A view from Britain in 1943 of dive bombers. Part 1

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A view from Britain in 1943 of dive bombers. Part 1

Interesting vintage article "The Dive Bomber" from the June 10, 1943 issue of Flight magazine, which I think will be of interest to colleagues. The author, hiding under the pseudonym Helldiver, wrote the article “Bombers,” the translation of which was posted on the “Alternative History” website.

Dive bomber

Its design, development and applications: fighter-dive bombers; adaptation of four-engine heavy vehicles

Editor's Note: Is the dive bomber dead? Many are ready to say “Yes!” In this article the author attempts to show that although the dive bomber represented by aircraft such as the Ju 87 can be called obsolete, it would be rash to assume that improved types cannot change the picture. The dive bomber is still a formidable anti-ship weapon and could play an important role in the ongoing war.

To use an academic definition, dive bombing is a type of attack in which a bomb is dropped from an aircraft diving towards its target. Except in cases where the dive is truly vertical (this is rare, since precise control is impossible in this situation), it is necessary to take into account the effect of gravity and air resistance on the bomb. This is usually achieved by releasing the bomb at a predetermined point in the dive recovery radius; alternatively, compensation for the bomb's "lag" can be accomplished by releasing it when the aircraft aims at a point beyond the target. In any case, it is necessary to take into account the wind speed and direction.

Thus, the conditions that determine the performance of dive bombing are essentially the conditions of stationary artillery fire, in which the pilot must compete with the “falling” shell.

Obviously, the bomber's dive should be as steep as possible, which is consistent with the good handling qualities of the aircraft, since the greater the angle, the smaller the correction for the steepness of the bomb's trajectory should be.

The specialized aircraft currently in use can dive at angles of 80 degrees or more, but it is much more common to perform shallower dives at angles of 50-70 degrees. Aiming in a steep dive, especially if it follows carefully planned evasive actions while approaching the target area, reduces the chances of air defense.

Provided that accuracy is not compromised when dropping a bomb from a high altitude, a steep dive will entail an abrupt transition to level flight. This necessitated the development of aerodynamic brakes, which are now standard on all types of dive bombers.

Degree of accuracy

The main advantages of dive bombing are a higher degree of accuracy compared to high and medium altitude bombing and greater penetration than is possible with low altitude bombing. When bombing in a dive, the possibility of the bomb “bouncing” over the target was excluded, which happened when bombing from low altitudes.

In dive bombing, as practiced today, it is the pilot of the aircraft who releases the bombs.

Dive bombing tactics vary greatly depending on the type of aircraft, the size of the formation and the weather. The advantage of cloud cover is that it confuses air defenses, and the dive can be carried out in several stages with periodic changes in direction. This requires good control of the ailerons and elevators, and as a result an aircraft specifically designed as a dive bomber is usually pleasant to fly.

Public critics of dive bombers include not only a surprising number of outraged amateurs and omniscient "aviation experts" but also high-ranking air force officers.

Usually their hostility is based on circumstantial evidence provided by individual operations of the war. It may be recalled, however, that about five years ago a senior Royal Air Force officer stated that in his opinion dive bombing was not advisable because modern aircraft in dives reached such high speeds that they would be extremely difficult to recover from dives and would certainly break up in the air !

Notably, recent criticism has also been directed less at the theory or practice of dive bombing as a method of attack (the enemy has demonstrated that a very high degree of accuracy is achievable) and more at the vulnerability and limited usefulness of what is commonly referred to as the typical dive bomber. Apparently the loudest critics have no idea about the wide variety of sizes, designs and tactical purposes of modern types and almost always their senseless dogma of "dive bombers are too vulnerable" is aimed at only one aircraft - an enemy type, old in design, ineffective, poorly armed and until relatively recently, it experienced a serious shortage of armor and sealed gas tanks.

The vehicle in question - the Ju 87 Stuka (sturzkampfflugzeug) - has operated in such numbers since the start of the war that there is now a lot of information available regarding its capabilities and limitations. No one who knows the facts well would dispute that in a fight with a modern single-seat fighter, one of these old "things" is in an almost deplorable position. However, these people will not deny that the Stukas performed tasks beyond the capabilities of any modern weapon - air or ground. The German command was fully aware of the Ju 87's shortcomings, and in the years before the Battle of Britain, the company that built it, Junkers, stopped calling it a fighter-dive bomber.

However, it should be noted that the Russians, who had a unique opportunity to study the capabilities of the Ju 87, were more restrained in their criticism than the British commentators. Even more important is the fact that, despite the number of Ju-87 dive bombers shot down and captured since the beginning of the war, there is still no indication that this type of aircraft has been subjected to objective flight testing by the Royal Air Force.

Application

Dive bombers were used in combat during World War II. The German Ju 87 is considered the symbol of this war and the very concept of “blitzkrieg”.

Before mankind created missiles and homing bombs, these bombers were the most accurate and reliable weapons for striking. In addition, the diving process also increased the flight speed of the bomb itself, which made it possible to inflict more damage on armored ships. The most striking example of the military use of dive bombers is the battle near Midway Atoll. Another historical fact of the use of these devices can be called the attack of Japanese troops on Pearl Harbor.

Dive bombers or attack bombers?

Based on a comparison of technical characteristics, critics consider the Ju 87 unsuitable primarily due to the weakness of its defensive weapons compared to American-style “attack bombers.” The latter are twin-engine aircraft of a much more modern design with a more powerful power plant, but more complex and expensive to manufacture. These vehicles are not capable of performing steep dive attacks, which are the only way to combine anything close to high precision with great penetration.

Dogmatic criticism of the unsuitability of dive bombers is unfounded. This will be illustrated by the following description of types of aircraft which have much higher performance than the old Junkers and which can be used as tactical reconnaissance aircraft even, in some cases, as heavy fighters. In the latter role, their dive brakes - an indispensable equipment of all modern dive bombers - can be a great advantage at night, allowing them not to overshoot the target. The best example of such an aircraft is the Me 210, which is currently entering service with the German Air Force.

THE LATEST GERMAN AIRCRAFT MODEL: Messers chmitt Me-210 has the characteristics and weapons of a fighter and carries bombs in a compartment located in the forward fuselage

NEWEST AMERICAN AIRCRAFT: Powered by a 1,700-horsepower Wright Cyclone engine, the US Army's Curtiss A-25 dive bomber is a modified version of the carrier-based Helldiver.

Much has been said about the vulnerability of dive bombers to small arms and light anti-aircraft guns during the final stages of their precision dive and during the subsequent withdrawal from the target. In this situation, a person with information will not dispute the fact that significant losses to Ju 87 and Ju 88 dive bombers were inflicted by heavy ground fire and other measures designed primarily to protect against low-flying aircraft. However, it has not been proven that the losses of these dive bombers were disproportionate either to the results obtained (especially against naval targets) or to the losses incurred by other methods of attack involving low-level flights. In the conditions in which a dive bomber often has to hit vertically, it is actually less vulnerable than a low-altitude bomber. Moreover, even when hit by anti-aircraft fire, the dive bomber, with its exceptionally robust design, has a better chance of survival than other classes of aircraft. The German Aviation Ministry published photographs of Ju 87 aircraft that suffered significant structural damage but were nevertheless able to return to their bases.

