During the First World War, artillery played a key role on the battlefield. The hostilities lasted for four whole years, although many believed that they would be as fleeting as possible. First of all, this was due to the fact that Russia built the organization of its artillery on the principle of the transience of armed confrontation. Therefore, the war, as expected, was supposed to be of a maneuverable nature. Tactical mobility became one of the main qualities of artillery.
Target
The main purpose of artillery in the First World War was to defeat enemy personnel. This was especially effective since there were no serious fortified positions at that time. The core of the artillery operating in the field consisted of light cannons, the main ammunition for which was shrapnel. At that time, military tacticians believed that due to the high speed of the projectile it was possible to perform all the tasks assigned to artillery.
In this regard, the French cannon of the 1897 model stood out, which, in terms of its technical and tactical characteristics, was among the leaders on the battlefield. At the same time, in terms of its initial speed, it was significantly inferior to the Russian three-inch, but compensated for this due to the advantageous shells, which were spent more economically during the battle. Moreover, the gun had high stability, which led to a significant rate of fire.
In the Russian artillery in the First World War, the three-inch gun stood out, which was especially effective during flanking fire. With fire it could cover an area of up to 800 meters with a width of about 100 meters.
Many military experts noted that in the fight for destruction, Russian and French field guns had no equal.
List of artillery units[edit]
Allied powers[edit]
- Canon de 155 C, model 1917, Schneider
- Canon 155mm GPF
- Canon de 75, model 1897
- Canon de 155 L, model 1877/14 Schneider
- 90 mm De Bange gun
- 95 mm Lahitolle gun
- 14-inch railway howitzer BL
- 9.1-inch BL howitzer
- 14-inch howitzer BL
- 50 pounder BL gun
- 18-pounder Ordnance QF gun
- QF 5.2-inch gun Mk I–IV
- M1902 4-inch field gun
Central Powers[edit]
- 10.5 cm leFH 16
- 15 cm Kanone 16
- 15 cm sFH 13
- Parisian gun
- 21 cm Morser 16
- Big Bertha (howitzer)
- 42 cm Gamma Morser
- 38 cm Belagerungshaubitze M 16
- Skoda 305 mm model 1911
- 42 cm Haubitze M. 14/16
- 35 cm Marinekanone L / 45 M. 16
- 7.7 cm FK 96
- 7.7 cm FK 16
- 9 cm Feldkanone M 75/96
Equipment of the Russian corps
The field artillery of the First World War stood out among other armies for its powerful equipment. True, if before the war light guns were mainly used, then during the battles a shortage of heavy artillery began to be felt.
Basically, the organization of Russian artillery troops was a consequence of the underestimation of machine-gun and rifle fire by the enemy. The artillery was required primarily to support the infantry attack, and not to conduct independent artillery preparation.
Organization of German artillery
German artillery in the First World War was organized fundamentally differently. Here everything was based on an attempt to foresee the nature of the coming battle. The Germans were armed with corps and divisional artillery. Therefore, by 1914, when positional warfare began to be actively used, the Germans began to equip each division with howitzers and heavy guns.
This led to the fact that field maneuvering became the main means for achieving tactical success; moreover, the German army was superior in artillery power to many of its opponents. It was also important that the Germans took into account the increased initial velocity of the projectiles.
Modern heirs of the shrapnel shell
In the 1930s, Germany developed the Sprengmine 35 anti-personnel mine, which the Red Army soldiers called the “frog.” A few seconds after the fuse was triggered, the warhead of the mine was thrown to a height of about a meter. This was followed by detonation of the main charge, which led to the scattering of a huge number of steel balls. It was very difficult to hide from Sprengmine 35. After the war, mines of a similar design were adopted by the Soviet Union, the USA and Italy.
In the 70s and 80s, the USSR developed shrapnel shells with needle-shaped and arrow-shaped striking elements (“Kilka”, “Lepestok”). They were used very successfully in Afghanistan. Similar ammunition was in service with the American army. The operating principles of shrapnel are used in the warheads of some anti-aircraft missiles, for example, the S-75.
Situation during the war
Thus, during the First World War, artillery became the leading means of warfare for many powers. The main qualities that began to be demanded of field guns were mobility in conditions of maneuver warfare. This tendency began to determine the organization of battle, the quantitative ratio of troops, and the proportional ratio of heavy and light artillery.
So, at the very beginning of the war, the Russian troops had about three and a half guns per thousand bayonets, while the Germans had about 6.5. At the same time, Russia had almost 7 thousand light guns and only about 240 heavy guns. The Germans had 6.5 thousand light guns, but almost 2 thousand heavy guns.
