Home » Real story » History of Wars » Hunting for hunters. American submarines against the destroyers of the Imperial Navy
History of Wars
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You know how our ships are dying one after another. The combat Samidare was sunk by a submarine! You understand - the boat is sinking the destroyer! The mouse eats the cat! Hara Tameichi. "Samurai Odyssey"
During the Pacific War, US Navy intelligence analysts provided their fleet with a number of sound strategic decisions. Among these was the direction of the submarine fleet's efforts in the spring of 1944 to destroy Japanese destroyers. Here's what Theodore Roscoe writes about it [1]:
“The importance of the destroyer as an object of [submarine] attack has never been particularly great. Destroying ships during a war of attrition, submarines preferred to attack tankers or transports...
... Several factors indicated that the general losses of destroyers of the Japanese fleet had caused a serious shortage of them and that the enemy was experiencing great difficulty in using these ships for the protection of convoys and as escorts for warships. Based on this information, the commander of the American fleet issued a directive stating that the main task of submarines after the destruction of aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers was the destruction of destroyers, and not merchant ships. The directive was not published, but it received serious attention in secret documents.”
An analysis of the 1944 campaign shows that Admiral King’s directive declaring a “hunting season” for destroyers had much more significant consequences than it might seem.
The world's first underwater
In 1775, the Revolutionary War raged in America and during its period, David Bushnell built the Turtle, the first submarine to be used in combat. But the history of the submarine fleet itself began almost 100 years later, in 1862, when the USS Alligator was commissioned into the fleet. Construction began on the first day of November 1861, the government made a requirement: to build the ship in 40 days. Despite this, construction was delayed and the first launching took place only on May 1, 1862. If you pay attention to the modern heritage of the Americans in this type of military, it is impossible to even imagine how small the dimensions of the Alligator were: length/width/height were 14/1.37/1.83 meters. And the submarine was armed with only two pole mines.
There was never a war
Samuel Du Pont was interested in using the Alligator, so he asked for the submarine to be towed to South Carolina. The USS Sumpter took on this mission; during the voyage, an unpredictable incident occurred, the weather suddenly deteriorated and a storm began. A tethered submarine could sink the ship that was towing it, so the decision was made to cut off all the cables and abandon the ship to the depths of the sea. On April 2, 1863, the submarine sank not far from Cape Hatteras, which is where it lies in the present time. “Alligator” did not undergo baptism of fire, since during its life it never took part in hostilities. But despite this, the ship has attracted artists and writers many times, about whom several works of art have been written.
Baptism of fire
For the first time, the Americans successfully used a submarine fleet on February 17, 1854. Then the submarine "HL Hunley" attacked the enemy ship, breaking it, after which the crew of the submarine signaled to the ground to return, but after long waits the submarine never returned. She sank in the same place where she carried out the attack. There is still debate about what happened to the Hanley. The main version says that all crew members died from the shock wave of a mine that exploded not far from the ship.
Submarines versus destroyers: 1941-1943
In the first two years of the war, American submarine commanders were not very successful in destroying Japanese destroyers.
In 1941, in the Pacific theater of operations, only the Dutch submarine K-XVI, commanded by Captain 3rd Rank Louis Jan Jarman, was able to sink a Japanese destroyer. This happened on December 24 in the area of. Sarawak. On the Sagiri (Fubuki type), hit by a single torpedo, the end of the aft cellars was torn off by the explosion, and the ship quickly sank to the bottom.
1942 showed that the theater was too large for any of the fifty available American boats to meet any of the hundreds of Japanese destroyers. And the headquarters of the three American submarine formations operating in the theater could not understand exactly where to look for enemy ships. Successful attacks by American submariners throughout 1942 were almost always a matter of chance. It was by chance that one of these attacks might have given the US Navy the “destroyer killer” two years before that nickname was assigned to the Harder submarine.
Lieutenant Commander Gilmore, in command of the Growler, left Pearl Harbor on June 29, 1942, on patrol to the Aleutians. This was the first military campaign for both the boat and its commander.
On July 5, the boat was in the area of the island. Pussy. At about 04:00 (it was just beginning to get light), as the Growler, using airborne radar (to locate the location by mountaintops) and echo sounder, was heading towards the entrance to Kiski Harbor, Gilmour discovered three ships that he believed were leaving from her. The standing fog made observation very difficult, so there was no confidence in the reliability of the information received. It took another two hours of approach to locate the three Japanese destroyers at anchor. "Arare", "Kasumi" and "Shiranui" have just arrived at the island, escorting the seaplane carrier "Chiyoda" and the transport "Argentina Maru". The latter - very large ships - were not noticed by Gilmore, since they were closer to the shore and were unloading.
The enemy discovered the boat, and Gilmore had to shoot while urgently diving. He attacked all three targets with four torpedoes and scored three hits. The Japanese managed to fire two torpedoes at the Growler, which, according to Gilmore's report, had already passed over the boat. But the destroyers did not have time to move.
The Kasumi's bow was torn off by an explosion, and the crew lost 10 people. One of two torpedoes aimed at Shiranui missed, but the other hit the first funnel, causing extensive damage to the hull and killing three sailors. Hit in the middle of the hull, the Arare exploded and sank, taking 104 people with it.
The boat was attacked by depth charges [2] and Gilmore retreated. Upon his return, he reported three destroyed destroyers, but submarine force headquarters gave him two. Although only the Arare was actually lost, the other two ships suffered very serious damage. The Japanese brought the Kasumi and Shiranui to their native shores, but the repair of the cripples continued until June and November 1943, respectively.
This story provides insight into how individual submariners were able to achieve their extraordinary results. Gilmore actually had the opportunity to chalk up three destroyers at once, but his chances of such an achievement would have been fundamentally lower if he had encountered the same ships on the move on the open sea. With all due respect to the American commander, in this case Fortune greatly played along with him.
The victories of US submarines over destroyers in 1942 are significant in their geography and chronology: three of the four ships of this class destroyed by submariners sank in the summer in the northern part of the theater of operations: Nautilus on June 25, 60 miles southeast of Yokosuka sank the Yamakaze, which was sailing alone from Ominato; "Triton" on July 4 near the island. Agatta (Aleuts) was sent to the bottom of the “Nenokha”; "Growler" destroyed "Arare". In addition, only Natsushio, a modern ship of the Kagero class, fell victim to the S-37 (in service since 1923). This happened on February 8 in the Java Sea, near Makassar.
Obviously, in northern waters, destroyers were among the very few targets, and submarine commanders did not show any particular discernment or excessive caution. In winter, in these latitudes, the number of targets for weather reasons fundamentally decreased, and the conditions for submarine attacks became more difficult. The Natsushio, like the Sagiri shortly before it, operated in waters where the obsolete boats of the US Asiatic Fleet were trying to do at least something to “sell the Philippines and the East Indies at a higher price” to the Japanese.
