Project 671 submarine: history of creation, description of the project, famous ships, photos

It was a legendary nuclear submarine project, born during the crazy military race between the USSR and the USA. Hurtful failures and harsh conclusions, adventurous orders and true heroism of sailors, underwater spy surveillance and ambushes under the ice - the history of the 671 series boats is full of drama and poignant plots, which can be used to make more than one world-class thriller.

As part of the project, forty-eight submarines with different combat equipment and constant improvements were built and launched. This was the most important stage in Soviet military shipbuilding: it was during the tough confrontation with the United States that domestic shipyards learned to make high-class submarines.

When it all started

This was after the Second World War. The first nuclear submarine in the world appeared only in 1954, it was the famous American Nautilus with a maximum underwater speed of 23 knots. He managed to swim under the ice to the North Pole, earning himself an honorable place in the history of the world's submarine fleet.

The USSR was four years behind the Nautilus: in 1958, the Leninsky Komsomol, the Soviet first nuclear submarine, was launched, capable of overtaking an American underwater without any effort: its underwater maximum speed was already 30 knots.

The parties worked under unequal conditions. If the previous boat project number 627 was created based on experience with diesel ships and scant information from the Americans, then the second generation boats were made taking into account their own difficult experience. Already at that time, the supply of consumables and related equipment was carried out through completely different channels and principles. Americans could choose the best examples of electronics or, for example, guns for shooting all over the world - even in Japan, even in Sweden. Our guys worked only with domestic manufacturers, with understandable difficulties.

Project 671RTM, 671RTMK

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0163628.12.19772002B-524 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-524 60 years of Komsomol patronage 11.10.1982
K-524
27130.12.197831.07.1996B-247 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the Far East / Naval Forces of the Far Eastern Republic / Red Siberian Flotilla
K-247
28230.11.197930.05.1998B-507 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the Far East / Naval Forces of the Far Eastern Republic / Red Siberian Flotilla
K-507
30330.12.197931.07.1996B-492 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the Far East / Naval Forces of the Far Eastern Republic / Red Siberian Flotilla
K-492
0163830.12.197930.05.1998B-254 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-254
30430.12.197931.07.1996B-412 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the Far East / Naval Forces of the Far Eastern Republic / Red Siberian Flotilla
K-412
29530.09.198030.05.1998B-251 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the Far East / Naval Forces of the Far Eastern Republic / Red Siberian Flotilla
K-251
29628.12.198008.2004B-255 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-255 01.10.1981
Red Banner Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the Far East / Naval Forces of the Far Eastern Republic / Red Siberian Flotilla
0164131.12.19802000B-502 Volgograd 21.03.1999Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
B-502 26.07.1992
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-502
29723.02.19812000B-324 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-324 03.12.1982
Red Banner Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the Far East / Naval Forces of the Far Eastern Republic / Red Siberian Flotilla
30830.09.198130.05.1998B-305 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the Far East / Naval Forces of the Far Eastern Republic / Red Siberian Flotilla
K-305
29929.12.198130.05.1998B-355 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the Far East / Naval Forces of the Far Eastern Republic / Red Siberian Flotilla
K-355
0164330.12.19811999B-527 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-527
30029.09.198230.05.1998B-360 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the Far East / Naval Forces of the Far Eastern Republic / Red Siberian Flotilla
K-360
0164527.12.198230.05.1998B-298 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-298
30128.12.198230.05.1998B-218 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-218
30225.10.198330.05.1998B-242 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the Far East / Naval Forces of the Far Eastern Republic / Red Siberian Flotilla
K-242 50 years of Komsomolsk-on-Amur 23.06.1982
K-242
0164729.12.198330.05.1998B-358 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-358 Murmansk Komsomolets 30.12.1987
K-358
33326.10.19842003B-264 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Pacific Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the Far East / Naval Forces of the Far Eastern Republic / Red Siberian Flotilla
K-264
0164922.12.19842000B-299 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-299
0165231.12.198530.05.1998B-244 26.07.1992Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-244
0165527.11.19872006B-292 Perm 07.2002Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
B-292 26.07.1992
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-292
0165730.11.19882013B-388 Petrozavodsk 22.02.2005Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
B-388 26.07.1992
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-388
0165930.12.1990B-138 Obninsk 05.05.2000Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
B-138 26.07.1992
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-138
0169530.12.1990B-414 Daniil Moskovsky 18.09.1996Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
B-414 26.07.1992
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-414
0169624.09.1992B-448 Tambov 25.03.1995Russian NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet
B-448 26.07.1992
03.06.1992USSR NavyRed Banner Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Northern Fleet of the USSR Navy / Naval Forces of the North Sea / White Sea Flotilla / Red Flotilla of the Arctic Ocean
K-448

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Historical Shock: Embarrassment in the Sargasso Sea

In 1962, the world froze in anticipation of the outcome of the largest American-Soviet conflict over the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. The United States of America introduced a strict maritime quarantine to block Soviet ships from reaching Cuba. The Soviet leadership immediately responded to such a demarche. The order was tough and urgent: break the naval blockade with the help of Soviet submarines.

Four diesel boats, reinforced with nuclear torpedoes and equipped with the latest tactical Soviet developments that allow them to evade the enemy underwater, urgently arrived on the Cuban shores. So it seemed to the Soviet submariners.

It all ended disastrously. In the Sargasso Sea, our boats were quickly detected using the hydrophones of the latest American Sosus tracking system. The Americans began dropping grenades on the boats, preventing them from rising to the surface of the water, which is vital for diesel engines. In the wild heat and lack of oxygen, the submariners fainted.

It ended with the B-130 boat being the first to rise to the surface of the water in full view of everyone. It was a desperate and brave gesture by the submarine captain, who sent an encrypted message with a damning text about a forced ascent, a broken diesel engine and a dead battery. And that the B-130 was surrounded by four American destroyers. Following this encryption, messages came from other crews with approximately the same content. Adventure, courage, complete failure - these are the most suitable words for a short summary, which in the end turned out to be a cruel and at the same time effective lesson. After all, it was with this offensive failure that the path of the famous nuclear submarines 671 began.

Conclusions and new challenges for second generation submarines

The level of awareness of the Soviet submariners who participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis was zero: after all, they were sure that there was an American spy at the headquarters of the USSR Navy. And that’s the only reason American ships were able to detect our diesel engines so quickly.

The first generation of Soviet diesel submarines had catastrophically short-range missiles. For this reason, they had to break through the US naval defense - they did not know how to shoot from afar. To protect them, a new type of boat was needed with a completely new task: to hunt not for surface ships, but for enemy submarines. New underwater hunters were needed - fighters to protect missile carriers.

The main criteria were determined by underwater speed, diving depth and maneuverability. Hence the special shape of Project 671 boats - everything is tailored to their functions and tasks. Hence the “fishy” coding of the series.

Project 671 “Ruff”: new underwater hunters

The famous Leningrad "Malachite" is not a jewelry company, as one might think. This is a serious design bureau, which was entrusted with the development of new Project 671 submarines. The main task was the fight against American strategic submarines, which were essentially missile submarines. Swimming under the ice, they were invulnerable. And the largest and strategic cities of the USSR Moscow, Murmansk, Leningrad and Sevastopol were under constant threat of a missile strike.

The situation was tense, the pressure from management was enormous, the speed of the project was fantastic. The matter was further complicated by new troubles on the American side: they were not asleep there either.

Already in 1963, the Americans launched a new class of submarines, the Lafayette. In terms of their functions, they were specialized missile carriers. Their main feature was fantastic noiselessness. Soviet radar equipment detected them at a distance of only a few kilometers. This situation could lead to nonsense: submarine 671 could become obsolete even before its birth. Of course, a solution was found. We had to create a new process for loading torpedoes: it has now become fully automated. Much of this project was done for the first time in Soviet shipbuilding; this moment was truly breakthrough.

The technical characteristics and dimensions of the Project 671 submarine called “Ruff” were as follows:

  • the length and width of the boat are 95 and 11.7 meters, respectively;
  • diving depth 320 meters;
  • nuclear power plant with turbine power of 30,000 horsepower;
  • underwater speed 32 knots;
  • Autonomous swimming ability – 50 days.

As for weapons, the "brushes" were equipped with 36 mines and two SS-N-15 missiles.

First baptism of fire

The underwater confrontation between the new underwater hunters of Project 671 and American strategic submarines turned into an interesting chronicle, which could be used to make an excellent action-packed series.

The Americans controlled almost half of Antarctica thanks to the excellent modified Sosus system. Their database contained records of all noise produced by Soviet ships, including civilian ships. And for each submarine, real detailed noise portraits were compiled. Detection tactics have also changed. The Americans did not report that they had discovered a Soviet submarine; instead, they continued to control the submarine's progress covertly, literally hanging on its tail, as in a spy novel. They could do this because they were silent, like cats.

What about our new submarines in such a difficult situation? They performed well from the very beginning. When breaking through anti-submarine blockades (which was their main function), the “ruffs” turned out to be quite effective. They made, of course, a lot of noise in comparison with American boats, but in terms of speed and performance they overtook everyone and easily escaped pursuit. In other words, the first combat mission in the launch series of Project 671 submarines was completed. The designers did an excellent job with the sailors.

