Characteristics of medium-range missiles, causes of the conflict in Europe and its outcome

The ending of the cult American film “The Terminator” makes a strong impression even today - a rising wind blows tumbleweeds along a deserted road, a Mexican boy warns Sarah Connor about an impending storm, and she quietly says in response: “I know...”. This ominous hint of an imminent nuclear war was especially acute for viewers in the year the film was released, since then, in 1984, the threat of a global apocalypse became even more real than in the turbulent times of Khrushchev and Kennedy. The main reason for this truly frightening escalation of the situation was the contradiction between the Soviet Union and the United States of America over the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe. More than three decades have passed since then, much has been forgotten, but in the near future the old threat may return in a new guise.

Background to the conflict

By the early seventies of the last century, the USSR was able to achieve approximately equality with the United States both in the number and power of nuclear warheads ready for use, and in the possibility of their delivery to the territory of a “potential enemy.” The only drawback of the Soviet “strategic triad” was its “one-sidedness” - the main emphasis was on intercontinental ballistic missiles, while the US military relied equally on the fleet, aviation and the same ICBMs. One way or another, the United States had to say goodbye to its former superiority in the field of nuclear weapons.

Under these conditions, the concept of “limited nuclear war,” developed by theorists from the Pentagon back in the late 50s, came to the fore. This doctrine assumed the achievement of victory in a relatively small conflict, during which “conventional” weapons would mainly be used.

“Early” plans for a nuclear attack against the USSR included the use of aviation and assumed complete victory, but already in the 60s they had to be revised.

The use of tactical nuclear warheads was permitted only in order to gain a decisive advantage or destroy large forces of the advancing enemy.

The main problem with this concept is maintaining “control of escalation.” In other words, the warring parties must somehow convince each other to abandon the use of more and more powerful weapons - otherwise the “limited” war will develop into a global one, and no one will be able to achieve victory in it.

From the very beginning, it was clear that Europe was primarily considered as the theater of “limited nuclear war.” It was in the “Old World” that the USSR had an undeniable advantage in the quantity and quality of “conventional” ground forces. Tank, motorized rifle and airborne troops concentrated in the territory of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and in the western part of the Soviet Union were able to crush NATO’s defensive lines in a matter of days and reach the entire length of the Atlantic coast.

This potential remained a US headache from the very beginning of the Cold War, and nuclear weapons were seen as the only means of “evening the odds” in Europe. It could be delivered to the target by aircraft based at airfields of NATO countries, as well as Pershing-1A (MGM-31A) short-range ballistic missiles deployed in West Germany.

NATO, of course, knew that Soviet troops had a well-developed air defense system. Its presence called into question the very possibility of using bombers to launch tactical nuclear strikes. At the same time, the number of Pershing-1As seemed insufficient (there were 180 in Europe). The NATO command was not satisfied with the flight range of these missiles, which was 740 kilometers.

Launch of the Pershing IA short-range missile.

Since 1973, work has been underway in the United States to create an improved version of the Pershing. The task was set to increase the missile's flight range by at least two times. At the same time, however, a significant problem arose - the classification of weapons changed. A range of 1,400 km turned the Pershing into a medium-range missile. This meant that its deployment in Europe would require a political decision, and for this, in turn, some compelling reason was needed. This occasion was the emergence of information that the USSR was adopting a new ground-based missile system RSD-10 “Pioneer”, better known in Western countries under its “NATO” designation SS-20 Saber.

The “official” initiator of the deployment of Pershing-II missiles in Western European countries was German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In 1977, he gave a speech that spoke of the need to build up nuclear forces in Europe in response to the emergence of new Soviet missiles. It was this speech that became the formal justification for NATO’s subsequent “dual decision” to deploy new Pershings and BGM-109G cruise missiles (a ground-based version of the now well-known Tomahawk) in Europe. The corresponding document was signed on December 12, 1979 in Brussels, during a joint meeting of the ministers of defense and foreign affairs of a number of states belonging to the North Atlantic military alliance. Thus began the last large-scale political crisis of the Cold War, which almost turned it into a “hot” one.

The battle for medium missiles: the military aspect of the INF problem for Russia and the USA

On October 19, 2022, the leading American publication The New York Times reported US President Donald Trump’s “in the coming weeks” to approve the decision to withdraw the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). The next day, President Trump himself personally confirmed his intentions regarding the INF Treaty. The US withdrawal from the INF Treaty seems inevitable.

The elimination of the INF Treaty has two important aspects: political and military. We have already written about the political context of the problem. Now - about the military.

The INF Treaty prohibits two types of missiles, designated in the name of the treaty as “medium” and “small”. These missiles - ballistic and cruise - were determined by the characteristics of their maximum flight range, i.e., the range of destruction of potential targets. “Medium range” was determined by the range from 1 thousand to 5.5 thousand km from the launch site. Small - from 500 to 1000 km. According to American terminology, this class of missile weapons is classified as “intermediate nuclear weapons” or “non-strategic”. If the maximum range exceeds 5.5 thousand km, then the missile is considered strategic. Currently, the United States and Russia maintain their strategic nuclear weapons on their national territories.

Under the 1987 agreement, the two contracting parties - the USSR and the USA - determined that each party would eliminate its intermediate- and shorter-range missiles and undertake not to have such weapons in the future. An additional condition is that ground-based missiles be eliminated. The ban did not apply to medium and small missiles on air and sea carriers.

According to the agreement, the USSR eliminated its medium missiles: R-12, R-14 and RSD-10 Pioneer; and short-range missiles: OTR-22 "Temp-S" and OTR-23 "Oka".(1)

The United States eliminated its medium-sized missiles: the Pershing-2 ballistic missile and the BGM-109G Tomahawk cruise missile. Small range - "Pershing-1A".

