World War II month by month. September 1941

Myths of September 1941

September 1941 can be considered one of the most intense, complex and confusing periods of the Battle of Leningrad. The number of events in this month per unit of time, their scale and significance are such that it is difficult to fully cover them even in a large and detailed monograph. Without setting ourselves such a task, in this material we will dwell on two common myths associated with the German offensive on Leningrad.

Myth 1: The Germans did not intend to cross the Neva

Relatively recently, in a translation by Yu.M. Lebedev published fragments of the war diaries of F. Halder and the commander of Army Group North, Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb. In the comments to the text of the diaries, and in the case of Leeb, these are partial borrowings from assessments of the situation given in the combat log of Army Group North, the author of the translation concludes that the Germans refused to cross the Neva. How this happened and why – the author of the translation does not specify. Moreover, in one of his other works, he generally claims that no German plans to overcome the Neva have been discovered.

A fragment of the action map of the XXXIX Motorized Corps, where the planned German bridgehead on the right bank of the Neva is marked in red and the number “1”. Also shown in red is the planned third line of encirclement of Leningrad.

As is usually the case, to understand the true state of affairs in this case, it is enough only to carefully evaluate the extensive documentary base at the disposal of researchers. Firstly, the order to encircle Leningrad clearly defined the task of crossing the Neva. Secondly, the Germans themselves did not refuse the crossing in September 1941 - Soviet troops simply did not allow them to do this. The task of carrying out the crossing was set at the end of September 1941. And plans in which crossing the Neva and seizing a bridgehead on its right bank figured as an important part of the plan were developed by the Germans throughout 1942.

But what exactly happened in September 1941, allowing such speculation to appear in our time? It is known for certain that the Germans decided to create a bridgehead on the right bank in the area of ​​the railway bridge, that is, where they could count on a convenient crossing. This was to be done by the 122nd Infantry Division, at that time subordinate to the XXXIX Motorized Corps. But it was precisely in this sector that the 1st Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division of the NKVD, commanded by Major Alexander Ivanovich Tarashkevich, firmly held the defense. The Germans could not do anything with his fighters. Tarashkevich's regiment retreated to the right bank in an orderly manner on the night of September 7-8, and just at that very moment the crossing of the Neva was postponed by the German command until more favorable times. Almost a year later, Tarashkevich was awarded for the battles of early September 1941. True, on his award one of the staff left the inscription:

“Cases of 1941. Cases of days gone by.”

XXXIX Corps orders the 122nd Infantry Division to attack on 7 September. The point about seizing a bridgehead on the right bank of the Neva is underlined in red.

Thus, numerous documents available in our time allow us to conclude that the enemy’s plans to cross the Neva existed and were thwarted for completely objective reasons. And very often, as the example described above shows, these reasons were the resistance of the troops of the Leningrad Front.

Myth 2: stop order near Leningrad

Another myth of September 1941 is associated with the notorious “stop order,” which supposedly decided the fate of Leningrad. The idea of ​​the fallacy of A. Hitler’s decision and the order given on its basis for German troops to stop in the Leningrad direction did not appear out of nowhere. When it comes to stopping the offensive on Leningrad and transferring troops from Army Group North, even wartime evidence carries a certain emotional overtones. Let's try to understand this complex issue.

Photocopy of the second page of the XXXXI Corps report dated September 12, 1941. It was this document that contained the proposal to storm the city: “It seems that a gap has opened in the enemy’s defensive front, which he is not able to close. Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy in some places, signs of decomposition begin to appear in increasing numbers. They show that the backbone of the enemy's defense has been broken, and the enemy's actions allow us to conclude that there is no organized leadership. One gets the feeling that the enemy’s will to systematically resist has been broken. It is quite possible that with a quick strike, advancing with tanks along as many roads as possible, it will be possible to take Leningrad on the move. Thus, it will be possible to prevent the systematic destruction of industry and the city itself, as well as to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to organize resistance, even hopeless.” Translation by N. Vlasov. Quoted from the book by Isaev A.V. Other 1941: From the border to Leningrad. M., 2011. pp. 396–397.

On September 9, the German 18th Army and 4th Tank Group launched an offensive with the goal of reaching specified lines, encircling Leningrad and destroying the troops of the Leningrad Front. In some places, German troops acted well, but overall there was no quick breakthrough of the Soviet defense. At the same time, the XXXI Motorized Corps achieved quite serious successes with part of its forces.

Just the day before, on September 6, the commander of Army Group North, von Leeb, faced the prospect of handing over his mobile formations for the attack on Moscow. This concerned not only the troops advancing on Leningrad, but also the troops of the 16th Army operating south of Lake Ilmen. The order to withdraw part of the mobile formations from the Supreme Command of the Ground Forces (OKH) from Army Group North came at the very height of the offensive near Leningrad, on September 11.

Erich Gepner

After this, the commander of the 4th Panzer Group, Erich von Hoepner, expressed clear dissatisfaction with the decision to encircle Leningrad (and not take it). In a letter to his wife, he noted that at that very moment signs of victory appeared. The commander of the XXXXI Corps, Georg-Hans Reinhardt, whose corps was part of the formations being withdrawn from the battle, also wrote to his wife about the feeling of “bitter disappointment.” Both letters were dated September 12. On September 22, Reinhardt already wrote about his regret that at the very moment when the defenses on the outskirts of Leningrad were broken through and his corps could rush forward, the order came to stop.

