"Stalingrad" on the water. Why Joseph Stalin's favorite cruiser was not completed in the USSR


Previous events

This began even before the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. As you know, V.I. Stalin had an inexplicable passion for cruisers, so it was his increased attention to heavy ships and unlimited power that played a major role in the decision to begin the development of the so-called Project 82.

At the end of August - beginning of September 1939, negotiations took place between representatives of Germany and the USSR, which ended with the signing of agreements on non-aggression, friendship and borders between states, as well as on trade and credit cooperation. A little later, the delegations of both countries met again, this time to conclude an economic agreement providing for the supply to the Soviet Union of a large number of engineering products, including weapons and military equipment, in exchange for raw materials.

With the outbreak of the war unleashed by Hitler's Germany in Europe, German shipbuilding campaigns were refocused on large-scale construction of submarines, while programs to create surface warships were temporarily suspended. That is why the Soviet government had the opportunity to purchase several unfinished military cruisers.

The Trade and Purchasing Commission, which included specialists from the Navy and the NKSP and which was headed by the People's Commissar of the shipbuilding industry of the Soviet Union I. T. Tevosyan, reviewed the documentation and negotiated the purchase of two or three heavy ships of the Admiral Hipper type, equipped with 203 mm artillery. These cruisers began to be built in series four years before the start of World War II. By that time, two of them had already been transferred to the German fleet, and three more were being completed afloat.

Such an acquisition would allow the USSR to replenish the fleet with the required number of combat units much faster, without reducing the number of military vessels already being manufactured or just planned for construction. Negotiations between the two parties ended with Germany agreeing to sell one of the unfinished ships - the cruiser Lützow, the technical readiness of which was 50%. In addition, the Germans pledged to provide the supply of not only weapons, but also equipment for its further construction. Also, a group of specialists from the construction shipyard located in Bremen was supposed to go to the USSR for the period until all work on the ship was completed.

Determining a priority direction in shipbuilding

According to the economic agreement concluded with Germany, in May 1940, the cruiser Lützow, which was renamed Petropavlovsk in September, was towed to Leningrad Plant No. 189 and left at the outfitting wall. Its acquisition provided an opportunity for Soviet specialists to become familiar with foreign models of the latest military equipment and, taking into account foreign experience, to introduce a number of advanced technological solutions during the creation and construction of domestic ships for their Navy. Provided that the German side fulfills all its obligations, work on the cruiser was to be completed in 1942.

During the war, the design of a new domestic cruiser slowed down somewhat. However, even before its completion, at the beginning of 1945, an order appeared from the People's Commissar of the Navy N. Kuznetsov on the creation of a commission, which included leading specialists from the Naval Academy. They had to analyze the experience gained in the war and prepare materials concerning both the type and tactical and technical elements of the most promising ships, which over time would be included in the new program for updating the fleet in the USSR.

In September of the same year, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin, where the heads of shipyards and the command of the Navy participated, he put forward a proposal to reduce the number of battleships and increase the number of heavy ships, such as the projected cruiser "Stalingrad". “Kronstadt” and a number of other similar unfinished pre-war ships, which by that time were obsolete, were decided to be dismantled for metal in March 1947.

Project 69 cruisers

Project 69 Kronstadt -class heavy cruisers

“Kronstadt” “Sevastopol”

Project development The design of heavy cruisers for the Soviet fleet began in the mid-30s, simultaneously with the development of designs for large (type “A”) and small (type “B”) battleships. In 1934-1935, the design bureaus of the shipbuilding industry, the Research Institute of Military Shipbuilding of the Directorate of Naval Forces (UMS) of the Red Army and the Italian company Ansaldo, which provided technical assistance in the creation of the light cruiser Kirov, completed several pre-design designs of heavy cruisers on the instructions of the UMS with a displacement from 15,500 to 19,500 tons and with main caliber artillery from 240 to 280 mm.

In 1936-1937, domestic designers developed preliminary designs for an “A” type battleship (project 23) with 406 mm guns, a “B” type battleship (projects 25 and 64, with 305 mm and 356 mm guns, respectively) and a heavy cruisers (project 22) in several versions, with 254 mm and 280 mm main caliber guns. Of these, only work on Project 23 was directly continued, according to which four ships of the Sovetsky Soyuz type were eventually laid down, while the rest were stopped for a number of reasons.

On November 1, 1937, the industry was issued new tactical and technical requirements (TTT) for the heavy cruiser, approved by the head of the Red Army Naval Forces, flagship of the 1st rank fleet M.V. Viktorov. They set the following tasks: in squadron combat - fighting enemy cruisers (especially heavy ones); supporting light forces in remote areas; independent actions on enemy communications. Armament composition: 9 254-mm guns in three three-gun turrets, 8 130-mm guns in four two-gun turrets, 8 100-mm anti-aircraft guns in four two-gun turrets, 4 quadruple 37-mm anti-aircraft guns (even after the start of design, their number was increased to six), 2 three-tube 533-mm torpedo tubes, 80 - 100 min (overload), 2 KOR-2 aircraft. Standard displacement is 22,000-23,000 tons. Speed ​​is at least 34 knots, economical cruising range is up to 8,000 miles, autonomy for provisions is 50 days. The TTT also indicated the combat distances and artillery caliber of the ships of the potential enemy to determine the thickness of the vertical and horizontal armor.

The design of the heavy cruiser, which was assigned the index “project 69,” was carried out by the TsKB-17 team (until January 1937 - TsKBS-1). The work was supervised by the chief engineer of the bureau V.A. Nikitin.

Already the first estimates showed that with a given composition of weapons it is impossible to withstand displacement restrictions. We had to take forced measures - reduce the amount of main caliber ammunition to 125 rounds per barrel (instead of 150), remove torpedo armament, and set the cruising range (20 knots) to 4,500 miles (instead of 6,000). The Military Council of the Red Army Naval Forces agreed with these proposals.

By June 1938, the preliminary design of 69 was completed. With the weapons specified in the TTT, the ship had a standard displacement of 24,450 tons and a speed of 33.3 knots. Reservation elements: side - main belt 140 mm, at the ends 20 mm, traverses 210 mm, tower barbettes 210 mm, middle deck 80 mm and lower deck 20 mm. In July, the head of the Main Marine Industry of the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry expressed gratitude to V.A. Nikitin “for the high-quality implementation of the preliminary design” and presented him with a bonus of 1000 rubles.

However, by this time it became known that the construction of two Scharnhorst-class ships was being completed in Germany. In terms of their tactical and technical elements (TTE), they occupied an intermediate position between battleships and heavy cruisers. They were faster than battleships, and their main caliber (280 mm)*, while inferior to that of the battleship, was significantly superior to the artillery of the “Washington” cruisers (203 mm). Similar ships (of the Dunkirk type), but with more powerful artillery (330 mm), were built in France. This information was discussed in the Defense Committee of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR at the end of June 1938. The heavy cruisers of the Red Army Naval Forces were given a new task - to fight ships of the Scharnhorst type.