What about the rest of the American submarines?
In 1942, many of them were involved in “curtains” in the path of the Japanese fleet, which relatively often went out to major battles, which extremely rarely led to positive results. In addition, American submariners experienced problems with torpedo fuses, and attacks carried out according to pre-war canons (according to sonar data from extreme distances) turned out to be useless in real conditions.
The situation began to improve only towards the end of 1942. New Gatow-class submarines began to arrive at Pearl Harbor, and older boats were gradually withdrawn from the active fleet. The command staff changed: commanders who were not aggressive enough were replaced by younger and less cautious ones. In August 1942, a new SJ search radar appeared on boats. Finally, the command of the submarine forces began to trust intelligence data more.
The results of 1943 were also not very impressive. US submarines sank five Japanese destroyers in a year, but successful attacks occurred at completely scattered points throughout the theater of operations, confirming the thesis that American submarine forces were not yet able to purposefully and reliably intercept large formations of the Japanese fleet. The Japanese have not yet involved any modern destroyers in escorting transport convoys following the same routes. Therefore, three units of the Minekadze type became victims of submarines in 1943, i.e. the oldest of the ships classified as 1st class destroyers, and one ship each of the Fubuki and Asashio classes:
- the Okikaze, which was on an anti-submarine patrol, was sunk by the Trigger submarine at the entrance to Tokyo Bay on the night of January 10;
- The Hakaze left Kavieng (New Ireland Island) on January 23, escorting air transport for servicing four-engine Akitsushima flying boats, but after only 15 miles of travel it was sent to the bottom by the Guardfish submarine;
- On February 20, during the transition from Palau to Wewak, the Albacore submarine was torpedoed and the Osio, which was escorting a military convoy, was torpedoed and killed;
- On April 9, in the inland waters of the East Indies, the Totog torpedoed the Japanese transport Penang Maru. The destroyer Isonami, which was accompanying the ship, stopped searching for the submarine too early and began rescue work. As a result, Totog also destroyed the destroyer;
- and only on December 19, 50 miles from Okinawa, the Grayback sank the old Numakaze.
In addition, the attack on January 24, 1943 by the submarine "Wohu", which ended with severe damage to the destroyer "Harusame", once again demonstrated that a ship of the "destroyer" class is capable of surviving a torpedo hit, but even one underwater explosion guarantees it heavy damage and a long repairs (“Harusame” was out of action for almost a year).
For almost the entire 1943, destroyers of all types were actively used by the Japanese in the Central Solomon Islands, where they remained the main warships conducting systematic active operations. Perhaps during this period, destroyers were still not of interest to American submariners as targets. Perhaps the American command considered this part of the theater too dangerous for its submarines. It is also possible that, actively using their light surface forces here, the Americans removed the submarines to avoid losses from “friendly fire.” In any case, during 1943, in the Guadalcanal - Bougainville - Kavieng - Rabaul area, the Japanese lost 28 destroyers, of which only one was sunk by a submarine. It is also curious that in 1943 there were no effective underwater attacks against Japanese destroyers in the northern part of the theater of operations.
Since the end of 1943, fundamental changes have taken place at the theater. Regarding the issues under consideration, it should be noted that the growth in the quantitative and qualitative indicators of the American submarine fleet, the constant improvement of radar detection equipment, the final solution (by mid-summer 1943) of the technical problems of torpedo weapons, the acquisition of combat experience by boat commanders and crews, the development of practice in the correct use command of submarine formations, reconnaissance data, development and improvement of group action methods - all this contributed to a radical change in the results of the combat activities of US Navy submarines.
Speaking about the situation with the state of Japanese destroyer forces during the same period, we have to state that there were no positive changes in any area related to the organization of anti-aircraft defense. The anti-submarine equipment and armament of the destroyers of the Japanese fleet generally remained at the level of 1941. An increase in the stock of depth charges (for example, for ships of the Kagero type from 16 according to the project to 36 by the end of the war) did not bring the expected results due to the fact that the Japanese have not developed devices that allow attacks on the bow heading angles. There has been no qualitative breakthrough in the performance characteristics of underwater enemy detection equipment. The transfer of new escort destroyers and patrol boats to the fleet somewhat improved the situation with covering transport convoys, but due to a number of unresolved problems of an organizational, technical and tactical nature, and most importantly - due to the fundamental increase in enemy forces, it was not able to reduce losses from submarines.
All this immediately affected the statistics of the death of Japanese destroyers as a result of submarine actions. From the beginning of 1944 until April 11, the Japanese lost 6 destroyers sunk by submarines, and two more ships received such heavy damage that they were out of action for a long time:
- "Sazanami" left Truk on January 12 and went out to meet a tanker convoy coming from Palau. Two days later, it was sunk by the Albacore submarine 300 miles southeast of the island. Yap;
- On January 15, the Suzutsuki (Akitsuki type), carrying the pennant of the commander of the 61st day, Captain 1st Rank Tomari Mitsuyoshi, led the same type Hatsutsuki and the Akagi-maru troop transport from Kure to Wake. On the night of January 16, the ships were discovered in Bungo Strait by the submarine Sturgeon, which hit the group leader with two torpedoes at once. Although the ship remained afloat, the damage was very serious: the destroyer lost its bow and stern ends, killing 135 people, including Tomari, the ship's commander, Captain 2nd Rank Seo Noboru, and 89 soldiers on the ship. The submarine did not resume the attack, and Hatsutsuki was able to take the crippled fellow in tow. On January 18, the detachment reached Kure. The Suzutsuki remained under repair until October 12, missing the battle of the Mariana Islands;
- in the evening twilight of January 16, the Redfin (Getow type, built in 1943, first combat campaign) north of the Spratly Islands discovered a Japanese convoy: six high-speed tankers, accompanied by the aircraft carrier Chitose and two destroyers. Lieutenant Commander Robert D. King attacked the destroyer Amatsukaze with four torpedoes and reported that they all hit their target. It is more likely that the destroyer received only one hit (four torpedoes are enough to guarantee the destruction of a heavy cruiser), but it caused an explosion in the bow magazine, as a result of which the bow section was torn off and sank, killing 80 crew members, including the commander, Captain 3rd Rank Suga Akiji - and the commander of the 16th day, Captain 1st Rank Furukawa Bunji (before the war, he served as a commander on four destroyers, and was also an aide-de-camp to one of the princes of the imperial house). Despite the fact that a year later the destroyer was partially restored and used for escort service, she no longer participated in operations as part of the fleet;
- The Suzukaze left Truk on January 24 as an escort for a convoy heading to Eniwetok. The next day the ship was hit by a torpedo fired by the Skipjack, exploded and sank with heavy losses of the crew;
- The Umikaze, escorting a convoy from Saipan to Truk, was sunk by the Guardfish submarine at the very threshold of the base on February 1;
- On February 10, Pogi distinguished herself by sinking the destroyer Minekaze 85 miles north-northeast of Formosa;
- "Totog", operating near Hokkaido, on March 16, 170 miles east of the port of Muroran, sent to the bottom of "Shirakumo", which was escorting a local convoy;
- On April 11, two days before the hunt was announced, Redfin (now under the command of Lieutenant Commander Austin) sank the destroyer Akigumo, which was en route from Lingga to Davao with cargo of airfield materials.
