“Nuclear ghosts” are returning: the Barguzin BZHRK will arrive on schedule
The Pentagon, which does not rule out launching a nuclear strike on Russia, has its own plans, and the Russian Ministry of Defense has its own, and they are based on the principles of nuclear deterrence, which implies the further development of the Strategic Missile Forces. Recently, the characteristics of the Yars-S mobile ground complex, which is a modification of the RS-24 Yars intercontinental system, were demonstrated to the general public for the first time on slides and announced. By the way, these new complexes are already in service with two missile formations, and Chinese experts managed to call the Yars-S “the deadly sword of the Russian troops.”
As noted, the Russian Ministry of Defense recognized the rational decision to recreate a highly effective system, which would be based on missile systems of various bases - silo, ground and railway. You can pay special attention to the latter - combat railway complexes (BZHRK) do not exist in the Russian Strategic Missile Forces. Those that were in service since 1989, the Molodets BZHRK, were disposed of until 2007, and the promising Barguzin BZHRK has not yet appeared. Now there is hope that the “rocket train” will still roll along the rails and arrive at the “station” on schedule. It is likely that the Barguzins will be equipped with Yars-S missiles.
Development of the design of the Barguzin railway mobile missile system (BZHRK) was suspended in 2017. And already in 2018, it became known that the “missile train,” as well as the RS-26 “Rubezh” strategic missile system with an intercontinental ballistic missile, were excluded from the state weapons program until 2027. The reason for exclusion was given as the inability to finance these programs.
Armored train of the XXI century. Return of "Barguzin"
Not so long ago, trains with nuclear missiles were a formidable weapon for the Land of the Soviets and an atomic nightmare for a potential enemy. A special group of 12 American satellites monitored the ghost trains without much success. But after the collapse of the USSR, this unique weapon was hastily and thoroughly destroyed.
In recent years, the rearmament of the army has turned from a dream into a reality. The Ministry of Defense regularly adopts the latest models of military equipment and equipment.
Connoisseurs of Soviet heritage are clearly intrigued by reports from the Russian Ministry of Defense about the resumption of production of Combat Railway Missile Systems (BZHRK) at a new technological level.
The project was named “Barguzin”, and the new BZHRKs will be armed with missiles similar in design to the missiles of the Yars complexes. It was previously reported that the new rocket train would be created before 2018-2020.
Such a BZHRK was already in service with the Soviet Union in the 80s, but in accordance with the START-2 treaty, the 15Zh61 missiles that formed the basis of the Molodets complex were dismantled and destroyed, and the trains themselves were scrapped.
Reporting that BZHRKs have suddenly become relevant again is, at the very least, incorrect. The relevance was there, has not gone away and will continue to be relevant in the future. But now the state leadership has enough political will to return to the railways a unique weapon that they tried, but could not create in the United States.
History of the creation of the BZHRK
The very creation of the BZHRK was a forced measure. Atomic trains were created as a weapon of retaliation; they were supposed to keep a potential enemy from the temptation to press the red button, and if this happened, then strike back.
In the early 70s, our intelligence obtained American plans for the creation of a BZHRK and photographs of it. For the military and political leadership of the country, it was a shock: it was almost impossible to track a train moving around the country, and therefore to point a missile at it.
It turned out that the United States was creating a strategic system against which the USSR had no antidote. But if we cannot intercept, then at least we will create a similar threat, the CPSU Central Committee reasoned and set such a task for designer Vladimir Utkin, who headed the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau in Dnepropetrovsk.
It took Utkin only 3 years to show the military his rocket train project.
But then it turned out that the Americans themselves do not create anything like this. They only planted technical misinformation by photographing a model of a “rocket train” against the backdrop of nature.
The United States initially intended to make a BZHRK, but quickly changed its mind. The country's railway network is not extensive enough, which hampered the movement of the missile train, and a significant part of it is privately owned, which made the passage of such a train commercially unprofitable.
The Americans had an idea to make this train underground. To lay a ring highway underground and drive trains along it: no one needs to pay, and it would be impossible to find this road from a satellite.
The only thing that prevented the practical implementation of this project was the fact that in order to launch ballistic missiles from the underground, hatches had to be made in certain places. And they, as it is easy to assume, had clear coordinates, which makes the existence of an underground missile carrier meaningless. If Russian missiles do not hit the train itself, then it will definitely not be difficult for them to tightly plug the missile vents.
The United States abandoned the construction of the BZHRK due to the high cost and technical complexity of the project, taking nuclear submarines as the basis for its strategic nuclear forces. The USSR could no longer respond symmetrically.
The West managed to cover the entire world's oceans with a network of acoustic stations and tracked the movements of our missile-carrying submarines. Of course, Soviet submariners resorted to various tricks, and sometimes our nuclear submarines with nuclear missiles unexpectedly appeared where they were not expected. But this did not solve the problem of global secrecy.
Therefore, silo launchers remained the basis of our Strategic Missile Forces. Then mobile ground systems appeared - “Pioneers” and “Topols”. But due to their size and characteristic outlines, they could still be called secretive.
The idea that it would be a good idea to install an intercontinental missile on a railway platform arose immediately after the advent of long-range solid-fuel missiles.
The first liquid-fueled ICBMs were very difficult to operate, required lengthy maintenance before launch and were fueled with highly toxic fuel. Everything changed when solid-fuel rockets came into service.
The long shelf life of such missiles made it possible to equip submarines and mobile ground systems with them and load them into mines. Naturally, the temptation arose to create trains armed with missiles.
The Americans weren't particularly worried about this. They considered that missile systems tied to a railway track would be very easy to track from space. And they miscalculated.
Externally, especially from above, BZHRKs were practically no different from refrigerator cars.
True, the strategic trains were pulled by two or three diesel locomotives. So many trains are pulled by two locomotives. And the enormous length and ramifications of the USSR railway network allowed trains to get lost in such a way that even the most advanced satellite reconnaissance could not detect them. The railway workers called the BZHRK “train number zero”.
It was possible to launch rockets from absolutely any point of the railway network or from three at once, and by one train!
For this purpose, the train consisted of three diesel locomotives, which, if necessary, could transport three launch cars to three different points. After launch, the train could be quickly hidden in one of the tunnels.
From the moment the launch command is received until the rocket takes off, about three minutes pass. Everything is done automatically, and the personnel do not even need to leave the cars.