The same feeling of disappointment permeates the materials revealing the actions of the troops of Army Group North during the attack on Leningrad, prepared by captured Germans as part of the “General Project”. Reinhardt himself was also captured by the Americans, and Erhard Routh, who commanded the 6th Panzer Division in Reinhardt’s corps in September 1941, apparently also took part in the creation of this work. Apparently, the seeds of dissatisfaction with the decision of the German command to limit themselves to the siege of Leningrad (albeit on the immediate approaches to it) began to germinate precisely on this soil. Thanks to this, after the end of the war, German generals had the chance to create its own history.

Erhard Routh

It is not surprising that a whole host of evidence was found in favor of the fact that it was the erroneous decision to stop the offensive that did not allow the capture of Leningrad. This point of view was expressed by Gunther Blumentritt, whose essay was published in the book Fatal Decisions. And thanks to Paul Karel and Werner Haupt, this version has become almost canonical.

And only Walter Chal de Beaulieu, the former chief of staff of the tank group, is the only German author in his book who honestly admits the fact of the existence of an order from Army Group North, according to which the 4th Panzer Group was supposed to advance only to the Uritsk-Kupchino-Aleksandrovskaya Sloboda line. De Beaulieu also mentions that this was precisely the task of the tank group, which the headquarters had known about since the end of August. True, Chal de Beaulieu himself believed that Gepner would have decided to enter Leningrad despite orders from above. He even specifically noted this in the notes.

Walter Chal de Beaulieu

What can the available documents add to this picture? The orders for the encirclement of Leningrad and the orders for the 4th Panzer Group clearly establish the range of tasks that Reinhardt's corps was supposed to deal with. They show that the corps had a very limited task, which was to capture the Duderhof Heights and advance with the forces of one division to the outskirts of Pushkin. As for the occupation of Leningrad itself, this should have been done by the 18th Army.

It is also known from now known documents that by September 12, 1941, the only task of the divisions of Reinhardt’s corps that had not been fully completed was a breakthrough to the eastern outskirts of Pushkin. In any case, tank and motorized divisions should not have participated in the very last offensive against Leningrad. By “the very last” we mean reaching the third boundary of the environment, i.e. capture of Kolpino and areas of modern St. Petersburg.

Convenient excuse

If we talk about how Reinhardt himself perceived the current situation, he really believed that he had a chance to enter the city. He reported this upstairs to the headquarters of the 4th Panzer Group. However, the proposal to launch an attack on Leningrad and enter the city was already beyond the tasks assigned to Reinhardt’s troops. Moreover, it indicated that Gepner had a very arrogant leader among his subordinate commanders.

Georg-Hans Reinhardt

On September 12, Reinhardt received an order not to cross the Peterhof-Pushkin line (modern Volkhonskoye Highway) personally from Gepner. The order was given verbally. Was this the same “stop order”? Most likely no. Reinhardt's troops had not yet fully reached the indicated line. There was no talk of stopping the advance of the entire tank group or the 18th Army. As mentioned above, Reinhardt’s corps almost completed its task. Moreover, the next day his troops even tried to take the Pulkovo Heights, but were repulsed, and they themselves were counterattacked just from the area west of Pushkin. Gepner’s headquarters understood that Reinhardt did not yet have enough strength for a further offensive. And having discovered that the Pulkovo Heights were still defending, the Germans decided to focus on a more realistic task. Moreover, the offensive of the troops of the 4th Panzer Group was seriously stalled in some places.

More importantly, on September 14, Reinhardt personally discussed with Hoepner the possibilities of a further offensive. His corps was given the task of facilitating the offensive of the neighbors on the right towards Pushkin. It was only the next day that the XXXXI Corps received special instructions to withdraw it from the battle. Of course, it can be assumed that if Reinhardt had the opportunity to use his 6th Panzer Division to storm the Pulkovo Heights or to attack in another direction, everything could have turned out differently. But at the time of receiving the order for the upcoming withdrawal, this formation was tied up in the battles for Krasnogvardeysk.

Diagram showing the advance of the 4th Panzer Group on Leningrad and the line reached by the time of the change of command on September 17

The planned withdrawal from the battle had a certain influence on the fact that from September 17 to 23, the Germans made no serious attempts to take the Pulkovo Heights. And the offensive scheduled for September 17 was cancelled. This, of course, was the enemy’s mistake, but Hitler had nothing to do with it. The German staff officers abandoned the “extra” combat activity of tank and mobile units in favor of preserving their combat potential before the march. As for the further plans of the 18th Army to occupy Leningrad, the German command was forced to abandon their implementation due to strong resistance from Soviet troops. The decision to suspend the advance of German infantry units was forced. And the enemy will return to the topic of continuing active actions more than once in the future.

It turns out that, having achieved a certain and very large success, Reinhardt was somewhat overzealous and went beyond the previously received orders. And although the order to withdraw German mobile units from the battle played a certain role in the September events near Leningrad, this role was not quite the same as what German generals described it after the war. The decision itself to withdraw mobile units would have been made in any case, and it was not due to “Hitler’s mistake”, but to objective circumstances.

The first page from the order on the withdrawal of part of the mobile formations from Army Group North. Here it is prescribed to remove the divisions of the XXXXI, LVI and LVII Corps from the subordination of the army group. The LVII and LVI Army Corps operated south of Lake Ilmen and did not participate in the September offensive on Leningrad

However, the residue that remained with Reinhardt and some of his subordinates ultimately gave rise to another myth of the Battle of Leningrad. In addition, Hans-Georg Reinhardt also had the opportunity to disseminate his point of view, being at one time the chairman of the Society for Military History. After the war, it was very convenient for German generals to claim that the entire September offensive near Leningrad was allegedly thwarted due to one wrong decision by Hitler.