The latest victory is quite significant. Redfin left Fremantle on March 19, setting off on her second combat tour. For Austin, this was his debut as a submarine commander. The Celebes Sea was designated as a patrol area. The destroyer turned out to be the first target on the boat's path. Austin fired a salvo of four torpedoes, three of which reached their target. "Akigumo", transferred to the fleet only in September 1941, turned out to be an easy prey.
Thus, in the first three months of 1944, submarines had already sank as many Japanese destroyers as in the entire 1943, despite the fact that at the beginning of the war, American submariners, having barely discovered enemy destroyers, tried to evade battle! An analysis of the losses of this period shows: mainly destroyers died when they were involved in escort missions or directly in transport operations. In turn, this suggests that by 1944 the American command had established all the main routes for enemy convoys, along which a sufficient number of boats were deployed.
This did not go unnoticed at Japanese headquarters: in March 1944, the Japanese command sensed a dangerous trend. William Holmes writes:
“According to the Japanese, American submarines were carrying out pre-planned actions against escort ships, which Japan was in dire need of. This assessment was a month ahead of King's headquarters in Washington, which concluded that after Japan suffered heavy losses in destroyers, it would be in an extremely difficult position due to the lack of light forces. In this regard, it was decided to consider Japanese destroyers the primary targets of American submarines.” [3]
Under these conditions, on April 13, 1944, submarine formations received a new directive from the commander in chief. Much more experienced submariners entered the battle with the destroyers.
World War I
The United States of America showed unprecedented activity in expanding its submarine fleet at the very beginning of the 20th century; subsequently, all submarines entered service during the First World War.
At the very beginning of the 20th century, the Americans ordered the following submarines:
- Type B – 3 “Wiper” boats (1905)
- Type C – 5 Octopus boats (1906)
- Type D - 3 boats "Narwhall" (1907)
- Type E – 2 boats “Salmon” (1908)
- Type F – 4 boats “Sagr” (1909)
"Sagr" (1909)
At the very last moment before the First World War, which took place from July 28, 1914 to November 11, 1918, America decides to release several more submarines Seawolf (SS-28), Nautilus (SS-29) and Garfish (SS -30), which made up the N type. The designation (SS) in the American fleet corresponded to the fact that the ship had a diesel engine, and subsequently the states completely removed them from their arsenal. Speaking on the side of the Entente, the American fleet maintained a defensive position during the war. This determined the rather late entry of America into the military conflict; before it, all the vessels described served in the Pacific Ocean, and after getting involved in the global confrontation they were transferred to the Atlantic. However, the heyday of the entire submarine fleet did not occur during this period.
Many boats, little use
All the submarines built were only a theoretical success, as they served as examples for orders for the construction of submarines for 8 countries. And during the First World War they never had any military clashes with the enemy. Many ships sank, dying in accidents.
On March 25, 1915, the war was already raging in the vastness of Europe, but at that time the United States was conducting exercises for its new submarine, where death awaited it. An SS-23 F-4 plunged into water near the Hawaiian Islands, leaving behind an oil slick. As it turned out, then the ship was completely sunk. The depth in that area turned out to be 90 meters, which did not allow saving the crew and the submarine itself. She was raised to the surface only after 5 months. On August 29 of the same year, when rescuers showed the researchers the pulled out ship, an analysis of the tragedy and reconstruction of the picture of events began. Unfortunately, the mystery was never solved, since all the holes were sealed and the body was not damaged.
Another representative of the military family of submarines also ended his life, without any outside intervention from the opponents of the Entente. “SS-30 N-3” ran aground on December 14, 1916, not far from the California coast. The entire crew of the ship was already beginning to lose consciousness from the release of chlorine, but rescuers from the shore reached the crew and managed to pull out all the sailors. Fortunately, only a few people were injured.
The hunt has begun
The score was opened by Commander Dealey on the submarine Harder. His victory over Ikazuchi on April 13 can be considered the beginning of the hunt, and it does not matter whether he managed to receive Admiral King’s directive or not.
On the night of May 14, not far from the northern coast of the island. The Borneo submarine Bonefish sank the destroyer Inazuma, which was en route to Manila as part of an escort for a tanker convoy.
On May 22, the Pollak distinguished itself by sinking the destroyer Asanagi, which was sailing from Saipan to Japan as an escort of a convoy, in the area of the Bonin Islands.
If the three named victories occurred according to the old (convoy) scenario of late 1943 - early 1944, then the attack of the submarine "Hake" by Lieutenant Commander Broach was of a completely different nature. On the night of June 8, at the exit from Davao Gulf (Mindanao Island), the boat met a detachment of warships consisting of the heavy cruisers Mioko and Haguro and three modern destroyers. Broach fired one torpedo, which sent the Kazagumo to the bottom. Such attacks were fundamentally more difficult: the targets had greater speed; the likelihood of air cover for such detachments was higher; The escort of warships was overwhelmingly stronger and more often included in the active search for the attacking boat.
The next day, June 9, off the Bonin Islands, the Swordfish sank the Matsukaze, which was accompanying a convoy to Saipan.
In the summer of 1944, Japanese destroyers were still present in the northern theater of operations.
On July 6, the submarine Skate sank the Usugumo in the Sea of Okhotsk, which was accompanying a small convoy to the Kuril Islands. Two torpedo hits tore off the stern, and the ship sank in 6 minutes.
The main place of hostilities in the summer of 1944 was still the southern seas. Here the Harder became famous, which, while carrying out a mission to evacuate a reconnaissance group from the coast of Borneo, was forced to proceed past the parking lot of the Japanese fleet of Tavitawi in the Sulu archipelago. In this area, from June 6 to June 9, three destroyers - Minatsuki, Hayanami and Tanikaze - became its victims. At the same time, the first one was escorting the convoy, but the other two were... on an anti-submarine patrol. "Hayanami" turned out to be the most modern destroyer "obtained" by American submarines during the hunt - it was transferred to the fleet in July 1943.
By the summer of 1944, the problem of underwater danger caused not only the concern of the Japanese command, but also excessive nervousness of ship commanders. This is confirmed by the case when American submarines sank an enemy destroyer, not only without expending a single torpedo, but generally... without participating in the battle.