These indicators clearly illustrate the views of military leaders on the use of artillery in the First World War. They can also give an impression of the resources with which each of the key powers entered into this confrontation. It seems obvious that it was German artillery in the First World War that better met the requirements of modern combat.
Next, we will look in as much detail as possible at the most striking examples of German and Russian artillery.
Bomb thrower
Russian artillery in the First World War was widely represented by bombers of the Aasen system. These were special rod mortars, which in 1915 were created in France by the famous designer Niels Aasen, when it became obvious that the available units of military equipment did not allow the Russian army to fight on an equal basis with their opponents.
Aasen himself had French citizenship and was Norwegian by origin. His bomb launcher was produced in Russia from 1915 to 1916 and was actively used by Russian artillery in the First World War.
The bomb thrower was very reliable; it had a steel barrel and was loaded from the treasury side using a separate type. The projectile itself was a cartridge case used for the Gra rifle, which was outdated by that time. A large number of these rifles were transferred by France to Russian troops. This mortar had a hinged bolt, and the carriage was of a frame type, standing on four supports. The lifting mechanism was firmly attached to the rear of the barrel. The total weight of the gun was about 25 kilograms.
With the help of a bomb launcher it was possible to fire directly, and it also had a grenade in its ammunition loaded with shrapnel.
At the same time, it had one, but very significant drawback, due to which shooting became unsafe for the crew itself. The whole point was that when the upper bolt was open, the firing pin was recessed to a very small depth. It was necessary to carefully ensure that the cartridge case was sent manually, and not using the bolt. This was especially important when shooting was carried out at an angle of about 30 degrees.
If these rules were not followed, then a premature shot occurred when the bolt was not fully closed.
New weapons
It quickly became clear that conventional guns sending projectiles along a flat trajectory are not particularly effective when it is necessary to launch a projectile in an arc into an adjacent trench, and the industry does not have time to adapt to new orders. And then the soldier’s ingenuity and cruel necessity began to work miracles. Sometimes very strange.
To begin with, the people remembered the heroic past, and, having pulled out mortars from the storerooms, which were no different in design from the guns of the 17th century, they began joyfully sending bombs to each other in a canopy.
But the matter did not end with mortars. Some geniuses invented something between a giant slingshot and the ballista of the ancient Romans, using this strange structure to send grenades 100-150 meters - often no more was required. They also remembered medieval weapons - soldiers en masse began to modify crossbows for throwing grenades. And yet they changed it.
Air gun
But then modern science came to the aid of the fighters, which created mortars that throw grenades using air pressure. There was a pressure gauge on the device that measured pressure; when the needle reached the desired point, the operator pulled the rope, and a pipe opened, from which a grenade flew out.
Then they began to use acetylene. It was pumped through the hose into the pipe, where it mixed with air and, when fired, ejected the projectile. Particularly brilliant inventors made twelve-barreled mortars that worked on the same principle.
At first, there weren’t enough grenades, so they were made from whatever they could find. For example, grenades are known that are assembled from a jar of preserved jam, an explosive, nuts as a striking element and a fuse cord. But the inventors went further, creating a saucer-shaped grenade, similar to a modern saw blade. Its teeth caught on the barbed wire and in an explosion destroyed a large piece of the barriers. The funny thing is that they even made special ballistas to launch such disks.
Grenade launchers are also known, mounted on rifle barrels - the bullet flew through the hole in the grenade, the powder gases pushed the grenade itself, launching it at the same one hundred to hundred fifty meters. Such rifles were sometimes used to assemble six-barreled grenade launching systems.
In addition to grenades, they also used mines. True, they did not always look like what we now perceive as a mine. For example, they often made a hole, placed a charge there, and covered it with stones so that the explosion would cause them to fly towards the enemy.
76 mm anti-aircraft gun
One of the most popular guns in the artillery of the Russian army in the First World War was the 76 mm anti-aircraft gun. For the first time in our country, it was produced for firing at air targets.
Its project was developed by military engineer Mikhail Rosenberg. It was assumed that it would be specifically used against airplanes, but in the end this proposal was rejected. It was believed that there was no need for special anti-aircraft artillery.
Only in 1913 the project was approved by the Main Rocket and Artillery Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The next year it was transferred to the Putilov plant. The gun turned out to be semi-automatic, by that time it was realized that special artillery for firing at air targets was necessary.
Since 1915, Russian artillery in the First World War began to use this weapon. For this purpose, a separate battery was equipped, armed with four guns, which were based on armored vehicles. They also stored spare charges.
During the war, these guns were sent to the front in 1915. In the very first battle they were able to repel the attack of 9 German aircraft, and two of them were shot down. These were the first aerial targets shot down by Russian artillery.
Some of the guns were mounted not on cars, but on railway cars; similar batteries began to form by 1917.
