Warships accepted into the Russian Navy since 2000

TARK "Peter the Great"

Belongs to the Northern Fleet of the Russian Federation, several years ago it was named the largest attack cruiser on the planet. And there was a reason: its length is more than 250 meters, and its width is almost 30 meters! Main technical indicators: two nuclear reactors (by the way, they can be safely operated for half a century); speed up to 31 knots. A team consisting of a thousand people can safely go on an independent voyage for a period of sixty days. The Peter the Great's armament is impressive: gun mounts with a range of more than twenty kilometers, a variety of missile weapons that can easily destroy targets within a radius of seven hundred kilometers. There are also three helicopters on the Petra. This is why the nuclear giant is such an impressive ship.

Traditions of choosing names for ships of the Russian fleet

Initially, only warships had the right to their own name, since during hostilities it was necessary to know which ships were participating in the battle, who was sunk, and who ultimately emerged victorious. Civil ships began to acquire names only in the middle of the 19th century.

In Russia, the tradition of naming ships was finally established only at the end of the reign of Peter I, although even before him it happened that some ships were given names. The first naval vessel in Russia to receive the name was the ship "Frederik", built in 1636 during the reign of Mikhail Fedorovich and named after the Duke of Holstein. The first Russian warship was called "Eagle". The decree of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich on this occasion said: “The ship, which was made in the village of Dedinovo, should be given the nickname “Eagle.” Put an eagle on the bow and stern and sew eagles on the banners.”

Peter I attached great importance to the names of ships and vessels, understanding their great political importance. This is a reflection of the greatness and power of the Russian state, helping to raise international prestige, as well as maintaining national patriotism and high military spirit, preserving the memory of the military victories of the army and navy.

Already during the construction of the first warships, Peter I legitimized that the approval and choice of names of warships was the exclusive privilege of the head of state. But for some time now, monarchs began to make their decisions on the basis of materials prepared for them. Only in rare cases was the name of the ship approved by the Admiralty Board (since 1827 - the Admiralty Council) on behalf of the head of state.

Peter I also laid down the basic traditions and principles of naming ships of the Russian navy. In most cases, he sought to find harmony in names, each of which had to correspond to the purpose, size, combat and seaworthiness of the ship, and have a certain ideological meaning. Thus, the largest ships and frigates were given names in honor of the places where the Russian troops and navy won the most significant victories, cities and lands, as well as saints, middle-class ships were baptized with the names of saints or some symbolic-allegorical ones, scampavei (small galleys ), galleys and other small vessels bore the names of birds, fish, animals, and also rivers.

Later, the ships began to be called after representatives of the Romanov dynasty, after the names of ancient Russian princes. These names were intended, as a rule, for ships of the highest ranks, mainly battleships and frigates.

The creation of new classes and types of ships in the era of the steam fleet gave rise to new groups of names. Thus, the steam gunboats of the Baltic Fleet received names associated with phenomena in the atmosphere and at sea, with weapons, with fairy-tale characters, with sea fish, birds and insects (“Lightning”, “Thunder”, “Blizzard”, “Sword”, “Shell”, “Rusalka”, “Brownie”, “Ruff”, “Kopchik”, “Kite”, “Mosquito”, “Bumblebee”), and steam frigates and sail-screw corvettes began to be called after Russian heroes and princes (“Ilya Muromets”, “Oleg”, “Peresvet”, “Oslyabya”, “Dmitry Donskoy”, “Alexander Nevsky”).

Since 1902, they began to give adjectives as names to destroyers.

Ships with the names “Fast”, “Terrible”, “Cautious”, “Easy”, “Brave”, “Right”, “Happy”, “Hurry” appeared. Such names were intended to symbolize the courageous spirit of a nation or state, expressed in the fighting qualities of these ships.

One of the main traditions established by Peter I is the continuity of ship names, especially those that earned this right in battles. Passed on from one generation of ships to another, the names formed entire dynasties of “namesakes.” Over the entire existence of the Russian fleet, the following names were repeated more than others: “Standart” and “Gangut” 5 times each, “Ingermanland” – 6, “Don’t touch me” and “Azov” – 7, “Poltava” and “Samson” – 8 , “Vyborg” – 10, “Mercury” – 11, “Narva” – 14, “Moscow” – 18, “Nadezhda” -22.

By 1914, a new system for naming naval ships was developed and documented in Russia, which adopted many traditions that originated in the times of Peter the Great. It was subject to clear rules, based not so much on state decrees as on the traditions of the fleet. The main feature of the system was the unquestioning requirement of harmony in the name and rank of the vessel.

According to this classification, submarines “as a new type of weapon” were supposed to bear “names: fish, animals and birds, the most euphonious and noble.” These names were supposed to symbolize the nature of the combat activity of the boats - secrecy and cunning maneuver, danger and surprise of the attack. This is how the submarines “Sperm Whale”, “Whale”, “Ruff”, “Eel”, “Vepr”, “Cheetah”, “Tiger” and even the mythical “Unicorn” appeared in the Baltic and Black Seas.

During the years of the revolution and civil war, new names came to the fleet. In the 1920-1930s. new and old ships began to be assigned mainly the names of state, party and military leaders of that time, as well as names reflecting revolutionary conquests.

The practice of naming ships after political figures has often failed. Each wave of repression that swept through the highest echelons of power forced the ships to be renamed. Therefore, in order to stop the frequent renaming of ships in the fleet, in mid-1938 the Main Council of the Navy decided not to assign proper names to submarines and destroyers, but to give them only lettered and numeric names.

At the same time, light combat units of the fleet were called adjectives that determined their qualitative characteristics, i.e. The tradition of Tsarist Russia was continued.

In the 1930s specifically for the needs of the border units of the NKVD, four border patrol ships were built, which received the names of precious stones - “Diamond”, “Ruby”, “Pearl” and “Sapphire”. The tradition of naming border ships “after” precious stones was continued after the Great Patriotic War. In the mid-1970s. A series of Project 1124P ships were built specifically for the naval units of the USSR border troops: “Emerald”, “Brilliant”, “Pearl”, “Ruby”, “Amethyst” and “Sapphire”.

During the Great Patriotic War, ships began to be named in honor of the Komsomol organizations that raised funds for their construction. Many of these “Komsomol” ships fought heroically, and after the war they passed on their names to new ones.