The main tasks when creating a dive bomber:

Increased use of armor to protect pilots and functional aircraft parts. This was necessary due to the low flight altitude when striking, and accordingly, the vehicle was vulnerable.
Installation of an automatic dive bomber launch system.
Single-engine models had problems when dropping bombs, since they could damage the propeller during a dive. Because of this, a system for removing bombs from the propeller was installed.
To prevent the aircraft's structure from collapsing from overload, when exiting a dive, a brake system was designed to reduce the dive speed.

Already in the 30s, high-quality dive bombers were manufactured. The armies of the United States and Germany were most actively involved in developments in this direction. The Germans produced the Ju 87 aircraft, and the Americans produced the P-6E Hawk.

Options for creating long-range bombers of this type were worked out, these were the German He 177 and the domestic PB-4, developed by Tupolev. As a result, none of these developments made it into the series.

The most famous models of dive bombers:

USSR: Pe-2 and Ar-2.
Germany: Ju 87, Hs 132, Hs 123 and Ju 88.
USA: A-24, SBD Dauntless, SB2C, A-36 Apache.
Japan: Aichi D3A, D4Y Suisei and Ki-48.
France: LN.401.
Britain: Fairey Barracuda and Blackburn Skua.

Physical aspects

It cannot be denied that the crews of dive bombers must be staffed with people of boundless courage and great physical endurance. However, if courage has a limitless reserve, then with regard to physical endurance, it can be said that the alarming deformations to which the human body is subjected in popular films about dive test flights are not usually encountered in the operation of modern dive bombers.

During factory testing, prototype dive bombers can be subjected to overloads of 9 g, but this value is not achieved during training and operation. Overload levels of 3.5-5.0 g are relatively common and can be tolerated for a short time by a person of normal build without “cutting out the light.” The latter phenomenon, which leads to temporary loss of vision, is caused by the fact that during the recovery from a dive, blood recedes from the head. The effect of the dive itself is insignificant and occurs only due to a rapid change in air pressure.

trajectories followed by an aircraft and a bomb dropped from an aircraft that dives at a 70 degree angle at 340 mph (547 km/h) and emerges from the dive into level flight at 5g.

depending on the direction of the wind, the pilot decides to approach from the direction of the sun and after hitting the clouds, or vice versa, use maximum cover for approach and leave in the direction of the sun

Left: In clear sky conditions, the approach to the target is as unpredictable as possible. Center: In the event of low clouds with cloud breaks, the bomber can attack from under the cloud cover. Right: In maximum cloud conditions (10/10), a single dive bomber briefly emerges from the cloud to position itself for an attack.

diagrams showing correct and incorrect attack methods depending on wind direction and movement of moving targets

diagrams illustrating the altitude reduction and overload effects that occurred at various dive recovery radii

However, the pilot of a modern dive bomber must have a keen mind to not only quickly decide on the tactics to be taken against a particular target, but also to carry out during combat operations a number of operations necessary for the safe flight of his aircraft. Various equipment has been developed to relieve the pilot of a number of duties, but this equipment is found mainly on multi-engine aircraft such as the Ju 88.

On a typical single-engine dive bomber, before the dive begins, it is necessary to adjust the supercharger and propeller pitch levers, close the radiator dampers or cowl skirt flaps, release the throttle, operate the airbrake and trim controls, and perhaps limit stick deflection to avoid excessive acceleration. overload during dive recovery. Although simply pressing a button on the control stick can release a bomb (or bombs if a salvo was previously selected on the bomb releaser for burst bombing) and move the elevator trims to the extended position, this will have to be followed by retracting the airbrakes, releasing the control stick lock and resetting cooling systems to prevent overheating.

It is often suggested - usually by those now trying to justify their previous antipathy towards dive bombers - that fighters armed with 30-40 mm cannons are as useful in air support for ground forces as the Ju 87 class aircraft. attacks on moving and vulnerable targets, this statement may be true; it is difficult to imagine blocking an important intersection, destroying heavy artillery positions or destroying an underground headquarters (much less disabling or sinking a large warship) with any known or suspected combination of guns and aircraft. What is often overlooked is that the much-maligned Ju 87 can carry more than a ton of bombs into a given area and drop them on a target with great precision and destructive power.

6. WHY PE-2 DIVE BOMBERS RARELY DIVE BOMBED?

The very modest assessment of the effectiveness of Soviet front-line bomber aviation of 1942-1945 given by the Germans is all the more interesting since the main Soviet day bomber of this period - the Pe-2 - seemed to allow much more to be achieved. After all, this aircraft was not only much faster and better armed than the SB, but could also bomb from a steep dive, at an angle of 60-90°. And this made it possible to achieve incomparably greater bombing accuracy: the greater the angle of the aircraft’s dive onto the target, the more the trajectory of the dropped bomb coincides with the aiming line. In the 284th Bombardment Regiment in 1943, when bombing from a horizontal flight, the average deviation of falling bombs from the target was more than 200 m, and when bombing from a dive - only 18 m81. The Pe-2 dived steadily, without yawing; entry and exit of the aircraft from a dive was provided by an automatic machine; brake grilles installed under the wing reduced the speed of the aircraft accelerating in a dive - and thereby facilitated aiming.

However, this main advantage of the Pe-2 - the ability to dramatically increase the accuracy of a bomb strike - was not used by the bulk of front-line pilots throughout most of the war! Until the end of 1943 (!), “pawns”, as a rule, bombed from horizontal flight; Dive bombing was rarely used. So, from the beginning of 1942, this last method began to be used in the 9th short-range bomber air regiment of the Western Front Air Force, from the summer of 42 - in the 150th bomber air regiment of special air group No. 1 of the 8th Air Army of the Stalingrad Front, from the end of 42- th - in the 301st Bomber Air Division of the same army, in January 43rd - in the 1st Bomber Air Corps of the 3rd Air Army of the Kalinin Front, headed by the former commander of the 150th Regiment and 301st Division I.S. .Polbin. However, in other units and formations with the Pe-2 they were even removed then - as unnecessary! – automatic dives and brake grids; according to V.B. Shavrov, the “pawns” of some series came out without bars already from , - it was stated in the directive of the commander of the Red Army Air Force A.A. Novikov dated July 7, 1943, summing up the work of Soviet aviation in March - June 43 -go83. And even after the Battle of Kursk, on September 2, 1943, Novikov had to summarize that dive strikes were used “insufficiently and uncertainly” (in I.S. Polbin’s corps in July and August they were carried out only in about 6% of combat sorties. – A.S.