The weapon turned out to be so successful that it was also used during the Great Patriotic War.
Meat grinder in trenches - the realities of that time
Since the trench was dug in such a way that it could not be shot at a long distance, it often turned out that when they reached the enemy trenches, the soldiers were forced to fight short, almost hand-to-hand. And then everyone again remembered about the weapons of their ancestors.
The Germans, British and French used a variety of daggers and knives. The Italians, the famous Arditi, used their favorite blades and gained fame as terrible opponents - we talked about them in an article about the history of Italian knife fighting.
knife fight
Canadians often took short hatchets to war, which were so easy to smash the heads of Germans. Also, soldiers from all countries used wooden clubs or other man-made clubs with nails driven into the striking part.
There were also strange mutants: a mixture of a dagger and brass knuckles, thrust daggers and even revolvers with blades.
When local contingents arrived from the colonies, the Europeans were generally terrified, because black warriors rushed at them with huge national knives, and the Nepalese cut their enemies with terrible kukris.
But it happened that angry people simply fought hand-to-hand, and then all available means were used. There is a known picture in which a Canadian soldier buys a German with his helmet removed, as well as numerous written instructions with drawings, where soldiers were taught to gouge out the enemy’s eyes, strangle him and break his legs. It is also known that the soldiers were trained in boxing, Japanese jiu-jitsu and savata.
Fortress artillery
Fortress artillery was still actively used in the First World War, and after its end the need for such weapons finally came to naught. The reason was that the defensive role of fortresses faded into the background.
At the same time, Russia had a very extensive fortress artillery. By the beginning of the war, there were four artillery fortress regiments in service, which were united into brigades; there were also 52 separate fortress battalions, 15 companies and 5 so-called sortie batteries (in wartime conditions, their number increased to 16).
In total, during the First World War, the Russian army used about 40 artillery systems, although most of them were very outdated by that time.
After the end of the war, fortress artillery almost completely ceased to be used.
Snipers and machine guns with periscope
Of course, in the conditions of trench warfare, snipers achieved great success. Even then, the famous camouflage robes with a bunch of patches sewn on them were used - they can still be seen in films about snipers.
No one wanted to catch a bullet by leaning out of a trench, so periscopes were often used for observation. But even here the craftsmen figured out how to complete this invention - they began to display such a periscope with a rifle attached to it, from which they fired using a special device. But some went even further and used a machine gun in the same vein.
Naval artillery
A considerable part of the battles took place at sea. The naval artillery of the First World War played a decisive role in them.
For example, large-caliber ship guns were rightfully considered the main weapon at sea. Therefore, by the total number of heavy guns and the total weight of the fleet, it was possible to determine how strong the fleet of a particular country was.
By and large, all heavy weapons of that time could be divided into two types. These are English and German. The first category included guns developed by, and the second - produced by, which became famous for its steel during the Second World War.
English artillery guns had a barrel, which was covered with a casing on top. The German artillery of the First World War used special cylinders that were placed on top of each other in such a way that the outer row completely covered the internal joints and joints.
The German design was adopted by most countries, including Russia, since it was objectively considered more progressive. English guns lasted until the 20s of the 20th century, and after that they also switched to German technology.
These are the guns that were used on ships for naval battles. They were especially common during the dreadnought era, differing only in minor details, in particular the number of guns in the turret. For example, for the French battleship called Normandie, a special four-gun turret was developed, which had two pairs of guns at once.
Heavy artillery
As has already been noted, the heavy artillery of the First World War determined the outcome of more than one battle. It was characterized by the ability to fire over long distances, and was capable of effectively hitting the enemy from cover.
Before the First World War, heavy guns were almost always part of the fortress artillery, but field heavy artillery was just beginning to take shape at that time. Moreover, an urgent need for it was felt even during the Russo-Japanese War.
The First World War, almost from its very beginning, had a pronounced positional character. It became obvious that without heavy guns it would not be possible to carry out a single successful offensive by troops. After all, for this it was necessary to effectively destroy the enemy’s first line of defense, as well as to advance further, while remaining in reliable cover. Field heavy artillery became one of the main ones during the war, including siege functions.
In 1916-1917, on the initiative of Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich, who at that time held the post of inspector general of artillery, a reserve was formed for the High Command, called special-purpose heavy artillery. It consisted of six artillery brigades.
The formation of this unit took place in conditions of increased secrecy in Tsarskoye Selo. In total, during the war, more than five hundred similar batteries were created, which included more than two thousand guns.