In accordance with the decision made by the Committee on the need to adjust the assignment for Project 69, the Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, Flagship Officer 1st Rank I.S. Isakov, on July 10 of the same year approved the “Main tactical and technical specifications (TTZ) for the design of the Project 69 heavy cruiser.” Now the main caliber of artillery was increased to 305 mm (with 100 rounds of ammunition per barrel), the amount of 130 mm ammunition was reduced to 150 rounds. per barrel (instead of 200), 37 mm ammunition - up to 800 rounds. per barrel (instead of 1800). The standard displacement was limited to 31,000 tons. The speed was set at 32 knots.

A new version of the draft design was submitted for consideration to the People's Commissariats of the Navy and Defense Industry on October 20, 1938. According to the conclusion of the Shipbuilding Department (UK) of the RKKF, it had a number of significant shortcomings. Therefore, to evaluate the results of the preliminary design and make a decision on its further fate, a special commission was created under the chairmanship of the 2nd rank flagship, head of the Department of Tactics of the Naval Academy, Professor S.P. Stavitsky, which considered possible opponents of the Project 69 heavy cruiser - the German Scharnhorst ”, French “Dunkirk”, English “Hood” and “Repulse”, Turkish “Yavuz” (formerly German “Goeben”), Italian “Cesare”, Japanese “Congo”, which had a speed of 26-30 knots. The tasks of the designed ship were significantly clarified.

Its main purpose was now to impart stability to the actions of light forces in all those cases where there is no need to use battleships or when the latter do not meet the task in terms of their speed. Particular tasks were: supporting one’s patrol and violating the enemy’s patrol; supporting light forces reconnaissance and countering enemy reconnaissance; providing light forces in active barrage operations; ensuring the exit and return of its submarines; actions on communications paralyzing the activities of enemy cruisers on our communications; neutralizing the actions of enemy cruisers in squadron battle.

Special tasks for individual theaters were specifically noted. In the Pacific - raid operations on the coast of the Japanese islands and actions on Japan's sea lanes with the aim of suppressing its maritime trade and diverting its forces from the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and the Sea of ​​Japan to the Pacific Ocean. Along the North - raid operations in the northern part of the German (North) Sea and in the Atlantic Ocean. According to Chernomorsky - creating a balance in the ratio of our and Turkish forces (compensation for the superiority of the Yavuz in speed over the Paris Commune and in artillery over our cruisers). When superior enemy linear forces appear in the theater, raid operations are carried out to maintain them in constant tension.

To study the issue of the tactical capabilities of the Project 69 ship, 8 tactical games were conducted in various conditions. Our cruiser’s opponents were “Scharnhorst”, “Dunkirk” and “Congo”. The results of the games showed that the Project 69 ship is superior to the Scharnhorst, has advantages over the Congo at combat distances of less than 90 cables and is inferior to the Dunkirk, and is also significantly superior to the Washington cruisers in artillery, although inferior to them in speed.

The commission’s conclusion indicated that the Project 69 ship met the main tasks assigned to it, but it clearly lacked the speed to successfully pursue light cruisers. The main caliber (305 mm) corresponds to the tasks in terms of the number of guns, rate of fire and range, but it is desirable to increase the ammunition capacity, bringing it to 120 rounds per barrel. Mine-resistant artillery (130 mm) does not have enough barrels to repel attacks by destroyers and is small in caliber for action against cruisers. Anti-aircraft weapons have limited capabilities in terms of the number of 100-mm guns; 37-mm machine guns are quite sufficient. A cruising range of 8,000 miles (at a speed of 17 knots) is even excessive. The commission also noted that the actions of a heavy cruiser on remote communications, where it would not be able to be accompanied by destroyers and covered by base aircraft, would be greatly hampered.

It was proposed to replace the 130-mm guns with 152-mm ones, strengthen the armor and mine protection by reducing the cruising range, and leave the speed unchanged.

Since V.A. Nikitin, as the chief engineer of the Central Design Bureau, was responsible for the entire technical policy of the design bureau and for all the projects being developed, in February 1939, F.E. Bespolov, who had previously participated in the design of patrol ships of the “Uragan” type, was appointed chief designer of Project 69. leaders of the “Leningrad” and “Minsk” type, destroyers of the “Gnevny” type, battleships of the “B” type, heavy cruiser of Project 22. Young engineers N.K. Gorbatenko and T.L. Dzhelomanov became deputy chief designers.

During the preparation of the adjusted preliminary design, the 130-mm guns were replaced with 152-mm ones, the armoring of the conning tower, main and anti-mine caliber turrets was strengthened, and the power of the power plant generators was increased. The length, width and height of the side and, as a result, the displacement increased slightly. At the same time, TsKB-17 issued orders to related enterprises for the development of technical designs for main, mine and anti-aircraft caliber towers, fire control devices, equipment for artillery magazines, ammunition supply mechanisms and other systems and mechanisms.

The corrected draft design was reviewed by the State Defense Committee and approved by its resolution dated July 13, 1939. However, the resolution simultaneously contained a requirement to strengthen the cruiser’s anti-aircraft weapons by increasing the number of 37-mm installations to seven.

Laying down While the designers were hard at work on the documentation, preparations for the laying down of the ships began at an accelerated pace at the construction plants. The construction of heavy cruisers was entrusted to plants No. 194 named after A. Marti in Leningrad (until November 1922 - “Admiralty Plant”, now the state enterprise “Admiralty Shipyards”) and No. 200 named after 61 Kommunar (until February 1930 - “Russud”) in Nikolaev .

The construction of heavy ships after a twenty-year break was associated with many problems. At plant No. 194, the largest southern slipway was urgently repaired, and at plant No. 200 a new one had to be built specifically for heavy cruisers (slipway No. 3). In Leningrad, where the lead ship was being created, full-scale models of the main combat posts, turbine and boiler rooms were made, and an experimental boiler was tested at the stand.

Orders for two heavy cruisers according to the drawings of Project 69 were issued to the factories in March 1939, and on November 30, at factory No. 194, the official laying of the lead cruiser “Kronstadt” took place, which received the serial number “550”. Construction was headed by S.M. Turunov. Somewhat earlier, on November 5, the foundation stone of “Sevastopol” was laid at plant No. 200 (serial number 1089, chief builder G.V. Babenko). The delivery date for the ships was set in 1943.

I.V. personally monitored the progress of the work. Stalin, which explains such a rush to lay them, it was important to report this to the Secretary General.

Final After the start of the Great Patriotic War, by a decree of the State Defense Committee of July 10, 1941, the construction of heavy cruisers was suspended when their technical readiness was about 12%. All the forces of the factories were devoted to the construction of light ships, submarines and boats.

In the summer and autumn of the first year of the war, the armored structures of the cruiser Kronstadt were used for the construction of pillboxes. The hull of “Sevastopol”, captured by Nazi troops in August 1941 on a slipway, was partially dismantled during the occupation, and the metal and armor were taken to Germany. After the end of the war, the completion of Project 69 cruisers was never resumed. The main caliber turrets and main mechanisms were missing. And the experience of the last war showed that it makes no sense to complete the construction of heavy cruisers with obsolete weapons. In addition, the design of his new favorites, heavy cruisers of Project 82, which were supposed to be more advanced than Project 69, was in full swing, still under the close supervision of Stalin himself. Various proposals were made for the completion of the ships and as heavy aircraft carriers on 76 aircraft, and as bases for whaling fleets, but all of them were rejected for various reasons. In March 1947, a decree was issued by the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the dismantling of Project 69 ships for metal. The experience gained in the design and construction of these heavy cruisers was used to create new, more modern ships.