) - and set the task for aviation commanders to train dive bombing by October at least one regiment in each division equipped with the Pe-2!84 However, in the 3rd Bomber Air Corps only one regiment per corps was able to do this even in October (and not per division) - 128th Bombardment. And in the 1st Polbinsk Corps in October and November, dive strikes were carried out only in about half of the combat sorties85.

What explained this persistent non-use of the “pawn’s” capabilities? Often, bad weather, or rather low clouds, prevented dive bombing. So, in November - December 1941, at the height of the battle for Moscow, the lower edge of the clouds in the Moscow region did not rise above 200-1000 m, and from such a height it was impossible to dive on the Pe-2: the pilot simply would not have time to bring out this rather inert car from a dive. It was precisely because of bad weather that the 4th Bomber Air Corps in March 1945 was able to carry out only about 2% of its bombing missions86. The 54th, 133rd and 603rd high-speed bomber air regiments of the Western Front Air Force did not dive during the Battle of Moscow also because they feared the failure of the unreliable mechanism for retracting the brake grids. Left unretracted after exiting the dive, they would continue to reduce the speed of the bomber in horizontal flight - and this would make the Pe-2 “easy prey for enemy anti-aircraft guns or fighters”87. The former commander of the 9th Short-Range Bomber Aviation Regiment, A.G. Fedorov, mentioning the reluctance of pilots to dive bomb, characteristic of the summer of 1942, pointed to another reason - “the desire to protect their actions over the target.” But, he added, “the main reason was different: the overwhelming majority of the flight personnel had not yet been properly trained in the art of dive bombing”...88

Indeed, the main reason for the refusal of the “pawn” pilots to dive bombing still has to be their poor training. When retraining pilots on the Pe-2 on the eve of the war, dive strikes were not practiced with them; in July 1941, at the Lipetsk Aviation Training Center they began to do this, but by October, saving time, the number of dive bombings that each crew was allowed to perform was again increased from 4-6 to zero; in 1942, during training in a reserve regiment, a young pilot managed to complete only one such bombing mission, and in 1943 - two89. True, the ratings received for these one or two bombing missions were not bad. In 1941, 32.4% of pilots here had “excellent”, 31.8% “good”, 35.8% “satisfactory”; in 1942 – 29.0%, 30.0% and 41.0%, respectively; in 1943 – 29.5%, 31.7% and 38.8%90. But this is a typical Soviet “inflated” report: in 1942 it was noted that the crews who arrived from reserve regiments were not ready for individual dive bombing91, and even in the second half of 1943, the crews of the front-line Pe-2 formations showed worse bombing accuracy than what was achieved on paper in spare parts. If in the latter there were, according to reports, no dive bombers at all, then in the 1st Guards, 1st and 3rd Bomber Air Corps in July - December 1943 there were from 14 to 50%, and excellent students were not about a third, but from 0 to 11% (and only in the 1st bomber in September - October - 38%)92.

It was very difficult to train pilots at the front: mastering a dive strike required considerable effort and time. Exiting the most effective dive from the point of view of bombing - at an angle of 90° - was accompanied by overloads that only specially trained pilots could withstand. Captain V.A. Gordilovsky from the 125th Bomber Aviation Regiment of the Air Force of the Leningrad Front - an experienced, but not so trained pilot - taking out a Pe-2 from a vertical dive in January 1942, lost consciousness and received damage to internal organs... Therefore, the angle of the dive during training I had to increase it gradually; It is no coincidence that, for example, in the 321st short-range bomber air regiment of the 77th mixed air division of the Western Front Air Force in the fall of 1941, they only managed to master a shallow dive (at an angle of 30-40°) - and only a few crews began to learn to dive at an angle of 60°. The memoirs of A.G. Fedorov and veteran of the 202nd Bomber Aviation Regiment N.I. Gapeenok especially emphasize how hard the transition to dive bombing at an angle of 60 degrees or more required from the front-line regiments; how long it took to practice such attacks - first by individual crews, then by units, squadrons and, finally, by the entire regiment93. Not all front-line air units had the time and training ground conditions for this; certainly not for all front-line commanders - those who were primarily responsible for combat work! – there was the strength and desire to organize these trainings, especially since back in 1942 the corresponding methodological developments were not available everywhere. “They ordered us to dive bomb,” recalls, for example, I.I. Kabakov, who then fought in the 73rd Bomber Aviation Regiment of the Baltic Fleet Air Force, “but the theory of dive bombing itself was absent”...94

It should also be taken into account that the Pe-2 - unlike, for example, the SB and Ju88 - was very difficult to pilot. A commission that at the beginning of the war studied the experience of operating “pawns” in the 58th high-speed bomber air regiment of the 2nd mixed air division of the Northern Front Air Force, oh, “the machine is too complex in piloting techniques, especially on takeoff and landing. Operating an aircraft requires pilots above average qualifications; an ordinary pilot has difficulty mastering it.”95 “How many times,” recalled A.G. Fedorov, “I had to watch how, at the beginning of the takeoff, the “pawn” suddenly turned to the right, and the pilot, unable to counter the turn with the help of another engine, was forced to stop taking off. And what attention is required when landing! The slightest mistake leads to a series of such high “goats” that you are involuntarily amazed at how quickly the chassis can hold up”96. Meanwhile, the total flight time on the Pe-2, with which the pilot arrived from the reserve air regiment to the front, in 1941 averaged only 6 (according to other sources - 7) hours, in 1942 - 12 (according to other sources - 13) , in 1943 - 15...97 Therefore, when introducing young recruits into service in the front-line regiments, there was probably very often simply no time to master dive bombing - to work out piloting techniques... In addition, an overly strict machine generally caused a “very wary attitude” "98. And this also did not encourage attempts to take everything possible from her.

It was possible to improve the landing qualities of the “pawn” only at the very end of 1944, when a version with a modified wing tip profile99 was launched into production. And the overwhelming majority of the Pe-2s that fought remained, according to test pilot P.M. Stefanovsky, “complex and inconvenient for the crew”100 machines.

As a result, even in one of the two divisions of the Polbinsk 1st Bomber Air Corps - the 1st Guards Bomber - by July 1943 only 16% of the pilots could dive bomb - and only by August this percentage in the corps was brought to 40, and by in October - up to approximately 70 (but the percentage of those who know how to bomb in groups is only up to 57-58). Even on October 20, 1943, of the 67 crews of the corps that bombed the railway stations of Alexandria, Koristovka and Verkhovtsevo (between Kremenchug and Dnepropetrovsk), only the 25 most prepared were allowed to carry out dive strikes101.

Bomb penetration depth

Here we can say a few words in response to the statement that the penetration depth of a bomb dropped in a dive is less than that of the same bomb dropped in horizontal flight at high altitude using a high-precision sight. The obvious answer is that this is offset by the greater accuracy achieved by dive bombing, but now that jet-powered bombs have been adopted an even stronger argument is possible. The design of such bombs particularly favors their use by dive bombers. The Russians use these rocket bombs against tanks from special armored aircraft that are not equipped with airbrakes.