FEATURES OF THE THEORY OF COMBAT USE OF ARTILLERY OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
SCIENCE AND MILITARY SECURITY No. 3/2009, pp. 58-64
FEATURES OF THE THEORY OF COMBAT USE OF ARTILLERY OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
UDC 355.43
Colonel
A.V. Lebedkin ,
Professor of the Department of State and Military Administration of the Faculty
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Military Academy of the Republic of Belarus,
Doctor of Military Sciences, Associate Professor
Colonel
S. N. Melnik ,
head of the department of operational art of the faculty
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Military Academy of the Republic of Belarus,
candidate of military sciences
As the experience of armed conflicts in recent years shows [1], artillery continues to be one of the main means of fire destruction of the enemy (OPE). During the First World War, the 90th anniversary of the end of which was celebrated in the fall of 2008, the artillery of the Russian army was the main means of attack and, through its actions, ensured the successful conduct of a number of operations. In this regard, it seems appropriate to consider the features of the combat use of artillery in the operations of the First World War and their influence on the existing theory of the combat use of the military branch.
After the defeat in the war with Japan, the Russian army was in a catastrophic state. In order to eliminate this situation, a military reform was launched in 1910, aimed at reorganizing the army. The main goal of the reforms was to increase the number of field troops, both peacetime and wartime. At the same time, great importance was attached to the development of artillery as the most important means of firepower in operations. Conducted in 1910-1912. the transformations were generally positive, but the reform was not completed primarily due to a lack of financial resources [2; 3].
In 1913, a set of measures was developed to carry out fundamental changes in the army, especially in the field of its technical equipment. These events were called the “Great Program to Strengthen the Army” with a completion date of the fall of 1917. Among the entire range of events, special attention was paid to artillery, which increased quantitatively by almost 130 thousand people and received a new organization (Fig. 1). As a result of the program, the division was supposed to have 54 light guns (instead of 12) and 12 light howitzers, and the corps - 156 guns (108 light guns, 24 light howitzers, 12 heavy field guns, 12 heavy field howitzers).
However, on August 1, 1914, the First World War began, and therefore the implementation of the “Great Program” was cancelled.
It should be noted that at the beginning of the war, Russian artillery was not inferior in many respects to the artillery of the armies of the leading states. However, there were a number of significant shortcomings, the main ones being
[2; 3;
4]:
lack of theoretical developments on the combat use of artillery in army and front-line operations, reserve artillery of the main command and army;
poor provision of troops with large-caliber artillery, which made it extremely difficult to organize counter-battery warfare, and modern means of control, reconnaissance and communications;
absence of artillery control bodies (headquarters) of divisions, corps, armies and fronts.
To eliminate the above shortcomings in the batteries, special teams are introduced to conduct artillery reconnaissance (AR) and organize communications, shooting with observation of the target and gaps from an airborne observation post (AP) - a balloon - is being developed, the foundations are laid and the first sound reconnaissance devices are tested.
Also, in the pre-war years, new guidance documents were developed that defined the procedure for the combat use of artillery, namely: Field Service Charter, Manual for the operation of field artillery in battle, Manual for preparing field artillery for firing, Rules of shooting and instructions for the use of a protractor, Information on shooting field artillery. These documents took into account the combat experience of Russian artillery, determined the need to increase the role of fire in modern warfare and reflected higher requirements
to
artillery in battle, for example
[2; 3; 4]:
noting that the main combat properties of artillery as a branch of the military are fire and mobility, it was emphasized that “... the main importance of artillery is to assist troops of other branches of the military in battle. All combat activities of artillery must be imbued with the desire to help others”;
the purpose of all types of artillery was clearly defined. Thus, “...light batteries are intended mainly for action against living targets; can act against targets of all kinds, except those that are heavily sheltered and especially strong...” “Mortar (howitzer) batteries are assigned to attack targets that are invulnerable to light batteries...”;
instructions were given on the tactical and fire assignment of artillery formations: “A division is a tactical artillery unit capable of independently solving combat missions. As a general rule, a division operates inseparably...", "A battery is a fire (rifle) unit capable of independent firing";
a requirement was put forward about the need to mass artillery and its fire in the most important areas: artillery can decisively influence the outcome of the battle if it “... from the very beginning is brought into battle in such forces as to achieve superiority in fire...”; in view of the importance of concentrating fire, “... light field artillery is included in combat areas, if possible, in divisions and nothing less than whole batteries...”, “... the best method for quickly suppressing the enemy is the concentration of fire from many artillery units, especially when combining frontal fire with flanking...”;
it was determined that artillery firing positions (OP) could be open, semi-closed and closed, however.
Rice. 1. Organization of Russian artillery in 1910
g.
[2;
3; 4] Implementing the theoretical provisions of the new guiding documents, Russian artillery in the battles and battles of the first operations of 1914 showed its superiority over the artillery of the Austro-Hungarian and German armies
[5; 6].