Characteristic feature. All Soviet medium missiles prohibited by the 1987 INF Treaty were, relatively speaking, “first-generation” and “prototypes” - the first working technical models taken into service, in the general development line, at the end of which strategic missiles with intercontinental range were created, i.e. The ability to hit the main enemy - the United States. It is for this reason that the medium Soviet missiles R-12, R-14, RSD-10 were not a pity to be eliminated under the 1987 INF Treaty. The first two were outdated, and the third, the RSD-10 Pioneer, was replaced by new generation strategic missiles.

Let me explain. The medium missiles R-12 and R-14, designed by Mikhail Yangel , were “intermediate” in range, but strategic in purpose and “destructive power”. So, for example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was the medium R-12 and R-14 missiles that were assigned a strategic mission - in the event of war, to hit targets on US territory with thermonuclear warheads from missile positions located in Cuba. Actually, the ready-made Soviet R-7A intercontinental-range strategic missiles in 1962 could be counted on one hand, there were so few of them. In addition, they were imperfect, requiring long preparation for launch, while remaining in unprotected open positions. The power of the warheads - one for each R-12 and R-14 - was within the more than “respectable” strategic format - 2.3 megatons. Yangel's "intermediate" R-12 and R-14 were in the same development line with the intercontinental R-16U of the same design bureau. With the adoption of this missile into service in 1963, the task of destroying US territory from the territory of the Soviet Union was finally resolved. The R-12 and R-14 immediately became obsolete.

Similarly, the RSD-10 Pioneer ballistic missile designed by Alexander Nadiradze , known in the West according to NATO classification as the SS-20, eliminated by the 1987 treaty, was the first in the line of Soviet third-generation strategic missiles. Its main advantages were that it was solid fuel and mobile when using a “mobile ground missile system”. Like its predecessors of the class of medium missiles eliminated under the INF Treaty - R-12 and R-14 - RSD-10, the Pioneer became the prototype for modern strategic ICBMs RS-12M Topol.

The RSD-10 Pioneer had a range of 4 thousand km, which made it possible to hit targets in most European countries, the Middle East and China from missile bases located on the territory of the Soviet Union. At its peak in 1984, the USSR had 419 missile systems deployed. Arithmetically, the total salvo of the deployed Pioneers was 188 megatons - colossal destructive energy. A typical Pioneer carried three multiple warheads, each weighing 150 kilotons. Such warhead power allows the Pioneer to be classified as a strategic class weapon. This was admitted. The Pioneer missile systems were deployed as part of units of the USSR Strategic Missile Forces.

Now about the “small” missiles eliminated by the 1987 INF Treaty. These include the Soviet mobile operational-tactical missile system of “front-line subordination” OTR-22 “Temp-S”. With a “short” range of 900 km, it carried a monoblock warhead with lethal strategic (and not at all operational-tactical) power - 0.5 megatons. "Temp-S" is not an operational-tactical, but a "conditionally strategic" missile. This strange feature of the Temp-S complex was determined by its specific targeting. It was intended to contain Maoist China. In 1967, the first OTR-22 missile division was sent to the Chita region, where, during the period of complications in relations between the USSR and the PRC, it demonstratively patrolled along the Soviet-Chinese border. However, the missile regiments rearmed with Temp-S were transferred from the Strategic Missile Forces to military districts - fronts in the event of war.

And finally, the OTR-24 Oka, liquidated under the contract. Unlike all other “liquidated” Soviet medium and small missiles, equipped exclusively with nuclear warheads in the “heavy” strategic megaton format, so characteristic of “city killers,” the Soviet mobile missile system “Oka” had pronounced operational and tactical characteristics. The complex was autonomous, mobile and maneuverable, easily camouflaged. The complex was intended to deliver precise missile strikes against small-sized and area targets - enemy missile systems, multiple launch rocket systems, long-range artillery, aviation at airfields, command posts and communications centers, the most important industrial infrastructure facilities, bases and arsenals. The missile had options for equipping it with conventional high-explosive fragmentation and cluster munitions and, as an option, with a nuclear warhead with a variable detonation power from 19 to 50 kilotons - i.e., an operational-tactical format. It is not difficult to notice that it was the Oka that became the prototype for the modern Iskander tactical missile system in service with the Russian ground forces, with the Iskander-K, Iskander-M, and Iskander-E variants.

The Iskander-M carries a quasi-ballistic missile. Iskander-K - R-500 cruise missile. The United States believes that the Novator 9M729 ground-based cruise missile tested on the Iskander-M launcher exceeded the range of 3 thousand km, which is a violation of the INF Treaty. To defeat the enemy, all Iskanders are equipped with a wide range of conventional warheads: fragmentation, high-explosive fragmentation, concrete-piercing, and various types of cluster warheads. Iskanders in any version: ballistic, quasi-ballistic and cruise can be a means of delivering tactical nuclear weapons with a yield of up to 50 kilotons.

Now about the American medium and small missiles eliminated under the treaty. “Intermediate”, according to the American definition, ballistic missiles “Pershing-2” were intended to deter Soviet medium-sized “Euromissiles” (in the sense of their targeting) RSD-10 “Pioneer”. Their high accuracy (CEP 30 meters) also allowed them to carry out quite strategic tasks - destroying control centers, headquarters and command posts, silo installations of Soviet ICBMs, etc. The highlight of the Pershing-2 was not only its short flight time to Moscow from West Germany (7 minutes), but also the ability to change the detonation power of its monoblock warhead - from 80 kilotons to 5 kilotons. At minimum detonation values, the Pershing 2 warheads acquired the properties of an operational-tactical weapon. The predecessor of the Pershing 2, the Pershing 1A, had a similar, but less pronounced tactical characteristic. With a range of 700 km, Pershing 1 carried a monoblock warhead with explosion power options of 60, 200 or 400 kilotons. The last two options are quite “strategic” in power and are not suitable for operational-tactical operations on the battlefield.