Project 671 RT "Salmon"

In the early 70s, a new problem came. Our underwater hunters of the 671 series found themselves in the role of game - the hunt began for them. It was about yet another modernization of the US Navy's weapons. New missiles with multiple warheads appeared on their boats. But they did not become the main problem, but the so-called torpedo missile - an anti-submarine weapon with an increased range. This missile-torpedo moved like a typical torpedo in the water. Then she came out of the water and turned into a rocket, which flew to the designated point. At this point, a special warhead departed from it, which exploded at the required depth in the water.

The designers of the Malachite bureau again had the urgent task of “catching up and overtaking.” The Soviet answer came a year later: it was a modified boat 671 with the abbreviation RT under the code "Salmon". Its main advantage was the new Vyuga missile system with an increased missile range of up to 40 km, a powerful caliber and a nuclear warhead.

"Salmon" was capable of destroying enemy boats several kilometers from the epicenter. Additional weapons included devices for high-power torpedoes with a caliber of 650 mm. The boats were lengthened by an entire compartment, and the comfort of the crew’s stay increased. They did a good job with the notorious noise: they managed to reduce it by five times, which, however, was still insufficient. The photo shows the submarine 671 of the RT project.

In 1975, a funny story happened. The Defense Department of the CPSU Central Committee urgently convened all submarine designers for an emergency meeting. They were met by a prosecutor with an official complaint in hand. A Navy officer working in the receiving office complained. He believed that the main problem of all Project 671 boats in the form of high noise (and this was exactly the case) was a consequence of the planned actions of the designers. The matter ended with a detailed debriefing, after which the designers promised to look at all possible options for reducing noise. The right solution was finally found. The main sources of noise - the turbine and turbogenerators - were placed on shock absorbers inside a special chamber. Subsequently, such a scheme was placed on all subsequent boats. The very first exit of the silent boat 671 RT caused a stir among the Americans: they lost Atlantic and Antarctic peace forever.

"Salmon" had excellent technical characteristics:

  • length 102 m and width 10 m;
  • ability to dive to 350 m;
  • nuclear power plant with a capacity of 30,000 horsepower;
  • underwater speed 30.5 knots;
  • possibility of autonomous navigation for 60 days;

The armament was more than serious: 12 torpedo tubes of various calibers and two SS-N-16 nuclear missiles.

Nuclear submarine of the "Ruff" type, pr. 671 ("Victor")

If the first-generation domestic nuclear-powered torpedo ships (projects 627, 627A and 645) were created to combat enemy surface ships, then in the second half of the 50s it became obvious that the Soviet Union also needed submarines with an “anti-submarine bias” capable of combating missiles. Submarines of the “potential enemy” in positions where they are likely to use weapons, primarily in the Arctic Ocean, ensure the deployment of their own SSBNs, as well as protect ships and transports from enemy submarines. Of course, the traditional tasks for torpedo submarines of combating enemy surface ships (primarily aircraft carriers), operating on communications, carrying out mine laying, etc. were not removed.

Work on studying the appearance of 2nd generation nuclear-powered ships began in the USSR in the late 50s. On August 28, 1958, in accordance with a government decree, the design of a unified steam-generating installation for new submarines began. Around the same time, a competition for designs for 2nd generation boats was announced, in which the country's leading design teams specializing in underwater shipbuilding - SKB-143, TsKB-18 and SKB-112 "Sudoproject" - took part. The Leningrad SKB-143 had the greatest technical potential, which, based on its earlier (1956-58) proactive developments carried out under the leadership of A.B. Petrov, prepared technical proposals for torpedo (project 671) and missile (project 639) boats.

The distinctive features of these projects were improved hydrodynamics, developed with the involvement of specialists from the Moscow branch of TsAGI, a single-shaft layout, the use of three-phase alternating current, as well as an increased diameter of the durable body, which ensured the transverse placement of two new, more compact nuclear reactors, unified for 2nd generation submarines .

As a result of the competition, SKB-143 received the task of designing a nuclear torpedo submarine pr.671 (code "Ruff") with a normal displacement of 2000 tons and an operating diving depth of at least 300 m. A distinctive feature of the new ship was to be powerful hydroacoustics (under the conditions of the competition for the first time, the dimensions of the GAS were specifically stipulated). The tactical and technical specifications for the new nuclear-powered submarine were approved on November 3, 1959; preliminary designs were completed in March 1960, and technical designs were completed in December of the same year. The creation of Project 671 submarines was carried out under the leadership of chief designer G.N. Chernysheva. In 1960, the Leningrad Admiralty Plant began preparing the construction of a series of new nuclear-powered torpedo ships. Act on the acceptance into the USSR Navy of the lead boat pr.671 - K-38 () - Chairman of the government commission Hero of the Soviet Union G.I. Shchedrin signed on November 5, 1967.

The double-hull submarine with a characteristic “limousine” fencing of retractable devices had a durable hull made of high-strength AK-29 steel, the thickness of the sheets of which reached 35 mm. Internal flat bulkheads were designed for a pressure of 10 kgf/cm2. The ship's hull was divided into seven waterproof compartments. The structure of the light hull, the bow of the superstructure, and the vertical and horizontal tail were made of low-magnetic steel. The fencing of the retractable wheelhouse devices, as well as the middle and aft parts of the superstructure, were made of aluminum alloy, and the large radome of the hydroacoustic complex antenna and rudders were made of titanium alloys. The Project 671 boat (as well as its further modifications) was characterized by careful finishing of the contours of the outer hull.

The main power plant of the PLA pr.671 (which had a rated power of 31,000 hp) included two OK-300 nuclear power plants (a VM-4 water-water reactor with a thermal power of 72 mW and four PG-4T steam generators), autonomous for each side. The reactor core was to be recharged on a cycle of eight years.

When creating the Project 671 submarine, much attention was paid to noise reduction issues. In particular, a hydroacoustic rubber coating of the light hull was used, and the number of scuppers was reduced. As a result, the acoustic visibility of the boat compared to the 1st generation nuclear-powered ships decreased approximately five times.

The submarine was equipped with the Sigma all-latitude navigation system. There was a television system for monitoring general and ice conditions MT-70, capable, under favorable conditions, of providing species information at a depth of up to 50 m.

However, the main information means of the ship was the MGK-300 Rubin hydroacoustic complex, developed by the Morfizpribor Central Research Institute under the leadership of chief designer N.N. Sviridov and having a maximum target detection range of about 50-60 km. It included a low-frequency nasal hydroacoustic emitter, a high-frequency mine-detecting sonar antenna MG-509 "Radian" in front of the fencing of the retractable wheelhouse devices, a sound-underwater communication station, hydroacoustic alarm and a number of other elements. "Rubin" provided all-round visibility, independent automatic tracking and determination of target heading angles, ranging by echolocation, as well as detection of active enemy sonar systems.

Retractable devices included a PZNS-10 periscope, an MRP-10 radio identification system antenna with a transponder, an Albatross radar complex, VAN-M or Anis and Iva radio communication antennas, a Zavesa direction finder, as well as an RKP device (compressor operation under water). There were sockets for a number of removable antennas installed to solve specific problems.

The ship's armament consisted of six 533-mm torpedo tubes, capable of firing at depths of up to 250 m. The torpedo complex occupied the upper third of the first compartment. The torpedo tubes were located in two horizontal rows. In the center plane of the ship, above the first row of tubes, there was a torpedo-loading hatch. Everything was done remotely: torpedoes were pulled into the compartment, moved around it, loaded into devices and lowered onto racks using hydraulic drives. The torpedo firing control was provided by the Brest-671 control system. The ammunition included 18 torpedoes and mines (SET-65, 53-65K, TEST-71, PMR-1, R-1). The loading option was chosen depending on the tasks being solved. Mine laying could be carried out at speeds of up to 6 knots.

Compared to the most modern American analogue - the nuclear submarine SSN 637 "Stargeon" (the lead ship of the series entered service on March 3, 1967), the Soviet submarine had a higher underwater speed (29 and 33.5 knots, respectively), and a slightly greater diving depth and commensurate ammunition. At the same time, the American PLA had less noise and more advanced hydroacoustic equipment, which provided it with better search capabilities.

Forty-eight boats of this project in four modifications entered service over 25 years - from 1967 to 1992. “Superboats” - super-fast Lyras, super-deep-sea "Mars", super-quiet "Bars" - set records for speed, depth, duration of covert tracking of the enemy, and prepared to carry out super-tasks, collecting guards pennants, orders and honorary titles.

But they were not the main force. The main force was “Ruffs”. And they were feared and respected. V - “VICTOR”, “Winner” - it was not without reason that NATO chose this particular encoding for them, despite the fact that in the early 70s many more letters were free. Even more characteristic is the name unofficially given to this type of boat by ENGLISH sailors - “Black Prince”. The name spread and stuck even stronger than the code name. It was the “Ruffs” that were the basis of Soviet underwater power. Simple and cheap - with a cost of about 50 million rubles and a construction period of 11-15 months, and some submarines even 8-9 months, but extremely “toothy”, maneuverable and autonomous, they became “duty guards” at all the most important sea crossings, taking over Project 613 diesel-electric submarines have this role. Where previously there was a flock of 10-11 Whiskeys, now 2-3 Ruffs were on duty, carrying out their tasks. With the increase in the performance characteristics of boats, it became possible to reduce their number in each specific place, but the main principle - covering all critical zones - remained. “Ruffs” were everywhere and nowhere - off western Greenland and in the Drake Passage, off Pearl Harbor and in the Arabian Sea, in the central Atlantic and in the “roaring forties.”