When it comes to anti-tank weapons, there is a lot to be said for a single-seat fighter-bomber like the Hurricane IID. However, even so, despite the recently released official announcement, the Hurri-bomber will inevitably face serious problems due to its lack of airbrakes when it moves away from its role as a low-altitude hollow dive bomber and attempts to perform a variation of the "hell diver" attack.

THIS? Hurricane IID attack aircraft with two 40-mm cannons, which in North Africa has proven itself in the fight against enemy armored vehicles

OR THAT? The Vultee Vengeance dive bomber, which went into production for the Royal Air Force. The aircraft carries 1,700 lb (771 kg) of bombs in the intra-fuselage bomb bay

Also worth mentioning are the legacy single-seat biplane fighters such as the Hs 123 and CR.42, which were adapted for dive bombing by Germany and Italy respectively. These types do not require airbrakes to reduce speed in a dive, as their designs create much higher drag than modern monoplanes. Moreover, their exceptional maneuverability has a great advantage in evading ground fire after dropping bombs and subsequent shooting at ground targets. Of course, their small bomb load and short range are disadvantages.

Whatever the true value of dive bombers (if, of course, they can be judged as a class), their merits must be accepted - at least in part - if for no other reason than that modern types of dive bombers are produced for the air force allies.

It should also be taken into account that Germany and Italy, with their many years of experience in designing dive bombers, are not relaxing, but increasing their efforts to develop more effective types.

Since the main purpose of this article is to study, as far as possible, the special properties of dive bombers of various powers, it is necessary to give a general idea of the use of dive bombers in modern warfare and the main directions of development of designs of machines of this type in different countries.

Project of the dive bomber-attack aircraft PBSh.

Project of the dive bomber-attack aircraft PBSh.

Developer: Mikoyan, Gurevich Country: USSR Project 1940

In July 1940, in development of the idea of using a dive bomber-attack aircraft as a battlefield aircraft, the A.I. Mikoyan Design Bureau (OKO Plant No. 1) proactively developed a preliminary design of a single-seat diving armored attack aircraft PBSh-1 with an AM-38 engine. It is known that back in the early 30s, M.I. Gurevich and OKO designer N.I. Andrianov participated in the development of a single-engine armored attack aircraft TSh-3 with an M-34 engine. Based on this experience, the new OKO aircraft was created. The direct development of the general appearance of the PBSh-1 aircraft, its general layout and armament layout, as well as the armored hull layout was carried out by N.I. Andrianov.

According to the scheme, the PBSh-1 was a low-wing aircraft with relatively good aerodynamic shapes and layout, borrowed from the I-200 fighter. The diving armored attack aircraft PBSh-1 was intended mainly for operations against heavily protected and small-sized enemy ground targets (tanks, bunkers, bunkers, etc.), as well as against its manpower directly on the front line. The maximum speed of PBSh-1 at the ground according to the project was 449 km/h, at an altitude of 1250 m - 472 km/h. Landing speed with flaps deflected by 60° without ammunition and with 25% fuel remaining - 121 km/h. The service ceiling was supposed to be 7600 m. The flight range at ground level at 0.9 Vmax was 813 km, and with drop tanks – 1013 km. Maximum flight weight of PBSh-1 is 6024 kg.

The front part of the fuselage was an armored compartment consisting of two side plates in the area of the pilot's cockpit with a thickness of 7.5 mm, a lower armor plate with a thickness of 5.5 mm, an armor plate at the rear of the pilot with a thickness of 15.5 mm, an armor disk with a thickness of 15.5 mm in front of the engine, armor plates the bottom and sides of the motor are 7.5 mm thick and the top are 4.5 mm thick. All armor plates were included in the power circuit of the aircraft.

The contours of the armored hull were chosen in such a way as to minimize the presence of curved surfaces, which greatly simplified the armor production technology and its assembly. The armor shields were fastened using lugs welded to the armor from the inside. This connection ensured not only ease of assembly and repair of the armored compartment in the field, but also eliminated the possibility of bolt heads flying out (the bolts only worked to shear) when shells hit the armor. The pilot's canopy had 60 mm armored glass on the front and 40 mm armored glass on the sides and top. The pilot's canopy was moved back using a pneumatic drive. There was also an emergency canopy release system.

The tail part of the fuselage is welded from chromansil pipes. A good flow around the fuselage was formed by a secondary duralumin frame and fabric covering. The wing is two-spar, trapezoidal in plan. It consisted of a center section and two detachable consoles. The spars are steel, the ribs and stringers are stamped duralumin, the skin is duralumin. From the fuselage to the ailerons, the wing was equipped with Schrenk-type flaps of duralumin construction. The aileron frame is made of duralumin, the covering is linen. The landing gear is single-post, completely retractable in flight. Cleaning and releasing from the pneumatic system. Oil-pneumatic shock absorption. Main wheels measuring 700 x 300 mm. The stabilizer and keel are made of duralumin. Steering wheels - duralumin frame, linen covering. There are trimmers on the steering wheels. The control of the ailerons and elevator is rigid and made of duralumin pipes. The rudder control is cable-operated. Flap control is pneumatic. The pedals and the pilot's seat are adjustable according to the height of the pilot.

The propeller-motor group included an AM-38 motor with a reduction ratio of 0.902 and a metal automatic propeller of the ZSMV-5 type with a diameter of 3 m. There was no motor frame in the usual sense, since the motor was attached using brackets with engine support bars directly to the walls of the armored hull. In all places where access to the power plant was necessary, there were hatches in the armor. The engine was started using compressed air.

The water radiator was located in the armored compartment behind the pilot's seat. The inlet and outlet air channels of the radiator are armored. The oil cooler and oil tank were located under the engine gearbox behind the armor. The main gas tank with a capacity of 650 liters was located in the armored compartment under the pilot's seat. The second gas tank with a capacity of 110 liters is located between the engine and the pilot’s instrument panel. Both gas tanks had a protector.

PBSh-1. Scheme.

The aircraft's small arms and cannon armament included two wing-mounted 23-mm MP-6 cannons with 96 rounds of ammunition per barrel and six wing-mounted ShKAS machine guns with 750 rounds of ammunition per machine gun. All small arms and cannon weapons were located outside the plane swept by the propeller. Fire and reload control is pneumatic.

Bomb load - up to 700 kg was supposed to be taken only during overload. To hang bombs on the plane, there were two bomb bays in the center section between the wing spars - for bombing from horizontal flight and two external bomb racks (one under each wing plane outside the area swept by the propeller) - for dive bombing. Center-section bomb bays provided loading of either 24 AO-10 fragmentation bombs (240 kg), or 24 AO-8 (192 kg), or 280 AO-2.5 (700 kg). The maximum caliber of bombs suspended on external bomb racks did not exceed 100 kg. At the same time, the bomb racks provided suspension and two jettisonable gas tanks of 150 liters each. Provision was made for the suspension of two airborne chemical weapons discharge devices of the VAP-6M type (total 140 kg). The installation of missile weapons was not provided.

