June 1941. 4th mechanized corps on the Lvov ledge

Reasons for the defeat of the mechanized corps of the Red Army

F. 229, op. 3780ss, no. 6, pp. 339-359

FROM THE REPORT “ON THE STATUS OF THE 21st MECHANIZED CORPS AS OF JULY 23, 1941”

...The 21st Mechanized Corps began to be created organizationally only in April 1941, with the expectation (according to the General Staff plan) of being equipped with combat materiel no earlier than 1942. 1. ...By the beginning of the war, the corps was 80-90% staffed, of which up to 70% were from the April-June conscription. The hull was provided with 10-15% of its material parts (wheeled and special vehicles). The corps went to the front with a significant shortage of artillery, heavy and light machine guns and automatic rifles, as well as mortars. Most 76-mm guns were without panoramas, and small-caliber anti-aircraft guns were without rangefinders (they were given two days before the war and during the war). The corps was sent to war on alert, unmobilized and understaffed with materiel of all types, with a significant number of untrained fighters. The lack of weapons, materiel and the unpreparedness of the recruits forced me to leave up to 17 thousand untrained soldiers in the winter quarters with the task of training, arming and recruiting them. 4. Due to the lack of repair shops, spare parts and parts for repair, a lot of material is damaged, which could be restored by the forces of the units. 5. The unarmed fighters I left in the areas of winter quarters are currently moving in the direction of Ostashki, experiencing extreme difficulties both in food and in training; Neither the 22nd Army nor other supply agencies want to supply the second echelon of the corps, considering it foreign, and at the same time they are taking the most decisive measures to take away its personnel and material, depriving me of the prospect of ever forming into a mechanized corps. So, for example: the material supplied to me according to the plans of the Main Armored Directorate and the Main Artillery Directorate and sent to my address is intercepted by the command of the 22nd Army. In Velikiye Luki they took from me 1,500 self-loading rifles, 126 trucks, 15 auto kitchens, 28 76-mm guns, 22 KV tanks, 13 T-34 tanks, several wagons of spare parts and 860 sets of tires. In addition, by order of individual senior commanders, “ZIS” - 115 pieces and “GAZ” - 186 pieces were taken away under various pretexts (by order of Major General Karmanov and the Chief of Staff of the 11th Army).

F. 624, op 2660s, d. 4, pp. 116-117. Typewritten copy.

FROM A POLITICAL REPORT OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE 11TH MECHANIZED CORPS TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE WESTERN FRONT DATED JULY 15, 1941

The attack of Nazi Germany found the 11th MK unsecured with material and technical property. There were: T-26 - 242 tanks, 18 flamethrowers, BT-5 - 44, T-34 - 24, KV - 3. The T-26 and BT-5 tanks were mainly a combat training fleet, received from other parts. Up to 10-15 percent. The tanks were not taken on the campaign because they were under repair. The artillery regiments were not fully equipped with guns, control devices, tractors and vehicles. The corps was provided with cars within 10-15 percent

TsAMO. f. 208, op. 2526, no. 28, pp. 65-72

FROM THE REPORT “ON COMBAT OPERATIONS OF TANK FORCES ON THE WESTERN FRONT FOR THE PERIOD FROM 6/22 TO 7/27/41”

1. SUPPLY OF MECHANIZED CORPS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR Provision of the 5th, 6th, 7th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 17th and 20th mechanized corps with combat and auxiliary equipment, ammunition, fuels and lubricants and their deployment before engaging in battle with the Nazis: a) Mechanized corps (excluding the first three) were equipped with 15–20% combat and auxiliary equipment. The artillery units that were part of the mechanized corps were equipped with about 10–15% of the material part of the artillery and tractors, did not have the required number of combat kits for both field artillery and tanks, the mechanized corps immediately began to feel a lack of armor-piercing shells for 76- and 45-mm guns. The combat materiel, on the basis of which the mechanized corps were deployed and with which they entered into battle, consisted mainly of “T-26”, “BT-2”, “BT-5” and “BT-7” with an average power reserve 75-100 engine hours. b) Tactical training of mechanized corps was carried out according to the program for tank forces, but in most cases they had to act as infantry, not having sufficient weapons. c) Before the outbreak of hostilities, the mechanized corps were fully provided with fuel and lubricants; despite this, from the very first days they began to feel an urgent need for fuel and lubricants, since there were far from enough containers for delivery (gasoline tanks, containers) and The organization of transportation was also not thought out. Fuel and lubricants were delivered mainly during the daytime, the columns were not covered by anything; naturally, these columns were often exposed to enemy aircraft with impunity and units were left without fuel and lubricants. d) The deployment of the mechanized corps did not correspond to the plans of the command of the Western Front: the 13th and 14th mechanized corps were located in close proximity to the border, and the tank division located in Brest was under the influence of enemy artillery fire, time to reach its starting position it took much more than the enemy to get from the border to the location of the tank division. The 14th Mechanized Corps had two tank divisions equipped with 50% light tanks, and in the 11th Mechanized Corps only one division had 50% light tanks. The remaining corps (17th and 20th) were not equipped with combat equipment and were separate units of unarmed tankers grouped around several training vehicles...

F. 38-39, op. 80038ss, no. 1, ll. 260-267

FROM THE REPORT OF THE HEAD OF THE ARMORED DIRECTORATE OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT “ON THE REASONS FOR LARGE LOSSES IN MECHANIZED CORPS AND PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THEIR USE”

...The lack of evacuation means, spare parts for the "KV" and "T-34", the presence of factory defects, lack of mastery of operation, insufficient training of personnel, ...the lack of armor-piercing shells for the "KV" and "T-34" - led the mechanized corps to huge losses and incapacity of the remaining available material. The 13th, 9th, 19th and 24th mechanized corps, due to the lack of sufficient material, act as rifle formations.

V. OPERATIONAL PREPARATION OF COMMAND STAFF AND STAFF. COMBAT TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

FROM J.V. STALIN’S SPEECH TO THE GRADUATES OF THE RED RED ARMED PEOPLE’S MILITARY ACADEMIES IN THE KREMLIN

May 5, 1941

“...Why was there a lag? Because, firstly, it is easier for teachers to teach the old technique that is already familiar. In order to teach students on a new material part, the teachers themselves need to know it and study it. We need to relearn. The academies teach using old programs. This is the first reason. The second reason is that our supply authorities in the army do not provide new equipment to schools and academies. This new technique must be given to our students for study, to eliminate the backlog of our schools and academies.”

RCKHIDNI. F.558. On. 1. D.3808. l. 1-12.

FROM THE REPORT OF THE ASSISTANT COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT FOR TANK FORCES “ON DEFECTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS OF MECHANIZED CORPS”

“...The Kiev Special Military District, subsequently reorganized into the Southwestern Front, included the following mechanized corps: 4, 8, 9, 15, 16, 19, 22 and 24th, with the 4th and 8th mechanized The corps were formed in the fall of 1940, the remaining corps in April 1941, thus, there was extremely insufficient time to put together, especially since the new mechanized corps lacked combat materiel for a long period of time.” “...The control of the mechanized corps by the combined arms commanders was poorly done, the formations were scattered (8th mechanized corps) and by the time of the offensive they were separated from each other. Army headquarters were completely unprepared to manage such large mechanized organisms as mechanized corps. The infantry, as a rule, acted independently, and the situation did not allow for organizing interaction. There were cases when combined arms commanders used tanks not only in small groups, but also as individual vehicles; this was especially striking in the 41st Tank Division. 3. The army headquarters completely forgot that the material unit has certain engine hours, that it requires inspection, minor repairs, additional replenishment of fuel and ammunition, and the technical staff and the heads of the armored departments of the armies did not tell them this, and instead of withdrawing after completing the task The mechanized corps, having given it the time necessary for this purpose, the combined arms commanders demanded only “come on” and nothing more. “... Our actions were in the nature of defense on a broad front, and, unfortunately, the mechanized corps were also forced in some cases in the initial period of hostilities, and subsequently as a system, to conduct defensive battles. Our command staff is poorly trained in peacetime for similar actions, so they strive for defense with an elbow connection with their neighbor, and the forces were not enough to have such a defense. 12. The training of crews in matters of preserving materiel was extremely poor: there were cases when crews abandoned vehicles with ammunition; There were isolated cases when crews left their vehicles and left on their own. 13. All units and formations lacked evacuation means, and those available could provide mechanized corps and tank divisions only in offensive operations. 14. The personnel have not mastered the new equipment, especially the KV and T-34, and are completely untrained in performing repairs in the field. The repair equipment of the tank divisions turned out to be unable to provide repairs in such a type of battle as withdrawal. 16. There were no technical means of closure in mechanized corps in peacetime, and very little attention was paid to this issue in preparation. 18. The lack of evacuation means in the regular organization led to the fact that the evacuation of combat equipment, as a rule, in the army and front-line rear areas was absent. 20. The headquarters turned out to be poorly prepared and, as a rule, were staffed by combined arms commanders who had no experience working in tank units. 22. Some of the commanders of the mechanized corps were not at the proper level and had absolutely no idea about managing a mechanized corps. 23. In higher educational institutions (academies), such types of combat that had to be encountered were never studied, and this was a major shortcoming in the operational-tactical outlook of the majority of the command and control personnel.

F. 38-39, op. 80038ss, no. 1, lll 2-4, 8-15

FROM THE PROTOCOL OF THE INTERROGATION OF THE ARRESTED PAVLOV D. G. (COMMANDER OF THE ZAPOVO TROOPS)

July 7, 1941

“...Parts of the district were prepared for military action, with the exception of the newly formed - 17th, 20th, 13th, 11th mechanized corps. Moreover, in the 13th and 11th corps, one division each was trained, and the rest, having received recruits, had only training equipment, and even then not everywhere. The 14th mechanized corps had only one poorly trained motorized division and rifle regiments of tank divisions.”

Central Election Commission FSB. Archival and investigative file No. R-24000, Ll.23-53. Manuscript, original.

FROM THE UNPUBLISHED MEMORIES OF MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION G.K. ZHUKOVA

“…I must say frankly, neither the People’s Commissar nor I had the necessary experience in preparing the armed forces for such a war”…. “...Our military doctrine has always given preference to offensive actions. We, the military, have always proceeded from the fact that only decisive offensive actions can lead to the defeat of the opposing enemy. The Soviet offensive doctrine was clearly and clearly expressed in the field manual of 1939: “...If the enemy forces war on us, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will be the most attacking of all the attacking armies. We will wage the war offensively, transferring it to enemy territory" (PU RKKA (draft). M. Voenizdat, 1939, p. 9)." “...Training troops in defensive actions, counter battles, and retreat actions rarely went beyond the tactical framework. I do not know of a single operational-strategic event where it would be played out or practiced on a large operational-strategic scale, where defense would counter a deep breakthrough of large armored groupings interacting with large air forces, and as a result, our headquarters and commanders on an operational scale on the eve of the war were not trained in the effective conduct of defense on an operational-strategic scale, not to mention the fact that such defensive operations were not developed at the headquarters of the border districts and the General Staff as a possible option.” “...And worst of all, military theory developed the issues of combat, battles and operations under encirclement, breaking through and breaking out of encirclement and retreating actions, which our troops had to face in the initial period of the war.”

FROM THE ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE "ON THE EXPERIENCE OF USING MECHANIZED FORCES IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR" No. 0045

July 1, 1941

...The experience of combat use of mechanized troops over the past 8 days has shown that the commanders of fronts and armies use mechanized troops in many cases incorrectly (they were used especially poorly and incorrectly in the North-Western and Western Fronts). When assigning combat missions to tank forces, they do not take into account: the availability and condition of the material, the time required to complete the combat mission, the distance that the troops must travel, material support and especially the provision of fuel. This situation leads to premature wear and tear of the material and does not allow for the maximum useful use of the combat power of our tanks. Where mechanized troops were led correctly, they inflicted crushing blows on the enemy, while at the same time they themselves suffered minor losses.

f. 4, op. 11, d. 62, l. 208-209. Script

ORDER TO THE RESERVE FRONT TROOPS “ON DEFECTS IN THE USE OF TANKS AND MEASURES TO ELIMINATE THEM” No. 005

Based on the experience of the battles in the Yelnya region, I established the unacceptable ignorance of the use of tanks and tank units in battle, which, as a result of improper use, suffered heavy losses in manpower and materiel. The commanders of the formations did not give time to conduct tank reconnaissance and organize the interaction of tanks, infantry, artillery and aviation. Interaction was organized not on the ground, but far from the battlefield, on maps. The tanks rushed to attack without any information about the location of the enemy’s fire system and the nature of the terrain. The commanders of units and combined arms formations assigned unclear and dubious tasks to the tank, and aviation, infantry and artillery support for the tanks was not organized. Mutual identification, calling fire and target designation were not organized. There were cases of tanks being hit by their own artillery due to mismatched artillery fire. When the tanks moved forward, the infantry, as a rule, did not advance behind the tanks and did not consolidate the lines captured by the tanks. The tanks, acting alone, suffered needless losses and returned back to their original position. Tank commanders did not show the necessary firmness in front of combined arms commanders in the correct use of tanks; blithely let go of the leadership of tank infantry support groups; did not organize the evacuation of damaged and stuck tanks from the battlefield; did not take measures to immediately send the tanks to collection points for emergency vehicles for their repair and rapid commissioning. I ORDER: 1. It is prohibited to bring tanks into battle without thorough reconnaissance of the enemy’s fire system, the terrain and without linking the interaction of the tank platoon or company commander with the commanders of the rifle battalion and artillery division or battery on the battlefield. 2. Prohibit the introduction of tanks into battle without thoroughly practicing mutual identification, without establishing call signals and a ceasefire. 3. Strictly warn before each attack all fighters, junior and middle commanders about the inadmissibility of falling behind tanks during an attack, which usually results in a disruption of the offensive and heavy losses 4. Do not allow tanks to be subordinated to rifle company commanders, and, as a rule, tanks are to be subordinated to commanders rifle battalions and regiments operating in the main directions. 5. Army commanders set in advance tasks for the chiefs of the army's armored forces to provide material support for tanks with evacuation and repair equipment. 6. Commanders of tank formations and units should sharply increase the responsibility of commanders of tank units and subunits for each lost tank, especially to prevent them from being left in the hands of the enemy; do not introduce KV and T-34 tanks into battle with poorly trained crews, organizing additional training for the latter at every opportunity. 7. My assistant for tank forces, Major General Shurov, must monitor the implementation of this order; report to me immediately any facts of improper use of tanks. 8. Work through this order with all command personnel.

