How great was the power of the Kriegsmarine?

Kriegsmarine

(German:
Kriegsmarine
, navy) - the official name of the German naval forces during the era of the Third Reich.
On May 21, 1935, the former Reichsmarine ( Reichsmarine
, Reich Navy) received this name.
After World War II, the West German fleet was called the Bundesmarine ( federal
fleet), the East German fleet - the
Volksmarine
(people's fleet).

Content

• 1. History
• 2 Organization of the German Navy in 1939
• 3 Composition in World War II 3.1 Battleships
• 3.2 Aircraft carriers
• 3.3 Heavy cruisers
• 3.4 Submarines
• 3.5 Other 3.5.1 Light cruisers
• 3.5.2 Auxiliary cruisers
• 3.5.3 Gunnery training ships
• 3.5.4 Destroyers

Vice admirals[edit]

Story

Under the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, Germany was allowed to have the following ships in its fleet:

In addition to this, a number of small auxiliary vessels were allowed. Submarines and aircraft were banned.

June 1935 - Anglo-German Naval Agreement.

July 1937 - Germany accedes to the Second London Naval Agreement (1936).

January 1939 - Plan “Z” was approved (until 1948).

Lucky Nines of the Kriegsmarine

No matter how paradoxical it may seem, not a single historical work is devoted to the most productive series of submarines of the Second World War. We will try to correct this injustice with a brief story about the history of German Type IXB submarines, which achieved very good performance during the Battle of the Atlantic: more than 100,000 GRT of sunk tonnage for each “nine”.

Prohibitions, tricks and secrets

The Treaty of Versailles prohibited Germany not only from having submarines, but even from building them for commercial purposes. To avoid losing the accumulated experience in the construction and operation of submarines, the Reichsmarine command resorted to a trick. It invited three German shipyards to register a company in Holland that would engage in the commercial design of submarines and their custom construction. Of course, all the work would be carried out by naval specialists who retired or were transferred to the reserve. Any connections between the Reichsmarine and this company were to remain secret from the Entente commission, which monitored the Germans' compliance with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles.

German submarine U 106. flickr.com

German capital met the fleet halfway. In 1922, what was essentially a secret design bureau of the Reichsmarine was opened in The Hague. During its existence, IvS has left a noticeable mark on the history of world submarine shipbuilding. We will not be distracted by the description of all its projects and will focus only on two that played an important role in the development of German submarines after 1935. This is a small boat project (Vesikko), developed by IvS for Finland, and a large submarine project (E-1), created by it for Spain.

Both projects were implemented in hardware in the named countries. The Reichsmarine chose them as prototypes for their own submarines - small boats type IIA and large boats type IA. Despite the "fetters" of Versailles, German admirals created a mobilization plan in case of war. It involved the assembly of submarines from pre-prepared parts, components and mechanisms. In the event that Germany was attacked, submarines of these two types were supposed to quickly enter service with the German fleet.

The birth of the "nine"

Following Hitler's refusal to comply with the Treaty of Versailles and the conclusion of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935, the German Navy began building submarines. But only two “units” were built: U 25 and U 26. Even before they entered service, it was decided not to build such submarines anymore. The command of the German Navy considered that their supply of fuel and torpedoes was not satisfactory for operations on long-distance communications. In addition, the surface speed of the “units” turned out to be less than the 20 knots stated in the project.

Technical characteristics of type IA submarines:

• Displacement (above / below): 862 / 983 t
• Dimensions: 72.39×6.21×4.3 m
• Powerplant: 2 diesel 3080 hp / 2 ED 1000 hp, 96 tons of fuel
• Speed ​​(over/under): 17.8 knots / 8.3 kt.
• Cruising range (over/under): 7900 miles at 10 knots. / 78 miles at 4 knots.
• Armament: 1x1 - 105 mm, 1x1 - 20 mm, 6 - 533 mm TA (4 bow, 2 stern - 14 torpedoes)

At the end of 1935, the Kriegsmarine design department received the task of designing a new boat with a large margin of autonomy, which made it possible to operate not only off the French coast of the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean Sea, but also off the coast of Africa. Without going into the technical nuances of its development, we note that the project of such a boat was ready by January 1936 and was named IX.

"Nines" in the harbor of Lorian. In the foreground is U 107, in the background is U 159. There is an error in the description of the photo. The photo could not have been taken on July 12, 1942, since U 107 returned from the campaign on July 11, and U 159 on July 13. Most likely, the photo was taken on July 13, 1942, when both boats were already in Lorient. Bundesarchiv, Bild 101II-MW-4386-01 / Meisinger / CC-BY-SA 3.0.

Technical characteristics of type IXA submarines:

• Displacement (above / below): 1032 / 1152 t
• Dimensions: 76.5×6.51×4.7 m
• Powerplant: 2 diesel 4400 hp / 2 ED 1000 hp, 154 tons of fuel
• Speed ​​(over/under): 18.2 knots / 7.7 kt.
• Cruising range (over/under): 10,500 miles at 10 knots. / 78 miles at 4 knots.
• Armament: 1x1 - 105 mm, 1x1 - 37 mm, 1x1 - 20 mm, 6 - 533 mm TA (4 bow, 2 stern - 22 torpedoes)

However, due to the doubts of the Kriegsmarine commander, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, and the criticism of the submarine commander, Karl Dönitz, by July 1936, only four boats of this type were ordered from the Deshimag concern: U 37 - U 40. The construction of the German submarine fleet took place within the framework of the above-mentioned British -German agreement, under the terms of which the tonnage of the German submarine should not exceed 45% of the British one. Taking into account the already built boats, it was necessary to make a decision on what to spend the remaining tonnage on. This led to real "battles" between Raeder's headquarters and Dönitz, since the latter wanted to have more medium boats of the VII series, and the headquarters wanted to build larger boats. At the end of 1936, the Kriegsmarine ordered four more boats of type IXA (U 41 – U 44) from Deschiemag, having exhausted the tonnage limit under the agreement.

German submarine U 108. mille-sabords.com

However, in 1937, the restrictions established in the agreement were updated to increase tonnage. Germany got the opportunity to build boats further. At this point, the Kriegsmarine design department, together with IvS, prepared a new boat project, which was an improved version of the IXA type. The main differences from the original were minor: the tonnage increased slightly, the amount of fuel increased by 11 tons, the 105-mm deck gun was moved closer to the wheelhouse. The project was named IXB.

Technical characteristics of type IXB submarines:

• Displacement (above / below): 1051 / 1178 t
• Dimensions: 76.5×6.76×4.7 m
• Powerplant: 2 diesel 4400 hp / 2 ED 1000 hp, 165 tons of fuel
• Speed ​​(over/under): 18.2 knots / 7.3 kt.
• Cruising range (over/under): 12,000 miles at 10 knots. / 64 miles at 4 knots.
• Armament: 1x1 - 105 mm, 1x1 - 37 mm, 1x1 - 20 mm, 6 - 533 mm TA (4 bow, 2 stern - 22 torpedoes)

During 1937–1938, the German Navy ordered 14 boats of this type from Deschiemag.

This is how the “nines” were born, who contributed to the destruction of Allied trade tonnage during the Battle of the Atlantic. It is worth noting that the evolution of the IX series did not end there. During the war, five more types of boats related to it were developed and implemented in hardware. In total, from 1937 to 1945, 194 “nines” were built.

The combat path of type IXB boats

1940

Boats of this type began their combat career during the Wehrmacht invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940. According to the plan, all combat-ready submarines were involved in the operation, including two type IXB submarines - U 64 and U 65. However, for the “nines” the first pancake came out lumpy. On April 13, U 64 was sunk off Narvik by an aircraft from the British battleship Warspite. U 65 managed to avoid such a fate. After spending 36 days at sea, she made two torpedo attacks: on April 15, she attacked convoy NP-1, and on April 18, the British cruiser HMS Emerald. And although success was not achieved in both cases, these were the first torpedoes fired by a Type IXB boat in combat conditions.

U 123 at Lorian, June 1946. Soon she will become part of the French fleet. ww2wrecks.com

During the rest of the year, five more boats of this type took part in the fighting: U 103, U 104, U 122, U 123 and U 124. They had some success in attacks on British convoys, but two of them, U 104 and U 122, died in the first trips to the Atlantic.

Two facts are worth mentioning separately. First, in the fall of 1940, the Kriegsmarine headquarters decided to send one boat to the African coast. The choice fell on U 65. Having set out on October 18, she spent 88 days at sea, sinking eight ships worth 47,794 GRT near Freetown. This submarine became the first German boat to cross the equator. Its commander, Lieutenant Commander Hans-Gerrit von Stockhausen, was awarded the Knight's Cross on January 14, 1941 for these and previous successes. Secondly, the first recipient of this award among the commanders of Type IXB boats was Victor Schütze. On December 11, 1940, he received the Cross for the total tonnage he sunk on U 25 and U 103.

1941

In 1941, the remaining boats of type IXB took part in hostilities: U 105, U 106, U 107, U 108, U 109, U 110 and U 111. This year became a time of both triumph and tragedy for the “nines”.

At the beginning of the year, the British took a number of measures that sharply reduced the success of German submarines in attacks on British convoys in the North Atlantic. To rectify the situation, Karl Dönitz decided to use a new strategy and strike at weakly protected enemy shipping areas. The African port of Freetown was chosen as such a place, from where U 65 had recently returned. At the end of February 1941, U 105, U 106 and U 124 were sent there.

U 123 at Lorian, June 1946. The bow of the boat. The outer covers of the bow torpedo tubes are open or removed, allowing the covers of the torpedo tubes themselves, located in the bow of the boat, to be seen. ww2wrecks.com

The success of the three boats in African waters was impressive. In March, they sank 16 ships worth almost 90,000 GRT. Plus, U 106 torpedoed and damaged the British battleship HMS Malaya. To consolidate the success in April, Dönitz sent five more submarines, including U 103 and U 107, to Freetown to help the boats operating there. As a result, in March - June 1941, more than 70 ships with a total tonnage of 400,000 GRT were sunk in that area.

The lion's share of successes belonged to the IXB type boats, which sank 58 ships for 323,000 GRT. Separately, it is worth mentioning U 107 captain-lieutenant Günter Hessler, which sank 14 ships for 86,699 GRT. This was the best result in one campaign among German submarines during the entire war. Upon their return, all commanders of the "nines" were awarded Knight's Crosses, and Schütze received Oak Leaves.

The success was overshadowed by the incident with the U 110 of the submarine ace Fritz-Julius Lemp. On May 9, 1941, after an attempt to attack the convoy, escort ships drove the boat to the surface with depth charges and then captured it. Lemp died before he could ensure the sinking of U 110, so a British boarding party penetrated her. The British managed to find important documents that later made it possible to crack the three-rotor Enigma code. The British took the boat in tow, but the next day it sank on its way to port.

U 110 and the British destroyer Bulldog. The photo was taken on May 9, 1941, after the boat was captured by the British.

The second half of 1941 for the Nines was spent in battles with convoys in the North Atlantic and in new raids into African waters. However, this time it was not possible to repeat the success in the south: few ships were sunk. A striking event was the sinking of the British cruiser HMS Dunedin: on November 24, 1941, it was torpedoed by U 124 of Lieutenant Commander Johan Mohr. In addition to U 110, U 65 and U 111 were lost in 1941. Thus, the number of “nines” of this type in the Kriegsmarine was reduced to eight units.

1942

The first half of 1942 became a repeat of the “golden time” of the autumn of 1940 for German submarines. After the United States entered the war, Dönitz, with five boats of the IX series, organized the first foray into shipping off the east coast of North America, which went down in history as Operation Paukenschlag .

- German
"Strike on the timpani"
). Its results were so successful that throughout the first half of 1942, Dönitz sent his main forces to the shores of the United States, to the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.