General assessment of the project For many decades, in our naval and technical literature, heavy cruisers of the Kronstadt class (as well as battleships of the Sovetsky Soyuz class) were presented as nothing less than “the strongest in the world.” This was not entirely true.

In terms of main-caliber artillery power, armor and mine protection, Project 69 and 69I ships were indeed superior to similar ships of foreign fleets. However, they had significant drawbacks.

“Kronstadt”, superior to its potential enemy “Scharnhorst” in the main caliber, was inferior to it in the number of anti-mine and anti-aircraft artillery barrels (8,152 mm and 8,100 mm versus 12,150 mm and 14,105 mm). And the very presence on our large ships, laid down at the end of the 30s, of two “medium” calibers - 152 mm anti-mine and 100 mm anti-aircraft - can be considered a serious drawback. Lacking sufficient experience, Soviet designers turned to foreign companies for help. The Italians provided us with the greatest assistance. The “Italian school” was reflected in the choice of weapons. Our heavy ships - like the Italian and German ones - carried anti-mine artillery and long-range anti-aircraft artillery. British and American battleships, built in the second half of the 1930s, each had 16-20 universal guns (127 mm for the Americans and 133 mm for the British) in twin mounts. The French Dunkirk, which was considered as one of the potential opponents of the Kronstadt, was also armed with 16 130-mm universal cannons. Both our designers and sailors knew about the installation of universal artillery on American and British ships. Moreover, in 1937-1939, the American company Gibs and Cox, commissioned by the Soviet side, completed several studies of battleships. They differed in displacement, dimensions, and caliber of the main artillery, but all had 127-mm universal two-gun installations. The issue of equipping heavy ships with universal artillery was also debated at the Naval Academy. As we see, supporters of the Italian and German path of development of naval artillery won in these disputes. This led to an increase in the range of fire control devices and combat posts.

In Russia, on the eve of the First World War, the fleet adopted an excellent rapid-fire 130-mm gun with a barrel length of 55 calibers from the Obukhov plant. Due to its ballistic and weight-size characteristics, it was considered the optimal means of combating destroyers and light cruisers of that time and was used on the Black Sea battleships of the Empress Maria type, battle cruisers of the Izmail type and light cruisers of the Svetlana type. Unfortunately, the Naval Forces of the Red Army and, on their orders, industry continued to improve guns of this caliber in the 30s only for firing at sea and coastal targets. Only at the end of the 30s did work begin on the universal two-gun installation B-2-U, but by the beginning of the war not even a prototype had been made. In reality, universal 130-mm installations first appeared on the destroyers Neustrashimy (project 41} and Spokoiny (project 56) in the early 50s, at least 10 years late.

This led to another major drawback of heavy cruisers - weak anti-aircraft weapons. The newest ship, if it had entered service in 1944, would have had the same number of 100-mm guns as light cruisers of the Chapaev class and even the outdated Red Caucasus. As a result, when repelling air attacks at a heading angle of 90°, our cruisers would fire 4 100-mm cannons, and the Americans would fire 8-10 127-mm cannons. And as war experience has shown, one anti-aircraft gun firing shells with a remote fuse is more effective than a battery of small-caliber machine guns that only had shells with contact fuses. Going out into the ocean with such anti-aircraft weapons without reliable air cover (we had only just begun design work on aircraft carriers) would be an adventure bordering on suicide. This was indicated in the conclusions of S.P. Stavitsky’s commission on the preliminary design in 1938.

“Kronstadt” was inferior to its potential opponents in terms of armor. The armor belt of the Scharnhorst had a thickness of 350 mm, and that of the Dunkirk - 241 mm (with an inclination angle of 12°). And this despite the fact that the displacement of the German and French ships was less. The effectiveness of armor protection and PMZ of Project 69 cruisers can only be judged by theoretical calculations. The effectiveness of the Scharnhorst's defense was tested in a battle with superior forces of the English fleet on December 26, 1943. It did not lose its combat effectiveness after being hit by about 30 152-356 mm shells and 4 torpedoes. And only after the battleship Duke of York was shot at from a distance of 9500 m by 14-inch guns and hit by about 10 more torpedoes, the German ship sank.

A serious drawback was the presence of one conning tower and limited visibility from the navigation bridge. Wanting to obtain the largest sectors of gun fire, the designers greatly narrowed the superstructure in the bow. The commander, being on the bridge, could not observe not only the stern of his ship, but also a wide sector in the stern, which made it difficult to control the ship in narrow places and in the harbor. The sailors encountered a similar problem when the Sevastopol-class battleships entered service in 1914. Then we had to urgently attach the wings to the navigation bridge.

And finally, speed. As a result of overload (especially in the 69I project), it dropped to 31 knots, and possibly lower. According to the specifications, the ship was supposed to catch up with the Scharnhorst and move away from the battleships. If the Kronstadt had entered service, it could not have caught up with the Scharnhorst, not to mention the heavy cruisers, and the new American battleships generally developed 33 knots.

It is worth mentioning a serious factor that has influenced the development of our shipbuilding for many years. This is the “leading and directing role” of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and then the CPSU. J.V. Stalin considered himself an expert on many issues, including the construction of the navy. Often, he single-handedly, contrary to the opinion of the sailors, determined which ships to build and in what quantity. Moreover, his word was final and not subject to criticism. Therefore, the pre-war and first post-war military shipbuilding programs were unbalanced, and the role of aircraft carriers and aviation in naval combat was underestimated. At the whim of the “father of nations,” the USSR was the only country in the world that continued work on the creation of battleships and heavy cruisers even after the end of the Second World War. Stalin considered Italian ships worthy of imitation, and Italian firms provided us with technical assistance in the design of destroyers, whose hulls broke in the conditions of the Northern Fleet, and cruisers, which, while possessing high speed, had weak anti-aircraft weapons. Often the leader alone made decisions even on individual elements of the ships. It was he who decided that a 100-mm anti-aircraft gun was quite sufficient for heavy ships (the sailors suggested a 130-mm). N.G. Kuznetsov recalled how, in response to a request to strengthen the air defense of ships, Stalin stated that “we will not fight off the coast of America.” Sometimes he demanded the impossible from designers and sailors, for example, a 35-knot speed for Project 82 cruisers. Anyone who objected or argued could pay with his head, there are many examples of this. In such conditions, it is difficult to blame the designers and sailors for the fact that our ships had serious shortcomings.

