The commander of the heavy machine gun crew of the 413th Infantry Regiment, Sergeant A.Ya. Kostroma May 17, 2016 Added by Evgeniy No comments Commander of the heavy machine gun crew of the 413th Infantry Regiment

MACHINE GUNS IN THE BATTLES OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

MACHINE GUNS IN THE BATTLES OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

The share of heavy machine guns in infantry armament began to grow already in 1942, which naturally coincides with the increase in their production. If we take the number of weapons in the Red Army on January 1, 1942 as 100%, then the increase in individual and group small arms will be:

- the number of rifles and submachine guns - up to 180% on January 1, 1943 and up to 280% on January 1, 1944,

- number of machine guns - 210% on January 1, 1943 and 450% on January 1, 1944.

The number of machine guns in the main tactical unit - the rifle company - more than doubled during the war.

FIRE CAPABILITIES OF THE RIFLE COMPANY OF THE RED ARMY[7]

The decrease in the share of machine guns (especially light ones) by the end of the war is associated with an increase in the number of submachine guns and mortars.

By the end of the war, the rifle regiment had 54 heavy and 108 light machine guns for 2,398 people (for comparison: the German infantry regiment had 24 heavy and 107 light machine guns, however, for 2,000 people).

Changes in personnel and the capabilities of rifle, machine gun and mortar fire of an infantry regiment during the war can be judged from the following table.

CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF SMALL ARMS BY STATE OF THE RKKA RIFLE DIVISION IN 1941–1945

From these figures you can see the change in the saturation of automatic weapons and the fire capabilities of the Red Army rifle division:

COMPARISON OF SATURATION OF DIVISIONS WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS (ACCORDING TO STATE)[8]

CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF SMALL ARMS BY STATE OF A SEPARATE RIFLE BRIGADE OF THE RKKA IN 1941–1942

Let us also remember the automatic weapons of other Soviet infantry formations. For example, a ski brigade of 3,000 people, according to the GKO Decree of August 28, 1942, had, in addition to other weapons, 948 submachine guns, 55 light, 18 heavy machine guns and 3 large-caliber (in the air defense platoon) machine guns. The infantry was also part of the formations of armored and mechanized forces. Thus, since 1942, separate mechanized brigades and mechanized brigades of mechanized corps were formed. By the end of the war, in addition to the tank regiment, the mechanized brigade included a company of machine gunners and a motorized rifle battalion, which included three rifle battalions, one machine gun (9 heavy machine guns), one anti-tank company, an anti-tank destroyer battery and a battery of 82-mm mortars. The tank brigades formed from August 1941 also included a motorized rifle (or motorized rifle and machine gun) battalion.

PRESENCE OF MACHINE GUNS IN THE TROOPS

Large-caliber machine guns, as already indicated, were used in the air defense of not only military units and formations, but also in the country's air defense system, in the air defense of naval bases, etc. Accordingly, the presence of machine guns directly in the active army was less than the indicated figures. Thus, on January 1, 1942, there were 720 heavy machine guns in the active army, and on January 1, 1944 - 8442.

The trend of increasing the range of small arms, which existed before the war and was associated with the desire to maximally “pin down the enemy’s battle formations” with fire of all types to the full depth, was replaced by the opposite trend - a reduction in the firing range and an increase in the density of fire at short ranges. If in 1942 the density of rifle and machine-gun fire in the defense was 3–5 bullets per linear meter of front per minute, then during the Battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 it reached 13–14 bullets (it is worth, of course, taking into account the pre-prepared positional defense of the Soviet troops). The average density of rifle and machine gun fire in the defense increased from 1.2–1.6 bullets per minute per 1 linear meter in the first period of the war to 9–12 in the third. However, the depth of continuous small arms fire decreased from 400 to 200 m, since submachine guns made the main contribution to it.

