a new tank was needed, more armored and with a more powerful gun.

By that time, the T-43 tank had already been created, which was superior to the T-34 in a number of parameters. However, it turned out that it was impossible to install a more powerful 85-mm cannon on it, which would be ideal for penetrating German tanks - the tank would become too heavy. So work on the T-43 was stopped, instead equipping the T-34 with a new gun and creating the final modification, the T-34-85.

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The T-34-85 featured not only a more powerful gun, but also enhanced armor, as well as additional fuel tanks. Because of all this, the tank began to weigh 32 tons, but its speed and maneuverability did not change.

In December 1943, the T-34-85 entered mass production, and already at the end of January 1944 it began to be used in battles. The tank was produced until 1958, including for export. In total, more than 35 thousand T-34-85 units were produced.

General information about T-34-85E

Information from the official War Thunder wiki

The T-34-85 medium tank, equipped in the field with screens for protection against cumulative ammunition, during the assault on Berlin. During the Berlin strategic offensive operation, tank units of the Red Army were faced with the problem of increased losses of personnel and combat vehicles from the enemy's use of hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers with cumulative action grenades. Particular difficulty lay in fighting on city streets, when the enemy had the opportunity to use hand-held anti-tank weapons from numerous shelters and from a short distance. One of the attempts to reduce the impact of a cumulative jet was the use of mesh screens installed on the tank hull, at some distance from the armor plates. The mesh screens were presumably made in tank repair shops. However, these screens did not provide effective protection.

TTX T-34-85

general information

• Classification - medium tank;
• Combat weight - 32.2 tons;
• The layout is classic;
• Crew – 5 people;
• Years of production – 1943-1958;
• Years of operation – 1944 to 1993 (officially in the USSR and the Russian Federation);
• The number produced is more than 35,000 pieces.

Dimensions

• Case length – 6100 mm;
• Length with gun forward – 8100 mm;
• Case width – 3000 mm;
• Height – 2700 mm;
• Ground clearance – 400 m.

Booking

• Armor type - rolled homogeneous steel;
• Body forehead (top and bottom) - 45/60° mm/deg;
• Hull side (top) - 45 / 40° mm/deg;
• Hull side (bottom) - 45/0° mm/deg;
• Hull stern (top) - 45 / 48° mm/deg;
• Hull rear (bottom) - 45 / 45° mm/deg;
• Bottom – 20 mm;
• Housing roof – 20 mm;
• Turret forehead – 90 mm;
• Gun mantlet – 40 mm;
• Tower side - 75/20° mm/deg;
• Turret rear - 52/10° mm/deg;
• Tower roof – 15-20 mm.

Armament

• The caliber and brand of the gun is 85 mm ZIS-S-53;
• Gun type - rifled;
• Barrel length - 54.6 calibers;
• Gun ammunition - 56-60;
• Angles VN- 5…+22 degrees;
• GN angles – 360 degrees. (manual rotation mechanism or electromechanical drive);
• Sights - telescopic articulated TSh-16, periscopic PTK-5, side level;
• Machine guns - 2 × 7.62 mm DT-29.

Mobility

• Engine type - V-shaped 12-cylinder diesel liquid cooled with direct injection;
• Engine power – 500 hp;
• Highway speed – 55 km/h;
• Speed ​​over rough terrain – 25 km/h;
• Cruising range on the highway – 250 km;
• Cruising range over rough terrain – 220 km;
• Specific power - 15.6 hp/t;
• Pendant type: Christie pendant;
• Specific ground pressure - 0.83 kg/cm²;
• Climbability - 30°;
• The wall to be overcome is 0.75 m;
• The ditch to be overcome is 3.4 m;
• The fordability is 1.3 m.

Modifications

• T-34-85 1943. A small-scale modification with a new three-man turret and an 85-mm D-5-T85 cannon. Produced from January to March due to unsatisfactory placement of the S-53 gun in the original turret;
• T-34-85. Main serial modification with 85 mm ZIS-S-53 cannon;
• OT-34-85. Instead of a frontal machine gun, it had an ATO-42 piston flamethrower;
• T-34-85 1947 with a new V-2-34M engine, a new radio station and optical instruments;
• T-34-85 1960 with a 520 hp V-54 or V-55 engine, modified internal design, new electronic equipment, a new radio station, increased ammunition and chassis from the T-55;
• PT-34 is a trawl tank created on the basis of the 1943 T-34.

Machine evaluation

Machine evaluation

The T-34-85 medium tank, in essence, represents a major modernization of the T-34 tank, as a result of which a very important drawback of the latter was eliminated - the cramped fighting compartment and the associated impossibility of complete division of labor among the crew members. This was achieved by increasing the diameter of the turret ring, as well as by installing a new three-man turret of significantly larger dimensions than the T-34. At the same time, the design of the body and the arrangement of components and assemblies in it have not undergone any significant changes. Consequently, there are still disadvantages inherent in vehicles with a stern-mounted engine and transmission.

As is known, two layout schemes with a bow and stern transmission are most widely used in tank building. Moreover, the disadvantages of one scheme are the advantages of another.

The disadvantage of the layout with a rear-mounted transmission is the increased length of the tank due to the placement in its hull of four compartments that are not aligned along the length, or the reduction in the volume of the fighting compartment with a constant length of the vehicle. Due to the large length of the engine and transmission compartments, the combat compartment with a heavy turret is shifted to the nose, overloading the front rollers, leaving no space on the turret plate for the central or even side placement of the driver's hatch. There is a danger that the protruding gun will “stick” into the ground when the tank moves through natural and artificial obstacles. The control drive connecting the driver with the transmission located in the stern becomes more complicated.