Project 671 R

This series is an extremely interesting project from all points of view; it would be useful to study it at universities as part of production management. First of all, it was an attempt (very successful in the end) to squeeze everything possible out of the two projects 671 and 671 RT. The fact is that in parallel, third-generation submarines were already being built in full swing - fundamentally new projects 945 and 971 with a radical reduction in noise levels and a powerful set of weapons.

The latest powerful hydroacoustic and navigation systems were introduced into the design of the Project 671 RTM submarine. New means of communication were at the world level. Two nuclear reactors were also installed with a significant increase in power. Improvements affected all systems of the boat. Taking into account such transformations, the RTM 671 submarine smoothly moved into the category of third generation submarines.

The legendary “Pike” is the most advanced option of the project. The Project 671 RTM submarine was a multi-purpose nuclear submarine. In total, 26 models were produced under the abbreviation RTM - a whole series of boats with excellent technical characteristics, including:

  • maximum diving depth 600 m;
  • maximum underwater speed 31 knots;
  • two powerful reactors of 31,000 horsepower each.

The boat could sail autonomously for 80 days. The crew required a more substantial size - approximately 100 people.

The main advantage of the RTM Project 671 submarine was its armament: Granat cruise missiles, 24 torpedoes or 34 mines, depending on the modification of the particular boat. This configuration, combined with speed and buoyancy, made the RTM series unique. The submarine's nuclear reactor met all safety requirements.

As a result, Project 671 turned out to be very competent from a technical evolutionary point of view: its beginning was the creation of a new second-generation boat, and the end was the transformation of 671 RTM submarines into the latest third-generation submarines.

Project 671 RTM nuclear submarines were built at two factories: the famous Admiralty Association in St. Petersburg and the Leninsky Komsomol Shipyard in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The final refinement was carried out at the base in Bolshoy Kamen.

Submarines of Project 671 "Ruff"

PLAT – Project 671 “Ruff”

“K-38” 04/12/63 / 07/28/66 / 11/05/67 “K-369” 12/22/67 / 11/06/68 “K-147” 09/16/64/06/17/68/12/25/68 K -53” 12/16/64 / 03/15/69 / 09/30/69 “K-306” 03/20/68 / 06/04/69 / 12/04/69 “K-323” 07/05/68 / 03/14/70 / 10/29/70, own. title: “50 years of the USSR” “K-370” 04.19.69 / 06.26.70 / 12.04.70 “K-438” 06.13.69 / 03.23.71 / 10.15.71 “K-367” 04.14.70 / 02.07. 71 / 05.12.71 “K-314” 05.09.70 / 28.03.72 / 06.11.72 “K-398” 22.04.71 / 02.08.72 / 15.12.72 “K-454” 16.08.72 / 05.05.73 / 09/30/73 “K-462” 07/03/72 / 09/01/73 / 12/30/73 “K-469” 09/05/73 / 06/10/74 / 09/30/74 “K-481” 09/27/73 / 09/08/74 / 12/27. 74

On May 26, 1958, in the United States, at the Electric Boat shipyard (General Dynamics) in Groton (Connecticut), the world's first specialized anti-submarine nuclear submarine SSN-597 “Tullibi” was laid down, optimized to combat Soviet missile submarines.

On November 9, 1960, she entered service with the US Navy. In 1962-1967. The American fleet was replenished with 14 significantly more advanced and powerful “underwater hunters” of the Thresher type. These single-hull, single-shaft submarines with a displacement of 3,750/4,470 tons developed a full underwater speed of about 30 knots and could dive to a depth of up to 250 m. The distinctive features of the “killers” (as the anti-submarine nuclear submarines were nicknamed by American sailors) were relatively low noise, heavy-duty sonar equipment and relatively moderate ( However, the torpedo armament, consisting of four 533-mm torpedo tubes, located in the middle part of the hull at an angle to the longitudinal axis, is quite sufficient for solving anti-submarine tasks. If domestic first-generation nuclear-powered torpedo ships (projects 627, 627A and 645) were created to combat enemy surface ships, then in the second half of the 50s. it became obvious that the Soviet Union also needed nuclear submarines with an “anti-submarine bias”, capable of combating missile submarines of the “potential enemy” in positions where they are likely to use weapons, ensuring the deployment of their own SSBNs (countering underwater and surface forces operating on anti-submarine lines), and also protect ships and transports from enemy submarines. Of course, the traditional tasks for torpedo submarines of combating enemy surface ships (primarily aircraft carriers), operating on communications, carrying out mine laying, etc. were not removed either.

Work on studying the appearance of second-generation nuclear-powered ships began in the USSR in the late 50s. On August 28, 1958, in accordance with a government decree, the design of a unified steam generating plant began for new nuclear submarines. Around the same time, a competition for designs for 2nd generation boats was announced, in which the country's leading design teams specializing in underwater shipbuilding - SKB-143, TsKB-18 and SKB-112 Sudoproekt - took part. The Leningrad SKB-143 had the greatest technical potential, which, based on its earlier (1956-1958) proactive developments carried out under the leadership of A.B. Petrov, prepared technical proposals for torpedo (project 671) and missile (project 639) boats.

The distinctive features of these projects were improved hydrodynamics, developed with the involvement of specialists from the Moscow branch of TsAGI, a single-shaft layout, the use of alternating three-phase current, as well as an increased diameter of the pressure vessel, which ensured the transverse placement of two new, more compact nuclear reactors unified for second-generation nuclear submarines. As a result of the competition, SKB-143 received the task of designing a nuclear torpedo submarine of the 671st project (code “Ruff”) with a normal displacement of 2000 tons and a working diving depth of at least 300 m. A distinctive feature of the new ship was to be powerful hydroacoustics (in conditions competition, for the first time the size of the GAS was specifically stipulated). If the first generation nuclear submarines used a direct current electrical system (which was logical for diesel-electric submarines, where batteries were the main source of energy when moving underwater), then on the second generation nuclear submarines it was decided to switch to three-phase alternating current.

The tactical and technical specifications for the new nuclear-powered submarine were approved on November 3, 1959; preliminary designs were completed in March 1960, and technical designs were completed in December of the same year. The creation of the Project 671 nuclear submarine was carried out under the leadership of chief designer G.N. Chernyshev (he had previously participated in the design of boats of Projects 617, 627, 639 and 645). Based on the fact that the new submarine was intended primarily to destroy American SSBNs in their combat patrol areas (i.e., in “clear water” and not under the ice of the Arctic), the customer, under increased pressure from the developer, considered it possible to refuse requirements to ensure surface unsinkability when filling any of the boat’s compartments with water.

As on the 1st generation nuclear-powered ships, it was decided to use a two-reactor power plant on the new boat, which fully satisfies the reliability requirements. A compact steam generating plant was created with high specific performance, almost twice as high as the corresponding parameters of previous power plants. “As an exception”, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S.G. Gorshkov agreed to use one propeller shaft in Project 671, which made it possible to reduce displacement and noise. By switching to a single-shaft design, an improvement in the ship's propulsion qualities by approximately 30% was achieved, and also (using more powerful domestic energy) ensured that underwater speeds were significantly higher than those of foreign analogues.

The implementation of a single-shaft design made it possible to place the main turbo-gear unit and both autonomous turbogenerators with all associated equipment in one compartment. This ensured a reduction in the relative length of the boat's hull. As a result, with a larger displacement, the wetted surfaces of the nuclear-powered submarines of projects 627 and 671 turned out to be approximately equal. The Admiralty coefficient, which characterizes the efficiency of using the power of a ship’s power plant, exceeded the similar indicator of the Project 627 nuclear submarine by approximately two times and was actually equal to the coefficient of the American Skipjack-class nuclear submarines.

In the design of the durable hull, it was decided to use new AK-29 steel, which made it possible to increase the immersion depth. Unlike the first generation nuclear submarines, it was decided to equip the new ship with autonomous (rather than mounted on GTZ) turbogenerators, which increased the reliability of the electrical power system. When creating the Project 671 boat, great importance was attached to the development of underwater detection and target designation means, and the development of navigation equipment and weapons. According to the initial design studies, it was planned to move the torpedo tubes to the center of the ship, as on the American Thresher-class nuclear submarines, placing them at an angle near the centerline of the nuclear submarine. However, it later became clear that with such an arrangement, the speed of the submarine at the time of torpedo firing should not have exceeded 11 knots (which turned out to be unacceptable for tactical reasons: unlike the American Thresher-class nuclear submarines, the Soviet submarine was intended to combat not only submarines , but also large enemy surface ships). In addition, with the “American” layout, torpedo loading operations were seriously complicated, and it became completely impossible to replenish ammunition at sea.

