Ballistic missiles for Russian submarines

[edit] Firing range

Now the firing range of Russian SLBMs is such that boats can reach enemy territory without even leaving their bases, right from the quay wall. This is important due to the fact that in the 1960-1970s the United States built the SOSUS anti-submarine defense line in the Atlantic, running along the Greenland-Iceland-British Isles line, consisting of a system of underwater sensors that picked up the noise of the propellers of Soviet submarines. This system was intended to prevent a massive breakthrough of boats to the US coast, which was necessary, since the firing range of the then boat-based missiles was 1500-3000 km. Now, due to the increase in the firing range of boat-based missiles to the level of intercontinental missiles (8500-11500 km), the need for Russian boats to overcome the SOSUS anti-submarine line has practically disappeared.[1]

[edit] Production

Main article

:
Production of submarine-launched ballistic missiles in Russia
The State Missile Center (Miass, Chelyabinsk region) is developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The Votkinsk plant produces Bulava missiles.[2] As of 2022, the capacity of the Votkinsk plant allows the military to transfer at least 15 such missiles annually.[3]

The Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant carries out serial production of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Russia produces Liner missiles.

[edit] History

[edit] 20th century

Main article

:
Submarine ballistic missiles in Russia in the 20th century
Since the mid-1960s, Krasmash began the development and mass production of ballistic missiles for submarines (SLBMs), developed by KBM under the leadership of Viktor Petrovich Makeev.[5]

The missile system with R-29R missiles (SS-N-18 according to the Western classification), which is equipped with missile carriers of Project 667BR, was put into service in 1979.[6]

The missile system with R-29РМ (SS-N-23) missiles, which is equipped with missile carriers of Project 667BDRM, was put into service in 1986.[7]

In 1999, Russia resumed production of the R-29RM missile, a modification known as the R-29RMU-2 Sineva, in order to replace expired missiles during the ongoing repair of Project 667BDRM missile carriers.[8]

[edit] XXI century

Main article

:
Submarine ballistic missiles in Russia in the 21st century
Tests of a new modification of the R-29RM missile were completed in June 2004.[9]

On September 23, 2004, the first prototype of the Bulava missile was successfully launched in the White Sea.[10]

On September 27, 2005, the first successful flight test of the Bulava missile was carried out.[11]

The R-29RMU2.1 “Liner” missile was tested successfully in 2011.[12]

On June 28, 2011, the Bulava missile was launched for the first time from the submarine Yuri Dolgoruky.[13]

On December 23, 2011, a salvo launch of the Bulava missile was successfully carried out from the White Sea from the cruiser Yuri Dolgoruky in its underwater position.[14]

Deliveries of ballistic missiles to submarines under the Russian state defense order in 2012:[15]

• 5-7 Bulava missiles
• ~10 Sineva and Liner missiles

Deliveries of ballistic missiles to submarines under the Russian state defense order in 2013:[16]

• 5-7 Bulava missiles
• ~10 Sineva and Liner missiles

Deliveries of ballistic missiles to submarines under the Russian state defense order in 2014:[17]

• 16 Bulava missiles
• 6 Liner missiles

Deliveries of ballistic missiles to submarines under the Russian state defense order in 2015:[18]

• ~10 Bulava missiles
• ~ 9 Liner missiles

As the TASS agency reported on June 29, 2022, the D-30 missile system with the R-30 Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile, based on the results of successful tests, was adopted by the Russian Navy in 2022. A source in the Russian military-industrial complex reported this to TASS.[19]

Missile carriers under fire

To solve the problems of combating SSBNs, significant forces of multi-purpose nuclear submarines of the US Navy can be used primarily. Based on the operational capacity of the areas of probable combat operations in the area of ​​responsibility of the Northern Fleet, fight our US and NATO SSBNs with more than a dozen of its submarines. If they manage to defeat our Northern Fleet, several more nuclear-powered submarines may be brought in to destroy the SSBNs, as well as base patrol aircraft (BPA) in the amount of up to two or three squadrons and one or two KPUGs consisting of two or three destroyers of the type " Orly Burke."

Project 941UM strategic missile submarine cruiser (TRKSN) “Dmitry Donskoy”. Photo: ruspekh.ru

In the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, the enemy can allocate several American nuclear and Japanese non-nuclear submarines to fight our SSBNs. With the suppression of the grouping of our Aerospace Forces in Kamchatka, Sakhalin and the Kuril Island zone, several squadrons of UAVs may be involved in the destruction of our SSBNs.