There are two ways out of this situation: either increase the length of the control (or combat) compartment, which will inevitably lead to an increase in the overall length of the tank and a deterioration in its maneuverability due to an increase in the ratio L/B - the length of the supporting surface to the track width (for the T-34- 85 it is close to the optimal - 1.5), or radically change the layout of the engine and transmission compartments. What this could lead to can be judged by the results of the work of Soviet designers when designing the new medium tanks T-44 and T-54, created during the war and put into service in 1944 and 1945, respectively.

Layout diagram of the T-34-85 tank. (borrowed from the textbook “Tank Design and Calculation”)

These combat vehicles used a layout with a transverse (and not longitudinal, like the T-34-85) placement of a 12-cylinder V-2 diesel engine (in the B-44 and B-54 variants) and a combined significantly shortened (by 650 mm ) engine and transmission compartment. This made it possible to lengthen the fighting compartment to 30% of the hull length (for the T-34-85 - 24.3%), increase the diameter of the turret ring by almost 250 mm and install a powerful 100-mm cannon on the T-54 medium tank. At the same time, we managed to move the turret towards the stern, making room on the turret plate for the driver's hatch. The exclusion of the fifth crew member (the gunner from the course machine gun), the removal of the ammunition rack from the fighting compartment floor, the transfer of the fan from the engine crankshaft to the stern bracket and the reduction in the overall height of the engine ensured a decrease in the height of the hull of the T-54 tank (compared to the hull of the T-34- 85) by approximately 200 mm, as well as a reduction in the reserved volume by approximately 2 m? and increased armor protection by more than two times (with an increase in mass of only 12%).

During the war they did not go for such a radical rearrangement of the T-34 tank, and, probably, this was the right decision. At the same time, the diameter of the turret ring, while maintaining the same hull shape, was practically limiting for the T-34-85, which did not allow placing a larger caliber artillery system in the turret. The tank's armament modernization capabilities were completely exhausted, unlike, for example, the American Sherman and the German Pz.IV.

By the way, the problem of increasing the caliber of the main armament of the tank was of paramount importance. Sometimes you can hear the question: why was the transition to an 85-mm cannon necessary? Could it be possible to improve the ballistic characteristics of the F-34 by increasing the barrel length? After all, this is what the Germans did with their 75-mm cannon on the Pz.IV.

The fact is that German guns were traditionally distinguished by better internal ballistics (ours are just as traditionally external). The Germans achieved high armor penetration by increasing the initial speed and better testing of ammunition. We could respond adequately only by increasing the caliber. Although the S-53 cannon significantly improved the firing capabilities of the T-34-85, as Yu.E. Maksarev noted: “In the future, the T-34 could no longer directly, in a duel, hit new German tanks.” All attempts to create 85-mm guns with an initial speed of over 1000 m/s, the so-called high-power guns, ended in failure due to rapid wear and destruction of the barrel even at the testing stage. To “duel” defeat German tanks, it was necessary to switch to a 100-mm caliber, which was carried out only in the T-54 tank with a turret ring diameter of 1815 mm. But this combat vehicle did not take part in the battles of World War II.

As for the placement of the driver's hatch in the front hull, we could try to follow the American path. Let us remember that on the Sherman the driver and machine gunner’s hatches, originally also made in the sloping frontal plate of the hull, were subsequently transferred to the turret plate. This was achieved by reducing the angle of inclination of the front sheet from 56° to 47° to the vertical. The T-34-85's frontal hull plate had an inclination of 60°. By also reducing this angle to 47° and compensating for this by slightly increasing the thickness of the frontal armor, it would be possible to increase the area of ​​the turret plate and place the driver’s hatch on it. This would not require a radical redesign of the hull design and would not entail a significant increase in the mass of the tank.

Polish-made T-34-85 tanks are on the left and Soviet-made T-34 tanks are on the right.

Left: T-34-85 Right: T-44

Soldiers of the US Army and the Russian Army from the international peacekeeping forces in Bosnia inspect a damaged Serbian T-34-85 tank. Bosnia, 1996.

The suspension hasn't changed on the T-34-85 either. And if the use of higher quality steel for the manufacture of springs helped to avoid their rapid subsidence and, as a result, a decrease in ground clearance, then it was not possible to get rid of significant longitudinal vibrations of the tank hull in motion. It was an organic defect of the spring suspension. The location of the habitable compartments in the front of the tank only aggravated the negative impact of these fluctuations on the crew and weapons.

A consequence of the layout of the T-34-85 was the absence of a rotating turret floor in the fighting compartment. In combat, the loader worked standing on the lids of cassette boxes with shells placed on the bottom of the tank. When turning the turret, he had to move after the breech, while he was hampered by spent cartridges falling right there on the floor. When conducting intense fire, the accumulated cartridges also made it difficult to access the shots placed in the ammunition rack on the bottom.

Summarizing all these points, we can conclude that, unlike the same Sherman, the possibilities for modernizing the hull and suspension of the T-34-85 were not fully used.

During the period from 1931 to May 1945, the Lya 183 plant produced 35 thousand tanks (not 35 thousand T-34s, as is sometimes written about). The anniversary vehicle, the T-34-85, has been preserved and is in good technical condition, as can be judged by this photo taken in Nizhny Tagil on May 9, 1995.