As a result, it was decided to install the torpedo tubes on the Project 671 nuclear submarine in the bow of the ship, above the sonar antenna. In 1960, the Leningrad Admiralty Plant began preparing the construction of a series of new nuclear-powered torpedo ships. The act of acceptance into the USSR Navy of the lead boat of the 671st project - K-30 (serial number "600") - was signed by the chairman of the government commission, Hero of the Soviet Union G. I. Shchedrin on November 5, 1967. Subsequently, 14 more were built in Leningrad Nuclear submarines of this type. Three ships (K-314, K-454 and K-469), intended for the Pacific Fleet, were completed according to the modified project 671B. The difference was that, in addition to traditional torpedoes, they were equipped with the Vyuga missile-torpedo system, which was put into service on August 4, 1969. The missile-torpedo ensured the destruction of underwater, surface and coastal targets with a nuclear charge at ranges of 10 - 40 km. It was launched from standard 533-mm torpedo tubes from a depth of 50–60 m.

The double-hull submarine with a characteristic “limousine” fencing of retractable devices had a durable hull made of high-strength AK-29 steel, the thickness of the sheets of which reached 35 mm. Internal flat bulkheads were designed for a pressure of 10 kgf/cm. The ship's hull was divided into seven waterproof compartments: - 1st torpedo, battery and living compartments; – 2nd central post, provision and auxiliary mechanisms; – 3rd reactor; – 4th turbine (it also houses autonomous turbine units); – 5th electrical and auxiliary mechanisms (it also contained a sanitary unit); – 6th residential and diesel generator; – 7th helmsman (the rowing electric motors and galley are also located here). The structure of the light hull, the bow of the superstructure, and the vertical and horizontal tail were made of low-magnetic steel. The fencing of the retractable wheelhouse devices, as well as the middle and aft parts of the superstructure, were made of aluminum alloy, and the large radome of the hydroacoustic complex antenna and rudders were made of titanium alloys. The Project 671 boat (as well as its further modifications) was characterized by careful finishing of the contours of the outer hull. The ballast tanks had a kingston (and not scupper, as on all previous Soviet submarines of post-war projects) design. The ship received an air conditioning and air purification system, fluorescent lighting, as well as a more convenient (compared to 1st generation nuclear-powered ships) layout of cabins and cockpits, and modern sanitary equipment.

The main power plant of the APL-671 project (which had a rated power of 31,000 hp) included two OK-300 steam generating units (a VM-4 water-cooled reactor with a thermal power of 72 mW and four PG-4T steam generators), autonomous for each sides. The reactor core was to be recharged on a cycle of eight years. Compared to the first generation reactors, the layout of the second generation nuclear power plants was significantly changed. Although it remained a loop, the spatial distribution and volumes of the primary circuit were significantly reduced (i.e., the reactor became more compact and “dense”). The “pipe in pipe” scheme was implemented, and the primary circuit pumps were “hung” on the steam generators.

The number of large diameter pipelines connecting the main elements of the installation (1st circuit filter, volume compensators, etc.) has been reduced. Almost all primary circuit pipelines (small and large diameter) were placed in uninhabited premises and covered with biological protection. The systems of instrumentation and automation of nuclear power plants have changed significantly. The share of remotely controlled valves (valves, gate valves, dampers, etc.) has increased. The steam turbine installation consisted of a main turbo-gear unit GTZA-615 and two autonomous OK-2 turbogenerators (the latter provided the generation of alternating current 380 V, 50 Hz and included a turbine and generator with a power of 2000 kW). As a backup means of propulsion, two PG-137 DC electric motors (2 x 275 hp) were used, each of which drove its own two-bladed small-diameter propeller. There were two batteries (112 cells each with a capacity of 8000 A/h), as well as two diesel generators (200 kW, 400 V, 50 Hz). All main mechanisms and devices had automated and remote control. When creating the Project 671 nuclear submarine, some (albeit insufficient) attention was paid to noise reduction issues. In particular, a hydroacoustic rubber coating of the light hull was used, and the number of scuppers was reduced. As a result, the acoustic visibility of the boat compared to the 1st generation nuclear-powered ships decreased approximately five times.

The submarine was equipped with the Sigma all-latitude navigation system. There was a television system for monitoring the general and ice conditions MT-70, capable, under favorable conditions, of providing species information at a depth of up to 50 m. However, the main information tool of the ship was the MGK-300 “Rubin” hydroacoustic complex, developed by the Morfizpribor Central Research Institute under the direction of chief designer N.N. Sviridov and having a maximum target detection range of about 50-60 km. It included a low-frequency nasal hydroacoustic emitter, a high-frequency mine-detecting sonar antenna MG-509 “Radian” in the front part of the fencing of the retractable wheelhouse devices, an underwater sound communication station, hydroacoustic alarm and a number of other elements. “Rubin” provided all-round visibility, independent automatic tracking and determination of target heading angles, ranging by echolocation, as well as detection of active enemy sonar systems.

After 1976, during modernization, on most boats of the 671st project of the Rubin State Joint Stock Company, a more advanced Rubicon complex with an infrasonic emitter was noticed, having a maximum detection range of more than 200 km. On a number of ships, the MG-509 was also replaced by the more modern MG-519. Retractable devices included a PZNS-10 periscope, an MRP-10 radio identification system antenna with a transponder, an Albatross radar complex, VAN-M or Anis and Iva radio communication antennas, a Curtain direction finder, as well as an RDP device. There were sockets for a number of removable antennas installed to solve specific problems. A navigation system was installed on board the submarine, providing course guidance and dead reckoning.

The ship's armament consisted of six 533-mm torpedo tubes, capable of firing at depths of up to 250 m. The torpedo complex occupied the upper third of the first compartment. The torpedo tubes were located in two horizontal rows. In the center plane of the ship, above the first row of tubes, there was a horizontal torpedo-loading hatch. At the bow end in front of the hatch there was a horizontal tray covered with shields, into which a torpedo was lowered by crane and loaded into the submarine. This design made it possible to radically shorten and simplify the process of loading ammunition, without requiring special physical effort or complex and dangerous operations from the team. Everything was done remotely: torpedoes were pulled into the compartment, moved around it, loaded into devices and lowered onto racks using hydraulic drives. The torpedo firing control was provided by the Brest-671 control system. The ammunition load included 18 torpedoes or up to 36 mines (12 of them in TA). Mine laying could be carried out at speeds of up to 6 knots.

Characteristics of the Project 671 nuclear submarine

Maximum length 92.5 m Maximum beam 10.6 m Average draft 7.1 m Displacement: normal 4250 cubic meters. total 6085 cubic meters Buoyancy reserve 32.1% Maximum diving depth 400 m Operating diving depth 320 m Full underwater speed 33.5 knots Surface speed 11.5 knots Endurance 60 days. Crew 76 people.

Compared to the most modern American analogue - the nuclear submarine SSN 637 Sturgeon (the lead ship of the series entered service on March 3, 1967), the Soviet submarine had a higher underwater speed (29 and 33.5 knots, respectively), and a slightly greater diving depth and commensurate ammunition. At the same time, the American nuclear submarine had less noise and more advanced hydroacoustic equipment, which provided it with better search capabilities. There was an opinion among Soviet submariners that “if an American boat has a detection range of 100 km, then ours has only 10 km.” This was probably an exaggeration, but the problems of stealth and increasing the detection range of the enemy on Project 670 boats were never fully resolved. The lead ship of Project 671, K-38, became part of the Northern Fleet. Its first commander was Captain 1st Rank E.D. Chernov. During testing, the new nuclear-powered submarine developed a short-term maximum underwater speed of more than 34.5 knots, becoming (at the moment) the fastest submarine in the world. Until 1974, the Northern Fleet was replenished with 11 more nuclear submarines of the same type, which were permanently based in Gremikha. In the West, these ships received the code name Victor (hereinafter referred to as Victor 1). Elegant, very photogenic “Victors” had a bright, eventful biography. They could be found in virtually all seas and oceans where the Soviet fleet carried out combat service. At the same time, the nuclear submarines demonstrated fairly high search and combat capabilities.

In particular, the “autonomy” in the Mediterranean Sea lasted almost 90 days instead of the required 60. There is a known case when the navigator of K-367 wrote in the log: “We determined the place of the ship by the release of the anchor on the aircraft carrier Nimitz (which moored in the port of Naples). At the same time, the nuclear submarine did not enter Italian territorial waters, but was tracking the American ship. In 1979, during another aggravation of Soviet-American relations, the nuclear submarines K-38 and K-481 carried out combat service in the Persian Gulf, where at that time there were up to 50 US Navy ships.

The voyage took place in extremely difficult conditions (the water temperature at the surface reached 40 degrees). According to the memoirs of campaign participant A.N. Shportko (commander K-481), in the power compartments of the boats the air was heated to 60 - 70 degrees, and in living quarters - to 40 - 50 degrees. The air conditioners worked at full capacity, but the equipment (designed for use primarily in northern latitudes) could not cope: the refrigeration machines began to work normally only at a depth of 60 m, where the temperature of the sea water dropped to 10 -15 degrees. The boats had two replaceable crews, located on the Berezina floating base, located in the Gulf of Aden or off the island of Socotra. The campaign lasted six months and was overall very successful. According to A.N. Shportko, Soviet nuclear submarines operated in the Persian Gulf very secretly: even if the US Navy detected them for a short time, they could not correctly classify them, much less organize prosecution. Subsequently, these conclusions were confirmed by intelligence data. At the same time, tracking of American ships was carried out at the range of use of missile and missile-torpedo weapons: if the corresponding order had been received, they would have been sent to the bottom with a probability close to 100%. In September - October 1971, K-38 and K-323 made an autonomous under-ice expedition to the Arctic. In January 1974, a unique 107-day voyage of two nuclear-powered ships of projects 670 and 671 began under the command of captains 2nd rank V.D. Khaitarov and V.P. Gontareva from the Northern to the Pacific Fleet. The route passed along the Atlantic (to the Cape of Good Hope), the Indian and Pacific oceans.

