Prerequisites for the emergence of the Baltic Flotilla
Since the formation of the Old Russian state with its capital in Novgorod, sea voyages in the Baltic began. Then there was no separate military fleet and military detachments were kept on merchant boats, which did not stop them from defending the famous route “from the Varangians to the Greeks” from the Livonian knights and other enemies along the entire waterway to Ladoga, one of the most ancient cities in the North of Rus'. In the 12th century, the Russians gained a foothold on the coast of the Gulf of Finland, and it became part of the Hanseatic Novgorod. All subsequent centuries there continued a constant struggle with the Livonians and Swedes for dominance in the Gulf of Finland of the Baltic Sea.
Long-term wars continued for decades and with the advent of Ivan the Terrible, the wars continued even more actively. The Livonian War, which began in 1558, initially brought victories to Russian weapons and Narva was captured, which became the main trading port leading to the West. Sweden and Poland lost large incomes from Russian merchants selling their goods in Reval and Narva, so the Swedish War began. During the war, the Danish allies negotiated with the Swedes, after which their troops captured Narva and, according to the truce concluded in 1583, the Muscovite kingdom lost not only Narva, but also the entire coast of the Gulf of Finland.
The seventeenth century in Russia began with the upheavals of the Time of Troubles, the almost complete destruction of the state and decades of restoration under the autocratic rule of the kings of the Romanov dynasty. In the second half of the century, the troops of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich fought with the Swedes, but with minor successes, the defeats were more serious, and this led to the final loss of access to the sea. Even Ivan-gorod was given to the enemy.
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
The Russian Imperial Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea represented a separate detachment in the Mediterranean Sea, although the company did not go there for several months, but stayed for several years. They were based at the port of Piraeus and the bays of the islands of Poros and Crete (Suda). Depending on the international situation, this unit could be called a squadron, but as a rule it was staffed on a residual basis, in addition, it often included ships that were either heading to the Far East or coming from there.
So in 1902, the head of the detachment, Rear Admiral A.Kh. Krieger temporarily joined his flagship battleship Nicholas I, two gunboats and two numbered destroyers with the armored cruiser Vladimir Monomakh, which was returning to Kronstadt, as well as 3 French-built destroyers of the Trout class, which were heading to Port Arthur, but for technical reasons other ships remained waiting in the Mediterranean. Fortunately, these ships did not even have to be painted; the ships of the Pacific squadron were in typical Mediterranean colors.
It should be noted that the forces in the Mediterranean Sea included ships not only from the Baltic Fleet, but also from the Black Sea Fleet, as a rule these were Donets-class gunboats. However, the frequency of service, due to the restrictions that Turkey imposed on the passage of warships through the straits, was not regular. For example, in mid-1902, the detachment of Black Sea ships was not included.
A separate detachment in the Mediterranean Sea on July 1, 1902
Creation of the Russian fleet on the Baltic Sea
The new history of the Russian presence in the Baltic began with the advent of Peter I to the reign. The young tsar listened carefully to foreigners serving in Moscow and merchants sailing to Russia, as a result of which he fell in love with the sea, having never seen it.
In the War of Azov, Peter created the first Russian fleet, but it became the forerunner of Russian naval power in the Baltic Sea. In 1696, the Boyar Duma sentenced: “Sea vessels will be...” and this can safely be called the birthday of the Russian Navy. The main idea of the reformer tsar was a “window to Europe,” which means final access to the Baltic and strengthening there. The war with Sweden, which lasted from 1700 to 1721, forced Russia to completely rebuild and learn many previously outlandish things, including the construction of real sea vessels. After the resounding victories of the Russian army and access to the shores of the Gulf of Finland, by order of the Tsar, the city of St. Petersburg was founded at the mouth of the Neva, all occupied Swedish fortresses were restored and several shipyards were founded.
The war with Sweden on the rivers and along the coast of the Gulf of Finland involved many small ships built on the Volkhov and other small rivers. Large naval frigates were laid down at the new shipyards; the first ship of the Baltic Fleet was called “Standart” and was launched on August 22, 1703. A little later, the time of victories came and the first, albeit small, victory was the capture of two Swedish ships near the Nyenskans fortress: the galliot "Gedan" and the shnyava "Astrild". This modest victory ensured that the Swedish squadron stood at the mouth of the Neva for the summer and, not daring to enter with fighting, went to its shores in the fall. And at this time, St. Petersburg was already being built on Hare Island and the Admiralty Shipyards were being built. This symbolic victory became a significant date and now May 18 is Baltic Fleet Day.
The Swedish navy continued to attempt cannon fire and amphibious landings, but always escaped with heavy losses—Russia was firmly entrenched on the Baltic shores. By 1710, already 250 rowing ships blocked Vyborg from the sea, which was besieged by ground forces, and with this help it was taken. The first full-fledged battleship, launched in 1712, was named Poltava in honor of the defeat of the Swedish ground forces near the town of Poltava. The final blow to Swedish dominance in the Baltic Sea was dealt in the naval battle off Cape Gangut, when the Swedish squadron, consisting of the best ships, was completely defeated. In all military operations of the Russian army in the past decade, the boarding rowing fleet, which can be called the Marine Corps of Peter the Great, took the most effective part.
BALTIC FLEET
BALTIC FLEET, operational-strategic. unification of the Navy in Russia and the USSR. Created during the Northern War 1700–21 after growing. troops established themselves at the mouth of the river. Neva, returning Russia access to the Baltic Sea. Construction of ships for B. f. began at the shipyards on the river. Syasya (1702), b. Svir and Lodeynoye Pole (1703). First base B. f. – St. Petersburg (from 1724 Kronstadt became the main base). In 1703, it became part of the B. f. The first ship entered - the frigate "Standard" (the first sailing battleship "Poltava", became part of the Baltic Fleet in 1712). Ships for B. f. were built at the Admiralty Shipyard in St. Petersburg, as well as in other Baltic states. shipyards, on the White Sea (Solombala shipyard) and were bought abroad. B. f. contributed to growing troops during the siege of Vyborg in 1710, the capture of Revel, Pernov and Riga in 1710, Helsingfors and Abo in 1713. He played a decisive role in the occupation of Russia. troops of the Moonsund Islands in 1710 and Finland in 1712–13. He won victories over the Swedes in the Battle of Gangut in 1714, the Battle of Ezel in 1719 and the Battle of Grenham in 1720, which allowed Russia to establish itself in the Baltic Sea and become a major naval power. Actions grew. ships and galleys in 1719–21 off the coast of Sweden influenced its readiness to conclude the Peace of Nystadt in 1721. Through the forces of the B.f. commanded by naval commanders F. M. Apraksin, N. F. Golovin, M. M. Golitsyn (1675–1730), N. A. Senyavin. In 1721, as part of the B. f. there were 32 battleships, approx. 100 other sailing ships and up to 400 rowing ships. Before the creation of the Black Sea Fleet in 1783, the B. f. was united. Russian fleet empires.