And finally, the BGM-109G Tomahawk cruise missile, prohibited by the INF Treaty. At a range of 2,500 km, it hit targets with a W84 nuclear warhead with detonation options ranging from 5 to 150 kilotons. The Tomahawk had such advantages as accuracy and secrecy from enemy air defenses, thanks to flight at extremely low altitudes. At the same time, the Tomahawk fully demonstrates the difference between the classes of cruise and ballistic missiles. If a ballistic missile flew to the target along a ballistic trajectory at a speed of several machs, then the Tomahawk cruise missile flew at a subsonic speed of up to 800 km per hour. This meant that the Pershing 2 could fly the distance from the Rhine to Moscow in 7 minutes, while the Tomahawk would take three hours.

However, it should be noted here that of the American medium weapons prohibited by the INF Treaty, it was the Tomahawks on permitted air and sea carriers that were developed in conventional non-nuclear equipment. In 2010, the Barack Obama eliminated the remaining Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles armed with a nuclear warhead. It was decided that "this system is redundant in the US nuclear arsenal." There are no nuclear-armed Tomahawks left in the US arsenal.

The Tomahawk cruise missile is highly technologically advanced and inexpensive to produce. A large number of “precision” Tomahawk cruise missiles deployed on air and sea platforms, albeit in a conventional version, are, in fact, the second strategic arsenal of the United States. Their simultaneous use in large quantities, as demonstrated by the experience of the wars in Yugoslavia and Iraq, can have a completely strategic result in achieving victory in the war. Until recently, it was the Tomahawks that were not so much a means of deterrence, but rather the most advanced military means of real modern technological warfare using conventional weapons. At the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries, the American Tomahawk cruise missile became a kind of Ultima ratio regum (The Last Argument of Kings). You can, of course, extol the dignity of the Russian air defense systems S-300, S-400, etc., as much as you like, but a simultaneous strike from several directions by several thousand Tomahawks in conventional non-nuclear equipment, no air defense system, even one equipped with the best air defense missiles, won't stand it. Each individual conventional Tomahawk has the capacity of a bomb (cluster bombs) of 300-400 kg, accurately hitting the target. When used in combat in one certain quantity, Tomahawks acquire operational-tactical quality, in another - even strategic, ensuring victory. "Tomahawk" is very technologically advanced in production. The cost of one Tomahawk missile in various modifications is approximately $1.5 million. At such prices, the production of 5 thousand Tomahawks will cost $7.5 billion - a ridiculous amount from the point of view of the modern American military budget. Now even civilian enterprises in Europe are involved in the production of components for American tomahawks. The advantages of the Tomahawk turned into its disadvantages when individual missiles that did not reach the target fell into the hands of a potential enemy. It seems that the Tomahawk has been studied and they have learned how to influence it with electronic warfare, directing it past the target. In addition, the Tomahawk is obsolete due to its subsonic speeds. After the liquidation of the INF Treaty, the Tomahawk line will be developed in the form of a new missile.

Let us further note that sea-based medium ballistic missiles turned out to be completely unnecessary for the United States, including for such a trivial reason. Recently, the United States discussed a project to deploy a medium-sized ballistic missile with a conventional warhead on a nuclear submarine as part of a hypersonic global strike program. Experts noted that a sea launch of such a missile would be indistinguishable to an interested observer from the launch of a Trident 2 strategic ballistic missile from a nuclear submarine (SLBM). Such a launch could inadvertently provoke a major nuclear war with an exchange of strategic weapons between the opponents.

The American medium-range missiles deployed in Europe in the 1980s were classified by the Americans as “non-strategic”, but they could hit central strategic targets in the Soviet Union. Therefore, thanks to their excellent tactical and technical characteristics, the land-based ballistic Pershing-2 and Tomahawk cruise missiles have acquired important military-political significance. As then-Secretary of State George Shultz : "If the West had not fielded the Pershing II and cruise missiles, the Soviets would have had no incentive to seriously negotiate nuclear arms reductions."

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So, we examined the types of weapons eliminated by the INF Treaty and determined that the class of medium missiles with combat nuclear units was insufficient in range and excessive in power. In the first part: in terms of range - these are “sub-strategic missiles”, in the other, in terms of the power of nuclear weapons - strategic ones. In part, in the Soviet case, this was due to the hasty development of prototypes of intercontinental missiles capable of hitting the United States. Therefore, in terms of “intermediateness,” Soviet medium missiles were intermediate models for the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In this regard, the RSD-10 “Pioneer” looks like an absolute monster. In relation to Europe, it was a strategic missile, dooming it to total destruction in the event of war.

With everything from a bow to a ballistic missile, long-range systems usually have obvious advantages. They can be deployed further from the lines of contact with the enemy and be less vulnerable to his weapons, as well as hit more distant targets. And what flies further can be used closer - at short distances. Therefore, a special medium-range strategic deterrent weapon against Europe is not at all necessary. It's redundant. Russia's existing strategic potential in its triad is quite sufficient to deter not only the United States, but also other potential adversaries, including in the European theater of military operations.

