Su-35, Su-24 MK, modernization of MiG-29: What aircraft will Iran buy from Russia

IRAN ARMY AIR FORCE

Objectives and organizational structure

The Air Force of the Iranian Army is an independent branch of the armed forces. They also include the country's air defense forces. The number of personnel in the Army Air Force exceeds 85 thousand people.

According to the views of the country's military leadership, the main purpose of the Army Air Force is the readiness to solve the following tasks independently or in cooperation with other branches of the armed forces:

• gaining air supremacy;
• defense of administrative and political centers, troop groups and important military installations from air attacks;
• striking at enemy ground, air and naval forces, military and economic targets;
• providing direct support to ground forces and naval forces;
• conducting aerial reconnaissance;
• carrying out airborne assaults behind enemy lines;
• transport of troops and military cargo by air.

The Air Force of the Iranian Army is armed with airplanes, helicopters, anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery installations. The combat force includes units and subunits of fighter-bomber, fighter, reconnaissance and auxiliary aviation, as well as anti-aircraft missile, anti-aircraft artillery, radio engineering and logistics troops.

This branch of the Armed Forces is headed by a commander who reports to the Chief of the Joint Staff of the Army and through him to the Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (SHC). He bears full responsibility to the latter for maintaining the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of formations and units of the branch of the armed forces subordinate to him, developing and implementing plans for the operational and combat use of troops, organizing and conducting operational and combat training, as well as for training personnel. The commander organizes the logistics of formations and units.

In peacetime, the commander exercises leadership and control of the troops through his apparatus, which includes deputies, the secretariat, the Air Force headquarters and administrative commands, and in wartime - through the Air Force headquarters and the headquarters of operational commands, which begin to function from the moment the troops are brought to full combat readiness and operational deployment armed forces of the country.

The Army Air Force Headquarters is the primary administrative and operational control authority for both Air Force and Air Defense units. It is entrusted with the functions of planning combat use, daily and combat activities of troops and their logistics.

The headquarters consists of directorates and departments. He directly supervises the subordinate commands - aviation, air defense, radio and electronic intelligence, communications, central garrison support, logistics and training.

The commands manage the daily activities of formations, units and subunits of the air forces of the PRI Army.

Combat composition

According to the foreign military press, the Army Air Force operates 13 air bases, including 11 fighter (IAB) and two separate transport (OTAB), which host up to 25 squadrons of combat aviation, 12 auxiliary, two helicopter, and up to 10 detachments communications and control aircraft (helicopters) and the same number of search and rescue helicopter units.

The Army Air Force units are armed with: 250-300 combat aircraft, including 25-30 Su-24 bombers; 60-65 F-14A Tomcat fighters, 55-60 F-4D and E Phantom, 50-60 F-5E Tiger, 25-30 F-7 (made in China), 30-35 MiG-29 , up to 10 reconnaissance aircraft RF-4 and RF-5.

According to foreign experts, due to the lack of spare parts and due to moral and physical obsolescence, only a little more than 70% of the aircraft are in combat service, including 50% F-4, 60% F-5 and 40% F-14.

Auxiliary aviation (about 10 units) is represented by C-130E Hercules transport aircraft (about 40 aircraft), Il-76 (10) and F-27 Friendship (10); Boeing 747 (eight); Boeing 707 transport and refueling aircraft (more than 10); F-33 ​​communications aircraft (over 20); training (RS-7 and L-20, about 20 vehicles in total).

The Iranian Army Air Force is also armed with helicopters of various types (more than 40 Alouette-2, AV-205, and N-1, AV-214, etc.).

Basing

The Iranian Army Air Force group is located mainly in the northwestern, western, central and southern parts of the country. In accordance with the tasks and deployment, the forces and assets of Iran’s combat aviation are distributed across three operational zones (commands): “North-West” (headquarters in Tabriz), “West” (Kermanshah) and “South” (Ahvaz).

The basis of the existing organizational structure of aviation formations and units of the Iranian Army Air Force was created in the 1960s under the direct influence and control of American military advisers and specialists. Over the subsequent years, the Iranian command, without changing the principles of the organizational structure, made some additions to it, aimed mainly at increasing the combat potential of formations and units.

The Fighter Air Base (AFB) is the main tactical aviation unit of the Iranian Army Air Force, which includes control, headquarters, combining relevant departments and services, as well as combat, engineering, logistics, security and other services.

