PTAB-2.5-1.5. on the Kursk Bulge

As you remember, our pilots were helpless in the fight against tanks.
And in the middle of 1942. designer I.A. Larionov proposed bombing German tanks not with 100-kg bombs, but sprinkling them with small cumulative bombs, which were later called PTAB-2.5-1.5. What's the trick here? Weighing 2.5 kg, this bomb penetrated 70 mm of armor. And the roof of the “tiger” is 28 mm, the “panther” is 16 mm. The bomb pierced the armor with an explosion, the hole was small, but hot gases and drops of armor melted from the enormous pressure flew into the armored space of the tank.

The tank caught fire. But a burning tank has a property - after a while, the ammunition in it explodes, and then the tank’s hull stands in one place on the battlefield, and the turret lies in another place.

And our Il-2 attack aircraft, instead of four 100-kg bombs, could take four cassettes with 78 bombs each. The shock wave from their explosion was small, so the Ilas could fly at an altitude of 25 m without fear of being shot down by the explosions of their own bombs, and from such a height they could aim more accurately. When approaching the tank, they opened the cassette, and bombs rained down on the tank, like shot from a gun onto a duck. Some kind of bomb hit the tank, and this was enough to set it on fire.

But even this incompetent and fragmentary information was enough for Stalin to understand the military value of Larionov’s invention. The generals rushed about, and things started to move at a frantic pace: on April 14, 1943, they had already signed an act on testing PTAB-2.5-1.5, and then Stalin gave the task: by May 15, i.e. by the time the roads dry out, make 800 thousand of these bombs! 150 factories of the Soviet Union rushed to fulfill this order and fulfilled it.

Here's what simplified things. Unlike shells of the same weight, this bomb is tens of times cheaper. The projectile is a very precise product made of high-strength steel with a very complex fuse. And PTAB-2.5-1.5 could theoretically be made even from wood. If you remember, Guderian taught that a tactical innovation needed to be used en masse, and only a cheap product could be produced en masse in one month. Of course, Stalin ordered to keep everything secret and not to use this bomb anywhere until the start of the Battle of Kursk.

And then the Battle of Kursk began, our attack aircraft took to the air and began to sprinkle the columns, pre-battle and battle formations of the German tank divisions with bombs from engineer Larionov. In total, during the Battle of Kursk they dropped 500 thousand of these products on German tanks. What is the effect?

But I’m interested in precisely the moment under consideration - to what extent did Stalin’s tactical innovation determine the outcome of the Battle of Kursk?

For example, during the Battle of Kursk on July 10, 1943, Soviet aviation attacked German tanks in front of the front of our 2nd Tank Army in the area of the First Guides. Our tankers captured the battlefield, preventing the Germans from taking out damaged equipment for repair, and the commission inspected it. Dive bombers with bombs weighing 100 and 250 kg destroyed only five German tanks, and PTAB attack aircraft destroyed 39. And a captured German tank lieutenant testified during interrogation: “On July 6 at 5 o’clock in the morning in the Belgorod area, our group of tanks attacked - there were at least a hundred - Russian attack aircraft attacked. The effect of their actions was unprecedented. During the first attack, one group of attack aircraft knocked out and burned 20 tanks. At the same time, another group attacked a motorized rifle battalion resting in vehicles. Small caliber bombs and shells rained down on our heads. 90 cars were burned and 120 people were killed. During the entire war on the Eastern Front, I have never seen such a result from the actions of Russian aviation. There are not enough words to express the full power of this raid.”

And some facts for thought can be gleaned from other sources. So, for example, a publication praising the T-VI Tiger tank reports that the repair service of the 502nd German heavy tank battalion (about 40 Tigers) that fought in the USSR for 1943-1944. repaired and returned to service 102 vehicles, of which only 22 had their armor broken by an armor-piercing projectile, and the rest were repaired due to the consequences of fires, i.e. they were hit by cumulative shells - actually artillery or aerial bombs.

Another source describing the TV Panther tank reports that during the Battle of Kursk, where this tank was first used, the bulk of the Panthers failed due to fires, and not from artillery fire.

That is, if we assume that the German tank forces were the striking force of the Wehrmacht, and the “tigers” and “panthers” were planned to be the striking force of the tank forces, then it turns out that at Kursk the German army was deprived of the striking force by PTAB-2.5-1.5 bombs . Our attack aircraft began bombing “tigers” and “panthers” on July 5, 15 minutes before the start of the German attacks. There are statistics on the Panthers. On the very first day of fighting, from 128 to 160 (according to various sources) of the 240 “Panthers” that the Germans managed to bring to the Kursk Bulge burned down (special automatic fire-fighting equipment did not help). After 5 days, the Germans had only 41 Panthers left in service. Without the “tigers” and “panthers,” the Germans were unable to overcome our defenses and began to retreat, and now, until the end of the war, this was all they did on all fronts. Their individual successful operations could no longer change anything.

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Place of birth It was the third year of a terrible war, both sides were preparing for one of the key battles of the Second World War - the Battle of Kursk. Opponents were preparing and looking for means that could ensure victory and crush the enemy.

To carry out the operation, the Germans concentrated a group of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 assault gun divisions, with a total number, according to Soviet sources, of about 900 thousand people.

The German command had high hopes for this new armored vehicle and with good reason - the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand self-propelled guns, despite the abundance of childhood diseases, were outstanding vehicles. We should not forget about 102 Pz.II, 809 Pz.III and 913 Pz.IV, 455 StuG III and 68 StuH (42-44% of all assault guns available on the Eastern Front) plus self-propelled guns Marder III, Hummel, Nashorn, Wespe, Grille. The Pz.III and Pz.IV tanks were seriously modernized.

For the sake of new arrivals of armored vehicles, the start of the “Citadel” was repeatedly postponed - the qualitative superiority of German tanks and self-propelled guns was the cornerstone on which fateful plans for Germany were built. And there was every reason for this - German designers and industry did everything possible.

The Soviet side was also preparing for battle. Intelligence played the most important role in the upcoming battle, and on April 12, the exact text of Directive No. 6, translated from German, “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht, but not yet signed by A. Hitler, was placed on J.V. Stalin’s desk. , who signed it only three days later. This made it possible to accurately predict the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge.

It was decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, carrying out counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front. But there was one more weapon that made a huge contribution to the victory of the Soviet troops and turned the IL-2 into a real legend of that war.

Asymmetrical response

By the 3rd year of the war, German and Soviet tank crews had become accustomed to the relatively low effectiveness of air bombing strikes.

Destroying German tanks with the help of Ilov at the beginning of the war was quite problematic. Firstly, the effectiveness of 20-mm ShVAK cannons against tank armor was low (23-mm, and then 37-mm aircraft cannons appeared on Ila only in the second half of the Great Patriotic War).

Secondly, to destroy a tank with a bomb, you needed truly diabolical luck. The crew did not have a navigator to provide aiming, and the pilot's bomber sight turned out to be ineffective. The IL-2 could attack either from low altitudes or from a very shallow dive, and the long nose of the aircraft simply blocked the target from the pilot.

And thirdly, the rockets, an analogue of those that the Katyushas fired, were not at all as good as Soviet military leaders were used to talking about. Even with a direct hit, the tank did not always fail, and hitting a separate target with a rocket again required that same diabolical luck.

But in mid-1942, the famous developer of fuses I.A. Larionov proposed the design of a light anti-tank cumulative air bomb. The Air Force command and personally I.V. Stalin showed interest in implementing the proposal. TsKB-22 quickly carried out design work, and testing of the new bomb began at the end of 1942.