Control came from the command module, which had increased resistance to electromagnetic pulses. Also, special communication antennas were created specifically for the control car, which ensured stable reception of signals through the radio-transparent roofs of the cars.
The advantages of the Combat Railway Missile Complex (BZHRK) are obvious.
A train can travel significant distances, avoiding impacts on previously known coordinates. In a day, a BZHRK train could cover a distance of over 1000 km.
Outwardly, even an experienced railway worker could not distinguish these cars from ordinary ones from 50 meters, and none of the civilians managed to get closer.
The rocket train passed through busy cities only at night; at the station it was met only by a few KGB officers, who also did not know where the train was heading.
Detecting such a train from a satellite is an almost impossible task.
Therefore, such trains were called “ghosts” and the BZHRK became an adequate response to the US deployment of Pershing nuclear missiles in Germany.
Each train carried three special versions of the RT-23 missile, designated 15Zh61 or RT-23 UTTH “Molodets”. The dimensions of the rocket were amazing: diameter 2.4 meters, height 22.6 meters, and weight more than 100 tons. The firing range was 10,100 km, and in addition to 10 individually targetable nuclear warheads, each missile carried a complex to overcome enemy missile defenses.
The total power of one salvo was 900 times higher than that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Not surprisingly, the missile train became the number one threat to NATO, where it received the designation SS-24 Scalpel.
Although the scalpel is a precise surgical instrument, and the deviation of the “Molodets” from the target was about half a kilometer, with its power this was not so important.
Even falling 500 meters from the target, the “scalpel” warhead was capable of destroying such a protected target as a silo launcher; the rest are not worth talking about.
But the BZHRK, whatever one may say, also has weaknesses.
The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has a very significant mass. The weight of the rocket-equipped carriage of the Soviet BZHRK “Molodets” reached 150 tons. This imposed additional requirements on the quality of railway tracks and led to their premature wear.
Therefore, in order to distribute the weight evenly, a special three-car coupler was created. This also helped to protect the rails from destruction during rocket launch, when the load increased sharply.
The second problem was the rocket launch itself - it was impossible to launch directly from the carriage, so a simple but effective solution was used.
The rocket was launched at 20-30 m along the mortar, then, while in the air, the rocket was deflected using a powder accelerator, and only then the main engine was turned on.
The need for such complex maneuvers, which the military called a “dance,” was dictated not only by concern for the carrier car, but also the railway track: without such a launch, the rocket would easily sweep away all the rubble for a good hundred meters around.
The third problem was the need to fit the rocket into the refrigerator car. It was also solved simply by making the fairing of variable geometry. At the moment the rocket exited the transport and launch container, pressurization occurred: the metal corrugated fairing took a certain shape under the action of a powder charge (it is also called a “powder pressure accumulator”).
In addition, old inertial navigation systems required predetermined launch coordinates, so along the route of the train it was necessary to organize special points for launching missiles, the coordinates of which, naturally, could fall into the hands of a potential enemy.
Theory, tactics and practice of using BZHRK
In theory, during the threatened period, Soviet missile trains should have dispersed throughout the country, merging with ordinary freight and passenger trains. It is impossible to distinguish one from another from space.
This means that the BZHRK could painlessly escape from the “disarming strike” of American ballistic missiles and deliver its missile salvo from any point along the route.
But this is in theory. Since entering combat duty in 1985, BZHRKs have left the territory of their bases only 18 times. We covered only 400 thousand kilometers.
Veterans of the Strategic Missile Forces recall that the main “enemies” of the BZHRK were not the Americans, who insisted on their disposal under the START-2 treaty, but their own railway authorities.
The BZHRK with the inscription on the sides “For the transportation of light cargo,” after the first passage along the railway tracks, forced the railway management, which could not withstand the vandalism of the military, to immediately file a petition: “They say, war is war, but who will pay for the repair of the road”?
There were no people willing to pay, and they did not send trains with missiles around the country, but training for officer-drivers of missile carriers began to be carried out on civilian trains traveling along the intended routes of the BZHRK.
This turned out to be not only more humane in relation to railway workers, but also much cheaper and safer. The military personnel received the necessary skills to control the train and visualize the route. Which is exactly what was required, because missiles from BZHRK can be launched from any point along the route.
The inability to use the entire territory of the country for combat patrols was also not the only problem in the operation of the BZHRK.
With the declared possibility of launching missiles from any point on the route, the missile train still needed an accurate topographic reference. To do this, along the entire combat patrol route, the military built special “settlers”, where at X-hour a train arrived, tied to a point and could fire a volley of missiles.
It must be understood that these were far from “stormy stops”, but well-guarded “strategic objects” with an infrastructure that treacherously betrayed their purpose.
In addition, by the time START-2 was signed, the USSR had ceased to exist. The Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, where the missiles were created, ended up in Ukraine, like Pavlogradsky.
“It is impossible to extend the service life of any type of weapon indefinitely,” Viktor Yesin, former chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, expressed his opinion to the ZVEZDA TV channel. “This also applies to the BZHRK, especially considering that this unique complex was created in Ukraine.”
However, the main reasons for abandoning the complex turned out to be the unresolved problem of deployment and the possibility of firing missiles from any point on the route, which in total made the BZHRK not as invulnerable as desired. Which means it’s not such an effective weapon.
Destroy by any means!
Since the advent of the BZHRD, the Americans and their allies have been trying to find a way to ensure their destruction.
If with a silo installation everything is simple: the missile launch is detected from a satellite, then a stationary target is easily destroyed, then with nuclear trains everything is complicated.
Such a composition, if guided by electromagnetic radiation, moves along a certain radius, covering an area of the order of 1-1.5 thousand km. To guarantee the destruction of the train, you need to cover this entire area with nuclear missiles, which is physically very difficult.
An experiment carried out by Soviet designers, code-named “Shift,” showed the excellent resistance of the BZHRK to the effects of an air shock wave.
For this purpose, several railway trains with TM-57 anti-tank mines (100,000 pieces) were blown up. After the explosion, a crater with a diameter of 80 and a depth of 10 m was formed.
A nuclear train located at some distance was covered by a shock wave; in the habitable compartments, the level of acoustic pressure reached the pain threshold of 150 dB. However, the locomotive was not seriously damaged, and after certain measures were taken to put it on alert, a missile launch was successfully simulated.
The Molodets missile trains with three RT-23 UTTH intercontinental ballistic missiles were put into service in 1987. Each carried 10 warheads. By 1991, 3 missile divisions were deployed, each with 4 trains. They were stationed in the Kostroma region, Krasnoyarsk and Perm territories.