In accordance with the staffing schedule, the IAB should include three air squadrons of 25 combat vehicles each, a detachment of communications and control aircraft (helicopters) (each with up to five aircraft), and a detachment of search and rescue helicopters (five to ten).

However, as foreign military experts note, due to the shortage of modern combat aircraft and trained flight personnel, the actual combat strength of fighter air bases differs significantly from the standard one. Moreover, each of them has some features in its organizational structure.

1 IAB includes one fighter-bomber aviation squadron (IBAE), which is armed with up to 15 front-line fighter-bombers Su-24MK, one fighter-aviation squadron (IAE) of F-4E, F-5E aircraft , MiG-29 and MiG-29UB, each of which has five to seven combat vehicles, as well as two reconnaissance aviation squadrons (RAE) of RF-4 and RF-5 reconnaissance aircraft.

The 2nd IAB hosts three combat aviation squadrons, which are armed with up to 20 F-5E and 15 F-7 aircraft.

3 IAB consists of two F-4E IAE (15-20 combat vehicles in total).

4 IAB is represented by two fighter squadrons of F-5E aircraft (about 20 units).

At 5 IAB there are three IAE (up to 10 MiG-29 and 30 F-7 aircraft).

6th IAB has two squadrons (about 20 F-4E and D).

The 7th IAB has one squadron of F-14A combat aircraft (up to 15 combat vehicles).

8th IAB has two F-14A squadrons with up to 50 combat vehicles.

9 IAB include one squadron, which is armed with about 10 F-4E aircraft.

10th IAB has one squadron of F-4E aircraft (about 15 aircraft).

In addition, almost every fighter air base has a detachment of communications and control aircraft (two to four T-33s) and a detachment of search and rescue helicopters (two to five AB-214, AB-205 and UH-1 Iroquois helicopters) ").

According to American military experts, the Iranian Air Force F-4E and D, F-5E and Su-24MK aircraft are designed to provide direct air support to ground forces, and the MiG-29, F-14A and F-7 are intended to provide air defense.

Military transport aviation

Military transport aviation (MTA) of the Iranian Army Air Force is designed to provide transport support for all types of armed forces. Air transportation in the operational zone facilitates the maneuver of troops, and constant logistics support makes it possible to conduct military operations even in isolation from the main forces. In the difficult terrain typical of Iran, the rapid delivery of personnel and cargo through airlift can be a decisive factor in the successful conduct of military operations. BTA must solve the following tasks:

• transfer of ground forces to the combat area;
• delivery of logistics items to troops from main bases; airborne landing of troops followed by their supply by air;
• supply by air to units that are surrounded or operating in isolation from the main forces;
• evacuation of the wounded and sick;
• other transportation in the interests of all branches of the armed forces.

The main organizational unit of the Iranian Military Aviation Administration is a separate transport aviation base (OTAB), which, according to the staffing table, has up to 2000 personnel. It includes: management; headquarters, uniting the relevant departments and services, as well as transport, engineering, logistics, security units and other services. The main ones are three transport aviation squadrons (TAE), which are required to have 16 aircraft. However, the quantitative composition of aircraft equipment at individual transport air bases differs significantly from the staffing table. Moreover, each of them has some features in the organizational structure.

Thus, the 1st detachment includes five transport aviation squadrons. numbering up to 25 C-130E aircraft, about 10 Boeing 747 and 10 F-27, as well as a refueling aviation unit represented by 15 Boeing 707 fuel tanks. According to foreign press reports, transport aviation squadrons (TAE) of F-27 and Boeing 747 aircraft are government owned (provide transportation for representatives of the highest authorities of Iran). The 7th detachment includes four transport air squadrons: three of them include the C-130E (about 20 aircraft) and one - the Il-76 (five to ten).

In addition, the Air Force of the Iranian Army includes: a regiment of meteorological equipment, training and air forces in the cities of Tehran and Semnam, respectively, a training squadron (Isfahan), as well as an Air Force training ground (Sabzevar).

Prospects for updating the Iranian Air Force fleet

Since Iran's national military industry is not capable of producing modern combat aircraft, and its capabilities allow them to carry out only average repairs, the Iranian command plans to continue updating its aircraft fleet by purchasing modern combat aircraft abroad. The combat readiness of aviation is also planned to be maintained through the overhaul of the aircraft. However, according to an American expert on military problems in Iran, the aircraft manufacturers of this country, based on the Swiss turboprop aircraft RS-7 Pilatus, created the Fajer training aircraft with a flight range of 900 km, as well as the single-engine Parastu, equipped with a 20-mm aircraft cannon and has a flight range of 1300 km. In addition, the Iranian press widely covered the successful overhaul of American-made combat aircraft.