After passing the Faroe-Icelandic anti-submarine line, the boats moved in a tactical group (one ship was at a depth of 100 m, and the other - 150 m). Periodically, they exchanged call signs via UZPS, being at a distance of stable sound-underwater communication from each other. In fact, this was the first experience of a nuclear submarine following such a long period as part of a tactical group. On March 10–25, the boat called at the port of Berbera (Somalia), where their crews received a short rest. On March 29, while on combat duty, they had a short-term contract with American surface anti-submarine ships and broke away from them, going to greater depths. On April 13, after completing combat service in specified areas of the Indian Ocean, the boats on the surface, led by the support vessel Bashkiria, headed for the Strait of Malacca.

During the transition, the temperature of the sea water reached 28 degrees. The air conditioning systems were unable to maintain the required microclimate: the relative humidity in the boat compartments was 90%, and the air temperature rose to 70 degrees. The detachment of Soviet ships was monitored almost continuously by American base patrols by Lockheed P-3 Orion aircraft based on Diego Garcia Atoll. In the Strait of Malacca, where the ships entered on April 17, American “guardianship” became even tighter: numerous anti-submarine helicopters joined the Orions. On April 20, one of the Rubin GAS units caught fire on board the Project 671 nuclear submarine due to high humidity. However, through the efforts of the crew, the fire was quickly extinguished. On April 25, the ships passed through the strait zone and, breaking away from observation, went into the depths. May 6 nuclear submarine V.P. Gontareva entered Avacha Bay. On May 7, a second nuclear-powered icebreaker joined her. In January 1976, the strategic missile submarine cruiser K-171, as well as the nuclear submarine K-469, which performed security functions, made another transition from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet. The ships sailed across the Atlantic Ocean at a distance of only 18 cables from each other. We passed the Drake Passage at different depths, constantly maintaining communication via the UPS. After crossing the equator, the boats separated and proceeded to Kamchatka (where they arrived in March), each along its own route. Over the course of 80 days, 21,754 miles were covered, and during the entire journey, K-469 surfaced to periscope depth only once (in the Antarctic region).

K-147, equipped with the latest, unparalleled system for tracking enemy nuclear submarines along the wake, from May 29 to July 1, 1985, under the command of Captain 2nd Rank V.V. Nikitin, took part in the exercises of the submarine forces of the Northern Fleet “Aport”, during which she performed six-day continuous tracking of the American SSBN “Simon Bolivar” (Lafayette class), using acoustic and non-acoustic means. A very dramatic incident occurred with K-314 (commander - Captain 1st Rank A. M. Evseenko) in March 1984. Carrying out, together with the Vladivostok BOD, tracking an American strike group consisting of the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and seven escort ships, which was maneuvering in the Sea of ​​Japan, on March 21, a Soviet boat, while surfacing to clarify the surface situation, pierced the bottom of an American aircraft carrier with its stern for almost 40 m. As a result, the US Navy maneuvers were curtailed and the Kitty Hawk, losing fuel oil through the hole, “crawled” into Japanese dock, and the Soviet nuclear-powered ship, which had lost its propeller, proceeded in tow to Chazhma Bay, where it also began repairs. This event caused a sharply negative resonance in the American press. Journalists specializing in naval topics noted the weakness of the AUG security, which allowed the boats of the “potential enemy” to surface directly under the keel of the aircraft carriers.

Time takes its toll. On March 14, 1989, the first boat of the 671st project, K-314, which was part of the Pacific Fleet, was decommissioned. In 1993-1996 The rest of the nuclear submarines of this type also left the fleet. However, the disposal of the honored ships was delayed. Currently, most of them are in the dumps, waiting for years for their fate.

Parity arms race underwater

Historically, the project of the Project 671 RTM nuclear submarine coincided in terms of timing with the beginning of the American program for the construction of third-generation multi-purpose nuclear submarines of the SSN-688 type. As a result, they became the most massive series of submarines in the world history of the submarine fleet (a total of 62 units were produced). In the photo, the nuclear submarine Los Angeles is the lead ship with a speed of 31 knots and an armament of 26 torpedoes. It was launched in 1976.

The coincidence of timing, of course, was not accidental. The fact is that American nuclear submarines at that time were significantly better than Soviet boats in terms of stealth and acoustic capabilities. The gap gradually narrowed, but did not disappear completely.

The Americans also had something to work on: they were inferior to their Soviet counterparts in maximum underwater speed, and the combat survivability and maneuverability of the “pike” were higher. In terms of armament level, both series could compete, but the Soviet 671 RTM had a relative advantage.

It was also important that fewer people were required to service the boats of the 671 RTM series. Thus, due to the compact crew, the habitability conditions on board were much higher. It may seem that this criterion is not a key one. But if we take into account the many months of autonomous submarine raids, for example, under ice, habitability conditions come to the fore in importance: this is the state and mood of the crew.

In general, according to independent experts, submarines 671РТМ and SSN-688 were approximately equivalent. We can say that the race of two conditional opponents in terms of improvement and defensive power went on in parallel, both participants were approximately equal.

Cruiser submarines Project 671, code "Ruff" Project 671B

Quantity

15 units

Construction

Project 671 – Leningrad, Shipyard No. 196 “Sudomekh” (from 10/25/1966 “Novo-Admiralteysky Shipyard”, from 01/31/1972 “Leningrad Admiralty Association”) - 12 units

Name

Factory Pawned Launched Commissioning Note
K-38 №600 12.04.1963 28.07.1966 5.11.1967
K-69 №601 24.01.1963 28.12.1967 6.11.1968from 07/25/1977 K-369
K-147 №602 16.09.1964 17.06.1968 21.12.1968from 06/03/1992 B-147
K-53 №603 16.12.1964 17.03.1969 30.09.1969from 06/03/1992 B-53
K-306 №604 20.03.1968 7.06.1969 5.12.1969
K-323 №605 5.07.1968 14.03.1970 23.09.1970from 8.12.1972 K-323 50 years of the USSR, from 3.06.1992 B-323
K-370 №606 19.04.1969 26.06.1970 5.12.1970from 06/03/1992 B-370
K-438 №608 13.06.1969 23.03.1971 15.09.1971from 06/03/1992 B-438
K-367 №609 14.04.1970 2.07.1971 5.12.1971from 06/03/1992 B-367
K-398 №01611 22.04.1971 2.08.1972 15.12.1972from 06/03/1992 B-398
K-462 №01613 3.07.1972 1.09.1973 30.12.1973from 06/03/1992 B-462
K-481 №01615 27.09.1973 9.09.1974 27.12.1974from 06/03/1992 B-481

Project 671V - Leningrad, Shipyard No. 196 "Sudomekh" (from 10.25.1966 "Novo-Admiralteysky Shipyard", from 01.31.1972 "Leningrad Admiralty Association") - 3 units

Name Factory Pawned Launched Commissioning Note
K-314 №01610 5.09.1970 28.03.1972 6.11.1972
K-454 №01612 24.07.1971 5.05.1973 30.10.1973from 06/03/1992 B-454
K-469 №01614 5.09.1973 10.06.1974 30.09.1974from 3.06.1992 B-469

From 07/25/1977 they were classified as large submarines, from 06/3/1992 as nuclear-powered large submarines.
Tactical and technical data

Displacement, t:
surface:3500
underwater:4690
Dimensions, m:
length:93
width:10.6 (overall - 16.5)
draft according to water line:7,2
Full speed, knots:
surface:11,5
underwater:33,5
Cruising range:
above the waterNot limited
under the waterNot limited
Immersion depth, m:
working:320
limit:400
Autonomy, days:50
GEM, full speed power:2 AR OK-300 72 MW each, 1x31000 hp. GTZA-615, 1 fixed propeller (K-462, 469, 481 – 1 tandem fixed propeller), 2x350 hp. electric motor PG-137, 2 weather-vane propeller propellers, 2 OK-2 2000 kW TGs, 1 200 kW diesel generator
Weapons:6,533 mm NTA (18 torpedoes 53-65K, SET-65, TEST-71, Vyuga (PLUR 81R) (project 671V) or 36 min RM-2G Golets or 18 min PMR-1, PMR-2 , PMT-1) - PUTS "Brest-671" (on some - "Ladoga-2", project 671V - PURS "Neva-2") RLK-101 "Albatross", RTR radar MRP-10 "Zaliv-P" , radio direction finder "Zavesa", GAK MGK-300 "Rubin", mine detection sonar MG-509 "Radian-1", hydroacoustic beacon MGS-29, NK "Sigma-671", communication complex "Molniya"
Crew, persons:68 (22 officers) (then 85)