Of course, the Americans did not sit idly by. Here is a documented fact of one of the secret operations to identify Soviet missile trains. To do this, under the guise of commercial cargo, containers were sent from Vladivostok to one of the Scandinavian countries, one of which was stuffed with reconnaissance equipment. But nothing came of it - Soviet counterintelligence opened the container immediately after the train left Vladivostok.
However, after the collapse of the USSR, the situation changed radically and the Americans were able to put an end to the Soviet threat.
Boris Yeltsin, who came to power, on instructions from Washington, banned Scalpels from going on duty, and also pledged to saw all 12 missile trains into metal.
This is how the “Scalpels” were destroyed under the supervision of the Americans.
In addition, on Yeltsin’s instructions, all work on the creation of such systems was prohibited.
To cut up “rocket trains”, a special “cutting” line was installed at the Bryansk repair plant of the Strategic Missile Forces. Under vigilant American supervision, all trains and launchers were disposed of, except for two that were demilitarized and installed as exhibits in the Museum of Railway Equipment at the Warsaw Station in St. Petersburg and in the AvtoVAZ Technical Museum.
By the way, at the same time, most of the launch silos for the most powerful R-36M missiles at that time, which NATO received the designation SS-18 Mod.1,2,3 Satan, were eliminated (filled with concrete).
Naturally, the destruction of complexes that had no analogues in the world did not cause delight either among the military or among experts.
But every cloud has a silver lining! Overseas, initially they didn’t even imagine that they were in a big hurry...
After all, the “Molodets” missiles were designed and produced in Ukraine, in Dnepropetrovsk, for the most part, which is now slowly but surely being destroyed by the Ukrainian authorities.
And if, under US pressure, Russia had not eliminated its BZHRKs, they would have been a heavy burden on us, because Maintenance and service life extension would become impossible under current conditions.
What is the current situation?
Over the past years, the situation with the BZHRK has changed noticeably. Today, against the backdrop of worsening Russian-American relations, Moscow is ready to once again pull out its “trump card”, which can seriously complicate the life of Washington - to revive the program for creating combat railway missile systems (BZHRK).
In response to the United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia withdrew from New START in 2002. Now restrictions on multiple warheads no longer apply and there are no formal bans on the use of BZHRK.
The element base has been seriously improved. Modern navigation systems have come a long way and no longer require prior entry of launch coordinates.
In fact, all that will remain from the old “Molodets” is the Emergency Catenary Wire Removal System and the mortar launch of the rocket, which allows minimizing damage to the train and tracks when starting the main engine.
Each Barguzin missile train will be armed with 6 RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles. This is a land version of the naval "Bulava". Although these missiles carry only 4 warheads, versus a dozen on the 15Zh61, they are distinguished by significantly greater accuracy and, most importantly, half the weight.
When its creation began, no one could have imagined that a single missile system was being developed for the Navy and Strategic Missile Forces. "Bulava" is for the fleet, and "Yarsy" can be based on wheeled chassis and railway platforms.
We must thank the former chief of armaments of the Armed Forces, Colonel General Anatoly Sitnov. It was he who insisted that not just a new missile for submarines be created, but a multi-purpose unified complex capable of operating both at sea and on land.
When the Americans finally found out about this, it was already too late - they failed to close the project. But still, probably, the designers were constantly hampered by certain external forces, since work on the Bulava was going very hard. Today it is no secret.
Nevertheless, the team of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering under the leadership of the then general designer and general director Yuri Solomonov managed the almost impossible. Apparently, it was no coincidence that in the spring Yuri Semenovich was awarded the title of Hero of Labor.
What will the new Russian BZHRK be like?
In some ways it is very similar to a strategic nuclear submarine. Only more comfortable. All train cars are sealed and very durable - even the explosion of a nuclear warhead a few hundred meters from the train should not disable the complex.
Autonomy – a month. During this time, the crew may not leave the train - there will be enough water and food. The Barguzin will be able to travel up to 1000 km per day. Or he might stop on an “abandoned” branch in a deep forest or hide in an unused tunnel.
By the way, the tactics of combat use of the new BZHRKs will most likely be different from the one that “Molodtsy” adhered to.
The missiles are brought into firing position within a few minutes. The firing range is 10 thousand km, the hit accuracy is within a radius of 100 meters from the target. The warheads are maneuverable and capable of overcoming any of the existing missile defense systems.
It is almost impossible for technical reconnaissance equipment to determine the location of a missile train during its combat duty. The most modern means of camouflage, powerful electronic warfare systems and the latest methods of protection against terrorists have been developed for the BZHRK.
The new BZHRK promises to be even more invisible than the previous one. Instead of three old diesel locomotives, the train will be pulled by one modern one. Thus, it will become even more difficult to distinguish combat personnel from ordinary commodity ones.
Also, due to the lighter weight of the rockets, the requirements for the tracks are changing.
The Yars rocket weighs only about 50 tons, which is almost the same as the weight of an ordinary freight car. This reduces track wear and allows a significant part of the railway network to be used for travel.
In addition, there is no need for various tricks characteristic of the Soviet complex, such as unloading devices that redistribute part of the weight to neighboring cars.
But the number of missiles in one train will increase from three to six. Given the smaller number of warheads on each missile, the total charge is smaller. But thanks to the increased accuracy of the hit, the modern complex promises to be more effective.
Conclusion
Roll tests of the missile for the new Russian combat railway missile system (BZHRK) “Barguzin” will take place this year.
And perhaps, at the beginning of the fourth quarter, based on the results of the launch at the beginning of 2022, a decision will be made to launch full-scale work on the BZHRK project, General Designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering Yuri Solomonov told reporters.
“As for the BZHRK, as reported, so-called throw tests are planned this year. They are carried out with the aim of verifying the correctness of the adopted design decisions from the point of view of the impact of the rocket on the units of ground-based launch equipment. This launch is guaranteed to be carried out - it will probably be the beginning of the fourth quarter of this year. And the state of affairs today is such that it inspires absolute optimism that this will be done,” Solomonov said.
The new Russian BZHRK "Barguzin" will be exclusively of domestic production. This complex will be a cheaper and faster response to the American deployment of a missile defense system in Europe, in contrast to hypersonic missiles and fighters, work on which will only enter the experimental stage by 2022.