“The final episode of the battle in the Chios Strait” (Battle of Chesme 1770). Artist J. F. Hackert. 1770s Central Naval Museum (St. Petersburg).
During the Seven Years' War 1756–63 B. f. participated in the capture of Memel and Kolberg. During the Archipelago expeditions of the B. f. squadron. under command. G. A. Spiridova, S. K. Greig, D. N. Senyavin, L. P. Heiden and others acted in the Mediterranean and won victories over the tour. fleet in the Battle of Chesma 1770, the Battle of Athos 1807 and the Battle of Navarino 1827. In Russian-Swedish. war 1788–90 B. f. The Swede repelled the attack. fleet that sought to capture Kronstadt and St. Petersburg, and won victories in the Battle of Hogland 1788, the Battle of Rochensalm 1789 (see Battles of Rochensalm), the Battle of Revel 1790, the Battle of Krasnogorsk 1790 and the Battle of Vyborg 1790 (but was defeated in the second Battle of Rochensalm 1790) . In 1826, it became part of the B. f. The first soldier entered. steamer, but up to the middle. 19th century it was based on sailing ships (26 battleships, 9 frigates), there were also 9 steam frigates, etc. In the beginning. – sir. 19th century ships B. f. participated in long-distance and circumnavigation voyages, during which a number of geographical discoveries and knowledge in the field of oceanography was significantly expanded (expeditions of I. F. Kruzenshtern and Yu. F. Lisyansky, F. F. Bellingshausen, M. P. Lazarev, F. P. Litke, O. E. Kotzebue, G. I. Nevelsky, etc.).
During the Crimean War 1853–56 B. f. thwarted the attempts of the Anglo-French equipped with steam ships. fleet to capture Kronstadt, Sveaborg, Helsingfors and blockade St. Petersburg from the sea. Ross. sailors successfully used minefields made from anchor mines for the first time.
Since 1861 in Russia for B. f. The construction of a steam armored fleet began. In 1877, it became part of the B. f. The first seaworthy battleship "Peter the Great" entered. K con. 19th century in B. f. there were 9 battleships, 20 coastal defense battleships and 11 armored cruisers. Since 1903, the B. f. has been put into service. submarines arrived.
Squadron battleship "Slava". 1912.
During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, from the B. f. The 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons were formed, which made a difficult transition of 18 thousand miles from the Baltic to the Far East, but then were defeated in the Battle of Tsushima 1905. B. f. restored during the Naval reforms of the 1900s–10s. In 1912, in service with the B. f. aviation appeared.
During the First World War 1914–18 B. f. acted on enemy communications, supported ground forces, defended Petrograd from the sea, and carried out large mine-laying operations. operations during which approx. 35 thousand min. Ch. The fleet's base was Helsingfors. On Nov. 1914 The first Russians were included in the fleet. battleships-dreadnoughts of the "Sevastopol" type. B. f. carried out the Irben operation of 1915, participated in the Moonsund operation of 1917.
Sailors B.f. played a significant role in the revolution. events, including the October Revolution of 1917.
By Decree of the Council of People's Commissars dated 29.1(11.2).1918 B.f. included in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet. In connection with the promotion of German troops to Tallinn, and then Fin. troops to Helsingfors, the Ice Campaign of the Baltic Fleet was completed in 1918. In 1918–19 Baltic Fleet. fought against the British. fleet, white North-Western army. Means. part of the personnel of the B. f. participated in the Kronstadt uprising of 1921. In April. 1921 B. f. transformed into the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea (since 1935 - Red Banner Baltic Fleet).
In the interwar period for armament of B. f. New ships, submarines, and aircraft arrived, the Baltic Air Force was created, and air defense and coastal defense (CD) were organized. Some of the personnel and ships of the B. f. became the basis for the creation of the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet.
By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45, the B. f. included 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyer leaders, 19 destroyers, 48 torpedo boats, 69 submarines, 656 aircraft, defense and air defense formations, and a marine brigade (MP). Ch. The fleet's base was Tallinn. During the war, B. f. joint With ground forces he defended naval bases and coastal areas, including during the Tallinn Defense of 1941, the Moonsund Islands Defense of 1941 and the Hanko Defense of 1941, and acted on enemy communications. In Aug. 1941 from o. Saaremaa long-range bombers B. f. launched the first strikes on Berlin. Large losses in ships and personnel of the B.F. carried in Aug. 1941 during the Tallinn transition to Kronstadt. Together with the ground forces, the fleet took part in the Battle of Leningrad in 1941–44, provided transportation across Lake Ladoga, and took part in the breakthrough operations (1943) and then the complete lifting of the blockade (1944) of Leningrad. B. f. carried out the Moonsund operation of 1944. Actions of ships and aviation of the B. f. to support ground forces and disrupt enemy sea communications in 1944–45 contributed to the defeat of the enemy on the Karelian Isthmus, in the Baltic States, East. Prussia and East. Pomerania. For military merits of St. 20 ships and units of the B. f. became guardsmen, 58 were awarded orders. More than 100 thousand Baltic people were awarded orders and medals, 137 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Union.
In Feb. 1946 B. f. divided into the 4th and 8th fleets (in December 1955 it was restored to its previous organization). B. f. got the opportunity to be based in the ports of the GDR and Poland. Since the 1950s The BF, like the entire USSR Navy, was equipped with qualitatively new military equipment. The composition of B. f. included diesel missile submarines, missile ships and missile-carrying aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, as well as diesel torpedo submarines, destroyers, anti-submarine ships, missile boats, minesweepers, landing ships (including hovercraft), other medium and small ships, aircraft, etc. types.