The submarine ace and commander of U 123 Reinhard Hardegen is the last living German submarine ace. alchetron.com

It was a real massacre. German submarines destroyed Allied ships in these areas with virtual impunity. According to American historian Clay Blair, from December 18, 1941 to August 31, 1942, the Germans sank 609 ships there with a total tonnage of 3.1 million gross tons, losing only 22 submarines. All eight Type IXB boats contributed to the destruction of Allied merchant shipping during this period - 76 vessels totaling 432,236 GRT. The best boat among them was the U 123 of Captain-Lieutenant Reinhard Hardegen, which sent 16 ships worth 89,338 GRT to the bottom in two trips. For his successes, Hardegen was awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves. The Knight's Cross was also awarded to the commander of U 103 Werner Winter and the commander of U 124 Mohr.

The second half of 1942 was spent for the “nines” in campaigns in African waters and in the fight against the Allied North Atlantic convoys. They also achieved some success in them. Not a single Type IXB boat was lost this year. However, despite the fact that these were the days of the greatest power of the German submarine fleet, difficult times lay ahead for German submariners.

1943–1944 1943

was the turning point year in the Battle of the Atlantic . During the first four months, the German “wolf packs” waged a stubborn fight against the Allied convoys, trying to cut the nutrient “thread” connecting Great Britain to the United States and Canada. But time was already working against the “gray wolves”. In May 1943, the Allied PLO forces went on the offensive, inflicting a heavy defeat on them. German submarines were forced to leave the North Atlantic. An attempt to return to convoy warfare in September 1943 was unsuccessful for the Germans. It became clear that the time of the “wolf packs” was over forever.

The German submarine U 124 returned from a cruise. December 29, 1941, Lorian. On the periscope of the boat two pennants are raised: with the image of the cruiser "Dunedin" and with the inscription "Hunter". The boat torpedoed and sank a cruiser during a cruise in the South Atlantic.

For the “nines” this period became the most difficult. During the 1943 fighting in the Atlantic, U 105, U 106, U 109 and U 124 were lost. Two submarines - U 103 and U 108 - were transferred to the Baltic, where they were used as training submarines. Only two submarines of type IXB remained in the combat formation of the German submarine: U 107 and U 123. Their fates turned out differently.

In May–July 1944, U 107 made a long and fruitless voyage to the shores of Canada, where she was only able to damage the small American sailing ship Lark by firing at it with 37 mm and 20 mm guns. This attack was the last "success" of the IXB boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. On August 16, 1944, U 107 left France on its last trip. Two days later, she was sunk in the Bay of Biscay by the British Sunderland from the 201st Squadron of the RAF.

U 123 made only one trip in 1944. From January to April she was at sea, operating off Freetown and in the Gulf of Guinea. However, this place of military glory of the "nines" of 1941 was now well guarded by Allied anti-aircraft forces. As a result, the submarine failed to hit a single target. On April 24, the “nine” returned to base in Lorient. By this time, the old, worn-out boat was in need of serious repairs, which were considered impractical, especially in view of the Allied landings that had begun in France. U 123 was withdrawn from the Kriegsmarine on June 17, 1944 and left in one of the “pencil cases” of the Keroman III bunker at the base in Lorian. After the surrender of the German garrison on May 9, 1945, the boat fell into the hands of the Americans, who subsequently handed it over to the French. The submarine was restored and became part of the French fleet under the name Blaison. The career of the “German” under the tricolor lasted more than ten years, and only on August 15, 1959, the boat was decommissioned and scrapped.

U 123 at Lorian, June 1946. The stern of the boat. The rudders, propellers and outer covers of the stern torpedo tubes are clearly visible. ww2wrecks.com

The most successful submarines

From 1940 to 1944 inclusive, 14 Type IXB submarines made 100 combat cruises, during which they sank 276 ships (including auxiliary ships) with a total tonnage of 1,490,000 GRT. They also sank a light cruiser, a sloop, a corvette, a submarine and damaged the battleship Malaya. Considering that each boat of this type averages over 120,000 GRT of sunk tonnage, this makes them the most successful submarines of the Second World War.

Four submarines of this type - U 103, U 107, U 123 and U 124 - sank over 200,000 GRT. Three submarines - U 105, U 106 and U 108 - managed to exceed the sunk tonnage level of 100,000 GRT. The most successful boat of this type was U 103, which accounted for 45 ships for 237,596 GRT.

Commander U 124 Johan Mohr.

Separately, it is worth mentioning the commanders of the “nines”. More than ten of them became underwater aces and were awarded the Knight's Cross and Oak Leaves (the list is given in order of award):

• Commander of U 103 Victor Schütze - 35 ships with a tonnage of 180,073 GRT (on U 25 and U 103): Knight's Cross and Oak Leaves;
• Commander U 65 Hans-Gerrit von Stockhausen - 12 ships with a tonnage of 66,174 GRT: Knight's Cross;
• Commander U 123 Karl-Heitz Möhle - 21 ships with a tonnage of 92,086 GRT (on U 20 and U 123): Knight's Cross;
• Commander U 106 Jürgen Esten - 18 ships of 100,007 GRT (on U 61, U 106 and U 861): Knight's Cross;
• Commander U 124 Georg-Wilhelm Schultz - 19 ships with a tonnage of 89,886 GRT: Knight's Cross;
• Commander U 105 Georg Schewe - 16 ships with a tonnage of 85,779 GRT (on U 60 and U 105): Knight's Cross;
• Commander U 107 Günter Hessler - 19 ships with a tonnage of 108,411 GRT: Knight's Cross;
• Commander U 108 Klaus Scholz - 24 ships with a tonnage of 111,546 GRT: Knight's Cross and Oak Leaves;
• Commander U 123 Reinhard Hardegen - 21 ships with a tonnage of 112,447 GRT (on U 149 and U 123): Knight's Cross and Oak Leaves;
• Commander U 124 Johan Mohr - 27 ships with a tonnage of 129,976 GRT: Knight's Cross and Oak Leaves;
• Commander U 103 Werner Winter - 15 ships with a tonnage of 79,302 GRT: Knight's Cross;
• Commander U 106 Hermann Rasch - 12 ships with a tonnage of 78,553 GRT: Knight's Cross;
• Commander U 107 Harald Gehlhaus - 19 ships with a tonnage of 100,373 GRT (on U 143 and U 107): Knight's Cross;
• Commander U 123 Horst von Schröter - 6 ships with a tonnage of 31,557 GRT: Knight's Cross.

The most successful commander of Type IXB boats is submarine ace Victor Schütze. tracesofwar.com

Concluding the story about the “nines”, I would like to note one interesting fact. According to British Admiralty data, during World War II, German submarines sank 2,775 ships with a total tonnage of 14,573,000 GRT. The VII series submarines that Dönitz wanted to build can only account for half of them. The second half falls mainly on series IX boats, nicknamed “sea cows” in the German fleet for their clumsiness. However, these “cows” showed results no worse than the nimble “sevens”. Operating on long-distance communications, where cruising range and a large supply of torpedoes were more important than the ability to quickly dive and quickly maneuver, they made good use of their combat potential, inflicting significant losses on the enemy.

Vladimir Nagirnyak

/

Golden Horseshoe by Otto Kretschmer

The first trip of the “king of tonnage” of the Kriegsmarine to the Atlantic: caution and accurate shooting as the key to success

• WWII
• fleet
• Germany
• submarines

Vladimir Nagirnyak

/

The Kriegsmarine and the inferiority complex

The defeat of the German “wolf pack” by the British in March 1941: the death of Schepke, the capture of Kretschmer and another unusual prisoner

• WWII
• fleet
• Germany
• submarines

Vladimir Nagirnyak

/

Submarine warfare and the laws of karma

The death of the British liner Laconia with a large number of Italian prisoners of war on board in September 1942 and its mirror image a few weeks later

• WWII
• fleet
• submarines

Literature:

1. Blair, S. Hitler's U-boat War. The Hunters, 1939–1942 / S. Blair. — Random House, 1996.
2. Blair, S. Hitler's U-boat War. The Hunted, 1942–1945 / S. Blair. — Random House, 1998.
3. Busch, R. German U-boat Commanders of World War II / R. Busch, H.-J. Roll. - Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999.
4. Busch, R. Der U-boot-Krieg 1939–1945. Deutsche Uboot-Erfolge von September 1939 bis Mai 1945 / R. Busch, H.-J. Roll. - Band 3. - Hamburg-Berlin-Bonn: Verlag ES Mittler& Sohn, 2001.
5. Gannon, M. Operation Drumbeat / M. Gannon. — New York: Harper Perennial, 1991.
6. Niestlé, A. German U-Boat Losses During World War II: Details of Destruction / A. Niestlé .
   — Frontline Books, 2014.
7. Ritschel, H. Kurzfassung Kriegstagesbuecher Deutscher U-Boote 1939–1945 / N. Ritschel. -
   Band 3. - Norderstedt.
8. U-Boat War in the Atlantic 1939–1945: German Naval History by Hessler, Günther (editor). - London: HMSO, 1992.
9. Wynn, K. U-Boat Operations of the Second World War / K. Wynn. - Vol. 1–2. - Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998.
10. Morozov, M. Hitler's steel sharks. Series “VII” / M. Morozov, V. Nagirnyak. - M.: Collection, Yauza, Eksmo, 2008.
11. Patyanin, S.V. Kriegsmarine. Navy of the Third Reich / S.V. Patyanin, M.E. Morozov, V.A. Nagirnyak. - M.: Collection, Yauza, Eksmo, 2009.

Composition in World War II

Battleships

• Bismarck class: Bismarck - commissioned in 1940, sunk in 1941.
• Tirpitz - commissioned in 1941, sunk in 1944.

Aircraft carriers

• "Graf Zeppelin" type: "Graf Zeppelin" - laid down in 1936. Did not enter service, scuttled in 1947.
• Aircraft carrier B - laid down in 1938, never entered service

In 1942, three passenger ships and two unfinished cruisers were converted into auxiliary aircraft carriers: the captured French De Grasse and the German heavy cruiser Seydlitz. In 1943, the conversion work was curtailed due to a lack of materials and a change in the strategic situation.

Heavy cruisers

• Deutschland class (pocket battleships): Deutschland (renamed Lützow) - commissioned in 1933, scuttled in 1945.
• "Admiral Scheer" - commissioned in 1934, sunk in 1945.
• "Admiral Graf Spee" - commissioned in 1936, scuttled in 1939.

Submarines

Main article: List of submarines of the Third Reich

By the beginning of the war, the Kriegsmarine had 57 submarines. During the war, another 1,113 submarines were put into operation (10 of them were captured, another 4 were new, built in foreign shipyards, 1,099 were new, built in Germany). Of the 1,170 Kriegsmarine submarines, 863 took part in hostilities. Of these, 753 submarines were destroyed (about 32 thousand submariners out of 39 thousand died). The victories of German submarines are estimated at: 148 enemy warships sunk and 45 damaged; 2,759 cargo ships with a total tonnage of 14,119,413 register tons[2].

Other

Light cruisers

• Emden class: Emden - commissioned in 1925, sunk in 1945.

Auxiliary cruisers

With the beginning of the war, a large number of civilian transport ships entered the fleet. Since the beginning of the war, 11 of them were converted into auxiliary cruisers (five more were being prepared, but never entered service)[3]. Moreover, the vessels for conversion were chosen not from the fastest ships, which were usually passenger vessels, but from commercial transport. The maximum speed of the raiders was in the region of 17-18 knots. 10 out of 11 raiders took part in hostilities; the total tonnage of ships captured and sunk by them, including those blown up by mines they laid, for the entire period of their active operations (1940-1943) amounted to approximately 950,000 GRT. Masquerading as ships from neutral countries, they were used as raiders, mainly in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Each ship, in addition to its name, which could change, had its own unique number.

• Orion (HSK-1)
• "Atlantis" (HSK-2)
• "Widder" (HSK-3)
• "Thor" (HSK-4)
• "Penguin" (HSK-5)
• "Shtir" (HSK-6)
• "Komet" (HSK-7)
• "Cormoran" (HSK-8)
• "Michel" (HSK-9)
• "Coronel" (HSK-10)
• "Hansa"

Artillery training ships

• "Bremse" - sunk in 1941
• "Brummer" - sunk in 1940[4]

Destroyers

By the beginning of the war, 21 destroyers were in service, and during the war, 19 more were commissioned.