General form

Project 671 cruising submarine - General view

History of the project

Modernization of the project

Project 671K – 1 unit: K-323 02/10/1984-04/18/1986 Blizzard “Nerpa”. RK 3K10 "Granat" (32 KR 3M10), GAK MGK-400 "Rubicon" instead of MGK-300 "Rubin", mine detection sonar MG-519 "Arfa" instead of MG-509 "Radian-1", NK "Sigma-671M" instead of "Sigma-671" On some (K-147) RLK MRK-50 Cascade" instead of RLK-101 "Albatross" On some since 1976 (K-53 09/18/1980-01/06/1984) GAK MGK-400 "Rubicon" instead MGK-300 “Rubin” On some (K-38 in 1973-79, K-69 in 1978) mine detection sonar MG-519 “Harp” instead of MG-509 “Radian-1” On K-147 in 1976-78, 438 installed SOKS MNK-100 “Kolos” Unimplemented modifications Project 06717 – modernization for RK 3K10 “Granat” (32 KR 3M10)

Distribution by fleet

SF

: K-38, 53, 69, 147, 306, 314 (from 03/18/1974
Pacific Fleet
), 323, 367, 370, 398, 438, 454 (from 03/18/1974
Pacific Fleet
), 462, 469 (from 03/3/1976 Pacific
Fleet
), 481

Side numbers

K-38: 347(1967), 674(1991) K-53: 354(1974), 656(04/11/1978), 660(04/10/1981), 657(03/29/1984), 692(03/25/1987), 029(02/19/1990) K-69: 368?(1968), 030(1991) K-147: 648(1991), 616(1997) K-306: 354, 654(1991) K-314: 784(1989 ) K-323: 682(1991) K-367: 657(1991), 614(1994) K-370: 657, 683(1991) K-398: 693, 684(1991) K-438: 640, 658( 1991) K-454: 754(1990), 776(1994) K-462: 651(1991) K-481: 695, 031(1991)

Write-off

1989 – K-314 (14.03) 1991 – K-38 (24.06), K-69 (24.06), K-306 (24.06) 1992 – K-481 (3.07) 1993 – K-53 (30.06), K-323 (30.06), K-370 (30.06), K-462 (30.06), K-469 (30.06) 1994 – K-367 (5.07), K-454 (5.07) 1995 – K-398 (4.08), K- 438 (4.08) 1997 – K-147 (8.09)

Export

American-Soviet sea hunt

Much has been written about American nuclear submarines in the world press. Even among ordinary people it was a well-known and discussed project. Almost no one knew about the Soviet submarines of Project 671 due to the traditional extreme secrecy of Soviet submariners. Even now, information about them is limited to narrow professional resources. It is difficult to find on the Internet, for example, high-quality photos of the Pike-class nuclear submarine.

Therefore, the long-term history of underwater “catch-up” between the two rival countries also remains behind secret curtains. But in vain, there were many interesting cases. One of the most striking is the major operation “Aport” in the Atlantic Ocean in 1985, when Soviet submariners “washed” their conditional enemy - the US Navy. Everything resembled a real hunt with an ambush, which is quite natural: the entire Project 671 was created specifically for hunting enemy submarines.

At the end of May, three beautiful hunters of the RTM class sailed out into the ocean from the Zapadnaya Litsa base on the Kola Peninsula with two boats of 671 other modifications attached to them. Of course, American naval intelligence could not help but notice such a nuclear submarine team. Noticed, but... lost. They searched with all intelligence in the most intensive way. The only American success was the discovery of the K-488 boat only when it was already returning home to the base. Meanwhile, our beauties were busy with their permanent combat missions: they monitored the missile submarines and anti-submarine aircraft of the US Navy during their patrols. As a result, the Americans hunted for the crew of boats 671 RTM for a whole month without success. "Aport" ended on July 1, 1985.

Operation Atrina was fundamental and most important in a political sense for Soviet submariners. This time the “magnificent five” of the famous submarines K-244, K-255, K-298, K-299 and K-524 took part in it. The five boats had support in the form of naval aviation and a pair of reconnaissance ships equipped with special hydroacoustic systems with antennas. Like last time, the Americans knew about the departure of the boats, but immediately lost them in the Atlantic Ocean. The hunt began again, all detection forces were brought up in the form of three search groups with the involvement of British ships. The boats left unnoticed and reached that same ill-fated Sargasso Sea.

The Americans managed to find contact with the boats only eight days after the start of the operation. They mistook the pikes for missile submarines, which was something they were seriously worried about. All of these actions took place during the peak of the Cold War.

The results of Operations Aport and Atrina showed that the US Navy will not be able to effectively counter the new generation of Project 671 RTM nuclear submarines if they are used on a massive scale.

This was the most important victory of the Soviet navy. This is what it means to make the right entries. Submariners have always been able to do this.

Another well-known heroic page was the under-ice navigation of the famous incredibly difficult boat K-524. The task was to sail from the Arctic Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean, bypassing the island of Greenland from the northeast. This passage became a legend, and captain Protopopov V.V. received the star of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Nuclear torpedo and multipurpose submarines. Project 671RTM

The large nuclear submarine K-324 was on combat duty off the Atlantic coast of the United States in December 1983. “Avtonomka” was carried out in difficult conditions: there were problems with the water supply, the refrigeration unit was out of order, there was sweltering heat in the compartments... The crew of the boat was tasked with monitoring the frigate “McCloy” (Bronstein class) of the US Navy, which was testing a new underwater system Towed Array Surveillance System (TASS) surveillance with an extended towed hydroacoustic low-frequency antenna. The K-324 submarine was able to record data on TASS operating parameters. In addition, during the tracking, some features of the interaction of a US Navy surface ship with its submarines and components of a stationary long-range hydroacoustic detection system were revealed. But unexpectedly, McCloy stopped testing and returned to base. Left without work, K-324 received an order to move to another navigation area.

However, this was not possible - strong vibration arose, which required stopping the main turbine. After surfacing, the commander of the submarine K-324 saw that “Uncle Sam” had made an unexpected and very “valuable gift” - 400 meters of a top-secret armored cable from the TASS antenna was wound around the submarine’s propeller.

K-324 in "The Episode with the Antenna"

Naturally, the Soviet submarine, which surfaced in the area of ​​the American test site, was soon discovered by a “probable enemy.” By morning, the destroyers Nicholson and Peterson (Spruance class) arrived in the area of ​​the incident and established close custody of the K-324. Obviously, the commanders of these ships received a very specific task - by any means to prevent the Russians from getting their hands on the antenna. The “joint voyage” of the destroyers and the virtually powerless submarine lasted 10 days. The American military behaved more and more harshly (what else could they do?), trying to go behind the stern of the nuclear submarine in close proximity and cut off the antenna. Fearing that the destroyers would take more decisive action, the commander of the submarine, Captain of the Second Rank Terekhin, ordered his ship to be prepared for an explosion.

Only after the Aldan ship arrived to help the submarine K-324 did the situation calm down. Finally, the American command realized that it was unlikely that they would be able to return their antenna by peaceful means, and they did not want to start a third world war because of the “hose.” As a result, the destroyers were recalled, and the K-324 was towed by Aldan to Cuba, where it was put in for repairs. The ill-fated antenna was delivered to the USSR for detailed study.

The main “hero” of these events was the cruising submarine of Project 671RTM - the seventh ship in the series, built in Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

In parallel with the start of work on the creation of fundamentally new Project 945 and Project 971 submarines, the Soviet Union made a very successful attempt to “squeeze” everything possible out of the design of the Project 671 and Project 671RT submarines. The basis of the modernized project 671RTM (the code "Pike" was assigned) was work on the installation of new radio-electronic weapons - a powerful hydroacoustic complex, a navigation complex, a combat information and control system, reconnaissance complex equipment, an automated communications complex, as well as measures to reduce unmasking fields ship. Project 671RTM, like the submarine missile cruiser 667BDRM, “moved” into the third generation of nuclear submarines.

Chernyshev (developer of boats 671 and 671RT) became the chief designer of the 671RTM project; Shmakov replaced him in 1984.

The most important element of the armament of the modernized nuclear submarine was to be the Shkval anti-submarine missile system, the development of which began in 1960 in accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU. The “ideologists” of the new complex were scientists from the Moscow branch of TsAGI named after. Professor N.E. Zhukovsky (today State Scientific Research Center TsAGI), in particular, Academician Logvinovich. The direct development of weapons was carried out by NII-24 (today SNPO Region). Project manager – chief designer I.L. Merkulov (later V.R. Serov, and E.D. Rakov completed the work).

The Shkval included an underwater super-high-speed missile that reached speeds of up to 200 knots, with a range of 11 thousand meters. These characteristics were achieved by using an engine that ran on hydro-reactive fuel and the movement of the projectile in a gas cavity, which ensured a reduction hydrodynamic resistance. The missile, which was equipped with a nuclear warhead, was controlled using an inertial system that is not sensitive to interference.

The first launches of this missile were carried out in 1964 on Lake Issyk-Kul, and on November 29, 1977, the VA-111 Shkval complex, equipped with the M-5 missile, was adopted by the Navy. It should be noted that to this day there are no analogues to this highly effective complex, which has an almost absolute probability of hitting targets that fall within its reach, in other countries.

The main power plant of the boat (31 thousand hp) was actually similar to the power plant of nuclear submarines of Project 671 (RT): two water-water reactors VM-4, GTZA-615, 290 rpm propeller, two auxiliary electric motors, each with a power of 375 hp. With.