Melting at the moment of explosion, the metal served as a ram, increasing the impact on the armor. The cumulative jet burned through the armor (that’s why the first cumulative shells were called armor-burning), hitting the crew, causing an explosion of ammunition, igniting the fuel. The fragments of the bomb body hit manpower and vulnerable equipment. The maximum armor-piercing effect is achieved provided that at the moment of explosion the bomb charge is at a certain distance from the armor, which is called the focal distance. The explosion of the shaped charge at the focal length was ensured by the appropriate dimensions of the nose of the bomb.

Tests of cumulative aerial bombs were carried out from December 1942 to April 21, 1943. Field tests showed that penetration of armor up to 60 mm thick at an impact angle of 30° was reliably ensured. The minimum height that ensured the bomb was aligned before meeting the tank’s armor and its operation was reliable was 70 m. The final version was PTAB-2.5-1.5, i.e. anti-tank aerial bomb of cumulative action weighing 1.5 kg in the dimensions of a 2.5-kg aerial bomb. The State Defense Committee urgently decided to adopt the PTAB-2.5-1.5 and organize its mass production. People's Commissar of Ammunition Vannikov B.L. It was ordered to produce 800 thousand PTAB-2.5-1.5 aerial bombs with an ADA bottom fuse by May 15, 1943. The order was carried out by more than 150 enterprises of various people's commissariats and departments.

It was the tandem PTAB-2.5-1.5 plus IL-2 that was to become a real threat to armored vehicles.

It should be noted that only thanks to I.V. Stalin, PTAB was adopted for service. In this case, Stalin proved himself to be an outstanding military-technical specialist, and not just a “satrap”.

Application on the Kursk Bulge

And so on the morning of July 5, 1943, the German offensive began.

Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin I.V. to achieve the effect of tactical surprise, he categorically prohibited the use of PTAB aerial bombs until special permission was obtained. Their existence was kept strictly secret. But as soon as the tank battles began on the Kursk Bulge, bombs were used in massive quantities. The first to use PTAB were pilots of the 2nd Guards and 299th Attack Air Divisions of the 16th VA on July 5, 1943. At the station. Maloarkhangelsk-Yasnaya Polyana enemy tanks and motorized infantry carried out 10 attacks during the day, subjected to bomb attacks using PTAB.

According to other sources, the new PTAB-2.5-1.5 cumulative bombs were first used by pilots of the 61st Shap 291st Shad in the early morning of July 5th. In the Butovo area "Ilam" station. Lieutenant Dobkevich managed to suddenly attack the enemy column. Descending after leaving the attack, the crews clearly saw many burning tanks and vehicles. While retreating from the target, the group also fought off the advancing Messerschmitts, one of which was shot down in the Suho-Solotino area, and the pilot was captured. The command of the formation decided to build on the emerging success: following the attack aircraft of the 61st Shap, groups of the 241st and 617th regiments struck, preventing the enemy from deploying into battle formation. According to the pilots' reports, they managed to destroy up to 15 enemy tanks.

The massive use of PTAB had the effect of tactical surprise and had a strong moral impact on the crews of enemy armored vehicles (in addition to the equipment itself). In the first days of the battle, the Germans did not use dispersed marching and pre-battle formations, i.e. on movement routes in columns, in concentration areas and in initial positions, for which they were punished - the PTAB flight line was blocked by 2-3 tanks, distant from each other at a distance of 70-75 m and the efficiency was amazing (up to 6-8 tanks from the 1st approach). As a result, losses reached significant proportions even in the absence of massive use of IL-2.

PTAB was used not only with IL-2, but also with the Yak-9B fighter-bomber

In the Oboyan direction on July 7, Il-2 attack aircraft of the 1st Shakh of the 2nd VA, providing support to the 3rd mechanized corps of the 1st TA, in the period from 4.40 to 6.40 in the morning, two groups of 46 and 33 aircraft, supported by 66 fighters, attacked accumulations of tanks in the Syrtsevo-Yakovlevo area, concentrated for an attack in the direction of Krasnaya Dubrava (300-500 tanks) and Bolshie Mayachki (100 tanks). The strikes were successful; the enemy was unable to break through the 2nd line of defense of the 1st TA. Deciphering photographs of the battlefield at 13.15 showed the presence of more than 200 destroyed tanks and self-propelled guns.

Probably the largest target that came under attack by Soviet attack aircraft from the 291st shad was a column of tanks and vehicles (at least 400 units of equipment), which on July 7 was moving along the Tomarovka-Cherkasskoe road. First, eight IL-2 st. Lieutenant Baranov dropped about 1,600 anti-tank bombs from a height of 200 - 300 m in two passes, and then the attack was repeated by another eight Il-2s, led by ml. Lieutenant Golubev. During the retreat, our crews observed up to 20 burning tanks.

Remembering the events of July 7, S.I. Chernyshev, in those days the commander of the 183rd Infantry Division, which was part of the second echelon of the Voronezh Front, slowly moved towards us, firing from cannons. The shells screamed through the air. My soul became alarmed: there were too many tanks. The question involuntarily arose: will we hold the line? But then our planes appeared in the air. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief. In low-level flight, the attack aircraft quickly rushed to attack. Five lead tanks immediately caught fire. The planes continued to approach the target again and again. The entire field in front of us was covered in clouds of black smoke. It was the first time I had the opportunity to observe the remarkable skill of our pilots at such a close distance.”

The command of the Voronezh Front also gave a positive assessment of the use of PTAB. In his evening report to Stalin, General Vatutin bombed concentrations of enemy tanks using new bombs. The effectiveness of the bombing was good: 12 enemy tanks immediately caught fire.”

An equally positive assessment of cumulative bombs is noted in the documents of the 2nd Air Army, which testify: “The flight crew of attack aircraft, accustomed to attacking tanks with previously known bombs, speak with admiration of PTABs, every flight of attack aircraft with PTABs is highly effective, and the enemy lost several damaged and burned tanks.

According to the operational reports of the 2nd VA, during July 7, pilots of the 291st Shad alone dropped 10,272 PTABs on enemy equipment, and a day later - another 9,727 such bombs. They began to use anti-tank bombs and aviators of the 1st Shak, who, unlike their colleagues, carried out attacks in large groups, numbering 40 or more attack aircraft. According to a report from ground troops, a raid on July 7 by 80 “silts” of V.G.’s corps. Ryazanov in the Yakovlevo-Syrtsevo area helped repel the attack of four enemy tank divisions that were trying to develop an attack on Krasnaya Dubrovka and Bolshie Mayachki.

It is necessary, however, to note that within a few days the German tank crews switched exclusively to dispersed marching and combat formations. Naturally, this greatly complicated the control of tank units and subunits, increased the time for their deployment, concentration and redeployment, and complicated combat interaction. The effectiveness of IL-2 strikes using PTAB decreased by approximately 4-4.5 times, remaining on average 2-3 times higher than when using high-explosive and high-explosive fragmentation bombs.

In total, more than 500 thousand anti-tank bombs were used in Russian aviation operations on the Kursk Bulge...

Efficiency of PTAB

The bomb load of the Il-2 attack aircraft included up to 192 PTAB in 4 cassettes for small bombs or up to 220 pieces in bulk in 4 bomb bays. When dropping a PTAB from a height of 200 m at a flight speed of 340-360 km/h, one bomb hit an area on average of 15 sq.m., while, depending on the bomb load, the total stripe was 15x(190-210) sq.m. . This was enough to guarantee the destruction (mostly irrevocably) of any Wehrmacht tank that had the misfortune of ending up in the explosion zone, because the area occupied by one tank is 20-22 sq.m.