In the post-war years, there were several directions in the ship naming system. Firstly, they began to name ships after famous generals and naval commanders, as well as the names of large cities. Secondly, they returned to the names of the ships of the pre-revolutionary fleet. Thirdly, the ships were named in honor of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War.

At the same time, they tried to adhere to the rule of giving a series of ships of the same class names that were related in meaning, but this was not always followed.

Thus, ships of the 1st rank - large anti-submarine ships, cruisers and aircraft carriers - were named after prominent people, after the names of cities or countries.

For example, the names “Moscow”, “Leningrad”, “Kiev”, “Minsk” were borne by anti-submarine and aircraft-carrying cruisers, and nuclear-powered missile cruisers - “Kirov”, “Frunze”, “Kalinin”, “Yuri Andropov” (by Decree of the President of Russia these the cruisers were renamed “Admiral Ushakov”, “Admiral Lazarev”, “Admiral Nakhimov” and “Peter the Great” respectively). Large anti-submarine ships of one of the series are also named after cities: “Nikolaev”, “Ochakov”, “Kerch”, “Azov”, “Petropavlovsk”, “Tashkent”.

Ships of 3-2 ranks, patrol ships and destroyers, have a different tradition; they were called adjectives: “Smart”, “Fast”, “Combat”, “Brave”, etc.

Small and auxiliary class ships also have their own traditions. For example, small rocket ships began to be given names associated with the names of all kinds of weather phenomena (“Typhoon”, “Whirlwind”).

All types of ships were named after people and ships killed in battle.

But there are series where there is no any system, for example, in one of the series, despite the fact that the lead ship was named “Kronstadt”, the remaining ships received the names of naval commanders of the Russian and Soviet fleets, as well as Soviet marshals. In another series, the lead ship is named “Udala”, and the remaining ships of the same type are named after Soviet admirals, a marshal and... the city of Simferopol. There is also a series of missile cruisers with the names “Grozny”, “Admiral Golovko”, “Admiral Fokin” and “Varyag”, another - “Slava”, “Marshal Ustinov”, “Chervona Ukraine”.

In recent years, the long-standing tradition of the Russian Navy to give warships the names of saints of the Russian Orthodox Church has been restored. For example, two large landing ships of the Pacific Fleet were named after the heroes of the Battle of Kulikovo, the holy monks Alexander Peresvet and Andrei Oslyabi. More than 100 years ago, ships with such names already existed in the Russian fleet, thus historical continuity was restored. Previously, these ships had numbered names.

In 2005, the diesel submarine was given the name “St. Nicholas the Wonderworker” in connection with the establishment of patronage ties over it by the St. Nicholas the Wonderworker Charitable Foundation.

A series of submarines named after Russian princes were launched in Severodvinsk - “Dmitry Donskoy”, “Yuri Dolgoruky”, “Alexander Nevsky”, “Vladimir Monomakh”.

Currently, they are starting to build a new nuclear submarine cruiser there, which will bear the name of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker. The submarine "St. Nicholas" will be part of a series of submarines of new strategic weapons.

When naming the new border patrol ship, it was decided to continue the tradition of Soviet times; it received the name “Rubin”.

The Navy continues to maintain the old tradition: when ships grow old and are scrapped, their names are transferred to new ones. At the same time, new traditions are emerging, for example, naming ships after companies. In 2003, the diesel-electric submarine was named Alrosa.

Now new types of ships have appeared, so the traditions of naming ships are being transformed. The new artillery ship was named after the city of Astrakhan. The type of this ship has no analogues in the world, because the ship was designed specifically taking into account the characteristics of the Caspian Sea and the Volga delta.

The first ships of the frigate series bear the names of the creators of the country's ocean-going navy ("Admiral Gorshkov", "Admiral Kasatonov"), although according to the Soviet classification they belong to patrol ships.

The series of newest corvettes are called by adjectives (“Guarding”, “Savvy”, “Boykiy”, “Stoikiy”).

But at the same time, the newest frigate-type patrol ship received the name “Yaroslav the Wise”, although the lead ship of this series is called “Neustrashimy”.

And the Baltic Fleet communications ship was named after Admiral Fedor Golovin.

In Russia, a special department in the Ministry of Defense is responsible for selecting names for warships. A questionnaire is drawn up for the named ship and a “birth certificate” is issued.

The name of the ship is assigned by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

SO "Admiral Kuznetsov"

This giant cruiser with a maximum displacement of 58.6 thousand tons is also in the Russian Northern Fleet. It has twenty airplanes and seventeen helicopters, and these are not the only aircraft - there are about fifty of them in total. The aircraft carrier is well armed, which cannot but amaze: it carries the Dirk, Granit, and Kinzhal missile systems, as well as sixty deep-sea bombs.

Warships accepted into the Russian Navy since 2000

Hello, you made us sad the day before by showing how many warships have been decommissioned from the fleet since 2000. Let's look at the opposite trend. How many large warships have been accepted into the Russian Navy since 2000? Only large ships were taken into account. The photo review did not include landing boats and Grachata. 1. Strategic missile submarine cruiser K-535 “Yuri Dolgoruky”. Commissioning - 2012. Affiliation: Northern Fleet.

2. Nuclear torpedo submarine K-335 “Gepard”. Commissioning - 2001. Affiliation: Northern Fleet.

3. Multi-purpose nuclear torpedo submarine with cruise missiles K-560 “Severodvinsk”. Commissioning - 2013. Affiliation: Northern Fleet.