In addition, the enemy will actively use minefields, mainly broadband mines, to destroy our SSBNs, both in the combat patrol areas of our SSBNs and on their deployment routes.

It is possible to assess the strength of our SSBNs and American submarines in a battle between them based on their generation. Considering that in terms of noise indicators and the capabilities of the SAC of submarines, our fleet is on par with the American one, only starting with the penultimate generation submarines - projects 877 and 971. Thus, it can be assessed that our SSBNs of projects 667 and 941, being ships of 80- s, are significantly inferior to the latest American submarines in detection range, which means that in a duel situation they have little chance of success. Our newest Project 955 Borei SSBNs are the same generation as the American Virginia. Therefore, we can assume that their chances of success are comparable, with some superiority for the “American”.

Our SSBNs have virtually no ability to effectively combat anti-submarine aircraft, since they do not have effective air defense and air reconnaissance systems. Without anti-ship missiles, in a battle with the enemy’s SSBNs, our SSBNs can only rely on the use of torpedo weapons, which will force them to get closer to enemy surface ships, entering the zone of effective use of their anti-submarine weapons - anti-submarine missiles and torpedoes.

Thus, it can be stated that in combat with enemy anti-submarine forces, our SSBNs are at a disadvantage. Therefore, their combat stability must be ensured mainly through secrecy. However, the size of possible patrol areas, as shown above, is very small. That is why it is impossible to ensure their combat stability without cover by other naval forces.

Since the main threat to our SSBNs comes from enemy nuclear submarines, the basis of the defense system for combat patrol areas is made up of anti-submarine forces. In the Northern Fleet, to solve this problem, to one degree or another, the main forces of the group of anti-submarine forces of the near sea zone, which includes several KPUG (from the ships of the near sea zone of the corvette and small anti-submarine class) and most of the nuclear and non-nuclear multipurpose submarines, as well as almost all anti-submarine aircraft. In addition to these forces, minefields, including broadband mines, can be placed in threatened areas.

In the Pacific Ocean, to cover the SSBNs in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, a group of anti-submarine forces of a similar composition, but somewhat smaller in number, could be created due to the limited naval strength of the fleet and the small operational capacity of the combat areas in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. Minefields may be placed in the straits between the islands of the Kuril ridge.

Estimates of the progress of the confrontation between these forces indicate that by the end of the first half of the expected period of combat operations with conventional weapons, we may lose up to a third of the original composition of our SSBNs. In the future, losses threaten to become significantly greater, which will mean an unacceptable weakening of our strategic nuclear forces. The losses of enemy submarines may also be significant - from a third to a half of their original strength. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that it is difficult to ensure the combat stability of our SSBNs with the existing composition of fleet forces and with existing approaches.

It should be noted that the combat stability of mobile ground-based missile systems may be significantly lower than that of SSBNs. All stationary objects of the strategic deterrence forces (SDF) are extremely vulnerable to damage from long-range precision weapons in conventional equipment: silo launchers for ICBMs, strategic aviation airfields with aircraft located on them, elements of control systems for strategic nuclear forces, missile launchers and missile defense systems.

At the same time, our capabilities to destroy American Ohio-class SSBNs are very limited and we will not be able to achieve a significant weakening of the American strategic nuclear forces. Obviously, this state of affairs is completely unacceptable and it is necessary to take emergency measures to increase the combat stability of our SSBNs.

[edit] Notes

1. The current state of our Strategic Nuclear Forces // Ruskline.ru
2. [1]
3. [2]
4. Directions for improving strategic nuclear forces in the context of missile defense development
5. [3]
6. The current state of our Strategic Nuclear Forces // Ruskline.ru
7. The current state of our Strategic Nuclear Forces // Ruskline.ru
8. The current state of our Strategic Nuclear Forces // Ruskline.ru
9. The current state of our Strategic Nuclear Forces // Ruskline.ru
10. 1990 - present day
11. 1990 - present day
12. The current state of our Strategic Nuclear Forces // Ruskline.ru
13. 1990 - present day
14. 1990 - present day
15. Fulfillment of the Russian state defense order in 2015
16. Fulfillment of the Russian state defense order in 2015
17. Fulfillment of the Russian state defense order in 2015
18. Fulfillment of the Russian state defense order in 2015
19. [4]

Source - ""

Categories: Ballistic missiles in Russia | Submarines in Russia | Submarine ballistic missiles

Underwater shot "Oktyabrenok"

Fifty years ago, on June 10, 1971, a secret decree of the Soviet government was signed, which determined the procedure for work on a missile system for strategic submarines. A feature of the new project was the use of a solid-fuel rocket, which at that time still seemed exotic. Two previous attempts to build such a complex failed ingloriously, but the third was a success.