Weighing 2.5 kilograms, the PTAB cumulative bomb penetrated 70 mm of armor. For comparison: the thickness of the Tiger roof is 28 mm, the Panther roof is 16 mm. A large number of bombs dropped from each attack aircraft almost simultaneously made it possible to most effectively hit armored targets at fuel refueling sites, at the initial attack lines, at crossings, when moving in convoys, and in general at concentration areas.

According to German data, having been subjected to several massive assault attacks in one day, the 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf” in the Bolshie Mayachki area lost a total of 270 tanks, self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers. The density of the PTAB covering was such that over 2000 direct hits of PTAB-2.5-1.5 were recorded.

According to German statistics, in the Battle of Kursk, approximately 80 percent of T-VI Tiger tanks were hit by cumulative shells - actual artillery or aerial bombs. The same goes for the T-V Panther tank. The bulk of the Panthers failed due to fires, and not from artillery fire. On the very first day of fighting, according to various sources, from 128 to 160 Panthers out of 240 burned down (according to other sources, about 440 units were concentrated). Five days later, the Germans had only 41 Panthers left in service.

German tank Pz.V "Panther", destroyed by attack aircraft 10 km from Butovo. The PTAB hit caused the detonation of the ammunition. Belgorod direction, July 1943

A study of the effectiveness of the PTAB against tanks and self-propelled guns destroyed by our attack aircraft and abandoned by the enemy during his retreat shows that as a result of a direct hit on a tank (self-propelled gun), the latter is destroyed or disabled. A bomb hitting a turret or hull causes the tank to ignite or its ammunition to explode, usually leading to the complete destruction of the tank. At the same time, PTAB-2.5-1.5 destroys light and heavy tanks with equal success.

Anti-tank control system "Marder III" destroyed by attack aircraft

SU "Marder III", a PTAB hit the compartment, the upper part was blown up, the crew was destroyed

But after such a fire, the tank needed repairs to the engine and electrical wiring, but its chassis was intact and the tank could easily be towed to places where damaged equipment was collected, fortunately, in the Battle of Kursk, the Germans created special engineering units for this purpose, moving behind the tank units, assembled and repaired damaged equipment. Therefore, strictly speaking, tanks knocked out by PTABs should have been given to our troops as trophies in exceptional cases, such as the incident in Pervy Ponyry.

Thus, a special commission that examined military equipment in the area north of 1st Ponyri and height 238.1 found that “out of 44 tanks knocked out and destroyed [by Soviet air strikes], only five became victims of bombers (the result of a direct hit by a FAB-100 or FAB-250 ) and the rest are stormtroopers. When examining enemy tanks and assault guns, it was possible to determine that PTABs inflict damage on the tank, after which it cannot be restored. As a result of the fire, all equipment is destroyed, the armor is burned and loses its protective properties, and the explosion of ammunition completes the destruction of the tank ... "

There, on the battlefield in the Ponyri area, a German Ferdinand self-propelled gun was discovered, destroyed by PTAB. The bomb hit the armored cap of the left gas tank, burned through the 20-mm armor, destroyed the gas tank with a blast wave and ignited the gasoline. The fire destroyed all equipment and exploded ammunition.

The high effectiveness of the PTAB against armored vehicles received completely unexpected confirmation. In the offensive zone of the 380th SD of the Bryansk Front in the area of the village of Podmaslovo, our tank company mistakenly came under attack from its Il-2 attack aircraft. As a result, one T-34 tank was completely destroyed from a direct hit by PTAB: it was broken “into several parts.” A special commission working on the spot recorded “around the tank... seven funnels, as well as... locking forks from PTAB-2.5-1.5.

All that remains of the T-34 tank, destroyed as a result of an explosion of ammunition after it was hit by a PTAB. Podmaslovo village area, Bryansk Front, 1943

Well, if we talk about efficiency, then it is necessary to note the low cost and ease of production of the PTAB itself, compared to the complexity and cost of the armored vehicles it destroys. The price of one Pz.Kpfw V "Panther" tank without weapons was 117 thousand Reichsmarks, the PzIII cost 96,163, and the "Tiger" - 250,800 marks. I couldn’t find the exact cost of PTAB-2.5-1.5, but it was tens of times cheaper than shells of the same weight. And we need to remember that Guderian taught that a tactical innovation should be used en masse, and that’s what they did with the PTAB.

Unfortunately, PTAB itself and the use of PTAB had shortcomings that reduced its effectiveness.

Thus, the PTAB fuse turned out to be very sensitive and was triggered when it hit the tops and branches of trees and other light obstacles. At the same time, the armored vehicles underneath them were not affected, which is what the German tank crews actually began to use later, placing their tanks in dense forests or under canopies. Already in August, documents of units and formations began to note cases of the enemy using an ordinary metal mesh stretched over the tank to protect their tanks. When it hit the mesh, the PTAB was detonated, and a cumulative jet was formed at a great distance from the armor, without causing any damage to it.

The shortcomings of clusters of small bombs on Il-2 aircraft were revealed: there were cases of PTABs hanging in the compartments, followed by their falling out during landing and an explosion under the fuselage, leading to serious consequences. In addition, when loading 78 bombs into each cassette, according to the operating instructions, “the ends of the wings facing the tail of the aircraft sag due to the uneven placement of the load on them, ... if the airfield is bad ... individual bombs may fall out.”

The accepted placement of bombs horizontally, with the stabilizer forward, led to the fact that up to 20% of the bombs did not explode. There have been cases of bombs colliding in the air, premature explosions due to deformation of stabilizers, windmills not collapsing, and other design defects. There were also shortcomings of a tactical nature, which also “reduced the effectiveness of aviation when operating against tanks.”

The assigned force of aircraft with PTAB to strike a concentration of tanks identified by reconnaissance was not always sufficient to reliably hit the target. This led to the need for repeated strikes. But by this time the tanks had time to disperse - “hence the large expenditure of funds with minimal efficiency.”

Conclusion This was the debut of the formidable tandem; it is no coincidence that after the first days of fighting, the German command ordered the Luftwaffe to concentrate all its efforts on destroying our attack aircraft, without paying attention to other goals. If we assume that the German tank forces were the main striking force of the Wehrmacht, then it turns out that the contribution of attack aircraft to the victory at the Kursk Bulge can hardly be overestimated.

And around this period of the war, the IL-2 acquired its nickname - “Schwarzer Tod (Black Death).”

But the real “finest hour” for Soviet aviation, including the IL-2, came during Operation Bagration, when aviation operated with almost impunity.

In general, recalling the famous dialogue “Unfortunately, it seems we will teach you how to fight! “And we will wean you off!”, we can state that our grandfathers turned out to be good students and first learned to fight, and then weaned the Germans from fighting, hopefully forever.

Pictured is the German Ministry of Defense.
On the first floor there is carpet on the floor. On the carpet are aerial photographs of Berlin in May 1945 https://www.veche.tver.ru https://krieg.wallst.ru https://ptab1943.narod.ru/ https://www.duel.ru/200642 /?42_5_1 https://810-shap.org/ https://mil-history.livejournal.com/468573.html https://dr-guillotin.livejournal.com/82649.html https://vadimvswar.narod .ru/ALL_OUT/TiVOut0809/FlAPz/FlAPz045.htm https://vn-parabellum.narod.ru/article/kursk_art_critics.htm

MILITARY REVIEW AND POLITICS

Introduction

There are practically no requests for “cumulative bomb” on the Internet and there seems to be no point in writing an article. But the authors, both online and on television, who are still BURNING through tank armor were so fed up that their hands reached for the keyboard. I will not delve into history to find out who was the very first. Many people guessed about the cumulative effect. But before the Second World War, the Germans and Americans were certainly ahead of the rest. They used the first samples of shells in Spain. To understand the principle of operation of a shaped charge, the Germans photographed the moment of the explosion in X-rays, which for that time was a very advanced research technology.