On the afternoon of June 15, a detachment of tankers from Vice Admiral Ozawa's Mobile Fleet followed along the eastern coast of the island of Mindanao, heading to join the fleet forces. At 13:45, on the destroyer Shiratsuyu, which was accompanying the detachment, they discovered a torpedo heading towards the ship. The commander (Captain 3rd Rank Matsuda Kuro, in office since September 1943, a veteran of the battle in Empress Augusta Bay) undertook an energetic evasive maneuver, as a result of which he placed the ship under the stem of the Seio-maru tanker. The tanker simply crushed the destroyer, and when it began to sink, its depth charges exploded, causing the death of 104 crew members, including the commander. A post-war study of the situation proved that the torpedo track on the Shiratsuya was either a ghost or the result of the movement of a sea animal. [4].
Meanwhile, the real hunt continued. On July 2, the old destroyer Hokaze left Ambon for the Celebes Sea to help people from the torpedoed transport Yamamiya Maru. By the 5th, the ship had picked up 118 people from the water, but their misadventures did not end there. On the morning of the 6th, Hokaze was discovered by the submarine Paddle, which fired two torpedoes at it. One hit the target, but that was enough. Among the dead were half of those who had just been rescued.
Quite often, the Japanese use of large, modern 1st class destroyers to escort transports led to the unjustified loss of warships. Bound by their slow-moving charges, they turned out to be too easy prey for submarines, in fact not presenting an adequate threat to the enemy. At the same time, such cases indicate the technical imperfection of the search devices of Japanese destroyers, since, as a rule, the ship did not suspect that a submarine was nearby until it received a fatal hit. So “Mingo” on the night of July 7 in the South China Sea near the island. Luzon sank the Tamanami (commissioned in April 1943), which was accompanying the tanker Kokuyo-maru from Singapore to Manila.
On August 23, the Haddow near Dasol Bay chalked up the destroyer Askadze.
Off the northwestern coast of Luzon two days later, the Yunagi was torpedoed by the submarine Picuda. The ship was traveling with a convoy from Takao to Manila.
On August 18, the destroyer Samidare, as a result of a navigation error, flew onto the Velasco Reef near Palau. The Batfish, which discovered it on the 25th, decided not to trust the matter to Fate and finished off the ship with a torpedo. The explosion broke the destroyer in half. The stern fell to the bottom, and the bow was later blown up by the Japanese themselves.
Finally, on September 12, operating at night on the surface off the island. Hainan, "Growler" sank "Sikinami" during a battle with a large convoy "H1-72" 240 miles south of Hong Kong.
It should be noted that even non-fatal damage to destroyers by submarines led to quite tangible consequences. Above we discussed the circumstances under which the valuable, modern Sudzutsuki and Amatsukaze broke down on the eve of the decisive battles of 1944. But the list of similar facts is not exhausted by these cases.
On October 12, Fuyutsuki was escorting the cruiser Oyodo from Yokosuka to the Inland Sea when it received a torpedo from the submarine Trepang. The crew was practically unharmed, but part of the bow compartments were flooded, and gun turret No. 1 was damaged. The destroyer was able to reach Kure, where it was repaired at the dock from October 14 to November 20.
On October 16 (just four days after leaving repairs!) the same type "Suzutsuki" was escorting a convoy from Oita to Formosa, when, abeam Toizaki, a torpedo from the submarine "Besugo" again deprived the destroyer of the bow end. The next day, the ship was docked in Kura for the second time, where it remained until November 11.
There is no doubt that both ships, if they had remained in service, would have participated in the Battle of Leyte, most likely (judging by their organizational affiliation) in the battle of Cape Engaño. This would hardly have affected the results of the battle, but it is precisely from such little things that the results of the war are formed.
We can talk about the start date of the “hunt for destroyers,” but it would be correct to calculate the date of its completion logically. The Battle of Leyte and the subsequent Operation TA cost the Mikado fleet, among other things, 21 destroyers. By the end of the year, 5 more destroyers were lost, four of which sank submarines, but this was no longer important. Thus, the “hunt” opened on April 13 by Harder actually ended with the Growler attack exactly five months later.
The Second World War
Before the biggest military conflict of the 20th century, many states began to modernize their army, weapons, including naval forces. The Americans did not stand aside and already in the 1930s began to take into account the mistakes of the past, preparing for World War II. The following submarines were in service:
- Type R and Barracuda, there were 17 of the first, and 3 of the second, they were not the most successful projects, and they were also very old. This becomes clear when you see that the ships did not even last until the end of the war, but ceased to be used in mid-1942. But they were used only to patrol the Panama Canal.
- Type S was more common and there were already 36 copies. Of the boats participating in the war itself, this particular type was the oldest, it also became a modernization of the R type, they were mainly sent to patrol the Atlantic, and they also carried out research on converting them into airplane carriers; on the S they even built the necessary deck, but this the idea did not live up to expectations and this modernization was never implemented.
- The Argonaut SS-166 was equipped with two tubes that could hold 30 mines, which were designed specifically for it. But he also enlisted in the navy quite early in 1928, despite such an early birth, the submarine built by the Portsmouth Navy Yard held the record for the largest submarine in existence until the advent of the first nuclear submarines. Its underwater displacement was 4164 tons. It was armed with 16 torpedoes and 4 torpedo tubes. It was “SS-166” that was conceived as the leading flagship of the entire military submarine fleet, but some problems arose with it. Firstly, due to its large mass, its speed was too low, 21 knots were planned, but in the end the boat could only accelerate to 14 and 8 knots, so for the entire period before the war it turned out to be the slowest submarine. Secondly, it was very difficult to control. Thirdly, it was planned to mine the space, which it also failed to cope with; in 1942, it returned to base without even completing the declared 90 days of autonomy. On January 10, 1943, she was sunk by 3 Japanese destroyers. Many people attribute this failure to too high a noise level and low speed.
- Type “Narwhal”, 2 underwater representatives were: “Narwhal”, “Nautilus”. The first is “Narwhal” SS-167. The submarine was ready by 1930, after which 2 torpedo launchers were installed instead of mine tubes, and accelerated to 17 knots with a displacement of 2915 tons. This submarine also did not live up to expectations in terms of speed and their engines could not gain the necessary power to accelerate to the required number of knots. The representative of “Nautilus” had a rather strange silhouette and a displacement of about 3000 tons. At the end of the war, at the beginning of 1945, both boats switched to reserve status, having accumulated 29 combat campaigns during their lives. Narwhal sank 6 enemy ships in 15 missions, and Nautilus destroyed 5 enemy ships in 14 trips.
"Narwhal" SS-167
- "Dolphin" was built in a single copy and with a displacement of 1560 tons was 2 times smaller than "Narwhal". Thus, it was much more maneuverable, but at the same time it had a weaker hull, which reduced the level of immersion, and also reduced its range to 9,000 miles. During his work, he was noted for only three combat approaches, where he did not bring any useful action, after which he was “demoted” to training ships.