The question arises, why not create an extra regiment of Yars ground systems instead of the rather expensive BZHRKs? After all, the Russian economy is not in the best condition, so why overload it?
It would seem yes, but the most complex and expensive device in a BZHRK is the missiles, and they will have to be produced regardless of the chosen type of deployment.
In addition, although the unpaved complex is mobile, its range of movement is tens of kilometers from the place of permanent deployment, and the BZHRK can cover up to 1000 km per day, which, with an autonomy of 28 days, allows it to reliably get lost in the vastness of our country.
And the most important thing is the policy of import substitution.
If missile production has long moved from Ukraine to Russia, then even from the name of the wheeled tractors for the Yars: MZKT-79221, it is clear that they are produced at the Minsk Wheeled Tractor Plant.
There are no quality claims against Belarus, but Russia’s internal policy is aimed at complete import substitution in the military sphere. And from this point of view, the BZHRK looks preferable.
Of course, when reviving the BZHRK, all the latest developments in the field of combat missiles will be taken into account. The “Barguzin” complex will significantly exceed its predecessor in accuracy, missile flight range and other characteristics, which will allow this complex to be in the combat composition of the Strategic Missile Forces for many years, at least until 2040,” says Strategic Missile Forces commander S. N. Karakaev.
Thus, a grouping will be recreated in the Strategic Missile Forces based on missile systems of three types - silo, mobile ground and railway, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces summarized.
Well, God forbid!
Boris Skupov
Does BZHRK exist now?
After the signing of the START-2 international treaty in January 1993, Russia lost its railway combat missile systems. Now most of them have been destroyed, and the rest have turned into exhibits standing on the sidings of railway depots. Therefore, in fact, until 2006, our state was left without a strike force to deliver a retaliatory strike with colossal mobile capabilities. But in 2002, Russia refused to ratify the START II treaty, which meant the possibility of restoring ballistic missile capabilities.
As mentioned above, none of the world powers currently has a single BZHRK worker in combat service. The only country taking steps to create a BZHRK is Russia, and several stages have already passed in the process of creating the complex.
The elusive “Barguzin”: a big surprise for the USA
In the next five years, Russia will have a new “weapon of retaliation” - the Barguzin combat railway missile systems. Appearing out of “nowhere”, these missile trains will be capable of delivering a crushing retaliatory strike on the territory of any enemy.
Last week, the first International Military-Technical Forum “Army-2015” took place in Kubinka (Moscow region). The event turned out to be colorful, useful and rich in food for thought. Russian President Vladimir Putin, opening the forum, in particular, mentioned that our country will continue to actively develop and improve its strategic nuclear weapons. “This year, the nuclear forces will be replenished with more than 40 new intercontinental ballistic missiles, which will be capable of penetrating any, even the most technically advanced, missile defense systems,” the Russian head of state emphasized.
This statement, of course, caused a storm of emotions among Western politicians. “This bellicose rhetoric from Russia is unjustified, dangerous and has a destabilizing role,” said NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. “No one should hear such statements from the leader of a strong country and worry about the possible consequences,” US Secretary of State John Kerry also spoke about this.
And our most likely enemy really has something to “worry” about. In recent years, Russia has not only been intensively restoring its nuclear missile shield, but is also regaining those types of strategic defensive weapons that the United States, with all its technological and financial power, was unable to create, no matter how hard it tried.
We are talking, first of all, about combat railway missile systems (BZHRK), which were created in the Soviet Union by the Utkin brothers - general designer of the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Vladimir Fedorovich Utkin (Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine) and general designer of the Special Engineering Design Bureau (St. Petersburg, Russia) by RAS academician Alexei Fedorovich Utkin in the mid-80s of the last century. Under the leadership of his older brother, the RT-23 intercontinental ballistic missile and its railway version, the RT-23UTTH (15ZH61, “Scalpel” according to NATO classification), were created; under the leadership of his younger brother, the “cosmodrome on wheels” itself, capable of carrying three “Scalpels” "and launch them from any point in the Soviet Union with which there is a railway connection.
Mobile combat railway missile system (BZHRK) with intercontinental combat missiles RT-23 UTTH
This weapon turned out to be absolutely lethal. BZHRK "Molodets" in appearance were practically no different from ordinary freight trains. Therefore, calculating their location visually or by means of space surveillance among the thousands of trains scurrying daily across the vast expanses of the country was an impossible task for the American military. And take measures to intercept it too. Because from the moment of receiving the order to carry out the combat mission until the launch of the first rocket, it took “Molodets” less than three minutes. Having received the order, the train stopped at any point on its route, a special device was used to move the contact suspension to the side, the roof of one of the refrigerator cars was opened, and from there a ballistic missile launched into the sky like a mortar, carrying 10 nuclear warheads at a distance of 10 thousand km..... Appearing, almost , out of “nowhere,” 12 Soviet BZHRKs carrying 36 intercontinental ballistic missiles in response to a nuclear strike could literally wipe off the face of the earth any European country that is a member of NATO, or several large US states.
American engineers and the military were unable to create anything like this, although they tried. Therefore, Western politicians got involved, and, at the insistence of the United States and Great Britain, from 1992 to 2003, all Soviet BZHRKs were removed from combat duty and destroyed. The appearance of two of them can now be seen only in the Museum of Railway Equipment at the Warsaw Station in St. Petersburg and in the AvtoVAZ Technical Museum.
However, over the past 20 years, the problem of an effective “retaliatory strike” from Russia in the event of aggression has not only not decreased, but has only worsened. The new strategy of a “global non-nuclear strike”, which is guided by the current American authorities, assumes that not a nuclear strike, but a massive strike with high-precision missiles will be launched on the territory of a potential enemy. Thousands of such missiles launched from American submarines, surface ships and ground-based installations should, like a carpet, cover the enemy’s most important industrial and energy centers, the locations of his nuclear potential and, ultimately, leave him without “teeth” and the will to resist ….
And one of the guarantees that this scenario will not be implemented on Russian territory is the revival in our country of the development and production of military railway missile systems. Which, by the mere fact of their existence, can “cool the ardor” of potential opponents of our country.
Work on their creation has already begun. Shortly before the international military-technical forum "Army-2015", Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia Yuri Borisov told reporters that the preliminary design of a new Russian BZHRK called "Barguzin" is already ready. By 2022, up to 5 Barguzin BZHRKs should enter the Russian Armed Forces. Their development and construction is carried out using funds provided for in the state weapons program until 2020.