F. 38-39, op. 30425ss, no. 45, pp. 24-26. Typewritten copy.

VI. COMBAT AND NON-COMbat LOSSES

FROM THE SUMMARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL PROPAGANDA OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT

...During the period of hostilities, a number of units and formations experienced significant losses of material. ... During the same time, the 22nd Mechanized Corps lost 45 vehicles and 119 tanks, of which 58 were blown up by our units during the retreat due to the inability to repair them en route. The losses of KV tanks in the 41st tank division were extremely high. Of the 31 tanks available in the division, as of July 6, 1941, 9 remained. 5 were disabled by the enemy, 12 were blown up by the crews, 5 were sent for repairs. Large losses of KV tanks are explained, first of all, by the poor technical training of the crews, low knowledge of the material part of the tank, as well as the lack of spare parts. There were cases when crews were unable to fix the malfunction of stopped KV tanks and blew them up.

TsAMO RF. F. 229. Op. 213. D. 12. L. 73

FROM THE REFERENCE “ON THE AVAILABILITY AND TECHNICAL CONDITION OF COMBAT VEHICLES 23 TD 12 MK” AS OF JULY 7, 1941

T-26 tanks 333 units went on campaign with the start of hostilities Lost: 144 units from enemy fire. due to technical failure 122 pcs. Transferred to another part 9 pcs. Consists of 58 pcs. of which: serviceable 2 pcs. require repair 43 pcs.

TsAMO RF. F. 221. Op. 1372. D. 10. L. 161

FROM THE REPORT OF THE HEAD OF THE ARMORED DIRECTORATE OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE FRONT DATED JUNE 30, 1941 “ON THE CONDITION OF MECHANIZED CORPS AND ABOUT THEIR WITHDRAWAL FOR THE RESTORATION OF MATERIAL PART”

30.6.41 No. E-1/0017

The lack of evacuation means, the remoteness of repair stationary bases and the lack of repair facilities directly in the units of the repair and restoration battalions of the formations and their staffing with flyers of type “A” and “B” created the conditions for a huge breakdown of the material part due to technical malfunctions. The lack of spare parts for the KV and T-34 tanks in all units has so far led to the impossibility of carrying out routine and medium repairs directly in the units. Carrying out a large number of marches in difficult conditions of wooded and swampy terrain and the impossibility of restoration due to the lack of spare parts units led to a large percentage of technical tank losses in the first 9 days of the battle. These losses, according to far from complete data, amount to 25-30% of the total combat materiel of tank formations.

F. 229, op. 3780ss, no. 1, pp. 1-3

FROM THE REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 12TH MECHANIZED CORPS DATED JUNE 27, 1941

After the first day of the march, and especially after the first day of the battle, dozens of vehicles quickly began to break down. Due to the lack of spare parts, both on routes and during combat operations, these vehicles were not restored, and if they were restored, then only a few, and only on the battlefield, since the lack of tractors did not allow them to be towed to collection points for emergency vehicles. For the same reason, a lot of material was left on enemy territory.

F. 334, op. 2759cc. d. 4, pp. 49-51

FROM INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF ARMORED FORCES OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT

August 1941

8 Mk essentially operated in battle for 3-5 days, the rest of the time it made aimless marches from one area to another in pursuit of the enemy. The tasks for the mechanized corps were not set specifically, and since there was no intelligence data and the exact grouping of the enemy tank units was not known, the corps, while making marches, did not have time to concentrate in one area before it was given the task of moving to another; Thus, he traveled over 1200 km, which rendered the material part unfit for combat.

“COLLECTION OF COMBAT DOCUMENTS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR ISSUE 6” MILITARY PUBLISHING HOUSE OF THE MINISTRY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNION SSR MOSCOW – 1948

FROM THE REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 73rd SEPARATE TANK BATTALION “ON THE COMBAT OPERATIONS OF THE BATTALION ON SEPTEMBER 20-21, 1941.”

SECRET TO THE ASSISTANT COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN FRONT FOR TANK FORCES

At 8.00 on September 24, 1941, after the evacuation of one tank, Lieutenant Colonel Semenov ordered the immediate dispatch of three tanks to evacuate the remaining vehicles. The senior adjutant of the battalion, Lieutenant Badin, reported to Lieutenant Colonel Semenov that the evacuation could not be carried out now without the support of infantry and artillery fire. Lieutenant Colonel Semenov again ordered me to immediately send the tanks with the words: “I am the regiment commander, I am responsible, I command the regiment and do not interfere with me, send the tanks immediately.” After this, one tank was allocated for evacuation, and two tanks were taken to the regiment's command post. Upon reaching the command post, it was discovered that the tank that had gone to be evacuated was set on fire by the enemy and did not return from the battlefield. The turret gunner and the vehicle commander were burned and evacuated from the tank, and the driver was killed

F. 228, op. 3968s. d. 1, l. 28

FROM THE MEMORIES OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 8TH MECHANIZED CORPS

By the beginning of the war, the corps units were just being created and rearmed. It was almost fully staffed with personnel and had 932 tanks (according to the state there were 1031). However, there were only 169 modern heavy and medium tanks and T-34s. The remaining 763 vehicles were of outdated designs, the overhaul mileage of their chassis did not exceed 500 km, and most of them were running out of service life. 197 tanks were subject to factory repair due to technical faults. During a march of almost 500 km, the corps lost up to half of its tanks of outdated designs and a large amount of artillery from enemy air strikes and for technical reasons. The tanks remaining in service required repairs and had a small supply of motor resources. Thus, even before entering the battle, the mechanized corps found itself significantly weakened.

Ryabyshev D.I. The first year of the war. M.1990.

Bottom line

FROM THE REPORT “ON THE CONDITION AND AVAILABILITY OF MATERIAL PART OF THE MECHANIZED CORPS OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT AS OF 7/17/41.”

Sov. secret to the Head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Comrade. Fedorenko

1. Regarding mechanized corps: ... the 8th mechanized corps was transferred from 8.7.41 to the front reserve - to the mountains. Nezhin for reorganization and has a total of 57 combat vehicles, 34 armored vehicles, of which: KV - 14, T-34 - 14, BT-7 - 16, T-26 - 13. Wheeled and auxiliary vehicles in total - 1409 pieces , of which: passenger cars - 41, GAZ trucks - 864, ZIS trucks - 479, tractors - 25. ... The 15th mechanized corps was assigned from 8/7/41 to the front reserve in the city. Piryatin for reorganization and includes only 10 combat vehicles, 10 armored vehicles, of which: T-34 - 1 piece, BT-7 - 9 pieces. There are only 690 wheeled and auxiliary vehicles, of which: cars - 25 pieces, GAZ trucks - 400, ZIS trucks - 237 pieces, tractors - 28 pieces. ...The 4th Mechanized Corps is subordinate to the commander of the 6th Army, having only 100 combat vehicles, of which: KV - 10 pieces, T-34 - 49 pieces, BT-7 - 23 pieces, T-26 - 18 pieces, armored vehicles - 38 pieces. Wheeled and auxiliary vehicles - 622 pieces, of which: cars - 39 pieces, GAZ trucks - 450 pieces, ZIS trucks - 109 pieces, tractors - 24 pieces. ...The 16th Mechanized Corps is subordinate to the commander of the 6th Army, having only 73 combat vehicles and 16 armored vehicles. There are a total of 903 wheeled and auxiliary vehicles, of which: passenger cars - 29, GAZ trucks - 620, ZIS trucks - 204, tractors - 50. ... The 9th mechanized corps is subordinate to the commander of the 5th Army, having in its composition combat vehicles in total 38, armored vehicles - 33, of which: BT-7 tanks - 10 pieces, T-26 - 24 pieces, T-40 - 4 pieces. There are only 905 wheeled and auxiliary vehicles, of which: cars - 49, GAZ trucks - 530, ZIS trucks - 257, tractors - 69. ... The 19th Mechanized Corps is subordinate to the commander of the 5th Army, including combat vehicles 77 units in total, 2 armored vehicles; of which: T-34 - 31 pieces, T-26 - 46 pieces. There are a total of 421 wheeled and auxiliary vehicles, of which: passenger cars - 25, GAZ trucks - 160, ZIS trucks - 199 pieces, tractors - 37 pieces. ... The 22nd Mechanized Corps is subordinate to the commander of the 5th Army, having in its composition only 40 combat vehicles, 15 armored vehicles, of which 36: Wheeled and auxiliary vehicles in total 482, of which: passenger cars - 48, GAZ trucks - 210, ZIS trucks - 183, tractors - 41. ... The 24th Mechanized Corps is subordinate to the commander of the 12th Army and, due to the lack of combat materiel, acts as a rifle corps, having 100 combat vehicles, of which T -26 – 100 pieces, acting as an infantry support group directly with corps units.

F. 229, op. 3780ss, no. 1, pp. 98-104. Typewritten copy.

“Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the Armed Forces. Statistical research"

“Collection of documents 1941” volume 2 UNDER THE GENERAL EDITION OF ACADEMICIAN A.N. YAKOVLEV INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION “DEMOCRACY” 1998

A daily boost of fighting spirit!WARHEAD.SU

In Spain, Soviet tanks quite successfully resisted German ones. And according to some authors, the Soviet tank armada had every chance of reaching the English Channel and Gibraltar. The thing is that when assessing the strengths of the parties, the tabular performance characteristics are only one of the factors, and not always the most important. And in RuNet there has long been a bad tradition of putting them at the forefront and ignoring everything else.

“We have been in hundreds of battles, the main thing in wars is supply!” sang the eccentric British in one Soviet film. And they were not so wrong. You can have completely fearless warriors, the best equipment in the world and the wisest commanders. But if the weapons have nothing to fire, the soldiers have nothing to eat, and the engines have nothing to work on, all this will allow, at most, to die with great dignity.

Before the war, the Soviet command was also very fond of tabular indicators. We created the fastest, most powerful, heaviest cars with excellent performance characteristics. But the issue of supply remained on the sidelines. It got to the point that the supply of these same mechanized corps had to be provided by vehicles seized from national economic enterprises. But there weren’t even clear plans for where, how much and what should be seized! And this despite the fact that in the field of, say, industrial evacuation, the Soviet People's Commissariats showed truly miracles of logistics. But the western campaign of the Red Army in 1939 clearly showed the problems in this area.

Alas, in the valiant Red Army, the organization of supply before the war remained in its infancy. As a result, the tanks very soon ran out of shells, fuel and spare parts. Many cars remained on the side of the roads, without even having time to engage in battle with the Germans. And this is only part of the problem.

No less questions were raised by the level of independence of the troops and the organization of communications. If German commanders were taught to take initiative on the battlefield, then Soviet commanders had to strictly follow instructions. This was partly justified - the Germans spent much more time and effort on training each officer, and their Soviet colleagues often simply did not have sufficient training to make decisions that deviated from the original order. But already in Spain this created big problems for the republican troops trained by Soviet instructors in battles with the nationalists who learned from the Germans. This quality was fully demonstrated in the battles in the Dubno-Lutsk-Brody triangle. The mechanized corps and their units diligently followed the letter of orders, while the operational situation changed hourly, and the logic of the command’s instructions became catastrophically outdated. This already great misfortune was aggravated by communication problems - orders and reports arrived with great delays, if they arrived at all.

And that is not all. On the one hand, the resource of the tanks available in the units was significantly used up by intensive combat training in previous years. On the other hand, the sharp increase in the number of the Red Army led to the fact that many newly arrived tankers had only a few hours of real control of the tank. But on the other side of the front, a significant part of the vehicles were veterans of many battles in Europe, already operating on the battlefield “automatically.”

The Wehrmacht in this battle looked like a nimble dandy with a sword, going up against a mighty hero with a two-handed axe. Only the ax was rusty, the hero’s eyes were blindfolded, and his legs were tangled with ropes. The result of such a fight is quite obvious.

Well, when the hero came to his senses, opened his eyes, took a newer ax and adapted to the enemy’s fighting style - the situation turned out to be completely, completely different.

Author: Igor Drogovoz.

Mechanized corps of the Red Army

Note: 5, 26, 27 MK in June 1941 were transferred to the border districts as part of the armies of the second strategic echelon.
Most mechanized corps did not have the required amount of weapons and military equipment. The staffing level by mid-June 1941 was: for cars - 39%, for tractors - 44%, for repair equipment - 29%, for motorcycles - 17%.

The following table shows the quantitative composition of the tank fleet of mechanized corps:

Other sources contain different figures. So, according to Vladimirsky, the 9th MK KOVO had 300 tanks, the 19th MK - 450, and the 22nd MK - 707. As you can see, the difference is quite large.

The largest number of tanks were in the KOVO mechanized corps, which was quite consistent with Stalin’s point of view that in the event of war, the Germans would deliver the main blow in Ukraine. Therefore, the southwestern direction was considered the main one. The 4th and 8th mechanized corps had about 600 KVs and T-34s alone and more than 1000 tanks of other brands.

The diversity of the tank corps fleet caused a lot of trouble. Many cars were discontinued and spare parts were no longer produced for them. New tanks - KV, T-34 - were just entering the troops and were still poorly mastered by personnel.

Due to the fact that the staffing of the mechanized corps was delayed, the General Staff on May 16, 1941 sent a directive to the troops, according to which, in order to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of the troops, 50 tank regiments of the mechanized corps, before they received tanks, were armed with 76 and 45-mm cannons and DT machine guns for use if necessary, as anti-tank regiments and divisions. The regiment was equipped with 18 45-mm cannons, 24 76-mm cannons, and 24 machine guns. But it was not possible to implement the General Staff directive before the start of the war, and the 17th and 20th mechanized corps of the ZapOVO, whose tank regiments were supposed to receive anti-tank artillery, were generally used in battles as rifle units.