Tactical and technical characteristics of Soviet heavy cruisers of the Kronstadt type (project 69)

Displacement, t: • standard – 35250 • full – 41540 Dimensions, m: 250.5 x 31.6 x 9.45 Power plant: 3 TZA, 12 PCs, 201,000 hp, 5450 t of oil Speed, knots – 33 Cruising range, miles – 8300 at 14.5 knots Reservation, mm: • main belt – 230 • traverses – 330...260 • middle deck – 90 • lower deck – 30 • main battery towers – 330 • main battery barbettes – 330 • wheelhouse – 330 Armament: 305 mm – 3x3, 152 mm – 4x2, 100 mm – 4x2, 37 mm – 7x4, 12.7 mm – 4x2, 1 catapult, 2 seaplanes Crew, persons. – 1037

Design history

In mid-1947, the Ministers of Armaments D.F. Ustinov, the Armed Forces N.A. Bulganin and the shipbuilding industry A.A. Goreglyad presented three KRT projects to the government for consideration. One of them proposed equipping a new type of cruisers with 220 mm, the rest with 305 mm main battery guns.

Officials explained the use of identical weapons in the two reports by the fact that disagreements arose between the ministries regarding the thickness of the hull armor of the projected cruiser "Stalingrad". Bulganin supported the idea of ​​a 200-mm ship plating, which could provide reliable protection for vital areas of the ship from 203-mm shells at a distance of more than 60 cables. As a result, such armor thickness made it possible to improve combat maneuverability in the event of a collision with similar enemy cruisers, which would be one of the main tactical advantages.

Goreglyad, in turn, was of the opinion that a 150-mm armor belt would be appropriate, which would significantly reduce the vessel’s displacement and also increase its full speed. The Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry was confident that such improvements would provide the cruiser with the ability to carry out fire interaction with heavy enemy ships at distances of more than 80 cables. Therefore, this armor thickness was quite sufficient to protect against 203 mm shells.

The third option, using 220 mm guns, was significantly inferior to the first two projects in both survivability and firepower. However, its advantage was the ship's 25% smaller displacement, as well as increased speed by another 1.5 knots.

In 1948, I.V. Stalin finally approved one of the options for further development. It was the project proposed by Bulganin, namely a ship with a displacement of 40 thousand tons with 200 mm armor, with a speed of 32 knots, and 305 mm guns. Stalin ordered the pace of construction of such military vessels to be increased as much as possible and later personally supervised the progress of its implementation. It is worth recalling that the heavy cruiser Stalingrad, being created in the USSR, was also positioned as the main opponent of similar American ships of the Alaska class.

Project ships: cruiser Hindenburg

The creators of the game World of Warships often launch design ships, and our colleagues from the worldofwarships.ru portal in their historical section talk about machines that never came to life, but in the game they cut the waves with might and main.
One of these ships was the German heavy cruiser of Project P , called Hindenburg - with its creation Germany planned to challenge Britain at sea.
On the eve of World War II, Berlin decided to no longer adhere to any treaties or restrictions. To renew the fleet, Plan Z was developed, finally approved in 1939 in its most expanded version. He assumed that the war with Great Britain would begin no earlier than 1948, and by that time the Kriegsmarine would have 684 warships of various types. There were several more rejected versions of this plan, including less ambitious and costly ones, but more realistic ones and designed for a shorter period. The “cruising” part of Plan Z was to consist of five heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper class and 12 battleships of Project P, which were a further development of the “pocket battleships” of the Deutschland class with a displacement of 25,500 tons, six 280 mm guns and diesel power plants. It is quite possible that there would have been room for the development of very interesting German “Washington” type cruisers of the 1930s.

Thus, the designers’ thoughts could develop in two directions. The first was the further improvement of the “pocket battleships”, later embodied in projects D and E and grew into the P class. The second was the development of the Admiral Hipper line of high-tech heavy cruisers, which began with the lead ship of the series and was modernized in the Prinz Eugen variant.

The last two classic “Washington” heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper type with a maximum displacement of about 20,000 tons and eight 203-mm guns, Seydlitz and Lützow, were laid down back in 1936–1937. They had many shortcomings, but in terms of layout, characteristics and equipment they became the basis for the further development of the class of cruisers throughout the world, anticipating the main trends: better fire control and high versatility. There were real prerequisites for continuing the construction of cruisers with 203 mm artillery in 1938. The Krupp concern developed the SK L/56 three-gun turret for the same SK C/34 guns that were mounted on the Admiral Hipper class cruisers.

Even then, for the Kriegsmarine, which was growing at a tremendous pace, it was appropriate to remember two significant personalities for Germany: Albrecht von Roon and Paul von Hindenburg.

Hindenburg is a heavy cruiser of high-quality reinforcement and an escort ship for N-type battleships. The arrangement of the main caliber turrets was classic, according to a linear-elevated scheme: two turrets in the bow and two in the stern, which made it possible to use half of the main battery guns both on linear courses and on retreat. The weight of a broadside salvo of SK C/34 guns, 8052 kg, made it a killer for Washington cruisers. The guns were housed in four three-gun turrets, similar to the Roon, giving the ship superiority over any type of heavy cruiser of the period, including the Buffalo cruiser designs and Project 82 (1943).

The ship's secondary task was raiding, so the cruiser retained enhanced torpedo armament: four 4-tube torpedo tubes were located on the upper deck and carried a decent supply of torpedoes. The cruiser was well equipped with universal-caliber guns in the form of eight Dop.L mounts. C/37 with sixteen 105 mm SK C/33 guns.

Like any large ship, the Hindenburg had quite powerful protection against aircraft attacks and, along with eight universal-caliber installations, was equipped with the latest 55-mm L/77 Gerät 58 anti-aircraft installation. The ship carried seven twin 55-mm L/77 Gerät 58 Zwilling installations and two single-barrel 55-mm L/77 Gerät 58 installations. Unfortunately, the Germans were never able to develop centralized target designation systems for these installations. Despite the excellent ballistic characteristics, the fire efficiency was lower than expected. The installation was aimed and tracked the target using two optical sights mounted on it for vertical and horizontal aiming. The color of the projectile tracers was used to adjust the fire. The rest of the MZA was represented by four twin 20-mm Flakzwilling 38 anti-aircraft guns and nine quad Flakvierling 38 anti-aircraft guns. Small-caliber installations did not have centralized fire control: German anti-aircraft gunners preferred to fire at a larger number of targets, so fire control was left to the plutong commanders.

The Hindenburg's aircraft armament was similar to that of the Prinz Eugen cruisers: three Arado 196 seaplanes, two of which were housed in a hangar with a retractable roof, and the third was stored under a cover in combat-ready condition directly on the catapult.

What about radar equipment? The main control panel housed the FuMO 26 radar, for which the control panel itself was built with a separate hardware room. On the top of the main mast there was a FuMO 25 all-round radar antenna, and a FuMO 27 radar was installed on the stern control panel. The bow control panel on the roof of the conning tower did not have a radar. Four FuMB-4 Samos dipole antennas were installed on the bow superstructure.

According to its main dimensions, the cruiser had the dimensions of a battleship: length - 228.9 m, width - 24 m, draft at the structural waterline - 7 m. The total displacement of the ship was 22,324 tons. The power of the steam power plant was 155,000 hp. (similar to the cruiser Roon), design speed - 31.6 knots. To accompany H-type battleships, the cruising range was noticeably increased: 5,500 miles at 18 knots. This did not eliminate the problems with fuel oil and complicated the supply of the ship unit, which had both boiler-turbine units and internal combustion engines.