Information about the start of practical work on recreating the BZHRK was confirmed by the Radio-Electronic Technologies (KRET) concern, which is developing electronic warfare systems for new missile trains. “These developments are underway. Now our institutes are engaged in these developments, and these proposals will be transferred to the lead contractor who will be appointed to restore the BZHRK,” adviser to the deputy head of the concern Vladimir Mikheev told TASS at the Army-2015 forum. “The train must be protected from reconnaissance and destruction, and the missiles themselves that will be used by it are also objects against which enemy missile defense will operate,” he emphasized.
There is still very little information about what the Barguzins will be like. However, it is already quite clear that these will not be “modernized “Molodets”, but completely new cars. Firstly, because technology has come a long way in 30 years (the first Molodets was put into service in 1987). Secondly, because all work on Barguzin is carried out in Russia, without the involvement of the Ukrainian design bureau Yuzhnoye and.
The main weapon of the Barguzinov will not be the 100-ton Scalpels, but the 50-ton RS-24 Yars missiles. This is a completely Russian rocket - developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, produced by the Votkinsk plant. As you have already noticed, the Yars is twice as light as the RT-23UTTH, but it also contains a smaller number of multiple warheads - 4 (according to open sources) instead of 10 (although it flies almost 1 thousand km further than the Scalpel). It is known that each Barguzin will carry 6 Yars. But it is not yet very clear which path the developers of the new rocket train will take - either they will try to place two Yars in each refrigerated car, which serves as a transport container for the rocket, or they will limit themselves to one for each rocket, but twice as much as “Well done,” they will increase the number of container launchers on each train. At the same time, obviously, “Barguzin” will retain the main know-how of the creators of “Molodets”, the Utkin brothers - the rocket launch system: withdrawal of the contact network above the train, mortar launch of the rocket, removal of it to the side using a powder accelerator and subsequent launch of the propulsion engine. This technology made it possible to divert the jet of the rocket propulsion engine from the launch complex and thereby ensure the stability of the rocket train, the safety of people and engineering structures, including railway ones. And it was precisely this that the Americans were unable to implement when developing their BZHRK, which in the early 90s of the last century was tested at the US railway test site and the Western Missile Test Site (Vandenberg Air Force Base, California).
At the same time, “Barguzin” in general - neither by cars, nor by diesel locomotives, nor by electromagnetic radiation, will stand out from the total mass of freight trains, thousands of which are now scurrying along Russian railways every day. Because railway technology has also gone far ahead during this time. For example, “Molodets” was hauled by three DM62 diesel locomotives (a special modification of the serial M62 diesel locomotive) with a total power of 6 thousand hp. And the power of only one current mainline freight two-section diesel locomotive 2TE25A “Vityaz”, which is mass-produced by Transmashholding, is 6,800 hp. The full autonomy of the train is assumed to be the same as that of the “Molodets” - 30 days. Range – up to 1000 thousand km per day. This, according to the developers, is enough to ensure the complete secrecy of the Barguzin and its ability to deliver an unexpected retaliatory strike to the enemy at any time.
US attempts to create a ghost train
The United States has also made attempts to create missile systems on a railway platform. Their development began in the 1960s, since around the same time Pentagon scientists first created a solid-fuel Minuteman ballistic missile, which, according to its technical parameters, could be launched from small sites and in railway shaking conditions. The development was given the name "Minitman Rail Garrison".
Initially, it was planned that a ghost train filled with missiles would run along predetermined positions, for which work would be carried out at the specified locations to create conditions in order to simplify the launch and adjust the missile’s navigation system to the specified launch points.
The first mobile Minuteman missiles on a railway platform were supposed to enter the US Army by mid-1962. But the American administration did not allocate the necessary amount to prepare the infrastructure and launch the production of prototypes, and the program was shelved. And the created transport cars were used to deliver the “Minitman” to the place of combat deployment - launch silos.
However, after the success of the Soviet Union in developing similar projects, the United States remembered the technology that had been collecting dust since the 60s and in 1986 created a new project using old developments. The then existing LGM-118A “Peacekeeper” missile was chosen for the prototype. It was planned that its traction would be provided by four-axle diesel locomotives, and each train would be provided with two security cars. 2 cars will be allocated to the launcher with an already charged missile in the launch container, another one will house the control center, and the remaining cars will take fuel and parts for routine repairs.
But the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison was never destined to get on the rails. After the official end of the Cold War, the US authorities abandoned the development of missile systems on a railway platform and redirected cash flows to other military industry projects.
In the United States, the railway-based missile system was never put into operation - its history ended after unsuccessful tests in 1989.
New railway missile system of the Russian Federation
Currently, for various reasons, none of the armies in the world have railway launchers in service. The Russian Federation is the only one that has been working on the creation of this type of weapon since 2012, and has now developed preliminary designs for a railway launcher that meets all modern requirements for strategic weapons.
It is known that the design name of the new BZHRK is “Barguzin”. Project documentation indicates that the Barguzin will be assembled from two main parts: a railway launcher and a combat missile.
The railway launcher will be located on a railway platform, to which a special beam with a lifting boom and a control mechanism is attached. A lifting frame with the possibility of longitudinal movement is attached to the railway boom. The TPK (torpedo hull perforator) with the missile will be supported by supports that are mounted on support plates and equipped with rotary rods.
The rocket is launched from the TPK, commands for which are given from a special car as part of the BZHRK with control systems attached to it. When a rocket is launched, the roof of the car opens (reclines), thereby creating the distance necessary for the launch.
Comparative characteristics
Parameter | BZHRK "Barguzin" | BZHRK "Molodets" |
Date of adoption | 2009 | 1989 |
Rocket length, m | 22,7 | 22,6 |
Launch weight, t | 47,1 | 104,5 |
Maximum range, km | 11000 | 10 100 |
Number and power of warheads, Mt | 3-4 X 0.15; 3-4 X 0.3 | 10×0,55 |
Number of locomotives | 1 | 3 |
Number of missiles | 6 | 3 |
Autonomy, days | 28 | 28 |
Advantages of the new BZHRK:
- Less train weight
- Modern navigation systems
- Greater missile accuracy
Rockets
At the stage of developing design documentation, the developers and command faced a choice - which of the modern missiles in service with the Russian army should be used as a projectile for the Barguzin BZHRK. After numerous discussions, the Yars and Yars-M missiles were chosen. This missile is a silo-based and mobile solid-fuel ballistic missile with a detachable warhead, the maximum flight range of which is 11,000 kilometers, and the charge power in TNT equivalent ranges from 150 to 300 kilograms. This ballistic missile performed excellently during preliminary tests.