The deployment of mechanized corps on the eve of the war was beneficial for conducting offensive operations. On the Bialystok ledge there were the 6th, 11th and 13th mechanized corps, on the Lviv ledge - the 4th, 8th and 15th MK, which made it possible in the event of a conflict to strike the flanks of the Lublin group of Germans. The 3rd and 12th MKs were intended for actions against the Tilsit group. The 2nd and 18th MKs posed a threat to oil fields in Romania. From the north, the 16th mechanized corps of the 12th army and the mechanized corps of the district subordination of KOVO hung over Romania. However, the German attack changed the situation - this arrangement of Soviet troops became a trap for the enemy.

The ratio of the authorized and actually available number of combat vehicles, artillery in mechanized corps on June 13-19, 1941. The ratio of the authorized and actually available number of combat vehicles,

artillery in mechanized corps on June 13-19, 1941

Tank park on the eve of war

To this day, the total number of tanks in the Red Army on the eve of the war cannot be accurately estimated. For a long time, in Russian literature it was talked about in one phrase: “The Soviet Army had tanks of various types in service, of which 1861 were T-34 and KV tanks. The bulk of the vehicles were light tanks of outdated designs.” Only recently have figures begun to appear that actually estimate the number of tanks that the Red Army had, but they also differ due to differences in data in different archival sources (one of the reasons for this is the well-known domestic attitude to the presentation of information and objectivity in reporting).

Major General L.G. Ivashov (“VIZh” No. 11'89) gives the figure 23457 tanks, of which 30% are combat-ready.

The publication of the General Staff “The classification of secrecy has been removed...” (M., 1993) determines their number at 22,600 units (heavy - 500, medium - 900, light - 21,200). These data are questionable in some respects - firstly, for many years the number of KV tanks at the beginning of the war has been textbook - 636, but there were also heavy T-35 tanks, of which about 60 were produced. In total, the number of heavy tanks is significantly more than 500 Secondly, 1225 T-34s (also an established figure) plus several hundred T-28s (in the 3rd TD - 38, in the 8th - 68, in the 10th - 61, etc.) do not equal 900. The percentage of serviceable tanks is set at 27. But in general, we can say that the classification of secrecy in this book has not been removed.

The most trustworthy is the “Summary statement of the quantitative and qualitative composition of tanks and self-propelled guns located in military districts, repair bases and NPO warehouses as of June 1, 1941.” N.P. Zolotova and S.I. Isaev (“VIZH” No. 11'93). According to it, the Red Army had 23,106 tanks and self-propelled guns in service. Of these, 18,691 or 80.9% are combat-ready. But this number is not final either - from May 31 to June 21, 1941, 206 new tanks were shipped from factories (KV - 41, T-34 - 138, T-40 - 27).

Combat-ready vehicles here include tanks included in the 1st and 2nd categories according to the Manual on Accounting and Reporting in the Red Army:

Category 1 - new, never used, meeting the technical requirements and fully suitable for use for its intended purpose.

2nd category - former (in use), fully operational and suitable for use for its intended purpose. This also includes property requiring military repairs (routine repairs carried out by the unit itself).

The authors stipulate that there is no reliable information revealing the state of the Red Army tank fleet as of June 22. But of all the data encountered, these seem to be the most plausible, although they contradict many established indicators, especially the qualitative condition of Soviet tanks (you must agree that the difference between 27% of serviceable and 80.9% is quite large).

The total number of tanks here includes vehicles of mechanized corps, tank regiments of cavalry divisions, tank battalions of airborne corps and rifle divisions. When assessing the number of vehicles in the western direction, it should be taken into account that the tank forces of KOVO, PribOVO, OdVO, LenVO and ZapVO were initially replenished with equipment transferred from the rear districts.

How did the German command assess the state of the ABTV of the Red Army? Before the war, the main command of the Wehrmacht determined the number of tank divisions at 7, plus 38 tank (motorized) brigades. The unreliability of this information was caused by the fact that the formation of mechanized corps continued, and the standard equipment was absent. After the start of the war, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, G. Halder, made the following entry in his official diary: “The number of tanks available to the enemy is presumably 15,000 vehicles. This corresponds to 35 tank divisions. Of these, 22 were found at the front. In the Far East - 5 tank divisions. 8 are missing (about 3 presumably in the north, including one - 6 TK, transferred from the Moscow area). Not counting the three divisions mentioned in brackets, the Russian command has 5 tank divisions, which it can use as an operational reserve” (entry dated July 2, 1941). “The number of enemy tank troops turned out to be greater than expected” (07/25/1941). In general, the Germans’ ideas about the size of the tank forces opposing them in the western districts were quite reliable and one can only wonder how they risked starting a war by moving their 3,329 tanks, most of them light, against this armada.

Our entire huge tank fleet was lost in the battles of the summer and autumn of 1941. The total losses of Soviet tanks also remain in question. Figures from different sources, including reports of units and formations, submitted in the turmoil of the retreat vary significantly, so we present here the official data of the General Staff, published in 1993. Losses of armored and mechanized troops in 1941.

Losses of armored vehicles during the 1941 operation.

The highest level of tank losses was during defensive battles in Western Ukraine, where the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front tried to stop the advance of Army Group South towards Kyiv.
Due to the unfortunate location of the covering armies, the main blow of the German group fell on the junction of the 5th and 6th armies. The command of the Southwestern Front, led by Mr. M.P. Kirponos, failed to organize and carry out a counterattack, although he had every reason to hope for success - more than five times superiority in tanks, the presence of a large number of vehicles of new brands (758 KV and T-34). But due to incompetent leadership, the lack of a well-functioning logistics system, and German air supremacy, all efforts went to waste. A large amount of equipment was simply abandoned when the Soviet troops retreated. Thus, in the warehouse in Dubno alone, German troops captured 215 tanks, 50 anti-tank guns and much other property. In the 10th Tank Division of the 15th MK, 140 tanks were left behind during the retreat (for comparison, combat losses amounted to 110 vehicles). In the 8th Panzer Division of the 4th MK, the crews destroyed 107 tanks, 10 went missing, 6 got stuck in a swamp and were abandoned. Knowing all this, one can no longer be surprised at the average daily losses of the Southwestern Front of 292 tanks. There was no such level of losses even in the largest tank battles of the war - for example, in the Battle of Kursk, this figure ranged from 68 (in the Oryol offensive operation) to 89 (in the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation).

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The level of combat readiness of the tank forces of the Red Army before the war was quite low and corresponded to 35% of the required potential. There was a shortage of everything - spare parts, shells, fuels and lubricants, crews and much more. Yes, and new types of vehicles had technical failures and raised questions about their removal from production. The first significant introduction of new vehicles took place at the beginning of 1941, although the military in the districts themselves knew little about them.

FIRST BATCHES The leadership of the military districts was notified of the new vehicles quite late. This document characteristically speaks of the ignorance that was occurring: “To the head of the 1st department of the armored control of the GABTU KA, military engineer of the 1st rank, Comrade. Korobkov 29.1.1941 On the issue: tactical and technical data of new vehicles. Due to the fact that new types of combat vehicles, in particular tanks, are being introduced into the tank and mechanized units of the district, in practical work I feel a great difficulty in the absence of any data on new brands of tanks. The operational department of the district continuously requests a number of data on types for planning operations, the organizational department constantly contacts staffing issues, but ABTU and, in particular, the maintenance and repair department do not have any data. I kindly ask you to send to ABTU ZabVO brief data on new vehicles, characterizing the tactical and technical parameters (KB, T-34, T-40, T-126, BA-11, I’m not quite confident in naming the brands). Vrid of the head of the 3rd department of the ABTU ZabVO military engineer of the 3rd rank Vershkov"

While ZAPOV commander Pavlov, himself a former co-author of the T-34 project, knew well what he was dealing with, his subordinates did not. In the period from January to April, the undisputed leader in obtaining new equipment was the southwestern direction. What is important is that if the USSR was preparing an aggression against Germany, then the main tank groups of the Red Army would go to the Western District, and so most of the new vehicles received KOVO, which kept the vehicles in the depths of the district. The Kiev special and Odessa districts received 187 KV and 102 T-34 in the first four months of 1941. During the same period, the Western Special Military District received only 2 KVs and 74 T-34s. However, since May the situation has changed dramatically. From May 1 to June 21, 1941, the Kiev Special District received 40 KV and 101 T-34, and the Western Special District received 20 KV and 292 T-34. As we see, almost three times more “thirty-fours” were sent to Belarus than to Ukraine.

Moreover, of this number, 138 T-34s arrived in the district of D.G. Pavlova only in June 1941. This month, the Kiev Special District did not receive “thirty-fours” at all; 100% of the receipts from the factories went to Belarus. One can clearly see the active “pumping up” of new armored vehicles in the western direction in the last pre-war weeks. Apparently, the accumulation of large forces on the border with BOVO convinced the military leadership to change priorities. One of the important stages was maintaining primary secrecy, as evidenced by this document: “To the heads of the departments of the motorized armored forces of the districts, to the commanders of tank corps and individual tank divisions, April 16, 1941, No. 140385ss. To maintain the secrecy of the KB and T-34 vehicles, take the following measures: Prohibit driving on cars of the specified brands in cities and towns during the daytime. Movement to and from the training ground should only be carried out at night. Tanks should not be driven to the shooting range and from the shooting range to the unit, but left at the firing range, taking measures to reliably protect them. Only assigned personnel undergoing training or servicing the machines should be allowed access to the machines. Upon completion of work, machines must be sealed and guarded. When transporting by rail, vehicles must be carefully covered with tarpaulins and provided with reliable security en route and on site. If possible, unload from the railway at night. If, according to time conditions, unloading is carried out during the day, then transport of vehicles to the unit should be carried out at night. Store the material in indoor parks, or, if there are none, store them under a tarpaulin. Correspondence on the specified machines should be kept confidential. Do not mention car brands during telephone conversations. I especially draw attention to maintaining the secrecy of information on the “Tactical and technical properties of vehicles,” which should only be known to the commanding personnel and crews working on these vehicles. Explain to all personnel and require them to keep information about these vehicles secret. Head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Fedorenko “ The Germans, despite their vaunted reconnaissance, did not learn anything about the new vehicles, and not only about the T-34, but also about the KV, remaining in deep ignorance.

EVERYTHING WAS NOT ENOUGH From the very beginning, it became clear that the new districts had huge problems with how to maintain this iron mass. To the credit of the District Military Council, it must be said that Pavlov and his immediate subordinates did not wait for favors from the General Staff. Later, former member of the Military Council of the ZapOVO Corps Commissar A.Ya. Fominykh wrote to L.Z. Mehlis: “ ...we organized 3 anti-tank brigades. But not a single tractor was given to the brigades. They are not allowed horses. What kind of part is this that has materiel, but cannot move it! And only recently, at our request, it was allowed to take tractors from rifle divisions, and transfer the artillery of rifle divisions to horse traction (where tractors were taken). The transfer of tractors from rifle divisions took place in the month of June in the most energetic manner, and by the beginning of the war, the PTBRs were mostly equipped with tractors.” This already indicates that the materiel was in a terrible state and there was no opportunity to advance anywhere. The lack of trained personnel was one of the main problems of the Soviet tank forces in 1941. One - but far from the only one. There was also a lot of other things missing - from banal files in repair shops to tanks. “Yes, yes, that’s right - although almost all the tanks of the Red Army were collected “with a broom from the floor” for the mechanized corps, including the ancient BT-2 and the double-turret T-26 of the first releases. But even at the same time, the head of the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army, Lieutenant General Fedorenko, reported to the Main Military Council in June 1941: “With the current 1941 plan for the production of tanks in the amount of 5220 units, this shortage can only be covered by the end of 1943 “ We emphasize - not to completely re-equip with new tanks, but only to complete them. With the retention of “BET” tanks and other old types of tanks in the mechanized corps.

In only one of his appeals, Fedorenko wrote: “The Red Army has a significant shortage of ZIS trucks, type A and B workshops and field charging stations. As the experience of the Polish and Finnish campaigns has shown, it will not be possible to count on covering the shortage of these vehicles through mobilization deliveries from the national economy, since a huge number of vehicles will arrive at delivery points in poor technical condition and with worn tires. The supply of vehicles and, in particular, ZIS trucks to NPOs has so far been insufficient. With an annual request from NPOs of 93,540 cars, of which GAZ - 40,785, ZIS - 43,205, others - 9,550 or 66.5% of the total production - 140,000 cars per year. Over five months, 27,633 vehicles were delivered, or 29.5% of the NPO’s annual request. The shortfall in receiving vehicles at the request of the NGO did not make it possible to provide vehicles for organizational events held throughout the Army. The supply of special vehicles to the Red Army is limited, on the one hand, by the shortage of special equipment (machines, tools, etc.), on the other hand, by 3-axle vehicles, on which about 50% of all types of special vehicles are mounted. The planned conversion of a number of special vehicles to trailers is not currently supported by the necessary production of the appropriate types of trailers. Existing off-road vehicles supplied to the army do not meet modern requirements; it is necessary: ​​1. Organize mass production of passenger cars and off-road trucks with 2 and 3 driving axles. To work in the rear of the army for the delivery of goods, some vehicles will be produced with a carrying capacity of 6–10 tons. Increase the supply of ZIS trucks to 70–80% of the total number of trucks supplied to NGOs, since the shortage in the Red Army is mainly due to this type of vehicle, the replacement of which with GAZ trucks is impractical due to the increase in the driver staff and rear of military units ."

But that’s not all, there was also something like this: So it worked out...

11th mechanized corps ZAPOVO. By state / In stock GAZ trucks - 1131 / 553 ZIS trucks - 1544 / 199 Type "A" workshops - 99 / 10 Type "B" workshops - 70 / 5 Tankers - 343 / 233 The situation is no better with the neighboring 13th mechanized corps . By state / In stock GAZ trucks - 1131 / 540 ZIS trucks - 1544 / 260 Type "A" workshops - 99 / 12 Type "B" workshops - 70 / 2 Tankers - 343 / 30 Maybe things are better in the great and mighty KOVO ? Let's see. 19th mechanized corps KOVO. By state / In stock GAZ trucks - 1147 / 332 ZIS trucks - 1565 / 250 Type "A" and "B" workshops - 166 / 20 Other special vehicles - 955 / 201 The 7th motorized rifle division of the 8th mechanized corps is a little better. By state / In stock GAZ-AA trucks - 478 / 764 ZIS trucks - 377 / 145 Type "A" workshops - 26 / 10 Type "B" workshops - 13 / 6 Tankers - 166 / 39

The numbers in the first line, those about GAZ-AA, are not an error. It’s just that, given the shortage of “three-ton” ZIS vehicles, they were replaced with “one and a half” ones. Thus, the total number in the “trucks” column increased noticeably - but the real situation did not improve, because in terms of carrying capacity, two “lorry” trucks, and not one, could replace one ZIS.