Having lost the class of land-based medium missiles under the INF Treaty, Russia could continue to hit targets in Europe by redirecting part of its strategic systems to it. Here the state of mind looks paradoxical. It seems that Europeans are quite happy with this psychological situation. Apparently, they en masse imagine that all Russian strategic systems with intercontinental range are aimed exclusively at the United States. Therefore, the experience of the INF Treaty definitely indicates that the Europeans have absolutely no tolerance for medium-range and strategic-power missiles. They rightly perceive medium-range weapons as aimed exclusively at them - the Europeans, even if some significant part of it is “addressed” by Russian military planners to Turkey and the countries of the Middle East, as well as China, Japan and South Korea.

If from a military point of view, medium ballistic missiles with strategic warheads are redundant for the European theater of operations, then from a political point of view, the lessons of the Euromissiles of 1970-1980 should teach us not to repeat the mistake. After withdrawing from the INF Treaty, Russia should not create strategic-yield ballistic missiles limited in range by non-strategic ranges. The specific targeting of such weapons always carries specific foreign policy harm. This should not be done in relation to China, remembering that the average range of modern Chinese ballistic missiles is evidence of their imperfection and the development of Chinese missile technology.

Another thing is that after the conclusion of the INF Treaty, we are seeing the development of this class in terms of operational-tactical missile weapons with conventional and tactical nuclear warheads. The best example is the Iskander OTRK, which officially has a shorter range than those prohibited under the INF Treaty. With such a range of up to 500 km, the Iskander will hit targets in Poland and the Baltic countries if it is launched from missile positions in Belarus or Kaliningrad. But Iskanders cannot hit targets in Central European countries, especially if the OTRKs are deployed further east in Russia.

At the same time, it is believed that the Iskander OTRK, in combination with Russian air defense systems and coastal anti-ship systems, creates for NATO troops what the US military defines as a “prohibited access zone” (Anti-Access/Area Denial, A2/AD). A2/AD means that NATO troops can remain and move in such an area only at the risk of “sustaining unacceptable harm.” In other words, “no-access zones” make it difficult or impossible for Americans to conduct air-land offensive operations (AirLand Battle). In 2011, AirLand Battle was renamed “Unified Land Operations.”

If we look at the situation from the point of view of Russian military operational art, then the improvement of a deep military operation, otherwise called a “strategic operation” after World War II, requires increasing its depth to the extreme possible limits. In our main direction, the “depth” will extend to the entire European theater of operations. During the battle, not only the first and second echelons of the enemy, his reserves, but also his very far rear will be affected to their last limit. In the situation of the European theater of military operations, such a depth is 2.5-4 thousand kilometers, i.e. exactly the same average range. The development of modern Russian OTRKs for the needs of this kind of “strategic operations” brings them into the range of medium missiles. The limitations of the INF Treaty have become an obstacle to the creation of operational-tactical missiles for this kind of strategic operations.

Another significant point. Russian nuclear doctrine allows for the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional war for the purpose of so-called de-escalation of the conflict. According to the 2010 doctrine, "Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies and in the event of aggression against it with conventional weapons that could threaten the very existence of the state" . Russia's adversary is faced with an alternative: either further escalation of the conflict or a truce. Modern Russian Iskander operational-tactical systems are very suitable for such a function. In the event of NATO's tactical success in a conventional war ("escalation"), the Iskander OTRK moves from striking the enemy with conventional ammunition to striking the enemy with tactical nuclear weapons, again and up to the point of causing unacceptable damage, entailing a stop to the continuation of the NATO operation, i.e. .before the so-called "de-escalation". The American strategy of “flexible response” also at one time provided for “controlled” escalation. In Europe, American non-strategic weapons were part of NATO's "flexible response" strategy during the Cold War.

In this regard, attention should be paid to the modern problem of tactical nuclear weapons and its connection with the problem of the INF Treaty. Tactical (non-strategic, by American definition) atomic weapons are intended for use by troops on the battlefield or theater of operations to achieve operational or tactical goals. The New START treaty, concluded in 2010, formally considers all nuclear weapons not covered by it as “non-strategic.” From the American point of view, the tactical nuclear weapons of their potential adversary have long not been a topic of extensive political debate or a reason for individual arms control negotiations, since they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. The United States currently has about 500 tactical nuclear weapons, of which about 200 in the form of B61 aerial bombs are deployed in Europe at six bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. The United States is pursuing a “full program” to extend the life of these atomic bombs.

In relation to modern Russia, estimates of the number of tactical nuclear weapons vary widely. By one estimate, Russia has nearly 2,000 non-strategic nuclear warheads intended for delivery by air, naval and other defensive forces. According to another option, Russia has about a thousand nuclear warheads for non-strategic nuclear weapons. Of this number, the ground forces have up to 210 warheads, the air defense has up to 166 warheads, the air force has 334 warheads, and the navy has 330 warheads.

The US Senate, in its resolution ratifying the 2010 New START, stated that the United States should seek to begin within one year “negotiations with the Russian Federation on an agreement to resolve the discrepancy between the non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United States, and for securing and reducing verifiable tactical nuclear weapons." Russia has shown little interest in such negotiations and has said it will not even begin the process until the United States removes its non-strategic nuclear weapons from bases in Europe. At the same time, political leaders of several NATO countries, including Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway, called on the United States to remove these weapons from Europe. They argued that it did not serve military purposes in Europe.

In 2014, the topic of tactical nuclear weapons was updated due to the possibility of a direct military clash between the Russian Federation and NATO in Ukraine. Then Moscow made threats to use nuclear weapons within the framework of the “escalation-de-escalation” concept. In this situation, it turned out that the United States had nothing to respond to such a threat at the tactical level. The available American free-fall atomic bombs did not seem particularly reliable in terms of their delivery to the target through the A2/AD zones. Meanwhile, the Americans need to tie up Russian tactical capabilities in a future hypothetical local war using conventional weapons. Thus, non-strategic nuclear weapons came to the fore in US military strategy in the same package as medium-sized missiles prohibited by the INF Treaty. The INF Treaty became a hindrance for them in this regard as well.