In addition, the Kriegsmarine had transport ships, supply ships, blockade runners and a large number of small ships - minesweepers, submarine hunters, torpedo boats and others.

Kriegsmarine compared to the Royal Navy at the beginning of the war

For comparison, Royal Navy

at the beginning of the war had[5]:

• 15 battleships and battlecruisers (5 more were under construction),
• 7 aircraft carriers (5 were under construction),
• 66 cruisers (23 under construction),
• 184 destroyers (52 under construction) and
• 60 submarines.

How great was the power of the Kriegsmarine?

Indeed, thanks to our former allies and the memoirs of the losers, we were more or less imbued with the idea that the German fleet in World War II was something quite formidable, terrible and difficult to destroy. But is it?

How bad are German admirals?

In fact, only the submarine forces of the Kriegsmarine really looked like a kind of hydra, in which, instead of one severed head, three grew.

But with the surface forces everything was very sad.
And the effectiveness of the surface forces of the Third Reich was no more than, say, that of the Italian or Soviet fleet. Which, by the way, is only confirmed by the fact that since 1943, Hitler sent large ships to bed. To avoid new losses. To be fair, I note that Stalin did this even earlier. But here the point is in the Soviet admirals, who quickly showed their complete unsuitability for such a delicate matter as naval command.

But who said that German admirals were better?

List of losses. Yes, he is the one who can tell a lot about the professional suitability of German admirals best of all.

Let's see how and under what circumstances the Germans lost their warships.

Let's agree that we will go from top to bottom, because everyone knows and understands (I hope) that commanding a battleship is one thing, but a minesweeper is completely different.

The only class that will very rightly remain on the sidelines are raiders, also known as auxiliary cruisers. Because these guys have done things that need to be looked at from a completely different perspective.

So, let's go stir up some waves.

Battleships

"Bismarck"

The heroic Bismarck was lost in a series of events that can only be called “strange”.
In general, the commander of the ship, Lutyens, did everything to ensure that the ship was lost, and he succeeded. Tell me, was it really not clear that after such a slap in the face as the sinking of the Hood, the British would tear at their flag, but would try to find a German battleship and sink it? Why was it necessary to bombard Berlin with your dispatches, which, by the way, were used to find Bismarck?

Further (in general, this has been discussed thousands of times) Lutyens did not take proper measures to wedge the rudders. Could he have given an order authorizing the wedging by explosion? Could. I was afraid for the shafts. As a result, the Bismarck sank to the bottom with perfectly balanced shafts, but completely useless in this matter.

Summary: a stupid loss due to not very brave command.

"Tirpitz"

In three lines: he lived sinfully, he died funny. To hide in the skerries throughout the war and fight only on the information front is shameful for a battleship. Well, at least he accepted death under bombs like a warship.

"Scharnhorst"

I have an ambivalent attitude towards the fate of this ship.
Captain 1st Rank Hinze and Rear Admiral Bey, who commanded the operation, knew that convoy JW 55B was guarding the battleship Duke of York, the cruiser Jamaica and 4 destroyers. And that somewhere in the area there is a return convoy RA 55A, which included the cruisers Sheffield, Belfast and Norfolk with eight more destroyers. Scharnhorst and 5 destroyers could in principle pose a huge problem for the British covering group, but Bey sent the destroyers to look for the convoy further south, since he still could not make contact. As a result, Scharnhorst was left alone. Several times the battleship went on the attack, a couple of times broke away from the convoy, but... The British battleship, one heavy and three light cruisers, 8 destroyers left no chance for the German ship.

Very heroic, but very stupid.

"Gneisenau"

This ship did not die heroically at all. Since at the time of his death there was no question of its restoration. He suffered too much from the British air force, and therefore he was sunk by his own in order to block the fairway.

Heavy cruisers

"Deutschland"/"Lutzow"

Blown up by its own crew in May 1945 in Swinemünde, where it was stranded after being hit by British bombs and was used as a battery.

"Admiral Scheer"

Sunk by British aircraft during a raid on the city of Kiel in 1945.

"Admiral Count Spee"

Raided in the Atlantic.
Sank 11 British ships. He was caught by a detachment of their heavy and two light cruisers and took the fight. The heavy cruiser Exeter and the light cruiser Ajax were significantly damaged. The commander of the ship Lansdorf succumbed to the provocation of the British. He believed that other ships were also taking part in the hunt for the Spee, and he blew up and sank the cruiser.

Controversial perhaps, but very mediocre.

"Admiral Hipper"

Destroyed by British aircraft during a raid on Kiel in 1945.

"Blücher"

He died in the first combat operation in 1939. Passing through the Oslo Fjord, he received several hits from 281 mm and 150 mm shells and torpedoes from Fort Oscarborg. Sank.

"Prince Eugen"

I went through the whole war. Sank near Kwajalein Atoll, where it took part in atomic tests as a target.

Light cruisers

"Emden"

Sunk by British aircraft during a raid on the city of Kiel.

"Konigsberg"

Sunk on 10 April 1940 by British Scue bombers. Actually, you could say it's a shame. It was possible to fight off the Skew with the help of MG.34.

"Karlsruhe"

Sunk on April 9, 1940. First, a torpedo hit from a British submarine, then they finished off our own.

"Cologne"

Sunk by Allied aircraft at Wilhelmshaven.

Destroyers

"Leberecht Maas".
Sunk by friendly aircraft due to lack of awareness in 1939.
"Georg Thiele".
Sunk by British destroyers in 1940 at Narvik.
"Max Schultz."
He was blown up by a mine in 1939 and died along with the entire crew.
"Hermann Schemann".
Sunk by the damaged cruiser Edinburgh during an attack on convoy QP-14.
"Bruno Heinemann."
Blown up by British mines in 1942.
"Wolfgang Zenker".
Sunk in April 1940 by British destroyers at Narvik.
"Bernd von Arnim."
Sunk in April 1940 by British destroyers at Narvik.
"Erich Giese".
Sunk in April 1940 by British destroyers at Narvik.
"Erich Kellner."
Sunk in April 1940 by British destroyers at Narvik.
"Friedrich Eckoldt".
Sunk on December 26, 1942 by the British cruiser Sheffield.
"Dieter von Raeder."
Sunk in April 1940 by British destroyers at Narvik.
"Hans Ludemann."
Sunk in April 1940 by British destroyers at Narvik.
"Hermann Künne."
Sunk in April 1940 by British destroyers at Narvik.
"Wilhelm Heidkamp".
Sunk at the First Battle of Narvik on 11 April 1940.
"Anton Schmidt."
Sunk at the First Battle of Narvik on 10 April 1940.

And we could stop there. Below, among the minesweepers, “schnellboats” and other little things, things weren’t much better. But not much worse. You understand that a lieutenant will not be put in command of a cruiser, they will just give him a boat. Survived - went higher, no... Well, there were always enough boats.

What can you say after seeing this mournful list? It’s right that it would be nice to put the British one next to it. But Britain fought all over the world, in all seas and on all oceans. Including where only completely crazy guys sailed on German raiders.

Let's look at German statistics.

German statistics

Of the 4 battleships, three were lost completely incompetently.
Especially "Tirpitz", a colleague of our "Marat". It’s sad, of course, when a huge and powerful warship dies like this: without firing a single shot at the enemy, without causing any damage. Downed planes, sorry, don't count. Too, you know, the price is different.

Three of the six heavy cruisers were lost in Bismarck-like situations. The leader, of course, is the Admiral Graf Spee, which could have at least tried to scatter the thoroughly battered British light cruisers and leave.

Two of the six light cruisers also died in situations that do not show the command of the ships in the best light. Karlsruhe received one British (not the most powerful in the world) torpedo. In a similar situation, the British Edinburgh received three German ones, but not only did it not sink immediately, it also sent the Hans Scheman to the bottom. Here is one torpedo - and that’s it, hands down, the ship was sunk.

With “Konigsberg” it’s also peculiar. Yes, they missed the battery on the shore. Yes, we received three 210-mm shells, but they could give a move within 22ꟷ24 knots, the rudders worked, the anti-aircraft guns fired. Do not fight off the Skew, which was flying at a speed of 300 km/h and carrying one

a 227 kg bomb... Yes, there were 15 bombers, but the Koenigsberg was not alone.

With destroyers it is both simple and difficult at the same time. At the start of the war, Germany had 21 destroyers, and built 19 more. A total of 40.

Of the 21 pre-war ships, 10 (that is, half) were lost during the operation to capture Norway. In general, Norway cost Germany a lot: 1 heavy, 2 light cruisers and 10 destroyers. Enumeration on all counts.

But the main thing is how

these ships were lost. In general, the battle of Narvik is worthy of a separate detailed analysis, since it is the best example of the quality of training of German naval commanders. More precisely, the absence of this quality.

"Erich Giese" shortly before its finale.

No less interesting and instructive is the story of the death of the Leberecht Maas and Max Schultz, which also indicates problems in the training of ship commanders.

The weakness of the surface fleet

In general, if we talk about how effectively the Kriegsmarine worked, then we can say this: the Kriegsmarine acted simply excellent... for the British media. By the very fact of its existence, it justified all the costs and expenses of maintaining the British fleet. Although, as the practice of that war showed, the sting of British battleships turned out to be, to put it mildly, ineffective. The sinking of the Bismarck and Scharnhorst is, of course, a big deal, but for the sake of this, maintaining 19 battleships...

British fleet on parade in Spithead. 1936

And yet, they kept it. The world of capitalism, money and nothing personal, as they say. If 2 full-fledged German battleships and 2 inferior ones (“Scharnhorst” and “Gneisenau”, if the readers don’t mind), with “small-caliber” (by the standards of this class of ships) 283-mm guns were sufficient reason to keep a pack of 19 battleships and cruisers...

Then the Kriegsmarine even exceeded its task, since from time to time the Royal Navy even suffered losses from the German fleet. The Kriegsmarine's surface unit has 1 aircraft carrier, 1 battle cruiser and 4 destroyers. The remaining losses of the British fleet are on the conscience of the submarine forces and the Luftwaffe.

Here it can be said that Versailles, with its restrictions, played a role, and the Kriegsmarine did not have as many properly trained sailors as the High Seas Fleet. Alas, it is quite possible. And if the Kriegsmarine ships were commanded by sea wolves from that fleet, perhaps such stupid losses could have been avoided.

But what happened is what happened, history is a harmful thing. And there is a reason in the way many historians present the “merits” of the Kriegsmarine. Although the actions of submarine forces and raiders deserve respect at a minimum.

But the combat operations of a handful of ships that personified the “power” of the surface part of the German fleet, alas, cannot be called successful. And this is a considerable merit of the commanders of the German ships, who did not have the proper level of training, and therefore did not prove themselves in any way.

Although, of course, there were quite good crews in the German fleet. For example, “Prince Eugen” was equipped at the most tolerable level, as its combat path showed. And his relative “Admiral Hipper” fought quite well.

But we'll talk about this a little later. Where we will solve such maritime mysteries as the missing Kriegsmarine destroyer or how to lose 10 ships and not end up in the Gestapo.

To be continued…

Fleet actions

• Presence in waters around Spain during the Civil War - 1936-1939.
• Battle of the Atlantic (1939-1945) U-29 sinks HMS Courageous (1916) - September 1939
• U-47 sinks the battleship HMS Royal Oak (1914) - October 1939
• Battle of La Plata, Admiral Graf Spee scuttled - December 1939
• Danish-Norwegian operation, "Blücher" sunk - April-June 1940
• Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sink HMS Glorious (1916) - June 1940
• Bismarck sinks HMS Hood (51) and dies - May 1941
• Countering Arctic Convoys: Operation Cerberus - February 1942
• German destroyers and U-456 cause fatal damage to HMS Edinburgh (C16) - May 1942.
• Operation "Knight's Move" - ​​June-July 1942
• Operation Wunderland - August 1942
• Battle in the Barents Sea - December 1942
• Operation Citronella - September 1943
• Battle of the North Cape, Scharnhorst sunk - December 1943

In total, 2,759 merchant ships and 148 allied ships were sunk by submarines, including 2 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 3 escort aircraft carriers. 630 Kriegsmarine submarines were lost in military campaigns, 123 in German waters, 215 were destroyed by their own crews, 38 were written off due to damage and wear and tear, 11 were transferred abroad, 153 went to the allies.