4. Strategic missile submarine cruiser K-550 “Alexander Nevsky”. Commissioning - 2013. Affiliation: Pacific Fleet.

5. Strategic missile submarine cruiser “Vladimir Monomakh”. Commissioning – 12/10/14. Affiliation: Pacific Fleet.

6. Special purpose nuclear submarine "AS-31". Commissioning - 2010. Affiliation: Northern Fleet.

7. Special purpose diesel submarine B-90 Sarov. Commissioning - 2008. Affiliation: Northern Fleet.

8. Diesel-electric submarine B-585 “St. Petersburg”. Commissioning - 2010. Affiliation: Northern Fleet.

9. Diesel-electric submarine "Novorossiysk". Commissioning - 2014. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

10. Diesel-electric submarine "Rostov-on-Don". Entry into service – 11/25/14. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

11. Patrol ship "Yaroslav the Wise". Commissioning - 2009. Affiliation: Baltic Fleet.

12. Corvette “Guarding”. Commissioning - 2008. Affiliation: Baltic Fleet.

13. Corvette “Savvy”. Commissioning - 2008. Affiliation: Baltic Fleet.

14. Corvette “Boikiy”. Commissioning - 2008. Affiliation: Baltic Fleet.

15. Corvette “Staudy”. Commissioning - 2008. Affiliation: Baltic Fleet.

16. Rocket ship "Tatarstan". Commissioning - 2003. Affiliation: Caspian Flotilla.

17. Rocket ship "Dagestan". Commissioning - 2012. Affiliation: Caspian Flotilla.

18. Small artillery ship “Astrakhan”. Commissioning - 2006. Affiliation: Caspian Flotilla.

19. Small artillery ship "Volgodonsk". Commissioning - 2011. Affiliation: Caspian Flotilla.

20. Small artillery ship "Makhachkala". Commissioning - 2012. Affiliation: Caspian Flotilla.

21. Small artillery ship “Grad Sviyazhsk”. Commissioning - 2014. Affiliation: Caspian Flotilla.

22. Small artillery ship “Uglich”. Commissioning - 2014. Affiliation: Caspian Flotilla.

23. Small artillery ship "Veliky Ustyug". Commissioning - 2014. Affiliation: Caspian Flotilla.

24. Small rocket hovercraft "Samum". Commissioning - 2000. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

25. Missile boat "R-2". Commissioning - 2000. Affiliation: Baltic Fleet.

26. R-32 missile boat. Commissioning - 2000. Affiliation: Baltic Fleet.

27. R-29 missile boat. Commissioning - 2003. Affiliation: Pacific Fleet.

28. Sea minesweeper “Valentin Pikul”. Commissioning - 2001. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

29. Sea minesweeper "Vice Admiral Zakharyin". Commissioning - 2008. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

30. Sea minesweeper “Vladimir Gumanenko”. Commissioning - 2000. Affiliation: Northern Fleet.

Separately, I would like to talk about the updates (trophies) that were captured from Ukraine and are currently officially listed as part of the reserve of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

31. Large landing ship “Konstantin Olshansky”. Captured from the Ukrainian Navy. Commissioning - 2014. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

32. Diesel-electric submarine “Zaporozhye”. Captured from the Ukrainian Navy. Commissioning - 2014. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

33. Small anti-submarine ship "Ternopil". Captured from the Ukrainian Navy. Commissioning - 2014. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

34. Small anti-submarine ship “Khmelnitsky”. Captured from the Ukrainian Navy. Commissioning - 2014. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

35. Small anti-submarine ship "Lutsk". Captured from the Ukrainian Navy. Commissioning - 2014. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

36. Missile boat "Pridneprovye". Captured from the Ukrainian Navy. Commissioning - 2014. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

37. Sea minesweeper "Chernigov". Captured from the Ukrainian Navy. Commissioning - 2014. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

38. Sea minesweeper "Cherkassy". Captured from the Ukrainian Navy. Commissioning - 2014. Affiliation: Black Sea Fleet.

ARK "Admiral Nakhimov"

Some time ago they began to modernize this cruiser, so it is currently out of service, but still we cannot help but talk about it in our TOP. And before this, the nuclear giant was famous for its missile weapons and artillery mounts, and after the completion of the upgrades, the Navy leadership promised to purchase many modern devices and complexes. The improvements were expected to be completed by 2022. We look forward to seeing what the cruiser will amaze the whole world with!

The purpose of this article is to compare the construction of ships of the Russian Navy over two periods:

Period No. 1: From January 1, 2000 to January 1, 2010 (10 years).

Period No. 2: From January 1, 2010 to March 24, 2022 (8 years and less than three months).

1. Submarines:

1.1. During period No. 1, one nuclear-powered submarine “Gepard” of Project 971 was received - 12/03/2001.

1.2. During period No. 2, 11 submarines were received:

- nuclear submarine missile cruiser "Severodvinsk" project 885 (generation 4) - 12/30/2013.

- large submarine (diesel) "St. Petersburg" of project 677 - 04/22/2010.

- large submarines (diesel) of project 636.3 “Veliky Novgorod”, “Stary Oskol”, “Krasnodar”, “Novorossiysk”, “Kolpino”, “Rostov-on-Don” - 6 boats from 08/21/2014 to 11/24. 2016.

- Project 955 strategic missile submarines “Yuri Dolgoruky”, “Alexander Nevsky”, “Vladimir Monomakh” - 3 boats in the period from 12/29/12 to 12/10/2014.

2 Surface ships with a displacement of more than 1000 tons:

2.1. During period No. 1, three ships were received:

— Patrol ship “Yaroslav the Wise” of project 11540 — 06/16/2009

— Corvette “Steregushchy” project 20380 — 11/14/2007

— Project 11661 rocket ship “Tatarstan” — 2003

2.2. During period No. 2, eight ships were received:

— Project 11356 frigates “Admiral Gregorovich”, “Admiral Essen”, “Admiral Maarov” in the period from 03/10/2016 to 12/25/2017 - three ships.

— Project 20380 corvettes “Savvy”, “Boikiy”, “Stoikiy”, “Perfect”, from 10/14/2011 to 07/20/2017

— Medium reconnaissance ship of Project 18280 “Yuri Ivanov” — received in 2014.

— Project 11661 rocket ship “Dagestan” — 2012

3. Surface ships and boats with a displacement of up to 1000 tons:

3.1. During period No. 1, 4 combat units were received

— Landing boats of the “Serna” project were received in the amount of 3 boats.

— Small missile hovercraft project 1239

3.2 In period No. 2, 44 combat units were received:

— Small missile ships of Project 21631 were received in the amount of 5 ships,

— Project 12700 sea minesweeper “Alexandrite” was received in 2016

— Anti-sabotage boats of the Raptor, Mongoose, Grachenok projects in the amount of 32 boats.

— Landing boats of Project 21820 “Dugong” were received in the amount of 4 boats.

— Landing boats of the “Serna” project were received in the amount of 2 boats.

Note: Only new fleet units are shown. Those that have undergone major repairs and modernization are not included. This list is not exhaustive. Data is used only from open sources.