We adopted an additional set of measures designed to increase the stealth of a nuclear submarine through the introduction of fundamentally new solutions for depreciation (the so-called “disconnection of foundations”), acoustic decoupling of structures and mechanisms. The submarine received a demagnetization device, which made it difficult for aircraft magnetometers to detect nuclear submarines.

"Skat-KS" is a hydroacoustic complex developed under the leadership of chief designer B.B. Indina - provided detection, classification of targets, and their automatic tracking during noise direction finding in the infrasound and audio frequency ranges. The complex made it possible to detect targets using echo direction finding with measuring the distance to them and provided the torpedo weapons with initial target designation data.


1 — main antenna of SJSC “Skat-KS”; 2 - 533 mm TA; 3 - 650 mm TA; 4 — torpedo loading hatch; 5 — bow (torpedo) compartment; 6 — bow emergency buoy; 7 — bow hatch; 8 — fencing for spare torpedoes and fast loading devices; 9 — spare 533 mm torpedo; 10 — spare 650 mm torpedo; 11 — tank for bubble-free torpedo firing; 12 — nasal trim tank; 13 — hardware enclosure for control devices for rocket and torpedo and torpedo firing “Ladoga 1V-671RT” and SJSC “Skat-KS”; 14 - AB; 15 — Central City Hospital; 16 - second (living) compartment; 17 — third (central post) compartment; 18 — antennas of SJSC “Skat-B”; 19 — navigation bridge; 20 — gyrocompass repeater; 21 — periscope of the MT-70-10 complex; 22 - PMU "Sintez" (space navigation systems); 23 - PMU antenna SORS "Zaliv-P"; 24 - PMU antenna of the Albatross radar; 25 — PMU antenna of the direction finder “Zavesa”; 26 – PMU antenna “Anis”; 27 - strong cabin; 28 - central post; 29—fences for radio-electronic weapons and acoustics; 30 — enclosures for auxiliary equipment and general ship systems (bilge pumps, pumps of the ship’s general hydraulic system, converters and air conditioners); 31 - fourth (reactor) compartment; 32 - reactor with steam generators, circulation pumps and biological protection tanks; 33 – VVABT “Paravan” and its winch; 34 — fifth (turbine) compartment; 35 — steam turbine; 36 — planetary gearbox; 37 — main thrust bearing; 38 - capacitor; 39 — cylinders of the VVD system; 40 — sixth (electromechanical and auxiliary equipment) compartment; 41 — aft hatch; 42 — stern emergency buoy; 43 - seventh (living) compartment; 44 — eighth (propeller and steering gears) compartment; 45 — aft trim tank; 46 — drives of horizontal rudders; 47 — vertical stabilizers; 48 — gondola UPV “Ruza-P” GPBA SJSC “Skat-KS”; 49 - ATG; 50 — drives of the stern horizontal rudders; 51 - VFT (auxiliary propulsors)

The Skat-KS complex was three times superior in its capabilities to hydroacoustic systems of the previous generation and approached American-developed complexes (although it continued to be inferior in terms of weight and size characteristics). The target detection range under normal hydrological conditions was 230 kilometers. On-board noise receivers were used, which operated in passive mode, and a towed extended infrasound antenna, which, when folded, was placed in a bulb-shaped special. container, which is located above the vertical tail of the submarine.

The Medveditsa-671RTM navigation complex provided continuous automatic generation of course, location coordinates, speed relative to ground and water, pitch and roll angles, as well as automatic transmission of these parameters to other ship systems.

The Omnibus combat information and control system carried out automated collection, processing and visual display of information, which ensured decision-making on the combat use of weapons and maneuvering, as well as control of missile and torpedo firing.

The submarine was equipped with a Molniya-L (automated communications complex) with a Tsunami-B (space communications system), and a special reconnaissance complex.

The armament of the Project 671RTM nuclear submarine included 4 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber and 2 of 650 mm caliber. Project 671RTM submarines used new anti-submarine systems. Also, the nuclear submarine carried special guided sabotage missiles “Sirena” as well as other “special purpose” weapons, most of which had no analogues in the world. In particular, at the OKB im. Kamov in 1975 created a single-seat folding helicopter Ka-56, which was intended for the transfer of saboteurs, and capable of being fired from a 533-mm TA of a submerged submarine.

It was decided to organize the construction of Project 671RTM submarines simultaneously at the Admiralty Association in Leningrad (with subsequent finishing at the Zvyozdochka shipyard) and at the SZLK in Komsomolsk-on-Amur (with completion at the shipyard in Bolshoy Kamen).

Technical characteristics of the Project 671RTM nuclear submarine:

Maximum length – 106.1 m (107.1 m); Maximum width – 10.8 m; Average draft – 7.8 m; Normal displacement – ​​6990 m3; Total displacement – ​​7250 m3; Buoyancy reserve – 28.0%; Maximum diving depth – 600 m; Working immersion depth – 400 m; Full submerged speed – 31.0 knots; Surface speed - 11.6 knots; Autonomy – 80 days; Crew - 92 people (the number of crew members varied depending on the RTMK or RTM project).

The creation of Project 671RTM submarines in the USSR coincided with the beginning of the American program for the construction of third-generation multipurpose nuclear submarines of the SSN-688 type, which became the most massive nuclear submarines in the world (in 1996, the American Navy received the last, sixty-second nuclear submarine of this type), equipped with a powerful AN sonar /BQQ-5. "Los Angeles" (lead ship of the series, displacement 6080/6927 tons, maximum speed 31 knots, diving depth up to 450 meters, armament of 4 TA 533 mm with ammunition of 26 missile-torpedoes and torpedoes) joined the US Navy in 1976.

New American submarines continued to surpass their Soviet counterparts in terms of sonar characteristics and level of stealth. But this gap, according to the Americans, has narrowed significantly and is no longer of a “dramatic” nature. At the same time, the nuclear submarines of the US Navy were actually equal to the submarines of the USSR in terms of maximum underwater speed (but were inferior in maximum depth). At the same time, the “Pikes” had better combat survivability and maneuverability. They also had some advantages in armament. Thanks to a higher level of integrated automation, Project 671RTM submarines had a smaller crew compared to the Los Angeles, which made it possible to create better habitability conditions on board the Shchuk. According to experts, the submarines of the SSN-688 and 671RTM projects were generally equivalent ships.

Project 671PTMK nuclear submarines built in Leningrad:

K-524 – laying down 06/07/76, launching 06/31/77, acceptance by the Navy 12/28/77 (from 1982 to 1991 it was called “60 years of Komsomol patronage”); K-502 – laying down 07/23/79, launching 08/17/80, acceptance by the Navy 12/31/80 (since 1999 “Volgograd”); K-254 – laying down 09/24/77, launching 09/06/79, reception by the Navy 09/18/81; K-527 – laying down 09/28/78, launching 06/24/81, reception by the Navy 12/30/81; K-298 – laying down 02.25.81, launching 07.14.82, received by the Navy 12.27.82; K-358 – laying down 07/23/82, launching 07/15/83, acceptance by the Navy 12/29/83 (from 1982 to 1991 - “Murmansk Komsomolets”); K-299 – laying down 07/01/83, launching 06/29/84, received by the Navy 12/22/84; K-244 – laying down 12/25/84, launching 07/09/85, received by the Navy 12/25/85; K-292 – laying down 04/15/86, launching 04/29/87, received by the Navy 11/27/87 (built according to project 671RTMK); K-388 – laying down 05/08/87, launching 06/03/88, acceptance by the Navy 11/30/88 (built according to project 671RTMK); K-138 – laying down 12/07/88, launching 08/05/89, acceptance by the Navy 05/10/90 (built according to project 671R); K-414 – laying down 12/01/88, launching 08/31/90, received by the Navy 12/30/90 (built according to project 671RTMK); K-448 – laying down 01/31/91, launching 10/17/91, received by the Navy 09/24/92 (built according to project 671RTMK). Project 671PTMK nuclear submarines built in Komsomolsk-on-Amur: K-247 – laying down 07/15/76, launching 08/13/78, acceptance by the Navy 12/30/78; K-507 – laying down 09/22/77, launching 10/01/79, reception by the Navy 11/30/79; K-492 – laying down 02/23/78, launching 07/28/79, reception by the Navy 12/30/79; K-412 – laying down 10/29/78, launching 09/06/79, reception by the Navy 12/30/79; K-251 – laying down 06.26.79, launching 05.03.80, received by the Navy 08.30.80; K-255 – laying down 11/07/79, launching 07/20/80, reception by the Navy 12/26/80; K-324 – laying down 02/29/80, launching 10/07/80, reception by the Navy 12/30/80; K-305 – laying down 06/27/80, launching 05/17/81, reception by the Navy 09/30/81; K-355 – laying down 12/31/80, launching 08/08/81, reception by the Navy 12/29/81; K-360 – laying down 05/08/81, launching 04/27/82, reception by the Navy 11/07/82; K-218 – laying down 06/03/81, launching 07/24/82, received by the Navy 12/28/82; K-242 – laying down 06/12/82, launching 04/29/83, acceptance by the Navy 10/26/83 (from 1982 to 1991 - “50 years of Komsomolsk-on-Amur”); K-264 – laying down 04/03/83, launching 06/08/84, received by the Navy 10/26/84.