- The Cachalot class gave birth to 2 submarines, Cachalot and Cuttlefish. In general, they were not remembered for anything in the war, except for one damaged tanker, but thanks to the innovation that the Americans used, they overtook any fleet in the world. The controller set the target angle, lead and depth of the torpedoes in automatic mode; this system was called Torpedo Data Computer.
- Type P had 10 representatives, which began to be designed in 1933. If we compare them with the C type, the displacement has increased to 1310 tons, their length has also increased by 8 meters, and the speed has been increased to 19 knots. It is not surprising that with such characteristics they were used throughout the war until 1944, each representative went on combat missions 8 times, and the SS-178 even patrolled assigned zones 14 times.
"Salmon"
- The US Salmon class presented 6 submarines. After the successful "P" era, the American Navy sought to improve its submarine technology. “Salmon” even had improved characteristics; its length was 94 meters and its displacement was 1450 tons. And the speed above and below the water was 20 and 9 knots, respectively. The submarine was also equipped with two additional torpedo tubes. Despite all the advantages, the Salmon had a significant drawback: its ventilation hatch did not close in the most reliable way, and despite the fact that this reason could be easily eliminated, it led to an accident on one of the submarines, where 23 people died. All submarines conducted no more than 8 trips, with the exception of Stingray, which became the leader among all submarines and made 16 trips.
- The Gato class was represented by a large number of submarines in the amount of 73 units, only the very similar Balao class, which could dive 100 feet deeper, had more representatives. They were also a continuation of the "P" line. The main characteristics were as follows: the length was 82 meters, and the displacement was 1825 tons. The boat could dive to a depth of 300 feet. In general, this type of submarine felt the full burden of the war; it was their share of service from 1942 until its very end. And for all this time, only the SS-248 Dorado was sunk in the Caribbean Sea, and 18 representatives were lost in the Pacific Ocean.
Chapter IV. Atlantic Fleet Submarine Force
Chapter IV. Atlantic Fleet Submarine Force
Atlantic front
When the problem of war on two oceans arose, the question of the comprehensive development of the two fleets arose in full force.
In reality, the US Navy was divided into three parts, and thus on February 1, 1941 there were three US fleets: the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Asiatic.
According to the new organization, submarines of the Atlantic Fleet were separated into an independent formation, and Rear Admiral R. Edward was appointed commander.
In February 1941, the submarine fleet was tasked with preparing for the upcoming war. It was a very serious and big task. In those days, the armored fist of the Nazi Wehrmacht struck across Europe. England, bloodied but unbending, fought for existence. In North Africa, German and Italian tanks made their way to Suez. German submarines operated in the Atlantic Ocean over a vast area from Norway to Dakar and from Greenland to Tierra del Fuego. German shells whistled over the port of Curacao (West Indies), and torpedoes sank ships off the coast of Brazil, in the Caribbean Sea and off the southern coast of Florida. American merchant ships with weapons and food transferred under Lend-Lease to England departed from their shores, but often did not return. The Americans soon became convinced that the Atlantic Ocean was only a few hours' flight from the European front; they remembered the First World War of 1914–1918[9].
In May 1918, the first German cruiser submarine, U-151, crossed the Atlantic Ocean to attack American coastal shipping. This boat sank dozens of ships, large and small, in American waters. The American heavy cruiser San Diego, which sank in the Fire Island area, and the battleship, which was blown up in the Delaware area, were damaged by mines laid by submarines. Following the U-151, four more German submarines appeared off the coast of America. This was during the First World War. Americans were afraid of repeating the lessons of the past. They asked themselves the question: would modern German submarines be able to bring planes to the shores of America that would bomb American cities?
Residents of Boston, New York, and Jacksonville hoped that the Navy would be able to protect them. The fleet was called upon to protect the coastline from Newfoundland to Panama and from Panama to Alaska. It was necessary to distribute defensive means along a front of 7,000 miles.
This problem was of great concern to the commander of the submarine forces of the Atlantic Fleet. With the exception of two new coastal submarines, Makerel and Marlin, he had at his disposal the old types of submarines - "B", "O", "R" and "S". Some of them took part in the First World War. They were suitable only for training purposes, but not for combat operations in the fight against the naval and air forces of Nazi Germany.
Relatively new (later built) S-type submarines also had a number of disadvantages. It took a lot of effort to prepare them for combat.
Newly designed submarines based on the east coast were used temporarily as part of the Atlantic Fleet for training purposes only. The submarines "Makerel" and "Marlin" as experimental boats, launched in 1941, were assigned to the detachment of ships of the submariner school. In April 1941, the commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral King, proposed leaving six new boats in the Atlantic Ocean as part of a “strike force.” The Chief of Naval Operations did not agree with this proposal, saying that the new type of high-speed submarines was needed for operations in the Pacific Ocean.
At first, it was decided to divide the submarines of the Atlantic Fleet into three formations.
The tasks of the first formation were not defined, but it was only said that “the first formation should consist of submarines and floating bases. At least five boats must remain at the Coco Solo submarine base. It was assumed that the first formation of submarines would be used for the defense of American waters and the Panama Canal, as well as for training personnel with a submarine school, an acoustic school and various anti-submarine detachments.
The second formation was to consist of long-range submarines. It was assumed that they would be based in Gibraltar. The task of the second unit was to control the enemy's sea lanes in the Mediterranean, acting on the instructions of the British commander in chief in the area, but remaining administratively part of the US Atlantic Fleet.
The third formation of submarines was planned to be sent to the command of the American naval forces in Northern Europe. Based in British waters, this formation was supposed to control enemy sea routes in the area.
These plans were later changed somewhat, but the general tasks of submarines in the Atlantic Ocean remained the same.
On March 17, 1941, the US Chief of Naval Operations ordered the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet to form the Submarine Patrol Group, consisting of the 20th Squadron and the 11th, 43rd and 41st Submarine Divisions. This formation was supposed to, as part of the support forces, operate from two bases, one in Gibraltar and the other in England.
After examining the boats that were intended for this formation, it was decided not to include boats of the “i” type in its composition, as having a small displacement and insufficient seaworthiness.
It was proposed to create two squadrons: one of 17 S-class submarines, which would operate from a base in the British Isles; the second of three B-class and seven S-class boats that will operate from a base in Gibraltar. The first squadron was assigned the floating base "Griffin", and the second - "Beaver".
Admiral Edwards' proposal was accepted, and the submarines began preparing for a new mission.
Gar Lock in the Clyde region was chosen for the English base. The location was relatively protected from the enemy, and repairs could be made at shipyards in the area. Premises for submariners and warehouses for food and ammunition were also identified.