This was expressed in the ability to fire from closed OPs, which ensured successful counter-battery combat; the use of concentrated fire from divisions and even brigades; mandatory artillery preparation for attack in the offensive and artillery support in defense; the use of new AR means - sound measuring stations. The shortcomings that influenced the effective use of artillery include, first of all, poor material support and the incompetence of the senior combined arms and artillery command in managing subordinate artillery.
In the battles of 1915, the Russian army suffered a number of defeats in Galicia and East Prussia. However, the fighting revealed the increased role of artillery fire, both in the offensive and
in defense.
At the same time, a number of significant shortcomings in the combat use of artillery were identified, the main of which were
[5; 6; 7]:
insufficient supply of ammunition, which did not allow full artillery preparation for the attack;
an acute shortage of melee artillery (mortars, small-caliber guns);
insufficient effectiveness of the AR, especially when determining the coordinates of the OP of enemy firing batteries.
In 1916, to increase the effectiveness of the combat use of artillery, the positions of field artillery inspector general, artillery inspectors of fronts, armies and corps were introduced, who became the closest assistants to the respective commanders and commanders on the correct and full use of the combat capabilities of all types of artillery. Artillery inspectors of all levels were required to provide general guidance and supervision over the correct use of artillery in technical and tactical terms, combat training and artillery design, compliance of command personnel with their positions, serviceable condition of the equipment and timely provision of artillery with ammunition and other material resources. The most important event in the field of organizing artillery was the creation of an artillery reserve of the high command, called “Heavy artillery for special purposes” [5; 8]. However, these proposals were not fully implemented in subsequent operations.
In this regard, special mention should be made of the Naroch operation, which was carried out on the territory of Belarus in March 1916. This operation was a complete failure due to the incompetence of the high military command, which was unable to correctly assess the current situation and it was advisable to use superior forces and means.
One of the reasons for the failure of the Russian army was that neither at the beginning of the operation nor during the offensive was close cooperation achieved between combined arms and artillery commanders of all levels. Artillery missions were often determined without the participation of artillery officers, before the OP batteries were occupied, which led to a sharp decrease in the effectiveness of fire and the failure to hit a large number of targets. There were also major shortcomings in the organization of the AR, especially in revealing the defenses of German troops and determining the coordinates of targets in the depths of the defense. At the same time, a positive aspect in this operation was the creation of artillery groups, however, for a number of reasons (non-specific and insufficient validity of the artillery combat plan, random composition of artillery groups, their unfortunate location in the operational formation of troops, lack of communication with the attacking troops and artillery maneuver plan after them, etc.) the effectiveness of their combat use was generally low [3; 5; 6; 7].
Taking into account the unsuccessful operations of early 1916 and, above all, the experience of the Naroch operation, when developing plans for offensive operations, planning for the combat use of artillery was carried out on the basis of comprehensive and specific instructions from the commander-in-chief of the front forces.
These guidelines included the following recommendations
[5;
7]:
artillery control in each sector should be organized under the combined arms commander leading the attack, with the condition of personal observation of artillery fire and the actions of his troops;
to provide constant and timely support to advanced infantry units during an attack, subordinate part of the light batteries directly to the commanders of the first line infantry regiments;
The tasks of artillery during the attack period are to determine: the destruction of the enemy’s wire and other barriers, his defensive structures and fortifications of the first and second lines; when attacking the front line with infantry, transfer artillery fire to enemy reserves, his artillery and fortifications in depth; when infantry captures enemy positions, create a fire curtain from the front and flanks against counterattacks by enemy reserves, thereby providing the opportunity to gain a foothold in the occupied area and lead the next wave of infantry;
for an artillery attack, batteries should not be massed in one place, but located depending on certain specific tasks, which will allow massing the fire of most batteries at the most important points of the enemy position;
batteries should occupy OP after receiving certain tasks and depending on the conditions for their implementation.
Based on the tasks set by the commander-in-chief of the front forces, the armies and corps developed appropriate instructions that took into account the composition and grouping of their artillery, the formation and equipment of the enemy’s defense.
In the preparatory period of the operation, the artillery solved the following tasks
[3; 5; 6]:
fired at columns of troops, convoys, mortars and enemy air targets (airplanes, balloons, balloons);
carried out sighting of batteries, OP, machine gun nests and other targets from both the main and reserve OP. Moreover, the shooting was carried out in such a way as not to induce the enemy to change points or positions;
suppressed enemy fire weapons that were firing at our troops.