Among other things, one Royal Navy aircraft carrier and one Royal Navy battlecruiser were sunk by Kriegsmarine surface ships.

Admirals General[edit]

Ranks

• Großadmiral _
  _
• Admiral General ( Generaladmiral
  )
• Admiral _
  _
• Vice Admiral ( Vizeadmiral
  )
• Rear Admiral ( Konteradmiral
  )
• Commander ( Kommodore
  )
• Captain of the Sea ( Kapitän zur See
  )
• Frigate captain ( Fregattenkapitän
  )
• Corvette captain ( Korvettenkapitän
  )
• Lieutenant Commander ( Kapitänleutnant
  )
• Senior lieutenant ( Oberleutnant zur See
  )
• Lieutenant of the Sea ( Leutnant zur See
  )
• Senior Warrant Officer of the Sea ( Oberfähnrich zur See
  )
• Ensign of the Sea ( Fähnrich zur See
  )
• Sea cadet ( Seekadett
  )
• Headquarters Chief Boatswain ( Staboberbootsmann
  )
• Chief Boatswain ( Oberbootsmann
  )
• Stabsbootsmann _
  _
• Bosun ( Bootsmann
  )
• Ober-maat ( Obermaat
  )
• Maat ( Maat
  )
• Sailor-Ober-Staff-Corporal ( Matrosenoberstabsgefreiter
  )
• Sailor-staff-corporal ( Matrosenstabsgefreiter
  )
• Sailor-haupt-corporal ( Matrosenhauptgefreiter
  )
• Sailor-Ober-Corporal ( Matrosenobergefreiter
  )
• Sailor-corporal ( Matrosengefreiter
  )
• Sailor ( Matrose
  )

Flags of ships and vessels of the German Navy

• War Ensign of Germany 1935-1938.svg

  Flag of ships and vessels of the German Navy 1935-1938

• War Ensign of Germany 1938-1945.svg

  Flag of ships and vessels of the German Navy 1938-1945

Flags of German Navy officials

• Kriegsmarine OF9-Generaladmiral-Flag 1945 v1.svg

  Flag of the Admiral General of the German Navy

• Kriegsmarine OF8-Admiral-Flag 1945 v2.svg

  Flag of the Admiral of the German Navy

• Kriegsmarine OF7-Vizeadmiral-Flag 1945 v1.svg

  Flag of a Vice Admiral of the German Navy

• Kriegsmarine OF6-Konteradmiral-Flag 1945.svg

  Flag of a Rear Admiral of the German Navy

Notes

1. [www.kriegsmarine.ru/lutzov_tallin.php TC “LUTSOV” - “TALLINN”]. Retrieved January 18, 2011. [www.webcitation.org/65lGDEHLA Archived from the original on February 27, 2012].
2. Gazeway, E.B.
   Gray wolves, gray sea = Gray wolf, gray sea. - Tsentrpoligraf, 2005. - P. 112. - 300 p. — 6000 copies. — ISBN 5952418503.
3. [militera.lib.ru/h/belli_penzin/03.html MILITARY LITERATURE - [Military history] - Belli V.A., Penzin K.V. Combat operations in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea. 1939-1945]
4. After his death, the Norwegian minelayer Olav Tryggvason, captured by the Germans, was renamed “Brummer”.
5. [www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignRoyalNavy.htm Royal Navy, warships, WW2, battleships, battlecruisers, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, escorts] (English)

The Kriegsmarine and the inferiority complex

March 17, 1941 was not the most ordinary day in the history of the Battle of the Atlantic. The Germans lost the boats of two of their best underwater aces at once: U 99 of Corvetten-Captain Kretschmer and U 100 of Captain-Lieutenant Schepke. The British, having gotten rid of two of their worst enemies who were wreaking havoc among the Atlantic convoys, received an interesting “bonus” in addition. At the site of the death of U 100, they caught a prisoner from the water, the like of whom, they admitted, had never been caught since the beginning of the war. This was a type of German officer previously unknown to the British, who... “did not suffer from an inferiority complex.”

The end of Black Panther

There is no doubt that Joachim Schepke was a talented submariner. Over the course of a year and a half of war, his actions more than once confirmed his title as an underwater ace. His boat U 100, bearing the emblem of a black panther, returned to base with pennants on the periscope indicating sunken ships from each trip. Schepke coped well with all dangers; he was not afraid of the depth charges of British ships and aircraft. To take such an ace out of the game, the enemy needed to use new effective means, against which Schepka’s experience and luck would be powerless.

The destroyer "Vanok" in camouflage distorting the silhouette, summer 1941. Commissioned back in 1917, the old ship went through the entire Second World War. In addition to the Schepke and Kretschmer boats, Vanock's credits included participation in the destruction of the U 392 boat on March 16, 1944 (Imperial War Museums)

Such a tool turned out to be the Type 286 radar installed on the destroyer HMS Vanoc, which put an end to the career and life of the U 100 commander on March 17, 1941. The Vanock was part of the escort of the large convoy HX-112, guarding it on the final leg of its journey from Halifax, Canada, before arriving in Liverpool. This convoy was discovered by the submarine U 110 of Captain-Lieutenant Fritz-Julius Lemp on the afternoon of March 15, 1941, 150 miles south of Iceland. Lemp reported his “find” to Dönitz, and the commander joined other boats in pursuit of the convoy, including Kretschmer’s U 99 and Schepke’s U 100.

A small “wolf pack” launched an attack on the evening of March 16, but only Kretschmer and Lemp were able to achieve success. Kretschmer, true to his tactics, made his way inside the convoy order, where, having fired all the torpedoes, he was able to hit six ships, five of which sank. Lemp was able to torpedo one tanker, which remained afloat. Shepka was categorically unlucky - when in the evening of the same day U 100 approached the convoy and was about to break through into the order, a destroyer appeared behind her stern, forcing the boat to dive and remain under water for almost an hour.

When U 100 surfaced, Schepke decided to try his luck in an attack again, but after some time the boat was discovered a second time by a destroyer and driven under water. The subsequent depth charge attack did not cause any damage to U 100. Breaking away from his pursuer, Schepke surfaced and discovered that he was already outside the order, and the convoy was moving away into the darkness, leaving two or three destroyers to deal with the submarines.

Such a number of opponents surprised the underwater ace, since some time ago Kretschmer broadcast that the convoy was guarded by only three escort ships. Schepke believed that there were at least eight of them. U 100 again evaded the destroyers by diving, but this time her luck changed - at 01:30 (hereinafter GMT), the destroyer HMS Walker, using sonar, received stable contact with an underwater target and reported this to neighboring "Vanok". Both ships created real hell for Schepka's boat, making four precise bombing runs over the next hour and dropping about 30 depth charges on the Germans' heads.

Vanock's partner, the destroyer USS Walker, in rough seas, 1939-1945. The ship, which entered service with the Royal Navy at the beginning of 1918, managed to take part in the First World War, in the intervention in Soviet Russia, and then, like the Vanok, it honestly served the entire Second World War, escorting more than a dozen convoys (Imperial War Museums)

The boat was damaged immediately after dropping the first series of bombs: the pumps were out of order, a number of instruments were broken, the depth rudders, fuel and ballast tanks and high-pressure air cylinders were damaged. Nevertheless, Schepke, trying to avoid the explosions, sank deeper and deeper until the boat reached 230 meters. This depth was a record: before this, no German submarine had ever dived so deep! However, the destroyers did not leave the attack site, since a strong smell of oil was felt on the surface, and direction-finding stations recorded the hiss of air escaping from the boat’s cylinders.

Schepke had little choice: float up or wait until the enormous pressure of the water crushed the boat into a cake. The underwater ace decided to surface and fight. Although the torpedo tubes were not ready to fire, he hoped that he would have enough time to reload and attack the destroyers. The boat surfaced at approximately 03:05–03:10, surfacing just 500 meters from the Vanock, which had detected it using radar. According to American historian Clay Blair, this was the first time a German submarine was detected by the radar of an escort ship. The British reacted quickly: the destroyer gave full speed and went to ram.

View of the Atlantic convoy from the destroyer Vanok (Imperial War Museums)

However, Schepke did not even think about giving up. Due to loss of fuel, the U 100 was unable to start the diesel engines, so it had to rely on electric motors, which also worked intermittently. He ordered the right electric motor to be turned full backward, although, on the contrary, it was necessary to give it full forward - this would have allowed us to avoid a collision with the destroyer and prepare for a torpedo attack. Schepke quickly realized his mistake, but time was lost - the enemy was quickly approaching. At first, the underwater ace assumed that the destroyer would still slip behind the stern of the boat, but he realized that a ramming was inevitable. His last order to the crew was to put on life jackets and jump overboard.

Some of the U 100 crew members, on their own initiative, wanted to make a last stand - several people rushed to the anti-aircraft gun on the bridge to open fire on the destroyer. However, their comrades shouted to dissuade the daredevils from such an undertaking, fearing that if they resisted, the British would not pick them up. At approximately 03:18, the Vanock's bow crashed into U 100 in the wheelhouse area, crushing everything in its path. Shepka was unlucky: during the ramming he was on the bridge, the blow hit the place where the underwater ace was standing, and he was almost crushed by the bow of the destroyer. After this, the submarine quickly sank, taking its commander to the bottom of the Atlantic.

Dropping depth charges from the stern of the destroyer Vanok (Imperial War Museums)

Immediately after this, the Vanok began picking up Germans from the water, taking six people on board. However, immediately after the rescue of the Germans began, another submarine was discovered, and the Venock went to the aid of the Walker to destroy it. It was Otto Kretschmer's U 99, which was also soon sunk - however, in this case, almost the entire crew, led by the commander, survived and were captured. The discovery of Kretschmer's boat played a fatal role for most of the submariners with U 100 - they were left in the water and died.

"Without an inferiority complex"

Among the six lucky ones rescued by the Venock was Corvette Captain Siegfried Flister, who became the only surviving officer from U 100. At the time of the ramming, he was on the bridge next to Schepke and survived miraculously. Flister stood behind the commander, and the bow of the destroyer struck between them, cutting the bridge. Schepke suffered greatly from the impact and was pinned by the displaced periscope cabinet in the front part of the bridge, after which he sank to the bottom along with the boat without any hope of freeing himself from the trap. Flister managed to get to the surface, although he was pinned down by the twisted fence of the bridge.

Corvetten-Captain Flister was not among the crew of the boat and was on board as a trainee commander. According to the established Kriegsmarine submarine rules, a submarine officer, after completing a boat commander course, before taking a command position on his own ship, made one trip on a combat submarine as a trainee under the guidance of an experienced commander.

On the left is the official photograph of Joachim Schepke after being awarded the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves (https://www.subsim.com). Right: The first ramming of a German boat by a British destroyer occurred in October 1914, when the destroyer HMS Badger overtook U 19. However, the boat was not sunk and managed to reach the base with damage (https://www.iwm.org .uk)

Flister began serving in the Reichsmarine in 1925. His career in the navy was initially connected with small ships, on which he served as a miner. In 1938, Flister was sent to teach at the School of Bononet Barriers and after some time became its head. At the beginning of the war, with the rank of lieutenant commander, he was transferred to the battleship Scharnhorst and took part in the Norwegian campaign on it.