Gibraltar seemed to be in great danger, and there was no point in creating long-term structures there. Located at the very border of Francoist Spain, Gibraltar could fall at any moment. There should have been only a floating base for boats and temporary structures, warehouses and housing for submariners located nearby.
A special representative of the Atlantic Fleet submarine command was appointed to participate in the development of the project for the construction of these bases, which was being prepared at naval headquarters.
All equipment for the bases was assembled at Quonset (Rhode Island) and State Pier (New London), and materials for repairs and supplies were assembled at naval depots in Norfolk and Bayonne.
While projects were being developed to establish bases at Gibraltar and Ghar Lock, attention was drawn to Bermuda. Military plans required the creation of a group of submarines for enhanced training and training of personnel. Therefore, the commander of the Atlantic Fleet insisted on equipping a training submarine base in San George Harbor on Ordnance Island (Bermuda).
In June 1941, construction began on the island of a temporary base for six submarines. The necessary equipment for the repair of boats of the "R" and "S" types was installed, and a detachment of submarines from the 7th squadron was sent to Bermuda.
Meanwhile, merchant ships sent from the United States with weapons and food for England were in serious danger. The actions of German submarines, using wolf pack tactics, began to threaten the Allied sea lanes of communication in the Atlantic Ocean. In June 1941, US submarines also began operating in the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, tasked primarily with the destruction of German and Italian submarines. The presence of submarines at sea was not constant; boats were sent to sea only when intelligence reported the appearance of enemy boats in American waters.
Back in 1940, the Caribbean Naval Region was established under the command of Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance with headquarters in San Juan (Puerto Rico). Spruance had at his disposal new bases in the West Indies, provided by the British to the United States in exchange for 50 destroyers transferred to the English fleet. In June 1941, US submarines were operating off the Virgin Islands, where shipping traffic was quite heavy and German and Italian submarines were reported.
After the American transport Steel Seafarer was sunk by German aircraft in the Red Sea, President Roosevelt issued an order on September 11th requiring US ships to open fire on any submarine or raider attacking any merchant ship in American waters. Before this order was issued, patrol ships were only supposed to monitor the movement of ships of the warring parties and report on it. The submarines were also ordered to sink any German or Italian warship that appeared in the patrol area. This was tantamount to entering a war.
In mid-October, German submarines operating in groups attacked a convoy heading to Iceland. At the same time, the American destroyer Cairney was hit by a torpedo. Eleven people died. Then the tanker Salinoye and the destroyer Reuben James were torpedoed in the Atlantic Ocean. The damaged tanker reached the port, and the destroyer sank, killing one hundred crew members. This was the first time an American warship was sunk in World War II. After this, the fleet personnel expected from hour to hour the official announcement of the US entry into the war.
The situation in the North Atlantic Ocean was very tense at that time. German submarines attacked all warships and vessels in the Newfoundland area. Five submarines from the 5th Squadron and the submarine Mackerel were sent to Argentia, Newfoundland, where anti-submarine patrols were to be established by submarines. The floating base of the Griffin submarines was also sent there. However, shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, these boats returned to New London.
When Germany and Italy declared war on the United States on December 11, 1941, American submarines in the Atlantic Fleet were ready for combat.
Before the war, in the Atlantic regions adjacent to the United States, intensive preparation of boats for combat operations and training of officers and sailors, who later had to fight in this theater, took place. In the Atlantic Ocean, most submariners of the Pacific Fleet tried their hand for the first time. Many of those assigned to boats based in Hawaii, Australia and the Philippines trained off the coasts of Rhode Island, Connecticut, Florida, Puerto Rico and Panama. The war progressed, and since there were actually fewer enemy targets in the Atlantic Ocean than initially thought, ocean-going submarines and S-class boats were transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
The Atlantic Ocean was a harsh school for submariners; submarines and submariners began the war prepared.
Actions in the Atlantic Ocean
Although history may repeat itself, no war is an exact repetition of the previous one. Each war has its own distinctive features.
A feature of the Second World War was the widespread use of submarines. While American submarines of the Pacific Fleet sank mainly surface ships, American surface ships of the Atlantic Fleet performed mainly anti-submarine defense tasks and fought enemy submarines.
In the Pacific Ocean, the main targets were ships of the Japanese merchant and navy, in the Atlantic Ocean - German submarines. Submarine warfare in the Pacific and anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic are the basis of warfare at sea, and one could assume that losing one of these wars meant losing both at once. And in the Battle of the Atlantic, American anti-submarine forces were helped by submarines of the Atlantic Fleet, and in combat operations on sea communications, submarines in the Pacific Ocean were helped by the surface fleet.
Acting in concert with the teams of destroyers, the submariners showed them various tactical techniques for combating submarines with the enemy. Increasing attention to anti-submarine defense before the war and after America's entry into World War II. The US Navy command attracted submarines to participate in anti-submarine exercises and to serve training centers established on the East Coast and in the Caribbean. As the war progressed, the requirements for such training increased even more. Submarines not only participated in exercises and training, but also took part in research work on the creation of various devices for detecting and combating enemy submarines. In November 1941, the sonar laboratory at Fort Trumbull (New London) conducted a series of experiments with such devices, involving submarines.
The submarines were assigned to training centers at bases such as Casco Bay, Maine, St. Thomas, Guantanamo Bay, Trinidad and Coco Solo, where they participated in anti-submarine exercises. For the exercises, one submarine was allocated to each base.
Submariner training at the naval base in Key West (Florida) began after the technical sonar school was transferred there from New London in December 1941. This move was dictated by the climatic and hydrological conditions of the New London area that were poor for experiments. Three submarines of the first experimental division were sent to Key West and assigned to the sonar school.
On June 1, 1941, the 12th Submarine Division, under the command of Captain 3rd Rank Gorrie, replaced the boats of the 1st Experimental Division. Renamed the 37th Submarine Division, it remained in Key West throughout the war.
With the intensification of the school's activities, the need to use squadron submarines to test various sound-detecting devices and apparatus has increased.
A modern submarine was also required for experiments that were carried out in Fort Lauderdale (Florida). In late 1943, the commander of the Atlantic Fleet ordered that every new submarine sailing from the East Coast into the Pacific Ocean be placed at the disposal of a sonar school for a short period of time.
Diving school
The New London Diving School was the main training center for submariners. Founded in December 1915, it quickly developed into one of the best technical schools. It trained not only all American submariners, but also submariners from a number of other countries.
The school has diesel and sonar laboratories, torpedo and periscope workshops, attack instruments, a rescue pool with a decopression chamber and various other facilities for training submariners. The main subjects of training are technical disciplines: electronics, radio, navigation, artillery, design and handling of torpedoes, strategy and tactics of underwater warfare. The school coped with the tasks posed by the war. True, there were many difficulties. There were not enough places for classes, textbooks, and new equipment.