Maxim's crew covers the unit's crossing of a small river

Already in the first period of the war, the decline in the production of self-loading rifles and the small effective firing range of submachine guns increased the importance of machine guns in fire combat at medium (up to 1000 m) and long (up to 2000 m) ranges. Sometimes they tried to compensate for the lack of artillery with the fire of heavy machine guns. Thus, the chief of staff of the 29th Army, Major General Sharapov, indicated in early January 1942: “To the commander of the 243rd Infantry Division: a) Create 4 batteries from heavy machine guns: 2 of them with 7 machine guns each and 2 others with 5 machine guns each. Use the indicated batteries to fire over the heads of friendly troops, in the gaps and on the flanks at a distance of actual machine-gun fire with the task of continuously escorting the advancing infantry, influencing both the enemy’s manpower and, especially, firing points that interfere with the movement of the infantry... To the commander 183- 1st SD: a) Create two machine gun batteries of 3–4 machine guns each with the same tasks.” True, now the “machine gun batteries” no longer fired at ranges of up to 2.5 or 4 km.

The experience of the first period of the Great Patriotic War forced, on the one hand, to combine the fire of all types of weapons with their close interaction, and on the other, to reconsider the range of use of small arms downward. Since the main task of the infantry was recognized as close combat, its weapons must first of all be adapted to the needs of close combat. The increase in the number of mortars and artillery support guns, the widespread use of tanks and attack aircraft freed the infantry from the need to fire from small arms at ranges of more than 1 km, especially since at such ranges this fire was of little effect and only led to a large consumption of ammunition. The range of fire of heavy machine guns decreased especially sharply. The 1942 “Combat Manual of the Infantry” established that “the machine gun squad conducts effective fire up to 1000 m; but it is better to conduct sudden fire from a distance of 600 m and closer,” from light machine guns from the same range of 800 m, but also recommended sudden fire from 600–650 m (“close” ranges) as the most effective. “The machine gun squad fires from camouflaged open positions... Long-term machine gun fire from one position is unacceptable.” Light machine guns fired at planes and paratroopers at ranges of up to 500 m, mounted machine guns - up to 1000 m with a special anti-aircraft sight and up to 500 m with a conventional sight. Let’s compare: before the war, the firing range of light machine guns was set at 800–1200 m, for heavy machine guns – up to 3000–5000 m against ground targets and up to 1500 m against air targets. If in the first period of the war the basis of the fire system was the fire of heavy and light machine guns, then already in the second period this became the fire of artillery and mortars, supplemented by rifle and machine gun fire. But this did not make the machine gun an “auxiliary” weapon and did not reduce the importance of its fire, which the Soviet High Command specifically pointed out to infantry commanders in a number of orders. Ideas about fire missions solved by automatic infantry weapons have changed. For example, when shooting at cargo targets on the eve of the war, shooting was divided into destruction (killing 80 - 100% of the figures that make up the target), suppression (50%), barrage (along lines, defeat - 50%) and disturbing (25%). By the end of the war, shooting was already allocated to destruction (defeating at least 80% of the figures), suppression (50%), and harassing (20%). Greater importance began to be attached to fire maneuver, which made it possible to increase the density of rifle and machine-gun fire in the most important areas.

Already in the first period of the war, the abolition of the division of the battle formation into strike and pinning groups returned the light machine gun to the chain of the rifle squad. When advancing, the light machine gunner, as a rule, moved to a new position first, and when leaving the battle he was the last to retreat. During the attack, machine gunners with light machine guns fired in motion from their belts. Operating as part of a tank landing force, the light machine gunner had to cover the actions of the riflemen and fire at enemy anti-tank crews. Machine guns sometimes fired from the rear of the tank, protecting the tank from grenade launchers and “faustniks.” The main weapon for a light machine gun was now considered to be short burst fire, with a normal combat rate of fire of 80 rounds/min. The battle formation of a rifle company now consisted of rifle platoons and a fire group, which included mortars, machine guns, and anti-tank rifles.