The principle of operation of a shaped charge

The principle of operation of a shaped charge is to direct part of the explosion energy in a certain direction. This is achieved using a special recess created in the explosive. A recess in the form of a cone with an angle of sixty degrees is considered close to ideal. The blast wave at each point is perpendicular to the surface of the charge and, meeting in the center of the recess, continues to move forward along the axis of symmetry of the cone. The result is a cumulative jet consisting of explosive combustion products flying at a speed of eight to twelve KILOMETERS per second. How does it act on an obstacle? The fact is that at high speeds and pressures, solids begin to behave like liquids. Therefore, the cumulative jet simply SPLASHES any obstacle. Naturally, traces of SPLASHING remain on the surface of the barrier, very similar to traces of melting. Our and American scientists came to the “splashing” theory almost simultaneously immediately after the war. But many authors, both on the Internet and on television, still burn through tank armor. Below are photographs that help to understand the process of jet formation, as well as the moments of armor penetration and their results.

Penetration depth of the cumulative jet

The depth of penetration, and accordingly the amount of armor penetrated, of a cumulative jet depends on its LENGTH, SPEED and WEIGHT. The length of the cumulative jet depends mainly on the height of the cone of the cumulative notch. And since this size grows with the caliber of the bomb or projectile, we can say that the thickness of the armor penetrated depends on the caliber of the cumulative bomb or projectile. The speed of the cumulative jet depends on the properties of the explosive. The most important characteristics of an explosive are the detonation speed and its specific gravity. The higher these parameters, the higher the pressure in the detonation front and, accordingly, the speed of the cumulative jet itself.

The third column shows the specific gravity of explosives. The fourth is the detonation speed. The fifth is the pressure at the front of the detonation wave.

By definition, the weight of a gas jet cannot be large. To increase it, add LINING of the cumulative recess. Any (even bread crumb) lining dramatically increases the thickness of the armor being penetrated. But the ideal material for cladding is a fairly plastic substance with a high specific gravity. A close to ideal material is copper.

Iron has lower values. An important factor is the thickness of the cladding. With thin cladding, the jet weight will not be sufficient. If thick, the jet speed will drop. With the correct thickness of the lining, it is not a gas jet that flies to the target, but a metal needle. The photographs show the difference in penetration depth of armor with and without lining.

The cumulative jet is formed in time and space, so the barrier being penetrated must be located outside of this space. The distance at which the jet has already formed and has maximum speed and minimum diameter is called focal. The focal length depends on the shape of the shaped charge and the caliber of the projectile or bomb and is usually a size slightly larger than the diameter of the charge. Modern, properly designed shaped charges penetrate armor up to six of their calibers thick.

Empire cumulative bomb

Although many cheering patriots consider Russia the homeland of elephants, we must admit honestly - before the war we had no idea about the theory of the production of cumulative bombs and shells. I had to copy everything from the Germans. The Germans themselves considered cumulative shells secret and had no intention of using them. But when they met our tanks, they immediately included these shells in the ammunition load of the T-4 tank, and the short seventy-five millimeter gun began to successfully hit the T-34. To be fair, it must be said that before the war we tested cumulative shells. But the focal length was not maintained, the fuse was slow and the results were disastrous. Having received samples of German shells, we began a new round of experiments. Moreover, our first shells were tested with German fuses.

As for our famous cumulative bomb, it was tested for a long time and tediously, but it turned out to be very unsuccessful. Everything was wrong - the shape of the funnel, the focal length, the thickness of the lining. Therefore, a cumulative bomb with a diameter of sixty-six millimeters penetrated only seventy millimeters of armor at an impact angle of ninety degrees. And according to the most conservative calculations, it should have penetrated at least one hundred and eighty millimeters of armor. But at that time, the fact that a tin cumulative bomb penetrated tank armor seemed like a miracle. And the top armor of even heavy tanks did not exceed thirty millimeters, and the cumulative bomb went into large production. Of course, this cumulative bomb increased the capabilities of IL-2 attack aircraft in the fight against German tanks, but its role in the Battle of Kursk is greatly exaggerated.

Modern cumulative bombs

The top armor of tanks has remained thin, so bombarding tank columns with small cumulative bombs is still relevant today. They are actually used not from bomb bays, but mainly from cluster bombs or special containers.

In the photo, a TORNADO plane fires cumulative bombs from a huge hanging container.

The cumulative combat element of the SMERCH multiple launch rocket system is very similar to a bomb. Instead of a stabilizer, it has a tape made of ordinary matter, which stabilizes the combat element and orients it with a cumulative funnel straight down.

Modern cumulative projectiles

The main difficulty in creating a cumulative projectile is that it flies and rotates quickly. High flight speed requires instantaneous operation of the fuse and leaves little time for the formation of a jet. The rotation of the projectile also prevents the correct formation of the jet. Instant fuses are designed as follows. There is a piezo crystal in the head of the projectile and from it there is a wiring to the electric fuse located at the bottom of the projectile or rocket. When hitting a target, the piezo crystal generates electricity (and the higher the speed of the projectile upon impact, the faster it generates it) and transmits it to the electric fuse. Rotation is more difficult. There are two main methods. In the first, the rotation is simply removed. There are also two options here. Install the charge on bearings in the projectile body (French version) or make the projectile non-rotating. A non-rotating projectile can be a feathered one fired from a smoothbore cannon. or fired from a rifled gun but also feathered. In the second case, a huge stabilizer of the projectile opens after the shot and this mill greatly reduces the rotation speed.

Shell for a 100mm tank gun. In the photo, the drop-down stabilizer is green.

Our ammunition is one hundred twenty-five millimeter caliber.

NATO caliber one hundred and twenty millimeters.

Our most advanced.

The second method of combating the influence of projectile rotation on the formation of a cumulative jet is to manufacture a lining of complex shape. What is written in the section about the formation of a cumulative jet is true, but the truth is simplified. In fact, when an explosive detonates, some kind of longitudinal - transverse - standing waves arise that must be fought with all our might. A person with an average-sized brain simply cannot understand this. Therefore, just look at the options for corrugated cladding and quietly melt with admiration.

It must be understood that both the cumulative bomb and the projectile direct only a small part of the energy forward, but in general they behave like an ordinary high-explosive charge. And if they wear a fragmentation shirt, then they get a universal bomb or shell.

You can read more about cumulative projectiles in this article

Protection against cumulative jet

I specifically did not write - protection from bombs and shells, in order to narrow the topic and not write about reactive armor. Our conditions are as follows: the cumulative jet has overcome all external obstacles and is left alone with the obstacle. Knowing that the jet sprays the obstacle, we just need to find a material that does not spray well. As it turned out, ceramics and organic glass are the worst to splash. For the latter, this is due to the size of the molecules - they are very large. These are the simplest options. But there is also cellular armor. Its cells are filled with polyethylene; when the jet passes, cross currents arise that deform and kill the jet.

why are there no kilogram cumulative bombs in Vartander?

I have no idea why

Cluster bombs

In service with the domestic air force in the 1980s. consisted of cluster bombs of 250 and 500 kg caliber. We call cluster bombs RBC - disposable bomb clusters.