When the R-class submarines used as training submarines at New London were sent to Key West with the sonar school, they were replaced by the O-class submarines, which had previously been mothballed after the First World War and then reintroduced into service. built in 1941 and 1942. The commander of the Atlantic Fleet's submarine forces insisted that the new submarines also be used for a time as training submarines at New London. But the war in the Pacific required that they be sent there first. It was only in December 1942 that the first new boats, Sperm Whale and Cuttlefish, were sent to New London.
When the United States entered World War II, the submarines of the Atlantic Fleet were consolidated into the 25th Task Force, with the headquarters of the Commander of Submarine Forces at New London.
This organizational structure remained until the end of the Second World War. On January 3, 1942, Rear Admiral Edwards was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of Admiral King, and Captain 2nd Rank Kate temporarily took command of the submarine forces, who was replaced in 1942 by Rear Admiral A. Dublin. The latter was replaced by Rear Admiral Charles Steyer at the end of 1944.
A submariner (officer or sailor) must be a highly qualified specialist, proactive and energetic. In addition, a submariner should not be an individualist. Consequently, training submariners for two fleets, the Pacific and the Atlantic, was the most important task of the commander of the submarine forces of the Atlantic Fleet.
Submarines of the Atlantic Fleet began their combat operations at a short distance from the coast. The boats of the 7th squadron searched for and destroyed submarines of the German fleet that threatened shipping off the coast of America. Each boat's combat voyage lasted an average of 12 days.
In January and February 1942, German submarines operated in American waters along the coast from Maine to Miami. That the situation was serious is indicated by the ease with which the Germans landed groups of saboteurs on Long Island, Cape May, and the coasts of the Carolinas and Florida. In February, the submarine patrol line extended from Bermuda to Nantucket Harbor.
The R-5 submarine encountered the enemy only once in the Bermuda area. On the evening of February 10, a German submarine was discovered on the surface. The commander of "R-5" ordered to prepare for an attack. Four torpedoes were fired at the enemy boat, but none of them hit the target. While the torpedo tubes were being reloaded on the R-5, the German boat disappeared.
The submarine R-1 discovered a German submarine in the same area at the end of April. The meeting took place 309 miles northeast of Bermuda. The commander of "R-1" decided to attack the enemy. One torpedo was fired. An explosion was heard. After this incident, the enemy submarine did not appear in the area. However, the fact of her sinking was still not confirmed.
R-class boats continued to operate in the area north of Bermuda, but did not encounter German boats until April 1942. In April, R-5 discovered a German boat, but failed to attack it. The submarine R-7 discovered and attacked a German submarine in May, firing four torpedoes, but none hit their target. On the night of April 14, the submarine Mackerel was surfaced from New London to Hampton Roads. At 11 p.m. 10 min. the observer noticed the trail of two torpedoes approaching the boat. The boat managed to evade, and the torpedoes passed by. Soon the enemy boat itself appeared. Two torpedoes were fired at it from the stern tubes. The German boat also dodged the torpedoes and soon completely disappeared from sight. The second time it was not possible to establish contact with her.
At 05 o'clock 03 min. the next morning the commander of the Makerel discovered the submarine. Identification documents were requested, but there was no response. A torpedo was fired at the silhouette of the boat, which was visible in the fog, but it missed the target.
Panama Canal Zone
The Panama Canal was vigilantly guarded during the First World War. In 1916, construction of a submarine base began in the canal zone in Coco Solo. In 1917 the base was ready to support a significant number of submarines. Guarding the canal, in addition, required the creation of another submarine base, since the base at Coco Solo was the only one in the eastern Caribbean. A commission was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to determine the site of a base in the Virgin Islands. The commission recommended building a base at St. Thomas, in Little Crum Bay. Construction of the new base began in the summer of 1939 and ended on March 1, 1941.
Three R-class submarines from the 32nd Boat Division arrived at the base at St. Thomas in May 1941, and in the fall several boats from the 7th Squadron, stationed at Coco Solo, arrived. After this, the boats changed periodically, moving from one base to another. In December 1941, submarines of the Atlantic Fleet were ready to defend the Panama Canal.
During the First World War, the Germans were never able to approach the canal and operate in its zone. But already at the very beginning of the Second World War they penetrated to the coast of Mosquito Bay. In addition, German boats operated in the Caribbean Sea.
Shortly after the United States entered World War II, submarine warfare operations around the Virgin Islands were carried out by boats based at St. Thomas.
The submarine "S-17" on March 4, 1942 discovered a German submarine in the Anegada Strait. "S-17" was underwater. The hydroacoustic reported the noise of the propellers of a ship nearby. Inspection of the surface through the periscope yielded nothing. In all likelihood, the source of the noise was the propellers of an enemy submarine. The commander of the “S-17” decided, guided by hydroacoustic instruments, to go for a ram, but this attempt failed: the German boat evaded, going into depth.
The next day at dawn, S-17, sailing submerged, again discovered a German submarine, which was out of torpedo range. The Germans probably noticed the boat and immediately began to dive. "S-17" also plunged under water. It was impossible to determine the position of the non-German boat. However, after some time, a torpedo was recorded passing the S-17. Apparently, the German boat maintained hydroacoustic contact with the S-17.
At this time, submarines from St. Thomas were at sea for the purpose of reconnaissance and surveillance of the French cruiser Joan of Arc, stationed in Guadeloupe, and the aircraft carrier Béarn, stationed on the island of Martinique. The French authorities in the West Indies, loyal to the Vichy government, were suspected of having links with the Germans, and therefore were required to observe the French ships and report their every movement. The submarines "S-12", "S-14" and "S-15" were always in the area of Martinique and Guadeloupe. After the US government and the Vichy government established diplomatic relations and the Vichy government promised that these ships would be stationed at the base, surveillance of the cruiser and aircraft carrier ceased.
In the southern Caribbean, submarines from the base at Coco Solo were sent to operate in the area of the San Andrews Islands, Old Providence Island and other islands north of Panama. Although there were reports of German submarines operating in this area, American boats did not encounter them during patrols. The patrols were stopped in September 1942 when intelligence reported that there were no Germans in the area.
Meanwhile, the commander of the 3rd Submarine Squadron based in Coco Solo faced two problems. The Panama Canal had two outlets, and after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Americans were forced to fight a war on two oceans. There was a threat of attack on the canal from the Pacific Ocean. Submarine forces were used to protect the entrance to the Panama Canal from the Pacific Ocean.
The patrol line, stretching nearly 800 miles from Balboa, covered an area where there was usually no shipping traffic, but the Japanese could choose it with the aim of launching a surprise attack on the Panama Canal from this direction. The boats went to sea for an average of 30 days, of which 22 were in position.
Protection of the canal began in December 1941 and continued until the end of 1942. During this time, not a single enemy ship was detected. However, the US submarine force lost its first boat in this area.