How can Russians protect themselves from the ban on dollar transactions?

The draft of a large-scale strategic agreement is being brought to Moscow by Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi. Why is it so important for Tehran to establish trade ties with Moscow, what will be the main difficulties in reaching agreements on the sale of Russian weapons to Iran - and what will the leaders of the two countries talk about besides this?

On January 19, the new President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ibrahim Raisi, arrives in Russia for a two-day visit. This is his third visit abroad since taking power (before that he visited Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), as well as the first visit of an Iranian president to our country since 2022.

The Iranian media, of course, write that the visit is being carried out in the most friendly manner possible,” reads the headline of the Tehran Times. And the article says that the main goals of the visit are economic.

“As a country that has always supported Iran in the face of brutal and unilateral sanctions, Russia has enormous potential to become Iran's close economic ally (close, but not closest - after concluding a package of investment agreements worth hundreds of billions of dollars, this place has been staked out for is China - note VIEW). Political relations between the countries have always been at a high level, but economic and trade cooperation in industries such as advanced technologies and the aerospace industry do not correspond to the large-scale capabilities of the two countries, and the situation needs to be corrected,” the publication continues.

Therefore, President Raisi is bringing to Russia a draft agreement on a strategic partnership for a period of 20 years. Which, of course, will be discussed with the Russian side. And besides this, they must decide how to promote economic cooperation in conditions where Russian businessmen are afraid to work in Iran due to sanctions and the specifics of local legislation.

Convenient excuse

However, the visit is not based on agreement alone.

“Iran is positioning the new agreement as the centerpiece of Raisi’s visit to Russia and a continuation of the trend that began with Iran’s entry into the SCO early in his administration,” writes Fardeen Eftekhari of the University of Tehran. “However, Raisi is unlikely to go to Russia just to negotiate this agreement. Rather, the agreement is a convenient pretext for discussing a wider range of issues and coordinating positions on various bilateral and international topics. These include the reconstruction process in Syria, national reconciliation in Afghanistan, as well as the fragility of the security system in the South Caucasus.”

And if the Syrian issue is obviously long-term, then the Afghan and Caucasian issues require the immediate attention of the presidents and coordination of positions. All three constructive external powers interested in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, that is, Russia, China and Iran, are now negotiating with the Taliban on the terms of its recognition.

Iran, as the country that has the most difficult relationship with the Taliban out of the whole trinity, does not want to be left behind in the recognition process - that is, it wants to synchronize its policy with Russia and China. Not only in the process of recognition, but also in principle on the issue of turning Afghanistan into a neighbor that does not create problems. And here Tehran, of course, will meet Moscow’s full understanding - the Kremlin, apparently, is not against coordination. Russia has enough problems without Afghanistan that require close attention.

It will be more difficult with the South Caucasus. By the “fragility of the security system” in the South Caucasus, the Iranians understand the sharp increase in Turkish influence in the region. This influence threatens not just the foreign policy interests of the Islamic Republic, but also its territorial integrity (Turkish-sponsored Azerbaijani-Turkic nationalism is muddying the waters in the northern provinces of Iran populated by Azerbaijanis).

For many months now, the Iranians have been testing the waters regarding joint containment of Turkey with the Russian Federation - and have not received the answer they are counting on. Some experts, of course, talk about the Russian side underestimating the Turkish threat - but others also point to a sober assessment of Iran’s capabilities as a partner in the policy of containment.

Iran is trying to sit on two chairs

- on the one hand, to restrain Turkey, but, on the other hand, not to take any public actions in this direction, so as not to provoke anti-government protests in the very regions populated by Azerbaijanis. That is, he is ready to help Russia, but quietly and behind the scenes - and Moscow is not going to be the tip of the spear.

Another important political topic will, of course, be the fate of the nuclear deal with the West. Since Joe Biden came to power, the United States has been trying to revive the deal and return Iran to it, but Tehran has taken a very competent and legally impeccable position. The Iranians want the United States to lift the illegally imposed sanctions first, then Iran will observe “for a while” and make sure they are lifted, and only then return to the deal.