And even then, not in all cases - not all cargo intended for ZIS could be “split” into two parts.

Have you forgotten anything? After all, somewhere we have already mentioned the trucks of the 8th Mechanized Corps. Well, yes, exactly, it was like “60% of trucks and wheeled vehicles are provided with rubber; armored vehicles at 100%. Of the available trucks, 200 vehicles are on blocks due to lack of tires. Average tire wear is 70%"

It’s funny as hell, as the hero of the now popular film about Caribbean pirates liked to say. But it turns out that for other divisions, corps, and so on, the figure for the availability of trucks may not be so final. Even minus any and all repairs - because a car without tires, it doesn’t seem to require repairs at all. You just need tires to drive. But they are not there. All the stocks of tires available to the People's Commissariat of Defense were used up during the period 1939–1940. For 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense declared 525,000 sets of tires. For the first half of 1941, a fund of 195,000 sets or 35% of the annual request was allocated." There was no hope for rectifying the situation - "for the holiday" in 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense was allocated only 260 thousand sets of rubber, so in the first six months the military the department received even more than half of the quota allocated to it. Theoretically, the severity of the problem with trucks should have been alleviated by the mobilization of vehicles from the national economy - according to pre-war plans, 239,744 vehicles were supposed to enter the army.

But the most scarce cars were not included in their number. Again. “ The Red Army has a significant shortage of ZIS trucks, type A and B workshops and field charging stations. It will not be possible to count on covering the shortage of these vehicles through mobilization deliveries from the national economy, as the experience of the Polish and Finnish campaigns has shown, since a huge number of vehicles will arrive at delivery points in poor technical condition and with worn tires.” How Comrade Fedorenko looked into the water: for example, the head of the armored department of the Southwestern Front, in a report dated July 17, 1941, on the state of the front’s armored forces, reported that “... the property available in front-line and army warehouses will meet the needs of the front by 40–60 % due to the lack of running parts and especially rubber of all sizes. The great need for rubber is explained by the fact that the front troops received vehicles from the national economy that were not 90% provided with rubber. In addition, the machines require repairs (medium and major).”

A completely comprehensive idea of ​​what the “transfer of vehicles to the troops of the valiant Red Army from the national economy” looked like in practice is given by a report on an inspection at the Darnitsky distribution point of vehicles under repair: “The head of the point reported that the point began working on June 28, 1941 ., and the record of arriving materiel was started on 2.7.41, as a result of which as of 27.7.41 the following data is available: 2527 vehicles arrived at the point, 2599 departed. Of the total number of vehicles that arrived at the point, they are under repair and awaiting repair There are only 304 cars on a separate site. Of the vehicles located on this site, 42 vehicles are in a completely dismantled state... According to the report of military technician Ch., who is responsible for the repair of vehicles, the dismantling of these 42 vehicles was carried out by order of the Darnitsa district military commissar for the restoration of the vehicles being repaired... “During my stay at the repair point for vehicles from Several vehicles were delivered to the Kirov district military registration and enlistment office for delivery to the Darnitsky district military registration and enlistment office, and two M-1 vehicles were delivered on trucks in a completely disassembled form. When interviewing the vehicle delivery person about the reasons for dismantling the vehicles, he stated that the “stripping” of the vehicles was carried out by order of the Kirov District Military Commissariat. Spare parts from these vehicles... were used to restore other vehicles... Recently, up to 60 dismantled vehicles of different brands arrived from the Kyiv district military registration and enlistment offices....”

That is, over 10% of the total number of cars that passed through the distribution point for the whole month are at the site awaiting repair at one time, and restoration of the cars is possible only by dismantling spare parts from their less fortunate counterparts - also, I note, transferred from the national economy for mobilization.

And here is the report on the organization of the repair and evacuation service of the 40th Tank Division of the 19th Mechanized Corps of the Kiev Special Military District: “The material received from the national economy required mainly medium, and often major repairs. The repair and restoration battalion could not go to the front at the same time as the division due to the lack of vehicles, but was staffed itself by restoring vehicles abandoned by other units. Having restored 31 vehicles, the RVB [204] arrived at the front only on July 10, 1941, having one field workshop of type “B”. Workshops of type “A” were organized and staffed already in combat conditions on trucks, by RVB forces at the expense of equipment and tools left at factories and workshops... The repair and restoration battalion did not have evacuation means. The division, going to the front, did not have a single tractor. The existing Komintern tractor was under repair at that time and, having come out of repair, could not serve the needs of the division.”

By the way, why, in fact, does the repair and restoration battalion of a tank division have only one type “B” flight station and absolutely no type “A” flight station, equipping them with its own resources? Why in the spring of the forty-first mechanized corps unanimously report about a less than mediocre staffing of mobile repair equipment? Perhaps the narrow-minded communist militarists demanded only tanks from industry and did not care at all about repair equipment? No, and in this case the situation is not as simple and obvious as it might seem.

The Army Repair and Reconstruction Battalion ABTU reported: “Mobile tank repair facilities first appeared in 1929 in the form of mobile tank repair workshops - type “B” flyers, equipped with universal screw-cutting lathes of the “Krause” type. The numerical growth of tank forces and the practice of organizing repairs in them subsequently showed the need to strengthen type “B” flights. As a result, in 1932, a tank repair flight of type “A” was created, being the most mobile repair facility. The “A” type flyer, together with the “B” type flyer, provided short-term repairs to tanks directly in the troops. As tank production developed, the types of tanks changed and improved. This, in turn, caused changes in the equipment of workshops and flights. In 1934, both flights ("A" and "B") were partially modernized (re-equipped). However, all these measures were not fundamental, and much of the equipment of the flights was preserved until the beginning of the Patriotic War; the vehicles based on them (ZiS and GAZ) with their unchanged tactical and technical data remained unchanged; the same body shape and much other equipment and its placement in the workshop have been preserved. The further growth of tank forces changed the system of their combat support. This was especially noticeable in the repair service, in which the performance of medium-sized repairs within the unit had by this time become a mass phenomenon. The quantitative increase in average repairs has necessitated the creation of mobile workshops for special purposes. In this regard, starting from 1937, special repair units of the ARVB type were created in the armored forces of the Red Army. Flyers of type “A” and “B” were retained and were intended for servicing minor repairs of units (tank companies and battalions) ... "

However, the tank fleet, which began to change even before the war, was almost completely replaced at the beginning of the war by new, more advanced and more complex tanks. This change required the repair facilities to have different, more advanced specialized equipment. During this period, the discrepancy between the production equipment and repair facilities and the repair fund became especially noticeable. A quick re-equipment of repair units with some types of basic and special equipment was required.” Well, okay, the reader will say, with the quality of mobile tank repair equipment not corresponding to the technical equipment of the tank forces, everything seems to be clear. What about the quantity? And with the quantity things are not at all rosy...

THERE IS NOTHING TO REPAIR THE TANKS The following document speaks about what happened to the quality condition : “To the Chairman of the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Comrade. Molotov. March 4, 1941 On the issue of logistical support for the order plan for field workshops. During 1939–40 NPO orders for the production of field workshops of type “A”, “B” and workshops of the army repair and restoration battalion (ARB) are not fulfilled due to poor provision of funds for the necessary equipment, tools and materials. The issue of allocating funds to support the order plan for field workshops in 1941 still remains unresolved. Factories, in accordance with the instructions of their People's Commissariat and Headquarters, refuse to sign contractual obligations with NGOs of the USSR, citing the lack of a Government decision on the logistics of the order. Having a great need for field repair equipment in the Red Army, I ask for your decision to provide material funds for the order of non-profit organizations for repair shops on a par with the main defense orders. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko Chief of the General Staff K.A. Army General Zhukov. Appendix: draft resolution of the Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The Economic Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides: To consider the order of the USSR NPO for field repair equipment as a military-current order and to provide it with material funds on a par with the main defense orders. The People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of Medium Engineering of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of Heavy Engineering of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of Motor Transport of the RSFSR shall submit separate applications to the State Planning Committee of the USSR for equipment, tools and materials to equip the repair facilities of NPOs of the USSR. The State Planning Committee of the USSR will allocate funds for specific purposes for equipment, tools and materials for equipping the field repair workshops of NPOs of the USSR at the request of the People's Commissariat of Manufacturers in accordance with the order plan for 1941.”

That is, the bottom line is: there is nothing to repair the tanks with.

Both spare parts and repair equipment are in acute shortage, and the shortage is only increasing over time. It is not surprising that in the current conditions, they are trying to replace type “A” workshops with trucks with a set of tools. And the tendency to remove scarce spare parts from faulty vehicles sometimes led to sad oddities: in the decommissioning certificate for the GAZ-M1 passenger car No. 20051 of the 3rd Tank Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps, it is stated that on July 8, 1941, in the area of ​​​​the city of Ostrov, the car came out the axle shaft was out of order, and due to the impossibility of restoration on the spot, the Emka was left on the road until the arrival of divisional evacuation vehicles. Repairmen who arrived from the division at the scene of the accident did not find either the car or the driver; after a search, the skeleton of a completely “dispossessed” car, from which almost all instruments, components and assemblies to be dismantled had been removed, was found dumped into a ditch

In general, the picture for the Kyiv district looked like this. “CERTIFICATE ON COMBAT READINESS OF TANK UNITS OF THE Kyiv SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT as of May 5, 1941. 4 CORPS 8 tank division is fully combat-ready, vehicles are fully operational. The 32nd Tank Division is combat-ready, can conduct close combat, and is 35% equipped with vehicles. The 81st motorized division is fully combat-ready and provided with vehicles. 8 CORPS 12 tank division is combat-ready, has no heavy tanks, and is fully equipped with vehicles. 34 - "- combat-ready, does not have medium tanks, vehicles - 60%. 7 motors. The division is 60% combat-ready in terms of combat vehicles, and 90% in vehicles. 9 CORPS 20 tank division - not combat-ready. 35 - "- not combat-ready. 131 motorized vehicles. the division is not combat-ready. 15 CORPS 10 tank division is fully combat-ready, vehicles are fully operational. 37 is combat-ready, has no heavy or medium tanks, and only 40% of vehicles. 212 motors. the division is not combat-ready. 16 CORPS 15 tank division is combat-ready, has no heavy tanks, and is fully equipped with vehicles. 39 - "- 50% combat-ready, does not have heavy or medium tanks. 240 motors. the division is not combat-ready. 19 CORPS 43 tank division - 40% combat-ready, does not have heavy or medium tanks. 40 - " - not combat-ready. 213 motorized vehicles. the division is not combat-ready. 22 CORPS 19 tank division - not combat-ready. 41 is combat-ready, does not have heavy or medium tanks, and vehicles are 50%. 215 motors. the division is not combat-ready. 24 CORPS 45 tank division - not combat-ready. 49 - "- not combat-ready. 216 motorized vehicles. the division is not combat-ready"

Please note that a third of the units were not combat-ready at all, and the other third did not have new tanks.

The lack of trucks called into question the ability of the mechanized corps not only to carry out a “deep operation”, but also to counterattack the breaking through enemy.

“Capable of close combat,” yes. An attempt to somehow arrange a supply of fuel and shells to tankers, as a rule, left them without “their” motorized infantry - which is very clearly shown in the above “help”. Somewhere there, in the rear, there was usually artillery, towed at a snail’s pace by agricultural tractors. Acting corps commander Colonel Ermolaev reports on the condition of the 37th tank division of the 15th mechanized corps at the beginning of the war: “The motorized rifle regiment is not fully formed, not staffed and not trained, was 150 km from the division (in Berezhany) and had no means of transportation. The artillery regiment consisted of 12 122 mm guns without panoramas and 4 152 mm guns, having only 5 tractors. The rest of the tractor guns did not have... Only one 122-mm battery was withdrawn, and after 4 days another 4 152-mm guns were brought in on tractors that arrived from the national economy.” The 212th motorized rifle division, having almost a complete supply of Red Army personnel, did not had absolutely no vehicles for transporting personnel and could not even provide itself with vehicles for transporting ammunition. The artillery regiment had 8 76-mm guns, 16 122-mm guns and 4 152-mm guns, and there were only one division's worth of propulsion equipment, and then without rear support. Therefore, the guns were brought to firing positions as the mechanized traction was released and manually.” It’s good that Comrade Carpezo’s 15th mechanized corps was able to avoid a half-thousand-kilometer senseless race before entering the battle: as you know, “two soldiers from the construction battalion replace an excavator.” But even the most prepared and motivated crew, even one entirely made up of Komsomol communists, Stakhanovites, excellent in combat and political training, will not be able to replace a tractor, especially on a 500-kilometer march. However, even where tractors seemed to be in the required quantity according to the state, the state of affairs did not inspire optimism: “The Military Prosecutor’s Office of the North-Western Front received materials about the losses during the period of hostilities of the motor transport fleet of the 110th howitzer artillery regiment named after. Comrade Voroshilov. In his explanations, the regiment commander said: “ Tractor park. a) 95 Kommunar tractors were lost due to their malfunction and lack of spare parts for restoration. These tractors were manufactured and received in 1926–27. and underwent major overhauls several times. Starting from 1934–35, that is, from the moment their production ceased and other brands of tractors appeared, the question of their withdrawal was raised. During my 14 years in the regiment, the condition of these tractors was repeatedly written about. In Bessarabia (1940), after a long four-hundred-kilometer march, the difficulties of which Colonel-General Lebedev saw, I reported directly in a letter to the People's Commissar of Defense and to the head of the GAU KA[213], Colonel-General Voronov, about the unsuitability of tractors and the replacement of them. In response to my letter, Colonel General Voronov issued a resolution: “The question has been raised about replacing these tractors with other brands.” Upon arrival in Lithuania, the same question was repeatedly raised before Nachart and the Head of ABTV about replacing these tractors, in addition, the above commissions noted a similar requirement in their acts. Only in the winter of this year, the regiment received 25 Voroshilovets tractors, which were only enough for the combat unit of one division. These tractors were taken to the camps. On the eve of the war, 26 “Voroshilovets” tractors were shipped from Riga to the regiment, which until now had not arrived at the regiment, as they were lost on the railway . There were no fuel depots along the regiment’s route, and the tractors had to be refueled with various random fuels. Dilapidated, rattling cars running on fuel that does not correspond to the given engine; Without a single spare part, naturally, the systems and trailers could not survive on such a long journey and failed. Of the total number of 95, 25 tractors were in winter quarters and could not be repaired. In addition, by the time hostilities began, 31 of the same number of tractors required major repairs, 20 were medium-sized, and the rest had a power reserve of 10–30 hours. b) Two Komintern tractors were received by the regiment in 1938; all motor resources were used up and required factory repairs. The regiment did not have spare parts for them, since there were no more tractors of this brand in the regiment. These tractors were waiting for a major overhaul for one year. c) 7 ChTZ-65 tractors broke down on the way, as they were used during the winter and summer periods and required repairs; they could not be restored en route due to the lack of spare parts. d) 12 ChTZ-60 tractors were received by the regiment in 1936–1937 and, without undergoing major repairs, were incapable of such a long journey; The regiment did not have spare parts for engine repairs. e) Non-standard STZ-NATI tractors 1 pc. and HTZ-wheeled 1 pc. They were waiting for factory repairs, the production order for which was received on the eve of the war and they did not have time to send them for repairs. All tractors, both those not taken from winter quarters and those left on the way, were put out of action by breaking the units and by arson...”