The development of Project 671RTM submarines in the fleets has been somewhat delayed. The reason for this was the lack of development of the Omnibus combat information and control system: until the mid-1980s. the system could not fully solve the tasks assigned to it. On early-built submarines, the Omnibus was completed during the operation of the boats, which significantly limited combat capabilities.

The most important improvement that was introduced on the 671RTM project was the use of a fundamentally new type of weapon - strategic small-sized subsonic cruise missiles "Granat", the maximum firing range of which was 3 thousand m. Equipping nuclear submarines with cruise missiles turned them into multi-purpose ships that could solve a wide range of problems not only in conventional, but also in nuclear war. The Granat cruise missiles were virtually no different from standard torpedoes in terms of weight and size characteristics. This made it possible to use “Granat” from standard torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber.

The last five submarines built in Leningrad were put into operation according to the 671RTMK project (the weapons complex was supplemented with cruise missiles). Subsequently, the KR was retrofitted with the remaining Project 671RTM submarines.

PLA pr.671-RTM in the database

Some boats were given “proper names” after they entered service. K-414 has been called “Daniil Moskovsky” since 1996, K-448 (the last nuclear submarine of Project 671RTM, commissioned after the collapse of the USSR) since 04/10/1995 has been called “Tambov”. The nuclear submarine K-138 is called “Obninsk”.

Perhaps the most striking fragment in the biography of Project 671RTM boats was their participation in the major operations Atrina and Aport, carried out by the 33rd Division in the Atlantic and significantly shaking the confidence of the United States in the ability of its Navy to solve anti-submarine missions.

On May 29, 1985, three submarines of Project 671RTM (K-502, K-324, K-299), as well as the submarine K-488 (Project 671RT), simultaneously left Zapadnaya Litsa on May 29, 1985. Later they were joined by the Project 671 nuclear submarine K-147. Of course, the entry of a whole group of nuclear submarines into the ocean could not go unnoticed by US naval intelligence. An intensive search began, but it did not bring the expected results. At the same time, Soviet nuclear-powered submarines, operating secretly, themselves monitored the missile submarines of the US Navy in their combat patrol area (for example, the K-324 nuclear submarine had three hydroacoustic contacts with a US nuclear submarine, for a total duration of 28 hours). In addition, the submarines studied the tactics of American anti-submarine aircraft. The Americans managed to establish contact only with K-488 returning to the base. On July 1, Operation Aport ended.

In March-June 1987, Operation Atrina, similar in scope, was carried out, in which five Project 671RTM submarines took part - K-244 (under the command of captain of the second rank V. Alikov), K-255 (under the command of captain of the second rank B.Yu. Muratov), ​​K-298 (under the command of captain of the second rank Popkov), K-299 (under the command of captain of the second rank N.I. Klyuev) and K-524 (under the command of captain of the second rank A.F. Smelkov). The submarines' operations were supported by naval aviation aircraft and two Kolguev-class reconnaissance ships, which are equipped with hydroacoustic systems with extended (towed) antennas. Although the Americans learned about the departure of nuclear submarines from Western Litsa, they lost them in the North Atlantic. The “underwater hunt” began again, which involved almost all the anti-submarine forces of the American Atlantic Fleet - shore- and deck-based aircraft, six anti-submarine nuclear submarines (in addition to the submarines already deployed by the United States Navy in the Atlantic), 3 powerful ship-based search engines group and 3 of the newest Stallworth-class vessels (hydroacoustic survey ships), which used powerful underwater explosions to generate a hydroacoustic pulse. Ships of the English fleet were involved in the search operation. According to the stories of commanders of domestic submarines, the concentration of anti-submarine forces was so large that it seemed impossible to surface for air pumping and a radio communication session. Despite this, the nuclear submarines managed to reach the Sargasso Sea area undetected, where the Soviet “veil” was finally discovered.

PLA pr.671-RTM at demonstration exercises. In the background is SSBN pr.941

The Americans managed to establish the first contacts with submarines only eight days after Operation Atrina began. Project 671RTM nuclear submarines were mistakenly mistaken for strategic missile submarines, which only increased the concern of the US naval command and the country's political leadership (it must be recalled that these events occurred at the peak of the Cold War, which at any time could turn into "hot") While returning to base to separate from the anti-submarine forces of the US Navy, submarine commanders were allowed to use secret sonar countermeasures.

The success of Operations Atrina and Aport confirmed the assumption that the United States Navy, given the massive use of modern nuclear submarines by the Soviet Union, would not be able to organize any effective countermeasures against them.

At the end of 1985, the most difficult under-ice voyage was made by K-524 under the command of captain first rank V.V. Protopopov, the senior on board - the commander of the thirty-third division, captain of the first rank Shevchenko. The idea of ​​the campaign was to go to the Atlantic Ocean from the Arctic Ocean, bypassing Greenland from the northeast. The submarine commander was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for this campaign.

The submarine, entering the Lincoln Sea, passed through the shallow and narrow Robeson and Kennedy Straits, which separate Greenland from Grant Land and Grinnell Land, passed through the Kane Basin and entered Baffin Bay through Smith Strait, after which it set off into the North Atlantic.

The route was dangerous and extremely difficult. It was replete with shoals, as well as icebergs, which were abundantly thrown up by the Greenland glaciers. Because of the icebergs in the Baffin Sea, there were no safe depths. The only reliable means of information in these conditions was hydroacoustics.


K-524, already in the Atlantic, met with the US Navy aircraft carrier America and covertly “attacked” it (conditionally, of course). The duration of the trip was 80 days, of which 54 were at depths of over 150 meters under the ice. For his participation in this operation, captain first rank Protopopov received the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Project 671RTM submarines were the first to master transpolar passages to the Northern theater from the Pacific.

In 1981–1983, in order to optimally distribute multi-purpose nuclear submarines between fleets, these transitions were carried out by the K-255 submarines built in Komsomolsk-on-Amur (ship commander captain of the second rank Ushakov), K-324 (captain of the second rank Terekhin), K- 218 (captain of the second rank Avdeychik).

At the beginning of 1989, in accordance with Soviet-American agreements, weapons equipped with nuclear warheads were removed and stored from multipurpose nuclear submarines of the American Navy and the Soviet Navy. As a result of the Project 671R submarine and Shkval.

Project 671RTM ships took part in solving both military and purely peaceful problems. For example, “Daniil Moskovsky” under the command of captain first rank P.I. Litvina, after ensuring missile launches from the North Pole area of ​​the underwater heavy cruiser TK-20, delivered 10 tons of flour and sugar to the ice-covered port of Kharasavey at the end of August 1995.

On August 29, 1991, for nuclear submarines of projects 671, 671RT, 671RTM, 945, 945A, 670M, the letter “K” in the tactical number was replaced by the letter “B”.

In the mid-1990s. Project 671RTM boats began to be gradually withdrawn from the Navy's operational inventory. On July 31, K-247, K-492, K-412, which in total made 12, 10 and 6 autonomous cruises, were excluded from the Pacific Fleet. K-305, after a fire that occurred in 1994 in the turbine compartment, did not return to service, and became part of the maintenance team. reserve.

However, the “Pikes”, being at a respectable age, continued to demonstrate their high combat qualities. This is evidenced by an incident that occurred in the winter of 1996, 150 miles from the Hebrides. On February 29, the Russian Embassy in London appealed to the command of the British Navy with a request to provide assistance to a submarine sailor (commander captain first rank Ivanisov), who underwent surgery on board the boat to remove appendicitis, followed by peritonitis (his treatment is possible only in a hospital setting). Soon the patient was redirected to the shore by a Lynx helicopter from the destroyer Glasgow. However, the British media were not so much moved by the manifestation of naval cooperation between Russia and Great Britain, as they expressed bewilderment at the fact that while negotiations were being held in London, NATO meetings were taking place in the North Atlantic, in the area where the Russian Navy submarine was located. anti-submarine maneuvers (by the way, the Glasgow EM also took part in them). But the nuclear-powered submarine was detected only after it floated to the surface to transfer the sailor to the helicopter. According to the Times newspaper, the Russian submarine demonstrated its stealth while tracking anti-submarine forces. It is noteworthy that the British mistook the Pike for a more modern (lower noise) submarine of the 971st project.

The Northern Fleet in 1999 included the submarines B-138, B-255, B-292, B-388, B-14, B-448, B-502 and B-524. The Pacific Fleet included B-264, B-305.

By 2006, five boats of this type were serving in the Northern Fleet. Most of the rest are under conservation.

Noisy. Sheathing. Acoustics. Write off…

Unfortunately, yes. Everything comes to an end, and the legendary hunter submarines of Project 671 “Ruff”, “Salmon” and “Pike” were no exception. The issue of their modernization was considered by the command of the Russian Navy in the most serious manner several years ago. This was a competition for pike modernization projects, where all possible options were explored.

It's all about the high noise of the boats - the criterion by which the 671 series lost to the American Los Angeles back in the days of the frantic race for improvements.

The cost of upgrading the boat would be approximately the same as the cost of a new boat. It would be necessary to change the entire contents, including the latest sonar systems and, of course, the reactors themselves. The cladding would also need some serious work.

Thus, modernization was considered futile. By 2015, the boats were decommissioned. The famous 671 submarine project has ended. Submariners remember and appreciate it; it was a glorious time for the flight of engineering, technical discoveries and exploits of submariners, which are still little known to many people.

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