In 2016, the House of Representatives required the US President to submit a report to Congress "on any development, deployment or testing of a system by the Russian Federation that is determined by the Director of National Intelligence to be inconsistent with the INF Treaty."

At the beginning of 2022, US Senator Tom Cotton introduced a bill, the INF Treaty Preservation Act of 2022, which authorized the allocation of $500 million to the US defense department for the development of systems to counter ground-based missile systems in the INF range. In addition, the law specified that the United States must “establish a preparatory program” for the development of its own INF-class cruise missile. Congress included Cotton's proposal in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2022, which required the development of a new US land-launched cruise missile. The law required the Secretary of Defense to prepare a plan for the development of ground-launched cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers and to submit “a report on the cost, schedule, and feasibility of modifications to existing and planned missile systems ... for ground-launched cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers.”

The Trump Administration, in its Nuclear Posture Review released in February 2022, determined that the United States must acquire two new types of non-strategic nuclear weapons: a new sea-launched cruise missile and a new tactical warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.(2) Similar the projects were clearly within the limits of the INF Treaty.

And now, if the treaty is cancelled, then the prospects for the project proposed by Congress open up - to create a new ground-based cruise missile. Here are its expected parameters. The new cruise missile will fly faster than the modern Tomahawk at supersonic speeds. The missile will fly further than the Tomahawk. It will be capable of hitting moving targets. Similar to the Tomahawk, the new cruise missile will be equipped with a set of conventional ammunition + nuclear ammunition with a variable explosion yield. Ideally, the new land-based cruise missile could be deployed on sea and air platforms. In this case, it would replace outdated Tomahawks in the same launchers, which would not need to be redesigned. The new cruise missile should be as technologically advanced and cheap to manufacture as the Tomahawk.

Meanwhile, the upcoming US developments in the field of LVDM systems are already reviving fears among experts in Russia, a kind of new “Pershing-2 complex” - about the vulnerability of its government centers due to the flight time to a sudden missile attack from the territories of Eastern Europe to which it has advanced NATO. It can be assumed that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was guided by this reason when once again in the spring of this year he spoke out in favor of moving the capital of the Russian Federation beyond the Urals. This is to increase the flight time. In the United States, meanwhile, they predict that this kind of “concern” will give rise to a new interest among the Russian leadership in limiting or banning medium-range missiles.

True, we note here that it is very difficult for Americans to find an allied country in Europe or Asia that would easily agree to deploy new American medium-sized missiles with nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Americans could find the following solution here. New American ground-based medium missiles must be designed for conventional ammunition and belong to the class of operational-tactical weapons. However, these systems will also have to be equipped with a nuclear warhead as an option. Such tactical nuclear weapons could be stored in warehouses in the United States and delivered to the European or Asian theater of operations in the event of a military emergency or war.

So, let us emphasize: Russia is not threatened with a total nuclear war with total destruction, but with a local war using conventional weapons. So far, the United States does not have the resources for a war of this kind. There is no need to be particularly afraid here. With the INF Treaty abrogated, what we should fear is not a “get away your Pershings” situation, but rather the development of American INF-class operational-tactical missile systems to block the possibility of Russian escalation-de-escalation actions and to counter Russian systems that create A2/AD zones. In the near future, we should monitor the changes taking place in the United States in the field of military-technical development. Next, draw appropriate political and military conclusions.

(1) The Oka missile system had a declared range of 400 km, i.e. formally it was not subject to the INF Treaty. It is believed that the inclusion of Oka under the treaty ban was a kind of bonus for M.S. Gorbachev to his American and European “partners.” However, we note that when nuclear-equipped with a 9N63 warhead, the Oka complex had a maximum range of up to 500. Apparently, this circumstance determined the lower range limit for small missiles.

(2) American experts have already managed to “challenge” the design of a tactical warhead for SLBMs. First reason. If such a warhead is installed on the Trident-2 SLBM, it will take away part of the strategic potential limited by START-3. Wouldn’t it be easier to simply “borrow” from the British their warheads for the Tridents, which have a variable explosion power down to small tactical values? Second reason. The project is flawed due to the inability to distinguish the launch of a tactical SLBM from a strategic one, which could provoke a full-scale nuclear war due to an inadequate response of warning systems against a missile attack.

Dmitry Semushin

Combat capabilities of the RSD-10 Pioneer, Pershing-II and BGM-109G

It should be noted that medium-range missiles in the 70s of the last century were not at all some new type of weapon. At that time, the USSR still had P-12 and P-14 on combat duty (SS-4 and SS-5 according to NATO classification).

R-14 rocket at the launch position.

Their American counterparts PGM-19 Jupiter and PGM-17 Thor were withdrawn from service back in the 60s because they were bulky and inconvenient to maintain.

All of the missiles listed were launched from silos and were never considered as “quick reaction” tactical weapons. The main fundamental difference between the new Soviet RSD-10 Pioneer complex and all its predecessors was mobility - it was installed on a powerful tractor and could move at speeds of up to forty kilometers per hour. Previously, only installations with short-range missiles had this ability.

Special control commission (verification commission)

Issues of fulfilling obligations and agreeing on measures to increase the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty were considered at meetings of the Special Control Commission (SCC). By October 2003, 29 meetings had taken place in Geneva. Then, for 13 years, the commission was not convened (only in September 2014 were closed consultations held in Moscow on the implementation of the agreement). The 30th meeting took place in November 2016, the 31st in December 2017. Participants confirmed the need to strengthen the treaty.