The commission that inspected the 15th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps did not go into unnecessary details and simply stated in the report: “The howitzer regiment is equipped with STZ-5 tractors. These tractors are low-powered and slow-moving. When going uphill, one implement has to be towed by two or three tractors."

However, this state of affairs can hardly be considered unexpected: “Deputy. Head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army , Colonel General of Artillery Comrade. Voronov on June 9, 1941. The STZ-5 tractor, used in the Red Army for towing divisional artillery systems, has been produced by the Stalingrad Tractor Plant since 1935 on the basis of the STZ-3 agricultural tractor. It was assumed that the STZ-5 tractor would be a universal type of tractor, meeting both the requirements of agriculture and transport, and the requirements for an artillery tractor. Using the very first samples of the tractor, the plant became convinced that the created machine did not meet any of the listed requirements. Having abandoned the idea of ​​​​creating such a universal machine; The plant began producing STZ-5 tractors, which, in its opinion, meet the requirements of agriculture and transport. However, the STZ-5 tractor did not meet these requirements in many respects, and during these years the plant had to introduce about 900 changes to the design of the tractors it produced. Since there was no tractor in the Red Army for divisional artillery, despite the fact that the STZ-5 tractor did not withstand a single field test, it was necessary to use this tractor in the Red Army as a temporary measure, until the appearance of a new tractor, fully meeting the new requirements of NPOs. In order to improve the design of the STZ-5 tractor... it was planned to modernize this tractor (increase engine power, improve overall dynamics, change the overall length of the tractor, improve traction with the ground...), although it was clear in advance that even after this modification the tractor would not be fully responsive NPO requirements for a tractor for divisional artillery... The Stalingrad plant produced 2 samples of modernized STZ-5 tractors, which were subjected to field tests in 1940. The modernized tractors did not withstand ground tests, after which the Stalingrad plant abandoned this work and to this day does nothing to modernize the STZ-5 tractor... The STZ-5 tractor is neither in terms of dynamic qualities, nor in ease of maintenance, nor in terms of operational reliability in any way does not meet the requirements for a divisional artillery tractor, and urgently requires a large number of changes covering the entire design of the tractor... Divisional artillery does not have an appropriate tractor that meets its tactical and technical data and requirements. Consequently, there is an urgent need to begin urgent work on the design and manufacture of a new tractor for divisional artillery... in order to be able to test prototypes already this year, and put them into production from the beginning of 1942... Deputy. Head of the Mechanized Traction Department, Major Ivanov"

Such are the things... So, did the Red Army have combat-ready mechanized corps? There were, and they could only defend themselves.

June 1941. 4th mechanized corps on the Lvov ledge

In Soviet historiography, the actions of the mechanized corps of the Red Army at the beginning of the war were rarely described in detail. Usually the matter was limited to general words about the lack of modern tanks, the uselessness of old-type vehicles and the manifold superiority of the Germans. But even against the general gloomy background, the actions of the Soviet 4th Mechanized Corps in June 1941 look like a blank spot. And the reason is that it was commanded at that time by Major General A. Vlasov. It was not customary in the USSR to remember the future traitor and commander of the ROA in any positive way. Be that as it may, you can’t erase the words from the song - the first orders to the 4th Corps were given by Vlasov. By and large, this was the end of his participation in the June battles, and then the divisions fought on their own...

First alarm

By the beginning of the war, the 4th Mechanized Corps was one of the most equipped formations in the Soviet tank forces. As of June 22, 1941, it included 892 tanks, including 101 KV and 313 T-34. The corps was stationed in Lvov and, according to pre-war plans, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, it was subordinate to the 6th Army of Lieutenant General I. N. Muzychenko.

In the area assigned to him, Commander 6 was most concerned about the flanks. Near Lvov, the USSR border formed the so-called “Lvov ledge,” and the Soviet units located in it were threatened with encirclement “by default.” Therefore, the 6th Army watched especially closely for signs of an approaching war. Its soldiers, unlike many others, were not found by the Germans sleeping in the barracks.

Fight on the streets of Nemirov. In the background, broken German 150-mm heavy infantry guns of the s.IG.33.71st Infantry Division and a damaged BT-7 tank of the 8th Panzer Division of the 4th MK are visible

Units of the 4th Mechanized Corps began moving to the concentration areas on June 17th. Unfortunately, not everything: already at this stage the connection began to “pull apart”. In particular, the 202nd Motorized Rifle Regiment remained in Lvov. Of course, in a city where a significant part of the population did not have much love for Soviet power, a strong garrison was needed. Unfortunately, subsequent events showed that the tanks of the 4th Mechanized Corps could not survive without support.

“Combat order No. 1, headquarters of 4 mk

1. Information about the enemy is reported separately.
2. Units of the second cover area advance to the state border and occupy the defense of the forefield:
3. 4 MK, having mobilized and prepared for battle, move to the reserve of the cover area - Krechow, claim. Janów, Brzuchowishche.
4. The concentration of corps units is covered by the regiments of the 15th SAD, 26th IAP and 154th IAP.
5. Simultaneously with bringing the units into combat readiness, organize defensive work with the help of engineering units and with the involvement of the local population.”

The war in the Lviv salient area began on June 22, 1941, at 4:15 am. The border outposts were the first to take the fight. Although the advancing German infantry was supported by Stugas, it took the enemy several hours to completely break the resistance of the Soviet “green caps”. In some areas, fighting continued even into the afternoon.

By this time, the 97th Infantry Division, which had been advanced to the border, had already entered the fray. At the end of 1940, it was recognized as the best in the Red Army, but even it was unable to withstand the attack of four German divisions at once.

T-34 tank from the 8th Tank Division of the 4th MK, knocked out west of the town of Mageruv

From the very beginning of the war, the main concern of the headquarters of Army Commander Muzychenko was the right flank of the army. Here, north of Lvov, the 1st Panzer Group of E. von Kleist hit the junction between the troops of the 6th and the neighboring 5th Army of M.I. Potapov. It was difficult to understand this from scattered reports from Soviet units that came under attack on the first day of the war - from everywhere there were new and new reports about the superior forces of the enemy and his breaking through tanks. But even what was visible was enough for Army Commander 6 to decide to send part of the troops of the 4th Mechanized Corps - the 32nd Tank Division - to the right flank.

“Combat order No. 3 shtakor 4 18.00 22.6.41 g

…

32 TD with two battalions of medium tanks with one battalion of motorized infantry from 81 MD to strike in the direction of Żulkiew, Kamnonka, Strumilova, Cholojów, in cooperation with units of 15 MK, destroy enemy infantry and tanks in the Radzechów area.”

The remaining units of the 4th Corps were supposed to remain in the concentration areas for now and conduct reconnaissance. It was the scouts who were the first to engage in battle with the Germans. Two tanks were lost and two tank crews were killed. The motorized rifle battalion also had to fight, which, together with a company of tanks, was sent to search for enemy paratroopers. In the summer of 1941, “parachute landings” appeared regularly in reports—the Soviet command did not immediately realize that enemy mobile units could break through deep into the rear.

"2/323 sp. With a company of tanks, 53 TP formed a detachment to combat parachute landings in the Gnoinitsa area. Having met the enemy at the Senev, Buchina, Zalaz line, the battalion went on the defensive. As a result of the battle there were losses: 1 wounded.

The reconnaissance unit of the 53rd TP, conducting reconnaissance in the direction of Dunkovishche-Radumno, upon reaching the Zaleska Volya line and the grove to the west, was met by the enemy from the direction of Dunkovishche, Ninovice.

As a result of the battle, two tanks were disabled, one of them burned down. Personnel losses: 1 middle commander killed, 1 junior commander, 1 person wounded.”

According to updated data, it turned out that both tanks were lost - the second one got stuck in a swamp. Another tank burned down along the way, capsizing into a ditch. Surely there were also cars that were out of order and even left in parks. Alas, the level of combat readiness of Soviet tank units in June 1941 was far from one hundred percent. But the 4th Mechanized Corps was still a fairly formidable force.

“To the commander of the 81st infantry division.

While traveling to the concentration area, the BT-7A tank (on Baku gasoline) overturned into a ditch and ignited. Despite all the efforts of the crew, the fire could not be extinguished. After the investigation I will report in more detail.

Commander 53 TP

Colonel Kobets"

Meanwhile, the situation in the 6th Army zone was deteriorating. North of Lvov, the divisions of Kleist’s 1st Panzer Group were rushing to the east. In the Lvov salient itself, the situation was also not the best - under pressure from the Germans, the advanced Soviet divisions were retreating back. At the same time, a gap had formed between the flanks of the 97th and 41st rifle divisions by the evening of June 23, which was not occupied by our units.

Fragment of the German map as of June 23

Commander's dilemma-6. Nemirov city

Muzychenko faced a difficult choice. On the one hand, the threat to the right flank of the 6th Army has not gone away. On the other hand, just at this time the headquarters of the Southwestern Front planned a counterattack on the German tank wedge, in which the Soviet 4th, 8th and 15th mechanized corps were to take part. The already difficult situation was aggravated by the “fog of war”: the headquarters of the 6th Army at that time did not have information about how far and with what forces the Germans had advanced deep into the defense. As a result, Muzychenko decided to first deal with “his” problems, eliminating the threat of a split in the front. By order of army headquarters, tank units were to begin the offensive at 14:00, in cooperation with the 97th Infantry Division.

But the battle began earlier and not according to the Soviet plan.

T-28 tanks of the 8th TD of the 4th MK, knocked out on the southern outskirts of Nemirov

The route laid out for the 8th Tank and 8th Motorized Rifle Divisions passed through the small Ukrainian town of Nemirov. It was located just in the “gap” and was not designated as captured by the enemy. As of the evening of June 23, this was true.

But on the morning of June 24, units of the 71st Wehrmacht Infantry Division began to enter Nemirov. They had not yet had time to really turn around and organize a defense when, at 12:40, on the outskirts of the city, first the tanks of the head patrol, and then the marching outpost of the 16th tank regiment of the 8th tank division, appeared on the outskirts of the city. On the streets of Nemirov they were met by the dream of every tank driver - enemy artillery in marching columns. The Germans managed to deploy only a few guns before the Soviet tanks began shooting horses and vehicles, crushing the guns and artillerymen who did not have time to escape with their tracks. The German anti-tank division entering the city managed to knock out two T-28s before it was ironed out by the tanks following. The “passage” of Soviet patrols cost the Germans four 37-mm Pak-36s, one crushed 50-mm Pak-38 and several “infantry guns”. Meanwhile, the main forces of the Soviet tank division were about to approach the city.

It seemed that now, after the successes of the advanced patrols, the “thirty-four” would only have to finish off the remaining Germans. But it turned out differently. Soviet tanks turned around to attack Nemirov and ended up in an almost invisible and not marked on the map swamp on the side of the highway. Several "thirty-fours" managed to break into the city, but the Germans shot them down with concentrated fire from anti-tank guns. Considering that there was no direct order to take the city, and further attacks without the support of infantry and artillery could lead to even more

To avoid greater losses, the commander of the 8th Panzer Division chose to bypass Nemirov.

T-34 tank of the 8th TD of the 4th MK, crushing the German 50-mm Pak 38 anti-tank gun

But the order to take it was from the following 81st Motorized Rifle Division, which approached the city a few hours later. True, the composition of the formation turned out to be very far from the staffing schedule: instead of two motorized rifle regiments, an artillery regiment and a reconnaissance battalion, two tank battalions and only one motorized rifle company approached the city. Simply put, the Soviet force had a lot of tanks and very little infantry. Moreover, the 81st division was equipped mainly with BT-7 tanks, for which the 37-mm Pak-36 guns were deadly. In addition, the Germans have significantly strengthened their defense over the past few hours, turning Nemirov into an “anti-tank hedgehog.” The city's defense bristled with 19 37-mm cannons, three 50-mm Pak-38s, and mortars. In addition, heavy artillery was positioned behind Nemirov, ready to support the defenders with overhead fire.

The first reconnaissance company to go into the city was a BT company from the 1st battalion. The city was then attacked with all available forces. In order to at least somehow replace the lagging artillery, some of the tanks were left to fire from the spot.

The Germans almost immediately cut off the infantry company with machine-gun and mortar fire. The tanks that managed to break into the city played a deadly game of hide and seek with the German anti-tank crews in the smoke and fire. By the evening of June 24, Nemirov was engulfed in flames.

From the report of the 53rd Tank Regiment:

“The enemy was expelled from the city, but our units did not capture the city, since hurricane fire from the enemy and our units was opened on it and the city burned.”

Battle for Mageruv

The Wehrmacht's 71st Infantry Division was not the only unit that fell under a Soviet tank roller in June 1941.