“Neustrashimy-class patrol ships are searching for submarines.” Artist V. A. Pechatin. 1998. Central Naval Museum (St. Petersburg).
By the beginning of 1991 B. f. was the largest navy in the Baltic Sea region, it consisted of 232 warships (including 32 submarines), 328 aircraft and 70 helicopters, 16 launchers of coastal missile units, military and marine formations, rear and technical provision. After the collapse of the USSR, the forces of B. f. removed from the former territory. East Germany, Poland, Baltic countries (the fleet lost up to 80% of its bases, 60% of enterprises and about 50% of barracks and housing stock). In 1995, it became part of the B. f. Leningrad entered. naval base. Of particular importance was the protection of sea routes of communication with the isolated region. enclave - Kaliningrad region. Ch. base B. f. – Baltiysk. By 2004, as part of the B. f. was located approx. 70 ships and submarines.
Until the beginning 20th century on B. f. in fact, there were permanent positions only at the beginning. squadrons, commands. As a rule, he was appointed by the fleet for the period of hostilities. The functions of managing the fleet on shore were performed by military commanders. ports. The first factual commands B. f. in May 1904 he became adm. A. A. Birilev, appointed chief. commander of the B. f. and beginning naval defense of the Baltic Sea. In 1908, to manage the B. f. the position of commands was established. United detachments of the Baltic Sea (since 1911 command of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea, since 1914 command of the Baltic Sea Fleet). Commanders of the B. f. were: N. O. Essen (1908–15), M. V. Viktorov (1921–24, 1926–32), L. M. Galler (1932–37), V. F. Tributs (1939–46), vice adm., since 1964 adm. A. E. Orel (1959–67), vice-adm., from 1969 adm. V. V. Mikhailin (1967–75), I. M. Kapitanets (1981–85), vice-adm., from 1987 adm. V. P. Ivanov (1986–91), etc.
B. f. awarded 2 Orders of the Red Banner (1928, 1965).
The Russian Empire is a maritime power
By 1725, the Baltic Fleet included 646 sailing ships and rowing galleys. This and military successes made it possible to call the Muscovite kingdom a maritime power - the Russian Empire, which became the master of the Baltic and Black Seas, and on the northern coast of the state.
The best achievements of Peter the Great in the Baltic can be called:
- Creation of a powerful fleet;
- Victories at Gangut, Ezel, Grengam;
- Capture, with the support of the fleet, of Revel (Tallinn), Riga, Vyborg, Helsingfors (Helsinki), Abo and the Moozund Islands;
- Founding of St. Petersburg and Kronstadt - the first naval base of the Russian fleet.
For many subsequent decades and throughout the nineteenth century, the Baltic Fleet showed its power to the whole world, and the best admirals and officers made the greatest contribution to the development of Russian weapons and the development of the world's oceans. History remembers the names of the great naval commanders and discoverers of new overseas territories and commanders of ships that circumnavigated the world, raising the proud flag of the Baltic Fleet in the southern and northern latitudes, on the islands of Oceania, in Alaska, off the coast of Antarctica and in other places. The greatness of the Russian Baltic Fleet is evidenced by 432 discoveries around the globe, which are marked on the globe with the names of 98 of the best people - admirals and officers of the Baltic.
The First World War engulfed the Baltic Sea, Russian sailors destroyed more than 100 German ships and transport vessels in fierce battles. In the most difficult conditions, the fleet was able to defeat Germany and its allies, winning most of the battles for the Baltic and the cities on its coast, including Petrograd. And already in the days and months when the foreign naval intervention of 1918-1922 was undertaken, the Baltic people were able to hold their sea borders and did not allow the enemy to approach the capital.
Content:
- BALTIC SEA
- MEDITERRANEAN SEA
- PACIFIC OCEAN
Although the Baltic Fleet was considered the strongest of the two fleets of the Russian Empire, in reality it was not large. In addition, it was divided into three maritime theaters - the Baltic Sea itself, the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, in addition, ships of the fleet were occasionally involved in sailing to the Northern latitudes in the White Sea region (in 1902 it was the messenger ship "Bakan"), as well as in the Atlantic. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to imagine the exact organizational structure of the Baltic Fleet in mid-1902; I simply did not find it and collected all the information bit by bit, looking at monographs on individual ships. In addition, ships were included in certain tactical units as needed, and the ship composition of each of them fluctuated from year to year. Let's look at what the fleet forces were like in each of the three regions.
Creation and development of the Red Fleet in the Baltic
The Baltic Fleet lost almost all its ships and port infrastructure in the First World War, Civil Confrontation and Intervention. The first years after the revolution, Soviet power had no time to restore the fleet, since it was necessary to overcome the devastation and create a new state of justice and peace. But by the end of the twenties, a hostile environment forced the authorities to start creating a new Red Fleet of the USSR. The real rise of the Baltic Fleet occurred in the thirties, when modern ships were created according to new designs at the Leningrad shipbuilding enterprises. The ships were launched and equipped with the best weapons. During these years, the Baltic Fleet became the center of engineering and design thought, from here all the fleets of the Soviet Union received advanced ships, the latest equipment, weapons and trained naval crews, brought up in the spirit of the Baltic sailors. By the end of the thirties, the powerful Red Banner Baltic Fleet stood in defense of the Motherland.
Participation of the Baltic Fleet in the Great Patriotic War
From the first day of the Great Patriotic War, the Baltic Fleet entered into a fierce struggle with the Navy of Nazi Germany. All these years, the command of the Baltic Fleet under the leadership of Admiral V.F. Tributs developed operations for the participation of all forces in the defense of Leningrad, destroyed enemy communications, and conducted naval battles with ships and submarines. Baltic sailors fought in large numbers as part of the ground forces, heroically defending Hanko, the Moonsund Islands, and the shores of the Gulf of Finland. Later, sailors destroyed the Baltic ports of the Nazis already on German territory. Many books have been written and films made about the heroism of the fleet, but there is something to write and show. During the Second World War, the Baltic Fleet destroyed 1,205 units of the Nazi fleet, shot down 2,418 Luftwaffe aircraft, and carried out 24 successful landing operations.