When considering the advantages and disadvantages of the T-34-85, it is necessary to take into account one more very important circumstance. The crew of any tank, as a rule, in everyday reality does not care at all about the angle of inclination of the frontal or any other sheet of the hull or turret. It is much more important that the tank as a machine, that is, as a set of mechanical and electrical mechanisms, works clearly, reliably and does not create problems during operation. Including problems associated with the repair or replacement of any parts, components and assemblies. Here the T-34-85 (like the T-34) was fine. The tank was distinguished by its exceptional maintainability! Paradoxical, but true - and the layout is “to blame” for this!

There is a rule: to arrange not to ensure convenient installation and dismantling of units, but based on the fact that until they completely fail, the units do not need repair. The required high reliability and trouble-free operation are achieved by designing a tank based on ready-made, structurally proven units. Since during the creation of the T-34, practically none of the tank’s units met this requirement, its layout was carried out contrary to the rule. The roof of the engine and transmission compartment was easily removable, the rear hull sheet was hinged, which made it possible to dismantle large units such as the engine and gearbox in the field. All this was of enormous importance in the first half of the war, when more tanks failed due to technical faults than from enemy action (as of April 1, 1942, for example, the active army had 1,642 serviceable and 2,409 faulty tanks of all types, while while our combat losses in March amounted to 467 tanks). As the quality of the units improved, reaching its highest level in the T-34-85, the importance of the repairable layout decreased, but one would hesitate to call this a disadvantage. Moreover, good maintainability turned out to be very useful during the post-war operation of the tank abroad, primarily in the countries of Asia and Africa, sometimes in extreme climatic conditions and with personnel who had a very mediocre, to say the least, level of training.

Despite the presence of all the shortcomings in the design of the "thirty-four", a certain balance of compromises was maintained, which distinguished this combat vehicle from other tanks of the Second World War. Simplicity, ease of operation and maintenance, combined with good armor protection, maneuverability and fairly powerful weapons, became the reason for the success and popularity of the T-34-85 among tankers.

Next issue of "ARMOR COLLECTION": Directory "Armored vehicles of European countries 1939-1945"

Medium tank T-34-85

Layout of the T-34-85 medium tank:

1 — ZIS-S-53 gun; 2 — armored mask; 3 — telescopic sight TSh-16; 4 — gun lifting mechanism; 5 — loader MK-4 observation device; 6 — fixed gun fence; 7 — commander’s MK-4 observation device; 8 — glass block; 9 — folding fence (sleeve catcher); 10 — armored fan cap; 11 — rack ammunition storage in the turret niche; 12 — covering tarpaulin; 13 — clamp stowage for two artillery rounds; 14 — engine; 15 — main clutch; 16 — air cleaner “Multicyclone”; 17 — starter; 18 — smoke bomb БДШ; 19 — gearbox; 20 — — final drive; 21—batteries; 22 — stacking shots on the floor of the fighting compartment; 23 — gunner’s seat; 24 - VKU; 25 — suspension shaft; 26 — driver’s seat; 27 — stacking of machine-gun magazines in the control department; 28 — side clutch lever; 29 — main clutch pedal; 30 — compressed air cylinders; 31 — driver’s hatch cover; 32 — machine gun D'G; 33 - clamp stowage of shots in the control compartment.

Internal view of the tank turret (front side): 1 — loader’s seat; 2 — sleeve catcher; 3 — gunner's seat; 4 — turret rotation mechanism; 5 — capture of the turret ring; 6 — locking device for the opening for firing from personal weapons; 7 — button for turning on the backlight of the protractor; 8 — electrical panel of tower equipment; 9 — sight suspension; 10 — MK-4 observation devices; 11 — sight TSh-16; 12 — sight lighting shield; 13 — cannon; 14 — tower lighting lamp; 15 — coaxial machine gun; 16 — stacking of machine gun magazines on the right side of the turret; 17 — turret stopper; 18 — device No. 1 TPU.

Management Department:

1 — machine gunner’s seat; 2 — stowage of machine gun magazines; 3 — emergency exit hatch; 4 - drawstring; 5 — fuel pedal; b — brake pedal; 7 — driver’s seat; 8 — main clutch pedal; 9 - syringe press; 10 - fire extinguisher; 11 — air distribution valve; 12 - air valve; 13 — electrical panel; 14 — air intake valve; 15 — relay-regulator; 16 — balancing mechanism of the driver’s hatch cover; 17 — starter button; 18 — speedometer; 19 — tachometer; 20—control levers; 21 — manual air pump; 22 — compressed air cylinders; 23 — instrument panel; 24 — device No. 3 TPU driver; 25 — installation of a forward machine gun; 26—clamp arrangement for two artillery rounds.

T-34-85. 55th Guards Tank Brigade, 7th Guards Tank Corps. Berlin, 1945

T-34-85 “Polar Explorer”, built at the expense of employees of the Main Northern Sea Route. 1st Belorussian Front, 1945

T-34-85. 51st Tank Regiment. Winter 1945

T-34-85. 4th Guards Tank Brigade, 2nd Guards Tank Corps, 3rd Belorussian Front. East Prussia, 1944

T-34-85 Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant B.P. Sapunkov. 95th Tank Brigade, April 1945

T-34-85. 41st Guards Tank Brigade, 7th Mechanized Corps. Hungary, February 1945.