Main tactical and technical characteristics of the RSD-10 “Pioneer” and the Pershing II medium-range missile

The RSD-10 Pioneer was transported in a transport and launch container loaded on a MAZ-547V special chassis, and the Pershing II was transported on a MAN M1001 tractor (another tractor, the M983 HEMTT, was used to transport missiles across the United States). It should be noted that the maximum range of 5,500 km was achieved by the Pioneer only when using a monoblock warhead. When installing multiple warheads with individual guidance, this parameter decreased (according to various sources) to 4583-5000 km.

RSD-10 "Pioneer".

The BGM-109G Gryphon was a completely different type of weapon. This is a long-range subsonic cruise missile, the flight of which is carried out at an extremely low altitude, skirting folds of the terrain, which allows it to avoid detection by air defense systems. Its tactical and technical characteristics are as follows:

Unlike the Tomahawk, that is, the naval version of the same BGM-109, the Griffin was a purely nuclear weapon; a “conventional” warhead was not provided for it. The launch was carried out from special mobile installations, each of which housed four missiles in a special container.

As a “response” to these weapons, the USSR developed KS-122 missiles, similar in their purpose and combat capabilities, which became the basis of the “Granat” and “Relief” complexes. Their creation ended in the mid-80s. Nowadays, the slightly improved KS-122 missile is better known as “Caliber”.

US claims and formal causes of the conflict

Helmut Schmidt's speech was hardly his own initiative. Considering the “limited sovereignty” of Germany that has survived to this day, it can be assumed that the United States used the Federal Chancellor as a mouthpiece to express its own claims, which were subsequently voiced directly by representatives of the Pentagon or NATO headquarters.

Mobile missile launcher BGM-109G Gryphon

The creation and deployment of the RSD-10 was called an attempt by the Soviet Union to dramatically change the balance of power in Europe in its favor. The Western media claimed that the appearance of the SS-20 was a direct preparation for subsequent aggression, or at least forcible blackmail of the “European democracies.” Accordingly, the deployment of new Pershings and Griffins was characterized as a forced defensive measure.

When performing a “mechanical” comparison of the performance characteristics of the Pershing II and the RSD-10 Pioneer, it may seem that the claims of the United States and NATO are largely justified. The Soviet missile is a much more powerful and long-range weapon than its American “rival”. The only problem here is that such comparisons are obviously speculative.

Before the advent of the Pioneer, the USSR already had missiles of comparable range. These were, in particular, the P-12 (SS-4) and P-14 (SS-5). The latter could fly a distance of up to 4,500 km, that is, slightly less than the SS-20. At the same time, the presence of the P-14 did not cause any particular concern for the United States.

According to the Soviet leadership, the deployment of the RSD-10 was a routine replacement of obsolete missiles with more modern ones. Of course, the capabilities of weapons increased, but not enough to speak of a sharp change in the balance of power. The Pioneer itself was a “truncated version” of the now little-known Temp-2S missile, which had an intercontinental flight range and was destroyed after the signing of the SALT-2 treaty.

The new missiles were supposed to be used in the event of a global war. With their help, it was possible to destroy enemy military installations throughout the “Old World,” while intercontinental missiles would strike American territory.

Warhead of the RSD-10 missile.

In addition, it was not difficult to reorient the Pioneer towards China, which in the 70s was considered a potential military adversary of the USSR in Asia and the Far East.

By announcing a change in the balance of power in Europe, American politicians actually attributed to the Soviet Union adherence to the alien doctrine of “limited nuclear war.” In this interpretation, the RSD-10 was regarded as a means of delivering the first strike, after which Soviet tanks would burst into Western Europe. Trying to prove that the Pioneer is a purely offensive weapon, NATO representatives, in particular, pointed out that the old R-14 missiles could be destroyed by a “preemptive defensive strike” at their positions, but the RSD-10 could not, since it mobile and his exact location is unknown.

The hypocrisy of such argumentation is admirable. The first nuclear strike by NATO is “defensive.” And the Soviet response is clear aggression. It is clear that with this approach, even a mobile air defense system can be called an offensive weapon.

Suspension of the INF Treaty by Russia

On February 1, 2022, US President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced that Washington would suspend implementation of its obligations under the INF Treaty on February 2, and six months later (August 2) would cease to be a party to it unless Russia takes action to return to compliance its provisions (the note was submitted to the Russian Embassy on February 2).

On February 2, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the suspension of participation in the treaty. At the same time, he instructed not to initiate further negotiations with Washington on this issue. The note from the Russian Foreign Ministry was transferred to the US Embassy on February 4.

On March 4, 2022, Vladimir Putin signed a decree suspending Russia’s implementation of this document. On March 7, the Russian Foreign Ministry sent an official notification to the parties to the Treaty—the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine—about the suspension of the implementation of this document. On May 30, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted to the State Duma a draft law on the suspension of the Treaty. On June 18, it was approved by the State Duma, and on June 26 by the Federation Council.

On July 3, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on Russia’s suspension of the Treaty. The law specifies that the decision on Russia’s resumption of the Treaty will be made by the head of state. The law came into force on the same day.

First attempts to resolve the conflict

The preliminary stage of negotiations, the purpose of which was to resolve the dispute over the Pershings and the Pioneers, began in the fall of 1980. The venue was Geneva. The deployment of Pershings and Griffins had not yet begun at that moment. Moreover, representatives of the USSR immediately outlined a “red line”, stating that as soon as NATO began deploying its new missiles, all negotiations would immediately cease.

In November 1981, the new US President Ronald Reagan came up with a proposal that the press called the “zero option.” This initiative provided for NATO to abandon the deployment of Pershings and Griffons in response to the complete elimination of both new and old Soviet missiles capable of covering a distance of 500 to five thousand kilometers.