A female crew of a DP machine gun from a fighter battalion. Leningrad, January 1943

The heavy machine gun remained the main automatic weapon of the units, capable of long-term intense fire with a combat rate of fire of up to 250-300 rounds per minute, providing the required sighting range and lethality with rifle cartridges, and with stable machine guns - good accuracy and accuracy of fire. According to BUP-42, heavy machine guns, distributed along the front and in depth, covered the advance of a rifle unit, hit enemy heavy weapons crews, supported the attack, secured flanks and advance in depth, and repelled a counterattack. Machine gun companies were usually assigned to rifle companies by platoon. During the engineering preparation of the starting position for the offensive (attack), it was required to create “the most favorable conditions for the use of heavy machine guns, mortars and guns.” This made it possible to use light and heavy machine guns in fire preparation for an attack - immediately before it began. In an attack, a machine gun platoon, compactly or in sections, had to move at the joints and flanks of rifle companies from one firing line to a line, individual machine guns - in the intervals between platoons, in readiness to repel enemy counterattacks. The heavy machine gun crews fired from short stops, from behind the flank or into the gaps of their troops, although the latter type of fire required good training of the machine gunners. The heavy machine gun still operated in the second lines or as part of machine gun groups on the flanks - the size and maneuverability of even a light machine gun, the time it took to change positions and prepare for firing did not allow it to be moved to the front lines. Because of this, machine guns could be late in reacting to an enemy counterattack or his revived firing points.

Moving the Maxim machine gun across the battlefield in a “wheelbarrow” crawling

Carrying a Maxim machine gun by three crew numbers in the old way “on a stretcher.” North Caucasus. October 1942. The SG machine gun was also later moved across the battlefield on a wheeled machine

Machine gun "Maxim" mod. 1940 in a Willys car - a “cart” of the Great Patriotic War

Tanks in the offensive sometimes played the role of “machine gun carriers” for heavy machine guns. They also found another way to “pull them up” behind the tanks with infantry. The commander of the 23rd Tank Corps, Lieutenant General Pushkin, reported to the GABTU on July 14, 1943: “In battles behind enemy lines, with limited numbers and bad roads, the heavy machine guns of motorized rifle battalions lagged behind the advance of the airborne infantry and were late to participate in battles. The spring and summer period of practical exercises with the use of heavy machine guns installed on the Willys vehicle, following the principle of installing machine guns on carts during the Civil War, successfully justified itself.”

A portable rifle shield, as well as a collapsible NTP armor cap (armor plate thickness 10–13 mm) and a concrete cap - for quickly organizing a long-term machine gun fire structure. Open exhibition of the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War

The heavy machine gun showed its power and capabilities mainly in defense. Each battalion prepared a machine-gun fire pattern. Heavy machine guns were located throughout the depth of the battalion defense area. At the same time, they tried to adapt the positions to the requirements of all-round defense and for firing at all ranges - from extreme to defeating the enemy who had penetrated the defense; they widely practiced equipping firing positions on the reverse slopes of heights.

Machine gun firing structures were further developed. Thus, in the Moscow defensive battle, only in the Bryansk direction on a front of 230 km in July - August 1941, 6,650 machine-gun trenches, 2,300 machine-gun bunkers and bunkers were built. During the Battle of Stalingrad, 200 bunkers were created in the city itself, and 37 reinforced concrete and armored caps for machine guns were installed. During the Battle of Moscow, a gradual transition began from the focal system of unit defense, when each fighter, each machine-gun crew was located in his own trench (cell), to the trench system - more precisely, it was a return to it at a new level. Trenches significantly increased the security of units and expanded the ability to quickly, covertly and relatively safely change positions with infantry fire weapons. Almost any section of the trench could be adapted into a firing position for a machine gun. At first, cells, machine-gun nests, and trenches per squad were connected by a continuous trench, communication passages to the rear were prepared, then the system was improved and developed in depth. The main position in the main line of defense was equipped with 2-3 trenches, communication passages and a system of engineering barriers covered by fire. The distance between the first and second trenches was usually 150–250 m. Such a defense formation, on the one hand, ensured fire communication between units and made it possible to maneuver forces and means along the front and from the depths during the battle, under enemy fire; on the other hand, it excluded simultaneous defeat of personnel in trenches by enemy artillery and mortar fire when firing at one sight line.

Dragging the Maxim machine gun through the snow

Soldiers of the naval rifle brigade with Maxim machine guns on ski mounts, 1941.