T-34-85. 39th Tank Brigade, 23rd Tank Corps. Hungary, January 1945

T-34-85 of the Egyptian Armed Forces. 1956

T-34-85.44-I armored brigade of the Syrian army. Golan Heights, June 1967.

T-34-85. 202nd Tank Regiment of the Vietnamese People's Army. 1971

T-34-85 of the Iraqi army. 1982

T-34-85 Yugoslav People's Army. Croatia, Karlovac, summer 1991

Application

The T-34-85 began to enter service with the troops in February 1944. Unfortunately, the first tank battles were not very successful - the crews were not given time to retrain, and very few tanks were provided.

One of the first T-34-85s was received by the 38th Tank Regiment, which also had OT-34s, flamethrower tanks based on the T-34. In March 1944, this regiment became part of the 53-1 combined arms army and participated in the liberation of Ukraine, where, in fact, the T-34-85 was used on a large scale for the first time.

When the offensive against Belarus began in June 1944, about four hundred T-34-85s took part in it. However, they were used much more widely in 1945, for example, in the battle of Lake Balaton and in the Berlin operation.

By mid-1945, Soviet tank divisions in the Far East mostly had outdated equipment - light tanks BT-5, BT-7 and T-26. When the war with Japan began, 670 T-34-85s were sent there. Thus, these tanks actively participated in the defeat of the Kwantung Army, acting as the main striking force of the tank units.

When even the power of an 85-mm cannon became insufficient to penetrate the armor of enemy tanks, work began on the T-34-100, as well as on the T-44. As a result, they all led to the appearance of the T-54 tank, which replaced the T-34-85 in the first years after the war. However, the service of this tank did not end - it actively participated in the Korean War, in the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the Arab-Israeli wars. Officially, this tank was in service until 1993, and in some countries it is still in service!

T-34-85 once took part in an interesting event of the 21st century. When there were anti-government protests in Budapest in October 2006, demonstrators were able to launch museum T-34-85s along with BTR-152s, and used the vehicles in clashes with officers of the law.

Memory of a tank

T-34-85 is one of the most popular tanks of the Great Patriotic War. Although most people have only heard of the T-34 tank, many museums have examples of the T-34-85. Also, this tank most often stands on pedestals in many Russian cities: Novokuznetsk, Voronezh, Kharkov, Nizhny Novgorod and several others.

Tank in culture

The T-34-85 tank was widely reflected in culture, and it was often replaced by earlier T-34s, since it was not possible to find the originals.

Movies

There are quite a lot of films featuring the T-34-85. The most famous of them:

• Chief designer. A film about the creation of the T-34, in which the T-34-85 was filmed instead of this tank;
• Fall of Berlin;
• In war as in war;
• Film epic “Liberation”;
• Hot Snow;
• Eternal Call;
• Four tankmen and a dog (despite the fact that during the series the crew fights first on the T-34, and then on the T-34-85, the T-35-85 was filmed in the film with minor alterations);
• White Tiger;
• Save Private Ryan. There is no mention of the T-34-85 here, but these were the tanks that were camouflaged as the PzKpfw VI “Tiger” featured in the story.

Games

The T-34-85 appears in many World War II games, such as Red Orchestra: Ostfront 41-45, World War II, Sudden Strike 3: Arms for Victory, and Sudden Strike: The Last Stand. , “Call of Duty”, “Blitzkrieg” as well as in the games “World of Tanks” and “War Thunder”.

Other

Due to its popularity, the T-34-85 was produced by many different companies in the form of models. Also during Soviet times, this tank was featured on postage stamps.

Temporary boost

Often, modernization of a tank begins almost immediately after it is put into service and preparations for mass production begin. The T-34 was no exception in this regard. Already in the first year of production, the design of the vehicle underwent a number of changes that improved the characteristics of the tank and simplified its production. The T-34 changed even more in 1941. For example, since March 1941, instead of the L-11 gun, the tank received the more powerful F-34 system. There were also plans to strengthen the armor, however, this point was only partially realized. We are talking about shielding the T-34

, which tanks received intermittently from 1941 to 1943.

Forced gain

The next stage in the history of shielding of Soviet tanks began in the spring of 1941. At this time, in addition to the earlier work on shielding the T-26 and T-28, the designers were given the task of strengthening the armor of the KV-1 and KV-2. The impetus for the start of this work was given by intelligence information about new types of German tanks obtained by Soviet intelligence in early March 1941. According to it, the Type V and Type VI heavy tanks were armed with 75 mm cannons capable of hitting the new Soviet heavy tanks.

On March 15, 1941, Resolution No. 548-232 ss was signed by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, according to which by May 1 it was required to produce 2 prototypes of shielded KV-1 and KV-2. The screens were supposed to be launched in series on June 1. This work was supposed to be a temporary solution, since in the summer it was planned to equip the KV with thicker armor (and this plan was implemented - however, only on the KV-1, since the KV-2 was already overloaded). Although German heavy tanks did not appear on the Soviet-German front in the summer of 1941, the idea of ​​​​reinforcing the armor turned out to be correct.

Drawing of the T-34 turret shielding. According to the signatures on the stamp, the drawing was finally approved on June 13, 1941

Another new Red Army tank, the T-34, also received shielding. But this happened later and for completely different reasons: intelligence reports have nothing to do with them.