In honor of the Great Victory, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was awarded the second Order of the Red Banner. For heroic deeds in defending the Motherland from the enemy, 24 formations and ships received the honorary title of Guards. Soviet people highly appreciated the maritime brotherhood of the Baltic people and the personal courage of the Red Navy, so in Leningrad, Kronstadt and other cities, sailors enjoy great love from the inhabitants.
Post-war development of the Baltic Fleet
During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Baltic Fleet suffered serious losses, and, having embarked on the path of peaceful restoration of the country, the Soviet government invested enormous forces in developing the power of the army and navy. The aggressive policy of the United States, which openly opposed the USSR and other countries that were part of the Warsaw Bloc, forced it to spend additional resources. The influence of the American aircraft carrier, submarine and surface fleet increased in all seas of the world's oceans, and in the fifties it began to be equipped with missiles with nuclear warheads. The Soviet Armed Forces had to restore nuclear parity and scientific personnel did everything to put missile launchers on duty in the fleets and other units. The Soviet Union created a powerful Navy:
- Russian ships plied the seas;
- long-range anti-submarine class naval aviation was on duty in the sky;
- Soviet ballistic missile submarines have become a real threat to the United States.
They were forced to talk to our country, and this balance was maintained until the collapse of the USSR.
Is the Baltic Fleet a former fleet? No!
Baltic corvettes in exercises, 2022
There is an opinion that the Baltic Fleet is a fleet without a future, that it is outdated and there is no point in developing it. There's even a joke about the former navy. It's worth looking into this issue.
Some characteristics of the theater of military operations, the countries located there and their impact on the situation
The Baltic Sea is very small in area and shallow. Depths everywhere measure tens of meters, there are shallows. Geographically, the sea is locked - the exit to the open ocean from it passes through the Danish Straits, controlled by a country unfriendly to Russia - Denmark. The Kiel Canal is controlled by Germany. Russia controls a few percent of the Baltic coast, and has only two naval bases on it - Kronstadt (to put it bluntly, this is more than just a base, it has a large infrastructure) and the Baltiysk naval base. The latter is within the effective range of Polish army artillery fire.
For those who don't remember the map of the region
The hydrology of the Baltic Sea significantly complicates the detection of submarines by acoustic methods, however, due to the shallow depths, it is difficult for a submarine to hide from non-acoustic methods - primarily radar detection of wave wakes on the surface of the water, above a moving submarine, detection of wakes, detection of heat generated by a submarine using thermal imaging equipment .
The Leningrad naval base in Kronstadt is located inside the narrow Gulf of Finland, the northern coast of which belongs mainly to Finland, and the southern coast belongs to the NATO Baltic countries. The Gulf of Finland can be very quickly blocked by laying minefields, which will cut off North-West Russia from sea communications. This will be an economic disaster for the country as a whole.
On the shores of the Gulf of Finland is the second most important and populous city in Russia - St. Petersburg, with its port, as well as the most important export infrastructure, such as the port of Ust-Luga.
Russia owns the Kaliningrad region, located “halfway” from Russian territory proper to the exit from the Baltic Sea. Its population is more than a million people and maintaining a stable connection with this territory is critically important for Russia and for the population of the Kaliningrad region. Communication with the territory, independent of third (hostile) countries, is carried out exclusively by sea. The lines connecting the Kaliningrad region with the rest of Russia are thus critical maritime communications that must remain free under absolutely any circumstances.
The population of the Baltic region countries is generally hostile to the Russian Federation. This has both historically determined reasons and is also due to the completely insane and unimaginable intensity of anti-Russian propaganda for the average Russian. So, in Sweden, for example, they make dramatic feature films where the Russian military massively poison the population of Sweden with rain contaminated with psychotropic substances, and this is presented in all seriousness and does not cause any rejection among the mass audience. The attitude of the Poles also does not require comment, with the exception of the population of the areas bordering the Kaliningrad region. The population of Finland is largely suspicious of Russia, although it is a far cry from hostility on the level of Poland or Swedish paranoia.
The British and US navies have free and unrestricted access to the Baltic Sea thanks to the position of Denmark and can deploy almost any force there, the number of which is limited only by military expediency.
The risk of a full-scale war in the region is low - all the countries that are in it are to a greater or lesser extent “friends against” the Russian Federation and will not fight among themselves, but a full-scale attack on Russia should be considered unlikely due to its nuclear status (although it cannot be completely ruled out ). At the same time, the intensity of anti-Russian propaganda in the media of some countries has already led to a partial loss of an adequate perception of reality by their population and political leadership, and this creates the risk of local clashes limited in scale.
These risks are especially increased by the fact that the US leadership, firstly, is interested in such clashes, and secondly, has almost unlimited influence on the mechanisms for making foreign policy decisions in some countries, the population of which is no longer able to adequately evaluate the actions of their authorities. Moreover, there have emerged opportunities to introduce mentally ill people, medically ill people, into the power structures of Poland, an example of which was the Minister of National Defense of Poland Antoni Macierewicz some time ago. With such personnel, the acquisition by the United States, Britain or another enemy of Russia of their own kamikaze country, willing to sacrifice itself in a war with Russia, is a purely technical task, feasible at any time.
Specifics of combat operations in the Baltic
The short distances between the bases of the warring parties, as well as the large number of skerries where warships can be camouflaged and hidden, have led to the fact that in order to ensure, if not victory, then at least non-defeat in the Baltic, the warring party has only one course of action - decisive offensive with the goal of neutralizing the enemy fleet as quickly as possible.
This theater of military operations does not provide any other options; the speed of any operations in this theater of operations is too high due to its small size, and the enemy simply must be forestalled in everything. During the First World War, both Russia and Germany ignored this situation and, as a result, none of the parties in the Baltic region achieved a strategically significant positive change in the situation, which made all the losses suffered by the parties in the battles largely in vain. The Germans drew the right conclusions from this. During the Second World War, very small German-Finnish forces, consisting largely of mobilized civilian ships, were able to effectively neutralize the disproportionately larger Baltic Fleet of the RKKF in the very first days of the war. The reason for this was the possession of the initiative and the pace of operations ahead of the enemy.