The small arms fire system began to be more closely linked with the general fire system, and above all with the fire of mortars, battalion, regimental and divisional artillery. At forward positions, flanking (directed at the target's flank), cross-fire (fired at one target from at least two directions) and oblique (at an angle to the front) machine gun fire began to be used more widely. These types of fire made it possible to hit chains of enemy infantry without changing the sight, in a short time and with less ammunition consumption, and increased the density and effectiveness in the selected areas of small fire. In the strongholds of the rifle companies, fire from heavy and light machine guns covered the barriers, provided gaps and flanks, covered the positions of anti-tank rifles and artillery, they tried to move them to forward points and positions, and allocated separate duty and “dagger” machine guns. The latter usually covered open flanks and joints in the defense, narrow approaches (hollows, ravines, fords, clearings; they were especially effective in the forest and on sharply rugged terrain). The range of “dagger” fire depended on the nature of the terrain and the task, but in general it was no more than 300 m (before the war it was set to 600 m), accordingly, the positions of the dagger machine guns were camouflaged more carefully.

Transportation of the Maxim heavy machine gun in winter on a drag boat. Fire could be fired directly from the boat

The bulkiness of the Maxim often made it difficult for crews to keep up with leading infantry units when going on the attack. Photo 1944

The trenches had a curved or broken outline, machine gun platforms were made adjacent to the trench or communication path, or remote (connected to the trench along the communication path). They tried to prepare open machine-gun sites with the expectation of firing at air and ground targets in the firing zones in front of the front line, inside the defense area and in front of neighboring areas. Covered (“light armored”) machine gun nests were protected from above by one row of thick poles or knurling, sprinkled with a layer of earth, and the embrasure for the machine gun was also protected. The removed machine gun nests looked like open areas or a “chopped machine gun nest” in the form of a low log house installed above the platform, covered with earth and camouflaged, with an embrasure. A characteristic feature of the second period of the war was the transfer of closed machine-gun firing structures such as bunkers from the first line of defense into its depths. 2-3 camouflaged positions connected by a trench, a quick change of position, a sudden opening of fire, and fire in short bursts contributed more to the survivability of machine guns in forward positions than the organization of bunkers here. So, on the one hand, the stability of the machine gun fire system increased, and on the other, the elasticity of the defense increased, it was possible to keep the enemy under the influence of organized fire longer.

The crew of the Maxim heavy machine gun in readiness for battle. In the background is a cartridge carrier with a cartridge box

Light machine guns of rifle squads were located in platoon strongholds, mainly at the front edge, in rifle trenches or close to them in nests for conducting flank and oblique action. The saturation of the defense of rifle formations and units with machine guns in the main directions can be judged by the order of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Army General N.F. Vatutin dated January 29, 1944 on the procedure for creating a defense on the outer front of the encirclement: “In the trenches have structures: 1. a) open machine gun platforms (for heavy and light machine guns) on average every 30 m; b) cells for riflemen every 4-6 m;... have on average 1 km of the front of each of the three stripes: a) machine gun bunkers with anti-fragmentation or light-type coatings 6 pcs...”. Thanks to the saturation of the troops with machine guns and a better supply of ammunition, the ability to conduct concentrated and barrage fire from heavy machine guns (the Maxim was very useful here) superimposed on areas of mortar and artillery fire increased. For example, near Kursk, in the sectors of the 36th and 39th Guards Divisions, 23 and 22 areas of concentrated fire from automatic weapons and stationary barrage fire from heavy machine guns were prepared. However, from the middle of the war, the importance of defensive machine-gun fire decreased - this task was increasingly transferred to mortars.

A variant of a trench for a machine gun compartment with main and reserve platforms, cells for riflemen and a remote cell for anti-aircraft firing. Below are options for anti-aircraft installations for the Maxim machine gun, proposed for production in the troops (from the “Combat Manual of the Infantry” 1942)

In the “Instructions for organizing a fire system for infantry weapons,” approved by the commander of the 5th Army, Lieutenant General P.G. Shafranov on November 20, 1944, said: “The infantry fire system in defense is built: a) from rifle-machine gun fire from the front edge; b) light machine gun fire, also from the front edge; c) fire from heavy machine guns with dagger action; d) fire from heavy machine guns of machine gun companies operating in their sectors; e) barrage and concentrated fire from machine guns and 82-mm mortars.”