In terms of armor, the cruiser looked more impressive than its prototype Prinz Eugen. The ship's side belt consisted of three sections, varying in thickness and height. Traditionally, for the German school of shipbuilding, an ice/anti-fragmentation armor belt with a thickness of 27–40 mm was placed in the bow of the ship. The thickness increased towards the bow armored beam of the citadel in order to cover it from the sides. The beam itself was 110 mm thick and from the main armored deck to the top it also had an internal bulkhead 40 mm thick.

The side belt in the area of ​​the main battery towers was represented by cemented armor with a thickness of 110 mm. Further to the stern there was a belt 100 mm thick, covering the power plant. The aft cellars of the main battery turrets were protected by a 110 mm armor belt, and from the 90 mm thick aft armored traverse to the stern there was an armor belt 90 mm thick, covering the steering compartment and its mechanisms. The hull plating above the citadel was made of 30 mm homogeneous armor and, together with 40 mm bow and stern bulkheads, formed an extensive casemate. The barbettes of the main battery towers did not have differentiated armor, and their thickness was 110 mm around the entire circumference.

Horizontal armor was represented by 30-mm homogeneous armor on the upper deck outside the superstructures, covering the ship from the bow to the stern main battery turrets. The design features of the main armored deck were characteristic of the German school of shipbuilding: an armored bevel adjacent to the lower part of the armored belt. The thickness of the bevel and armored deck in the areas of the main battery cellars was 60 mm, and in the area of ​​the power plant - 45 mm. The only anti-torpedo bulkhead had a thickness of 20 mm. In general, the quality and depth of anti-torpedo protection for such a large ship left much to be desired.

The general appearance and arrangement of the main battery and artillery, as well as the general architectural and layout solutions, give the ship a noticeably enlarged cruiser Prinz Eugen, but this fits well with the principles of the German shipbuilding school. For example, the silhouette of the cruiser Prinz Eugen from a distance resembled the battleship Bismarck. This was done intentionally in order to confuse the enemy, and also made it possible to use proven and industry-developed solutions, and therefore reduce the cost of building ships and make it easier for crews to master them.

In terms of the totality of its combat qualities, the cruiser Hindenburg at the time of its design was certainly superior to all existing and projected heavy cruisers of Germany's potential enemies. However, during the war, a class of large cruisers appeared: the American Alaska, the Japanese B-65 and the Soviet Project 69 Kronstadt, laid down before the war to fight heavy cruisers armed with 203 mm artillery. These ships would hardly have given the Hindenburg much of a chance on the battlefield.

Hindenburg in World of Warships

In the game, Hindenburg is located at level X in the German cruiser branch. The location of the main battery turrets makes the ship versatile in both defense and offense. High armor penetration of landmines, four turrets with three guns, good rate of fire and excellent ballistics make this cruiser a dangerous opponent for any class. The thickness of the armor and the slopes of the citadel's armored deck allow the Hindenburg to withstand even salvoes from battleships.

Air defense can cover allies within a radius of up to 7.2 km. A GAP with a longer range helps avoid torpedoes and detect the enemy in smoke or behind cover. The cruiser has two four-tube torpedo tubes on both sides with comfortable launch sectors, which makes it possible to launch torpedoes without exposing the side too much to shells. But there is also a minus: they can only be implemented over a short distance - up to 6 km.

Thus, this is a universal cruiser, capable of operating both as part of a formation, covering allies from torpedoes and aircraft, and alone, holding the flank. It is even capable of successful close combat against any class of ship, something that few cruisers are capable of.

Warspot Editorial

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Photo of the day: “baby killers”

On December 16, 1914, German cruisers shelled several towns on the northeast coast of England

  • WWI
  • Germany
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Warspot Editorial

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Photo of the day: the last minutes of “Blücher”

On January 24, 1915, the German armored cruiser Blücher was sunk by the British in the North Sea.

  • WWI
  • fleet
  • Germany

Vladislav Goncharov

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Hipper armor. The story of a myth

Were the German heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper class really inferior to their competitors in armor protection?

  • WWII
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Groundbreaking and construction

By a special government decree, several teams from design bureaus, research institutes, shipbuilding enterprises and related industries were involved in the work to create the first heavy cruiser of the Stalingrad type, which included Metal named after Stalin, Izhora, Novokramatorsky, Kirov, Kaluga Turbine, “ Bolshevik", "Barricades", "Electrosila" and Kharkov Turbo Generator Plant.

The ceremonial laying of the battle cruiser "Stalingrad" took place on December 31, 1951 in Nikolaev, at plant No. 444, despite the fact that several sections of the bottom were installed on the slipway a month earlier. It is a known fact that the workers of this enterprise promised to launch the ship ahead of schedule, namely November 7, 1953, coinciding with the 36th anniversary of the October Revolution. However, this was not the only Stalingrad-class cruiser that began to be built in the USSR after World War II.

In the fall of 1952, in Leningrad, at plant No. 189, another cruiser “Moskva” was laid down on slipway “A”. Around the same time, the construction of the third warship of the same type began in Molotovsk, which did not receive its own name. It was called Hull No. 3. This ship was laid down in the slipway workshop at plant No. 402.

The construction of the project 82 cruiser "Stalingrad" was carried out faster than anyone else. At the end of 1952, about 120 samples of various components were supplied for this ship, including weapons, heat exchangers, diesel and electric generator sets, boiler turbines, cable devices, instrumentation and automation systems and other auxiliary mechanisms.

"Stalingrad" on the water. Why Joseph Stalin's favorite cruiser was not completed in the USSR

Even during the life of the “leader of the people” Joseph Stalin , the USSR began to implement a grandiose project - a heavy battle cruiser, which was supposed to be more powerful than the German battleship Scharnhorst and faster than the battleship Bismarck. The Soviet Union intended to build 10 such warships, but Stalin's plans were not destined to come true. Experts from the American conservative magazine The National Interest (NI) explained why.

The one and only

After the invasion of the Legions of the Third Reich into the USSR in 1941, the Soviet fleet was not in the best shape. Joseph Stalin understood this, so he decided to carry out a serious personnel purge among naval officers. Because of this, a number of projects had to be suspended, and the ongoing hostilities interfered with the development of the Kronstadt cruiser, on which the head of the USSR had high hopes.

Only in 1944 did Stalin revive the original concept of the most powerful and fastest cruiser. Soviet engineers began developing the battle cruiser Stalingrad. Even at the drawing stage, dissatisfaction appeared among active officers: military personnel believed that in the era of aircraft carriers, large-caliber warships faded into the background and became ineffective.

Indeed, Stalingrad was a rather large and clumsy cruiser with a length of 263 meters. The design included four steam turbines that could accelerate the ship to a speed of 35.5 knots (about 65 kilometers per hour). For comparison, the German Scharnhorst accelerated to only 31 knots.

wikipedia.org/Cay Jacob Arthur Renard/Public Domain

Among the shortcomings, the thin armor especially stood out. Battleships of those years had much more impressive protection, but because of this they could not reach high speeds. "Stalingrad" was just a fairly fast and powerful interceptor, which was created to hunt weaker ships.