RBCs are thin-walled aircraft bombs designed to be equipped with small fragmentation, anti-tank, incendiary bombs or aircraft anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. The cassettes have the dimensions of high-explosive aerial bombs of 100-500 kg caliber and are designated by a code that indicates the abbreviated name of the cassette, its caliber and type of equipment (for example, RBK-250 AO-1). Different types of RBC differ from each other in the way they disperse small bombs

In the head of the cassette there is a glass into which an expelling charge of black powder is placed and a remote fuse is screwed in. When the RBC is dropped, a remote fuse is activated, which is triggered after a set time along the trajectory of the cassette in the air and ignites the expelling charge. By the pressure of the powder gases, the cassette is divided into 2 parts, the bombs are pushed out of it and fall on their own. The explosion points of the bombs, due to their aerodynamic dispersion, are distributed over a certain area, called the covering area. Depending on the angle that the axis of the cassette made with the horizon line when the bombs were pushed out, the covering area is limited to either a circle if the angle is 90°, or an ellipse if it is less than 90°. The dimensions of the covering area depend on the speed of the cassette and the opening height. To increase the coverage area, RBCs may have special devices for releasing bombs with a certain initial speed and time interval.

Cluster bomb RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM

Disposable bomb clusters

1 RBK-250 2-RBK-500 SHOAB 3 RBK-500 JSC 4 KMGU-2

Cluster bomb RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM

Cluster bomb RBK-500 PTAB-1M

Let's consider several types of RBC.

Thus, the RBK-250 AO-1 is equipped with 150 fragmentation elements (bombettes, as the Italians would say). RBC length 2120 mm, diameter 325 mm. RBC weight is 273 kg. Element weight 150 kg. Maximum affected area by RBC – 4800 m 2

RBK-500 SHOAB-0.5 is equipped with 565 SHOAB-05 elements (0.5 kg caliber ball bombs). RBC length 1500 mm, diameter 450 mm. RBC weight 334 kg. The weight of the elements is 282.5 kg. The radius of the zone of destruction of ground targets is 150-200 m.

RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM is equipped with 108 AO-2.5RTM elements. The length of the RBK is 2500 mm, the diameter is 450 mm. RBC weight 504 kg. Element weight 270 kg.

The weight of one element (bomb) AO-2.5RTM is 2.5 kg, length 150 mm, diameter 90 mm.

The RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM cassettes are dropped from aircraft flying at speeds from 500 to 2300 km/h at altitudes from 300 m to 25 km.

RBK-500 PTAB-1M is equipped with 268 PTAB-1M anti-tank elements. RBC weight is 427 kg. Length 1954 mm, diameter 450 mm.

The PTAB-1M cumulative anti-tank element weighs 944 g. Its length is 260 mm and its diameter is 42 mm. The element penetrates 200 mm homogeneous armor (if hit normally)

Cluster bomb RBK-500 ZAB-2 5RSM

Formidable tandem

Place of Birth

Asymmetrical response

By the 3rd year of the war, German and Soviet tank crews had become accustomed to the relatively low effectiveness of air bombing strikes.

It was the tandem PTAB-2.5-1.5 plus IL-2 that was to become a real threat to armored vehicles.

It should be noted that only thanks to I.V. Stalin, PTAB was adopted for service. In this case, Stalin proved himself to be an outstanding military-technical specialist, and not just a “satrap”.

Application on the Kursk Bulge

And so on the morning of July 5, 1943, the German offensive began.

PTAB was used not only with IL-2, but also with the Yak-9B fighter-bomber

In total, more than 500 thousand anti-tank bombs were used in Russian aviation operations on the Kursk Bulge...

Efficiency of PTAB

German tank Pz.V "Panther", destroyed by attack aircraft 10 km from Butovo. The PTAB hit caused the detonation of the ammunition. Belgorod direction, July 1943

Anti-tank control system "Marder III" destroyed by attack aircraft

SU "Marder III", a PTAB hit the compartment, the upper part was blown up, the crew was destroyed

All that remains of the T-34 tank, destroyed as a result of an explosion of ammunition after it was hit by a PTAB. Podmaslovo village area, Bryansk Front, 1943

Unfortunately, PTAB itself and the use of PTAB had shortcomings that reduced its effectiveness.

Conclusion

And around this period of the war, the IL-2 acquired its nickname - “Schwarzer Tod (Black Death).”

But the real “finest hour” for Soviet aviation, including the IL-2, came during Operation Bagration, when aviation operated with almost impunity.

Pictured is the German Ministry of Defense. On the first floor there is carpet on the floor. On the carpet are aerial photographs of Berlin in May 1945

https://www.veche.tver.ru https://krieg.wallst.ru https://ptab1943.narod.ru/ https://www.duel.ru/200642/?42_5_1 https://810- shap.org/ https://mil-history.livejournal.com/468573.html https://dr-guillotin.livejournal.com/82649.html https://vadimvswar.narod.ru/ALL_OUT/TiVOut0809/FlAPz/ FlAPz045.htm https://vn-parabellum.narod.ru/article/kursk_art_critics.htm

Anti-tank bombs (PTAB)

An anti-tank aircraft bomb (PTAB) is used to destroy armored vehicles. Caliber 0.5–10 kg. The damaging effect is created by a cumulative jet formed as a result of the explosion of a charge that has a cumulative notch. This jet is capable of penetrating armor 150–200 mm thick and hitting manpower, units, fuel and ammunition located behind the armor. Fragments of the PTAB hull can hit nearby personnel. PTAB also includes aircraft bombs with destructive elements that form so-called shock nuclei upon explosion. The latter are formed from metal linings of cumulative recesses of a small depression. Having an initial speed of 3–4 km/s, the compact impact core has a good armor-piercing effect at ranges of up to 100 m. The explosive charge of such an aircraft bomb is detonated at the moment when the heated components of the tank enter the field of view of the infrared fuse sensor, which coincides with the axis of the charge. PTAB was first used in 1943 in the Battle of Kursk. The history of the creation of domestic PTAB is as follows. During the Great Patriotic War, the low effectiveness of conventional high-explosive and high-explosive fragmentation bombs in the fight against tanks was revealed. Thus, OFAB-100 penetrated armor 30 mm thick with its fragments only when it exploded at a distance of no more than 5 m from the tank. Only 4 such bombs could be hung on the Il-2 attack aircraft. When flying at high speed, the probability of hitting the tank was low. Therefore, the Air Force command showed interest in implementing the proposal of the famous fuze designer I. A. Larionov, who in mid-1942 proposed the design of a light anti-tank cumulative bomb.

The charge of anti-tank bombs has a cumulative recess covered with a thin metal shell. The main damaging factor of an anti-tank aircraft bomb is the cumulative jet, which is formed due to compression of the lining. The cumulative jet has a diameter of 1-3 mm and a speed of 12-15 km/s. At the point where the jet hits the armor, a pressure of up to 105 MPa arises: the cumulative jet burned through the armor (that’s why the first cumulative projectiles were called armor-burning). The fragments of the body of such an aerial bomb damage manpower and vulnerable equipment.

The maximum armor-piercing effect of an anti-tank bomb is achieved provided that at the moment of explosion the bomb charge is at a certain distance from the armor, which is called the focal distance. The explosion of a shaped charge at the focal length is ensured by the appropriate dimensions of the bomb head.

Tests of cumulative aerial bombs were carried out from December 1942 to April 21, 1943. The aerial bombs reliably penetrated armor up to 70 mm thick and acted [481] so effectively that the State Defense Committee, on the initiative of I.V. Stalin, urgently decided to adopt an anti-tank aerial bomb PTAB-2.5-1.5 and organize its mass production. The People's Commissar of Ammunition B.L. Vannikov was instructed to produce 800 thousand PTAB-2.5-1.5 aerial bombs with an ADA bottom fuse by May 15, 1943. The order was carried out by more than 150 enterprises of various people's commissariats and departments.

From May to August 1943, 1,612 thousand aerial bombs were manufactured. Supreme Commander-in-Chief J.V. Stalin categorically prohibited the use of these aerial bombs until special permission was obtained. The existence of PTAB-2.5-1.5 aerial bombs was kept strictly secret. But as soon as the tank battle on the Kursk Bulge began, bombs were used in massive quantities.