The Baltic Fleet, given its numerical superiority over any potential enemy in the region, was unable to counter this.
There were a lot of reasons for this state of affairs; today we can safely say that the Baltic Fleet, like the RKKF as a whole, was in a state of systemic crisis, which determined its effectiveness.
What should the Baltic Fleet have done?
Use your light forces and aviation for effective reconnaissance to great depths, and large surface ships to prevent German offensive mining operations in the Gulf of Finland. There was enough strength for this, the courage of the personnel too, in the end, Soviet pilots opened fire on German ships for the first time even before the “canonical” moment of the start of the war at 03.30 on the morning of June 22, 1941. The command had an understanding of when the war would begin approximately; the circle of future opponents was clear. If such measures were taken in advance, no blockade of the fleet would have happened and it would have been able to have a completely different influence on the course of the battles.
But nothing was done, for a complex set of reasons. The results are known.
Another feature of combat operations in the Baltic is that this is the only theater of operations where light forces are actually capable of performing a wide range of tasks independently, and where surface ships are more likely to engage in combat against other surface ships than anywhere else.
Another specific feature of the theater of war, also stemming from its geography, is the possibility of waging mine warfare on a scale that is not possible anywhere else. For a long time, minelayers were a very common class of warships both in NATO and in neutral countries, and even today minelayers are the main warships in the Finnish Navy.
Current state of the Russian Baltic Fleet
At the present time, the Russian Baltic Fleet is still a “splinter” of the USSR Baltic Fleet.
This is not an association created for a task or tasks, these are the remnants of what was there before and what should have operated in completely different conditions. There is no doctrine or concept of combat employment behind the structure of the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy, behind its ship composition, and behind the naval aviation forces available to the fleet. It's just “a lot of ships” and nothing more. Let's give a few examples.
There is a clear disregard for the submarine forces of the Baltic Fleet; at the moment they consist of one serviceable submarine B-806 “Dmitrov”. Hypothetically, she will soon be up to speed, but first she must leave repairs and make the transition to the Baltic.
There is a lack of understanding of what surface forces the fleet should have and where – the most valuable and largest ships of the fleet, Project 20380 corvettes, are based in Baltiysk, where Polish artillery can reach them. The flagship of the fleet, the destroyer Nastoychivy, is also there, naturally, when it comes out of repair.
The Project 11540 Neustrashimy TFR, which is under repair, may still emerge from it without the Uran missile system “relying” on it, however, there may still be options.
But there are no options with the existing mine action forces - even if the minesweepers that the Baltic Fleet has could fight modern mines, they would not be enough. But they can't. In general, the Navy’s attitude towards the mine threat in the Baltic is not much different from its attitude towards the mine threat in the North or the Pacific, but, as just said, in the Baltic even the geography is favorable to waging a mine war, and the neighbors are preparing for it.
In general, the Baltic Fleet is not ready for a serious war.
No wonder. On the website of the Russian Ministry of Defense
The main tasks of the Baltic Fleet are defined as:
—protection of the economic zone and areas of production activity, suppression of illegal production activities; —ensuring the safety of navigation; —carrying out foreign policy actions of the government in economically important areas of the World Ocean (visits, business visits, joint exercises, actions as part of peacekeeping forces, etc.).
The Defense Ministry explicitly assigns to the Baltic Fleet the character of a sort of “ritual” formation, the purpose of which is “to appear, not to be.” Hence the lack of a clear strategy behind the existing deliveries of new ships to the Baltic - they exist, but they are largely unsystematic in nature, not consistent with the model of threats that Russia faces in this theater of operations.
Threats and Challenges
The “model” war that could be waged against Russia today is the war with Georgia in August 2008.
That is, this is a conflict during which Russia, under the cover of some kind of provocation, is attacked by a kamikaze country acting in the interests of third countries (for example, the United States), which inflicts losses on it in people and equipment, and then suffers a military defeat, but at the cost of inflicting damage on Russia colossal foreign policy damage. At the same time, the issue of military losses and political damage are interconnected - the less capable the Russian military organization has shown itself, the higher the political damage. The fate of the kamikaze country does not matter; moreover, the more it “gets”, the better for the beneficiary of the conflict. Thus, the harder Russia hits back, the better for the beneficiary of the conflict (to a first approximation, this is again the United States and the NATO bureaucracy). The Baltic is an ideal place for such provocations. Firstly, due to the presence of at least four potential kamikaze countries - Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Secondly, thanks to the presence of a country that itself will not engage in offensive hostilities against Russia, but will happily play the role of a victim - Sweden. Thirdly, thanks to the presence in Russia of an extremely vulnerable point - the Kaliningrad region, separated from the territory of the Russian Federation. Fourthly, due to the fact that there is a technical opportunity to concentrate the main efforts of the parties at sea, where Russia not only does not have adequate naval forces, but also does not understand how to use them, and what is the essence of naval warfare in principle.
What could be the object of such provocation?
Kaliningrad region.
If some beneficiary needs a war with Russia’s participation, then it is necessary to attack a point that Russia cannot help but defend. In 2008, these were peacekeepers in South Ossetia and its civilian population.
When in 2014 the Americans needed to provoke Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian troops deliberately fired at the civilian population of Donbass, since their masters believed that Russia would not be able to stand aside in this case. Then they managed to avoid an open invasion by limiting themselves to smaller-scale measures, but in the case of a hypothetical attack on Kaliningrad, this will not work; they will have to fight back openly.
In what form can the attack take place? Any, depending on the scale of the conflict required by the beneficiary. So, in the minimum version, this could be artillery shelling of military facilities in Baltiysk from Poland, with simultaneous propaganda pumping up its population that it is Russia that is shelling itself or that it is the crooked Russians who are exploding shells, and they are trying to make the “forces of good” to blame " Any Russian response to this will be portrayed as unprovoked aggression.
In a more severe version, such shelling will be only the beginning, followed by continuation and various kinds of retaliatory actions. At this stage, it is very convenient to transfer the war to the sea in order to exclude the possibility for Russia to realize its superiority on land.
The possibility of such a transfer is quite real. For this, it is enough that the subject of the conflict is not NATO, but that it is an independent operation of the Polish Armed Forces, for example.