In the period from April 1 to April 21, 1941, at the training ground of the Mariupol plant named after. Ilyich, two hulls and two turrets of the T-34 were fired upon. The 37 mm Polish anti-tank gun Armata przeciwpancerna 37 mm wz was used. 36 Bofors, a 37-mm anti-tank gun model 1930, two 45-mm anti-tank guns model 1937 and a 76-mm divisional gun model. 1902–30 It turned out that the armor of the hull and turret, with the exception of the upper frontal plate of the hull, is penetrated by 45-mm sharp-headed shells at a distance of 600 meters and closer. The sides were especially vulnerable. The forehead of the hull was more reliably protected and even withstood hits from 76 mm shells. But there were weakened zones on it too.

The 45 mm thick armor now looked insufficient.

Drawing of the housing shielding. This design was rejected because the bolted connection could be knocked down by the first hit of a shell

For the design bureau of plant No. 183 and the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GABTU KA), this was not news. Back on March 5, 1941, the tactical and technical requirements for the “T-34 tank with a T-60 torsion bar suspension” were approved; later the T-60 was corrected to the T-34-T. The number 60 in the designation meant that the thickness of the top frontal plate of the tank was increased to 60 mm. It was already known then that armor 45 mm thick was not guaranteed protection against 45 mm cannon shells.

In mid-April 1941, the story of strengthening the armor of the modernized T-34 continued. It was proposed to strengthen the entire front of the hull and turret to 60 mm, and the thickness of the bottom increased from 20 to 30 mm. Such a machine is known as the A-43.

The issue of strengthening the armor of conventional T-34s was also considered. On May 7, 1941, Resolution No. 1216-502ss “On the production of T-34 tanks in 1941” was issued by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. It talked about the future production of the A-43, as well as the T-44 (A-44) tank. In the context of this article, the 10th paragraph of the resolution is interesting:

«Oblige:

a) People's Commissariat of Medium Machinery, Comrade Malyshev, and director of plant No. 183, Comrade Maksarev, in June of this year. to manufacture and, together with the People's Commissariat of Defense (GABTU KA), test two prototypes of the T-34 tank with additional shielding of the turret and frontal hull plate with armor 13–15 mm thick. Provide shielding for 500 units in 1941. T-34 tanks located in military units by sending special brigades with material and tools to the field;

b) People's Commissariat of Industry, Comrade Nosenko, and director of the Mariupol plant, Comrade Garmashev, ensure the production of armor parts for shielding 2 T-34 tanks, within two weeks upon receipt of drawings from plant No. 183;

c) The People's Commissariat of Defense (GABTU KA Comrade Fedorenko) organize screening of T-34 tanks in the military units of the base, providing them with equipment for welding and mechanical work, and auxiliary labor.

STZ and plant No. 183 produced shielded tanks according to the approved model from August 1941.

The Mariupol plant will supply plant No. 183 with armor parts in accordance with the production of shielded tanks, starting from July 1941.

Since July 1941, Plant No. 264 of the People's Commissariat of Sustainable Industry will supply STZ hulls and turrets with parts for shielding.”

At the time of signing this document, no screens existed, even in the form of developments. The design bureau of plant No. 183 had yet to develop them. The branch of NII-48, which dealt with armor, also got involved in the work. Some publications claim that screens were developed as early as May 1941, but this is not true. According to the summary of experimental work at Plant No. 183, in May 1941 the drawings were still in progress. At the same time, the plant, instead of 15 mm thick armor, used BT-7 armor, the thickness of these sheets was 13 mm. By the beginning of June, the designers had not yet decided on the method of attaching the screens - with bolts or welding. The factory preferred bolt-on mounting with a gap between the screen and the main sheet of 25 mm. In May, the first experiments on firing screens were carried out. It turned out that after their installation, the through-penetration limit (the speed required for a projectile to penetrate armor) increased by 40–55 m/s.

T-34 with serial number 811-28, one of two tanks that received shielding

Working documentation for the screens was ready by mid-June 1941. As expected earlier, the screens were mounted on bolts, which, in turn, were mounted on welded bonks. The frontal part of the body was covered with four sheets on top and two on the bottom; this design was simpler to manufacture and made it possible to quickly replace the screen if it was damaged. The bow beam was not shielded, although the option of installing a shield for vehicles that had a solid frontal part of the hull without a beam was being explored. The tower received more reliable reinforcement: screens were placed around its entire perimeter, and the turret ring was also protected. According to calculations, the total weight of the shielding was 1050 kg.

This car was removed in July 1941 at the entrance of plant No. 183

As required by SNK decree No. 1216-502ss, two tanks received shielding. These were vehicles with serial numbers 0618-7 (manufactured in 1940 with an L-11 gun and a beamless frontal hull part) and 811-28 (produced in 1941 with an F-34 gun and a hull with a beam). True, this did not happen in June, but already in July 1941. The conversion of the tanks required an average of 120–140 man hours, which was quite consistent with the norm for such work.

In order to understand how weighting would affect the characteristics of the tank, the third vehicle (numbered 311-25-3) was loaded to a mass of 28.5 tons and tested in the spring and summer of 1941. After 1697 kilometers, no special problems were identified. But the general disadvantage of shielded vehicles made itself felt here too: due to overload of the frontal part of the body, “pecks” were observed when driving on bumpy roads.