The States do not want to take such a “leap of faith” - simply because they do not trust Tehran. Technically, of course, this “leap” will not cause problems - the United States lifted the sanctions, saw Iran’s reluctance to return to the deal and returned the sanctions back. Politically, however, this would be portrayed as a weakness for President Biden that Democrats cannot afford ahead of the midterm congressional elections. That is why a mediator is needed here, which Russia can act as.

Balance and money

In addition to political issues, the parties will also discuss military issues. There are reports that defense contracts worth as much as $10 billion are expected to be signed, including the repair and modernization of the Iranian MiG-25 and Su-24MK, as well as the supply of Su-35 fighters and S-400 systems.

And if, most likely, there will be no issues with the “dryers” (they are already ready - this, according to rumors, is the batch that was supposed to be delivered to Egypt and which Cairo refused under American pressure), then the sale of the S-400 is in question . According to some experts, it may contradict the fundamentals of Russian foreign policy.

The fact is that the Russian Federation adheres to a clear rule: it cooperates with everyone who is ready to cooperate with it, and does not cooperate with some powers loyal to it against other loyal ones. That is why, for example, Moscow actively interacts with Tehran in the Syrian space, but does not participate in Iran’s intraregional disputes with Israel and Saudi Arabia, Russia’s other partners.

And it does not participate in transactions that change the military-political balance of power between these players. Why, in fact, was a unique understanding reached with Israel that Tel Aviv does not touch the latest Russian weapons transferred to the Syrian army, but can attack it if the Syrians transfer it to Hezbollah or the Iranians.

Meanwhile, the supply of S-400 to Iran can radically change this very balance of power. The Russian air defense system nullifies, although not very high, but still realistic, Israel’s chances of launching a missile and bomb attack on Iranian nuclear infrastructure (unless Tehran and Washington suddenly come to an agreement on the return of Iran and the United States to the nuclear deal).

The defense deal has another controversial issue - the issue of payment. The Iranians have no hard cash and want to pay by giving Russian companies access to Iranian gas fields in the Caspian Sea, in particular the recently discovered Chalus. However, experts doubt that Moscow will be satisfied with this option.

“We don’t need Iranian gas. It is not clear how to use it and how to obtain it. A gas pipeline through the Caspian Sea to Russia cannot be built. We ourselves are against such a project from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan,” Igor Yushkov, an expert at the Financial University and the National Energy Security Fund, explains to the VZGLYAD newspaper.

Apparently, this issue will be discussed during the visit. Important, necessary, interesting – but very difficult. The main thing is that these two days are enough for the parties.

IRAN air defense

Iran's air defense forces and assets are part of the Army Air Force. They are designed to control airspace, repel enemy air raids and cover important administrative and strategic facilities in the country.

The air defense commander is simultaneously one of the deputy commanders of the Army Air Forces. In peacetime and wartime, it exercises operational control of the units and subunits subordinate to it through its headquarters (the main operational center of air defense) and the operational centers of air defense areas. To successfully solve the tasks assigned to air defense, as well as for more efficient control of fighter aircraft, air defense forces and means, a unified automated control system has been created.

The air defense is armed with about 170 missile launchers, more than 100 of which are medium-range (Hawk, Vega, Volga), the rest are short-range (Rapier), as well as 35-mm Oerlikon anti-aircraft artillery systems "and a 23-mm Soviet-made charger.

Iran's air defense is built on the zonal-object principle. The airspace over the territory of the country, as well as neighboring states, the waters of the Persian and Oman Gulfs and the Caspian Sea is divided into five air defense regions, each of which includes two to nine air defense groups, which include units of radio technical troops, units of anti-aircraft missile forces and anti-aircraft artillery . Air defense groups are mostly deployed in close proximity to air and naval bases and strategically important areas of the strait zone of the Persian Gulf.

The 1st air defense region (operational center in Tehran) covers the airspace of the north-eastern part of the country, the capital - Tehran, controls the southern part of the Caspian Sea and the border with Afghanistan. There are nine air defense groups operating in this area.

The 2nd air defense region (operational center in Tabriz) covers the airspace of the northwestern part of the country, controls the Transcaucasus, Turkish Eastern Anatolia, northern Iraq, and regions inhabited by Kurds in neighboring countries. It consists of seven air defense groups.

The 3rd air defense region (operational center in Omidie) covers the airspace of the southwestern part of the country, controls Iraq, Kuwait, the northern regions of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. There are eight air defense groups operating in this area.