Sources and literature:

1. Documents of Army Group North, 4th Panzer Group and 122nd Infantry Division from the NARA collection.
2. Leningrad "Blitzkrieg". Based on the war diaries of senior Wehrmacht officers Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb and Colonel General Franz Halder. 1941–1942 // Transl. and com. Yu.M. Lebedeva. M., 2011.
3. Chales de Beaulieu W. Der Vorstoss der Panzergruppe 4 auf Leningrad. Neckargemund, 1961.
4. Hürter J. Hitlers Heerführer: die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion, 1941/42. Munich, 2007

SEPTEMBER 1 • MONDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 1, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 1, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 1, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. Our aviation continued to deliver massive attacks on enemy motorized units, infantry and artillery and destroyed aviation at its airfields. According to incomplete data, on August 30, 31 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles. Our losses are 16 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 2 • TUESDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 2, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 2, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 2, our troops continued to fight stubbornly with the enemy along the entire front. After fierce fighting, our troops evacuated the city of Tallinn. According to updated data, on August 30, not 31 German aircraft were destroyed, as previously reported, but 75 German aircraft. During August 31, 23 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles. Our losses are 22 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 3 • WEDNESDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 3, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 3, our troops continued to fight the enemy along the entire front. Our aviation continued to strike at enemy motorized units, infantry and artillery and attacked aviation at its airfields.

Evening message During September 3, our troops fought stubborn battles with the enemy along the entire front. On September 1, 39 enemy aircraft were shot down in air battles and destroyed at airfields. Our losses are 27 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 4 • THURSDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 4, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 4, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 4, our troops continued to fight with the enemy along the entire front. During September 2, our aviation destroyed 52 enemy aircraft in air battles and at airfields. Our losses are 28 aircraft. In the Baltic Sea, our aircraft and torpedo boats attacked enemy transports and a patrol ship. As a result of the attack, one transport and a patrol ship sank from being hit by torpedoes, two transports, having received major damage, washed ashore.

SEPTEMBER 5 • FRIDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 5, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 5, our troops continued to fight the enemy along the entire front. Our aviation attacked enemy troops and their airfields.

Evening message During September 5, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. According to incomplete data, during September 3, 33 German aircraft were destroyed. Our losses are 27 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 6 • SATURDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 6, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 6, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 6, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. Our aviation carried out massive attacks on enemy motorized units, infantry and artillery on the battlefield and destroyed aviation at its airfields. According to updated data for September 3, not 33 German aircraft were destroyed, as previously reported, but 56 aircraft. On September 4, 61 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and mainly at enemy airfields. Our losses are 7 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 7 • SUNDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 7, our troops continued fighting with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 7, our troops continued to fight stubbornly with the enemy along the entire front. Our aviation carried out massive attacks on enemy troops and attacked their aircraft at airfields. During September 5, 23 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at enemy airfields. Our losses are 11 aircraft. The German submarine U-73 was captured in the Barents Sea.

SEPTEMBER 8 • MONDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 8, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 8, our troops continued fighting with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 8, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. In the Smolensk direction, twenty-six days of battles for the mountains. Yelnya near Smolensk ended in the defeat of the SS division, 15th infantry division, 17th motorized division, 10th tank division, 137, 178, 292, 268 enemy infantry divisions. The remnants of the enemy divisions hastily retreat to the west. Our troops occupied the city of Yelnya. Our aircraft continued to strike enemy troops on the battlefield and destroyed aircraft at their airfields. On the night of September 8, our planes bombed Bucharest. All planes returned to their bases. On September 6, 62 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at enemy airfields. Our losses are 33 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 9 • TUESDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 9, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 9, our troops continued fighting with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 9, our troops fought stubborn battles with the enemy along the entire front. Our aircraft attacked enemy troops on the battlefield and destroyed aircraft at their airfields. On September 7, 71 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles, anti-aircraft artillery fire and at enemy airfields. Our losses are 24 aircraft. On the afternoon of September 9, 2 German reconnaissance aircraft were shot down near Moscow.

SEPTEMBER 10 • WEDNESDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 10, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 10, our troops continued fighting with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 10, our troops continued to wage stubborn battles with the enemy along the entire front. During September 8, 59 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at enemy airfields. Our losses are 27 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 11 • THURSDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 11, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 11, our troops continued to fight stubbornly with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 11, our troops fought stubborn battles with the enemy along the entire front. Our aviation, in cooperation with ground forces, attacked enemy motorized units, infantry and artillery and destroyed aviation at its airfields. During September 9, 81 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles by anti-aircraft artillery fire and at enemy airfields. Our losses are 41 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 12 • FRIDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 12, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 12, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 12, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. After stubborn battles, our troops left the city of Chernigov. On September 10, 53 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at enemy airfields. Our losses are 32 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 13 • SATURDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 13, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 13, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 13, our troops fought stubborn battles with the enemy along the entire front. During September 11, 50 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at enemy airfields. Our losses are 34 aircraft. On the night of September 13, our aircraft bombed Bucharest. All your planes have returned to their bases. A German patrol ship and a large German transport were sunk by torpedo boats of the Northern Fleet.

SEPTEMBER 14 • SUNDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 14, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 14, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 14, our troops continued to wage stubborn battles with the enemy along the entire front. After many days and fierce battles, our troops abandoned the city of Kremenchug. On September 12, 21 German aircraft were shot down in air battles and 46 German aircraft were destroyed at airfields, and a total of 67 enemy aircraft were destroyed. Our losses are 28 aircraft. On the afternoon of September 14, one German reconnaissance aircraft was shot down near Moscow.