In this case, Russia will find itself in a situation where it does not border the attacking party on land. Moreover, in order to immediately set all the traps, the enemy can behave as follows - the former Soviet Baltic republics will verbally condemn the actions of the attacking party - Poland, and demand that it abandon the continuation of hostilities, initiating ceasefire negotiations with Russia. At the same time, foreign military contingents in the Baltic countries will be strengthened.
Russia, therefore, loses the political basis for “breaking through” the corridor to Kaliningrad by force - on its way there are countries that supported it, albeit in words, and that are members of NATO, and have the right to apply for help from other countries of the bloc in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Charter. And who are not involved in the attack on the Russian Federation. An attack on these countries in such conditions, and even when there are military units of other NATO countries there that are also not openly participating in the conflict, would be political suicide for the Russian Federation, and potentially fraught with a truly big war with unpredictable consequences.
Next, the enemy can take any measures to blockade Kaliningrad from the sea, for example, massive offensive mining, to which the Russian Federation has nothing to respond. Any blow from Russia against neutral countries is already a victory for the United States, Belarus’ refusal to participate in the war and Russia’s permission to release Kaliningrad from land is already a victory for the United States, and the threat of using nuclear weapons in Europe is a doubly victory, since it will clearly show to the whole world, Russia’s incapacity even in defending its territory and its near-zero value as an ally.
In fact, absolutely any outcome of such a war will be a defeat for Russia and a victory for its enemies, except for one thing - the lightning defeat by Russia of those forces that the enemy uses against it, without serious damage to its territory and population, and without damage to neutrals, whose role in such a scenario is No wonder NATO will act.
But for this, Russia at a minimum needs to retain communications with Kaliningrad for the rapid transfer there of large forces sufficient to decisively defeat the enemy, which requires a capable fleet, which does not exist and which the Russian Federation, apparently, does not plan to have in the Baltic at all.
Moreover, what is very important is that the defeat of the enemy must be accomplished faster than the beneficiary of the conflict (for example, the United States) can deploy its forces in the region - everything must be completed by the time they arrive.
This scenario is far from the only one. There are options that are much more difficult to resolve. If the sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation continues, then it will be possible to lead to a naval blockade of Russian ports, and the enemy dominating the sea may well be able to do this somewhere near the Danish Straits. Moreover, you can banally wrap up any ships under neutral flags going to or from Russia, without touching ships under Russian ones, then from the point of view of international law the Russian Federation will have no reason to intervene at all - neither its territory nor its ships will be touched.
A way out of such a crisis would be to force Denmark to allow ships to pass through the straits under the threat of causing damage elsewhere, and the simultaneous deployment of the Northern Fleet in the North Sea and the Baltic in the Baltic to make blockade operations impossible. And again we are talking about the need to have a fleet adequate to the tasks.
The danger is posed by a combination of several scenarios of military operations and provocations. Thus, during some crisis around Kaliningrad, NATO, regardless of Poland, may instigate another round of provocations with submarines in Swedish territorial waters (see “Submarines and psychological warfare. Part 1”
and
“Submarines and Psychological Warfare.
Part 2" ), which could help draw Sweden either into a war with Russia or into NATO or into blockade actions against the Russian Federation and in any case will cause significant political damage to Russia.
In addition to military crises, the Baltic Fleet also has peacetime tasks that are not related to the actual military operations in the Baltic. So, it is Baltiysk that is the military base closest to the Atlantic. The presence of a certain number of large surface ships in the Baltic in peacetime is quite rational, since they are closest to those areas of the world ocean where naval groups are currently operating (with the exception of the Mediterranean, where it is closest to reach from the Black Sea). Actually, now this is the only task that the fleet is truly working on.
At the same time, given the mass of military scenarios, the presence of large surface ships in the Baltic, on the contrary, will be unjustified, and the Navy, on the contrary, must be ready to withdraw them to the North in advance or deploy them in the Atlantic together with the forces of other fleets.
It is important to understand that nowhere else is there such a gathering of anti-Russian countries as in the Baltic; nowhere else are there such opportunities for intrigue against Russia as in the Baltic. Both in Ukraine and around the Kuril Islands, bilateral confrontations are possible, one of the parties in which will be the Russian Federation. Anything is possible in the Baltic, and at an extremely high pace.
What will be the consequences of a victory for some country over Russia in the Baltic theater of operations? Shutting down, even temporarily, the economy of the second most important region in the Russian Federation - North-West Russia, together with St. Petersburg, as well as the loss of communication with the overseas territory of the Russian Federation - Kaliningrad, where, we repeat, more than one million people live. This is a catastrophe. True, if due to a banal shortage of minesweepers or anti-submarine aircraft we have to resort to nuclear weapons, it will not be much better.
Conclusions on the importance of the Baltic Fleet
In peacetime, the Baltic Fleet is important for naval operations by surface ships in the Atlantic, Caribbean and Mediterranean Sea.
However, limited deployment locations and the limited value of such ships in some Baltic Sea conflict scenarios require that the number of large surface ships be limited. At the same time, the importance of submarines and light forces remains. The Baltic Sea is the only maritime theater where light forces will be able to perform a wide range of tasks independently, without the support of large surface ships and nuclear submarines. They will, however, depend on aviation.
The Baltic region is the site of a potential military conflict that will take unusual forms - a high-intensity and high-tech conflict of limited scope, in which one of the parties will pursue goals far from military victory, which will require adequate goal setting from Russia. The peculiarities of military operations will be their high pace - on the verge of loss of control on the part of politicians, since in some cases the warring forces will have no choice but to maintain an ultra-high tempo of operations.
A purely Russian specificity will be the need to be ready to deploy both naval forces and floating rear forces at sea at the first intelligence signs of any impending provocation. At the same time, since the issue of possessing communications between Russian territories in the Baltic will be key, not only the forces of the fleet, but also the aerospace forces and even parts of the marine corps and airborne and ground forces must be prepared for actions to destroy enemy ships, for example, through raids against its naval bases by land with evacuation by air or sea.
The key issue for victory will be the speed of naval operations and other operations against the enemy fleet.
During the Second World War, it was the Baltic theater of military operations that turned out to be the most difficult for the USSR. There is no particular reason to believe that the situation today will be different.