Tales of Power
Today, when remembering the advantages of the BZHRK, they first of all talk about its secrecy. As I said above, it was very difficult to distinguish the complex from a freight train, even when located next to it, and this was even more difficult to do from reconnaissance satellites of that time! The missiles were placed inside the carriages and raised to a horizontal position only immediately before launch. However, an experienced eye could still recognize the complex by the characteristic eight-axle design of the platforms - containers. Due to the large weight of the ballistic missile (and the missile with the launcher weighed more than 150 tons), it was necessary to create a special platform, which was “exotic” for our railways. Information about the limited radius of the BZHRK was also kept in the strictest confidence. The load on the railway track was such that for each missile division it was necessary to strengthen the railway track and bridges within a radius of 1,500 kilometers from their bases. True, it was still unrealistic to “find” a moving rocket train in an area with a diameter of 3,000 kilometers.
In 2007, the history of the Soviet BZHRK ended. Only a few museum copies of it remain. It seemed that the era of “nuclear trains” was forever a thing of the past.
But just four years after the “cutting up” of the last “Scalpel”, military futurologists again started talking about the revival of the BZHRK. In December 2011, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, General Sergei Karakaev, announced this. Then, in April 2013, then Deputy Minister of Defense Yuri Borisov announced that the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering had resumed development work on the creation of a new generation BZHRK. In May 2016, it was announced that the creation of individual elements of the railway complex, called “Barguzin”, had begun, and towards the end of the year, successful throw tests of the BZHRK rocket took place at the cosmodrome in Plesetsk.
A new spark of life was breathed into this project by the information about the completion of development and entry into combat duty of the Yars-S mobile ground complex, which is a modification of the RS-24 Yars intercontinental system. This rocket, which weighs only 46 tons, may well be suitable for domestic railways, designed for a load of 65-70 tons.
It would seem that there are all prospects for recreating such a unique missile system, but... but do we need it today? This is not an idle question. And the author of these lines is definitely not a “pacifist” or an enemy of the domestic defense complex. Let's just figure it out.
The development of the BZHRK began at the very end of the 60s, when the mobility of strategic ballistic missiles was still only a distant prospect for the development of the Strategic Missile Forces. Half a century has passed since then. During this time, not only was the RT-23 UTTH “Molodets” complex installed on the railway platform, but also a whole class of ground mobile complexes was created, begun with the R2PM “Topol” monoblock missile, continued by the R2PM2 “TopolM” and the recently adopted PC-24 complex "Yars". In terms of mobility and stealth, they are superior to BZHRKs tied to the railway network. Ground complexes are much more compact and much more secretive than their railway counterparts. Moreover, the development of space reconnaissance means today is orders of magnitude greater than the capabilities of spy satellites thirty years ago. Today’s information processing speeds, the use of artificial intelligence systems, the deployment of automated control systems at all levels and the Americans’ reliance on the strategy of a “quick global disarming strike” - the BGU has long deprived the BZHRK of their main former advantage - “invisibility”. And to deliver a pre-emptive strike on an already identified target, tightly tied to a certain trajectory, in the era of hypersonic weapons is precisely the task for the “BGU” concept.
Rocket trains, old and new
At the very end of last year, news appeared in the Russian media regarding a return to an old and almost forgotten idea. According to RIA Novosti, work is already underway to create a new combat railway missile system (BZHRK) and the first missile train of the new project can be assembled by 2022. Our army already had similar systems in service, but the only BZHRK 15P961 “Molodets” in history were taken off duty back in 2005 and soon most of the equipment from them was disposed of. Trains with missile weapons were rightfully the pride of Soviet designers, and of the entire country as a whole. Thanks to their capabilities, these complexes posed a serious threat to a potential enemy. However, the history of this type of technology cannot be called simple. First, a series of completely unpleasant events first greatly limited the potential of domestic BZHRKs, and then led to their complete disappearance.
The creation of a railway missile system was very difficult. Despite the fact that the corresponding order from the country's leadership and the Ministry of Defense appeared back in 1969, the first full launch of the new RT-23UTTH missile took place only in 1985. The development of the BZHRK was carried out at the Dnepropetrovsk design bureau "Yuzhnoye" named after. M.K. Yangel under the leadership of V.F. Utkina. The specific operating conditions of the new system forced the development of a lot of new solutions, from a newly designed launch vehicle disguised as a refrigerator to a folding fairing for the missile head. Nevertheless, more than fifteen years of work were crowned with success. In 1987, the first “Molodtsov” regiment went on duty. Over the next four years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, three divisions were formed, armed with a total of twelve new BZHRKs.
Unfortunately, shortly after the formation of the last third division, several unpleasant things happened that had a very bad impact on the future service of the BZHRK. In 1991, during international negotiations on the future START I treaty, the Soviet leadership agreed to several unfavorable proposals from the American side. Among them was a restriction regarding the patrol routes of “missile trains”. With the light hand of USSR President M. Gorbachev and some of his associates, BZHRKs could now only move within a radius of several tens of kilometers from the bases. In addition to the obvious military-political disadvantages, such a restriction also had economic consequences. Simultaneously with the commissioning of the “Molodets” complexes, the Ministry of Railways carried out work to strengthen the tracks within a radius of several hundred kilometers from the BZHRK bases. Thus, the Soviet Union lost both the main advantage of the BZHRK and a lot of money spent on reconstructing the tracks and preparing launch positions.
The next international treaty - START II - implied the removal from duty and disposal of all RT-23UTTH missiles. The target date for completion of this work was 2003. Especially for dismantling and disposal, a cutting production line was assembled at the Bryansk Missile Forces Repair Plant with the participation of the United States. Fortunately for the BZHRK, shortly before the deadline for the disposal of missiles and trains, Russia withdrew from the START II treaty. However, recycling continued over the next few years, although at a much slower rate. To this day, only a few carriages of the former BZHRK have been preserved, which are used as museum exhibits.