“Battleships and battlecruisers fell out of fashion after World War II, making Stalingrad the only postwar big ship,” wrote naval historian Norman Polmar.

Defense weapon

However, Joseph Stalin did not plan to set his cruiser against enemy ships. According to the leader's idea, Stalingrad was supposed to be guarded by Soviet aircraft carriers after the end of World War II: in bad weather, when fighters could not take off from the carrier ship, it became an almost defenseless target for enemy warships.

The cruiser Stalingrad could easily cope with the task of a “bodyguard”, because nine 12-inch guns were installed on board, each of which fired at a range of 33 miles (more than 50 kilometers). In addition, small 5.1-inch and 1.8-inch guns were installed on the left and right sides of the cruiser. Experts at The National Interest note that this combination made the Stalingrad the greatest threat to any American warship of that era.

wikipedia.org / Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-R80329 / CC-BY-SA 3.0

At the bottom

The most ardent opponent of the construction of Stalingrad was Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov , after whom a heavy aircraft carrier would be named a few decades later. It was on aircraft carriers that Kuznetsov insisted during the development of the battle cruiser, but Stalin did not want to listen to him. Moreover, in 1947, the admiral was demoted from the post of commander in chief to the post of head of the Directorate of Naval Educational Institutions.

The Soviet Navy abandoned Joseph Stalin's project after his death in 1953. The three Stalingrads that the engineers were working on were never completed - the era of aircraft-carrying cruisers began.

wikipedia.org/PH2 Paul A. Vise/Public Domain

One of the unfinished ships was towed to the Black Sea in 1955 and was assigned the role of a target for firing practice. However, it was not possible to launch the ship: as a result of the damage, the Stalingrad sank. The cruiser was raised only a year later, after which it played the role of a target for new warships. The rest of the Stalingrads were sold for scrap.

“If Stalin had seen what happened to his beloved battlecruiser, he would have been very upset,” conclude experts from NI.

Politics Today previously wrote about the death of Joseph Stalin - the most difficult loss for the USSR at that time, which even after 67 years is shrouded in mystery.

Tests

During the design of a new type of cruiser, its creators carried out a number of development and research work. Tests were carried out to determine the degree of resistance of deck and side armor by blasting and firing homogeneous and cemented protective plates. Modeling of the main premises of the power plant, ammunition cellars, power compartments and combat posts was carried out.

The optimal version of the theoretical contours of the ship's hull was found during tests of the ship's seaworthiness and running properties on scale models in experimental pools located on the territory of TsAGI named after N. E. Zhukovsky and the Central Research Institute of Academician A. N. Krylov. In addition, numerous theoretical studies were carried out on a variety of issues related to the use of new technology.

Cruiser "Stalingrad": design description

Basically, the hull of the ship had a longitudinal framing system with gaps between the frames in the citadel area within 1.7 m, and at the ends - about 2.4 m. In addition, it was divided from the lower deck to the bottom by transverse bulkheads with a thickness of no more than 20 mm, with 23 waterproof compartments.

The methods of sectional assembly of the hull provided for by the project, which used simultaneously flat and volumetric segments connected by welding, significantly reduced the time allocated for the construction of the vessel.

Booking

The thickness of the walls of the side cabin of the cruiser "Stalingrad" reached 260 mm, the traverse bulkheads of the citadel - 125 mm (aft) and up to 140 mm (bow), the roof - about 100 mm. The decks had armor: lower - 20 mm, middle - 75 mm and upper - 50 mm. The wall thickness of the main caliber towers was: frontal - 240 mm, side - 225 mm, roof - 125 mm. As for the rear one, it also served as a counterweight, since it was made up of three plates, the total thickness of which could vary from 400 to 760 mm.

The most important compartments of the ship, such as ammunition cellars, power plant rooms and main posts, had mine protection (PMZ), which consisted of 3-4 longitudinal bulkheads. The first and fourth of them were flat and had a thickness from 8 to 30 mm, and the second (up to 25 mm) and third (50 mm) were cylindrical. For more reliable protection, additional plates up to 100 mm thick were placed on the third bulkhead.

For the first time in shipbuilding practice in the USSR, the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad" was equipped with triple bottom protection. For this purpose, a longitudinal-transverse system was used throughout the citadel. The outside plating was made of 20 mm armor, the second and third bottoms were up to 18 mm thick.

Armament

According to the approved project, the ship was supposed to be equipped with 305-mm SM-31 guns, the total ammunition of which consisted of 720 salvos, as well as 130-mm BL-109A turrets, designed for 2,400 rounds. The artillery fire control system included both radar and optical means.

In addition, it was planned to place on the cruiser “Stalingrad” 45 mm SM-20-ZiF and 25 mm BL-120 anti-aircraft guns, designed for 19,200 and 48,000 rounds, respectively. The SM-31 turret guns were supposed to be equipped with a More-82 launcher with a Grotto radio range finder, while the Sirius-B was intended for the BL-109A.

Stalingrad-class heavy cruisers

Project 82 cruisers, also known as Stalingrad-class heavy cruisers, are a class of the world's largest heavy cruisers (according to the official Soviet classification), built for the USSR Navy in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The project was based on the Project 83 cruiser (the Lützow heavy cruiser purchased from Germany). The initiator of the construction of Stalingrad-class cruisers was Joseph Stalin personally. After his death, the construction of cruisers was stopped.

Main caliber

Three SM-31 turret installations were provided. Each turret was armed with three SM-33 cannons of 305 mm caliber and a barrel length of 61 calibers. The gun had a firing range of 53 km (projectile weight 467 kg). A projectile weighing 230.5 kg was also developed for a firing range at coastal area targets (cities, large naval bases) of over 120 km.

Ships series

"Stalingrad" (serial number 400). Enlisted in the lists of the USSR Navy on August 31, 1951. Laid down on December 31, 1951 at plant No. 444 (Nikolaev). By order No. 00112 of the Minister of Transport and Heavy Engineering I. I. Nosenko dated April 18, 1953, construction was stopped. In June 1953, a decision was made to use part of the hull, including the citadel, as a full-scale experimental compartment to test the resistance of the ship's structural protection to the effects of new types of naval weapons. In 1954, the converted compartment was launched and in 1956-1957 was used as a target for testing cruise missiles, artillery shells, bombs and torpedoes. As a result of all the tests, the compartment did not lose buoyancy in the complete absence of forces and means of combating survivability.

"Moscow" (serial number 406). Enlisted in the lists of the USSR Navy on April 31, 1951. Laid down in September 1952 on slipway “A”, Leningrad). On April 18, 1953, it was removed from construction and transferred to Glavvtorchermet for dismantling and cutting into metal.

Building No. 3 (no name assigned, serial No. 401). Laid down in October 1952 at plant No. 402 (Molotovsk).

Features of the national classification

According to the Western classification of artillery ships, "Stalingrad" belongs to the class of battlecruisers, which usually included ships with a displacement of more than 20,000 tons and a gun caliber of 280 mm, which, due to their weak armor and high speed, did not fall into the class of battleships. By the end of the 1940s, when Stalingrad was planned for construction, the class of battlecruisers had already left the historical arena. A relic of this class were also the American Alaska-class cruisers, called “large cruisers” due to the absence of the “battlecruiser” class in the American classification.