As you know, Soviet military intelligence managed to establish not only the day, but also the hour of the attack of German troops on the Kursk Bulge - July 5, 3 am. At dawn on July 5, on the instructions of Marshal G.K. Zhukov carried out powerful artillery and air counter-training. The surprise that the German command so counted on did not work out, and German troops were able to launch an offensive only at 5:30 am.

On this day, our attack aircraft used the new PTAB-2.5-1.5 anti-tank bombs for the first time. They penetrated the armor of the German Tigers and Panthers. Using them, pilots of the 291st Attack Air Division near Voronezh destroyed 30 enemy tanks in a day. The Il-2 aircraft carried 312 of these bombs - 78 in each of four cassettes.

In the operations of our aviation on the Kursk Bulge, more than 500 thousand anti-tank bombs were used. Subsequently, they were successfully used in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation, in the Mius operation of the Southern Front and many others.

In 1943, 6,044 thousand PTAB-2.5-1.5 aerial bombs were manufactured, in 1944 - 6,792 thousand aerial bombs.

In total, 12,370 thousand PTAB-2.5-1.5 aerial bombs were manufactured during the war.

Options for loading aircraft with anti-tank bombs

Media type	Type of cassette or bomb screen	Number of bombs
		in cassette		by plane
		PTAB-2.5-1.5	PTAB-10-2.5	PTAB-2.5-1.5	PTAB-10-2.5
IL-2	KMB	68	—	272	—
IL-2	Universal bomb bay	72/68*	35	280	140
Po-2	KMB	33	15	132	60
Pe-2	KMB	48	20	96	40
Pe-2	ABK-P-500	86	45	172	90
Tu-2	ABK-P-500	86	45	172	90
IL-4	PBK-P-500	86	45	258	135
IL-4	ABK-3	80	40	160	80
Fighters	BAS-1	22	12	—	—

TTX	PTAB-2.5-1.5	PTAB-10-2.5	PTAB-1M
Bomb weight, kg	2,5	10	0,94
Explosive weight, kg	1,5	2,5
Case diameter, mm	42
Bomb length, mm	260
Speed of meeting an obstacle, m/sec	100-200
Fuse	AD-A	AD-A

Classifiers
Purpose	Basics
Type	Anti-tank bomb
Control	Uncontrollable
Carriers

Modifications
Model	Description
PTAB-2.5-1.5	Anti-tank cumulative aerial bomb, adopted for service in 1943.
PTAB-10-2.5	Anti-tank cumulative aerial bomb, adopted for service in 1944.
PTAB-1M	An anti-tank aircraft bomb in service, designed to destroy armored vehicles: tanks, self-propelled artillery, infantry fighting vehicles. The aircraft bomb is equipped with aviation cluster munitions: RBK-500, KMGU, missile warheads.

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The formidable tandem on the Kursk Bulge (Photo)
Place of birth

It was the third year of the terrible war, both sides were preparing for one of the key battles of the Second World War - the Battle of Kursk. Opponents were preparing and looking for means that could ensure victory and crush the enemy. To carry out the operation, the Germans concentrated a group of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 assault gun divisions, with a total number, according to Soviet sources, of about 900 thousand people.

German troops received a certain amount of new equipment: 134 Pz.Kpfw.VI "Tiger" tanks (14 more - command tanks) 190 Pz.Kpfw.V "Panther" (11 more - evacuation and command tanks) 90 Sd.Kfz assault guns. 184 "Ferdinand". (There is an opinion that these figures are underestimated). The German command had high hopes for this new armored vehicle and not without reason - the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand self-propelled guns, despite the abundance of childhood diseases, were outstanding vehicles. We should not forget about 102 Pz.II, 809 Pz.III and 913 Pz.IV, 455 StuG III and 68 StuH (42-44% of all assault guns available on the Eastern Front) plus self-propelled guns Marder III, Hummel, Nashorn, Wespe, Grille. The Pz.III and Pz.IV tanks were seriously modernized. For the sake of new arrivals of armored vehicles, the start of the “Citadel” was repeatedly postponed - the qualitative superiority of German tanks and self-propelled guns was the cornerstone on which fateful plans for Germany were built. And there was every reason for this - German designers and industry did everything possible. The Soviet side was also preparing for battle. Intelligence played the most important role in the upcoming battle, and on April 12, the exact text of Directive No. 6, translated from German, “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht, but not yet signed by A. Hitler, was placed on J.V. Stalin’s desk. , who signed it only three days later. This made it possible to accurately predict the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge. It was decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, carrying out counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front. But there was one more weapon that made a huge contribution to the victory of the Soviet troops and turned the IL-2 into a real legend of that war.

Asymmetrical response

By the 3rd year of the war, German and Soviet tank crews had become accustomed to the relatively low effectiveness of air bombing strikes. Destroying German tanks with the help of Ilov at the beginning of the war was quite problematic. Firstly, the effectiveness of 20-mm ShVAK cannons against tank armor was low (23-mm, and then 37-mm aircraft cannons appeared on Ila only in the second half of the Great Patriotic War). Secondly, to destroy a tank with a bomb, you needed truly diabolical luck. The crew did not have a navigator to provide aiming, and the pilot's bomber sight turned out to be ineffective. The IL-2 could attack either from low altitudes or from a very shallow dive, and the long nose of the aircraft simply blocked the target from the pilot. And thirdly, the rockets, an analogue of those that the Katyushas fired, were not at all as good as Soviet military leaders were used to talking about. Even with a direct hit, the tank did not always fail, and hitting a separate target with a rocket again required that same diabolical luck. But in mid-1942, the famous developer of fuses I.A. Larionov proposed the design of a light anti-tank cumulative air bomb. The Air Force command and personally I.V. Stalin showed interest in implementing the proposal. TsKB-22 quickly carried out design work, and testing of the new bomb began at the end of 1942.

The action of the anti-tank bomb was as follows: when it hit the armor of the tank, a fuse was triggered, which, through a tetryl detonator block, detonated the main explosive charge. The main charge had a funnel-shaped notch - a cumulative notch - on the vertical underside. At the moment of detonation, due to the presence of a funnel, a cumulative jet with a diameter of 1-3 mm and a speed of 12-15 km/s was formed. At the point of collision of the jet with the armor, a pressure of up to 105 MPa (1000 atm) arose. To enhance the impact, a thin metal cone was inserted into the cumulative funnel. Melting at the moment of explosion, the metal served as a ram, increasing the impact on the armor. The cumulative jet burned through the armor (that’s why the first cumulative shells were called armor-burning), hitting the crew, causing an explosion of ammunition, igniting the fuel. The fragments of the bomb body hit manpower and vulnerable equipment. The maximum armor-piercing effect is achieved provided that at the moment of explosion the bomb charge is at a certain distance from the armor, which is called the focal distance. The explosion of the shaped charge at the focal length was ensured by the appropriate dimensions of the nose of the bomb.

And so on the morning of July 5, 1943, the German offensive began.