The 4th air defense region (operational center in Bandar Abbas) covers the airspace of the southern part of the country, controls the waters of the Persian and Oman Gulfs, the straits zone, the Kish and Qeshm islands, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. There are three air defense groups operating in this area.

The 5th air defense region (operational center in Kerman) covers the airspace of the southeastern part of the country, controls the southwest of Afghanistan and the western regions of Pakistan. Two air defense groups have been deployed in the area.

In addition, the air defense command system operates an air defense training center located in Hashemabad, consisting of six anti-aircraft missile divisions equipped with medium-range Vega missile launchers.

The program for the development of air defense systems, designed for the period until 2020, provides for the purchase abroad of medium-range air defense systems and modern anti-aircraft artillery systems, as well as radar stations.

Trust but check

Russia's full support for Iran during the Vienna negotiations, including Tehran's tough position on lifting sanctions against it, strengthened relations between the two countries, writes the English-language Iranian publication Tehran Times. In his opinion, solidarity and understanding of common threats (primarily from the West) made relations between Iran and Russia very strong. But there is one thing - economic and trade cooperation does not correspond to the level of political contacts. “The volume of trade between Iran and Russia is the same as Russia’s trade with some small countries, while Iran has very large potential,” the newspaper points out.

At the same time, Russian-Iranian trade turnover, despite the coronavirus pandemic and sanctions, grew by 41% over the past nine months and amounted to $1.65 billion, and in 2022, trade between the two countries grew by 39.8%, exceeding $2 billion.

Although there are no plans to sign agreements in the economic sphere during the visit of the Iranian president, further prospects for cooperation will certainly be discussed - it is no coincidence that Mr. Raisi is accompanied by ministers of the economic bloc. Even before the president’s arrival in Moscow, meetings took place between Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak and Energy Minister Nikolai Shulginov with Iranian Oil Minister Javad Oudji. Messrs. Shulginov and Oudzhi also act as co-chairs of the Russian-Iranian commission on trade and economic cooperation.

The Iranians hope that a new 20-year agreement, which will consider all aspects of bilateral relations, will help to maximize cooperation. The document was discussed a couple of years ago, under the previous Iranian administration, but it is still not ready. At the same time, last year, Iran signed a similar document, but for a 25-year period, with China. It was decided to begin its implementation during a recent visit to Beijing by Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian. True, there is an ambiguous point here - the contents of the agreement are unknown, which causes criticism from the Iranian public. The potential agreement with Russia is the same story.

According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Dutch Gamaan Foundation in September 2022 in Iran, only 25% of Iranians surveyed have a positive view of Russia and 27% of China, while 65% and 66%, respectively, have a negative view.

At the same time, 52% and 35% of respondents have a positive attitude toward the United States and Israel, respectively, and 39% and 48% have a negative attitude. As for bilateral documents, 71% of respondents are against the “25-year cooperation program between Iran and China,” and 66% are against the “20-year cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia.” Even more - 71% - are against the “Agreement between Iran and Russia on the legal regime of the Caspian Sea.” Let us remind you that the last document is not actually two-sided. In August 2018, the heads of the Caspian Five countries - the presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - signed the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. The document was ratified by the parliaments of four countries, but the Iranians are still undecided.

According to Sergei Lavrov, Iran took a break during the elections (parliamentary in 2020, presidential in 2021), but is now returning to this topic. It acquired particular relevance during the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the aggravation of relations between Iran and Azerbaijan. In particular, in the fall, Tehran regarded as provocative military exercises conducted by Azerbaijan with the participation of foreign states, and also accused Baku of too close cooperation with Israel. Tehran also expressed its attitude to the exercises during the visit of the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry to Moscow. To which Sergei Lavrov gave a very unequivocal answer: “As for the Caspian and preparing the ground for interference in the affairs of the Caspian region by foreign states, today we have repeatedly emphasized to our interlocutors, our friends, the need to ensure as soon as possible the entry into force of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, which directly prohibits the presence of military forces of any non-Caspian states in the Caspian Sea.”

“The mood of Iranians may be unstable, but there has always been an element of distrust in Russia,” PIR Center expert Yulia Sveshnikova told Kommersant.