It is already complex - in the Baltic, Russia borders on a mass of hostile countries, and has only two naval bases, while Poland is slowly modernizing its Navy, and with its modest number, it already has three submarines in service, and surpasses the Russian Baltic Fleet in the number of minesweepers , and Sweden has technological superiority over the Russian Federation in naval underwater weapons, anti-submarine ships and aircraft and a number of other weapons.
Also, the most important quality of the Baltic Fleet should be readiness for mine warfare, both in terms of defense and in terms of offensive mining. Everything is bad with this, individual ships practice mining, but exercises on massive deployments are not carried out for a while, as for mine action, everything has already been said in principle.
It is worth describing what the forces of the Baltic Fleet should be.
Baltic Fleet for the first half of the 21st century
As we remember from the article “ Building a fleet.
Theory and purpose ", the fleet must establish dominance at sea, if possible, then without a fight, if not, then by fighting with the enemy naval forces, in which the latter should be destroyed or defeated and forced to flee.
The specificity of the Baltic is that the fleets of potential adversaries are mainly represented by surface ships. In addition, with a hypothetical deployment of the navies of non-Baltic countries in the region, it will also be carried out mainly by surface ships - for nuclear or large non-nuclear submarines, the Baltic is too small (although technically they could well operate there), the risks of losing them in an unfamiliar hydrological environment are very high . But large surface ships of the United States and NATO have been deployed in the Baltic more than once, including aircraft carriers - the last time was the Spanish UDC with Harrier II aircraft. Thus, Russia, with its budgetary limitations and insufficient resources, must have within its Baltic Fleet the forces and means to destroy surface ships.
The most logical thing for the Baltic seems to be the massive deployment of light forces as the main strike weapon, and slightly more powerful strike ships to protect them. The small size of the Baltic Sea makes it possible to ensure the presence of fighter aircraft in the air to protect naval strike groups. In this situation, the “composition” of forces looks like this: large NKs (for example, Project 20380 corvettes modernized to increase the effectiveness of air defense and anti-aircraft defense or other multi-functional corvettes in the future) under the protection of fighters from the shore are forces that ensure combat stability (consider defense against any enemy forces and means) to light forces performing the main strike missions, as well as defense of floating rear support vessels from any enemy forces and means.
What kind of light forces should these be? Taking into account the need to strike surface ships, these should be high-speed and seaworthy missile boats, inconspicuous in the radar range. Moreover, it is necessary to make an important caveat. There is no question of turning such a boat into a Death Star. It should be a simple and cheap ship, of small displacement. It should not be a pity to lose him (now we are not talking about the crew). But he must be really fast. For example, the old Turkish missile boats of the Kartal class, with a displacement of two hundred and a half tons, carried four anti-ship missiles and had a maximum speed of 45 knots on four not very powerful diesel engines. What is more important is that they could travel over long distances at high speed, so, at 35 knots, these ships could travel 700 miles and with a high degree of probability nothing would break.
“Kartal” is not exactly a role model, but definitely “a direction worth looking towards.”
Of course, this example from the past is not entirely relevant - today we need significantly more powerful electronic weapons. But, nevertheless, these missile boats are a good demonstration of the approach to light strike forces in the form in which they have a right to exist. Our Project 1241 Molniyas, in any of its modifications, are “ideologically” very close to the desired version of the ship, but they lack stealth in the radar and thermal range, and moreover, they are most likely too expensive, given the gas turbine power plant. We need something simpler, cheaper, less noticeable, smaller and, perhaps, quite a bit faster. And in principle, as long as the Molniyas are in service, the development of such a cheap missile boat is quite realistic.
Missile boat pr. 12411M Pacific Fleet
Under no circumstances should such a ship be confused with an RTO. A modern MRK of Project 22800 “Karakurt” costs about ten billion rubles, which completely deprives it of any sense as an attacking “unit” - it is simply too expensive to climb under fire on it. In addition, it lacks speed compared to a missile boat. And as part of the “heavy” forces, he is too specialized. There is no PLO, there is no anti-torpedo protection, a helicopter cannot be landed on it... They, of course, will have to be used in this capacity while they are in service, but gradually the role of carriers of "Caliber" in the Baltic should be taken over by multifunctional corvettes and submarines, and, if it comes to this – ground launchers. As for the Buyanov-M, these are pure floating batteries, and they can influence the outcome of an armed struggle to the very minimum extent.
The “heavy” forces will enter into battle when the enemy tries to reach the “light” ones with a massive attack, or, as an alternative, when a third party’s naval forces successfully attempt to break through the Danish Straits, if a decision is made not to let it there. And if it is possible to establish dominance at sea, especially with the destruction of enemy submarines, then such ships will be able to accompany landing detachments, support them with fire from their guns, provide basing for helicopters, including attack helicopters, capable of operating along the coast, provide a blockade of enemy ports, and air defense of naval formations , landing troops and convoys.
They will be able to prevent the enemy from approaching the areas where anti-submarine search is being conducted, and they themselves will be able to conduct it in the future, when instead of the Project 1331 MPK there will be other ships, whatever they may be.
We need submarines, but smaller in size and displacement than what we are doing today or even what we plan to do. Moreover, for the Baltic it is critical to have a VNEU - the boats will have at most a couple of days to deploy while the enemy adapts to combat operations, then his aircraft will hover over the sea and, firstly, it is unlikely to be able to surface at least under the RDP to charge the batteries, and secondly, it will be very important to perform a separation from the enemy’s anti-submarine forces in a submerged position, and for a submarine devoid of VNEU this will mean the complete consumption of its electrical power reserve in literally one hour. The presence of VNEU is critical for the Baltic Sea.
The boats must be small - this is how the Poles are armed with diesel-electric submarines of the Kobben class, which have an underwater displacement of 485 tons. It is the small size that is critical for reducing the likelihood of detecting a boat using non-acoustic methods. And it’s easier to work in shallows. Against this background, our “Halibuts” with their 3000 or more tons in the Baltic look somewhat strange. This should not be understood as a call for the mass construction of ultra-small boats, but our Halibuts, Varshavyankas and Ladas are definitely too large for the Baltic. The Amur-950 project with VNEU would be close to a certain ideal submarine in terms of its displacement and dimensions for the conditions of the Baltic Sea, if someone had made both it and VNEU.