US President Ronald Reagan during the inauguration ceremony.

This initiative, as expected, was well received by the Western press. The American president's proposal was called evidence of the United States' love of peace. But Reagan knew that such an approach was unacceptable for the Soviet side, since if it were adopted, NATO would still have air- and sea-launched cruise missiles at its disposal. As a result, the United States received a huge advantage in both the event of a “limited” and global nuclear war.

The next two years of negotiations did not bring any tangible results. Then. The first batch of Pershing II missiles arrived in West Germany. In this regard, the Soviet delegation, as promised, interrupted the negotiations and returned to their homeland.

Basic provisions

The INF Treaty became the first document in history to eliminate an entire class of weapons. Its participants pledged to destroy all medium-range (from 1000 to 5500 km) and short-range (from 500 to 1000 km) ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles. The liquidation period for RMD is 1.5 years, RSD is three years.

In addition, the parties agreed not to produce or test new INF missiles (however, the agreement does not prohibit research work that does not lead to the production and flight testing of prohibited systems). In order to monitor compliance with the provisions of the agreement, each party was given the right to conduct inspections. Sea- and air-launched cruise missiles falling within the range of 500 to 5,500 km were left outside the scope of this document.

Period of maximum escalation

Deployment of the Pershing II and BGM-109G Gryphon cruise missiles was expected to take about two years. That is why some Western military experts said that a global nuclear war would begin in 1985. There were also alternative points of view - it was assumed, for example, that the USSR would not wait for new missiles to be brought into combat readiness and would strike first.

Such gloomy forecasts may seem strange today - after all, the nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers began long before the 80s. But there were indeed objective reasons for serious concern. The main one was the possibility of delivering a so-called “decapitation strike” on the USSR, which appeared immediately after the completion of the deployment of new weapons.

The expected scenario for the start of the war provided for a salvo launch of Griffins aimed at command centers, military district headquarters, as well as the most important government and administrative facilities.

Launch of the BGM-109G cruise missile.

Since detecting cruise missiles was a difficult task in those years, they could literally “sneak up” on their targets. The Pershings were supposed to launch at a time when the Griffins were already close to their targets.

The minimum flight time of American medium-range missiles did not leave the Soviet military leadership the opportunity to decide on a retaliatory strike. The instant destruction of command and control centers would paralyze the army. In addition, the “Griffins” were capable of flying directly to Moscow and completely destroying the political and military leadership of the USSR.

The fact that the NATO command was tempted to take advantage of this opportunity was well understood in the Soviet Union. Therefore, even before the start of negotiations in Geneva, the GRU and the First Main Directorate of the KGB carried out a joint large-scale operation in the United States and other Western countries, the purpose of which was to search for any signs of preparation for a nuclear war.

It should be noted that in the Western press of those years it was repeatedly stated that the only reliable means of preventing the “decapitation” of the Soviet Union was to launch a first strike on its part. This possibility additionally pushed the NATO command to “preventive defensive measures,” that is, to its own attack. The political conflict, therefore, could turn into a military conflict at any moment.

For several years, Europe, the USSR, and humanity as a whole literally lived with a loaded pistol to their temple, and several times the shot was not fired only by pure chance - false alarms of missile attack warning systems occurred with frightening regularity.

American Lance missile on a mobile launcher.

An additional factor that contributed to the aggravation of the situation was the emergence of new types of operational-tactical missiles - the American Lance and the Soviet Oka (OTR-23), as well as the US attempt to create a space-based defense system against ballistic missiles.

Signing of the Washington Treaty

Negotiations on the reduction or complete destruction of missiles with a range of 500-5500 km were resumed in 1985 after the well-known M.S. came to power. Gorbachev. This “progressive leader” agreed to a discussion about the problem of stationing Pershings in Europe, in isolation from disagreements over space weapons systems. However, at first Gorbachev’s efforts were not crowned with success - his first meeting with Reagan did not lead to a compromise.

Soon Gorbachev made new concessions. In essence, he agreed to the “zero option” once proposed by Reagan. But it was not possible to conclude an agreement this time either. The American side referred to the objections of Japan and China - the reduced RSD-10 missiles were supposed to be moved beyond the Urals, which meant that all of Asia and the Far East would fall within their coverage area.

In the fall of 1987, discussions continued. Gorbachev’s comrade-in-arms, E.A., who took part in them. Shevardnadze agreed to the use of a new unified classification for missiles with a range of 500 to 5000 km. As a result, in December of the same year, an agreement was signed in the US capital providing for the destruction of the following types of weapons:

1. RSD-10 "Pioneer" (SS-20).
2. P-12 and P-14 (in fact, they were already withdrawn from service).
3. KS-122 (in the RK-55 “Relief” version).
4. MGM-52 Lance and Lance II (short-range missiles with a neutron warhead).
5. BGM-109G Gryphon.
6. MGM-31C Pershing II.

The Pershing IA and IB missiles were also covered by the agreement, but neither one nor the other was in service with the United States by the time the agreement was signed.

Soviet complex OTR-23 "Oka".

The USSR, in addition, agreed to destroy the OTR-23 Oka complexes, although its range was only 400 km, while the ban included missiles capable of flying at a distance of 500 to 5,500 km.

What did the INF Treaty establish?