According to the Western classification, a heavy cruiser is a ship with a 203 mm gun caliber (the displacement of such ships ranged from 10,000 to 20,000 tons). Not a single ship falling into this category was built in the USSR, although in the original design of the Project 68-bis Cruiser it was supposed to be armed with 8,203 mm guns.

Project evaluation

The Project 82 cruisers did not receive much support from the fleet command. The new Minister of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, assuming that in the near future the USSR would have guided anti-ship missiles, expressed his opinion about this ship.

Heavy, unclear ship. It is not clear that the end justifies the means. A very expensive ship...

— Vasiliev A., Morin A. Stalin’s superbattleships. "Soviet Union", "Kronstadt", "Stalingrad".

As development progressed, the project was subject to numerous alterations, which also did not benefit it. Thus, at the request of Stalin, in order to increase speed, the range and anti-aircraft artillery were reduced, which turned Project 82 into a kind of “battle cruiser of coastal defense”

The tactical niche of the heavy (in fact, battle) cruiser of the Stalingrad project was also very vaguely defined. Stalin had a different view on the purpose of ships of this class, suggesting their use to combat light cruisers.

We have no reason to get involved in a battle with enemy heavy cruisers. The main task of a heavy cruiser should be different - to fight enemy light cruisers. It is necessary to increase its speed to 35 knots so that it can panic the enemy’s light cruisers, disperse them and destroy them. This cruiser must fly like a swallow, be a pirate, a real bandit. He must escape from the attack of heavy enemy ships.

— Vasiliev A., Morin A. Stalin’s superbattleships. "Soviet Union", "Kronstadt", "Stalingrad".

The emergence of air-based and then ship-based anti-ship missiles of the KS-1 Comet series made it pointless to continue the construction of heavy artillery ships in general.

Interesting Facts

Ready-made rotating support devices for the main caliber gun turrets were used in the construction of the ADU-1000 antenna systems of the Pluto long-distance space communications complex.

The unique 305-mm SM-33 cannon for the three-gun SM-31 turret installations of heavy cruisers of the Stalingrad type, Project 82 had a range of 53 km with a conventional high-explosive projectile weighing 467 kg. - a special long-range projectile (developed by NII-24 1954 drawing 5219) Weighing 230.5 kg - 127.3 km

Before N.S. Khrushchev’s trip to the USA, all work on ultra-long-range, as well as heavy artillery in general, was stopped.

Main characteristics:

Displacement 36,500 tons (standard), 43,000 tons (full). Length 250.5 m. Width 31.6 m. Draft 9.7 m. Reservation 200 mm - side, up to 323 mm - towers, 90...110 mm - deck. Engines: 12 steam boilers, 4 steam turbines, 4 × GTZA TV-4. Power 280,000 l. With. (206 MW). Propulsion 4. Speed ​​15 knots (economic), 34 knots (maximum). Cruising range 5000 nautical miles at 15 knots. Crew 1481 people.

Weapons:

Artillery 3 × 3 - 305 mm/61 AU (SM-31), 6 × 2 - 130 mm/60 AU (BL-109A). Anti-aircraft artillery 6 × 4 - 45 mm/78 (SM-20-ZIF) 10 × 4 - 25 mm/79 (BL-120).

Ancillary equipment, communications and detection equipment

As mentioned above, the cruiser had an installation of the main caliber “More-82” PUS, which provided the SM-28 control center, which had a rangefinder base of 8 and 10 meters, and two radar stations of the “Zalp” station. The second and third main battery towers were equipped with Grot radio rangefinders. Supported by three SPN-500, the PUS had a standard Zenit-82 caliber. Stag-B radio rangefinders were installed in three UK towers. Three Fut-B radar systems supported firing from SM-20-ZIF anti-aircraft guns.

The radio equipment armament consisted of “Reef” surface object detection radars, “Guys-2” airborne objects, and “Fut-N” target designation stations. As for electronic defense equipment, it consisted of the Mast search radar, as well as the Coral used for jamming. In addition, they planned to install the Hercules-2 hydroacoustic station and a pair of Solntse-1p heat direction finders on the cruiser.

Termination of construction

The assembly of the ships progressed at a rapid pace. However, only a month passed after the death of V.I. Stalin, when on April 18, 1953, the Minister of Heavy and Transport Engineering I.I. Nosenko issued an order to stop the construction of three ships of Project 82. The cruiser “Stalingrad” was almost half ready. Work not only on the manufacture, but also on the partial installation of weapons on the lead ship was in full swing. In addition, various ship devices and equipment were installed on it, including diesel and turbo generator units, power plants, heat exchangers, an automation system and a number of other auxiliary mechanisms.

In June of the same year, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, together with the Minister of Heavy and Transport Engineering, decided to use part of the hull of the cruiser Stalingrad, including its citadel, at the test site as an experimental full-scale compartment. It was planned that the latest models of naval weapons would be tested on it. The purpose of the exercise was to test the resistance of the ship's mine and armor protection.

Branch No. 1 of the bureau, based at that time in Nikolaev, was entrusted with developing documentation for the equipment and the formation of the compartment, as well as for its descent from the slipway and further towing to the test site. The head of this project was K.I. Troshkov, and the chief engineer was L.V. Dikovich, who was the lead designer of project 82.

In 1954, a section of the heavy cruiser Stalingrad was launched. During 1956 and 1957, it tested the power of cruise missiles, torpedoes, aerial bombs and armor-piercing artillery shells. However, despite this, the compartment still remained afloat even in the absence of any special forces and means responsible for its survivability. This state of affairs only once again confirmed the extremely high efficiency of the defense of this ship.

As for the remaining two cruisers, their unfinished hulls were cut into scrap metal. This work was carried out on the territory of factories No. 402 and No. 189. In mid-January 1955, according to a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, on the basis of the SM-31 turret installations remaining from the cruisers of the unrealized Project 82, it was planned to produce four 305-mm railway batteries for the needs of the USSR coastal defense.

"Stalingrad" and other ships developed by TsKB-16 were highly praised by the Soviet government. Despite the unfinished project 82, it was quite interesting and very significant, given the fact that the ships were created in an extremely short time. Their design and subsequent construction demonstrated to the world the highest technical and scientific potential of the country.

It is noteworthy that Project 82 and its objects were the only artillery heavy vessels in the world laid down after the end of World War II. Using the example of the model of the cruiser "Stalingrad", made in 1954, which is kept in the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg, we can still easily imagine the full power of this ship.

Artillery armament of heavy cruisers of post-war projects 82 and 66

This is what a Project 82 heavy cruiser would look like

On May 15, 1941, the People's Commissar of the USSR Navy approved the operational-tactical task for the design of a heavy cruiser of Project 82. It was conceived as a multi-purpose ship that should fight cruisers, including heavy ones, support its light forces, lay active minefields, suppress coastal medium-caliber batteries, operate on enemy communications. With an unspecified displacement, the new cruiser must carry eight 203 mm guns, twelve 100 mm stabilized anti-aircraft guns, twelve 37 mm machine guns, two three-tube torpedo tubes, four reconnaissance aircraft; have a maximum speed of at least 36 knots and a cruising range of 10,000 miles at a speed of 20 knots. The armor was chosen based on the impenetrability of the side, beam and conning tower with a 203-mm projectile at a distance of more than 60 kb, and the deck - with 250-kg aerial bombs.