Layout of weapons in the PS-1 wing.

Having worked in detail on the PBSh-1 project (the leading engineer of the institute, military engineer of the 1st rank N.S. Kulikov, dealt with this issue), specialists from the Research Institute of the Air Force KA concluded that in its presented form the attack aircraft cannot be considered as a dive attack aircraft. The combat capabilities of the PBSh-1 were more consistent with the requirements for a single-seat armored attack aircraft. The fact is that the design did not provide the necessary devices to limit the speed of an attack aircraft during a dive. Therefore, ensuring effective dive bombing on the PBSh-1 was doubtful.

The project lacked materials confirming that the PBS-1 design was designed for 11-13 times overload (necessary for a diving aircraft), while a simple calculation showed that with an empty weight of about 4000 kg, its strength for such an overload was not ensured. In addition, the maximum caliber of aerial bombs (100 kg) for dive bombing was insufficient to solve the entire range of combat missions of a front-line dive bomber. In particular, the experience of the Red Army breaking through the Mannerheim Line in 1940 showed that in order to destroy long-term reinforced concrete defensive structures, aerial bombs of at least 250-500 kg caliber were needed.

Military experts considered the composition and placement of small arms and cannon weapons to be quite acceptable.

The pilot's forward-downward viewing angle of 9° was considered sufficient (for example, for the IL-2 this angle was 8°). It was noted that the OKO of Plant No. 1 had not at all worked out the issue of special equipment for the aircraft.

According to specialists from the Air Force Research Institute, the real take-off weight of the PBSh-1 will be 400 kg more than shown in the project (that is, about 5254 kg), the maximum speed at the ground (taking into account the real propeller efficiency of 0.75) will not exceed 420 km /h, and the time to climb 5000 m will be 11.5-12.0 minutes.

Due to an insufficient stability margin, the aircraft's aerobatic performance will seriously deteriorate with increasing flight weight. The takeoff and landing characteristics of the attack aircraft will also become unsatisfactory.

The armor of the attack aircraft was highly praised. It was noted that the reservation scheme in relation to the location of the armor on the aircraft is satisfactory, since all the most vital parts of the aircraft are protected by the armor: the pilot, the engine, radiators, gas tanks and main equipment units. Armor plates 15 mm thick, installed in front of the engine and behind the pilot's cabin, protect against armor-piercing bullets of 12-13 mm caliber from a firing distance of up to 200 m at a flight altitude of 25 m. Armor plates 7.5 mm thick on the sides of the cockpit and engine compartment and armor plates 5 mm thick .5 mm from the bottom of the armored compartments under the same shelling conditions can only provide protection against armor-piercing bullets of normal caliber.

Booking scheme ПБШ-1.

Thus, taking into account the clarifications of the military, the PS-1 in terms of the entire range of flight technical and combat capabilities no longer fell within the framework of the requirements of the experimental aircraft construction program for 1941.

In the conclusion of the Research Institute of the Air Force of the Spacecraft on the preliminary design of the PBSh-1, the conclusion of the Research Institute of the Air Force on the preliminary design of the PBS-1 was signed by the head of the institute, divisional engineer A.I. Filin, and on August 5 it was approved by the acting deputy chief of the Air Force of the Spacecraft, brigade engineer Fedorov.

On July 27, 1940, the preliminary design of PBSH-1 was reviewed by the commission of Academician B.N. Yuryev, which in its conclusion was signed by: B.N. Yuryev, V.I. Polikovsky, I.I. Mashkevich, V.N. Belyaev and P.Ya. Zatessky.

On July 31, the minutes of the Yuryev commission meeting were approved by the Deputy People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry A.S. Yakovlev. At the same time, he crossed out the words “Taking into account that the assignment for a similar type of aircraft was given to Comrade. Sukhoi, but with less fire power and higher flight speed near the ground (500 km/h).”

Note that on July 29, on the second copy of the protocol, engineer of the 7th Main Directorate of the NKAP I.I. Mashkevich, who carried out a preliminary examination of the PBS-1 project, wrote: “According to the conclusion of the Air Force, the implementation of the project should be refrained for the reasons specified in the commission’s conclusions.”

It must be admitted that the conclusion of civilian aviation experts regarding PBSh-1 was to a certain extent harsher than the opinion of the military. However, despite the obvious shortcomings of the project, the construction of the PBSh-1 model was allowed. By August 30, a mock-up of the PBS-1 was built and on September 5 presented to the customer, who did not approve it, nor did he approve the additional materials for the preliminary design of an improved version of the machine, presented by OKO around the same time.

PBSh-1. Drawing.

The wing area of the second version of PBSh-1 was increased from 30.5 m2 to 33.0 m2. In the area of the aileron span, provision was made for the installation of automatic slats. The main wheels of the chassis 700 x 300 mm were replaced by twin 650 x 200 mm. The location of the water radiator changed - it was located under the floor of the pilot's cabin, and the inlet and outlet were under the fuselage. Instead of gas tanks with a capacity of 650 and 110 liters, gas tanks with a capacity of 430 and 450 liters were installed and thus the total capacity increased by 120 liters.

The weight of the aircraft's armor increased to 1390 kg. The thickness of the armor protecting the engine has been increased from 4.5 mm to 5.5 mm. Part of the armor from 5.5 mm has been increased to 7.5 mm.

Bomber armament was strengthened: the center-section bomb bay now included four sections, each of which could accommodate bombs of up to 100 kg caliber. Thus, 400 kg of bombs were suspended on the internal sling. In addition, the maximum caliber of bombs on underwing bomb racks has been increased to 250 kg.

According to the project, the maximum speed of the vehicle at the ground was supposed to be 446 km/h, and at an altitude of 1000 m - 472 km/h.

For a normal flight weight of 5400 kg, the aircraft alignment became more forward and amounted to 23.2% of the MAC.

The required improvement in the takeoff and landing properties of PBSh-1 was not achieved. Increasing the wing's mechanization was impossible due to the placement of a large number of weapon barrels in the wing consoles. An increase in the wing area would inevitably lead to a decrease in the maximum flight speed, which was already low. In this regard, OKO recommended using a motor reduction of 0.732 or even 0.550 instead of 0.902, and also using a propeller with a diameter of 3.3 m.

The safety factor in the dive bomber version with two FAB-250s was no more than 8.75, which in principle was insufficient.

Despite the obvious shortcomings of the revised project, specialists from the Air Force Research Institute of Spacecraft still recommended the second version of PBSh-1 for construction. However, the head of the KA Air Force, Lieutenant General P.V. Rychagov, on September 20 put an end to the issue of further work on this aircraft, imposing the following resolution on the materials on the preliminary design: “My opinion is that Comrade. “We shouldn’t give Mikoyan a new car, but demand that the I-200 aircraft be adjusted to the standards we require.”