Conclusions:

1. In total, from January 1, 2000 to January 1, 2010, 8 ships (including submarines and boats) were built and delivered to the Russian Navy.

2. In total, from January 1, 2010 to March 24, 2018, 62 ships (including submarines and boats) were built and delivered to the Russian Navy.

3. Thus, the number of warships commissioned after January 1, 2010 is almost 8 times greater than the number of ships (including submarines and boats) commissioned between January 1, 2000 and January 1, 2010.

4. Due to the fact that the number of combat units built has increased almost 8 times, it cannot be called anything other than success. Moreover, you can even use words like

a) “a radical turning point has been achieved in the matter of military shipbuilding.”

b) “space takeoff in the number of new warships.”

c) “huge, amazing, wonderful achievements of our shipbuilding industry”

d) “the coordinated work of shipbuilders and military sailors is amazing.”

e) “the modern combat power of the Russian fleet is growing at a tremendous pace.”

But, since the purpose of this article is a dry analysis of the facts, we will not use these words in the article and here they are used only as an example of what words should be used to discuss these facts.

BOD "Admiral Chabanenko"

Another pride of the Northern Fleet with terrifying weapons: a variety of missile systems, including “Dagger”, “Dirk”, “Vodopad” and “Boa”, a hydroacoustic complex, navigation systems and its own air group consisting of two Ka-27s. This anti-submarine ship is distinguished by maneuverability and high fire performance.

Navy of the Russian Federation

Let's talk in more detail about the Russian fleet. In addition to a clear division into submarine, surface forces, naval aviation and coastal forces, there is a division along territorial lines. Each fleet has its own headquarters, subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Let's look at the list of naval formations, their combat power and tasks. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy - Admiral Evmenov M.A.

Red Banner Northern Fleet

The largest of the five military maritime districts in terms of composition is the Northern. The headquarters is located in Severomorsk, the troops are commanded by Vice Admiral A.A. Moiseev.

"Peter the Great" guarding the northern shores of the country

The history of the northern naval forces began in 1933, although Peter I was building ships in cold conditions at the end of the 17th century. This is the youngest association. The basis of the combat force is torpedo and nuclear submarines, anti-submarine, missile and aircraft carriers with the flagship "Peter the Great", which is a heavy missile cruiser.

By

BOD "Kerch"

The Varyag, second in size and armament after the Moskva GRK, belongs to the Black Sea Fleet. It can reach speeds of up to 33 knots and set off on independent voyages for up to a month. Its armament includes two installations of the Metel anti-submarine complex, the Storm anti-aircraft missile system, respectable super-artillery and torpedo tubes, by the way, there is also a helicopter.

Russian Navy. A sad look into the future. Missile cruisers

In the last part of the series, we examined the prospects for the development (or rather, the complete lack thereof) of destroyers and large anti-submarine ships of the Russian Navy. The topic of today's article is cruisers.

It must be said that in the USSR the closest attention was paid to this class of ships: in the post-war period and until 1991, 45 ships of this class entered service (including artillery ones, of course), and by December 1, 2015, 8 cruisers remained. (We will devote a separate article to the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov”, since, regardless of the peculiarities of the domestic classification, this ship is an aircraft carrier. Today we will limit ourselves to missile cruisers.)

Missile cruisers (RKR) of project 1164. 3 units.

Displacement (standard/full) - 9,300/11,300 tons, speed - 32 knots, armament: 16 Basalt anti-ship missiles, 8 * 8 S-300F Fort air defense systems (64 air defense systems), 2 * 2 Osa air defense missile launchers -MA (48 missiles), 1*2 130-mm AK-130, 6 30-mm AK-630, 2*5 533-mm torpedo tubes, 2 RBU-6000, hangar for Ka-27 helicopter.

All three ships of this type: “Moskva”, “Marshal Ustinov”, “Varyag” are in service with the Russian Navy, the first of them being the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, and the last of the Pacific Fleet.

Heavy nuclear missile cruiser (TARKR) of project 1144.2. 3 units

Displacement (standard/full) - 23,750-24,300/25,860 - 26,190 tons (data in various sources differ greatly, sometimes the total displacement is 28,000 tons), speed - 31 knots, armament - 20 anti-ship missiles "Granit" ", 6*8 SAM "Fort" (48 SAM), "Fort-M" (46 SAM), 16*8 SAM "Dagger" (128 SAM), 6 SAM "Kortik" (144 SAM), 1*2 130 -mm AK-130, 2 * 5 533-mm torpedo tubes with the ability to use PLUR of the Vodopad-NK complex, 2 RBU-12000, 1 RBU-6000, hangar for 3 helicopters.

It was assumed that all three ships of this type, “Peter the Great”, “Admiral Nakhimov” and “Admiral Lazarev”, would be built according to the same design, but in fact they were not identical and had some differences in the range of weapons. The Fort-M air defense system is installed only on the Peter the Great; the remaining ships have two Fort air defense systems, their total ammunition load is 96 missiles, not 94, as on the Peter the Great. Instead, the Osa-M air defense systems (2 per ship) and eight 30-mm AK-630 were installed on the Kinzhal air defense system and the Kortik air defense system on the Admiral Nakhimov and Admiral Lazarev. "Peter the Great" and "Admiral Nakhimov" have 2 RBU-12000 and one RBU-6000, but on the "Admiral Lazarev" - on the contrary, one RBU-12000 and two RBU-6000.

"Peter the Great" is currently serving in the Northern Fleet of the Russian Federation, "Admiral Nakhimov" is undergoing modernization. “Admiral Lazarev has been removed from the fleet.

Heavy nuclear missile cruisers (TARKR) of project 1144.1. 1 unit

Displacement (standard/full) 24,100 /26,190 tons, speed - 31 knots, armament - 20 Granit anti-ship missiles, 12*8 Fort air defense missile systems (96 missiles), 2*2 Osa-M air defense systems ( 48 missiles), 1*2 PU PLUR "Metel", 2*1 100-mm AK-100, 8 30-mm AK-630, 2*5 533-mm torpedo tubes, 1 RBU-12000, 2 RBU-6000, hangar for 3 helicopters.

The first-born of the TARKR class in the domestic fleet, in the USSR it received the name “Kirov”, in the Russian Navy - “Admiral Ushakov”. It was withdrawn from the Russian Navy in 2002, but has not yet been disposed of.