Flister witnessed the sinking of the British aircraft carrier HMS Glorious by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the final battle of its defenders, the destroyers HMS Ardent and HMS Acasta. Interestingly, this German officer was mentioned in the memoirs of the escort commander of the infamous convoy PQ-17, John Egerton "Jackie" Broome, whose friend Commander Charles Eric Glasfurd commanded the Acasta and died:

“When we approached the Orkney Islands, I had already collected all the available information and prepared a report on the fate of the Glories. I radioed the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, who was at Scapa Flow, to send a ship to pick up the report as we passed by. And so it was done.

In my report there was no mention of the fate of the destroyers Acasta and Ardent, because only one person escaped from them, but he was in too bad a condition. Senior Seaman Carter later recovered and was able to give a brilliant account of the disaster, which Winston Churchill quoted in his History of the Second World War. Charles Glassford handled the destroyer superbly. He set up a smoke screen and attacked the Germans under its cover, landing a torpedo at the Scharnhorst. But at the same time, the destroyer Akasta was sunk. “When I was already in the water, I saw the captain standing on the bridge. He took a cigarette out of his cigarette case and lit it. We shouted to him to get down on the raft, but he just waved his hand to us: “Goodbye, good luck to you!” A wonderful death for a brave man,” Carter concluded his report. By a strange coincidence, a few months later the Venock fished out the artillery officer of the Scharnhorst from the water. He was transferred from a battlecruiser to a submarine, which was sunk by the Venock. A German officer confirmed that the Scharnhorst was seriously damaged, and vividly described the last stand of my old friend Charles Glassford - I was best man at his wedding.

In 1940, Flister received the rank of corvette captain and was transferred to submarines. Although he did not expect that he would have to serve in the submarine, on the whole he was satisfied with the prospect of serving under Dönitz. After completing training courses at the submarine school in Pillau, he was sent to consolidate his knowledge under such an authority as Schepke, but his first combat campaign on a submarine was Flister’s last.

This is what the bow of a British destroyer looked like after ramming a German submarine. On December 26, while escorting convoy HX-219, the destroyer HMS Hesperus

rammed and sank the submarine U 357 of Captain-Lieutenant Adolf Kellner (Imperial War Museums)

To the officers of the intelligence department of the British Admiralty who interrogated him, Flister seemed to be an extremely unusual representative of the Kriegsmarine officers, the like of whom had never been captured before. As a result, they awarded him the following characteristics:

“He was a rather pleasant man, small in stature, and, being older and having seen more humane times, seemed less of a fanatical Nazi than most of the prisoners captured to date. But on the question of the infallibility of the Fuhrer, Flister demonstrated the tenacity of a fanatic; however, he could not clearly explain why the infallible Hitler continued to make mistakes, surrounding himself with individuals whom the best representatives of the German people (especially the military) despised as unprincipled opportunists and bandits. Flister was noticeably ashamed of this ominous surroundings of his beloved leader and each time turned the conversation to naval topics. He clearly had deep respect for the Royal Navy, and described the sinking of the Ardent and Acasta with almost tears in his eyes. Flister seemed in many ways a more normal person and a more typical naval officer than the previous prisoners, and he also did not have the obvious inferiority complex that made the previously captured [naval] officers so vulnerable.”

It is interesting to note that at the time of Flister’s interrogation, almost half a thousand German submariners were already in British captivity, several dozen of whom were officers. Flister was the only one among them who received such a flattering description from British intelligence. However, what kind of “inferiority complex” did her employees mention when evaluating Kriegsmarine officers?

The crew of the destroyer Vanok, summer 1941 (Imperial War Museums)

Most likely, the answer to this question can be found in the novel “Sharks and Little Fish” by the German writer Wolfgang Ott, published in 1956 - in Russia it was published under the title “Steel Shark”. In it, describing the life of German sailors during World War II, the author reproduced a dialogue between a retired Kriegsmarine officer and his former cadets:

“
But, Mr. Captain,” interrupted Heine, “ don’t you know that these things are not even mentioned at the academy?
At least until now... - And they won’t mention it, my boy, in my time this wasn’t talked about either.
But this mutiny cast a shadow over the entire officer corps of the Imperial Navy. The Kaiser left. The naval officers were left to their own devices. Their army colleagues came up with a lie - I’m sorry, but there’s no other word for it. I am referring to the myth that the army was “invincible on the battlefield.” By the way, Ebert came up with this formula, but the generals gladly picked it up. And the admirals echoed them - the German fleet was “invincible on the high seas.” Army officials boasted of victories at Tannenberg, Verdun and Isonzo, and naval officials boasted of victories at Cape Coronel and the Skagerrak, as well as Weddigen. This was the beginning of a naval tradition that is still chewed on at the academy. Having lost the war, naval officers took up history and discovered Prince Adalbert and the Great Elector. What they couldn’t find in the archives, they came up with themselves; every German who ever boarded a ship became a great naval genius. Yes, this is exactly the story they live in the academy. They hung portraits of our great sailor heroes on the walls and displayed “the best ships in the world” in glass cases. The reason for all this lies in an inferiority complex. And this is truly a complex, since German sailors were always inferior to others. The British don't consider us sailors; We were always defeated, but we did what could be done with our insignificant forces.”

The author expresses gratitude to Evgeny Skibinsky for his assistance in working on the article.

Literature:

1. Blair S. Hitler's U-boat War. The Hunters, 1939-1942 – Random House, 1996
2. Hogel G. Embleme, Wappen, Malings Deutscher U-boote 1935-1945 – Hamburg: Koehler Verlag, 2001
3. Roll H.-J. Kapitänleutnant Joachim Schepke: Der kühnste Geleitzugkampfer der U-Bootwaffe – Flechsig Verlag, 2009
4. Wynn K. U-Boat Operations of the Second World War. Vol.1-2 – Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998
5. Ott V. Steel shark. A German submarine and its crew during the war. 1939-1945 – M.: “Tsentrpoligraf”, 2011
6. Two convoys: PQ-17 and PQ-18: Sat. / Per. from English A.G. Sick – M: ACT, 2004
7. Morozov M., Nagirnyak V. Hitler's steel sharks. Series VII – M.: “Yauza”, “Eksmo”, 2008
8. https://www.uboat.net
9. https://www.uboatarchive.net
10. https://historisches-marinearchiv.de
11. https://www.naval-history.net

Literature

• Zalessky K. A.
  Kriegsmarine. Navy of the Third Reich. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005. ISBN 5-699-10354-6
• Patyanin S., Morozov M., Nagirnyak V.
  Kriegsmarine. Navy of the Third Reich. Eksmo, 2009. ISBN 5-699-29857-6, 978-5-699-29857-0
• Patyanin S., Morozov M., Nagirnyak V.
  Hitler’s Navy: the complete encyclopedia of the Kriegsmarine. Eksmo, 2012. ISBN 978-5-699-56035-6
• Porten, E. von der
  [alexgbolnych.narod.ru/porten/index.htm German Navy in World War II]
• Ruge F.
  [militera.lib.ru/h/ruge/index.html War at sea. 1939-1945]
• Dönitz K.
  [militera.lib.ru/h/donitz/index.html German submarines in World War II]
• Reder E.
  [www.fictionbook.ru/ru/author/reder_yerih/gross_admiral_vospominaniya_komanduyushe/ Grand Admiral. Memoirs of the commander of the Navy of the Third Reich. 1935—1943]
• Assman K.
  War at sea.
  Godt E.
  Submarine warfare In the book: Results of the Second World War. M.: Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1957. Pp. 156-195

Grand Admirals [edit]

Links

• Large surface ships
  Battleships	Bismarck type: Bismarck • Tirpitz Scharnhorst type: Scharnhorst • Gneisenau Deutschland type (battleships): Schlesien • Schleswig-Holstein
  Aircraft carriers	Graf Zeppelin type: Graf Zeppelin • Aircraft Carrier B De Grasse • ​​Seydlitz (from cruiser)
  Heavy cruisers	Deutschland type (pocket battleships): Deutschland (Lützow) • Admiral Graf Spee • Admiral Scheer Admiral Hipper type: Admiral Hipper • Blücher • Prinz Eugen • Seydlitz » • "Lutzow"
  Light cruisers	Type "Emden": "Emden" Type "K": "Konigsberg" • "Karlsruhe" • "Cologne" Type "Leipzig": "Leipzig" • "Nuremberg"
  Auxiliary cruisers	"Orion" • "Atlantis" • "Widder" • "Thor" • "Penguin" • "Stier" • "Komet" • "Cormoran" • "Michel" • "Coronel" • "Hansa"
  Destroyers
  Types:	1934 • 1934A • 1936 • 1936A • 1936A(Mob) • 1936B
  Fleets:	• • • • • •
  Destroyers
  Types:	1923/Raubvogel • 1924/Raubtier • 1935 • 1937 • 1939/Elbing • 1941/“Ausland”
  Fleets:	• • • • • • • •
  Torpedo boats
  Types	S 26 • S 30 • S 38/S 38b • S 100 • S 151 • Typ 700
  Fleets:	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 (educational) • 2 (educational) • 3 (educational)
  Artillery training	"Bremse" • "Brummer"
  Submarines (list)
  Projects	Type I • Type II • Type VII • Type IX • Type X • Type XIV • Type XVII • Type XXI • Type XXIII | Unfinished projects
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Admirals [edit]