The first to use PTAB were pilots of the 2nd Guards and 299th Attack Air Divisions of the 16th VA on July 5, 1943. At the station. Maloarkhangelsk-Yasnaya Polyana enemy tanks and motorized infantry carried out 10 attacks during the day, subjected to bomb attacks using PTAB. According to other sources, the new PTAB-2.5-1.5 cumulative bombs were first used by pilots of the 61st Shap 291st Shad in the early morning of July 5th. In the Butovo area "Ilam" station. Lieutenant Dobkevich managed to suddenly attack the enemy column. Descending after leaving the attack, the crews clearly saw many burning tanks and vehicles. While retreating from the target, the group also fought off the advancing Messerschmitts, one of which was shot down in the Suho-Solotino area, and the pilot was captured. The command of the formation decided to build on the emerging success: following the attack aircraft of the 61st Shap, groups of the 241st and 617th regiments struck, preventing the enemy from deploying into battle formation. According to the pilots' reports, they managed to destroy up to 15 enemy tanks. The massive use of PTAB had the effect of tactical surprise and had a strong moral impact on the crews of enemy armored vehicles (in addition to the equipment itself). In the first days of the battle, the Germans did not use dispersed marching and pre-battle formations, i.e. on movement routes in columns, in concentration areas and in initial positions, for which they were punished - the PTAB flight line was blocked by 2-3 tanks, distant from each other at a distance of 70-75 m and the efficiency was amazing (up to 6-8 tanks from the 1st approach). As a result, losses reached significant proportions even in the absence of massive use of IL-2.

PTAB was used not only with IL-2, but also with the Yak-9B fighter-bomber

Pilots of the 291st shad of Colonel Vitruk A.N. The 2nd VA, using PTAB, destroyed and disabled up to 30 German tanks during July 5th. Attack aircraft of the 3rd and 9th air corps of the 17th VA reported the defeat of up to 90 enemy armored vehicles on the battlefield and in the area of river crossings. Northern Donets. In the Oboyan direction on July 7, Il-2 attack aircraft of the 1st Shakh of the 2nd VA, providing support to the 3rd mechanized corps of the 1st TA, in the period from 4.40 to 6.40 in the morning, two groups of 46 and 33 aircraft, supported by 66 fighters, attacked accumulations of tanks in the Syrtsevo-Yakovlevo area, concentrated for an attack in the direction of Krasnaya Dubrava (300-500 tanks) and Bolshie Mayachki (100 tanks). The strikes were successful; the enemy was unable to break through the 2nd line of defense of the 1st TA. Deciphering photographs of the battlefield at 13.15 showed the presence of more than 200 destroyed tanks and self-propelled guns. Probably the largest target that came under attack by Soviet attack aircraft from the 291st shad was a column of tanks and vehicles (at least 400 units of equipment), which on July 7 was moving along the Tomarovka-Cherkasskoe road. First, eight IL-2 st. Lieutenant Baranov dropped about 1,600 anti-tank bombs from a height of 200 - 300 m in two passes, and then the attack was repeated by another eight Il-2s, led by ml. Lieutenant Golubev. During the retreat, our crews observed up to 20 burning tanks. Remembering the events of July 7, S.I. Chernyshev, in those days the commander of the 183rd Infantry Division, which was part of the second echelon of the Voronezh Front, slowly moved towards us, firing from cannons. The shells screamed through the air. My soul became alarmed: there were too many tanks. The question involuntarily arose: will we hold the line? But then our planes appeared in the air. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief. In low-level flight, the attack aircraft quickly rushed to attack. Five lead tanks immediately caught fire. The planes continued to approach the target again and again. The entire field in front of us was covered in clouds of black smoke. It was the first time I had the opportunity to observe the remarkable skill of our pilots at such a close distance.” The command of the Voronezh Front also gave a positive assessment of the use of PTAB. In his evening report to Stalin, General Vatutin bombed concentrations of enemy tanks using new bombs. The effectiveness of the bombing was good: 12 enemy tanks immediately caught fire.” An equally positive assessment of cumulative bombs is noted in the documents of the 2nd Air Army, which testify: “The flight crew of attack aircraft, accustomed to attacking tanks with previously known bombs, speak with admiration of PTABs, every flight of attack aircraft with PTABs is highly effective, and the enemy lost several damaged and burned tanks. According to the operational reports of the 2nd VA, during July 7, pilots of the 291st Shad alone dropped 10,272 PTABs on enemy equipment, and a day later - another 9,727 such bombs. They began to use anti-tank bombs and aviators of the 1st Shak, who, unlike their colleagues, carried out attacks in large groups, numbering 40 or more attack aircraft. According to a report from ground troops, a raid on July 7 by 80 “silts” of V.G.’s corps. Ryazanov in the Yakovlevo-Syrtsevo area helped repel the attack of four enemy tank divisions that were trying to develop an attack on Krasnaya Dubrovka and Bolshie Mayachki. It is necessary, however, to note that within a few days the German tank crews switched exclusively to dispersed marching and combat formations. Naturally, this greatly complicated the control of tank units and subunits, increased the time for their deployment, concentration and redeployment, and complicated combat interaction. The effectiveness of IL-2 strikes using PTAB decreased by approximately 4-4.5 times, remaining on average 2-3 times higher than when using high-explosive and high-explosive fragmentation bombs. In total, more than 500 thousand anti-tank bombs were used in Russian aviation operations on the Kursk Bulge... The effectiveness of PTAB

Enemy tanks continued to be the main target of the Il-2 throughout the defensive operation. It is not surprising that on July 8, the headquarters of the 2nd Air Army decided to test the effectiveness of the new cumulative bombs. The inspection was carried out by army headquarters officers who monitored the actions of the Il-2 unit from the 617th regiment, led by the regiment commander, Major Lomovtsev. As a result of the first attack, six attack aircraft dropped PTABs onto a concentration of German tanks from a height of 800 -600 m; during the second, a salvo of RSs was fired, followed by a decrease to 200 - 150 m and shelling of the target with machine-gun and cannon fire. In total, our officers noted four powerful explosions and up to 15 burning enemy tanks. The bomb load of the Il-2 attack aircraft included up to 192 PTAB in 4 cassettes for small bombs or up to 220 pieces in bulk in 4 bomb bays. When dropping a PTAB from a height of 200 m at a flight speed of 340-360 km/h, one bomb hit an area on average of 15 sq.m., while, depending on the bomb load, the total stripe was 15x(190-210) sq.m. . This was enough to guarantee the destruction (mostly irrevocably) of any Wehrmacht tank that had the misfortune of ending up in the explosion zone, because the area occupied by one tank is 20-22 sq.m. Weighing 2.5 kilograms, the PTAB cumulative bomb penetrated 70 mm of armor. For comparison: the thickness of the Tiger roof is 28 mm, the Panther roof is 16 mm. A large number of bombs dropped from each attack aircraft almost simultaneously made it possible to most effectively hit armored targets at fuel refueling sites, at the initial attack lines, at crossings, when moving in convoys, and in general at concentration areas. According to German data, having been subjected to several massive assault attacks in one day, the 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf” in the Bolshie Mayachki area lost a total of 270 tanks, self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers. The density of the PTAB covering was such that over 2000 direct hits of PTAB-2.5-1.5 were recorded.

A captured German tank lieutenant testified during interrogation: “On July 6 at 5 o’clock in the morning in the Belgorod area, Russian attack aircraft attacked our group of tanks - there were at least a hundred of them. The effect of their actions was unprecedented. During the first attack, one group of attack aircraft knocked out and burned 20 tanks. At the same time, another group attacked a motorized rifle battalion resting in vehicles. Small caliber bombs and shells rained down on our heads. 90 cars were burned and 120 people were killed. During the entire war on the Eastern Front, I have never seen such a result from the actions of Russian aviation. There are not enough words to express the full power of this raid.” According to German statistics, in the Battle of Kursk, approximately 80 percent of T-VI Tiger tanks were hit by cumulative shells - actual artillery or aerial bombs. The same goes for the T-V Panther tank. The bulk of the Panthers failed due to fires, and not from artillery fire. On the very first day of fighting, according to various sources, from 128 to 160 Panthers out of 240 burned down (according to other sources, about 440 units were concentrated). Five days later, the Germans had only 41 Panthers left in service.