Drawing of the submarine "Amur-950" - alas, only a drawing
Ka-52K helicopters can play a huge role in aviation, but only if their radars are replaced with more efficient ones. If there is little room for them on warships operating in the far sea and ocean zones - helicopters in autonomous formations must be able to fight submarines, then in the Baltic such highly specialized fighters would be quite out of place, especially if it is possible to debug their interaction with surface ships . Due to the small distances in the theater of operations, they will be able to operate from the shore, including in a “shore-ship-shore” rotation.
Ka-52K Katran naval combat helicopter
This, of course, does not negate the need for naval attack air regiments on the Su-30SM and for full-fledged basic anti-submarine aviation, which we, alas, do not have today. If necessary, such forces, if they were available, could be transferred from other fleets.
It is especially important to pay attention to mine warfare. We must lay at least hundreds of mines every day of military operations. For this purpose, submarines, aviation, landing ships, and those very “light forces” - missile boats - can be involved. There is nothing stopping you from having space for five or six mines of different types on each one. After all, during the Great Patriotic War, torpedo boats were quite capable of laying mines. Moreover, since we are building simple and cheap boats, then nothing prevents us from having high-speed mine-laying boats as part of the “light” forces, even simpler and cheaper than a missile boat, equipped with a primitive set of self-defense means, and armed with mines. Such boats could well operate at the moment of an attack on the shore by our aviation, and under its cover, and ensure the high-speed and accurate placement of a large number of mines of various types, such that, for technical reasons, aviation cannot deploy.
Drawing of a Taiwanese high-speed minzag boat being created with a displacement of 500 tons. It can be simpler and cheaper
This fact is also indicative - out of forty-five warships of the Polish Navy, twenty are minesweepers. We, apparently, will first have to come to the same proportions, and then realize that in the old days, minesweepers absolutely correctly and naturally had more powerful weapons than today. We will have to “return to the true path” in this matter too.
What tasks can such a fleet perform?
Seize supremacy at sea faster than the beneficiaries of the conflict will introduce their naval forces into the Baltic and will put the Russian Federation in front of the need to accept an unwanted escalation of the conflict, destroy the opposing surface fleets, leaving anti-submarine forces (corvettes, IPCs, while they exist, and aviation, when it is revived) a few enemy submarines in the theater of operations.
Ensure the passage of convoys and landing detachments through communications provided by the Baltic Fleet forces. To ensure that the blockade of Kaliningrad is impossible, no matter who tries to carry it out. If necessary, manage with the help of screens from your submarines, minefields, deployment of fleet forces at a distance favorable for attack, and ensure the prevention of the passage of forces of third countries through the Danish Straits.
Thus, create a favorable operational regime throughout the Baltic, provide the ability to conduct amphibious operations against an enemy who does not want to surrender and continues to resist.
In general, perform ordinary naval work for its intended purpose.
And in peacetime, Baltic Fleet ships already go to Cuba, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, you just need to use their capabilities there correctly and wisely.
And there is certainly no question of treating the Baltic Fleet as in the famous naval joke: “The Baltic Fleet is a former fleet.” The Baltic is our most complex theater of war, and potentially the most problematic, with vulnerabilities like the coastal city of St. Petersburg (does Russia have a vulnerability comparable to this at all?) and downright crazy neighbors.
This means that, in the right version, the Baltic Fleet must continue to prepare for difficult wars both organizationally and technically. After all, traditionally the most difficult naval wars in Russia take place here. The future in this sense is unlikely to be very different from the past.
The current state of the Baltic Fleet
The destructive nineties and zero years for the Russian Armed Forces remained in history, when the fleet was destroyed with one’s own hands, exploits were belittled, and the significance of the contribution of the Baltic Fleet in the formation of Russia as a great maritime power was reduced. Since the mid-2000s, a gradual rise in the country's military power began. The Navy returned to the vastness of the World Ocean and gained its position in protecting the military-strategic and economic interests of the country. Surface and underwater nuclear missile forces are on duty in all corners of the globe, and the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet is constantly working to improve the skills and combat training of the crews. Today's Russian fleet is a formidable force that all maritime powers reckon with, and the United States is forced to recognize equality and respect our sailors. The commanders of the Baltic Fleet, admirals, officers and sailors have made a huge contribution to the victorious development of the Russian Navy from the time of Peter the Great to the present day. For more than 300 years, Baltic sailors have served as an example to all other Russian fleets, therefore the Day of the Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy is celebrated as the most important national holiday.
Outpost on the Baltic
Located in the Kaliningrad region, Baltiysk (formerly Pillau) is considered the westernmost city in Russia. For a long time it remained closed to the public, but recently tourism has been actively developing here. A particularly popular month is July. The parade of ships of the Baltic Fleet in honor of Navy Day attracts many people.
Express salvo: “racing” anti-aircraft regiments passed the exam
Why does Russia need mobile air defense units?
The official countdown of the existence of the base in Baltiysk dates back to March 1, 1956. On this day it was formed by order of the USSR Minister of Defense. Every year its military potential was intensively increased, as a result of which it turned into the largest basing point for the Russian fleet in the region.
“Germany has long used the base in Pillau as a base for its own naval forces,” military expert Dmitry Boltenkov told Izvestia. — Following the results of World War II, it was transferred to the USSR. But the problem of the Soviet fleet was the chronically low funding of its life support systems, which made the service of the ships difficult.
Now the Ministry of Defense is taking a different path: first, it provides a basing system, repairs piers, electricity, supplies compressed air, organizes life activities, and then brings in new ships. In connection with the strengthening of NATO forces in Europe, Russia is also strengthening its assets in the region, the expert concluded.
Before the start of reconstruction, work was carried out on an engineering survey of the berths, which had been in use for 60 years without major repairs. Their emergency condition and unpreparedness for the deployment of warships and vessels, especially modern ones, were discovered. Since 2012, work began on large-scale modernization, which was carried out by Spetsstroy of Russia and the Main Military Construction Directorate No. 4.
Treatment facilities with the possibility of three-stage wastewater treatment have already been built and will begin to operate after the completion of work; a new storm sewer has also been installed.