Excerpt characterizing the Kriegsmarine

- Well, tell him so. - Mom, are you angry? You’re not angry, my dear, what’s my fault? - No, what about it, my friend? If you want, I’ll go and tell him,” said the countess, smiling. - No, I’ll do it myself, just teach me. Everything is easy for you,” she added, responding to her smile. - If only you could see how he told me this! After all, I know that he didn’t mean to say this, but he said it by accident. - Well, you still have to refuse. - No, don't. I feel so sorry for him! He is so cute. - Well, then accept the offer. “And then it’s time to get married,” the mother said angrily and mockingly. - No, mom, I feel so sorry for him. I don't know how I'll say it. “You don’t have anything to say, I’ll say it myself,” said the countess, indignant that they dared to look at this little Natasha as if she were big. “No, no way, I myself, and you listen at the door,” and Natasha ran through the living room into the hall, where Denisov was sitting on the same chair, by the clavichord, covering his face with his hands. He jumped up at the sound of her light steps. “Natalie,” he said, approaching her with quick steps, “decide my fate.” It's in your hands! - Vasily Dmitrich, I feel so sorry for you!... No, but you are so nice... but don’t... this... otherwise I will always love you. Denisov bent over her hand, and she heard strange sounds, incomprehensible to her. She kissed his black, matted, curly head. At this time, the hasty noise of the countess's dress was heard. She approached them. “Vasily Dmitrich, I thank you for the honor,” said the countess in an embarrassed voice, but which seemed stern to Denisov, “but my daughter is so young, and I thought that you, as a friend of my son, would turn to me first.” In this case, you would not put me in the need of refusal. “Gafinya,” Denisov said with downcast eyes and a guilty look, he wanted to say something else and faltered. Natasha could not calmly see him so pitiful. She began to sob loudly. “Countess, I am guilty before you,” Denisov continued in a broken voice, “but know that I adore your daughter and your entire family so much that I would give two lives...” He looked at the countess and, noticing her stern face... “Well, farewell, lady,” he said, kissed her hand and, without looking at Natasha, walked out of the room with quick, decisive steps. The next day, Rostov saw off Denisov, who did not want to stay in Moscow for another day. Denisov was seen off at the gypsies by all his Moscow friends, and he did not remember how they put him in the sleigh and how they took him to the first three stations. After Denisov’s departure, Rostov, waiting for the money that the old count could not suddenly collect, spent another two weeks in Moscow, without leaving the house, and mainly in the young ladies’ room. Sonya was more tender and devoted to him than before. She seemed to want to show him that his loss was a feat for which she now loves him even more; but Nikolai now considered himself unworthy of her. He filled the girls' albums with poems and notes, and without saying goodbye to any of his acquaintances, finally sending all 43 thousand and receiving Dolokhov's signature, he left at the end of November to catch up with the regiment, which was already in Poland. After his explanation with his wife, Pierre went to St. Petersburg. In Torzhok there were no horses at the station, or the caretaker did not want them. Pierre had to wait. Without undressing, he lay down on a leather sofa in front of a round table, put his big feet in warm boots on this table and thought. – Will you order the suitcases to be brought in? Make the bed, would you like some tea? – asked the valet. Pierre did not answer because he did not hear or see anything. He began to think at the last station and continued to think about the same thing - about something so important that he did not pay any attention to what was happening around him. Not only was he not interested in the fact that he would arrive in St. Petersburg later or earlier, or whether he would or would not have a place to rest at this station, but it was still in comparison with the thoughts that occupied him now whether he would stay for a few days. hours or a lifetime at this station. The caretaker, the caretaker, the valet, the woman with Torzhkov sewing came into the room, offering their services. Pierre, without changing his position with his legs raised, looked at them through his glasses, and did not understand what they could need and how they could all live without resolving the questions that occupied him. And he was preoccupied with the same questions from the very day he returned from Sokolniki after the duel and spent the first, painful, sleepless night; only now, in the solitude of the journey, did they take possession of him with special power. No matter what he started to think about, he returned to the same questions that he could not solve, and could not stop asking himself. It was as if the main screw on which his whole life was held had turned in his head. The screw did not go in further, did not go out, but spun, not grabbing anything, still on the same groove, and it was impossible to stop turning it. The caretaker came in and humbly began to ask His Excellency to wait only two hours, after which he would give courier for His Excellency (what will happen, will happen). The caretaker was obviously lying and only wanted to get extra money from the passerby. “Was it bad or good?” Pierre asked himself. “For me it’s good, for another person passing through it’s bad, but for him it’s inevitable, because he has nothing to eat: he said that an officer beat him for this. And the officer nailed him because he needed to go faster. And I shot at Dolokhov because I considered myself insulted, and Louis XVI was executed because he was considered a criminal, and a year later they killed those who executed him, also for something. What's wrong? What well? What should you love, what should you hate? Why live, and what am I? What is life, what is death? What force controls everything?” he asked himself. And there was no answer to any of these questions, except one, not a logical answer, not to these questions at all. The answer was: “If you die, everything will end. You’ll die and find out everything, or you’ll stop asking.” But it was also scary to die. The Torzhkov merchant offered her goods in a shrill voice, especially goat shoes. “I have hundreds of rubles that I have nowhere to put, and she stands in a torn fur coat and timidly looks at me,” thought Pierre. And why is this money needed? Can this money add exactly one hair to her happiness, peace of mind? Could anything in the world make her and me less susceptible to evil and death? Death, which will end everything and which should come today or tomorrow, is still in a moment, in comparison with eternity.” And he again pressed the screw that was not gripping anything, and the screw still turned in the same place. His servant handed him a book of the novel in letters to m m e Suza, cut in half. [Madame Suza.] He began to read about the suffering and virtuous struggle of some Amelie de Mansfeld. [Amalia Mansfeld] “And why did she fight against her seducer,” he thought, “when she loved him? God could not put into her soul aspirations that were contrary to His will. My ex-wife didn't fight and maybe she was right. Nothing has been found, Pierre told himself again, nothing has been invented. We can only know that we know nothing. And this is the highest degree of human wisdom." Everything in himself and around him seemed to him confusing, meaningless and disgusting. But in this very disgust for everything around him, Pierre found a kind of irritating pleasure. “I dare to ask your Excellency to make room for a little bit, for them,” said the caretaker, entering the room and leading behind him another traveler who had been stopped for lack of horses. The man passing by was a squat, broad-boned, yellow, wrinkled old man with gray overhanging eyebrows over shiny eyes of an indeterminate grayish color. Pierre took his feet off the table, stood up and lay down on the bed prepared for him, occasionally glancing at the newcomer, who with a sullenly tired look, without looking at Pierre, was heavily undressing with the help of a servant. Left in a worn-out sheepskin coat covered with nankin and in felt boots on thin, bony legs, the traveler sat down on the sofa, leaning his very large, short-cropped head, wide at the temples, against the back and looked at Bezukhy. The stern, intelligent and insightful expression of this look struck Pierre. He wanted to talk to the passerby, but when he was about to turn to him with a question about the road, the passerby had already closed his eyes and folded his wrinkled old hands, on the finger of one of which there was a large cast-iron ring with the image of Adam’s head, sat motionless, either resting, or about thinking deeply and calmly about something, as it seemed to Pierre. The traveler's servant was covered with wrinkles, also a yellow old man, without a mustache or beard, which apparently had not been shaved, and had never grown on him. A nimble old servant dismantled the cellar, prepared the tea table, and brought a boiling samovar. When everything was ready, the traveler opened his eyes, moved closer to the table and poured himself one glass of tea, poured another for the beardless old man and handed it to him. Pierre began to feel uneasy and necessary, and even inevitable, to enter into a conversation with this passing person. The servant brought back his empty, overturned glass with a half-eaten piece of sugar and asked if anything was needed. - Nothing. “Give me the book,” said the passerby. The servant handed him a book, which seemed spiritual to Pierre, and the traveler began to read. Pierre looked at him. Suddenly the traveler put the book aside, laid it closed, and, again closing his eyes and leaning on the back, sat down in his previous position. Pierre looked at him and did not have time to turn away when the old man opened his eyes and fixed his firm and stern gaze straight into Pierre's face. Pierre felt embarrassed and wanted to deviate from this gaze, but the brilliant, senile eyes irresistibly attracted him to them. “I have the pleasure of speaking with Count Bezukhy, if I’m not mistaken,” said the traveler slowly and loudly. Pierre silently and questioningly looked through his glasses at his interlocutor. “I heard about you,” continued the traveler, “and about the misfortune that befell you, my lord.” “He seemed to emphasize the last word, as if he said: “yes, misfortune, whatever you call it, I know that what happened to you in Moscow was a misfortune.” “I’m very sorry about that, my lord.” Pierre blushed and, hastily lowering his legs from the bed, bent over to the old man, smiling unnaturally and timidly. “I didn’t mention this to you out of curiosity, my lord, but for more important reasons.” “He paused, not letting Pierre out of his gaze, and shifted on the sofa, inviting Pierre to sit next to him with this gesture. It was unpleasant for Pierre to enter into conversation with this old man, but he, involuntarily submitting to him, came up and sat down next to him. “You are unhappy, my lord,” he continued. -You are young, I am old. I would like to help you to the best of my ability. “Oh, yes,” Pierre said with an unnatural smile. - Thank you very much...Where are you passing from? “The face of the traveler was not kind, even cold and stern, but despite that, both the speech and the face of the new acquaintance had an irresistibly attractive effect on Pierre. “But if for some reason you don’t like talking to me,” said the old man, “then just say so, my lord.” - And he suddenly smiled unexpectedly, a fatherly tender smile. “Oh no, not at all, on the contrary, I’m very glad to meet you,” said Pierre, and, looking again at the hands of his new acquaintance, he took a closer look at the ring. He saw Adam's head on it, a sign of Freemasonry. “Let me ask,” he said. -Are you a Mason? “Yes, I belong to the brotherhood of free stonemasons,” said the traveler, looking deeper and deeper into Pierre’s eyes. “Both on my own behalf and on their behalf, I extend a brotherly hand to you.” “I’m afraid,” said Pierre, smiling and hesitating between the trust instilled in him by the personality of a Freemason, and the habit of mocking the beliefs of Freemasons, “I’m afraid that I’m very far from understanding how to say this, I’m afraid that my way of thinking about everything the universe is so opposite to yours that we will not understand each other. “I know your way of thinking,” said the Mason, “and that way of thinking that you are talking about, and which seems to you to be the product of your mental labor, is the way of thinking of most people, it is the monotonous fruit of pride, laziness and ignorance.” Excuse me, my lord, if I did not know him, I would not have spoken to you. Your way of thinking is a sad delusion. “Just as I can assume that you are also in error,” said Pierre, smiling faintly. “I will never dare to say that I know the truth,” said the Mason, more and more striking Pierre with his certainty and firmness of speech. – No one alone can reach the truth; “Only stone by stone, with the participation of everyone, millions of generations, from the forefather Adam to our time, is the temple being erected, which should be a worthy dwelling of the Great God,” said the Mason and closed his eyes. “I must tell you, I don’t believe, I don’t... believe in God,” Pierre said with regret and effort, feeling the need to express the whole truth. The Mason looked carefully at Pierre and smiled, as a rich man holding millions in his hands would smile at a poor man who would tell him that he, the poor man, did not have five rubles that could make him happy.

Wings of the Kriegsmarine: Goering vs. Raeder

Former Kriegsmarine commander Karl Dönitz wrote in his post-war memoirs: “Historians will describe the war at sea during the Second World War in different ways. But they will certainly be united on one thing: the fact that the German navy in the 20th century, the century of aviation, was forced to fight without air support and aerial reconnaissance, no one can explain.” Why did this happen, and was the retired grand admiral being disingenuous?

Naval aviation: choosing a path

By the beginning of the 30s of the twentieth century, aviation had firmly won one of the main places in the structure of the armed forces of the leading states of the world. Thanks to unprecedented progress during the First World War, constantly improving technology and active propaganda of new adherents of air power, the modest branch of the military quickly turned into an independent branch of the armed forces, claiming a leading role in combat operations and attracting the best representatives of society into its ranks. The ideas of the Italian general Giulio Douhet, who preached total air war, excited the minds of aviators around the world and brought confusion to the ranks of military theorists.

In connection with such a rapid growth in the influence of supporters of aviation as an independent branch of the armed forces, the question arose in all advanced military powers of streamlining the subordination of naval aviation. Operations over the sea and in the interests of the fleet placed their own specific requirements on aircraft, training of pilots and navigators, infrastructure, communications and interaction with ships. During World War I, naval aviation turned out to be extremely effective and useful for the fleet, carrying out reconnaissance in the interests of the main forces of the fleet, searching for and attacking submarines, patrolling coastal areas, and at the end of the war began to carry out attacks on enemy ships and vessels at sea.

The preservation of the order of things in which the pilots operating over the sea were themselves naval officers and spoke “the same language” with the sailors seemed obvious, but there were also opposing views. According to them, naval aviation, which “falls out” from the doctrine of the development and combat use of the Air Force, was a redundant and even harmful structure. In this regard, during the interwar period, the military had to decide on the path along which aviation units operating in the interests of the Navy would develop - whether they would remain a structural unit of the fleet or become specialized units of the Air Force. In different countries, this dilemma was resolved in different ways, depending on national characteristics and the views of the leadership of the armed forces.

Despite the fact that in all respects the main pre-war naval fighter Mitsubishi A5M was very similar to the army Nakajima Ki-27, the Japanese army and navy continued to order and purchase equipment separately. The long rivalry and unwillingness to cooperate were only put to an end by the country’s capitulation

The Japanese acted in the most original and radical way - they did not create an air force at all, clearly dividing aviation into two types - army and navy, without any unification. The United States followed the same path, but the Americans' army aviation, unlike the Japanese, which, in fact, did not go beyond the front line, was a full-fledged air force with strategic functions. In addition, it did not have such antagonism with naval aviation. A curious nuance of the American model was the Marine Corps' own aviation. However, despite the desire for specialization, the US Air Force almost immediately after World War II nevertheless became an independent branch of the armed forces.

In France, after some hesitation, the fleet defended its own aviation; in the USSR, the fleet received its own aviation in 1938. Only in Italy and Great Britain did the navies completely cede the right to their aviation to the air force, while the British did this back in 1918. The command of the English fleet, concerned about the upcoming gigantic reduction in ship personnel, resignedly parted with its aviation units, which they later bitterly regretted.

In Italy, the aviation lobby was as strong as the English one, and immediately declared its claims to “its own conquest of supremacy at sea.” The doctrines of the Air Forces of both countries were similar - strong units of bombers and torpedo bombers would be able to independently attack enemy naval groups. But Italy did not have aircraft carriers, but in the English fleet an almost anecdotal situation developed - the fleet built aircraft carriers, but could not influence the development of aircraft for them, and the entire flight crew of these ships was subordinate to another branch of the armed forces. The Royal Navy barely overcame this savage situation until 1937, when Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain finally declared: “In respect of Fleet Air Force aircraft, the Government consider it necessary to place the ship's aircraft under the administrative control of the Admiralty.”