The town of Magerów is located 20 kilometers east of Nemirov. In the morning of June 25, the 97th Light Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht entered it. On the way from the border, the Germans encountered almost no resistance, and the fact that they managed to get further than their neighbors - the 295th and 71st Infantry Divisions - was initially considered by the command to be a great success. True, the Germans did not know that the Soviet side also paid attention to this achievement.

The 15th Tank Regiment was given the task of driving the Germans out of Magerow. The description of the battle in the Soviet report is dry and clear in a military way. The regiment commander made a decision: at a distance of 150 meters, tank from tank, break into Mageruv and destroy the enemy there. Judging by the German descriptions, Soviet tank crews acted more creatively. Our tanks attacked in threes - three vehicles side by side, the side ones firing on the sides, the central tank forward. The vehicles turned on their spotlights and combat lights. Some of the tanks were carried by infantry troops.

A damaged T-34 tank of the 8th TD 4 MK, which crushed a German 50-mm Pak 38 anti-tank gun

There is evidence that in this attack the three-turret “oldies” T-28 performed excellently, the bow machine-gun turrets of which were seemingly created to “sweep” the streets in front of them with a lead broom.

According to the report of the 15th Tank Regiment, during the occupation of the city, a battery of 75-mm cannons and a mortar battery were destroyed, the headquarters of the 7th Artillery Regiment was destroyed, and staff documents were captured. And judging by German photos, not only 75-mm cannons, but also heavy howitzers remained on the streets of Mageruv in the form of piles of scrap metal crushed by tanks.

Combat losses of the 15th Tank Regiment directly in Mageruwa were relatively small. The loss of control in the ensuing night battle had a much worse effect on the condition of the unit - only 15 tanks out of 53 that went on the attack managed to return to the assembly point.

BT-7M of the 81st Motorized Rifle Division of the 4th Mechanized Corps, which failed due to a technical reason

June 1941 and the fighting in the Lvov ledge were ending. Units of the 6th Army and the 4th Mechanized Corps retreated to the east. Behind them were destroyed and abandoned tanks, as well as broken and crushed German guns, and killed enemies, for whom the campaign in the USSR ended before it even began.

Three years later, Soviet tanks returned to these places again. But then everything will be completely different. In July 1944, Nemirov would be taken by the 21st Guards Cavalry Regiment with the support of only five tanks from the 87th Tank Regiment. Taken without loss.

The author warmly thanks the team of the Nemirov-41 project: Andrey Karpov, Yuri Morgun, Konstantin Kovalishin, Vladimir Grechukh, Roman Shalev and Denis Kolokolchikov

Sources:

1. Operational documents of the 4th mechanized corps.
2. Operational documents of the 81st Motorized Rifle Division.
3. Operational documents of the 6th Army.
4. Front-line illustration for 2008 No. 4 - Nemirov. The first battle of General Vlasov's corps.
5. Front-line illustration for 2004 No. 4–1941 Fighting in Ukraine.

Pre-war structure of the Red Army armored forces

In this article we will look at some features of the organization of domestic tank forces in the pre-war period. Initially, this material was intended as a continuation of the series “ Why the T-34 lost to the PzKpfw III, but won against the Tigers and Panthers ,” which would illustrate changes in views on the organization, role and place of the Red Army armored forces in the pre-war and war years, against the background which the T-34 evolved. But the article turned out to be too voluminous, and did not go beyond the pre-war years and did not even reach the “thirty-four”, and therefore the author decided to offer it to respected readers as a separate material.

It must be said that the armored forces, which until 1929 were called mechanized troops, and since December 1942 - armored and mechanized troops, before the war had a very complex and, moreover, constantly changing structure. But its description could be briefly summarized as follows. In the structure of the armored forces, two directions are clearly visible:

1. Creation of units and units for direct interaction with rifle and cavalry divisions;

2. Creation of large mechanized formations capable of independently solving problems in operational cooperation with large combined arms formations, such as the army or the front.

So, as part of the solution to the first task, a large number of separate tank companies, battalions, mechanized squadrons, armored vehicle divisions and regiments were formed, which, as a rule, were part of rifle and cavalry divisions or brigades.

These formations may not have been on the staff of the divisions, but existed separately, as a means of strengthening them, attached for the period of a particular operation. As for the second task, to solve it, starting in 1930, mechanized brigades were formed, and since 1932, mechanized corps.

The basis of the mechanized corps was made up of two mechanized brigades , each of which had 4 tank battalions, a self-propelled artillery division, rifle-machine-gun and engineer battalions, reconnaissance and chemical companies. In total, the brigade had 220 tanks, 56 armored vehicles, 27 guns . In addition to the mechanized brigades of the specified composition, the mechanized corps included a rifle and machine-gun brigade and many support units: a reconnaissance battalion, a chemical battalion, a communications battalion, an engineer battalion, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, a regulation company and a technical base. It is also interesting that the mechanized brigades that were part of the mechanized corps had their own staffs that were different from the individual mechanized brigades.

However, the exercises of 1932-34. showed that such mechanized corps turned out to be overly cumbersome and difficult to manage, which is why their staffs were reformed in 1935.

Tanks of the 45th Mechanized Corps at the Kyiv maneuvers, 1935.

They were still based on two mechanized brigades, but now of a new composition. The fact is that by that time the need to unify their composition with separate mechanized brigades had already been realized, but, oddly enough, this was not possible at that moment. The number of tanks in these formations decreased, while T-26 tanks were excluded from the corps mechanized brigades and were now equipped exclusively with BT. Nevertheless, as can be understood from the descriptions, the corps mechanized brigade still remained unequal to a separate formation of the same type.

As for the remaining units and subunits, the mechanized corps retained a rifle and machine-gun brigade, but most of the supporting units were withdrawn from their composition - only a communications battalion and a reconnaissance tank battalion remained. The number of tanks in the mechanized corps across the state is now 463 units (it used to be more, but the author is not clear how much). In total, the mechanized corps included 384 BT, as well as 52 flamethrower tanks and 63 T-37 tanks.

In general, the mechanized corps remained an unbalanced formation, which, in addition to many tanks, had armored vehicles, motorcycles, but had practically no guns (only 20 units) and motorized infantry. There were 1,444 vehicles for such a mechanized corps. In total, starting from 1932, 4 such mechanized corps were formed.

In 1937, the next round of modernization occurred. Firstly, all mechanized brigades of the Red Army began to gradually be renamed tank brigades (the process dragged on until 1939), and were now divided into light and heavy tank brigades. Their staff and the amount of military equipment have changed. The number of tanks increased from 157 to 265 combat and 36 training tanks in brigades equipped with T-26s, or 278 combat and 49 training tanks for BT brigades.

Now the tank brigade was supposed to include 4 tank battalions (54 tanks and 6 self-propelled guns each), as well as one reconnaissance and motorized rifle battalion, not counting support units. Only now was it possible to unify the composition of corps and separate tank brigades; now the number of tanks in one mechanized corps was 560 combat and 98 training.

But then something strange began to happen.

It would seem that the Red Army is gradually taking the right path: on the one hand, starting to form large independent tank formations, and on the other, gradually realizing that they should not be purely tank, but also have their own mobile artillery and motorized infantry. And suddenly, having taken a step forward, the army leadership takes two steps back:

1. The commission created in July 1939 to review the organizational and staffing structure of the troops, although it proposes to preserve tank brigades and mechanized corps, but advocates the exclusion of motorized rifle and machine-gun brigades and battalions from their composition.

2. In October 1939, a plan for the reorganization of the Red Army was sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, according to which it was proposed to disband the mechanized corps, and the need to remove motorized rifle and rifle-machine-gun units from tank brigades was again emphasized.

It can be assumed that the reason for the abandonment of motorized infantry is primarily due to the small number of available vehicles. As we have already said, the same mechanized corps was assigned almost 1.5 thousand vehicles, and this is a lot.

Let us remember that the German tank division of the 1941 model, having 16,932 personnel, that is, surpassing the Soviet mechanized corps mod. In 1935, the number of soldiers and officers was one and a half times, and it had 2,147 vehicles on staff. But in fact, cars were the eternal Achilles heel in the Red Army, there were never enough of them, and it can be assumed that in the brigades and mechanized corps their actual number was much lower than the standard one.

Most likely, a situation arose when the available fleet of vehicles was simply not enough even to service the existing tanks, and there was nothing to transport the motorized infantry at all, as a result of which, in fact, the mechanized corps and brigades were only partially motorized formations. That is, the same brigade could select a mobile group from its composition, but it was not completely mobile. Hence the desire of the commission members to “free” it from infantry in order to ensure mobility at least for the tank battalions in its composition.

As for the disbandment of the mechanized corps, there are probably no mysteries here. By the time the final decision was made on them, and this happened on November 21, 1939, the 20th mechanized corps (more precisely, already a tank corps) managed to fight at Khalkhin Gol, and the 15th and 25th took part in the “Liberation Campaign” to Western Belarus and Ukraine. Thus, the Red Army had the opportunity to test the real combat effectiveness and mobility of its highest tank formations and, alas, the results were disappointing.

It turned out that given the existing level of communications and combat training, as well as the real capabilities of the tank corps headquarters, managing three brigades at the same time was very difficult, and the structure was too cumbersome. This may seem strange, but in terms of the pace of advancement, the 25th Tank Corps in Belarus and Ukraine managed to lose not only to cavalry, but even to infantry formations. At the same time, individual tank brigades showed significantly better results.

Very often, the author of this article had to deal with the point of view in Internet discussions that in 1939 there was a disaggregation of the armored forces in the USSR, and that mechanized corps were abandoned in favor of tank brigades. But this, of course, is wrong, because until the very end of the 30s of the last century, it was individual mechanized (later tank) brigades that formed the backbone of the tank forces of the Red Army.

So, for example, in 1938-39. The Red Army included at least 28 tank brigades (this is how many mechanized brigades received new numbers when the name was changed), but only 8 of them were included in the mechanized corps. Thus, in addition to 4 mechanized corps in the Red Army, there were at least 20 tank brigades, but most likely there were 21 of them. According to other sources, the number of separate tank brigades reached 28 by the end of 1937, which, however, is somewhat It’s doubtful, but by May 1940 there were already 39 of them.

In other words, despite the presence of mechanized corps and not taking into account the mass of tanks in the rifle and cavalry divisions, the main type of formation of the armored forces of the Red Army was a tank brigade, and in this regard, the decision to disband the tank corps did not change anything. In addition, it must be taken into account that, according to the decision made in November 1939, instead of four tank corps that were to be disbanded, the Red Army should have received 15 motorized divisions.

The strength of the new unit was supposed to be 9,000 people. (initially they planned for a thousand more, but when they started forming, there were already 9 thousand people) in peacetime. This was not too different from the staff of the mechanized corps, which, according to the 1935 staff, should have included 8,965 people in peacetime. personnel. However, if the mechanized corps had a brigade structure, then the mechanized division consisted of 4 regiments, including a tank, artillery and two rifle regiments.

Thus, with approximately the same number of personnel, the number of tanks in the motorized division in comparison with the mechanized corps was reduced from 560 to 257 units, but the number of motorized infantry and artillery increased significantly.

In other words, the motorized division of 1939 turned out to be very close to such a perfect instrument of tank warfare as the German tank division of the 1941 model was . Yes, of course, the German TD had even more personnel - almost 17 thousand people. against 12 thousand people. Soviet MD according to the wartime staff, and there were even fewer tanks in it - from 147 to 229. But, nevertheless, the new Soviet formation, apparently, was much closer to the ideal combination of tanks, artillery and motorized infantry than any similar tank connecting any country in the world in 1939

But how then did it happen that later, instead of improving such a successful type of tank formation, the Red Army moved along the path of forming giant mechanized corps, which included 3 divisions and more than 1000 tanks?

Apparently, the following happened.

First . It must be said that the motorized divisions, depending on the point of view, were either a little late to be born, or, on the contrary, they were far ahead of their time. The fact is that their advantage lay in versatility, that is, they had enough tanks, artillery and motorized infantry for independent and effective combat operations. But alas, the general level of training of the Red Army personnel in 1939 simply did not allow them to take full advantage of the benefits that, in theory, the structure of a motorized division could provide.

The Finnish war showed “excellently” that the Soviet infantry of that time was poorly trained and could not operate either together with tanks or together with artillery, and the latter did not have a high level of interaction with each other. This completely intolerable situation was caused by gaping gaps in combat training, and in addition, the Red Army experienced a severe personnel shortage in terms of competent officers at all levels and junior commanders.

Here, by the way, it is not the mythical Stalinist repressions that must be blamed, but the fact that for a long time the number of armed forces of the Country of Soviets did not exceed 500,000 people, and even of those, a significant number were territorial troops. Only at the end of the 30s efforts began to be made to expand the army, but there was no personnel reserve for this.

In other words, bringing four regiments into one division is one thing, but ensuring that they turn into a combat-ready instrument capable of 100% revealing their potential capabilities is something completely different. At that time, the Red Army had neither commanders nor staffs capable of effectively leading such a division, and there was a large shortage of commanders of its individual units and subunits, not to mention ordinary Red Army soldiers.

Second. The formation of motorized divisions turned out to be greatly “blurred” by the Soviet-Finnish “winter war” of 1939-1940, since their creation began already in December 1939, that is, during military operations. Thus, the motorized divisions could not, they simply did not have time to properly show themselves in battle - they were simply not ready.

Third , the Soviet-Finnish war revealed large gaps in the organization of the tank forces of the USSR, which required immediate elimination, but could not be solved by simply building up the motorized divisions of the above-mentioned staff.

As mentioned above, in the 30s of the last century it was considered extremely necessary to saturate rifle and cavalry divisions with tanks, which were assigned tank formations from a tank company or battalion to a regiment. This, again, turned out to be theoretically absolutely correct, but at the same time a premature decision.

Without a doubt, the presence of a trained and combat-ready tank battalion as part of an infantry division significantly increased its capabilities both defensively and offensively. But for this, in addition to the approved staff of the division and the supply of a certain number of tanks with crews, it was necessary:

1. Somewhere to get division commanders and divisional headquarters officers who are well acquainted with the capabilities and needs of the tank battalion entrusted to their command, and the tanks themselves. That is, it was not enough to give the infantry division commander a certain amount of armored vehicles, it was also necessary to teach him how to use these armored vehicles.