As we can see, the short history of the Molodets missile systems was difficult and unsuccessful. Almost immediately after entering service, trains with missiles lost their main advantage and after that no longer posed the same threat to the enemy as before. However, the complexes continued to remain in service for a decade and a half. Now there is every reason to believe that the disposal of Molodtsev occurred only when they had exhausted their service life and the available stock of missiles had come to an end. One of the most serious blows to Russian missile trains was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Because of him, on which the complexes and missiles for them were assembled, remained on the territory of sovereign Ukraine. This country had its own views on the future work of rocket production and therefore the trains were left without new weapons.
In discussions of the news about the start of development of a new BZHRK, the advantages and disadvantages of this type of equipment are often discussed. The first, of course, includes the possibility of being on duty at a great distance from the base. Once a missile train has entered the public railways, detecting it becomes very, very difficult. Of course, three diesel locomotives, nine refrigerator cars (three missile modules) and a tank car to some extent gave away the old BZHRKs, but to guarantee tracking of their movements required enormous efforts. In fact, it was necessary to “cover” with reconnaissance means the entire or almost the entire territory of the Soviet Union. Another advantage of the complex can be considered the successful liquid-propellant rocket RT-23UTTH. A ballistic missile with a launch mass of 104 tons could deliver ten warheads with a capacity of 430 kilotons each to a range of up to 10,100 kilometers. In light of the mobility of the missile system, such characteristics of the missile gave it simply unique capabilities.
However, it was not without its drawbacks. The main disadvantage of the BZHRK 15P961 is its weight. Due to the non-standard “load”, several original technical solutions had to be used, but even with their use, the launch module of three cars exerted too much pressure on the rails, almost to the limit of the latter’s capabilities. Because of this, in the late eighties, railway workers had to change and strengthen a huge number of tracks. Since then, the country's railways have again suffered wear and tear, and before the new missile system is put into service, another track renewal will most likely be needed.
BZHRKs are also regularly accused of insufficient strength and survivability, especially in comparison with silo launchers. To test survivability, appropriate tests began in the eighties. In 1988, work on the themes “Radiance” and “Thunderstorm” was successfully completed, the purpose of which was to test the performance of trains with rockets in conditions of strong electromagnetic radiation and thunderstorms, respectively. In 1991, one of the production trains took part in the Shift tests. At the 53rd research site (now the Plesetsk cosmodrome) several tens of thousands of anti-tank mines were laid with a total explosion power of about 1000 tons in TNT equivalent. At a distance of 450 meters from the ammunition, with its end facing them, they placed the train's missile module. A little further - 850 meters away - another launcher and command post of the complex were placed. The launchers were equipped with electrical rocket launchers. During the detonation of mines, all modules of the BZHRK were slightly damaged - glass flew out and the operation of some secondary equipment modules was disrupted. The training launch using the rocket's electrical layout was successful. Thus, a kiloton explosion less than a kilometer from the train is not capable of completely disabling the BZHRK. To this should be added the more than low probability of an enemy missile warhead hitting a train while moving or near it.
In general, even the short-term operation of the Molodets BZHRK with serious restrictions on routes clearly demonstrated both the advantages and difficulties associated with this class of military equipment. Probably precisely because of the ambiguity of the very concept of the railway complex, which simultaneously promises greater mobility of rockets, but at the same time requires strengthening the tracks, not to mention the complexity of creating a train and rockets for it, design work on creating new “rocket trains” has not yet been resumed . According to the latest data, employees of design organizations and the Ministry of Defense are currently analyzing the prospects of the BZHRK and determining the necessary features of its appearance. Therefore, it is now impossible to talk about any nuances of the new project. Moreover, due to the availability of mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRS) “Topol”, “Topol-M” and “Yars” in service, which do not require a durable railway track, the creation of a new BZHRK may be completely canceled.
Nowadays, a variety of opinions are being expressed about the possible appearance of the promising BZHRK. For example, it is proposed to equip it with missiles of existing projects, such as the RS-24 Yars. With a launch weight of about 50 tons, such a rocket, which is also already used on the PGRK, can be a good replacement for the old RT23UTTH. With similar dimensions and half the weight, the new missile, with certain modifications, can become the weapon of the new BZHRK. At the same time, the combat characteristics of the complex will remain approximately at the same level. Thus, the gain in range (up to 11,000 km) will be compensated by a smaller number of warheads, because only 3-4 (according to other sources, six) charges are placed in the head of the RS-24. However, the Yars missile will have been in operation for about ten years by the expected date of putting the new BZHRK into service. Thus, new missile trains will require a new ballistic missile. It is quite possible that its appearance will be shaped along with the requirements for the entire complex.
At the same time, rocket designers can use the experience gained from creating relatively small rockets like the Topol or Yars. In this case, it will be possible to create a new rocket with extensive use of developed solutions and technologies, but at the same time suitable for use in railway complexes. As the basis for a new missile for the BZHRK, the existing Topoli-M or Yarsy are suitable, partly due to the fact that they are adapted for operation on mobile systems. However, the final decision regarding the “origin” of the missile and the requirements for it does not seem to have been made yet. Given the length of time it takes to develop and test new rockets, to meet the 2022 deadline, rocket designers must receive requirements within the coming years or even months.
Finally, the need to build infrastructure must be taken into account. Judging by the available information about the condition of the old BZHRK bases, everything will have to be built anew. In a matter of years, old depots, control rooms, etc. were taken out of service, deprived of a large amount of special equipment, rendered unusable and sometimes even partially looted. It is quite clear that for effective combat operation, new railway missile systems will need appropriate structures and equipment. But restoring existing buildings or building new ones will significantly increase the cost of the entire project.
Thus, if we compare railway and ground-based missile systems, the comparison may not be in favor of the former. A hypothetical mobile ground launcher, with the same missile as a railway one, is less demanding on the condition of the road, is much simpler to manufacture, and also does not require coordination of travel routes with third-party organizations, for example, with the management of the railway. An important advantage of ground-based missile systems is also the fact that all the infrastructure necessary for them is simpler and, as a result, cheaper than for railway ones. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the mid-2000s the command of the Strategic Missile Forces officially announced the abandonment of the BZHRK in favor of the PGRK. In light of this decision, the resumption of work on railway complexes looks solely like an attempt to expand the capabilities of nuclear forces and, if there are certain prospects, to equip them with another type of equipment.
In the current situation, you should not yet wait for news regarding the start of construction of the first rocket train of the new project, because it has not even been decided what it will be like or whether it will be at all. Therefore, we can only hope that the analysis of capabilities and prospects, including comparative ones (BZHRK or PGRK), will be carried out with full responsibility and its results will only bring benefits to our missile forces.