But time was lost, and until the very end of the war, the carrier-based aircraft of the Royal Navy were much inferior in combat qualities to their counterparts, both the enemy and the allies.

Supermarine Seafire Mk.I, a naval version of the land-based Spitfire Mk.V, on the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Victories, May 1942. With poor forward visibility and a narrow-gauge chassis, the Seafire was far from the best carrier-based fighter, but before large-scale Lend-Lease deliveries of specialized naval fighters from the United States began, British naval pilots had no other acceptable options (https://www. iwm.org.uk)

The Royal Air Force Coastal Command was supposed to operate from the coastal bases of the British metropolis in the interests of the fleet, but it never came under operational control of the fleet. The only thing that the Admiralty achieved was that the Air Force could not use the aircraft of this command for other purposes without agreement with the fleet.

There was only one great power left that had to decide on the choice of path - Germany.

Raeder v. Goering

By the end of the First World War, the German fleet had a successfully functioning naval aviation, which it lost under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. However, Germany was generally prohibited from having any aviation, and only a few years later the ban on civil aviation was lifted, which the Germans took full advantage of. Just as in the case of the submarine fleet, the Germans carefully preserved the flight and design personnel and, even before the Nazis came to power, they were gradually preparing the return of naval aviation to the fleet.

Through various scams, the navy has financed the development of seaplanes since 1924, and explained their presence at their bases simply - we are allowed to have anti-aircraft artillery, which needs to conduct exercises, for which, in turn, we need aerial targets. With Hitler's rise to power, the Kriegsmarine began to hope to acquire its own naval aviation, but this hope was immediately debunked by the Fuhrer.

At the end of the First World War, German naval aviation was a serious force, numbering about 2,500 aircraft, including such unique machines as this giant Zeppelin-Staaken 8303 float bomber, capable of carrying 1,000 kg of bombs

Former naval commander Erich Raeder in his memoirs described in detail his long battle with the head of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Goering, for naval aviation, but if you look closely, it becomes clear that this battle was lost back in 1933, when secret preparations began after the Nazis came to power to the creation of the Luftwaffe. For the next six years, Raeder fought only to preserve “naval aviation within the Luftwaffe.”

The Kriegsmarine command knew about trends in other countries and analyzed them; the war between the British Admiralty and the Ministry of Aviation over the fact that at least carrier-based aircraft were subordinate to sailors was no secret to them. The Japanese and American experience was also considered successful. When the question of creating the Luftwaffe arose, Raeder conveyed to the country's leadership his point of view on the advisability of creating Kriegsmarine naval aviation.

Alas, as Raeder writes, “... the point of view of the air command prevailed when making the decision.”

What was it?
The arguments of Goering and his supporters were as follows: a good pilot is a generalist who can operate equally successfully over sea and over land: “They believed that the determining factor was the ability to fly itself, and combat training or experience in the army or navy only secondary."

Ernst Heinkel's float torpedo bomber He 59 was one of the first naval aircraft revived by the Luftwaffe. By the beginning of World War II, the plane was hopelessly outdated, but something was found for it - it became a rescue plane. The photograph, taken approximately in 1940, shows a He 59B from the rescue squadron Seenotstaffel 3. The unit's emblem is clearly visible on the nose of the fuselage - a white albatross with a red lifebuoy above the waves on a blue shield. On October 14, 1941, this plane was shot down by British fighters off the Belgian coast near Ostend.

German admirals and Raeder himself linked the choice of the Reich leadership of the Air Force model, which was obviously detrimental to the navy, with the personality of Goering, who had great influence on Adolf Hitler. However, it should be borne in mind that in 1933–1935. The construction of the Wehrmacht was still managed by the War Ministry headed by Colonel General Werner von Blomberg, and not by Goering. The pilots' views on a unified air force turned out to be more economically beneficial. Given that the Luftwaffe was to become the most powerful air force in Europe, the division of resources into the fleet's own aviation was apparently rejected.

But Raeder did not give up. He decided to go a different route - since naval aviation cannot be created in the structure of the fleet, it is necessary for the Luftwaffe to create it for the fleet themselves: “If such aviation units are not an integral part of fleet aviation, then they must be organized so that their combat preparation and use would be entirely determined by the naval command.”

We must pay tribute to the Kriegsmarine Commander-in-Chief - he showed amazing persistence and responsibility in this matter, and even the officers and admirals who had a difficult relationship with Raeder are unanimous in the opinion that he did everything he could, and even more.

The groundwork had already been created - back in 1933, naval aviation structures began to be created in the still non-existent Luftwaffe under the leadership of naval officers Konrad Zander and Hans-Ferdinand Geisler. They were transferred from the navy to the Reich Ministry of Aviation, under whose cover the Luftwaffe was created, at the beginning of 1934. On April 1, 1934, the backbone and main organizational unit of the future naval aviation of the Luftwaffe was created - the 6th Naval Aviation District (Luftkreis-Kommando VI See), headed by Rear Admiral Konrad Zander.

The Heinkel He 115 float torpedo bomber, which entered service in 1939, was by that time, despite its elegant appearance, a flying anachronism. The outbreak of the war, which brought heavy losses among the float torpedo bombers, showed that their place from now on was on the sidelines. Now the Heinkels were delivering saboteurs or rescuing the crews of planes and ships in distress. The photo shows a He 115B-1 from the coastal squadron 1./Ku.Fl.Gr. 506 over the coast of Norway

When Germany officially announced the creation of the Luftwaffe in 1935, naval aviation took a very prominent place in the new branch of the armed forces. Initially, Raeder pushed for the creation of 25 naval aviation squadrons within the Luftwaffe before 1939 - they were to be included in three mixed shore-based air groups, two ship-based air groups (onboard seaplanes), three mixed carrier-based air groups and three shore-based fighter air groups. In total, the fleet expected to have about 300 aircraft by 1939.

In 1933–1934 The design of the first German aircraft carrier, Graf Zeppelin, was carried out at an accelerated pace. Here we can also see a temporary unity of views between the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe - having no experience in creating these ships, the Germans in September 1935 sent a delegation to Japan to study the experience of aircraft carrier shipbuilding. It included two former naval officers - ex-naval pilot Major Ernst-August Roth, who was transferred to the Ministry of Aviation as head of the department in 1933, and ex-employee of the naval leadership, Corvette-Captain Hans-Armin Zschech (Czech)). The third member of the delegation was military shipbuilder engineer Karl Oelrich, who was directly included in the design team of the Graf Zeppelin aircraft carrier.

Considering that the navy financed the development and launch of Ernst Heinkel's He 59 and He 115 seaplanes, it seemed quite realistic that by 1939 the Kriegsmarine would receive, by analogy with the British, its own Coastal Command and fleet air force. The fact that the subordination of deck and ship air groups to the Luftwaffe would be only nominal was obvious to Raeder.

"Sworn friends". The German military leadership at a reception with Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler. From left to right: Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Colonel General Werner von Blomberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe Air General Hermann Goering, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces General of Artillery Werner von Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine Admiral Erich Raeder

Very soon, in 1936, Raeder informed the Luftwaffe that the fleet considered it necessary to create about 62 squadrons (about 700 aircraft). This was a very serious figure for that time - the main potential enemy of the Kriegsmarine, the French fleet, was extremely slow to develop naval aviation, and the number of its shore-based aircraft by the beginning of the war barely reached 200 aircraft. Goering easily grasped the desire of the Kriegsmarine to tear off a huge piece (almost the entire air fleet) and supply it at the expense of the Luftwaffe, which already needed enormous resources and was actively recruited from other types of armed forces. Raeder made a compromise that had far-reaching goals - he decided to transfer all officers with flight training to the Luftwaffe, hoping that this “Trojan horse” would strengthen the position of the fleet within the Luftwaffe:

«I agreed to transfer all my officers who had flying experience to the Air Force. I hoped that by such a step we could achieve greater consideration of the interests of the fleet on the part of the Air Force. I wrote a personal letter to each of the senior airmen transferring to the Air Force explaining the interests of the Navy and asking them to keep this in mind during their subsequent service. Unfortunately, not all the personnel transferred to the Air Force were assigned to naval aviation; some of them received assignments that were in no way connected with the fleet."

Goering agreed that naval aviation as part of the Luftwaffe was needed, but not in such volumes and not in the same composition as the fleet proposed. He rejected the fleet’s desire to have fighters under its operational command; moreover, he questioned the very need for operational subordination. In his opinion, tactical cooperation would be enough for the fleet. This was fundamentally different from Raeder's views. In this regard, it literally “found a scythe on a stone,” and both sides spent a huge amount of time on endless conferences, meetings and appeals to the Fuhrer.

After the only pre-war maneuvers of the Wehrmacht involving all types of armed forces, which took place in 1937, when the Luftwaffe first acted as an independent branch of the armed forces and fully began to realize its power, the scales swung towards the pilots. Their willingness to carry out independent operations and loyalty to the Nazi leadership impressed Hitler, who was a supporter of technical superiority and was aware that army generals considered air power to be “something that would enliven the battlefield.”

. But there were no complaints about the fleet in terms of recognizing the leading role of the Nazi Party - the Fuhrer had to choose between the authority of Raeder and the arguments of his oldest party friend Goering.

The Arado Ar 196 float reconnaissance and patrol aircraft was one of the best aircraft of the Second World War in its class. It was in service with most Kriegsmarine airborne air groups and, if necessary, in addition to reconnaissance and anti-aircraft missions, it could cope with enemy bombers and reconnaissance aircraft

The situation changed in 1938, when the British reaction to the partition of Czechoslovakia made it clear that, contrary to Hitler's wishes, this state should be considered as a potential enemy, and operational plans were ordered to be drawn up in the event of war with the British. This time the arguments in favor of the fleet were too powerful, and Goering had to agree to the 62 squadrons required by the fleet. But he again categorically refused to give full leadership of these units to the fleet. The creation of this group was planned to be carried out in two stages, until 1942. At the same time, Goering warned that the Luftwaffe plans to create its own units for use over the sea, and they will fully cope with their tasks in cooperation with the fleet. This was an echo of the fact that back in 1935 the Luftwaffe created its own long-range maritime reconnaissance unit - squadron 1./Aufkl.Gr.125 (See).

This time it was definitely about the fact that the Luftwaffe was going to take on strike functions over the sea. For this purpose, it was no longer coastal air groups (Küstenfliegergruppen - Kü.Fl.Gr.), but standard bomber squadrons (Kampfgeschwadern - KG). Raeder did everything to defend his brainchild, actively involving representatives of the ground forces in the confrontation and personally pushing his point of view to Hitler. Raeder wrote: “ During my battles with Goering over the creation of naval aviation, I sometimes felt that Hitler internally agreed with me rather than with Goering.”

However, the fact remains: the concept of universal use of the Luftwaffe was adopted, which became the “contractor” of the fleet in solving its highly specialized tasks.

Launching of the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin in Kiel, December 8, 1938. Alas, the ship, which could have become the reason for the emergence of truly Kriegsmarine-controlled aviation, was not destined to enter service

The apogee of the confrontation was the signing on January 27, 1939 of the protocol initiated by Raeder. In this strange document of agreement between the two types of armed forces, the Luftwaffe, guided by self-confidence and considerations of the prestige of its commander-in-chief, assumed full responsibility for attacks on ships and vessels on the high seas, mining of water areas, attacks on enemy coastal naval bases, suppression of commercial shipping, etc. .d.

The only thing that Raeder defended, besides the legal abdication of responsibility for the ambitions of the Air Force, was that the coastal and naval air groups, which remained operationally subordinate to the fleet, were supposed to carry out reconnaissance and patrol functions and provide direct support to naval groups of the fleet during combat clashes with the enemy under tactical leadership of the fleet. Considering that the Luftwaffe retained organizational control over the coastal and naval air groups, everything was clear to Raeder: “The plans for creating naval aviation as part of the fleet were put to rest.”