As a result, a conclusion (approved by P.V. Rychagov) was sent to the NKAP, signed by the deputy chairman of the Scientific and Technical Committee under the head of the Air Force, military engineer Znamensky, 1st rank, which stated that “... according to its flight data, the PBSh-1 aircraft does not satisfy the 1941 program g. A similar example of Comrade Sukhoi’s armored attack aircraft with higher flight characteristics than the PBSh-1 is under construction. Therefore, we should refrain from implementing the PBS-1 project.”

Let us note that the Air Force leadership, when deciding to reject the PBSh-1 project, in addition to citing the need to quickly complete the work on fine-tuning the I-200 fighter, also took into account the insufficient maturity of the OKO team at Plant No. 1.

Later, at OKO Plant No. 1, a project was developed for the PBSh-1 aircraft with hydraulic transmission to the propeller from the AM-38 engine, but the work was not completed. In order to eliminate the main shortcomings of the PBS-1 (poor take-off and landing characteristics and insufficient stability margin), which significantly hampered the development and combat use of the attack aircraft by flight personnel who had insufficient flight training in wartime conditions, a project for an attack aircraft was proposed at the OKO A.I. Mikoyan -PBSh-2 biplane with AM-38 engine.

PBSh-2. Drawing.

It was assumed that during the creation of the PBSh-2 such aerobatic qualities would be achieved in which the new attack aircraft would “forgive” the most serious mistakes of the pilots. This seemed especially important, since the tactics of combat use of attack aircraft at that time involved carrying out an attack either from a low-level flight, or from a gentle glide from a jump to a height of 150-200 m. In this case, the flight to the target and back was carried out only at low level. Obviously, under these conditions, any mistake by the pilot due to illiterate actions or injury most likely led to disaster.

PBSh-2. Scheme.

In the explanatory note to the preliminary design of PBSh-2, it was stated in this regard: “...Taking into account the fact that flying a monoplane with a large load on the wing close to the ground is very difficult, and also that monoplanes do not forgive gross mistakes of pilots at low altitudes, We have developed a project for the PBSh-2 aircraft, similar in purpose to the PBSh-1 aircraft, with a biplane design. Biplane aircraft are much simpler in piloting technique. They also have significantly better stability and controllability than monoplanes...” The PBSh-2 biplane was made according to a rather unusual design. The upper wing, which had a large forward sweep and no lateral controls, was moved back in relation to the lower wing. Its area was almost half the area of the lower wing. The lower wing was equipped along the trailing edge with two-section flaps and large-area ailerons. The wings were connected by two struts without braces.

Full-scale studies of such a wing box carried out at TsAGI in a wind tunnel showed good results.

Model of the airplane ПБШ-2.

The engine, cabin and fuel tanks were protected by sheets of cemented and homogeneous armor of variable thickness from 1.5 to 7.5 mm. The attack aircraft's small arms and cannon armament included two MP-6 23 mm cannons and six ShKAS machine guns. The bombs were placed in two bomb bays in the center section between the wing spars - when bombing from horizontal flight, they were suspended on two external bomb racks (one under each wing plane) outside the area swept by the propeller - for dive bombing. Center-section bomb bays allowed the loading of small aerial bombs of various types with a caliber from 1 to 10 kg. Bombs of caliber from 25 to 250 kg could be suspended on external underwing bomb racks. The normal bomb load was 200 kg. The installation of missile weapons was not provided.

Despite the fact that PBS-2 fully provided a solution to the problem of simplifying piloting at low altitudes, all work on this original machine was also stopped. The fact is that the real flight data of the PBSh-2 would be much worse than that of the PBSh-1, while the possibilities for improving them were very limited. In addition, the design of the PBSh-2 is more complex, which would create additional difficulties in mass production, especially in wartime.

LTH:

Modification: ПБШ-1 Wing span, m: 13.50 Length, m: 10.145 Wing area, m2: 33.00 Weight, kg - empty aircraft: 4344 - normal take-off: 5400 Engine type: 1 x PD AM-38 Power, hp - take-off: 1 x 1625 - flight: 1 x 1550 Maximum speed, km/h - at altitude: 469 - at the ground: 446 Cruising speed, km/h: 398 Practical range, km: 1180 Practical ceiling, m: 7600 Crew: 1 Armament: 2 x 23 mm cannons and 6 x 7.62 mm machine guns, up to 700 kg of bombs.

List of sources: V.B.Shavrov. History of aircraft designs in the USSR 1938-1950. B.L. Simakov. Airplanes of the country of the Soviets. 1917-1970. Encyclopedia-reference book. Airplanes of the country of the Soviets. Vladimir Perov, Evgeny Arsenyev. Aircraft from OKB im. A.I. Mikoyan. Vladimir Perov, Oleg Rastrenin. Stormtroopers of the Red Army.

Direct support

In land theaters of war, dive bombers have so far been used primarily as a means of direct support of ground forces with the aim of suppressing strong points, disrupting lines of communication and defense, as well as destroying military units, transport, firing positions, headquarters and similar targets. For such aircraft, a long flight range is usually not required, except in cases of attacks on strong points, and today the dive bomber in direct support of ground forces is a single-engine, two-seat monoplane of a very robust design, having special aerodynamic brakes for diving, attacking at high angles up to vertical and exiting in horizontal flight with a small radius and, therefore, at low altitudes. Equipped with additional fuel tanks and a reduced bomb load, this dive bomber can, under certain conditions, pose a serious threat to strategic targets such as docks, railway stations and other vital installations. Operations against these targets typically require heavy fighter escort, but fighter escort has become a standard requirement for bomber formations operating during daylight hours over the territory defended by fighters.

It appears that single-engine powerplants will remain the preferred powerplant for dive bombers intended to directly support ground forces, but it is likely that, albeit on a more limited scale, twin-engine designs using moderately powered aircraft engines will also be adopted. A plane modeled after the German attack aircraft Hs 129 naturally suggests itself.

Advantages of a twin-engine power plant

The twin-engine dive bomber offers significantly improved visibility when approaching the final target and in addition to this, the vehicle is in some cases capable of continuing flight on one engine. This circumstance is of some importance, since the power plant of a dive bomber is the most vulnerable element during a dive. The absence of a propeller at the front of the fuselage simplifies the task of dropping bombs (provided the bombs are placed in or under the fuselage) and is another advantage of this arrangement.

For use at sea, dive bombers, except in coastal defense, are likely to remain relatively small single-engine aircraft, since they must operate from and be deployed on aircraft carriers. With the exception of a landing hook, wing-folding equipment and buoyancy for landing on water, there is no reason why a carrier-based dive bomber should not resemble a single-engine land-based bomber for direct support of ground forces. In this regard, mention may be made of the Brewster Bermuda dive bombers, which were ordered by the Royal Air Force to support ground forces and which in their basic design are identical to the carrier-based aircraft adopted by the US Navy.

The Brewster Buccaneer dive bomber, designated Bermuda by the Royal Air Force, is powered by a 1,600-horsepower Wright Cyclone engine, giving it a top speed of 310 mph (499 km/h) at an altitude of 12,000 feet (3,658 m).