It is unnecessary to remind that all the missile cruisers that we have were inherited by the Russian Federation from the USSR. Only “Peter the Great” was completed in the Russian Federation, but it was launched in 1989 and by the time the collapse of the Union was at a fairly high degree of readiness.

Soviet missile cruisers are unique weapons of their kind, created within the framework of the concepts of combat use of the USSR Navy. Today we will not analyze in detail the history of their creation, because both the RKR project 1164 and the TARKR project 1144 are worthy not even of a separate article, but of a series of articles each, and we will limit ourselves to only the most general milestones.

For some time (after World War II), NATO aircraft carrier groups were considered the main enemy of our fleet, and during this period the concept of the USSR fleet assumed fighting them in our near sea zone, where surface ships would operate together with missile-carrying aircraft. Although it is worth noting that even then we were building quite ocean-going ships, such as artillery cruisers of the Sverdlov type (project 68 bis) - apparently, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin well understood that the ocean fleet is an instrument not only of war, but also peace.

However, after the appearance of nuclear submarines (carriers of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, SSBNs) in the enemy fleets, they became a priority target for our Navy. And here the USSR encountered, let’s not be afraid of this word, insoluble conceptual difficulties.

The fact is that the range of even the very first ballistic missiles of SSBNs was many times greater than the combat radius of carrier-based aircraft; accordingly, enemy SSBNs could operate at a greater distance from our shores. In order to counteract them, one had to go to the ocean and/or remote sea areas. This required fairly large surface ships, with powerful hydroacoustic equipment, and they were created in the USSR (BOD). However, the BOD, of course, could not operate successfully under the conditions of the overwhelming dominance of the United States and NATO in the ocean. In order for the USSR anti-aircraft defense groups to successfully perform their functions, it was necessary to somehow neutralize the American aircraft carrier and ship strike groups. MPA (marine missile-carrying aircraft) could do this off our shores, but its limited radius did not allow it to operate in the ocean.

Accordingly, the USSR needed a means of neutralizing NATO AUG far from its native shores. Initially, this task was assigned to submarines, but very soon it became clear that they would not solve this problem on their own. The most realistic path - creating its own aircraft carrier fleet - for a number of reasons turned out to be unacceptable for the USSR, although domestic sailors really wanted aircraft carriers and ultimately the USSR began building them. However, in the late 60s and early 70s one could only dream of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines could not independently defeat NATO fleets in the ocean, and the country’s leadership set the task of destroying SSBNs.

Then it was decided to shift the focus to the creation of new weapons - long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as a space-based target designation system for them. The carrier of such missiles was to be a new, specialized class of ocean surface attack ship - a missile cruiser.

It was not clear what exactly it should be. Initially, they thought about unifying projects 1134 and 1134B on the basis of the BOD, in order to create anti-aircraft defense ships (that is, BOD), air defense ships (with the placement of Fort air defense systems on them) and attack carriers of anti-ship missiles using one hull. Then they abandoned this in favor of the missile cruiser "Fugas" of Project 1165, which carried both anti-ship missiles and the Fort air defense system, but it was later closed due to too high a cost - the ship was supposed to be nuclear-powered. As a result, they returned to the BOD of Project 1134B, but decided not to make unification in a single hull, but to make a much larger missile cruiser based on it. The idea was to create a flagship ship of the anti-aircraft defense group, equipped with powerful strike and anti-aircraft weapons, and the latter was supposed to provide not object-based, but zonal air defense (i.e., cover the entire group of ships). This is how the Project 1164 missile cruiser appeared.

At the same time, and in parallel with the development of a new missile cruiser, domestic design bureaus were designing a BOD with a nuclear power plant. They started with a displacement of 8,000 tons, but later the sailors’ appetites grew and the result was a ship with a standard displacement of about (or even more than) 24,000 tons, equipped with almost the entire range of weapons existing at that time. Of course, we are talking about the Project 1144 heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser.

The fact that Project 1164 was originally created as a missile cruiser, and Project 1144 as a BOD, to some extent explains how in the USSR at the same time, in parallel, two completely different ships were created to perform the same tasks. Of course, such an approach cannot in any way be called sound, but one cannot help but admit that as a result of this, the Russian Navy received two types of extremely beautiful ships instead of one (may the dear reader forgive me such a lyrical digression).

If we compare the Atlantas (ships of Project 1164) and the Orlans (Project 1144), then, of course, the Atlantas are smaller and cheaper, and therefore more suitable for large-scale construction. But, of course, the Eagles are much more powerful. According to the views of those years, in order to “pierce” the air defense of the AUG and cause unacceptable damage to the aircraft carrier (to completely disable or destroy) it was necessary to have 20 heavy anti-ship missiles in one salvo. “Orlan” had 20 “Granites”, 24 such missiles were installed on the Project 949A “Antey” nuclear submarine missile carriers (so to speak, with a guarantee), but “Atlantas” carried only 16 “Basalts”. The Orlans had two Fort air defense systems, which meant there were two Volna tracking and target illumination radar posts. Each such post could direct 6 missiles at 3 targets, respectively, the Orlan’s ability to repel massive raids was much higher, especially since the Atlant’s radar located in the stern “does not see” the bow sectors - they are covered by the cruiser’s superstructure. The close-range air defense of the Orlan and Atlant was comparable, but on the Peter the Great, instead of the outdated Osa-M air defense systems, the Kinzhal air defense system was installed, and instead of the AK-630 metal cutters, the Dirk air defense system was installed. On Atlantas, due to their smaller size, such modernization is hardly possible.

In addition, the Atlantov PLO was deliberately sacrificed: the fact is that the placement of the most powerful at that time SJSC "Polynom" increased the ship's displacement by about one and a half thousand tons (the SJS itself weighs about 800 tons) and this was considered unacceptable. As a result, Atlant received a very modest “Platinum”, suitable only for self-defense (and even then – not very much). At the same time, the Orlans’ underwater search capabilities are not inferior to those of specialized BODs. The presence of an entire air group of three helicopters, without a doubt, provides the Orlan with much better anti-aircraft defense capabilities, as well as search and tracking of surface targets, than a single Atlanta helicopter. In addition, the presence of a nuclear power plant provides Orlan with much better capabilities for escorting enemy aircraft carrier groups than Atlanta with its conventional power plant. "Atlant", unlike "Orlan", does not have constructive protection.