The screens received 13 mm thick armor for the BT-7

The widespread assertion that the war prevented the organization of shielding production is not entirely true. Yes, enterprises engaged in hull production in the new conditions were overloaded with main orders. But there were complaints about the screens themselves. The bolted fastening turned out to be unreliable, since the first hit of any projectile tore off the bolts. The design with the mud flaps was also too complex.

It was proposed to redo the shielding: the shields had to be placed close to the sheets, and by welding. It was proposed to shield the inclined sides of the hull in the area of ​​the fighting compartment. The branch of NII-48 also expressed its claims. They rightly noted that the screens do not cover the most vulnerable spots in the front of the hull: the driver's hatch and the installation of the front-facing machine gun. True, these details were not covered in any of the subsequent T-34 shielding options.

In any case, the development of plant No. 183 was rejected and it still would not have gone into series. Both vehicles, equipped with such screens, went to the front, and the tank with the F-34 cannon even “surfaced” in one of the front-line photographs.

The second coming of screens

After the shielding developed by Plant No. 183 was rejected in July 1941, work on this topic was suspended for some time. Unlike the KV-1, the T-34 did not receive thicker armor plates: the vehicle continued to be produced with armor 45 mm thick. In the fall of 1941, the question of shielding was raised for the second time. This was facilitated by an analysis of the combat use of the T-34 and captured documents, among which was a German memo on the fight against Soviet tanks.

The data from it largely coincided with those received in the spring of 1941. The frontal part of the T-34 hull turned out to be the most resistant, and the weakest part of the tank was the lower parts of the hull sides, which were hit by even small-caliber anti-tank artillery from a distance of 400 meters and closer. The situation was even worse when the same zone was shelled from a 50-mm Pak 38 anti-tank gun, which was already in widespread use by the German army in the summer of 1941. These guns took on the T-34 from a distance of 700 meters, and at the same distance the tank was hit by a more massive weapon - the 105-mm light field howitzer leFH 18.

In October 1941, a proposal appeared to install screens on the sides of the T-34. It was proposed to install 15 mm thick screens on the inclined sides, and cover the chassis with 25 mm thick screens. It was also proposed to install protection for the shoulder strap in the front and side projections, thereby preventing it from jamming. To compensate for the increased mass of the tank, it was proposed to develop rollers with internal shock absorption and a smaller diameter.

GKO Resolution No. 1062ss of December 25, 1941, which initiated the second, main wave of T-34 screening

In practice, shielding work went in a different direction. By the fall of 1941, production of the A-43 had turned into a ghostly dream, so it was decided to strengthen the existing design. Despite the fact that the results of the shelling indicated the need to strengthen, first of all, the sides of the hull, the frontal part of the vehicle remained the main “receiver” of enemy shells. It was this that it was decided to strengthen.

In mid-November 1941, a technical meeting on this issue was held at plant No. 112. Then he repeatedly rose to the level of the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry (NKTP). On December 25, 1941, Stalin signed GKO decree No. 1062ss “On T-34 and T-60 tanks.” According to this document, from January 15, all T-34s were to be produced with a frontal part shielded to 60 mm, and from February 15 - with armor thickened to 60 mm.

Shielded T-34 of plant No. 112 Leningrad Front, summer 1942

By that time, the production of the T-34 had been mastered at three enterprises: the Stalingrad Tractor Plant (STZ), plant No. 112 (Gorky) and plant No. 183 (Nizhny Tagil). Plant No. 183 remained the main plant, but by the beginning of 1942 the plants were producing quite different tanks. Due to technical difficulties, by the end of 1941, Plant No. 183 began to produce a hexagonal turret, which used developments from the A-43 (for example, a characteristic gun mount, separate round hatches and other parts). There were also differences in the body. The tanks from factories No. 112 and STZ were also different, and over time the differences only accumulated.

Despite the fact that, according to technical conditions, only the front part of the sides of the tower was shielded, often there was shielding even on its stern

Plant No. 183 decided to approach the issue of implementing GKO resolution No. 1062ss in its own way. According to a letter dated January 3, 1942, only the bow of the hull was to receive shielding. The turret's protection was improved by increasing the thickness of its armor to 60 mm. Taking into account the fact that the turret was cast, and the thickness of 52 mm corresponded to rolled armor 45 mm thick, it turned out that the level of protection of such a turret was lower than required. At the same time, in fact, the towers continued to be cast with a wall thickness of 52 mm.

At plant No. 112, by January 13, they had developed a shielding scheme in which the frontal part of the hull, as well as the forehead and partially the sides of the turret, were covered with 15 mm thick shields. As in the case of the shielding of plant No. 183, the shields were attached by welding. They were assembled from small fragments.

In Stalingrad, shielding was carried out by the supplier of hulls and turrets - plant No. 264. They also developed shielding to reinforce the armor of the frontal part of the hull and part of the turret. Moreover, if plant No. 112 used mainly cast towers, then plant No. 264 used welded ones.

A T-34 produced by factory No. 183 with a shielded hull destroyed by enemy fire

Plant No. 183 was the first to begin shielding the T-34. It happened on January 20, 1942. Plant No. 112 began producing shielded hulls and turrets on February 1, and plant No. 264 on February 2. By February 17, plant No. 264 had approximately 120 of these hulls and turrets ready. At plant No. 112, production was uneven - in total, 80 shielded hulls and 109 shielded towers were produced there. It turns out that in February 1942, hundreds of T-34s began to be shielded, but... On February 23, 1942, Stalin signed GKO Decree No. 1333, according to which shielding was abolished. True, the released stock of shielded hulls and turrets was used to build tanks.