By the beginning of the operation, the artillery in the divisions’ offensive zone, as a rule, had:
an equipped OP for the division artillery chief, provided with telephone communication with the division commander, commanders of artillery groups and with the balloon;
equipped main, reserve, advanced, flanking and decoy OPs, as well as shelters for personnel on all batteries;
objects of enemy destruction detected by various types of AR with sufficient completeness and reliability (the number of trench lines and their outline, the location of communication passages; the number and nature of wire barriers; the position of OP, OP and the nature of their engineering equipment, areas of concentration of reserves and possible routes for their advance);
telephone communication between commanders of artillery groups, commanders of infantry regiments, battalions, companies and with neighbors;
prepared ammunition at the OP of batteries for artillery preparation, duplication of numbers in crews and commands for bringing ammunition;
organized uninterrupted communication, to ensure which officers were allocated with telephones and a supply of cable, who were to move along with the advancing infantry units;
special batteries assigned for direct fire support of the advancing infantry, which determined the paths of advancement;
reconnaissance and repaired rear roads for uninterrupted supply of ammunition.
Generalized data about the enemy became the basis for calculating the need for artillery and ammunition.
When calculating artillery preparation for attacks and offensive support, we proceeded from the available number of guns and
ammunition, while the duration of artillery preparation was determined by the time it took to solve an important task, which, as a rule, was taken to be the time of making passages in wire barriers.
High-quality preparation for the operation made it possible, for the first time in history, to break through the enemy’s heavily fortified defenses and create conditions for the development of an offensive, while artillery played a decisive role in ensuring the successful operations of combined arms formations.
By the beginning of 1917, Russian artillery had acquired vast experience in conducting combat operations in conditions of both maneuver warfare and
during positional actions of troops. Based on this experience, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Russian Army published the “Manual for the fight for fortified zones” in three parts, the second part of which discussed in detail the issues of the combat use of artillery in the offensive, and the third part - in defense.
The main provisions of this document on the combat use of artillery determined
[5;
6]:
the need for centralized control of artillery, its massing, responsibility of combined arms commanders for the most rational use of artillery in an operation (combat), close interaction with other branches of the military;
when breaking through positional defenses, artillery combat operations must be carried out in two periods - preliminary and combat;
the combined arms commander (commander) must determine the plan for breaking through the fortified zone with the obligatory participation of the chief of artillery, set specific and clear tasks for the artillery (in what areas, in what quantity and what size to make passages in the barriers, in what areas and how many trenches to destroy, where and which defensive structures to destroy;
the obligation to coordinate the actions of artillery and combined arms formations, artillery and combined arms chiefs (commanders);
When developing a plan for the combat use of artillery, it was necessary to take into account the following:
tasks for batteries, divisions and artillery groups should be simple, few in number and accurately indicated on the ground;
position the artillery in the outpost so that the batteries and divisions do not interfere with each other when firing and have their own areas for hitting the enemy;
all issues regarding the use of various types of projectiles, the distribution and transfer of fire must be resolved in advance and according to the periods of fire damage;
when the attack begins, the artillery should be positioned as close as possible to the enemy in order to fire to the entire depth of his defense and successfully fight his artillery;
as the offensive develops, provide for the reassignment of artillery to combined arms commanders, and, if necessary, create new artillery groups to solve newly emerging problems;
pay special attention to organizing close and stable communication;
Regarding the grouping of artillery, it was determined that most of it was assigned to the so-called “shock corps” (those that advance in the direction of the main attack), while within each corps the artillery was divided into groups. It was necessary, if possible, not to split up batteries and divisions;
engineering equipment of the OP, OP, locations of limbers and charging boxes of battery reserves was required to be carried out before the start of the battle;
to ensure the necessary calculations when planning the combat use of artillery, the “Manual” was accompanied by a “List of tasks solved by artillery in accordance with the properties of its various types and calibers (tables of the approximate consumption of shells per gun by day, the approximate consumption of shells for solving various fire tasks and etc.);
regarding artillery firing, the following was established:
firing efficiency should be achieved not by the number of shells consumed, but by methodical firing with its appropriate distribution among targets and careful monitoring of each shot, therefore, special attention was paid to the accuracy of zeroing and fire adjustment;
the importance of using airplanes and balloons for reconnaissance, surveillance and fire adjustment;
when fighting enemy artillery, set the goal of suppressing it, not destroying it;
widely use incendiary (to hit the enemy in depth) and chemical shells (as an additional means to suppress machine gun nests and casemates);
to combat artillery, divisions (batteries) are brought together into anti-battery groups, which are divided into subgroups;
the importance of defensive fire with a frontal range of 30 to 60 meters per gun;
widespread use of night shooting, indicating specific tasks to assigned units, the nature of the fire and the consumption of shells;
conducting a counter artillery strike (counter-preparation) to defeat enemy personnel preparing to attack near the front line.