Arsenal missiles

Today it seems obvious that the most suitable missiles for strategic nuclear forces are solid fuel missiles. However, at a time when the foundations of new types of weapons were just being laid, it was not clear which of the proposed options would be more effective in terms of reliability and manufacturability.

Particular uncertainty arose when deciding to equip surface ships and submarines with heavy ballistic missiles. The United States initially relied on the Jupiter rocket (PGM-19 Jupiter), which was built in the interests of the army and navy in December 1955 by a team of German specialists led by Wernher von Braun. Of course, the experts raised many questions about the use of kerosene-oxygen fuel components in the rocket: they suspected that the sailors would face serious problems when operating the complex, which requires a large amount of liquid oxygen on board, but were forced to put up with this, since according to calculations only Jupiter provided the required launch range of 2000 km.

An alternative emerged in the summer of 1956, when an interdepartmental study, Project Nobska, was commissioned by the Navy to examine aspects of a future naval war involving submarines. Visiting nuclear scientists, including Edward Teller, reported that it was possible to create a small atomic warhead weighing 600 pounds (272 kg) and yielding up to a megaton of TNT. Navy rocketeers involved in the same study said that the bulky Jupiter, whose launch weight was estimated at 73 tons, would then be eliminated and could be replaced by a solid-fuel version of similar range weighing 14 tons. After further Navy research in December they left the joint project with the army, establishing their own, which was called Jupiter-S, and then Polaris (UGM-27 Polaris). It took almost four years to implement the plan: on July 20, 1960, two missiles of a new type were successfully launched from the submarine USS George Washington, SSBN-598, demonstrating the effectiveness of the chosen option.

Launch of the Polaris A-1 solid-fuel medium-range ballistic missile; July 20, 1960 lockheedmartin.com

In the Soviet Union the situation was completely different. Significant progress in the field of creating rockets with liquid engines against the background of the lack of mixed solid fuels with acceptable characteristics contributed to the development of a direction that was abandoned in the United States. And although the R-11FM (8A61FM) missile, created at the Special Design Bureau No. 1 (OKB-1) under the leadership of Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, launched much earlier than the American one (in September 1955), its combat capabilities with a flight range of 150-160 km were left behind wish for better.

In May 1956, work on strategic missiles for the fleet moved to Special Design Bureau No. 385 (SKB-385), located on the northern outskirts of the city of Miass, Chelyabinsk region. They were headed by Viktor Petrovich Makeev, one of the leading designers of OKB-1. His subordinates experimented with various types of fuels, but could not abandon liquid engines, although the American Polaris served as a clear example of a different path.

On September 5, 1958, Resolution No. 1032-492 of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on the creation of a solid-fuel ballistic missile for the complex, which received the D-6 index. The Project 629 diesel-electric submarine was chosen as the carrier; it was supposed to place three missiles in vertical silos. The lead contractor was the Central Design Bureau No. 7 (TsKB-7) in Leningrad, later renamed the Arsenal Design Bureau. At that time, it was led by Pyotr Aleksandrovich Tyurin, who had extensive experience in designing field artillery systems and launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems for Navy ships. Many years later he said:

“Powder rockets for tactical purposes have already found wide use in the Armed Forces. Multiple launch rockets known as Katyusha and other modifications were deservedly used in the Great Patriotic War and improved after it, but there were no trajectory-controlled ballistic missiles, with the exception of individual projects. The principles of controlling ballistic missiles on engines using gunpowder, especially on mixed solid fuels created in laboratories, have not been worked out.