Variant of an open machine gun nest in a trench with a niche shelter for a heavy machine gun

Much more attention was paid to firing at night, with limited visibility, in the forest and when suppressing unobservable targets. For this purpose, various methods of firing were widely used in areas targeted in advance, still before dark, with artificial dispersion along the front and in depth (installation of machine guns on supports, pegs with strings limiting the firing sector, grooves in the parapet, etc.). For shooting at night, cartridges with tracer bullets were widely used; sometimes magazines and machine gun belts were loaded with cartridges alternately - with ordinary and with tracer bullets. This achieved not only a better direction of fire, but also a psychological impact on the enemy. In the defense at night, machine guns were assigned on duty with crews on duty to repel sudden enemy attacks.

Concealed machine gun nest using a concrete cap

The DT tank machine gun on a bipod was also used in the infantry. 1941

Training in handling the Maxim machine gun was included in the Vsevobuch program

A few words need to be said about the training of machine gunners. Preparations took place both in the rear and at the front. Among the military specialties for which training was carried out in the system of general military training (Vsevobuch) according to a 110-hour program, there were light machine gunners and heavy machine gunners. But in the system of Vsevobuch and OSOAVIAKHIM, mainly the tasks of initial military training of reserves were solved. Waging a fierce and bloody war required a large number of well-trained military resources. Therefore, with the beginning of the war, spare parts of all branches of the military were deployed, and from August 1942, training units were deployed.

The training of command personnel was important. Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 046 of December 12, 1941 concerned the training of battalion and regiment commanders at the “Shot” course and set the main directions of this training: “The main training objectives should be: for battalion commanders: ... b) master small arms in service with the battalion , and be able to use it in battle." Military infantry and machine gun and mortar schools of the Red Army trained platoon commanders - junior lieutenants - according to accelerated programs, in just six months, and the training of Red Army soldiers and junior commanders in reserve regiments, training battalions and regimental schools was carried out even faster. In 1942, training courses for platoon commanders, including rifle and machine gun platoon commanders, were opened. However, according to the results of an inspection in June-July 1942 of infantry and machine gun and mortar schools of several districts, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Major General Rumyantsev noted: “In fire training in all schools, the weak point is the issue of fire control... The skills of cadets in shooting techniques, especially from machine guns and mortars are not brought to automaticity.” In 1943, military infantry schools were transferred from a 5-battalion staff to a 3-battalion staff, while the third battalion trained commanders of machine gun and mortar units. A whole range of measures was introduced to encourage personnel to master military specialties. For example, the GKO Decree of May 11, 1942 and NKO Order No. 0388 established: “1. The positions of assistant gunners of heavy and light machine guns should be staffed by Red Army soldiers who have fully mastered their weapons, with the simultaneous assignment of the rank of “corporal”... 3. In order to encourage machine gunners, establish: a) for excellence in battles, machine gunners of heavy machine guns, regardless of promotion in position, should be awarded the next military rank... to the squad commander (chief machine gun) - “Art. sergeant"; deputy squad commander (gunner) - “sergeant”; pom. machine gun gunner - “junior sergeant”; to a machine gunner - “corporal”, b) for distinction in battles, machine gunners of light machine guns, regardless of promotion, are awarded military ranks... deputy. squad commander - “sergeant”; to the machine gunner (assistant gunner) - “junior sergeant”. On May 21, 1942, among other “excellent” badges, the “Excellent Machine Gunner” badge was approved. Already during the war, the enemy recognized “the skillful actions of the Soviet machine gunners” (Berliner Bersenzeitung newspaper).

Badge "Excellent machine gunner", 1942

In infantry combat, the share of street fighting has increased significantly. In conditions of constant close contact with the enemy, the saturation of units with machine guns was especially important. So, during the battles in Stalingrad in the defense sector of the 39th Guards. rifle regiment with a length of 1300 m, 32 heavy and 48 light machine guns were installed at firing positions. Their fire alone created a density of over 9 bullets per 1 m per minute. The Maxim's ability to conduct intense fire was important both in repelling enemy attacks and in suppressing his firing points in an attack, but the massiveness of the machine gun made it difficult for crews to move through street rubble and inside buildings when organizing multi-tiered fire or sudden flanking fire was required. The supply of water to the machine guns caused great difficulties. In Stalingrad, for example, soldiers shot through water pipes and collected the remaining water drop by drop, primarily for machine guns. Presumably, the casings of the machine guns were filled with liquid “in the pioneer way.”