In 1917 artillery actively participated in a number of front-line offensive operations in various directions. Thus, in the Mitau operation (January 5-11, 1917), special attention was paid to planning the combat use of artillery to break through the enemy’s positional defenses. Using the element of surprise, it was decided not to carry out artillery preparation for the attack, although the quantitative and qualitative composition of the artillery made it possible to carry it out. However, an attack without artillery preparation provided only tactical surprise. Support for the advancing infantry was provided only by individual units, and heavy artillery was used ineffectively. In general, the Mitau operation did not achieve its goal, including due to the limited artillery, without using the principle of massing [5; 8].
The theory and practice of the combat use of artillery were further developed in the summer offensive operations of 1917. According to the plan, the main blow was to be delivered by the Southwestern Front consisting of four armies (Special, 11th, 7th and 8th) in the general direction of Lvov, and the rest the fronts carried out auxiliary attacks.
In the direction of the main attack of the Southwestern Front, a double superiority in artillery was created over the enemy (1114 guns, including 337 heavy, versus 528, including 66 heavy, from the enemy), due to which the density of guns reached 47 guns at 1 km front.
The instructions for planning the combat use of artillery determined
[5; 6]: the need to concentrate as many guns as possible in the direction of the main attack; the mandatory creation of army heavy artillery groups to ensure a successful breakthrough of enemy defenses; expedient distribution of artillery weapons among artillery groups; the appointment of “the chief of the artillery attack on the main attack front and the formation of his headquarters, the division of artillery on the main attack front into groups and the order of their subordination”; the important role of artillery in the fight against enemy tanks and armored vehicles.
A positive aspect was that the content of the plan for the combat use of artillery of the strike group was specifically determined (grouping of artillery, distribution of reconnaissance and surveillance assets, a plan for firing artillery groups during the period of artillery preparation, a plan for artillery support for an infantry attack, fire patterns, a plan for moving artillery).
Also, for the first time, AR bodies were created in operational and tactical headquarters under the leadership of the chiefs of artillery reconnaissance of armies and corps.
In turn, the artillery group of the shock corps (Siberian, 34, 41 and 22 Army Corps) of the 7 Army, which delivered the main blow in the operation, was created for its intended purpose (Fig. 2).
Rice. 2. Artillery grouping of the shock corps of the 7th Army [3;
5;
6]
Artillery headquarters assigned enemy defense sectors to artillery departments and groups. Within departments and groups, fire missions were distributed by type and caliber of guns. The artillery battle formation was chosen in advance and well equipped in engineering terms, carefully camouflaged from enemy ground and air surveillance, and continuous reconnaissance of the enemy was carried out.
The headquarters of the shock corps planned the use of artillery in three periods:
artillery preparation for an attack lasting two days;
artillery support for infantry capturing all five lines of enemy trenches;
artillery support for infantry capture of the entire fortified enemy defense zone.
Based on the plan for the combat use of artillery, combat orders were given to each battery, which indicated: op. reassignment when accompanying infantry after artillery training, the procedure for communication with combined arms commanders, the procedure for providing ammunition. Also, all commanders, starting from company (battery) commanders, received graphic plans with targets and local objects marked on them, and a schedule with the order of fire by periods of artillery operations. Such careful preparation for the breakthrough bore fruit, and the artillery successfully completed all the tasks assigned to it, while the completion of the tasks by the artillery was confirmed by official certificates from company commanders and company soldier committees.
The command of the 8th Army, which carried out an auxiliary strike with the forces of the 12th and 16th Corps, had a slightly different approach to planning the combat use of artillery. According to the order of the artillery inspector of the 16th Army Corps, it was prescribed: to have an artillery group in each division operating in the direction of the main attack; corps heavy artillery group; an artillery group to combat enemy aircraft (Fig. 3).
Rice. 3. Artillery grouping of the 12th Army Corps [3; 5; 6]
Thus, all the artillery of the shock corps was distributed among three types of artillery groups:
infantry support groups (according to the number of first-echelon divisions) with the tasks of suppressing fire, destroying resistance nodes and trenches, making passages in barriers, escorting infantry during the attack and further advance;
a group to combat enemy artillery;
group to combat enemy aircraft.
Artillery control was centralized in the hands of the corps artillery inspector, as stated in the order of Fr.
Taking into account the assigned tasks and the construction of the enemy’s defense, the actions of the artillery of the 8th Army were planned for the following periods:
artillery training lasting 2.5 days;
artillery support for infantry attacks;
accompanying infantry advance with artillery fire.
In contrast to the Southwestern Front, in accordance with the decision made, taking into account the quantitative and qualitative composition of the artillery and based on the results of reconnaissance of the enemy defenses in the offensive operation of the Western Front, an artillery grouping of the following composition was created:
in the corps - large-caliber artillery groups, anti-artillery groups, divided into subgroups;
in divisions - light caliber artillery groups and destruction groups.