305-mm turret mount SM-31 on the cruiser pr.82

The very first studies of the project showed that the displacement of such a ship would be 25,000 tons! It is quite natural that the main caliber (203 mm) for such a large ship seemed insufficient. Further consideration of Project 82 was interrupted by the Great Patriotic War. In 1943, development of designs for ships of various classes began, taking into account the experience of conducting military operations, including Project 82. After specifying the tasks and clarifying the characteristics of the ship, the caliber of its main artillery was increased to 220 mm. In 1947, another review of the operational-tactical task for Project 82 took place, this time with the participation of the government. As a result, it was decided to arm the new ship with 305 mm artillery. It was with this main caliber that the tactical and technical specifications were approved on August 31, 1948. It was necessary to build the same Project 69 cruiser (see more >>>), but only at a new quality level.

305-mm turret mount SM-31 on the cruiser pr.82

On December 31, 1951, the lead ship of the “Stalingrad” series was laid down in Nikolaev, in September 1952 in Leningrad - “Moscow”, and a month later in Molotovsk (now Severodvinsk) - the third ship. The launch of the lead ship was scheduled for the November holidays of 1953, but in April, due to the death of I.V. Stalin, all work on the Project 82 cruisers was stopped, and then they began to be dismantled on the stocks. True, the Stalingrad citadel was launched into the water in 1954 to conduct full-scale tests of the durability of the structure and new types of weapons. In 1956–1957 the compartment was hit by cruise missiles, aerial bombs, and torpedoes and remained afloat, although, naturally, there was no struggle for survivability on it (!). But this did not prevent us from concluding that with the advent of cruise missiles, the traditional scheme of constructive protection is futile.

According to the approved project, Stalingrad-class cruisers were to have three SM-31 turrets with three 305-mm guns with a barrel length of 61 calibers as the main caliber. These turrets (like the guns themselves) had a greater mass compared to the MK-15 turrets of the Kronstadt-class cruisers with 305 mm B-50 guns. The projectile of the new gun was 4 kg lighter, but with an initial speed of 950 m/s it was thrown at a distance of 290 kb, which is 30 kb more than that of the B-50 guns. At the same time, at a distance of 150 kb, the new gun penetrated horizontal armor with a thickness of 312 mm (B-50 - 280 mm), and horizontal armor with a thickness of 73 mm (B-50 - 88). It is clear that such firing ranges must be provided with fire control devices and sources of detection and target designation. This is where the advantages of “Stalingrad” (in relation to “Kronstadt”) end: the ship’s detection and, even more so, fire control systems of that time could not ensure firing at distances of more than 135 kb, and aircraft weapons were not provided for on the Project 82 cruiser*. In addition, at distances greater than 200 kb, the natural dispersion of projectiles is very high. So, to hit one shell on a cruiser at a distance of 210 kb would require about 125 shells (the ship's ammunition load is 720 shells), at a distance of 120 kb - about 13, while to disable an enemy cruiser it would take about 20 hits.

* It can be assumed that if these ships entered service, they would be among the first to receive helicopters, which could solve the problem of detecting and adjusting fire beyond the visible horizon.

Offensive capabilities of the heavy cruiser Project 82 in comparison with the US Navy cruiser Alaska

Such long distances are usually realized when firing at coastal area targets. In relation to naval targets, the ability to throw a projectile further only characterizes the better ballistics of the gun, which at the same distances, other things being equal, would provide a greater probability of the projectile hitting the target, that is, at the selected combat distance, the Project 82 cruiser will quickly achieve the required number of hits.

Thus, it can be assumed that with the entry into service of heavy ships of the Stalingrad type, the Soviet Navy would have received a powerful, fairly well-balanced artillery ship, quite “competitive” with the American large cruiser Alaska. It is also necessary to note the better security of Stalingrad. Although in other respects the ships would have been almost equivalent (the 3-knot speed advantage of the Soviet cruiser, as war experience showed, would not have been significant).

But it is unlikely that “Stalingrad” would have found “specialty” use in military operations in the first half of the 1950s. By the time it entered service, “Alaska” was already in reserve, from where it went to be cut up.

Even before the decision to arm Project 82 ships with 305-mm artillery was approved, the question of the need to create a cruiser that was lighter and cheaper than the future Stalingrad arose again. After all, the latter was supposed to be used independently or as the flagship of the main forces of the fleet at sea, but a massive ship was needed to give combat stability to various groupings of fleet forces at sea from possible attacks by enemy light and heavy cruisers. In practice, we were talking about an analogue of one of the intermediate versions of the Project 82 cruiser project with 220 mm artillery, the development of which was carried out back in 1945.

The preliminary design of such a cruiser LKR-22 (a light cruiser with 220 mm artillery) provided for the creation of a ship that, with a total displacement of 23,500 tons, was supposed to carry nine 220 mm guns, have a main armor belt 90 mm thick, and develop a speed of 35 knots. But the removal from the post of People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov (the initiator of the creation of such a cruiser) in 1947 led to the cessation of all work on it. Only a few years passed, and the idea of ​​a cruiser with 220-mm artillery again captured the minds of the Navy leadership, but now it was initiated by I.V. Stalin at the beginning of 1951, and a year later it was considered by N.G. Kuznetsov, who had returned from exile. presented a preliminary design of a new ship (project 66).

The main feature of the Project 66 cruiser was the main caliber artillery. Its three-gun 220-mm artillery turrets SM-6 began to be designed in 1945 for the Project 82 cruisers, then they were planned to be installed on the Project 22 cruiser and, finally, on the new Project 66 cruiser. A gun with a barrel length of 65 calibers, fired at the test site in 1954, threw a 176-kg projectile at a distance of 260 kb with an estimated rate of fire of 4–5 rounds/min.

The main purpose of the Project 66 ships was to fight cruisers, including those armed with 203-mm artillery, the last representative of which was the American heavy cruiser Des Moines, which entered service after the war and was armed with automated 203-mm artillery mounts with rate of fire, twice the calculated rate for the SM-6.

The mass of the American projectile was only 152 kg, and the firing range did not exceed 150 kb, however, at the actual combat distance (less than 130 kb), the Soviet “heavy cruiser fighter” could itself become a victim. If we take into account the 203-mm main armor belt of the Des Moines, we can say that the Project 66 cruiser certainly would not have been able to “successfully defeat all ships of its class,” as N.G. Kuznetsov wanted. This was confirmed by a tactical research game conducted in 1954, which showed that the Project 66 cruiser would not be able to destroy enemy heavy cruisers with 203 mm artillery, built after the end of World War II, with impunity. The views of the country's leadership on the role and place of large surface ships have changed - the project of the last Soviet large artillery cruiser was archived. This time for good!

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