SEPTEMBER 15 • MONDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 15, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 15, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 15, our troops fought stubborn battles with the enemy along the entire front. On September 13, 15 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles. Our losses are 10 aircraft. Our aircraft bombed Galati, Sulin and Constanta. On September 13, the enemy launched an operation to land troops on the coast of the island of Ezel. Thanks to the actions of our ships, aircraft and fire from coastal batteries, the German landing force was defeated. 4 enemy transports and one enemy destroyer were sunk. The remaining two transports and several German destroyers received serious damage.

SEPTEMBER 16 • TUESDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 16, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 16, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 16, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. Our aviation attacked enemy motorized vehicles, infantry and artillery, attacked aviation at its airfields and bombed crossings. On September 14, 29 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at enemy airfields. Our losses are 18 aircraft. According to updated data, on September 15 our Northern Fleet ships destroyed not 2 large enemy transports, as previously reported, but 3 large transports.

SEPTEMBER 17 • WEDNESDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 17, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 17, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 17, our troops fought stubborn battles with the enemy along the entire front. During September 15, 78 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at enemy airfields. Our losses are 25 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 18 • THURSDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 18, 1941

Morning message On the night of September 18, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. Our aircraft attacked enemy troops and destroyed aircraft at their airfields.

Evening message During September 18, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. Our aviation attacked enemy motorized units, infantry and artillery on the battlefield and attacked aviation at its airfields. During September 16, 112 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at enemy airfields. Our losses are 29 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 19 • FRIDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 19, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 19, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front and were especially fierce near Kiev. Our aviation attacked enemy motorized units, infantry and artillery on the battlefield, and attacked aviation at its airfields.

Evening message During September 19, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front and were especially fierce near Kiev. On September 17, 45 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at enemy airfields. Our losses are 23 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 20 • SATURDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 20, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 20, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front and were especially fierce near Kiev.

Evening message During September 20, our troops fought stubborn battles with the enemy along the entire front and were especially fierce near Kiev. Our aviation attacked enemy motorized units, infantry and artillery, bombed enemy aircraft at airfields and destroyed crossings. During September 18, 16 German aircraft were shot down in air battles. Our losses are 14 aircraft. A large German transport was sunk by our ship in the Barents Sea.

SEPTEMBER 21 • SUNDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 21, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 21, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front and were especially fierce near Kiev.

Evening message During September 21, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. After many days of fierce fighting, our troops left Kyiv. During September 19, 60 German aircraft were destroyed. Our losses were 24 aircraft, the Finnish coastal defense battleship Ilmarinen in the Gulf of Finland, attacked by our ships, ran into mines and sank.

SEPTEMBER 22 • MONDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 22, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 22, our troops fought with enemies along the entire front.

Evening message During September 22, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. During September 20, 100 German aircraft were destroyed, of which 28 were shot down in air battles and 72 were destroyed at airfields. Our losses are 21 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 23 • TUESDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 23, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 23, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 23, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. During September 21, 53 enemy aircraft were destroyed, of which 28 were shot down in air battles and 25 were destroyed at airfields. Our losses are 16 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 24 • WEDNESDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 24, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 24, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 24, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. On September 22, 75 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at enemy airfields. Our losses are 28 aircraft. In the Gulf of Finland, our torpedo boats sank enemy transport.

Fascist nonsense about Soviet losses The Nazis, carried away by false fabrications, lied to such an extent that they completely stopped making ends meet. In early September, the German information bureau amazed the whole world by “destroying” the entire naval fleet of the USSR with one stroke of the pen. Forgetting about this, the German command in a report for September 22 reported: “German aviation yesterday was especially successful in its attacks against the Soviet fleet,” while “1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1 battleship and 9 steamships with a total displacement of approximately 25 thousand tons were allegedly sunk.” . Two more warships and two steamships were set on fire.” Thus, Hitler’s empty-headed fools managed to “sink” for the second time the ships of the fleet, which they had already sunk once in their inkwells. “If he lies, he doesn’t remember himself,” says the Russian proverb. This is what happened with Hitler’s lies. There is no need to say that the Nazis did not sink any “ships of the Soviet fleet” and did not burn any Soviet ships. Things turned out just the opposite: recently, Soviet sailors sank 14 German transports and ships and one Finnish battleship; 10 German transports and destroyers were damaged and disabled. The same should be said about another fascist lie, according to which one Nazi tank division allegedly destroyed 302 Soviet tanks near Leningrad. In fact, the Nazis did not destroy any 302 Soviet tanks either near Leningrad or in any other place “the other day.”

SEPTEMBER 25 • THURSDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 25, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 25, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 25, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. During September 23, 138 enemy aircraft were destroyed, of which 70 aircraft were shot down in air battles and by anti-aircraft artillery, and 68 aircraft were destroyed at airfields. Our losses are 36 aircraft.