What may not be widely understood is that a twin-engine carrier-based dive bomber is in no way beyond the realm of technical feasibility, and it has even been reported that Japan has been attempting to create an aircraft of this class for some time. The main factors determining the suitability of aircraft of this type are the strength of the decks of aircraft carriers and the minimum dimensions for their placement.

The conversion of the American single-seat twin-engine fighter Grumman Skyrocket into a dive bomber deserves close attention.

Although the article already mentioned the ability of single-engine dive bombers to strike strategic targets and industrial facilities, these tasks are usually assigned to larger twin-engine aircraft, which, although not capable of diving at high angles, are nevertheless capable of carrying two to three times the load. Their disadvantages in the form of a relatively small permissible dive angle and a higher flight altitude can be largely negated by the use of special sights and computers that are not available on smaller single-engine vehicles. However, it is often argued that types such as the German Ju 88 and Do 217 cannot be strictly classified as dive bombers because they are not capable of vertical dives. This shows ignorance of modern technology, for a true vertical dive, in which the flight path of the aircraft exactly coincides with the line of sight and the flight path of the bomb, is exceptional even in the case of the most highly specialized single-engine machines. Typically the dive is performed at an angle of 65 degrees.

On the other hand, it is a mistake to classify as dive bombers those aircraft that are not equipped to perform steep dives and that are used to bomb at a flat angle with the engines off. One may recall the American official report which mentioned the “dive bombing” of an enemy submarine by a Catalina flying boat!

The credit for creating a heavy twin-engine aircraft, equipped with aerodynamic brakes, capable of bombing (at an angle of 60 degrees or even more), delivering a bomb load at least twice that of modern single-engine types, and flying much longer distances, should go to Germany . A typical example of the described class of aircraft is the Ju88, which, despite its special design and special equipment, has demonstrated superior performance in relation to the power of the power plant and can be more effectively armed than a two-seat single-engine aircraft.

Several times Ju 88s performed dive bombing at night.

Heavyweight dive bombers

It is reported that in Germany, as well as in other countries, the development of dive bombers that are larger than the Ju 88 (in particular the He 177) is underway. Dive bombing even at a 45 degree angle by an aircraft carrying six or seven tons

The problems associated with the design of dive bombers, especially those of the size of the He 177, are varied and complex. The fact is that just a few years ago the difference between the altitudes of entering and exiting a dive was measured by several hundred feet, and diving itself at large angles to the horizontal was considered as an aerobatics maneuver and a combat maneuver that should be performed exclusively by small aircraft. Consequently, dive bomber development was largely carried out by a relatively small number of specialized aircraft manufacturing companies.

In Germany, the Junkers concern found itself in a particularly advantageous position; This concern not only received unprecedented support from the German Ministry of Aviation for several years, but also, in addition to the gliders of its dive bombers, creates engines and, in some cases, propellers. Each of these three points has its own specific problems, and it seems that it was very useful to group the studies within one organization.

From a design perspective, the first requirement for a dive bomb is greater strength to withstand the stresses of dive recovery and evasive maneuvers. This alone results in a lower payload compared to an aircraft that was not specifically designed to perform a steep dive.

The additional mass of the structure arises both from the installation of aerodynamic brakes and from the design of the structure, which must withstand the loads arising during braking.

The aerodynamic design can be compromised by achieving good visibility from the cockpit and by installing a transparent panel in the floor necessary to observe the target during approach.

Flight control surfaces must be particularly robust and must provide sufficient maneuverability for dive aiming.

The design of a single-engine dive bomber must include strong components for attaching a parallelogram mechanism that would bring the bomb beyond the propeller sweep zone.

The design of aerodynamic brakes presents particular difficulties. These brakes should not create strong turbulence and thus not cause tail buffeting and wing flutter. Also, aerodynamic brakes should not affect aileron control. Flight control surfaces must have sufficient area, and if the aircraft is equipped with a dive recovery device, the elevator trims must be designed accordingly.

Due to the vulnerability of liquid-cooled engines when installed in a conventional manner, air-cooled powerplants may be preferred in the future; An exception may be if a hood shape is used that allows the liquid-cooled engine to effectively apply protective armor. Internal placement of radiators would also be desirable, but this, as well as comprehensive engine protection, would mean a significant increase in weight, which would be detrimental to the dive bomber's performance. Relative to their size, these will be the heaviest aircraft.

Currently, liquid-cooled engines are standard on German dive bombers, while air-cooled engines are standard on American aircraft of this type.

Some of the problems encountered in adapting dive bomber propulsion systems will be discussed next week. This issue will provide an overview of German dive bomber types.

Dive bomber

The question of whether the Spanish Civil War (1937–1939) can be considered a dress rehearsal for World War II remains debatable, but one thing is indisputable: it was in the battles on the Iberian Peninsula that the latest types of military equipment of the USSR and the Third Reich first met and tested each other’s strength . From the experience of these battles we had to urgently learn lessons, sometimes very bitter ones. Not least of all, this concerned aviation.

The SB bomber (“Speed Bomber”), launched into mass production in 1934, was deservedly considered the pride of the Soviet aircraft industry. The SB reached speeds of up to 350 km/h, which made it virtually invulnerable to fighter aircraft of that time. However, this advantage did not last long. In Spain, the Security Council had a most dangerous enemy - the German Bf.109B fighter - an early modification of the famous Messerschmitt. With the appearance of this fighter on the battlefield, the SB became obsolete overnight. Having insufficient defensive weapons and having lost their advantage in speed and altitude, the SB squadrons found themselves practically defenseless. Losses increased catastrophically, which, in turn, forced an urgent start to the creation of a fundamentally new machine with a fundamentally new tactic of use.

Bomber SB ("Speed Bomber")
Global trend

In general, in the interwar years, all aviation powers, as if by magic, rushed to develop dive bombers. The fact is that classic, “horizontal” bombing from “safe” heights for an aircraft demonstrated low accuracy, due primarily to the imperfection of aircraft sights and the lack of adjustable bombs. At the same time, anti-aircraft artillery did not allow bombing from low altitudes: while dropping bombs, the plane must strictly maintain a combat course, leaving which means missing. Thus, a bomber flying in a straight line and not maneuvering in any way was simply a “school” target for artillerymen. The Americans found a solution, they were the first to create an aircraft specifically designed for dropping bombs in a dive. As it turned out later, the decision was correct: during a dive attack, the bomber becomes a difficult target for anti-aircraft gunners, and the accuracy of bombing increases significantly. The battles over Poland clearly demonstrated the high efficiency of the new German dive bomber Junkers Ju 87 Stuka, the initiator of which was the famous First World War ace Ernst Udet.