2. Create conditions for the operation of tanks - that is, at a minimum, equip base areas, create repair services, arrange timely supply of spare parts, etc.

3. Create conditions for normal combat training of tanks as part of infantry and cavalry divisions.

So, in fact, we have not fulfilled any of the above-mentioned points. The Red Army had a chronic shortage of at least some knowledgeable rifle division commanders. Many of those who occupied these positions due to their qualifications could not effectively command even a purely infantry formation, and then there were tanks... what kind of tanks, when a significant part of the officers at the radio station looked askance? Of course, this does not mean that the Red Army had absolutely no division commanders capable of effectively leading divisions with the tanks assigned to them, there were simply too few of them.

At the same time, even tankers who came to serve in divisions (battalion commanders and below) often themselves had gaps in education, and did not know how to properly organize the maintenance of complex equipment, did not have experience in building interaction with infantry and artillery, and did not know how to establish combat training . And even if they did, they were often faced with the fact that there simply wasn’t enough materiel for this – spare parts for maintenance, etc.

And all this together led to the fact that there were tank units in infantry formations, but there was almost no sense in this, the division commanders did not know how to use tanks in battle, the materiel transferred to the rifle divisions was simply not used, so as not to develop a resource, or quickly went out of order if someone did try to conduct serious training. And therefore the conclusion drawn from the results of the “winter war” by the armored subcommittee (April 20, 1940) is not at all surprising:

“Based on the use in combat conditions of previously existing and newly created formations: separate SD tank battalions, MSD separate tank companies in regiments, SD tank regiments, the commission considers these organized units to be completely unviable. Such organizational forms only lead to a complete dispersion of combat vehicles, their improper use (even to the point of protecting headquarters and rear areas), the impossibility of their timely restoration, and sometimes the impossibility of using them.”

It was quite an embarrassing fiasco. In essence, it was said that a significant part of all tanks delivered to the Red Army cannot be used for their intended purpose, and if everything is left as is, this will lead to their wear and loss without a noticeable increase in the combat effectiveness of rifle and cavalry units. What did the subcommittee propose?

“All separate tank battalions of rifle and motorized rifle divisions, separate light tank regiments and divisions, with the exception of the 1st and 2nd OKA and personnel cavalry divisions, are to be disbanded and created tank brigades... ...Categorically prohibit all formations of tank units, except tank brigades . If there is a need for tanks, send them only in whole brigades.”

Did this mean that the analysis of combat operations showed that the brigade was optimal for tank forces? No. As we know, nothing like that happened. On the contrary, it turned out that tank brigades, being purely tank formations, cannot operate effectively without the support of infantry and artillery (we will not remember the Air Force).

For example, on December 17-19, 1939, the 20th heavy tank brigade, armed with the T-28, unsuccessfully tried to break through the Finnish fortified area of ​​Summa-Hotinen. The problem was that, although the 20th TBR was supposed to be supported by the 50th Rifle Corps, in fact it was unable to do this - everything came down to sporadic and weak infantry support for the advancing tanks.

Destroyed tanks of the 20th brigade after the offensive

In other words, if rifle divisions did not know how to use tank companies and battalions in their composition, then where would they get the ability to interact with the tank brigade assigned for the duration of the operation? At the same time, the tankers had neither artillery nor motorized infantry; in order to conduct full-fledged combat operations, they had to rely only on tanks, which, naturally, led to large losses and periodic failures of combat missions.

It can be assumed that the members of the subcommittee saw and understood all this very well, so they did not at all want to abandon the motorized divisions mod. 1939 Their recommendations were:

“Preserve the existing organization of motorized divisions. Form 3-4 such divisions according to the peacetime staff, test them in exercises and combat operations in various directions, and then make appropriate clarifications for new formations.”

In other words, it turned out like this. In 1940, the tank brigade was the most combat-ready unit of the Red Army's armored forces. Companies, battalions, and regiments transferred to infantry and cavalry units demonstrated low efficiency, larger mechanized corps were too clumsy and poorly controlled, and motorized divisions had not yet had time to prove themselves. At the same time, the tank brigade, although it was definitely not the ideal of a tank formation, was still an already mastered formation that was understandable to the army, which they learned to manage, maintain in peacetime, train and use in battle.

Hence the commission’s natural and absolutely sensible proposal: to withdraw all (or rather, almost all) tanks from the rifle divisions and unite them into brigades. And, at the same time, in practice, continue the search for a more optimal formation of armored forces, which was exactly what the motorized division was supposed to be. And only then, when the structure, staff and management issues of such a division have been worked out, it will be possible to gradually reorganize the armored forces into new formations.

In general, the Red Army did not have any other reasonable options, because leaving tanks in separate companies/battalions in rifle divisions would only mean wasting money on their maintenance, and forming a mass of motorized divisions that could “master "Tanks withdrawn in this way was impossible. And the same T-26s were not suitable for motorized divisions. In addition, of course, no one stopped us from using the newly formed brigades in the future to directly support the rifle corps.

However, the development of domestic tank forces took a different path - on May 27, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense, together with the Chief of the General Staff, sent a memo to the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars with a proposal to form tank divisions, consisting of two tank regiments, as well as artillery and motorized rifle regiments , and an anti-aircraft artillery division, and again return to mechanized or tank corps.

It is difficult to say what was the reason for this decision: on the one hand, the idea of ​​​​creating formations with over 1,000 tanks, according to the memoirs of Marshal M.V. Zakharov, voiced by none other than I.V. Stalin. But, according to all the same memories, this was done at the end of May, when the NPO and the Chief of General Staff were working hard on the idea of ​​​​forming tank divisions and corps, so it is unlikely that Joseph Vissarionovich was the initiator of this process.

Most likely, the leadership of the Red Army was impressed by the Polish campaign of the Wehrmacht and the striking power of its tank divisions and corps. At the same time, as of 1939, one German tank division contained 324 tanks (disaggregation began in 1940 and later), respectively, two such divisions combined into a corps gave a total of almost 700 tanks.

This was how it was in reality, but it is difficult to say what information the leadership of the Red Army had in May 1940 - unfortunately, domestic intelligence greatly exaggerated the capabilities of the German tank industry. But in any case, the German tank corps, even in terms of its actual numbers, seemed to be a much more powerful and dangerous formation than individual tank brigades or motorized divisions. It is possible that this is precisely what led to the desire of our commanders to receive an equivalent “tank fist”.

Nevertheless, the NPO memo dated May 27, 1940 was rejected: the structure of the tank forces needed to be modified in order to meet the staffing level of the Red Army at the level of 3,410 thousand people, which was approved by the government. The proposals were redone, and the new staff of the mechanized corps was approved on July 6, 1940 by resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1193-464ss. The same decree established the staffing levels for the tank division, and for the motorized division the staffing was adopted, approved by NKO Resolution No. 215ss adopted on May 22, 1940.

In total, the mechanized corps was supposed to include 2 tank and 1 motorized division and, in addition to them, a motorcycle regiment, one air squadron, a road battalion and a corps communications battalion. In addition, by the same decree, each MK was assigned one air brigade consisting of two short-range bomber regiments and one fighter regiment. The latter, however, was not fulfilled.

In this form, the MK existed until the Great Patriotic War; changes in the structure were minimal. So, for example, according to decree No. 1193-464ss, a tank division was supposed to have 386 tanks, but then its staff was slightly changed, and in fact their number increased to 413, but later it was reduced to 375 units.

In total, in 1940, it was decided to create 8 mechanized corps. For this purpose, a new structure of armored forces was introduced, which envisaged the creation of 18 tank, 8 motorized divisions, as well as 25 tank brigades, not counting the units assigned to other units. At the same time, 16 tank and 8 motorized divisions were intended to form 8 mechanized corps, 2 tank divisions became separate, and tank brigades were considered as a means of strengthening the rifle corps.

This plan was even exceeded: at the end of 1940, the Red Army had: 9 mechanized corps, 2 separate tank divisions, 3 motorized rifle divisions, 40 T-26 tank brigades, 5 BT tank brigades, 20 motorized brigades, 3 motorized armored brigades, 15 tank regiments cavalry divisions, 5 armored divisions of mountain cavalry divisions, as well as other, smaller units that had tanks.

It must be said that until this time the formation of mechanized units looked reasonable and logical. Firstly, they were created on the basis of existing formations, so they immediately turned out to be “full-blooded”, that is, rich in both equipment and personnel. And, in addition, numerous brigades were also retained as part of the armored forces, whose task was to provide direct support to the rifle corps.

But then, alas, the leadership of the Red Army changed its sense of proportion and, starting in the spring of 1941, it began to form another 21 MKs, in order to bring their total number to 30. But they had to be created practically from scratch, and as a result they were transferred almost any remaining equipment at your disposal. And including, of course, the one that individual tank brigades had.

As a result of such approaches, the following happened: firstly, the rifle divisions were deprived of tank support, and among the newly formed formations such strange formations appeared as, for example, the 40th Tank Division, whose tank fleet consisted of 19 T-26 and 139 T -37.

In other words, the development of the armored forces of the Red Army in the 30s was characterized by a polar change of priorities. If in the early 30s the main priority was to saturate rifle and cavalry units with tank units, then closer to the beginning of the war the infantry was practically deprived of such support, and giant mechanized corps began to play the main role.

Mechanized (hereinafter referred to as tank) brigades in the early 30s were the main type of tank formation, designed to independently solve problems in operational cooperation with other branches of the military, that is, in fact, they were the main instrument of tank warfare. But in 1940, tank brigades became a means of supporting rifle corps instead of tank battalions withdrawn from rifle divisions, and then almost completely disappeared from the tank forces. Moreover, the reason for this disappearance was not the denial of the usefulness of the tank brigade, but the priority of the pre-war formation of a huge number of mechanized corps.

The service and combat use of tank brigades were well developed, but at the same time, many in the leadership of the Red Army were well aware that a tank brigade was not the optimal formation for modern tank warfare. That is why throughout the 30s the search continued for other formations, larger than a tank brigade, but at the same time combining tanks, motorized artillery, and infantry. In this way, mechanized corps of the 1932-35 model were created, which were abandoned in favor of motorized divisions, and then mechanized corps were restored again, but at a completely different organizational level.

/Andrey from Chelyabinsk, topwar.ru/

Source

Divisions of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War

2nd Mechanized Corps - military unit 6869.

Commander - Lieutenant General Yuri Vladimirovich Novoselsky.

Deputy for combat unit - Major General of Tank Forces A. G. Polikarpov.

Deputy for political affairs - brigade commissar Sergei Petrovich Semenov (3.06.40–17.08.41).

Chief of Staff - Colonel Nikolai Ivanovich Suchkov (died 08/2/41).

Chief of Artillery - Major General of Artillery Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko (until May 1941).

The head of the engineering service is Lieutenant Colonel Larioshkin.

Head of the sanitary service - military doctor 1st rank Grigory Alekseevich Chulkov (since 09.40).

Deputy head of the political propaganda department - regimental commissar Ivan Aleksandrovich Gavrilov (3.06.40 - 03.41), senior battalion commissar Nikolai Solomonovich Kholidze (20.03.41 - 17.08.41).

Compound:

11th Tank Division - military unit 7970. Commander - Major General of Tank Forces Pyotr Vasilyevich Volokh, Colonel Grigory Ignatovich Kuzmin.

16th Tank Division - military unit 4488. Commander - Colonel Mikhail Ivanovich Myndro.

15th motorized division - military unit 5343. Commander - brigade commander Semyon Moiseevich Krivoshein (until June 4, 1940), brigade commander Mikhail Dmitrievich Solomatin (4.06.40 - 03.41),

6th Motorcycle Regiment - military unit 6961. Commander - Major, Lieutenant Colonel A. Z. Morozov (died in June 1941). Deputy for combat unit - Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain Lev Illarionovich Puzanov. Deputy for political affairs - battalion commissar Ivan Vasilyevich Dubeykovsky. Technical assistant - captain Ilya Mikhailovich Georgievsky. Chief of Staff - Captain Ivanov.

182nd separate communications battalion - military unit 6920.

49th separate motorized engineering battalion - military unit 7109.

102nd separate corps aviation squadron - military unit 1921.

243rd field postal station.

The history of the 2nd Mechanized Corps can begin in the spring of 1940, when the 15th Sivash Rifle Division of the Order of Lenin, twice Red Banner, Order of the Red Banner of Labor, was among the first in the Red Army to be reorganized into a motorized division - and from May 15, 1940, contained by state wartime.

On June 28, 1940, at 23.00, the 15th Motorized Division was the first to enter Chisinau, the capital of Bessarabia being returned from Romania. After this “liberation campaign” on the territory of Moldova in the OdVO on July 20, 1940, the formation of the 2nd mechanized corps began.

The administration and corps units of the 2nd MK were formed in Tiraspol on the basis of the administration and corresponding units of the 55th Rifle Corps [268th separate communications battalion and 254th engineer battalion]. The 6th Motorcycle Regiment was reorganized from the 567th Infantry Regiment of the 173rd Infantry Division. The air communications unit of the 15th motorized division was deployed to the corps air squadron.

The 11th Tank Division was formed in Chisinau on the basis of the 4th Light Tank Brigade. The 366th Howitzer Artillery and 490th Rifle Regiments of the 173rd Infantry Division were reorganized into the howitzer artillery and motorized rifle regiments of the 11th Division. In addition, the 389th Tank Battalion of the 176th Infantry Division, the 18th Anti-Aircraft Division and the Medical Battalion of the 173rd Infantry Division applied for the formation of the division.

The 16th Tank Division was formed in summer camps in Kotovsk on the basis of the 173rd Infantry Division. The tank regiment was formed from two battalions of the 4th infantry brigade (43rd and 71st) and tank battalions of the 25th, 30th, 51st, 96th, 150th and 156th infantry regiments. The 173rd Division itself was formed in September-November 1939 in the city of Balashov (PriVO) by allocating personnel and property from the 53rd Infantry Division, 307th Infantry Division, 36th and 64th Infantry Division. On December 20, 1939, the division was reorganized into a motorized rifle division [Initially it was planned to form a motorized division, so the 567th rifle division and the 488th gap were disbanded, and the 47th tank division was formed. However, the division was already at the front consisting of three small infantry regiments and one artillery regiment. The tank regiment was consolidated into the 449th tank battalion] and in this capacity participated in the Soviet-Finnish war. On April 26, the division arrived in the OdVO and settled in a camp in Pervomaisk. In May, the 366th Gap arrived from the PriVO to the division during its reorganization into a rifle division.