Interesting aspect. For a long time it was argued that the weak point of our heavy ships was the combat control system, which was unable to combine the use of the entire variety of weapons installed on cruisers. This may be true, but the author of this article came across online descriptions of exercises in which a heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser, having received air target data from an A-50 AWACS aircraft (the target was not observed from the cruiser), issued target designation to the anti-aircraft missile system of a large anti-submarine ship, and it , without observing the air target himself, and using exclusively the control center received from TARKR, he hit it with an anti-aircraft missile. The data, of course, is completely unofficial, but...

Of course, nothing comes for free. The dimensions of the Orlan are amazing: the total displacement of 26,000 - 28,000 tons makes it the largest non-aircraft carrier ship in the world (even the cyclopean SSBN of Project 941 "Akula" is still smaller). Many foreign reference books call Peter the Great a “battlecruiser,” that is, a battlecruiser. Without a doubt, it would be correct to adhere to the Russian classification, but... looking at the swift and menacing silhouette of the "Orlan" and remembering the fusion of speed and firepower that battle cruisers showed the world, you inevitably think: there is something in it.

But such a large and heavily armed ship turned out to be very expensive. According to some reports, the cost of the TARKR in the USSR was 450-500 million rubles, which brought it closer to heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers - the Project 1143.5 TAVKR (hereinafter referred to as “Kuznetsov”) cost 550 million rubles, and the nuclear-powered TAVKR 1143.7 cost 800 million. rub.

By and large, Soviet missile cruisers had two fundamental shortcomings. Firstly, they were not self-sufficient, because their main weapon, anti-ship missiles, could be used at over-the-horizon ranges only by external target designation. For this purpose, the Legend reconnaissance and target designation system was created in the USSR, and it did allow the use of anti-ship missiles at full range, but with significant limitations. Passive radar reconnaissance satellites could not always reveal the location of the enemy, and there were never many satellites with active radar in orbit; they did not provide 100% coverage of sea and ocean surfaces. These satellites were very expensive, they carried a powerful radar that made it possible to monitor NATO warships from an orbit at an altitude of 270 -290 km, a nuclear reactor as an energy source for the radar, and also a special booster stage, which, after the satellite had exhausted its resource , was supposed to launch the spent reactor into an orbit 500-1000 km from the Earth. In principle, even from there, gravity will eventually pull the reactors back, but this should have happened no earlier than in 250 years. Apparently, the USSR believed that by this time spaceships would already be roaming the expanses of the Galaxy and we would somehow deal with the numerous reactors lying around in the atmosphere.

But the important thing is that even the USSR could not provide absolute coverage of the earth’s surface with the active satellites of the Legend system, which meant that it was necessary to wait until the satellite passed over the desired area of ​​the sea or ocean. In addition, satellites in relatively low orbits, and even those that reveal themselves with strong radiation, could be destroyed by anti-satellite missiles. There were other difficulties, and in general the system did not guarantee the destruction of enemy AUGs in the event of the outbreak of a global conflict. However, Soviet missile cruisers remained a formidable weapon, and no American admiral could feel comfortable being within range of the Kirov or Slava missiles.

The second big drawback of domestic RKR and TARKR is their high specialization. By and large, they could destroy enemy ships, lead and control the actions of a detachment of ships, covering them with their powerful air defense systems, but that’s all. Such cruisers did not pose any threat to coastal targets - despite the presence of a 130-mm artillery system, bringing such large and expensive ships to hostile shores for artillery shelling was associated with excessive risk. Theoretically, heavy anti-ship missiles could be used to destroy ground targets, but in practice this made little sense. According to some reports, the Granit anti-ship missile cost about the same, or even more than its contemporary fighter, and few coastal targets were “worthy” of such expensive ammunition.

In other words, the Soviet concept of combating enemy AUGs: the creation of long-range anti-ship missiles and their carriers (RKR, TARKR, submarine missile carriers "Antey"), reconnaissance and target designation systems for these missiles ("Legend") and, at the same time, also the strongest naval land-based missile-carrying aviation was comparable in cost to the construction of a powerful aircraft carrier fleet, but did not provide the same broad capabilities for destroying surface, underwater, air and ground targets as those possessed by aircraft carrier groups.

Today, the capabilities of the missile cruisers of the Russian Navy have decreased significantly. No, they themselves remained the same, and despite the emergence of the latest defensive weapon systems, such as ESSM or SM-6 anti-aircraft missiles, the author of this article would not at all want to be in the place of the American admiral, at whose flagship aircraft carrier Peter the Great fired two dozen "Granites". But the Russian Federation’s ability to provide target designation to heavy anti-ship missiles has greatly decreased: the USSR had the “Legend”, but it self-destructed when the satellites exhausted their resources and no new ones appeared; the “Liana” was never deployed. No matter how much NATO data exchange systems are praised, their analogue also existed in the USSR fleet (mutual information exchange stations or MIS) and a missile cruiser could use the data that another ship or aircraft received. This possibility still exists, but the number of ships and aircraft has decreased significantly compared to the times of the USSR. The only progress is the construction of over-the-horizon radar stations (OGRLS) in the Russian Federation, but whether they can provide target designation for missiles is unclear; as far as the author knows, in the USSR they could not issue control centers for OGRLS. In addition, ZGRLS are stationary large-scale objects, which, probably, in the event of a serious conflict, will not be so difficult to damage or destroy.

Nevertheless, today it is missile cruisers that represent the “fulcrum” of the domestic surface fleets. What are their prospects?

All three Atlantas of Project 1164 currently remain in service - one can only regret that at one time it was not possible to agree with Ukraine on the purchase of the fourth cruiser of this project, which is rotting at a high degree of readiness at the outfitting wall. Today this step is impossible, and would be pointless - the ship is too old to be completed. At the same time, Project 1164 is literally “stuffed” with weapons and equipment, which made it a very formidable ship, but greatly reduced its modernization capabilities. "Moscow", "Marshal Ustinov" and "Varyag" entered the Russian fleet in 1983, 1986 and 1989, respectively, and today they are 35, 32 and 29 years old. The age is serious, but with timely repairs, these RKR are quite capable of serving for up to forty-five years, so that in the next decade none of them will “retire.” Most likely, during this time the ships will not undergo any major upgrades, although the installation of new anti-ship missiles in old launchers and the improvement of the Fort air defense system are excluded - however, all this is guesswork.