Table
The tasks of artillery in the offensive operation of the 8th Army [3; 5; 6]
All artillery groups were created on the principle of tactical and fire missions, but taking into account the fact that each division and each corps had its own groups. The tasks of the artillery in the offensive operation of the 8th Army were to conduct artillery preparation for two days and make passages in the obstacles by the end of the second day of artillery preparation (table).
The experience of the combat use of artillery in all considered offensive operations of the Russian army conducted in 1917 showed the enormous role of artillery in achieving success in combat operations.
Based on the above, the main conclusions regarding the combat use of domestic artillery during the First World War are:
the emergence and widespread use of new types of artillery (air, sound), advanced artillery observers, the creation of artillery bodies in operational and tactical headquarters under the leadership of the chiefs of artillery reconnaissance of armies and corps, which significantly increased its role as the main type of support for artillery combat operations;
the introduction of the post of field inspector general (chief) of artillery of the Russian army, as well as inspectors (chiefs) of artillery of fronts, armies and corps;
mandatory coordination of the actions of artillery and combined arms formations, subordination of specially designated light batteries to combined arms commanders to provide constant and timely support for the attack, mandatory resubordination as the offensive of artillery formations develops to combined arms commanders, creation, if necessary, of new artillery groups to solve newly emerging problems;
approval of the principles of centralized control of artillery, its massing, responsibility of combined arms commanders for the most rational use of artillery in an operation (combat), close interaction with other branches of the military;
introduction into the practice of planning the combat use of artillery of recommendations developed in accordance with the properties of various types of artillery and its calibers (tables of the approximate consumption of shells per gun by day, the approximate consumption of shells for solving various fire tasks, etc.);
development of artillery shooting issues:
achieving firing efficiency is ensured not by the number of shells expended, but by conducting methodical fire with its appropriate distribution among targets and careful monitoring of each shot;
when fighting enemy artillery, the goal was to suppress it, not destroy it;
the use of new forms and methods of fire destruction (concentrated fire of divisions and brigades, various types of barrage fires, a barrage of fire, artillery preparation of an attack and support in defense, counter artillery strike, widespread use of shooting at night, incendiary and chemical shells);
the final formation of the periodization of fire defeat of the enemy in the offensive: artillery preparation of the attack and artillery support of the advancing troops in depth;
establishing a uniform content of combat documents (plan for the combat use of artillery, combat orders, etc.);
mandatory creation of artillery groups, such as: infantry support groups (according to the number of first-echelon divisions), a group to combat enemy artillery, a group to combat enemy aviation.
The analysis of the experience of the combat use of artillery of the Russian army in the First World War made it possible to identify general trends in the development of the theory of the combat use of military branches, which have been confirmed in armed conflicts of recent decades [1; 5]. The main ones are: the increasing leading role of the united forces in the defeat of the enemy; a combination of centralized and decentralized artillery control at various moments of the battle; massing artillery not by increasing its number, but by maneuvering trajectories; improvement of forms and methods of artillery counterattack in the direction of increasing their effectiveness; development of periodization of fire damage by clarifying its essence and content; expansion of the list of EPP tasks in relation to tasks solved by troops in combat operations, etc.
LITERATURE
1. Report of the interdepartmental commission on the results of the combat use of missiles and aircraft in the North Caucasus in the period 1996-2000. - M., 2001.
2. History of domestic artillery. Volume. P. Artillery of the Russian army in the era of capitalism. Book 5. Artillery of the Russian army during the period of imperialism (90s of the XIX century - 1905). - Ln.: VI, 1970.-364 p.
3. History of domestic artillery. Tom P. Artillery of the Russian Army in the Age of Capitalism. Book 6. Russian artillery during the period of imperialism. First World War 1914-1918
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Ln.:VAA, 1979.-518 p.
4. Russian military-historical dictionary.
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M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002.-655 p.
5. Lebedkin A.V. Development of the theory of combat use of missile troops and artillery in the defensive operation of the United Group of Forces. Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Military Sciences. - M.: VA General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, 2008. - 418 p.
6. History of military art. Textbook in three volumes.
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vol. 1. - M.: VAF, 1961. - 396 p.
7. Lebedkin A.V. Theoretical foundations of the combat use of missiles and weapons in a defensive operation and trends in its development. Monograph. - M.: VA General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, 2007. - 126 p.
8. G. T. Khoroshilov, R. B. Braginsky, A. I. Matveev and others. Domestic artillery, 600 years.
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M.: Voenizdat, 1986.
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243 p.