The victim was the S-26, which was sunk on January 24, 1942 in the Gulf of Panama by its own ship. The boats “S-26”, “S-21”, “S-29” and “S-44”, accompanied by the patrol vessel “RS-460”, set out to sea from Balboa to the combat area. 14 miles west of the San Jose lighthouse, the patrol ship signaled to the submarines that it was leaving and that they should then proceed to their destination on their own. But only the S-21 boat received the signal.
Soon after this, the RS-460 collided with the S-26 in the dark, ramming it into the starboard side of the torpedo compartment. A few seconds later the boat sank. Only two officers and one first class sailor were saved during the disaster.
Rescue operations began immediately, but the boat sank at a depth of 90 m and attempts to rescue the people were unsuccessful.
In the spring of 1942, construction began on the Balboa submarine base. Previously, submarines based in Coco Solo had to pass through it in order to conduct combat operations in the area of the entrance to the Panama Canal.
The creation of a base in Balboa would make it possible for submarines to have good support in the Pacific Ocean in the Panama Canal area and to organize a training center there for personnel of submarines operating in the Pacific Ocean.
The Balboa base was not completed until late 1943. There was no point in forcing its completion, since the situation was calm. At the end of 1942, submarine combat in this area ceased.
At both the eastern and western entrances to the Panama Canal, American submarines detected enemy boats less and less often. And in the Caribbean, American anti-submarine ships fought against German submarines. As a result, submarine patrols in the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean were discontinued at the end of 1942. By this time, air and surface anti-submarine forces were already quite well organized, and German submarines were gradually retreating from the American coast. Before the end of 1942, American submarines switched from defending coastal waters to active offensive operations.
The Atlantic Ocean was like a school for American submarines. From there came the first information about the poor quality of torpedo fuses. At the beginning of the war, the British abandoned the magnetic fuse, pointing out its shortcomings to American mine specialists. Some American submarine officers sailed on British boats in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea in 1940 and 1941. Returning to the States, they organized training based on the combat experience they had already gained. As a result, the qualifications of American submariners have improved. Thanks to their reports on British submarines, the submarines at Pearl Harbor and Manila were prepared for action at the outbreak of war in December 1941.
US nuclear submarines
While Russia has both nuclear and diesel submarines, the states have abandoned the diesel engine and currently only have nuclear submarines in their arsenal.
The first such submarine appeared in the United States in 1959, and was named “George Washington” in honor of the first president of America. Since then, states have built their submarines only with nuclear reactors. And on June 28, 1960, for the first time in the world, ballistic missiles were launched from under water. They were the main type of weapons of the submarine in the amount of 16 pieces. Also for self-defense, torpedo tubes with an ammunition capacity of 18 torpedoes were installed. Even though the submarine’s diving depth was 220 meters, Washington’s main trump card was that ballistic missiles could be launched no deeper than 25 meters, and the speed during this should not exceed 5 knots. When the maximum acceleration under/over water was 25/20 knots. The length and width were 116.3 and 9.9 meters.
On the last trip
The results of naval battles are usually summarized by lists of dead ships; analysis of personnel losses is somehow not practiced. But Nelson also said that
“It is easy to console ourselves with the loss of a ship, but the loss of the services of a brave officer would be a national loss.”
With fifteen destroyers sunk by submarines during the five-month hunt, ten of their commanders were killed. Although among them, the overwhelming majority did not participate in effective (for the Japanese side) battles, they all had extensive experience in escort operations. The destroyers they led systematically escorted either fleet forces or groups of transports. Alas, both the officers and their ships died as a result of attacks from under water. The conclusion is obvious: the escort service experience acquired by the commanders of Japanese destroyers did not become a factor that significantly increased the level of danger for enemy submariners when meeting them. However, the same applies to all other components of the Japanese anti-submarine warfare system - be it the tactical and technical characteristics of anti-submarine weapons and equipment or methods of their use.
Even more experienced destroyer officers, veterans of numerous operations and campaigns, were the division commanders who sank in April-September 1944: Akazawa Shizuo (commander of the 10th day; died on the Kazagumo), Tomura Kiyoshi (commander of the 6th day ; died on the "Inazuma"), Orita Tsuneo (commander of the 32nd day; died on the "Hayanami") and Aoki Kyuji (commander of the 32nd day; died on the "Tamanami").
Finally, when the destroyer Shimotsuki was sunk by a submarine in November 1944, in addition to the commander of the 41st division, the commander of the 31st escort squadron (originally an anti-submarine unit), Rear Admiral Edo Heitaro, died.
Reading that the Imperial Navy, in its plans, was preparing for a general battle, and destroyers were assigned an important role in it in conducting a massive torpedo attack, it is necessary to understand that the destroyers had to be led into this attack by experienced commanders. And further. Some sources contain the idea that the Japanese’s only chance in battle is near Fr. Samar consisted of attacking the enemy with all available destroyers. Perhaps that's fair. But it was the officers with the experience of Captain 1st Rank Orit who had to carry out such an attack. Alas, they died in minor skirmishes, before they lived to see the decisive battle.
One way or another, the 15 destroyers and 14 experienced commanders who died in the spring-summer of 1944 did not have a single destroyed enemy submarine in their entire military biography.
To summarize the question, we note that a total of 9 division commanders were killed on the destroyers of the Japanese fleet attacked by submarines and only two survived the death of the ship under the mentioned circumstances. The most indicative is the sequential death of two commanders of the 32nd day (with the Khayans and the Tamans), since this division was equipped exclusively with the latest ships of the Yugumo type, which were matched by their commanders - destroyer officers with extensive combat experience.
The most powerful submarine
Currently, the United States has submarines of the USS Virginia class; when this predator descended into the depths, it became clear that it has practically no equal. It sends cruise missiles at a distance of up to 1,500 km, and it is capable of “diving” to a depth of 250 meters. The US Navy has been developing in this direction for quite some time and has not changed the vector. Virginia is not just a new peak in the world's submarine fleet, it is a huge opportunity for the manufacturing country. It is full of sensors and modern solutions. For example, a submarine can detect and neutralize mines at a safe distance; thanks to its nuclear reactor, its voyage is limited to 30 years. When designing the submarine, engineers first created a 3D model and then turned it into reality, which was an unprecedented way to model an underwater vessel. The periscope also underwent technical improvements; it was removed and replaced with cameras and a multisensor mask. In a stormy current, the vessel can also remain motionless thanks to sensors, and its propeller, which is hidden in the pipe, allows it to move through the depths almost silently. To date, five submarines of the class have already been launched, and in the future it is planned to launch thirty more representatives of the class. At the moment, the Americans have 72 submarines, but the development benchmark has been set, and it is definitely going towards improving the Virginia class, as well as increasing the number of its representatives.