The Ju 87 Stuka was rightfully considered one of the most famous aircraft in the world.
Despite the ridiculous appearance and mediocre flight characteristics, it was a very effective bomber. The birth of the “pawn”

The development of a Soviet dive bomber based on the high-altitude fighter “100”, which did not go into production, began just at the dawn of the war, in 1938, in the famous “Tupolev sharashka” TsKB-29. It was one of the prison design bureaus belonging to the Special Department of the NKVD. The entire composition of engineers consisted of convicted “enemies of the people,” and the chief designer was formally a certain Kutepov, an NKVD colonel and a former electrician. In fact, the leader of the group of engineers working on the new aircraft was Vladimir Petlyakov. The work proceeded at a very fast pace: only a month and a half was allotted to convert the 100 fighter into a dive bomber. Since the new aircraft was to fly at low and medium altitudes, it was necessary to abandon the installation of pressurized cabins and turbochargers provided on the original aircraft. Nevertheless, during the first flights the aircraft showed very good performance. The reputation of the new car was not hampered even by several accidents that occurred during testing due to engine failures. The military was in a hurry to launch the aircraft, called the Pe-2, into production. They were in such a hurry that the “reference” model of the car was released “retroactively”.

The haste was not in vain: World War II had begun, and although the Soviet Union had not yet taken an open part in it, it was clear that the time to prepare for combat operations was counted in months, and for the Soviet Air Force the Pe-2 was truly a step forward. The pilots immediately noted the fact that, compared to the clumsy SB, the flight characteristics of the Pe-2 were much higher: the new bomber found a “golden mean” between stability and maneuverability. An important advantage was that the plane finally had reliable and convenient communication between the pilot, navigator and gunner. The Pe-2 received protected fuel tanks (which significantly improved its survivability), and electric motors were widely used in the controls, which made piloting the aircraft much easier. Nevertheless, the Pe-2 was strict to control, especially at low speeds, and required attention and accuracy from the pilot (therefore, at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, when the level of training of the flight crew was simply terrible, many young crews crashed while landing). The bomb load was 600 kg, and when overloaded - a ton (many considered it insufficient for an aircraft of this class). The low weight of the bombs was primarily due to the fact that upon exiting the dive, the power elements of the Pe-2 design had to withstand enormous loads - a large margin of safety had to be included during development. For this reason they sacrificed part of the bomb load. To reduce speed during a dive, air brakes were installed under the wings of the Pe-2 - folding grids made of steel pipes. Due to their deflection perpendicular to the air flow, effective speed damping was achieved. The electric drive of the air brakes was controlled by the AP-1 “automatic dive”. The defensive armament of the “pawn” initially consisted of four 7.62-mm ShKAS aircraft machine guns, two of which were mounted stationary in the nose of the aircraft. The remaining machine guns were mounted in movable pivot mounts at the navigator's and gunner's positions and had a limited field of fire.

Pe-2
By June 1941, 904 Pe-2 aircraft had been produced, most of which, unfortunately, were soon irretrievably lost either on the ground or during poorly prepared combat missions. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the pilots did not have time to fully master the zealous machine and, moreover, were practically not trained in dive bombing. Weak defensive weapons also caused criticism: rifle-caliber machine guns were clearly not enough against the new Messerschmitt Bf109G fighters, capable of attacking bombers with impunity from a safe distance. Only in 1942 did the “pawn” finally receive powerful and reliable large-caliber machine guns of the Berezin system. At the same time, many design flaws discovered during operation were eliminated. The car received new forced engines, while the aerodynamics were also improved. With such modifications, the “fighter past” of the Pe-2 quickly made itself felt - now the “Messer” (“thin”, as our pilots called him), recklessly left alone with the “Petlyakov”, had every chance of ending up in the role of a victim - some Pe-2 crews had as many as five downed planes! At the front, there were often cases when “pawns”, who accidentally discovered a group of enemy bombers in flight, took on the role of fighters...

Messerschmitt Bf109G
Chronicles of dive bombers: who is better?

Many historians undertake to compare the Pe-2 and the Junkers Ju 87 Lapotnik. The conclusions drawn are very varied. But, despite similar tasks, it is not entirely correct to compare these aircraft. It should be admitted that the hit accuracy of the Ju 87 was slightly higher than that of the Pawn, since the Junkers dropped bombs from a height of only 600–700 m, unlike the Pe-2, which bombed from at least a kilometer. In such conditions, the Junkers pilot had the opportunity to aim almost point-blank, making adjustments based on weather reports, “by eye.” In addition, the Lapotnik dived at a relatively low speed (about 600 km/h), and the pilot had enough time to adjust the flight path.

But the slowness of the “lapotnik” was also a drawback. It is not for nothing that the Junkers Ju 87 is considered one of the symbols of the “blitzkrieg” - it was intended for operations in conditions of insufficiently active enemy air defense. Otherwise, the advantages of the slow and poorly protected Junkers were quickly reduced to a minimum. When the number of Soviet fighters and the level of training of their pilots began to increase, the losses of the Ju 87 increased catastrophically, which forced the Germans to bomb only from high altitudes and accompany the Junkers with good fighter cover, and the lack of on-board automation capable of introducing all the corrections necessary for an attack from a high altitude, negatively affected accuracy. An error in the direction of the aircraft of just one degree resulted in a miss of 50 m.

Soviet designers solved this problem by adding another crew member to help the pilot. Thus, the Pe-2’s aiming at the target was “double”. The navigator measured the speed and direction of the wind (to determine the “drift” of the bomb and the plane itself), calculated the “combat angle of turn” and set the sight, while the pilot kept the target in the crosshairs and tried to maintain the dive trajectory as accurately as possible. It was due to this “division of labor” that the hit accuracy was 40–50 m (this was quite enough), and the experienced crew of the “pawn” could place the bomb in a ten-meter circle. In addition, the faster and better armed Pe-2 needed fighter cover less than the Ju 87 and suffered less from anti-aircraft fire. By the way, in 1944, the Germans attempted to use the Focke-Wulf Fw190F fighter as a dive bomber, which was significantly superior in flight characteristics to both the Pe-2 and Ju 87. The main advantage was that, freed from the bomb load, this dive bomber could easily repel any fighters. However, practice has shown that the hit accuracy of the Fw190F turned out to be significantly lower than that of the “old man” Ju 87. This was primarily due to the increased dive speed: the heavy and powerful Focke-Wulf quickly accelerated during a dive, and even a highly qualified pilot simply did not managed to control the plane and aim at the same time. As time has shown, only the development of electronics made dive bombing quite convenient for the pilot of a single-seater.

Focke-Wulf Fw190 Designed by Kurt Tank, it still receives mixed reviews from military and historians.
At the time of its creation, the most advanced technologies were used in this aircraft. The Focke-Wulf was very effective against bombers, but the strike version of this vehicle did not take root in the Luftwaffe. The depicted modification of the Fw190D - the “long-nosed Dora” (with a star-shaped air-cooled engine) - was intended to combat “flying fortresses”. Only towards the end of 1944 the question arose about replacing the Pe-2 with the more advanced Tu-2 dive bomber, but the Petlyakov machine remained the main Soviet front-line bomber until the very end of the war. Most of the pilots who tamed the fast “pawn” doted on their plane, considering it the most advanced machine in its class.