Since a solid fuel engine, unlike a liquid one, cannot be regulated by decreasing the thrust or even stopping it and then starting it again, the control system must be different, created on different principles. Developers of ballistic missile control systems did not lose hope of obtaining solid fuel engines with thrust control. Bold proposals arose to regulate the thrust using ultrasound, by building a sound generator in the form of a whistle into the nozzle apparatus, or to place a bulb in the nozzle block, rotating it in the most intense area of ​​the nozzle, changing the gap - the critical section area in the flow of gases, and thereby achieving a change in thrust. But it was just fantastic! Fortunately, these ideas quickly disappeared and briefly delayed the only real option - to control the thrust with cutoff at the right time or use the engine fuel until it burns out completely (used mainly in the first stages of rockets).”

Submarine K-142 of project 629B, which was created for the D-6 solid-fuel missile system, in the harbor of the port of Liepaja; 1986 ruspodplav.ru

At the stage of the preliminary design of the D-6 complex, Tyurin’s team developed the layout of a two-stage missile with a firing range of 2500 km. They were going to use either Nylon-B ballistic fuel based on artillery gunpowder, or Nylon-S mixed solid fuel. The latter was created on the basis of ammonium perchlorate, furfural-acetone resin, thiokol grade “T” and nitroguanidine; They planned to organize a specialized enterprise for its production. Based on the results of analysis and preliminary tests at the Rzhev test site near Leningrad, experts proposed seven versions of the rocket: two with Nylon-B fuel and five with Nylon-S.

At the same time, the Central Design Bureau No. 18 (TsKB-18), under the leadership of Abram Samuilovich Kassatsier, was working on a second-generation nuclear missile carrier of Project 667, which could accommodate eight missiles of the D-6 complex in SM-95 rotary launchers. But soon another option appeared - a small-sized single-stage ballistic missile R-27 (4K10) using high-boiling fuel components (asymmetrical dimethylhydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide) with a flight range of up to 3000 km, which was independently designed by Makeev’s bureau. Customers liked it better, and in April 1961 the D-6 project was recognized as “unpromising”

.

Pyotr Tyurin later claimed that his team dropped out of the project due to unavailability of fuel:

“We were entirely dependent on the availability of a workable mixed solid fuel developed by GIPH [State Institute of Applied Chemistry] (director and chief designer of the charge V.S. [Vladimir Stepanovich] Shpak). It is no coincidence that the main efforts were aimed at working with GIPH and plant No. 6 in Morozovka [a village named after Morozov]. <…>

The development of new technology of mixed fuels came with unforeseen difficulties. There was no stability of the declared products; sometimes charges were obtained that, when burned on the stand, showed the calculated parameters, but more often than not there were serious deviations with negative results (ruptures for unknown reasons).

At regular meetings at GIPH, V.S. Shpak assured that the reasons were clear and everything would be normal in the future. Weeks passed from the moment of making adjustments and waiting for the next charge to cure, submit to the stand... and again failure. Search for reasons for failure and new proposals.

One day there was an accident. The new workshop collapsed along with the equipment during the next filling of the engine casing from the mixer.

At a meeting of the bureau of the Regional Party Committee, where we were all summoned, there was an investigation and search for the perpetrators. The regional committee supervised the implementation of this topic, which was in the order of things at that time. Unexpectedly, the director of GIPH V.S. Shpak placed all the blame on TsKB-7 and Plant No. 7, allegedly the technological shell lost stability during evacuation, collapsed and finally cracked, struck a spark, the mass ignited and a volumetric combustion occurred - an explosion.

Since such an interpretation was not expressed to us in advance, but was considered at the meeting as a general opinion, without taking into account our opinion, we immediately moved on to recommendations to punish the culprits, i.e., our designers who designed the technological equipment to help GIPH. The real cause of the accident was the drain valve from the mixer. Friction in this valve was a thermal impulse to ignite and further along the fuel in the liquid phase led to a general ignition - an explosion. After the proceedings in the Regional Committee, I turned to Vladimir Stepanovich [Shpak], how one can blame without warning in advance, to which I received the answer: “If the blame is attributed to the difficulties of mastering the new technology for producing mixed fuel with its possible accidents, then this will undermine the very idea of ​​​​using such fuels." This is how victims are chosen! <…>

The unstable operation of the experimental engines did not allow for normal development of propulsion systems in relation to the missile for submarines [submarines] - naturally, the customer decided to suspend his intentions to continue design work until stable results were obtained on mixed solid fuels, the work ended with a report on the topic D-6.”