According to her, traditional conservatives, which now include the top of the Iranian leadership, are more inclined to cooperate with Russia and move away from the West, while reformists, on the contrary, want rapprochement with the West and not too close relations with Russia. “This discourse has existed for a long time. It becomes especially loud when it comes to another visit or negotiations. Thus, on the eve of the presidential elections in Iran, the issue of potential Russian intervention was discussed in all seriousness. Now an anti-Russian background accompanies the negotiations in Vienna. Some forces believe that Russia is not interested in their success, since Iran is a bargaining chip for it in negotiations with the West,” the expert added. As for the Caspian Sea, this issue has always been painful for the Iranians; some even believe that Tehran has the right to lay claim to 50% of the entire Caspian Sea. “I’m not sure that the elections are the main reason for the delay in ratification of the convention. Rather, the factor of public discontent is at play here,” Ms. Sveshnikova emphasized. Trade agreements are much easier to explain: they do not hurt the national pride of Iranians, although there are those who manage to write about the seizure of Iran by China and Russia.

ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS AEROSPACE FORCES

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, along with the Army, is one of the main components of the regular Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The law on the IRGC, adopted in May 1982, states that “the purpose of the corps is to protect the Islamic revolution of Iran, its conquests, the “holy war against the infidels” (jihad), the spread of the rule of God’s law in the world in accordance with the laws of Iran and the comprehensive strengthening defense base of the country through interaction with other armed formations, military training of the masses and leadership of them.”

The IRGC includes ground forces, aerospace forces, naval forces, the Basij Resistance Force and the Quds Force. The total number of the corps is about 500 thousand people.

Objectives, structure, number

The Aerospace Forces (ASF) of the IRGC are an independent branch of Iran's armed forces. According to the views of the country's military leadership, they must be ready to solve the following tasks: launching missile strikes on land, air and naval groups of enemy forces, their military and economic targets; providing close air support to ground forces and naval forces.

The number of AKS personnel is about 10,000 people. The units are armed with missile systems of operational-tactical and tactical surface-to-surface missiles, auxiliary aircraft and helicopters. The combat force includes missile units and subunits, auxiliary aviation units, training centers and training grounds.

The AKS is headed by a commander who is operationally subordinate to the Chief of the Joint Staff of the IRGC and, through him, to the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The commander of the AKS bears full responsibility to the Supreme Commander and the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC for maintaining the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of subordinate units, instilling high moral and political qualities among the personnel of this type of armed forces, developing and implementing plans for the operational and combat use of troops, organizing and conducting operational, combat and psychological training, as well as for religious and ideological indoctrination of personnel and training in training centers. He organizes logistical support for subordinate formations and units.

The commander carries out leadership of the troops through his apparatus, which includes deputies, the secretariat and the headquarters of the AKS.

The Aerospace Forces Headquarters, located in Tehran, is the main administrative and operational control body for both the AKS missile forces and aviation units. It is entrusted with the functions of planning combat use, daily and combat activities of troops, as well as their logistics. The headquarters, consisting of directorates and departments, directly supervises the headquarters of subordinate units.

Armament

According to foreign press reports, the IRGC ACS is armed with more than 30 launchers of operational-tactical missiles (OTR), purchased in Libya, North Korea and Syria, as well as assembled at military enterprises of Iran itself, the prototype of which was the Soviet-developed Scud-B OTR. . According to Israeli experts, Iran has 250-300 missiles of this type, and according to American experts, a much smaller number. The flight range of Iranian OTR is 290-310 km (maximum 325 km). They are capable of carrying a combat charge weighing up to 1000 kg.

In addition, the AKS has about 45 launchers of tactical missiles with a launch range of 80-100 km, capable of carrying a combat charge weighing up to 150 kg. There are up to 150 auxiliary aircraft in service, in particular communication aircraft (Cessna, RS-7 Pilatus, Albatross, RS-6 Porter) and training aircraft (EMV-312 Tucano, S-101, MiG- 21U), as well as AV-205 helicopters.

Two OTR missile brigades are deployed in the areas of the cities of Hamadan and Isfahan, and two tactical missile brigades are deployed near the city of Shiraz. Aviation groups are located in the cities of Ahvaz, Birgent, Dizful, Zahedan, Omidie, Sanandaj, Urmia, Khorramabad, and a detachment of communications and control aircraft is based in Tehran. In addition, the IRGC ACS has a missile training center (Isfahan) and two missile ranges (near the cities of Semnan and Dasht-e-Lut).