The corps includes the previously formed 15th Motorized Division (Tiraspol).

The formation of the corps was completed on July 18, 1940.

Although the corps was classified as a combat corps, it was worse equipped than all the corps of the first wave of the summer of 1940 and on June 22, 1941, had, according to various sources, from 489 to 527 tanks. There were 50 new T-34 tanks in the corps, KV-10, all of them were in the 11th Tank Division. The 16th Panzer had even fewer tanks than the 15th Motorized Division of the same corps. The 6th motorcycle regiment was fully equipped with trucks, but special ones - 25%, and motorcycles - 22% [Data for December 1940].

Deployment (as of May 1, 1941):

management - Tiraspol;

6th motorcycle regiment - Dubossary;

11th Tank Division - Chisinau; mp-Ganchesti;

16th Tank Division - Kotovsk (summer camps); orb - Too small; winter quarters of the Balta division;

15th motorized division - Tiraspol; 47th mp, obs, orb, ozad, oiptd - Bendery.

"Stormy June":

Although the corps was stationed on the territory of the Odessa Military District, in case of war it constituted the reserve of the High Command in the regions of Chisinau, Tiraspol, and Kotovsk. Its use without the permission of the Civil Code was prohibited. Thus, according to the note on the action plan of the troops of the Odessa Military District in covering the state border No. 00276/op dated June 20, 1941, the 2nd Mechanized Corps was not involved in covering the border within the OdVO.

On June 14, 1941, the administration of the 9th Army (Colonel General Ya. T. Cherevichenko) was separated from the administration of the Odessa Military District and moved to Tiraspol. The army included, among other formations, the 2nd Mechanized Corps. On the morning of June 20, the army command was alerted and, under the guise of command and staff exercises, by the end of the day it deployed a command post in an area pre-equipped in case of war, establishing contact with the formations included in the army.

On the night of June 22, the chief of staff of the OdVO received a message from the district commander that a telegram of special importance was expected from Moscow. General M.V. Zakharov called the corps commanders to the telegraph machines and, with the permission of the commander, ordered the covering units to occupy their defense areas. As recorded in the combat log of the 9th Army, “at 24.00 on June 21, 1941, army units covering the border were put on alert by telegraph. The order was given to corral the areas according to the cover plan.”

The commanders of the formations of the 2nd mechanized corps were called to the corps headquarters, where Lieutenant General Novoselsky informed them that the commander of the district troops had ordered the units to be brought to full combat readiness, withdrawn from their deployment points and camouflaged.

The formations of the 2nd MK immediately began to carry out the assigned task. On the night of June 21-22, they left their permanent deployment points and concentrated: the 11th Panzer Division on the northeastern outskirts of Chisinau, the 11th Motorized Rifle Division in Gancheshti. The 16th Panzer Division dispersed in the Kotovsk area; 15th motorized division - Lipkani station, large farm (area of ​​the city of Bendery), Ternovka, Sukleya (area of ​​the city of Tiraspol); 6th motorcycle regiment - Dubossary city. The corps headquarters was located on the southern outskirts of the city of Tiraspol (Koltovaya). Here the 2nd Mechanized Corps met the beginning of the war.

On the morning of June 22, the corps received orders to advance to the state border. In the afternoon, the commander of the 9th Army, General Cherevichenko, issued combat order No. 01 for the defense of the state border, according to which the 2nd Mechanized Corps by the morning of June 23 was to concentrate in the Chisinau region and the forests to the north and north-west in readiness, covering Ganchesti with one regiment, to a counterattack on Balti. The army commander took one motorized rifle regiment of the 15th MD into his reserve, located in the Tiraspol, Krasnaya Gorka region.

On June 23, parts of the corps marched, and by 6 p.m. they concentrated: corps headquarters in the southeastern outskirts of Goyana; 15th motorized division - 47th motorized rifle division and 203rd ap-Krikov, 14th tank division - Gulboka and the forest to the east; The 16th Panzer Division, consisting of three regiments (tank, infantry, ap), crossed the Dniester River in the Criulani area; The 6th motorcycle regiment, consisting of 2 motorcycle companies, an armored company, a PTO battery, a control company and a park company, concentrated at 8:40 2 km southeast of Orhei, in this area it remained until June 25. The 3rd and 4th motorcycle companies of the regiment were left in Dubossary, where a tractor battalion was formed on their base. The 11th Panzer Division was in its previous concentration areas and took part in the march only the next day.

On June 24, 1941, the corps completed the march and concentrated by 12:00: corps headquarters by 11:00 - Peresechina; 11th TD - 21, 22nd TC - Bukovets, (lawsuit) Vernicheny, eastern forest Vernicheny, 11th MSP - Gancheshty; 15th MD - 47th MRR and 203rd AP - Kamenka, high. 242 and the forest northeast of Kamenka, 14th TP-Recha and the forest southeast. The 321st Motorized Rifle Regiment was transferred to the reserve of the commander of the 9th Army; 16th TD - 16th Motorized Rifle Regiment took up defense at the Valya-Popi, Brovichi line, with a front to the north; The 6th MCP was in the previous area and was conducting reconnaissance in the direction of Orhei.

On June 25, corps formations were in the same areas. In the evening, the 1st battalion of the 22nd tank regiment of the 11th tank division under the command of Captain Gavrilov and one company of the 11th motorized rifle regiment attacked the enemy in the direction of Petreshta. As a result, the group lost 8 tanks, 7 people killed and 13 missing.

On June 26, the corps makes a new march. By 15:00, the 2nd MK concentrated: corps headquarters - Korneshti; 11th TD - in the Cornesti area and the forest to the southeast, a tank battalion was sent for reconnaissance in the direction of Todoresti, Skuleni-Tirg; 16th TD - in the area of ​​Mandreshty, Kisla-Deznisha, Chilika. Due to the rains, the division marched on foot, and vehicles were sent to the concentration area; 6th MCP - Chulukany.

The 15th Infantry Division was concentrated in the area of ​​Girchesti, Manzaresti, and Kurtai. The division received the task - at 19:00 from the Stynzhenen line, with two battalions of tanks and one motorized rifle battalion, with the support of the 203rd artillery regiment, in cooperation with the 591st rifle regiment, to destroy the enemy in the Skuleni area.

On June 27, the tank divisions were in the same areas. 15th motorized division in the area of ​​​​Pyrlitsa, Ekaterinivka, Patreshty. By order of the command of the mechanized corps, a detachment was created consisting of the 1st TB 14th Tank Regiment, 2nd TB 47th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 1st Adn 203rd AP, which was concentrated in Ekaterinovka.

On the night of June 28-29, the corps once again changed its location. On June 29, the corps, according to the combat order of the commander of the 9th Army No. 0023, concentrated: corps headquarters - Singerei; 16th TD - Sinchzherei, Gilichen; 11th TD - Katranyk, Glindzheni, 11th motorized rifle regiment was transferred to the disposal of Army Commander-9 in the Ganchesti area; 15th MD - Ezeren, Nikolaevka, Kishkoren.

On the Reut River. Beginning of July 1941.

From June 30 to July 3, 1941, the corps marched to a new concentration area: Drochia, Sofia, Recha, Nikoleni to launch a counterattack against the enemy who had broken through.

On July 2, on the right flank of the 9th Army, the enemy (four German and Romanian divisions) went on the offensive at the junction between the 30th Guards Division and the 95th Division. Two divisions and two brigades attacked the 176th Infantry Division. Soviet troops were unable to stop the enemy advance. German and Romanian troops, having begun crossing the Prut River on July 1, reached the line of Stolnicheni, Zaikani, Chuchulya, Kulugar-Soch, Bushila by the end of July 2, having advanced to a depth of 8-10 km.

The commander of the 9th Army advanced the 2nd Mechanized Corps to the threatened direction. By the end of July 2, the corps concentrated in the area of ​​Drochia, Nicoresti, Anfisovka and conducted reconnaissance in the sector of the 176th Infantry Division. From 12:00 on July 3, in cooperation with the 176th Infantry Division, the corps took part in battles with enemy units that crossed the Prut River and the Stefanesti area.

According to the directive of the commander of the Southern Front on July 3, the troops of the 9th Army were supposed to destroy the enemy who had crossed the Prut in the direction of Stefanesti and Sculeni.

On the night of July 4, the commander of the 9th Army issues combat order No. 4/OP. The right-flank group of the 9th Army received the task of destroying the enemy who had broken through into Soviet territory and re-secure the state border in the Lopatnik-Skuleni sector. The 2nd mechanized corps was ordered to deliver the main blow with the right flank in the direction of Nikoreni, Mosheni, Baratek, from the line of Bratusheni, (claim) Borosheni-Noui and destroy the enemy in the area of ​​​​Gorodishche, Patrusheni, Zaikani, preventing his withdrawal to the western bank of the Prut River in area of ​​Costesti, Branishta. The actions of the entire group were to be covered by a strong screen on the right from the direction of Unity-Tyrg, Tyrnova. The offensive began at 16:00 on July 4.

On July 4, in cooperation with units of the 48th Rifle Corps, the 2nd Mechanized Corps also took part in the counterattack on Costesti. Despite some successes (for example, the 16th Tank Division, together with the 176th Infantry Division, captured the villages of Borzhenei-Noi and Sturdzeni in a counterattack), the counterattack was not successful. Enemy units, having forestalled the mechanized corps in its deployment, constrained its actions. As a result of the fighting in the area of ​​Bratshteni, Moshen, formations of the 2nd mechanized corps switched to defensive actions at the Oknul-Alb, Mikhaleni, (leg.) Roshkani, Tyrk line.

If, according to the plan of the army command, the troops of the 2nd Mechanized Corps on July 4 were to deliver a powerful counter-attack to the German-Romanian formations that had crossed the Prut and throw them back to their original positions, then in reality the opposite happened - all three divisions of the corps due to a lack of forces and means from the very beginning they were forced to defend themselves, to hold back the onslaught of the enemy, who was rushing towards the city of Balti.

By the morning of July 5, in front of the front of the 2nd MK (by 6:00 in the area of ​​​​Mikhaileni, Oknul-Alb, Rakariya) and the 48th SK, the enemy was developing an attack on the joints of the units defending on a wide front, with a general direction towards Balti.

The commander of the Southern Front, General of the Army Tyulenev, assumed that up to 40 infantry, up to 3 tank and up to 10 motorized enemy divisions were operating in front of the front, which provided the German-Romanian troops with an overall superiority over the Soviet troops in manpower by 3-4 times, in technology - in 2-2.5 times. In reality, there were half as many infantry divisions, and there were no tank or motorized divisions at all [In total, the enemy grouping in Romania consisted of 20 infantry divisions (13 Romanian and 7 German), as well as 5 Romanian infantry brigades and 4 cavalry brigades. There were only Romanian motorized units here. (Editor's note)]. But, based on the above considerations, General Tyulenev decided to withdraw the 9th and 18th armies across the Dniester River to the positions of fortified areas.

On July 5, the Military Council of the Front, in a combat report to the Headquarters of the Civil Code, reported that:

“The armies of the Southern Front have the opportunity to carry out the tasks assigned to them using the method of mobile defense, relying on the fortified missiles, river. Dniester.

Specifically, the grouping of front troops is envisioned as follows:

2) 9th Army: ... 15 ° SD, 2 MK, 2 KK - army reserve in the area of ​​​​Slobodka, Kodyma, Zhury, Kotovsk. Have 2 MKs on the right flank of the army.”

The next day, the front commander, without waiting for a response from Headquarters to his proposal, gave the troops the order to withdraw and they began to carry out this order.

On July 6, the 2nd mechanized corps defended on the lines: 11th TD-high. 238, Nikoren; 16th TD - high. 252, hut. Ramadan; 15th MD - south of Baraboy, high. south of Mihailena.

By the middle of July 7, the enemy reached the line of Khotyn, Tarnovo, Balti. The enemy, having crossed the Prut River in certain sections, developed offensive operations in the Mogilev-Podolsk and Soroki directions, trying to break the resistance of Soviet troops and seize crossings across the Dniester.

The troops of the Southern Front began to implement the decision of the front commander to withdraw beyond the Dniester. According to the combat order of Army Commander-9 No. 0024 dated July 7, 1941, the troops of the 9th Army were supposed to contain the enemy between the Prut and Dniester rivers using the method of maneuverable defense and, putting up stubborn resistance on intermediate lines, move on to a strong defense of the Dniester River line, relying on URY. The 2nd Mechanized Corps was supposed to, covering the withdrawal of the 48th Rifle Corps, begin to retreat to the area of ​​​​Zgura, Shureli, Ketrosu, where it would remain until the end of July 8, 1941. On the night of July 9, the corps was supposed to cross the Dniester at Saracea, Rybnitsa and north of Gederim to the area of ​​​​Pirozhka, Serta, Ivashkovo, forming an army reserve. The motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Tank Division was attached to the 48th Rifle Corps.

By the end of July 7, the 2nd Mechanized Corps retreated to the Reut River and concentrated on the line of Drochia, Tsargrad, Anfisovka. Losses on July 7 amounted to 20 tanks and 20 guns.

The enemy of the corps in these battles was the 22nd Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, Lieutenant General von Sponeck (N. Sponeck). As Franz Halder wrote in his diary on July 7, 1941: “The 22nd Infantry Division suffered heavy losses as a result of enemy tank counterattacks.”

By Directive No. 00226 of July 7, 1941, the Civil Code Headquarters informed the commander of the Southern Front that it did not approve the decision to withdraw troops across the Dniester River, which he had made on July 5:

“The proposal set out in No. 723 was not approved by Headquarters, as it is exclusively passive and does not correspond to the situation. In the Iasi sector and up to the Black Sea, the enemy is not capable of active actions, and only in the Iasi, Bratusani sector will he wedge himself into the defensive zone for 20–25 km. This group, if it wanted to actively fight, could have been crushed by a counterattack from parts of our defense and thrown back beyond the Prut.

The headquarters ordered:

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Tags: 2nd Mechanized Corps, Great Patriotic War