Despite this failure, under the new agreement, impressive forces were supposed to act in the interests of the fleet: 41 squadrons (about 500 aircraft), of which nine long-range reconnaissance squadrons, 18 multi-purpose squadrons (anti-submarine missions, mine laying, torpedo-bomb attacks, close-range reconnaissance) , 12 aircraft carrier squadrons and two airborne seaplane squadrons. These were serious numbers, but they remained on paper.

The air group of the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin was supposed to consist of Messerschmitt Bf 109T fighters and Fisiler Fi 167 torpedo bombers. It was then decided to replace the latter with a special modification of the well-known Junkers Ju 87C dive bomber with a folding wing. The fate of these aircraft developed differently - while the attack aircraft did not go beyond the construction of prototypes and experimental batches, the “deck” Bf 109T managed to produce 70 units. They fought in Norway, where on small landing sites their wing, which was larger than the standard Bf 109E, came in handy

Raeder's last hope was aircraft carriers - the possibility remained that with their commissioning, the fleet would receive its own air force, as the British sailors received them. But this dream was not destined to come true. German designers managed to create an original ship with a specific system of flight-lifting operations, the Luftwaffe created the necessary types of aircraft and an entire flight test center in Travemünde, but German industry was unable to bring the ship to operational readiness. Over time, the ship's catapults became outdated (the realities of combat required more powerful aircraft), and even in April 1942, Vice Admiral Kranke, presenting the report “On the completion of construction of an aircraft carrier” to the Fuhrer, said that the manufacturer of the brake winches could not report the date of their supplies.

On February 1, 1939, a few days after the signing of the protocol, Goering disbanded Luftkreis-Kommando VI See. The commanders-in-chief exchanged high-ranking liaison officers on issues of cooperation in the use of naval aviation. The same principle was used in lower authorities during the war - the command of naval associations had an aviation representative, the naval delegated their liaison officer to the aviation territorial associations. It was in this way of “exchanging ambassadors” that the two types of armed forces of the Third Reich were supposed to coordinate their efforts in military operations at sea. There was only one opportunity to check the performance of this organization and the implementation of the protocol of January 27, 1939 - war, and this opportunity soon presented itself.

War over the sea without protocols

As soon as war broke out, the German and British Air Forces, both contenders for naval missions, rushed into battle to demonstrate their capabilities. During September-October 1939, they launched attacks on enemy naval bases and raids on ships on the high seas. All this ended in failure - the British lost many bombers during the raids on Wilhelmshaven, while the Germans were embarrassed after, at the instigation of Goering, they trumpeted the sinking of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal (HMS Ark Royal). The Germans' retaliatory strikes on the main British naval base at Scapa Flow also ended in vain and with losses.

But the attacks of German dive bombers on Polish ships in the cramped waters of the Bay of Danzig were crowned with complete success. Basically, they were carried out by pilots of “aircraft carrier” groups who did not yet have aircraft carriers, but had solid experience in training strikes against sea targets. The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe received almost identical directives regarding actions against England and tried to jointly solve these problems during the “Phantom War,” but a mismatch in control led to the two most noticeable failures of cooperation in naval warfare.

Destroyer Z 3 Max Schultz

- one of the victims of uncoordinated actions of the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe on February 22, 1940

From the very beginning, sailors argued that the actions of aviation outside the fleet would lead to difficulties in identifying targets and precedents for attacks on their own forces. And so it happened - the most egregious case occurred on February 22, 1940, when, due to lack of cooperation, the German destroyers Leberecht Maaß (Z 1 Leberecht Maaß) and Max Schultz (Z 3 Max Schultz) were attacked by a He 111 bomber from Squadron 4 ./KG 26. Having received damage, while evading attacks, they fell into a minefield laid out by the British and died. The same thing happened with the British. Here are the memories of the commander of the Tetrarch submarine (HMS Tetrarch) Ronald George Mills:

“One day around six o’clock in the evening I was heading out to sea to charge my batteries. We saw a group of planes flying east at about 5,000 feet. I identified them as Blenheims, we gave the identification signal, and then, to my horror, I saw them descending and diving straight at us. We made an emergency dive as quickly as we could; when we dived to about 70 feet, bombs exploded. They exploded around the stern close enough to rip off the engine room hatch and cause some damage. Already at night a request came from the Admiralty: were our submarines in such and such a place at such and such a time? To this request I answered literally the following: “Yes, it was me. Good attack. The shells passed close." I was later reprimanded for this report - they thought it was rather dismissive of the RAF, who had meanwhile reported that the target had been hit. I had to go to the coastal command and apologize to them.”

At the same time, the German fleet, implementing its strategy of a surprise mine strike on enemy communications, insisted on the start of air mine laying off the coast of England. Considering that the Kriegsmarine handed over to their colleagues a fully developed technology for the production of bottom magnetic mines dropped with a parachute, the dissatisfaction of the sailors is understandable when they learned that the Luftwaffe has too few of these mines and asked to postpone mass production. The sailors insisted on their own, and the pilots dropped 68 mines, two of which immediately landed on the coastal sandbank, and from there they were studied by the British. The mine blitzkrieg of the fleet and aviation broke down.

Heinkel He 111 bombers from the KG 26 squadron at Trondheim-Vaernes airfield in Norway. The squadron pilots were true all-rounders and could operate against both ground and sea targets. It was they, together with the Junkers Ju 88 of the KG 30 squadron, who staged a real beating of the Arctic convoys PQ 17 and PQ 18

However, we must pay tribute to the Luftwaffe command and the naval officers who joined them - they quickly found a recipe for influencing the enemy fleet and its communications by creating anti-ship aviation associations, organized on a territorial basis, and specialized formations that worked out the tactics of bombing ships enemy (topmast or gliding). Units such as the squadrons KG 26, KG 30 and KG 40 achieved outstanding success in the fight against enemy ships and vessels.

On February 2, 1940, the Royal Navy's losses from Luftwaffe aircraft were counted when the minesweeper HMS Sphinx was seriously damaged by a bomb from a He 111 from KG 26 15 miles off the coast of Scotland. It sank the next day, taking 54 sailors to the bottom. Already in the Norwegian operation and in the battle for Crete, it became clear that the Royal Navy was not able to adequately resist German pilots without air cover. By the way, it was in the Cretan operation with bombs against ships that the Bf 109 fighters of the air group III./JG 77, the failed deck crews of the Graf Zeppelin, successfully flew.

Before the attack on the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941, serious Luftwaffe forces were thrown against British shipping - the results were more than impressive. Coupled with blows on Mediterranean routes and metropolitan ports, Great Britain’s imports dropped seriously in the second quarter of 1941. In the Mediterranean Sea, the Germans literally mowed down British destroyers and escort ships - here the bet on the versatility of the Ju 87 dive bombers was justified. Pilots of attack air groups truly achieved complete versatility - they could effectively support ground forces and no less effectively attack ships on the high seas.

Designed as a passenger airliner, the four-engine Focke-Wulf FW 200 was called the Condor by the Germans. However, among the Allies it received the nickname “Scourge of the Atlantic” - the KG 40 squadron, which used the aircraft as a long-range reconnaissance aircraft and bomber, achieved great success in the field of combating Allied shipping. If the Condors did not attack the targets themselves, then they directed submarines and Kriegsmarine ships at them

On the Eastern Front, it was the Luftwaffe that neutralized the weakness of the Kriegsmarine forces allocated against the USSR, and allowed the Germans to dominate the Baltic and Black Sea theaters and provide tough opposition to Soviet landing operations. There was one big “but” in all these successes - they were all achieved when the Luftwaffe strictly followed the instructions of the Wehrmacht High Command. When OKW needed it, the Kriegsmarine immediately felt the full support of the Luftwaffe at sea. This was the case, for example, in Operation Cerberus, when during the breakthrough of the battleships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, air cover was allocated on Hitler’s personal orders and fulfilled its tasks in an exemplary manner. But if the Kriegsmarine fought independently in a theater that was not considered paramount by OKW, everything looked as described by the commander of the submarine fleet, Karl Dönitz:

"01.10. Aviation, which must conduct reconnaissance to the north, northeast, south, southeast and west of the combat area (Rockall Bank area), does not have the strength to complete this task.

09.12. Aerial reconnaissance assigned to the aircraft of the 406th group (reconnaissance aircraft of the BV-138 type) cannot be carried out within the next two months due to the technical shortcomings of aircraft of this type.

14.12. It was possible to establish very weak interaction with the following aviation formations:

1. With the 406th Coastal Air Group, based in Brest and subordinate to the West group. Due to technical shortcomings of the BV-138 aircraft, their use was suspended for two months.

2. We do not maintain official contact with KG 40, based in Bordeaux. Personal contacts have been established. Unfortunately, today they can only provide us with one FW 200 type machine per day.

3. With
the V Air Fleet, which conducts reconnaissance from case to case in a certain area according to a specific request. Until now, reconnaissance has only been carried out once. In recent days, another application has been submitted. It was not completed due to lack of strength.”

Thus, "very weak interaction"

and
“personal contacts”
determined the combat support of an entire branch of troops. Dönitz, on the advice of Raeder, had to personally contact the chief of staff of the Wehrmacht operational leadership, Colonel General Alfred Jodl, in order to receive subordination to the 1st air group of the KG 40 squadron, equipped with four-engine FW 200, in order to provide long-range reconnaissance to his submarines. Moreover, it was necessary to establish an entire procedure for radio direction finding, since the coordinates transmitted by the Luftwaffe navigators were extremely inaccurate.

In general, the “naval aviation” of the Luftwaffe came to the end of the war in an extremely pitiful state - their command, without coordination with the fleet, rearmed units, sent them out for reorganization and retraining, and the core of true naval pilots was gradually washed out. All attempts by the Kriegsmarine to influence the development of the “joint brainchild” failed. Even belated attempts to create strong torpedo-carrying units could no longer provide serious assistance to the Navy of the Third Reich.

The striking power of modern Bundesmarine aviation consists of more than 100 Tornado fighter-bombers.

Time has shown that the concept on which the Kriegsmarine leadership relied, if they themselves had developed naval aviation, was erroneous - seaplanes (torpedo bombers), flying boats (reconnaissance) and naval fighters would hardly have been able to gain dominance in the naval theater. The Kriegsmarine’s ability to re-equip its air units with modern aircraft on a wheeled chassis and give the strike function to naval aviation also raises questions.

But the inferiority of the fleet, which does not have its own trained aviation, which it can operate at its own discretion in carrying out the tasks assigned to it, was fully realized by the Germans. When the Bundesmarine was created in Germany after the war, naval aviation was immediately allocated to them, capable of carrying out strike missions over the sea. This time there was no need for discussion - it was obvious to the Germans who had lost the war what the ambitions of the commanders-in-chief were leading to.

Literature:

1. Raeder E. Gross Admiral - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2004
2. Ruge F. War at sea, 1939–1945 - M.: AST, 2000
3. Wilhelm Marshall. World War II at sea and in the air. Reasons for the defeat of the German naval and air forces - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2011
4. Roskill S. W. Flag of St. George - M.: ACT, 2000
5. K. Pullman. "Ark Royal". The first salvos of the British fleet - M.: ACT, 2004
6. Parker J. Silent Service - M.: ACT: Ermak, 2004
7. Combat operations of the Luftwaffe: the rise and fall of Hitler's aviation (publication of the British Air Ministry, trans. P. Smirnov) - M.: Yauza-Press, 2008
8. A. Chechin, N. Okolelov, S. Shumilin. Aircraft carrier of the Third Reich Graf Zeppelin - history, design, aircraft weapons
9. Luftwaffe and Allied Air Forces Discussion Forum (https://forum.12oclockhigh.net)
10. https://historisches-marinearchiv.de
11. https://www.niehorster.org
12. https://luftwaffe-zur-see.de