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Venezuela will purchase weapons from Russia According to the agreement, the Soviet ballistic missile launchers "Pioneer" (SS-20), R-12 (SS-4), R-14 (SS-5) and CRNB RK-55 (S-X-4) were subject to liquidation ), as well as shorter range OTR-22 (SS-12) and OTR-23 (SS-23); The United States was supposed to eliminate the Pershing-2 ballistic missiles, the BGM-109G (Tomahawk) GLCM, as well as the Pershing-1A short-range missiles. The liquidation period for the RSD was set at 3 years, the RMD at 1.5 years, the liquidation was carried out in two stages (the first stage took 29 months). Methods of destroying missiles - by detonation or by burning stages; in the first 6 months after the treaty entered into force, up to 100 RSDs were allowed to be destroyed by launch.

Refusal of the agreement on the liquidation of the INF Treaty

The signing of the Washington Treaty from the very beginning was assessed ambiguously both in the USA and in the USSR. Today we often hear allegations that Gorbachev went too far and actually betrayed national interests. Indeed, during the implementation of the terms of the treaty, 1,846 Soviet missiles were destroyed, while the Americans eliminated only 846. At the same time, they retained many sea-based Tomahawks.

In addition, the agreement did not affect any third countries - only the USSR and the USA. As a result, today there are no medium-range missiles in Russia and the United States, but China and Iran have quite a lot of them. In the “zero” years, a new threat arose - the Americans placed anti-missile launchers in European countries, which, if necessary, could easily be adapted for the use of Tomahawks.

The possibility of ending the INF Treaty was discussed at various times by Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Baluevsky, Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Federation Solovtsov, as well as Sergei Ivanov, who mentioned this issue both as Minister of Defense and as head of the presidential administration. In all these cases, the main reason was cited as the US actions to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

In 2014, American President Barack Obama officially accused Russia of non-compliance with the terms of the Washington Treaty. According to the US leader, the 9M729 cruise missile developed for the Iskander complex has a flight range exceeding the maximum permissible value of 500 km.

Loading the 9M729 missile (in a transport container) onto the launcher.

These accusations, supported by the American press, were repeated after Donald Trump came to power.

In November 2022, when the US Congress had already approved the allocation of funds for the development of new medium-range missiles, Russia made counter-accusations. In particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the deployment of MK41 launchers in Europe a flagrant violation of the Washington Treaty.

On December 4, 2022, the United States demanded that Russia remove the 9M729 missile from service within sixty days, threatening otherwise to withdraw from the INF agreement. The Russian Ministry of Defense tried to convince its “partners” by holding a special briefing, during which the parameters of this missile were revealed, but neither the United States nor its allies ignored this event, calling it an attempt to deceive the international community. No evidence has yet been provided to support the American claims.

As a result, in August 2022, both sides announced their withdrawal from the treaty, and Vladimir Putin promised to ensure that if the Americans deploy new medium-range missiles in Europe, the flight time of Russian missiles to Washington will be reduced to 10-12 minutes.

It is still difficult to say whether this new aggravation will reach the same dangerous point as it did in the early 80s of the last century. Currently, no new medium-range missiles have yet been deployed in Europe. Some experts believe that the United States intends to use these weapons against China, not Russia. And yet, in general, the situation is gradually becoming more alarming, and the anti-Russian campaign in the Western media is becoming more and more unbridled and brazen.

Skeletons in the closet

What distinguishes the INF Treaty from the group of regimes on strategic offensive weapons is the general scandalousness and constant mutual claims of the participants.

NATO decided to “put pressure on Russia” on the INF Treaty

Russia's claims against the United States boil down to two points. The first arose in the late 1990s and was associated with the development of “target missiles” simulating medium-range missiles for testing missile defense systems (Hera, 1100-1200 km; MRT-1, 1100 km; LRALT, 2000 km). Samples were produced on the basis of the stages of the Minuteman II intercontinental missile. At the same time, say, the same Hera carried a guidance system from the Pershing II missile.

The second claim appeared several years ago, and is made against the ground-based fire weapons of the European component of the American global missile defense system - the so-called Aegis Ashore. They use the same Mk.41 launchers as the Navy. But the Navy also launches Tomahawk cruise missiles from them. Thus, Aegis Ahore facilities (one has already been put into operation in Romania, another will be put on duty in northern Poland in 2022) are considered by Moscow as ground-based cruise missile launchers deployed near the Russian borders.

The United States also had several questions for Russia. At first, for example, doubts were raised by the RS-26 Rubezh missile system, which experts consider to be something like a “medium-range accelerator”: a missile intended for use in the prohibited INF range, but formally having a longer maximum range. The Rubezh range demonstrated in tests was 5,800 km, which makes it possible to legally remove the missile from the INF regime.

But the main complaint is the 9M729 cruise missile, about which little is known reliably. The Americans claim that Russia has tested and deployed a number of enlarged launchers for the Iskander-M missile system, allowing the use of extended-range cruise missiles (compared to the standard 9M728, which flies at a contractual range of 500 km). In their opinion, this is, in fact, a ground-based version of the 3M14 missile from the Kalibr complex, that is, Russia is trying to restore the weapons line that was stopped at Relief.

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Combat launches of Iskander-M OTRK cruise missiles

Photo: TASS/press services of the Eastern Military District for the Pacific Fleet

Russia responds by stating that the 9M729 really exists, but is not violating any treaties.

Author of the quote

“The characteristics of the 9M729 fully comply with the Treaty,” Mikhail Ulyanov, head of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control at the Russian Foreign Ministry, said a week ago.

General Vladimir Dvorkin, former head of the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, and now one of the leading experts at IMEMO RAS, noted to this that the 11th paragraph of the 7th article of the treaty allows the testing of sea- or air-based cruise missiles from ground-based installations that are intended only for these tests and which differ from launchers for ground launch missiles.

Author of the quote

“It can be assumed that Americans interpret signs of distinction differently than we do,” he emphasized.