Shielded T-34 produced by STZ. Summer 1942. The machine was built from the stock of hulls

Why did they refuse to shield the T-34? Back on January 21, a draft decree of the State Defense Committee was prepared “On the timing of the production of T-60 and T-34 tanks with a shielded and thickened frontal part,” according to which the release date of shielded tanks was shifted to February 10. From March 10, tanks with a thickened hull front and a shielded turret were to be produced, and from April 1, the shielding was completely replaced by thicker armor. In February 1942, however, it became clear that the rolled armor should not be counted on to become thicker. Factories overloaded with orders and experiencing difficulties were simply physically unable to switch to 60 mm thick armor. As for shielding, it took a lot of time, effort and resources from factories.

The most important reason was that shielding did not provide any significant benefit. The remaining shielded hulls and turrets were used up gradually; for example, tanks produced in the summer of 1942 were equipped with similar hulls at the STZ.

T-34 of factory No. 112 with a “patch” screen. This was not an increase in armor, but rather an elimination of defects. The screen covered the cracks in the upper frontal plate of the hull

Nevertheless, at plant No. 112 they were forced to return to shielding. This time the reason for this was not the strengthening of the armor, but defects in armor plates, of which there were many in 1942. First of all, this concerned the upper frontal plate of the hull. A complex part with a bunch of cutouts became a real headache for the factory workers. It is for this reason that screens began to be installed on the upper frontal sheet. It was more of a patch, although often the size of the entire frontal part. They differed from earlier screens in shape, often being made in one piece.

Protection from “thermite projectiles”

We had to return to the topic of shielding the T-34 again at the very end of the summer of 1942. The Germans increasingly began to use new types of ammunition, primarily cumulative, or, as they were also called, thermite shells. Their first use against tanks was noted at the end of 1941, although the Germans began to use them in large numbers since the beginning of 1942. This significantly increased the combat effectiveness of the short-barreled guns that the PzIV and StuG III were armed with. According to Soviet data, the cumulative projectile easily penetrated armor 45 mm thick at a distance of 1000 meters. The use of sub-caliber shells was also noted.

The hull and turret of a T-34 during testing of screens in the fall of 1942

NII-48 presented another unpleasant surprise around the same time. Having analyzed the picture of the combat use of the T-34 from May to July 1942, the institute’s specialists prepared an extremely interesting report. It turned out that 50.5% of the defeats occurred on board the T-34.

At the very beginning of September 1942, GABTU KA initiated work on creating screens for protection against new types of projectiles. At the same time, now there was no talk about shielding the forehead: it became clear that completely different parts of the tank needed to be protected.

Installing screens close to sheets showed poor results

On September 12, 1942, at plant No. 112 a meeting was held on the topic of protection against new types of ammunition with the participation of plant management, representatives of NII-48 and a representative of the GABTU KA engineer-lieutenant colonel M.A. Burtseva. Engineer A.T. Larin from NII-48 proposed placing the screens at a certain distance from the main sheet, at least no less than the length of the core of the sub-caliber projectile. As for the cumulative projectile, experiments were required to identify methods of protection. It was decided to conduct tests with various options for mounting the screen, differing in the distance to the main armor plate.

The most effective method was to place the screens at a distance from the sheet they protected.

The shell samples were fired at the Gorokhovetsky ANIOP in the period from September 25 to October 9, 1942. Various screens were installed on the T-34 hull and turret, both close to the sheets and at various distances from them. It turned out that 10 and 20 mm thick screens without an air gap are easily penetrated by cumulative shells from both the Soviet 76 mm regimental gun and the German 75 mm KwK L/24 gun installed in the Pz.Kpfw.IV Ausf.E.

The best results were shown by screens with a thickness of 5 and 20 mm, installed at a distance of 425–480 mm from the main sheet. HEAT shells did not penetrate this combination. It also turned out that the tank’s turret, even without screens, is more resistant to cumulative shells than the side of the hull. Low survivability of the screens was also revealed. The 16 mm thick screen, as tests showed, was destroyed when hit by two sub-caliber or three cumulative projectiles.

T-34 shielding model, later realized in metal

Having studied the results of the shelling, the design bureau team of plant No. 112, headed by V.V. Krylov in mid-October 1942 developed a project for shielding the T-34. Since the tank had to be protected from both cumulative and sub-caliber shells, the screens had to be made quite thick, which means their weight was considerable. The main version of the project involved the use of 20 mm thick screens, the thickest and heaviest.

Same layout on the right

According to the project, the sides, wing flaps, bow beam, as well as the sides and partly the bow of the turret were protected by screens. There was also a “light” version without tower protection. A total of five shielding options were proposed, differing in screen thickness and level of protection. The combat weight of tanks equipped with such screens varied from 31.8 to 32.19 tons. For comparison: the T-34 without shielding had a combat weight of 28.63 tons.

The screens were bolted using Belleville springs. To facilitate work with the chassis, the screens covering it were installed on hinges. If necessary, such a screen could be detached from the mounts from below and folded up.

The list of proposed shielding options included several upgrades with changes in the angles of inclination of the hull sides. They were offered, rather, as backup options, since during the war no one would alter the tank so much.