But with TARKR the situation is far from so rosy. As we said above, today work is underway on the Admiral Nakhimov, and its modernization is quite global. It is more or less reliably known that the Granit anti-ship missile system on the UVP will be replaced with 80 modern missiles, such as Caliber, Onyx and, in the future, Zircon. As for the air defense system, initially there were many rumors in the press about the installation of the Poliment-Redut system on the TARKR. It is possible that initially such plans existed, but then, apparently, they were abandoned, or perhaps this was initially the speculation of journalists. The fact is that Redut is still nothing more than a medium-range air defense system, and complexes based on the S-300 have a much longer arm. Therefore, the most realistic information seems to be that Admiral Nakhimov will receive a Fort-M, similar to the one installed on Peter the Great. It can also be assumed that the complex will be adapted to use the latest missiles used in the S-400, although this is not a fact. The AK-630 “metal cutters” will be replaced, according to available data, with the “Kinzhal-M” air defense system. In addition, it was planned to install the Package-NK anti-torpedo complex.

About the timing of repairs and modernization. Generally speaking, the Admiral Nakhimov TARKR has been at Sevmash since 1999, and in 2008, spent nuclear fuel was unloaded from it. In fact, the ship was more likely to be laid up than to be repaired. The modernization contract was signed only in 2013, but preparatory repair work began earlier - from the moment it became clear that the contract would be concluded. It was assumed that the cruiser would be delivered to the fleet in 2022, then in 2022, then again the date was given as 2022, then 2020, and now, according to the latest data, it will be 2022. In other words, even if we assume that the deadlines will once again not “go” to the right, and count the start of repairs from the moment the contract is concluded (and not from the actual start date of repairs), it turns out that the repair of Admiral Nakhimov will take 8 years.

A little about the cost. In 2012, the head of the state defense procurement department of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), Anatoly Shlemov, said that the repair and modernization of the cruiser would cost 30 billion rubles, and the acquisition of new weapons systems would cost 20 billion rubles, that is, the total cost of work on the Admiral Nakhimov " will amount to 50 billion rubles. But you need to understand that these were only preliminary figures.

We have long become accustomed to the situation when ship repair times and the cost of their repairs increase significantly from the original ones. Usually shipbuilders are blamed for this, saying that they have forgotten how to work, and their appetites are growing, but such a reproach is not entirely true, and anyone who has worked in production will understand me.

The thing is that a full assessment of the cost of repairs can only be made when the unit being repaired has been disassembled and it is clear what exactly needs repair and what needs replacement. But in advance, without disassembling the unit, determining the cost of its repair is akin to fortune telling on coffee grounds. In this “fortune telling”, the so-called preventative maintenance schedules greatly help, but under one condition - when they are carried out in a timely manner. It’s just that there was a problem with the repair of naval ships back in the USSR, and after 1991 it, one might say, disappeared - due to the lack of any repairs.

And now, when a decision is made to modernize a particular ship, a kind of “pig in a poke” arrives at the shipyard and it is almost impossible to immediately guess what needs repair and what does not. The real scope of repairs is revealed already during its implementation, and, of course, these “discoveries” increase both the repair time and its cost. The author of this article is not trying, of course, to portray shipbuilders as “white and fluffy”; there are plenty of problems there, but the shift in deadlines and costs has not only subjective, but also completely objective reasons.

Therefore, it should be understood that 50 billion rubles, announced by Anatoly Shlemov in 2012, is only a preliminary estimate of the cost of repair and modernization of Admiral Nakhimov, which will increase significantly during the work. But even the indicated 50 billion rubles. in today's prices, if recalculated through official inflation data (and not through real inflation) amount to 77.46 billion rubles, and taking into account the “natural” increase in the cost of repairs - perhaps at least 85 billion rubles, and maybe and even more.

In other words, the repair and modernization of Project 1144 Atlant TARKR is an extremely time-consuming and expensive thing. If we try to express its cost in comparable terms, then the return to service of the Admiral Nakhimov will cost us more than three frigates of the “Admiral” series or, for example, more than the construction of a submarine of the Yasen-M type.

The next “candidate” for modernization is the Peter the Great TARKR. The cruiser, which entered service in 1998 and has not undergone major repairs since then, is time for a major overhaul, and if so, then at the same time it is also worth modernizing it. But Admiral Lazarev, obviously, will not be modernized, and there are several reasons for this. Firstly, as mentioned above, the cost of modernization is extremely high. Secondly, today in the Russian Federation, repairs and modernization of this level of complexity, perhaps, can only be carried out by Sevmash, and in the next 8-10 years it will be occupied by Admiral Nakhimov and Peter the Great. And thirdly, “Admiral Lazarev” entered service in 1984, today it is already 34 years old. Even if you put it in a shipyard right now, and taking into account the fact that it will stay there for at least 7-8 years, then after modernization it is unlikely to last more than 10-12 years. At the same time, "Ash", built with approximately the same money and in the same time frame, will last at least 40 years. Thus, even immediate repair of the Admiral Lazarev is a rather dubious undertaking, and taking on its repair in a few years will not make any sense at all. Unfortunately, all of the above also applies to the lead TARKR “Admiral Ushakov” (“Kirov”).

In general, we can say the following: for some time the situation with missile cruisers in the Russian Federation has stabilized. In recent years, we had three ships of this class ready “for campaign and battle”: “Peter the Great”, “Moskva” and “Varyag” were on the move, “Marshal Ustinov” was undergoing repairs and modernization. Now “Ustinov” has returned to service, but “Moskva” is long overdue for repairs, then “Varyag” will probably be repaired. At the same time, "Peter the Great" will be replaced by "Admiral Nakhimov", so we can expect that in the next 10 years we will have two cruisers of Project 1164 and one of Project 1144 permanently operating. But in the future, the time will come for the "Atlantas" to gradually leave to retire - after a decade, their service life will be 39-45 years, but the Admiral Nakhimov, perhaps, will remain in the fleet until 2035-2040.

Will there be a replacement for them?