Another fake by the Nazis about Soviet losses. On September 24, fascist empty nesters from the main command of the German army burst out with yet another fake. Now they are no longer satisfied with dozens of “destroyed” Soviet tanks and thousands of “captured” Red Army soldiers with a flick of the pen. The German public is so accustomed to such nonsense that it can no longer be surprised by such a lie, common among fascists. Taking this into account, the Nazis decided to lie more forcefully. To please themselves, they solemnly broadcast about the capture of 570 Soviet tanks and 380 thousand prisoners in the Kyiv area. Of course, the Nazis did not capture or destroy any 570 tanks and did not take any 380 thousand prisoners. The fierce struggle on the Kiev front continues. There is no doubt that the German invaders have a preponderance of forces here. It is still difficult to say how this struggle will end. Of course, the Germans have a plan to capture thousands of prisoners and hundreds of tanks. But the plan still needs to be implemented, and the desire of the Germans alone is far from sufficient to implement such a plan. The essence of the stupid nonsense of the German fascists is that they present their plan as reality. Fraudulent attempts by the German command to create undeserved glory for themselves At one time, the Germans shouted to the whole world that they had broken through the French fortified Maginot Line. In fact, the Germans did not break through the Maginot Line, they bypassed it. The Germans needed to declare a breakthrough in order to attribute undeserved success and glory to themselves. The German invaders repeated this trick during their treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, when they declared that they had allegedly broken through the “Stalin Line.” The Soviet Information Bureau explained that there was no fortified area of ​​the “Stalin Line”, but rather ordinary field-type fortifications. The Germans invented the “Stalin Line” “in order to attribute to themselves undeserved successes and glory. Now the Nazis are fraudulently trying to repeat the same trick for the third time. The German magazine Militerische Correspondents Aus Deutschland writes in one of its articles about the superiority of the defensive system of Leningrad compared to the Maginot Line. Any more or less literate person knows that fortified lines of the Maginot type took years to build, and that it is impossible to build such a line in one or two months. The ego is also known to the Nazi invaders. Why do they fraudulently claim the superiority of the defensive system of Leningrad compared to the Maginot Line? The Nazis do this in order, firstly, to justify their enormous losses that they suffered on the outskirts of Leningrad; secondly, in order to explain why their boastful plan to capture Leningrad, scheduled for the end of August, is being disrupted. On one of the sections of the Western front, our rifle regiment completely destroyed two enemy companies. There were 200 killed and 70 wounded German soldiers and officers, 20 light machine guns, over 200 rifles, many machine guns and other weapons left on the battlefield. On another section of the Western front, our troops defeated an enemy battalion. The enemy lost over 150 soldiers and officers killed and up to 300 wounded. Our troops captured 8 heavy machine guns, 400 rifles, 20 machine guns, 10 mortars and grenade launchers, 2 radio stations and 50 horses. West of Novgorod-Seversky, a detachment of Soviet aircraft destroyed 10 German tanks and many vehicles. Seven tanks, more than a company of fascist soldiers, and several dozen cavalrymen were destroyed by Soviet pilots in the Pochinok area. At one of the Dnieper crossings, the Germans lost up to two infantry battalions, 57 vehicles, 10 guns and several dozen wagons with ammunition from the fire of our aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 26 • FRIDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 26, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 26, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. On September 25, near Moscow, our aircraft shot down two German reconnaissance aircraft. During September 23, our aviation carried out attacks on enemy troops. During this day, various aviation units destroyed 86 German tanks, 32 armored vehicles, 7 tankettes, 339 vehicles with troops and military cargo, 27 gasoline tanks, 7 anti-tank guns, 15 anti-aircraft installations, and suppressed 11 anti-aircraft artillery batteries. Five infantry companies and an artillery battalion were also destroyed, and three enemy battalions were scattered. In addition, 138 German aircraft were destroyed in air battles and at enemy airfields.

Evening message During September 26, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. On September 24, 118 German aircraft were destroyed. Our losses are 29 aircraft.

The defeat of the Romanian divisions near Odessa The morning message of the Soviet Information Bureau on September 24 spoke of a new defeat on the approaches to Odessa of 13 and 15 replenished Romanian divisions. The additional information received gives a more detailed picture of the defeat of the Romanian divisions. On September 22, our troops, with a combined strike of infantry units and a landing force of sailors, thrown by our ships behind enemy lines, delivered a strong surprise blow to the Romanian troops on the approaches to Odessa. The actions of the ground forces were supported by fire from several ships of the Black Sea Fleet and aviation. As a result of the successful operation of our troops, the Romanians suffered serious losses in people and weapons. The total Romanian losses in killed, wounded and prisoners amount to at least 5,000–6,000 soldiers; 2000 of them were killed. According to incomplete data, our units captured 33 guns of various calibers, including several heavy long-range ones, 6 tanks, 2 thousand rifles, 110 machine guns, 30 mortars, 130 machine guns, 4 thousand shells, 15 thousand mines, a large number of boxes with rifle cartridges and grenades.

SEPTEMBER 27 • SATURDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 27, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 27, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 27, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. On September 25, 44 German aircraft were destroyed. Our losses are 19 aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 28 • SUNDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 28, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 28, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 28, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. On September 26, 98 German aircraft were destroyed. Our losses are 31 aircraft. Our Northern Fleet ships sank two enemy transports with a displacement of 8 thousand and 5 thousand tons. Coastal batteries and ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet sank one enemy cruiser and one destroyer and severely damaged two destroyers. An enemy tanker with a displacement of 6 thousand tons was sunk in the Black Sea. Near Moscow, on September 27, two German reconnaissance aircraft were shot down and on September 28, two more aircraft were shot down.

SEPTEMBER 29 • MONDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 29, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 29, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 29, our troops fought stubborn battles with the enemy along the entire front. According to updated data, on September 26, not 98 German aircraft were destroyed, but 113 aircraft. On September 27, 150 German aircraft were destroyed, of which 37 aircraft were shot down in air battles and 113 aircraft were destroyed at airfields. Our troops are 128 aircraft. According to updated data, the joint actions of coastal batteries and ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet sunk not a cruiser and one destroyer, as stated earlier, but one cruiser and two destroyers.