Thus, the main striking force of Iran is the missile forces that are part of the IRGC ACS. As Iranian experts note, their importance for the country's defense capability goes beyond the tasks assigned to this type of armed forces.

Development prospects

Increasing the country's missile potential is one of the priority areas of the Iranian Armed Forces modernization and development program, designed for ten years. The program provides for two parallel areas of activity: the purchase of missile weapons abroad, as well as the development and production of our own missile systems, primarily for operational-tactical purposes. Currently, Iran is actively conducting R&D, attracting foreign missile technologies, and creating and modernizing rocket industry enterprises. According to foreign military experts, a large missile manufacturing center built by the North Koreans is already operating in the Isfahan area. A plant built with the help of Chinese specialists in the area of ​​Semnan (175 km east of Tehran) also produces products. In the city of Parchin (50 km southeast of Tehran) and the capital, there are enterprises for assembling operational-tactical missiles from components and parts supplied by the DPRK and Libya.

Iranian scientists are making efforts to improve the tactical and technical characteristics of missile systems. Thus, judging by data from the American Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iran, Syria and, possibly, Pakistan have coordinated efforts to modernize the liquid-fuel OTR “No-Dong-1” developed in the DPRK (flight range over 1000 km, payload warhead weight up to 900 kg) . Under the leadership of Chinese and North Korean specialists, the development program for the Zelzal missile with a range of up to 900 km is being successfully implemented. Iran has become interested in the new Tapeo-Dong-1 and Tapeo-Dong-2 missiles being created in the DPRK.

PERSONNEL WORK IN THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE

Recruitment and combat training

The manning of the Army Air Force and the IRGC ACS is somewhat different, although in both cases it is carried out on the basis of the law on universal conscription, adopted in 1986. All males over 19 years of age are subject to conscription for military service. The term of conscript service for privates and non-commissioned officers is two years. The share of conscripts in the Army Air Force personnel is small, since service in aviation requires special professional knowledge and skills, and not only for pilots. Therefore, the Army Air Force has created a special system of recruitment (primarily from among the most literate conscripts), as well as education and training of personnel, which consists of three stages: initial training, a secondary training course and a higher education course.

A course of initial military and special training (one to six months) is completed at the beginning of service by all Army Air Force personnel. After its completion, certificates of the established form are issued.

Within the framework of the secondary education system, there are two levels of training of specialists for the Army Air Force: with regular secondary military education and advanced professional qualifications. In both cases, training is carried out in two stages: full-time - at the training command of the Army Air Forces and correspondence - directly in the aviation units. After successful completion of the first stage, cadets are awarded the rank of sergeant, and they receive their primary officer rank in units after completing the full course of training.

The higher education system of this branch of the armed forces includes the military university of the Army Air Forces. It trains career officers in the following specialties: military pilot, aircraft maintenance engineer, computer systems, electrical equipment, airspace management and control, administrative issues and others. In terms of its equipment, educational facilities, and level of teaching, the military university is one of the best universities in the country. The duration of study is four years. In the future, its graduates can rise to the military rank of brigadier general of 2nd rank. To obtain subsequent ranks, you must graduate from the Command and Staff Academy and the Academy of Strategic Sciences.

The staffing of the IRGC ACS has its own characteristics. Along with conscription into the corps in accordance with the general provisions of the law on universal conscription, its recruitment is carried out by recruiting volunteers from among civilians (who have reached the age of 16), as well as military personnel of the Air Force and Army ground forces (for missile forces). Both when conscripted into military service and when enlisted into the cadre, candidates are subject to thorough security checks, undergo testing, and in some cases are required to provide recommendations from clergy and pass exams.

The non-commissioned officer corps is composed of volunteers, primarily sergeants. Its training is carried out by non-commissioned officer schools and specialized training centers.

The training of officers for the missile forces of the IRGC ACS is carried out in military schools, admission to which is carried out on a competitive basis from both civilians and military personnel of conscript and long-term service under the age of 22. Applicants to military educational institutions of the Army Air Force and the IRGC ACS undergo strict selection and testing for adherence to Islam. The main criteria are: professing Islam, devotion to the ideas of the Islamic Revolution, nationality (preference is given to Persians), state of health and lack of criminal record. When enrolling for study, preference is given to those with combat experience, as well as children of those killed during the Iran-Iraq conflict. The duration of training in schools depends on the specialty chosen by the cadet. Graduates are awarded the military rank of lieutenant.