This may sound seditious, but it is completely unclear whether we need missile cruisers as a class of warships. It is clear that today the Russian Navy needs ANY warship, because their numbers have long since hit the bottom and in its current state the fleet cannot ensure the fulfillment of even such a key task as covering SSBN deployment areas. In addition, it should be understood that in the future, with the economic policy that the country’s leadership is pursuing today, we do not foresee any rivers of abundance in our budget, and if we ever want to get a capable Navy that is somewhat adequate for its tasks , then they must choose the types of ships taking into account the “cost-effectiveness” criterion.

At the same time, it is extremely doubtful that the class of missile cruisers satisfies this criterion. For ten years now there has been talk about the creation of a promising destroyer, and after the start of the implementation of the State Armed Forces 2011-2020, some details about the future project appeared. From them it became absolutely clear that, in fact, what was being designed was not a destroyer, but a universal missile and artillery surface combat ship, equipped with powerful strike weapons (cruise missiles of various types), zonal air defense, the basis of which was to be the S-400 air defense system, if not S -500, anti-submarine weapons, etc. However, such universalism obviously does not fit into the dimensions of the destroyer (7-8 thousand tons of standard displacement), accordingly, at the very beginning it was said that the displacement of the ship of the new project will be 10-14 thousand tons. In the future, this trend continued - according to the latest data, the displacement of a Leader-class destroyer is 17.5-18.5 thousand tons, despite the fact that its armament (again, according to unverified rumors) will be 60 anti-ship cruises, 128 anti-aircraft and 16 anti-submarine missiles. In other words, this ship, in size and combat power, occupying an intermediate position between the modernized Orlan and Atlant and having a nuclear power plant, is a full-fledged missile cruiser. According to the plans announced in the open press, it was planned to build 10-12 similar ships, but more modest numbers of 6-8 units in the series also “slipped”.

But what is the cost of implementing such a program? We have already seen that the repair and modernization of TARKR, according to preliminary (and clearly underestimated) forecasts, cost 50 billion rubles in 2012. but it is obvious that building a new ship would be much more expensive. It would be completely surprising if the cost of the Leader destroyer in 2014 prices was 90-120 billion rubles, or even more. At the same time, the cost of a promising Russian aircraft carrier in 2014 was estimated at 100-250 billion rubles. In fact, of course, there were many assessments, but the words of Sergei Vlasov, General Director of Nevsky PKB, in this case are the most significant:

“I already said once that an American aircraft carrier in the recent past cost 11 billion dollars, that is, 330 billion rubles. Today it is already worth 14 billion dollars. Our aircraft carrier will, of course, be cheaper - from 100 to 250 billion rubles. If it is equipped with various weapons, the price will increase sharply; if only anti-aircraft systems are supplied, the cost will be less” (RIA Novosti).

At the same time, Sergei Vlasov clarified:

“If the future aircraft carrier has a nuclear power plant, then its displacement will be 80–85 thousand tons, and if it is non-nuclear, then 55–65 thousand tons.”

The author of this article does not at all call for another “holy war” in the comments between opponents and supporters of aircraft carriers, but only asks to take into account the fact that the implementation of the “Leader” program for the serial construction of destroyers (and in fact, heavy nuclear cruisers) is quite cost-effective comparable to the program for creating an aircraft carrier fleet.

Let's summarize. Of the seven missile cruisers that did not go under the gas cutter before December 1, 2015, all seven have been preserved today, but two TARKRs, Admiral Ushakov and Admiral Lazarev, have no chance of returning to the fleet. In total, the Russian Navy still has five missile cruisers, of which three non-nuclear ones (project 1164) will leave service around 2028-2035, and two nuclear ones may well survive even until 2040-2045.

But the problem is that today we have 28 large non-aircraft carrier ships in the ocean zone: 7 cruisers, 19 destroyers and BODs and 2 frigates (counting Project 11540 TFRs as such). Most of them went into operation during the Soviet era, and only a small number of them were laid down in the USSR and completed in the Russian Federation. They are becoming obsolete physically and morally and require replacement, but there is no replacement: until today, not a single large surface ship of the ocean zone has been built in the Russian Federation (from laying down to delivery to the fleet). The only additions that the fleet can with any guarantee count on in the next 6-7 years are four Project 22350 frigates, but you need to understand that these are just frigates, that is, ships inferior in class to a destroyer, not to mention a missile cruiser. Yes, we can say that the armament of frigates of the “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov” type is significantly superior to what, for example, our Project 956 destroyers had. But you need to understand that for its time the “956th” were quite competitive with American destroyers type "Spruance", in response to which they were created. But the frigate "Gorshkov", with all its undoubted advantages, is absolutely no match for the modern version of the "Arleigh Burke" with its 96 UVP cells, LRASM anti-ship missiles and zonal air defense based on the SM-6 missile defense system.

The Leader project destroyers were positioned as a replacement for Project 1164 missile cruisers, Project 956 destroyers and Project 1155 BODs, but where are these “Leaders”? It was speculated that the first ship of the series would be laid down before 2022, but this remained good intentions. As for the new State Program 2018-2025, at first there were rumors that “Leaders” had been completely removed from there, then there was a denial that work on them would be carried out, but funding (and the pace of work) under this program was reduced. Will at least the first “Leader” be laid down before 2025? Mystery. A reasonable alternative to the Leader could be the construction of Project 22350M frigates (essentially the Gorshkov, increased to the size of a Project 21956 destroyer, or Arleigh Burke, if you like). But so far we don’t have a project, or even a technical specification for its development.

There is only one conclusion from all of the above so far. The surface ocean fleet, which the Russian Federation inherited from the USSR, is dying, and, alas, nothing is replacing it. We still have a little time to somehow improve the situation, but it is quickly running out.

To be continued…

TARPC "Dmitry Donskoy"

Every submarine of the Russian Navy deserves to be in our TOP, especially the Dmitry Donskoy - the most gigantic of all, which makes it one of the largest submarines on the planet. For four months, the Donskoy can sail in sea waters, fully supporting a crew of more than 160 people. The battleship has a Bulava missile system with six nuclear warheads.

Destroyer "Admiral Ushakov"

Our list is completed by a destroyer belonging to the Russian Northern Fleet. The giant is armed with deck guns and anti-aircraft artillery, an air group with a helicopter, missile systems, many mines and torpedo missiles.

All the ships of our TOP serve the Navy of the Russian Federation; in the near future, other, modern ships will be launched, equally powerful, and sometimes even more impressive. We look forward to new giants defending Russia.

Pacific Fleet