SEPTEMBER 30 • TUESDAY

OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 30, 1941

Morning message During the night of September 30, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front.

Evening message During September 30, our troops fought with the enemy along the entire front. After stubborn battles, our troops left Poltava. On September 28, 65 German aircraft were destroyed. Our losses are 27 aircraft.

News and events

September 9, 1941. 80th day of war

Battle for Leningrad.

Leningrad Front. Leningrad defensive operation. At 9:30 am, Army Group North launched a new offensive, bypassing Krasnogvardeysk (Gatchina) from the west, and Krasnoye Selo from the south and east. The 36th Motorized Division, advancing in the first echelon of the XLI Motorized Corps, broke through the defenses of the 3rd People's Militia Division and by the end of the day advanced 10 kilometers into the depth of the defense of the Soviet troops.

Southwestern Front. Kyiv defensive operation. At the request of the front command, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command allowed the withdrawal of the 5th Army and the right flank of the 37th Army to the Desna in order to cover the right wing of the front. The enemy, advancing from the north, pushed the 5th Army away from the Desna and advanced from Chernigov to Nezhin. The 17th German Army, having crossed the Dnieper southeast of Kremenchug, captured a large bridgehead. The main forces of the army and the 1st Tank Group were concentrated here. Attempts by the command of the South-Western direction to push the enemy back beyond the Dnieper remained unsuccessful.

Southern front. Tiraspol-Melitopol defensive operation. In the morning, the German 11th Army resumed its offensive, delivering the main blow from the Kakhovsky bridgehead. The troops of the 9th Army held back enemy attacks.

September 9, 1942. 445th day of the war

Battle for Leningrad.

Volkhov Front. Sinyavinskaya operation. Front troops with the 2nd Shock Army continued offensive operations. The army formations, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance and repelling his counterattacks, made little progress in the area between the Kruglaya grove and the large swamp.

Western Front. The 29th and 31st armies launched an offensive operation with the goal of defeating the enemy’s Rzhev group. The front's combat order required them to encircle and destroy it with joint strikes, liberating Rzhev at the same time. The offensive began at dawn after a half-hour artillery preparation. Since the rifle divisions were unable to completely break through the enemy defense, units of the 6th Tank Corps were brought into battle that same morning to complete it. The tankers broke into the German positions at Belogurovo and Zubarevo in one rush and captured both villages by 10 o’clock. On the same day, the corps troops began fighting for Mikheevo. The Germans clung especially fiercely to this stronghold, the capture of which opened up the possibility of an attack on Rzhev from the southeast. The tankers took the village of Mikheevo, but the offensive as a whole was unsuccessful.

Battle of Stalingrad.

Stalingrad defensive operation.

Stalingrad front. Soviet troops fought offensive battles in the sectors of the 24th, 1st Guards and 66th armies. The enemy put up stubborn resistance and in a number of areas launched counterattacks with infantry and tanks. None of the advancing armies completed the task. The German breakthrough to the Volga, a narrow 8-kilometer ribbon, continued to separate the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts.

South-Eastern Front. The front troops on their right wing fought fierce battles with enemy infantry and tanks, who went on the offensive. At the same time, part of the enemy’s right wing forces counterattacked in the direction of Aleksandrovka, Sadovaya, height 147.5. By 5 p.m., the enemy, thanks to continuous air support, managed to occupy Gorodishche, Uvarovo and Aleksandrovka.

Battle for the Caucasus.

Transcaucasian front. Mozdok-Malgobek operation. Front troops by the Northern Group of Forces, commanded by a native of the Chalykla station in the Saratov region, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov, fought heavy battles with the enemy, who resumed the offensive in the direction of Terek and mark 154.

Formations and units of the 46th Army continued offensive battles on the passes of the Main Caucasus Range.

Black Sea group of forces. On the Novorossiysk sector of the front, Soviet troops repulsed fierce enemy attacks in the city of Novorossiysk and on its outskirts.

September 9, 1943. 810th day of the war

Bryansk front. Bryansk operation. North of Bryansk, troops of the 3rd Army liberated Lyudinovo.

Battle of the Dnieper.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent a directive to the troops, in which the commanders of the fronts and armies stated: “During combat operations, the Red Army troops have and will have to overcome many water obstacles. A quick and decisive crossing of rivers, especially large ones like the Desna River and the Dnieper River, will be of great importance for the further success of our troops.” The directive further stated: “For crossing a river such as the Desna River in the Bogdanovo region (Smolensk region) and below, and rivers equal to the Desna in terms of the difficulty of crossing, be awarded the following awards: 1. Army commanders - the Order of Suvorov, 1st degree. 2. Commanders of corps, divisions, brigades - to the Order of Suvorov, 2nd degree. 3. Regimental commanders, commanders of engineering, sapper and pontoon battalions - to the Order of Suvorov, 3rd degree. For crossing a river such as the Dnieper River in the Smolensk region and below, and rivers equal to the Dnieper in terms of the difficulty of crossing the above-mentioned commanders of formations and units, the commanders of the formations and units should be awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.”

Central front. Chernigov-Pripyat operation. Developing the attack on Chernigov, the troops of the left wing of the front with the forces of the 13th and 60th armies, after two days of fighting, captured the city and the large railway junction of Bakhmach. To the south of the city, Soviet units surrounded and within a few days completely destroyed the remnants of 4 German infantry divisions. A gap opened in the enemy's defenses in this area. To close it, he threw into battle one infantry division, pulled up from the rear to the Nezhin area.