The model received protection for the bow beam

After discussing the presented project at GABTU KA, a compromise decision was made. Of course, 20 mm thick screens protected the tank better, but the increase in mass turned out to be too great. It was decided to use sheets 16 mm thick. It was proposed to build the shielded tank in two versions. The first option involved increasing the combat weight by 2622 kg, while protecting both the hull and the turret of the tank. The second option did not provide for turret protection, but the mass of the shielding was smaller - 1833 kg. In the second case, sheets with a thickness of not only 15–16, but also 10 mm were used.

This is what the screening looked like according to the second option. Spring 1943

On November 19, a report on screening was presented to Stalin. It proposed building 46 shielded T-34s - 23 according to the first option and 23 according to the second. The proposal was approved by Stalin; on December 7, 1942, he signed GKO decree No. 2594ss, according to which plant No. 112 produced the specified number of shielded vehicles by March 1, 1943. They were made in the spring of 1943.

T-34 with turret number 232 from the 41st Tank Brigade, which also had a second shielding option. The vehicle was destroyed by a 75-mm armor-piercing shell hitting the front of the hull

The built vehicles entered service with the 139th and 198th tank regiments. By order of the commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army No. 064 dated June 9, 1943, the vehicles were sent to the front for testing in combat conditions. Units equipped with shielded T-34s became part of the 41st Tank Brigade of the 5th Tank Corps and the 111th Tank Brigade of the 25th Tank Corps. The 139th Tank Regiment had 21 T-34s shielded according to the first option, as well as 11 T-34s with shielding of the second option. The 198th Tank Regiment received two tanks with the first shielding option, 12 with the second, as well as 18 T-34s from factory No. 112 without any shielding.

The tank with turret number 100 had the first shielding option. It was also destroyed by a hit in the forehead of the hull, but with an 88-mm shell

On the march to the concentration site, a number of defects in the chassis and engine-transmission group were identified. These defects, however, were also observed on the T-34 without shielding. A more specific drawback was the deterioration in maneuverability when driving on soft ground. This was due to the clogging of dirt between the main armor and the screen during turns. In general, it turned out that the screens have almost no effect on cross-country ability and maneuverability.

Another hit by an 88-mm shell, this time on the side of the hull of tank No. 111

The brigades, equipped with shielded T-34s, took part in combat operations from July 25 to August 8, 1943. By the beginning of the offensive, the 41st Tank Brigade had 89 T-34s and ten Valentines. On July 28, the formation went into battle with the task of knocking the enemy out of Rudnevo. The enemy met the attack with fire from tanks, self-propelled guns and anti-tank artillery. The brigade managed to occupy the village at the cost of losing seven shielded tanks. It turned out that the shielding holds 75 mm cumulative shells well. But the enemy mainly fired with armor-piercing shells of 75 mm caliber. Even worse, it was in these places that the Germans used 88 mm heavy anti-tank guns 8.8 cm Pak 43/41. The brigade suffered serious losses the next day.

The screen in the front part of the turret did not protect tank No. 321 from being penetrated by an armor-piercing 75-mm shell

The 41st Tank Brigade fought 35 kilometers, successfully completing the task. But it was the shielded tanks among its vehicles that suffered the greatest losses. Two tanks with shielding option 1 and five with shielding option 2 remained operational. 14 tanks were lost forever, five required major repairs and six required medium repairs.

The 111th Tank Brigade has five serviceable shielded tanks left. Thanks to participation in less intense combat operations and fewer shielded tanks, their losses in this formation were lower. Two tanks were irretrievably lost, and two more required major repairs (all with the second shielding option). Another five shielded tanks (one of them with the first shielding option) required medium repairs.

This vehicle with turret number 222 was blown up by a mine. In total, four shielded tanks were lost to mines, another was damaged by mortar fire, and two were disabled by Molotov cocktails.

Analysis of the damage caused made the conclusions about the effectiveness of shielding even more gloomy. In total, two hits were counted with armor-piercing shells of 50 mm caliber and cumulative shells of 75 mm caliber. The largest number of hits (37) were from armor-piercing shells of 75 mm caliber, of which 16 were in the side, five in the wing flaps, six in the bow of the hull and ten in the turret. The 88th shells from the Pak 43/41 hit 15 times, seven of them on the side, three on the wing flaps, two on the nose of the hull, two on the stern and one on the turret. In total, 24 shells hit the sides, and nine hit the wing flaps. Yes, the idea of ​​additional protection for the sides turned out to be correct. But the screens turned out to be ineffective for protection against fire from 75-mm and 88-mm anti-tank guns. And the screens also did not save us from armor-piercing shells of 50 mm caliber.

Captured German 88 mm Pak 43/41 anti-tank gun. Some of the shielded tanks were destroyed using just such guns

The results of the combat use of shielded T-34s were summarized in a report prepared on September 25, 1943. Its drafters suggested that the NKTP develop more reliable protection for the sides. But at that time, even heavy tanks did not have reliable protection from the Pak 43. Participation in battles of an experimental batch of T-34s, built by plant No. 112, turned out to be the last case of mass use of shielded tanks by the Red Army. Work on shielding tanks did not stop, but they no longer went beyond the production of prototypes.

The author expresses great gratitude to Alexey Makarov and Igor Zheltov (Moscow) for their assistance in preparing the article and for the materials provided.

Sources:

1. Materials from TsAMO RF
2. GARF materials
3. RGASPI materials
4. RGAE materials
5. Author's photo archive
6. Archive of Igor Zheltov
7. Materials of RGAKFD