German tank Pz.V "Panther", destroyed by attack aircraft 10 km from Butovo. The PTAB hit caused the detonation of the ammunition. Belgorod direction, July 1943. A study of the effectiveness of PTAB on tanks and self-propelled guns destroyed by our attack aircraft and abandoned by the enemy during his retreat shows that as a result of a direct hit on a tank (self-propelled gun), the latter is destroyed or disabled. A bomb hitting a turret or hull causes the tank to ignite or its ammunition to explode, usually leading to the complete destruction of the tank. At the same time, PTAB-2.5-1.5 destroys light and heavy tanks with equal success.

Anti-tank control system "Marder III" destroyed by attack aircraft

SU "Marder III", a PTAB hit the compartment, the upper part was blown up, the crew was destroyed

True, it is necessary to note one significant nuance: the main problem of destruction by cumulative ammunition was the fire that occurred in the tank after breaking through the armor. But if this fire broke out right on the battlefield, then the surviving crew members had no choice but to jump out of the tank and run away, otherwise our infantry would kill them. But if this fire occurred after an air raid on the march or in the rear, then the surviving tank crews were obliged to put out the fire, if a fire occurred, the mechanic was obliged to close the shutters of the power compartment, and the entire crew, jumping out, slammed the hatches and filled the cracks with fire extinguisher foam, according to through which air could enter the tank. The fire went out. And in the Panthers, in the power compartment there was an automatic fire extinguishing system, which, when the temperature rose above 120°, filled the carburetors and fuel pumps with foam - places from which gasoline could leak. But after such a fire, the tank needed repairs to the engine and electrical wiring, but its chassis was intact and the tank could easily be towed to places where damaged equipment was collected, fortunately, in the Battle of Kursk, the Germans created special engineering units for this purpose, moving behind the tank units, assembled and repaired damaged equipment. Therefore, strictly speaking, tanks knocked out by PTABs should have been given to our troops as trophies in exceptional cases, such as the incident in Pervy Ponyry. Thus, a special commission that examined military equipment in the area north of 1st Ponyri and height 238.1 found that “out of 44 tanks knocked out and destroyed [by Soviet air strikes], only five became victims of bombers (the result of a direct hit by a FAB-100 or FAB-250 ) and the rest are stormtroopers. When examining enemy tanks and assault guns, it was possible to determine that PTABs inflict damage on the tank, after which it cannot be restored. As a result of the fire, all equipment is destroyed, the armor is burned and loses its protective properties, and the explosion of ammunition completes the destruction of the tank...” There, on the battlefield in the Ponyri area, a German Ferdinand self-propelled gun was discovered, destroyed by PTAB. The bomb hit the armored cap of the left gas tank, burned through the 20-mm armor, destroyed the gas tank with a blast wave and ignited the gasoline. The fire destroyed all equipment and exploded ammunition. The high effectiveness of the PTAB against armored vehicles received completely unexpected confirmation. In the offensive zone of the 380th SD of the Bryansk Front in the area of the village of Podmaslovo, our tank company mistakenly came under attack from its Il-2 attack aircraft. As a result, one T-34 tank was completely destroyed from a direct hit by PTAB: it was broken “into several parts.” A special commission working on the spot recorded “around the tank... seven funnels, as well as... locking forks from PTAB-2.5-1.5.

All that remains of the T-34 tank, destroyed as a result of an explosion of ammunition after it was hit by a PTAB. Podmaslovo village area, Bryansk Front, 1943

In general, combat experience in the use of PTAB has shown that tank losses on average up to 15% of the total number subjected to attack were achieved in cases where for every 10-20 tanks a detachment of forces of about 3-5 Il-2 groups (six each) was allocated machines in each group), which operated sequentially one after another or two at a time. Well, if we talk about efficiency, then it is necessary to note the low cost and ease of production of the PTAB itself, compared to the complexity and cost of the armored vehicles it destroys. The price of one Pz.Kpfw V "Panther" tank without weapons was 117 thousand Reichsmarks, the PzIII cost 96,163, and the "Tiger" - 250,800 marks. I couldn’t find the exact cost of PTAB-2.5-1.5, but it was tens of times cheaper than shells of the same weight. And we need to remember that Guderian taught that a tactical innovation should be used en masse, and that’s what they did with the PTAB. Unfortunately, PTAB itself and the use of PTAB had shortcomings that reduced its effectiveness. Thus, the PTAB fuse turned out to be very sensitive and was triggered when it hit the tops and branches of trees and other light obstacles. At the same time, the armored vehicles underneath them were not affected, which is what the German tank crews actually began to use later, placing their tanks in dense forests or under canopies. Already in August, documents of units and formations began to note cases of the enemy using an ordinary metal mesh stretched over the tank to protect their tanks. When it hit the mesh, the PTAB was detonated, and a cumulative jet was formed at a great distance from the armor, without causing any damage to it. The shortcomings of clusters of small bombs on Il-2 aircraft were revealed: there were cases of PTABs hanging in the compartments, followed by their falling out during landing and an explosion under the fuselage, leading to serious consequences. In addition, when loading 78 bombs into each cassette, according to the operating instructions, “the ends of the wings facing the tail of the aircraft sag due to the uneven placement of the load on them, ... if the airfield is bad ... individual bombs may fall out.” The accepted placement of bombs horizontally, with the stabilizer forward, led to the fact that up to 20% of the bombs did not explode. There have been cases of bombs colliding in the air, premature explosions due to deformation of stabilizers, windmills not collapsing, and other design defects. There were also shortcomings of a tactical nature, which also “reduced the effectiveness of aviation when operating against tanks.” The assigned force of aircraft with PTAB to strike a concentration of tanks identified by reconnaissance was not always sufficient to reliably hit the target. This led to the need for repeated strikes. But by this time the tanks had time to disperse - “hence the large expenditure of funds with minimal efficiency.” Conclusion

This was the debut of the formidable tandem; it is no coincidence that after the first days of fighting, the German command ordered the Luftwaffe to concentrate all its efforts on destroying our attack aircraft, without paying attention to other goals. If we assume that the German tank forces were the main striking force of the Wehrmacht, then it turns out that the contribution of attack aircraft to the victory at the Kursk Bulge can hardly be overestimated. And around this period of the war, the IL-2 acquired its nickname - “Schwarzer Tod (Black Death).” But the real “finest hour” for Soviet aviation, including the IL-2, came during Operation Bagration, when aviation operated with almost impunity.

Cluster bombs

In service with the domestic air force in the 1980s. consisted of cluster bombs of 250 and 500 kg caliber. We call cluster bombs RBC - disposable bomb clusters.

Cluster bomb RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM

Disposable bomb clusters

1 RBK-250 2-RBK-500 SHOAB 3 RBK-500 JSC 4 KMGU-2

Cluster bomb RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM

Cluster bomb RBK-500 PTAB-1M

Let's consider several types of RBC.

RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM is equipped with 108 AO-2.5RTM elements. The length of the RBK is 2500 mm, the diameter is 450 mm. RBC weight 504 kg. Element weight 270 kg.

The weight of one element (bomb) AO-2.5RTM is 2.5 kg, length 150 mm, diameter 90 mm.

The RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM cassettes are dropped from aircraft flying at speeds from 500 to 2300 km/h at altitudes from 300 m to 25 km.

RBK-500 PTAB-1M is equipped with 268 PTAB-1M anti-tank elements. RBC weight is 427 kg. Length 1954 mm, diameter 450 mm.

The PTAB-1M cumulative anti-tank element weighs 944 g. Its length is 260 mm and its diameter is 42 mm. The element penetrates 200 mm homogeneous armor (if hit normally)

Cluster bomb RBK-500 ZAB-2 5RSM

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