Southern front. Donbass offensive operation. Front troops continued their offensive along the entire front line. The second echelon of the Mariupol landing force was landed.

Battle for the Caucasus.

North Caucasus Front. The Novorossiysk-Taman offensive operation of the front forces began in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla, which lasted until October 9, 1943. The plan of the operation provided for a sudden amphibious landing at dawn on September 10 in the port of Novorossiysk on a wide front from Cape Lyubvi to the Power Plant. For this purpose, three landing detachments were created, each of which included landing units and boats disembarking them.

The naval landing group consisted of the 255th Marine Brigade of the 393rd Separate Marine Battalion, the 290th NKVD Regiment and the 1339th Infantry Regiment of the 318th Infantry Division. In total, the landing group included 6,480 soldiers and officers, of which more than 4 thousand were marines.

With the onset of darkness in Gelendzhik, personnel began boarding the watercraft and loading weapons of the first echelon of troops. The second echelon landed in the village of Kabardinka. From 21:15 to 22:00, landing troops, under the cover of fighter aircraft, entered the landing area. Due to the delay in loading and during the transition to sea of ​​the third landing detachment, Rear Admiral G.N. Kholostyakov moved the time of his disembarkation from 2 hours 15 minutes to 3 hours on September 10.

September 9, 1944. 1176th day of the war

1st Ukrainian Front. East Carpathian operation. On the night of September 9, the enemy transferred the 75th Infantry Division to the Krosno-Dukla direction from the Turka area (75 kilometers southeast of Sanok). The 1st and 8th tank divisions were transferred from the Sandomierz bridgehead area. On this day, units of the 1st Panzer Division counterattacked the troops of the 38th Army. Individual units from Slovakia, who had previously fought against the rebels, were also urgently transferred here. In the morning, the troops of the 38th Army resumed their offensive. To develop success, the 25th Tank and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps were introduced into the battle, and in the afternoon the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps. The introduction of the mobile group and the Czechoslovak Army Corps into the battle did not lead to a turning point in the operation, since the gap that was initially made in the German defense was already tightly closed. The fighting became protracted.

4th Ukrainian Front. The Carpathian-Uzhgorod offensive operation began, which lasted until October 28, 1944. In the morning, the 107th Rifle Corps of the 1st Guards Army went on the offensive. The corps advanced 4-5 kilometers during the day. During the offensive of the 107th Rifle Corps, and then the neighboring rifle formation, the enemy launched repeated counterattacks, trying to close the breakthrough.

2nd Ukrainian Front. Bucharest-Arad operation. The front troops continued the offensive and by the end of the day on the left flank they had advanced up to 25 kilometers and captured 150 settlements.

3rd Ukrainian Front. The front troops, meeting no resistance, continued to advance forward.

Despite the heat, the mobile units traveled 100-120 kilometers, and the main forces - up to 45 kilometers, occupying up to 700 settlements, including the cities of Razgrad, Shumen, Provadia, etc. The advanced detachments of the armies reached the Malki-Lom river line - Shumen - south of Provadiya and Varna, the 7th Mechanized Corps reached the area of ​​Shumen and Karnobat, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps entered Burgas, and part of its forces entered Aitos.

In the afternoon, ships of the Black Sea Fleet landed a force of about 400 people in Burgas, where an airborne assault had previously been dropped. The ships of the Bulgarian navy remaining in the ports of Varna and Burgas did not offer resistance. The entire German fleet operating in the Black Sea was scuttled by order of the German command.

An armed uprising began in Sofia and the government of the Fatherland Front was formed, headed by K. Georgiev, which declared war on Nazi Germany and turned to the Soviet government with a request for a truce. On this evening, the commanders of the front and the Black Sea Fleet received a directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to cease hostilities in Bulgaria. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered to complete the operation to occupy the settlements planned by the plan by 21 o'clock, to firmly gain a foothold in that part of the country occupied by Soviet troops, and to cease military operations in Bulgaria from 22 o'clock.

Sources:

Materials from the Internet sites “Wikipedia”, “Feat of the People” (Journals of combat operations of the Volkhov, Stalingrad, South-Eastern and Transcaucasian fronts for September 1942; 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts for September 1944).

Liberation of cities: A guide to the liberation of cities during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1985.

What was it like on September 1 in the front city of Leningrad?

The siege of Leningrad is one of the most tragic pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. And although time has distanced us from the mournful events for more than 75 years, the search for little-known documents of an unparalleled national feat continues. In preparation for the anniversary of the Great Victory, the Presidential Library made a significant contribution to preserving our common memory of the war: more than 4,000 unique documents were donated by Leningraders, their children and grandchildren for digitization to the library on Senateskaya, 3. There are also memories of little Leningraders, after all, in the besieged There were children and youth left in the city who not only survived, but also worked for Victory; they were not lacking in perseverance and heroism. What was it like on September 1 in the besieged city?

“On September 1, 1941, our school did not work,” a third-grader from school No. 218 at 13 Rubinshteina Street wrote in her blockade diary. More than 70 years later, Zinaida Arkadyevna Itkina’s notes became available on the Presidential Library portal.

“September 1941,” I. Malakhov records in his diary. – I had to sit at my desk in 9th grade. But the war changed everything...students are digging anti-tank ditches. Will classes start? I don't think so, the front is too close. And I want to study! Lyova Rabkevich and I wanted to apply to the correspondence school (if it’s open).”