The following ranks are established in the Air Force of the Army and the ACS of the IRGC of Iran: corps general, division general, brigadier general, brigadier general 2nd rank, colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, captain, senior lieutenant, lieutenant, junior lieutenant, sergeant major 1st category, sergeant major 2nd 1st category, senior sergeant, sergeant, junior sergeant, corporal, private 1st category, private 2nd category, private.

During service, an officer may remain in each military rank (position) for no more than four years. After this period, he is presented for promotion to position and military rank. If the officer does not meet the requirements, then the command considers the issue of his professional suitability and the advisability of further stay in the armed forces.

To improve their qualifications during their service, officers periodically undergo training and retraining in special courses, the study of which is a prerequisite for promotion in peacetime.

The final stage in the training of officer cadres of the Army Air Force and the IRGC ACS is study at the Army Air Force Academy, which accepts a small number of Corps military personnel, as well as at the Command and Staff Academy and the Academy of Strategic Sciences.

Social security for military personnel

Pursuing the goal of increasing the prestige of military service, the leadership of the Iranian armed forces constantly pays attention to the issues of material and financial support and improving the social protection system for officers. It provides for free medical care, compulsory state life insurance, as well as the provision of official living space while in the armed forces. The salary of officers, consisting of official salary, salary according to military rank, as well as a number of additional payments, is constantly indexed to take into account inflation. In recent years, its level has increased slightly. This especially applies to flight personnel who receive special allowances and rations. In addition, the command, as a rule, does not prevent officers from engaging in small business. In general, the financial situation of officers of the Army Air Force and ACS of the IRGC corresponds to the average level of material well-being for Iran.

Upon completion of 30 years of service or reaching the age of 60, an officer may retire. Flight personnel may be dismissed for health reasons or decommissioned from flight work and transferred to one of the ground services. A military pensioner has the right to receive a plot of land and a cash loan for housing construction. The commanders of the armed forces are given the right, in agreement with the Ministry of Defense, to extend the service life of officers to 65 years, as well as to hire pensioners from among those transferred to the reserve to work in units and institutions while maintaining their pension.

Religious and political-ideological work in Iran is a single process. To effectively carry out the tasks of ideological and psychological training of military personnel, an extensive network of political and ideological bodies has been created in the air forces of the Army and the IRGC.

Regional bonds

Ebrahim Raisi took over as president at the beginning of August last year. His acquaintance with Vladimir Putin could have taken place back in September at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Dushanbe, but the Russian President took part in the event via video link. For Tehran, the last SCO summit became historic - it was decided to begin the procedure for admitting Iran to this structure, which Russia has long supported. On the eve of the summit, Presidents Putin and Raisi discussed this issue during a telephone conversation. In total, since the inauguration of President Raisi, three telephone conversations have taken place with his Russian colleague. In addition to the SCO, they discussed issues related to bilateral cooperation, negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, as well as the situation in Afghanistan, Syria and around Nagorno-Karabakh. And this is not the whole international agenda.

Just on the eve of President Raisi's visit, the situation around Yemen worsened.

The Houthi Ansar Allah movement, which controls the Yemeni capital Sanaa, attacked the infrastructure of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), as well as a construction site near the international airport of the capital Abu Dhabi. According to the latest data, as a result of a fire that broke out at one of the ADNOC facilities, four people were killed and several more were injured. The UAE authorities demanded that the United States recognize Ansar Allah as a terrorist organization, while the air force of the Riyadh-led Arabian coalition launched a series of attacks on Houthi military targets in Sanaa. As a result, according to news agencies, more than ten people, including civilians, were killed. Earlier this month, the Houthis seized a UAE-flagged ship in the Red Sea, claiming it was carrying military equipment. Abu Dhabi denied this. The escalation could negatively impact Iran, which Arab monarchies accuse of supporting the Houthis and transferring technology to them to produce drones and missiles.

At one time, the Arab monarchies insisted that the United States include a discussion of the issue of Iran's missile production and its active interference in the affairs of the countries of the region (Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon) within the framework of the negotiation process on the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This document, signed in 2015 by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany with Tehran, limited the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. In 2022, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA; in response, Iran abandoned some of its obligations. This year, with the arrival of a new administration in the White House, negotiations began in Vienna on the return of Washington and Tehran to the JCPOA. Russia and China insisted that the document continue to focus only on the nuclear program, and for other topics both countries proposed taking their concepts on security in the Persian Gulf as a basis.