The DP machine gun crew is fighting in Berlin. April 1945

The crew of the Maxim heavy machine gun is fighting on the streets of Vienna. March-April 1945

In assault groups, crews of light and heavy machine guns were usually included in the covering and consolidation group (an assault group based on a platoon usually received a section of heavy machine guns), together with mortarmen and snipers, they suppressed the enemy’s flanking firing points, repelled his counterattacks, and after capturing the enemy, they organized a perimeter defense. Machine guns were deployed in ambushes on enemy routes, installed in pillboxes and bunkers, blocking the streets with fire.

It was even more difficult to operate with the Maxim in the mountains, where it was necessary to organize multi-tiered fire, and the ability to maneuver heavy weapons was difficult. Meanwhile, the role of the heavy machine gun was especially great as a means of support - here the range of aimed fire reached 2300 m, and they more often practiced shooting over the heads of their troops. In the mountains, wheeled machines were sometimes replaced with homemade tripods. Machine guns in the mountains were located in trenches, in specially placed forward nests made of bags of soil, in light prefabricated structures or caves. For the flanking machine guns and guns, the same nests and half-caponiers were built, embedded in the steep slopes of the heights or adjacent to the steep walls of the rocks; in valleys, passages and gorges blockhouses could be built from large stones and bags of soil, in mountainous and forested areas - from wood and stone. Firing heavy machine guns at long ranges other than mountains was used, for example, when crossing water obstacles, but even then no further than 2000–3000 m (such ranges were now considered maximum) instead of the previously established ranges of up to 5000 m.

The increased importance of infantry combating low-flying aircraft and paratroopers with a shortage of special anti-aircraft installations forced - as in the First World War - to send out to the troops and even include descriptions of homemade installations in the regulations. A machine gun on Sokolov’s machine could, for example, be mounted on a wheel rotating on a vertical pin; instead of a wheel, a simple block with a groove could be used, into which the axis of the machine would fit. At ranges up to 1000 m, an anti-aircraft sight was used (for example, foreshortening model 1943), up to 500 m - a regular sight.

In winter conditions, ski units transported DP and Maxim machine guns on ski rigs or drag boats made by the troops; a crew of two skiers pulled such a rig by the lines, firing directly from the drag boat (drag boats were also useful in swampy areas).

The partisans returned to the machine guns on carts and sleighs. The basis of the partisans' machine gun armament was captured and repaired machine guns, although automatic weapons were supplied to them from the mainland, special and sabotage groups of the GRU and NKVD were also supplied with a supply of weapons. During the war, the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement sent 2,674 machine guns to the partisans, and handed over weapons and fronts to them. To drop machine guns, the paratroopers and partisans used the PDMM-42 parachute landing bag. However, already at the beginning of the war, paratroopers-machine gunners mastered jumping with a standard DP on a belt; they often used instead the “manual” version of the DT, which was more compact, with a more capacious and less prone to death magazine.

DS machine gun on a partisan cart. Belarus

For large-caliber machine guns, the main role became anti-aircraft. However, according to the Manual on Shooting, large-caliber machine guns were intended “for firing at air targets” and “for combating enemy firing points and his manpower covered by light armor.” And in addition to firing at air targets, large-caliber machine guns found application in the fight against enemy firing points and his manpower covered by light armor, as well as against lightly armored moving targets. In orders from the initial period of the war, when German troops were still quite widely using light tanks in combat units, one can often find instructions to “involve” heavy machine guns in the fight against tanks. Later, you can also repeatedly find recommendations for installing DShKs in the positions of anti-tank units (for example, as part of anti-tank strong points or anti-tank areas), but to protect them from enemy aircraft attacking from low altitudes.