BZHRK base
Based on materials from the sites: https://rbase.new-factoria.ru/ https://pentagonus.ru/ https://armscontrol.ru/ https://rian.ru/
BZHRK "Scalpel" - previous generation of nuclear trains
The development of nuclear trains first began in the 60s of the twentieth century. Work was carried out in the USSR and the USA approximately in parallel.
Moreover, the idea of creation, according to legend, was planted by the Americans. After unsuccessful attempts by the United States to create the complex, it was decided to spread misinformation that such trains were being actively created and would soon hit the rails. The purpose of the false information was one - to force the Soviet Union to invest huge amounts of money in an unrealizable idea. In the end, the result exceeded all expectations.
On January 13, 1969, the Order of the Commander-in-Chief “On the creation of a mobile combat railway missile system (BZHRK) with the RT-23 missile” was signed, in pursuance of which by the 1980s in the USSR, for the first time in the world, it was put into production and tested in conditions close to combat, a missile carrier on a railway platform, which had no analogues in the whole world. As experts said, there is no more formidable and mobile weapon on the planet than a mobile railway combat train with a continental missile on board.
A team from the Russian Academy of Sciences, led by brothers Alexei and Vladimir Utkin, worked on the creation of the complex. During its creation, the designers faced several serious difficulties.
- Firstly, the mass of the train - the huge weight could deform the railway track. The smallest ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) weighed 100 tons.
- Secondly, the direct flame from the rocket launch melted the train and the rails on which it stood.
- Thirdly, the contact network above the car, naturally, was an obstacle to launching a rocket. And this is not the entire list of problems that Soviet specialists faced.
The BZHRK used RT-23U missiles (NATO classification SS-24 “Scalpel”). Special rockets with a retractable nozzle and fairing were manufactured for the composition. One missile carries a MIRV-type multiple warhead with 10 warheads with a yield of 500 kilotons each.
An original solution was made to distribute the load on the track. The three cars were connected by a rigid coupling, which ensured that the weight of the rocket was distributed over a longer section of the railway track. In combat mode, special hydraulic paws extended.
To remove the catenary system that interfered with the launch, a special device was invented that carefully removed the wires from the complex’s operating area. The network was de-energized before launch.
An ingenious solution was also invented to launch the rocket - a mortar launch. A powder charge ejected the rocket 20 meters above the ground, after which another charge adjusted the tilt of the rocket nozzle away from the train, and after that the first stage engine turned on. Thus, the column of flame of enormous temperature did not cause damage to the cars and tracks, but was directed in the right direction.
The autonomy of the rocket train was more than 20 days.
On October 20, 1987, after tests carried out at the Semipalatinsk test site, the RT-23UTTH “Molodets” missile regiment went on combat duty. And by 1989, 3 divisions of the BZHRK were deployed on the territory of the USSR, dispersed over a distance of many thousands of kilometers: in the Kostroma region, in the Perm and Krasnoyarsk territories.
The BZHRK device includes railway modules for various purposes, namely: 3 ICBM launch modules RT-23UTTH, 7 cars as part of the command module, a module with fuel reserves in a railway tank and 2 diesel locomotives of the DM-62 modification. Work on improving the equipment did not stop even after entering the troops, and its combat potential grew steadily.
BZHRK "Molodets" were a nightmare for the Americans. Huge amounts of money have been allocated to track ghost trains. Reconnaissance satellites searched for 12 ghost trains across the country and could not distinguish the combat complex from a train with refrigerators (refrigerated cars) carrying food.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, everything changed in Russia. On January 3, 1993, the START-2 treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which the Russian Federation must destroy part of its missile potential, including the RT-23U missiles, therefore by 2005, according to the official version, all BZHRKs are removed from combat duty and destroyed, and the few survivors are sent to storage for further disposal.
The complex was officially on combat duty in the Soviet Union for about 20 years, until 2005.
Why does Russia need BZHRK?
Does Russia need “nuclear trains”? Yes, sure.
Their creation in the USSR became a necessary measure after missile submarines became the basis of the nuclear missile triad in the United States. It turned out to be impossible to launch a pre-emptive strike against the submarines, because... They are elusive in the vastness of the ocean, but they themselves could approach our coastline closely and keep the main territory of the country at gunpoint. The USSR could not respond equally.
Over the past decades, NATO countries have managed to cover the seas and oceans with a network of sonar stations that monitor the movements of our submarines. Of course, Soviet submariners resorted to various tricks... Sometimes our nuclear submarines with nuclear missiles unexpectedly appeared where they were not expected at all. However, this did not solve the problem of global secrecy.
The basis of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces were silo launchers. It is clear that they have become the primary target for NATO strategic missiles. Meanwhile, the world's longest railway network allowed the USSR to create truly covert mobile nuclear missile systems . Externally, especially from above, BZHRKs were no different from refrigerator cars. True, such a train was pulled by two diesel locomotives - many trains are pulled by two locomotives... In general, it turned out to be very difficult to identify them using space reconnaissance.
Combat missile trains were easily lost in the vast expanses and could go into numerous underground tunnels - unused or for special military purposes. Thus, along the railway line from Asha to Zlatoust (Southern Urals) alone there are more than 40 tunnels and underground adits, which make it possible to shelter any train from observations from space... If necessary, the train could be pulled out of the tunnel and prepared for firing in 3-5 minutes . If the signal for a missile launch caught a train on the way, it would urgently brake, the supports of the cars would extend, the wires of the railway contact network would move apart and a salvo would be fired!
The railway workers of the BZHRK received the letter “train number zero”. Molodets missile trains each carrying three intercontinental ballistic missiles, have been in service since 1987. Each missile carried 10 warheads. They had unique accuracy in hitting the target, for which they received the name Scalpel .
By 1991, 3 missile divisions were deployed, each with 4 trains. They were stationed in the Kostroma region, Krasnoyarsk and Perm territories.
In accordance with the START-2 Treaty, by 2007, Russia disposed of all but two BZHRKs. Although many experts argued that START-2 did not require this at all. Of course, the destruction of complexes that had no analogues in the world did not cause delight among the military. But the wisdom was confirmed: every cloud has a silver lining. The missiles were designed and produced in Ukraine, in Dnepropetrovsk. So, if Russia had not liquidated its BZHRKs under US pressure, their maintenance and service life extension would have become impossible under current conditions.