A week later, on September 8, 1941, the city was encircled. At this time, there were 201,082 schoolchildren in Leningrad, and it was decided to continue education in the besieged city. But in November 1941, only 90,152 people started studying. This was partly explained by the mass evacuation of children, partly by the fact that many high school students replaced their parents who had gone to the front at work. Hunger began to feel more and more intense. In the winter of 1941–1942, the most difficult time of the blockade, the number of schools decreased sharply. By the spring of 1942, only 2,800 children and teenagers attended classes. These data are taken from the book “School No. 138 during the Siege” - a collection of memories of students and teachers of this educational institution, which piece by piece reconstructs the blockade period of education.

“October 1941. Classes fell out of the blue,” I. Malakhov continues his notes. – Consultations began on October 15, and the “school year” began on November 3... The teachers teach well, intelligently and clearly. Especially physics. We live in a school where we have light and heat, but at home, because of saving wood, we rarely heat firewood... Pupils are fed soup without cards, and sometimes even a third... Simultaneously with the start of classes in Leningrad, the second German offensive on Moscow began..."

This is how the children and teenagers of the besieged city kept their notes, interspersing school news with Sovinformburo reports on the state of affairs at the fronts.

The realities of the first blockade winter, the hungriest and coldest, completely changed school life.

“In the winter of 1942, the janitor of our house, Uncle Vasya, told children of primary school age to come to the bomb shelter at 8 or 10 Vladimirsky Prospekt,” we read in the blockade diary of Zinaida Arkadyevna Itkina. “The very next day the guys, everyone who could, ran to this bomb shelter. The roadway of Vladimirsky Prospekt was thickly covered with snow, even the tram rails were not visible. In the bomb shelter, women, children and elderly people sat on chairs taken from apartments or directly on the floor. Near the wall there was a table, at the head of which sat a young man - a teacher. About ten children aged 9–10 years gathered, we sat on long benches, and the teacher read to us, told us, we even drew something. We came every day and “studied” for several hours, despite the daily long bombings.”

In 1942, the new school year looked different. In the newspaper “Leningradskaya Pravda. 1942, No. 208 (September 2)” in the article “Back at the desks” we read: “Long before the start of classes, the school corridors came to life. In fact, the doors of the school were wide open in the summer months: junior school children worked in clubs and gathered here for excursions. Yesterday they sat down at their desks again. <…> After lessons, the children headed to the dining room, where a hearty lunch was prepared for them.

The school has been renovated. Water supply and sewerage are in good working order. Some of the firewood has already been prepared. The premises are clean; there are flowers on the tables. There is a library and a teaching room. Books and notebooks were distributed to students.

High school students are still engaged in agricultural work; in a month they will sit down at their desks.

Yesterday classes began in many schools in the city. The first day showed that Leningrad schools were well prepared for them.

The second academic year in the front city has begun.”

About life in the evacuation of Leningrad kindergartens and schools in the article “ We take care of Leningrad children as if they were our own ” in the newspaper “Leningradskaya Pravda. 1942, No. 210 (September 4)” it is written:

“A year ago, in the days when enemy tanks and motorized columns rushed to Leningrad, we escorted thousands of our children to distant regions of the country, to the deep rear... For a long time there was no news about how the children lived away from their parents. But then the letters began to arrive in a flood. Written by directors and teachers of kindergartens and hearths. Teachers and schoolchildren write.

Pupils of junior classes of the 249th school of the Oktyabrsky district and pupils of the 49th boarding school of the Smolninsky district write from the city of Shadrinsk, Chelyabinsk region: “The teachers take care of us like family. In winter we studied with “good” and “excellent” marks. Everyone, as one, moved on to the next grades. There are no repeaters. When the summer holidays arrived, our boarding schools planted vegetables. The harvest will be good. We are already eating our cucumbers, carrots, and radishes. On August 15, a group of schoolchildren began picking mushrooms and berries in the forest. We have already pickled 150 kilograms of mushrooms. The second group of schoolchildren went to the collective farm for harvesting work. The third group prepares fuel for the winter. The slogan “We will help the front and Leningrad with excellent studies and excellent work!” sunk into the soul of each of us.”

A year later, an article in the newspaper “Leningradskaya Pravda” begins with a confident positive note. 1943, No. 206 (September 1)" under the heading "Classes begin in schools today."

“Today classes begin in the lower grades of Leningrad schools.

“Leningrad schoolchildren,” the head of the City Department of Public Education, Comrade, told our employee. Nikitin, - we had a good time over the summer in pioneer camps and on school grounds. Tomorrow they will sit down at their desks again.

Schools are well prepared for the new academic year. In the vast majority of schools, renovation work has already been completed. Roofs, water supply, sewerage, stoves were repaired; school premises have been brought into a comfortable state. <…>

Fuel for six months has already been delivered to schools; a number of schools in the Vyborg and Primorsky districts have fully stocked up on firewood...

For high school students engaged in agricultural work, classes will begin on October 1.”

After the siege of Leningrad was broken in the winter of 1943, there was even more encouraging news. The tone of the schoolchildren's diary entries has also changed noticeably. Here is an excerpt from the book “Girl from the Siege” digitized by the Presidential Library, compiled from Leningrad resident Alisa Konstantinovna Bolshakova’s own records of the siege:

“On September 1, 1943, I went to girls’ school No. 335... I was wearing a checkered dress and holding a yellow straw briefcase. As my mother explained to me, the things came to us from American parcels and American humanitarian aid. Near the school I immediately met a girl. We sat at the same desk."

There were less than five months left until the blockade was completely lifted on January 27, 1944...