DShKs often fired at enemy personnel and firing points in urban battles. In the fight against the enemy entrenched in fortified buildings, a heavy machine gun often turned out to be more effective than a normal-caliber machine gun - due to the greater penetrating effect of the bullet. This, for example, led to their use to support the actions of assault groups with fire. The Brief Summary of Generalized Combat Experience, prepared by the operational department of the headquarters of the 5th Shock Army on May 25, 1945, based on the experience of the Berlin operation, said: “It is completely inappropriate to assign 45-mm guns or 76-mm guns of regimental artillery to the assault group because due to their low power fire, they do not cause any destruction in brick buildings, and therefore contribute little to the success of the assault group. Experience has shown that if there is a lack of high-power guns, it is better to equip assault groups with heavy machine guns or DShK machine guns. They successfully suppress fire from enemy firing points, are more maneuverable and easily camouflaged.”

When crossing water barriers, platoons and companies of the DShK tried to cross first to quickly organize air defense on the bridgehead, but often machine guns, taking advantage of their range, fired through the water barrier to support the landing.

Study of the DS machine gun in a partisan detachment. Belarus

One of the improvisations of the Great Patriotic War is an aircraft machine gun on a Sokolov machine. A sight and control handles were added to the machine gun.

Installation of DShK on torpedo boats, 1944

By the end of the war, a view was established on a heavy machine gun as a weapon designed to fire at air targets at ranges of up to 1,500 m and to combat enemy firing points (up to 800 m) and his manpower covered by light armor (up to 500 m).

A few words about tank machine guns. Since purely machine-gun tanks ceased to be used as combat tanks already in the first period of the war, tank machine guns played the role of auxiliary weapons for fighting infantry and tank destroyers and firing at low-flying aircraft. The importance of anti-aircraft tank machine guns increased towards the end of the war. Machine gun armament of armored vehicles, even for auxiliary purposes, became mandatory.

The Second World War finally “separated” ground and aircraft machine guns, establishing the main aircraft type as a rapid-firing heavy machine gun, complementing aircraft guns. Normal-caliber machine guns will still be destined to return “to the air,” but as weapons for helicopters.

Calculation of the Maxim machine gun

German soldiers next to the dead crew of the Maxim heavy machine gun. Next to the machine gun there was a bunch of spent cartridges and an empty tape. The men stood until the last. The outskirts of Stalingrad, August 1942.

Former Wehrmacht private Eduard Koch: "...I ended up on the Eastern Front with reinforcements, after the successful counter-offensive of our troops near Kharkov in the spring of 1942. Then this endless march to the Volga began...we almost didn’t encounter any resistance, only isolated skirmishes, there were very few prisoners, The Reds quickly retreated, almost ran, but without panic, in a fairly organized manner. We, young soldiers, rejoiced at this, because then it seemed to us that the enemy was completely broken and the end of the war was near.

My friend and fellow countryman Heinz was worried that the war would end like this, but he had not even been in a serious battle. But our old platoon sergeant-major did not share our enthusiasm; he was gloomy and constantly told us: “What are you idiots happy about? Since they could not be surrounded and destroyed in this devilish steppe, then they will all go to Stalingrad and build a new Verdun for all of us there.” But we made fun of the old grump among ourselves.

However, he was right; all hell broke loose on the distant approaches to Stalingrad. I remember some village and a high-rise building in front of it, on the right there was some kind of swampy river, on the left there was an open field that was full of mines, we tried to get around it, but came under fire from camouflaged tanks. This means there is only one way out - through this village, the Russians were holed up in houses there, and a heavy machine gun was firing at us from a high-rise building, and there were losses.

The high-rise was bombarded with mines, but as soon as the explosions subsided, the machine gun came to life and put us on the ground again. An hour later, the Russians left the village, the fire from there stopped, but the damn machine gun did not stop, and the mortars could not silence it. Finally he fell silent. We climbed to this high-rise building and what we saw there shocked us.

In a half-filled trench, next to a broken machine gun, two soldiers lay. One, apparently, was killed earlier and his comrade put him on the bottom of the trench, covering him with an overcoat, and he continued to shoot, but the worst thing was that he had no legs, he tied the stumps with some pieces of fabric to stop the blood and continued shoot until he was finished off by fragments of a mine that exploded nearby.

Everyone fell silent. Our old sergeant major lit his pipe and asked us: “Well, now do you understand that everything is just beginning?” And if we manage to get away from here, consider ourselves very lucky...

We buried those Russians there, in the trench, installing their broken machine gun instead of a tombstone. Probably since then many of us have thought hard about the future...”