To ensure that the groundwork did not go to waste, the developments of Tyurin’s team were transferred to Makeev’s bureau: on April 4, 1961, a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 316-137 was issued, in which SKB-385 was entrusted with the creation of the D-7 complex with the RT-15M solid-fuel rocket ( 4K22) for the Project 667 boat.

The naval version of the RT-15 (8K96) was a “truncated” version of the “land” missile RT-2 (8K98), consisting of its second and third stages. With a launch weight of 50 tons, the modernized rocket could provide a flight range of about 2600 km. It was going to be developed in three stages: throw tests of the prototype from the PSD-7 submersible stand, then from the S-229 submarine (project 613D7) and, finally, flight design tests from the K-142 submarine (project 629B); with the last stage planned to be completed in the fourth quarter of 1963.

Work on the D-7 complex was brought to the stage of throwing tests, but in 1962, when the customer wished to increase the ammunition load of the submarines with a reduction in the size of the missiles, interest in the project in SKB-385 began to fade, and in 1964 work on it stopped altogether due to for “ the inability to meet the new requirements”

.
However, witnesses to those ancient events believe that the main problem was in the position of chief designer Viktor Makeev, who remained a supporter of the use of liquid fuels and still considered alternative options “ruinous for the country
.

A model of a solid-fuel ballistic missile RT-15M (4K22) at a military parade on Red Square in Moscow bastion-karpenko.ru

Third try

In 1969, having accumulated experience in creating “ground-based” solid-fuel missiles for strategic purposes, the TsKB-7 team again decided to turn to naval topics. Pyotr Tyurin recalled:

“Head of Design Bureau and Director of Plant No. 7 E.K. [Evgeniy Konstantinovich] Ivanov obtained permission to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the enterprise founded by Peter I at the beginning of the 18th century [as Cannon Foundry Workshops], to return the original name (since 1719) “Arsenal” and to widely celebrate this date with a ceremonial meeting in the October Hall city ​​[BKZ "Oktyabrsky"] with a large gathering of numerous guests, where the awarding of the plant with a Government award - the Order of Lenin - was announced. A large number of congratulations were received from organizations in the city and country. Minister of General Engineering S.A. [Sergei Alexandrovich] Afanasyev announced the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the award. <…>

Significant achievements in the creation of weapons for the country, extensive accumulated experience contributed to obtaining new orders. This proposal was the desire of the Arsenal Design Bureau to return to the design of a missile system for arming submarines [submarines] using proven principles for the use of solid rocket fuels. <…>

[We] were involved in the design of a medium-range missile in relation to the existing Project 667A submarine, subject to major overhaul and armed with the D-5 missile system, which also had to be replaced with a more effective one. In order to clearly and clearly present the task at hand, a group of managers went to the Northern Fleet to familiarize themselves with operating conditions on the spot and listen to the wishes of the personnel.”

The command reviewed on a competitive basis two options for the complex for boats: with a solid-fuel missile from the Arsenal design bureau and a liquid-propellant one, presented by SKB-385. This time, Tyurin’s team was able to enlist the support of influential people: the chief designer of Project 667A submarines Sergei Nikitich Kovalev, the Minister of Shipbuilding Industry Boris Evstafievich Butoma and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Pavel Grigorievich Kotov - and won the competition. On June 10, 1971, Resolution No. 374-117 of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued on the development of a complex with a solid fuel rocket; it received the designation D-11, and its missile was R-31 (3M17).

The tactical and technical task turned out to be very difficult. According to it, the designers had to provide an ejection method of launch from a “dry” silo, the ability to fire twelve missiles in one salvo in one minute, provide options for using monoblock and multiple warheads, and guarantee a seven-year shelf life for missiles. It was also necessary to take into account the customer’s requirement to adjust the dimensions of the rocket to the existing diameter of the shafts.

The R-31 turned out to be a two-stage solid-fuel rocket with a launch weight of 26,840 kg and an estimated flight range of up to 4,500 km with a circular probable deviation of 1,400 m. The first stage engine was equipped with four nozzles and ran on T9-BK-8(R) mixed fuel with a combustion time of 84 seconds. The second stage had only one nozzle in a gimbal; the same fuel was used, but with a shorter burning time - 73 seconds. The combat stage was equipped with four small engines with low-temperature NK-2 fuel, which operated for 101 seconds.

Marine ballistic missile R-31 (3M17) of the D-11 complex bastion-karpenko.ru

The stage bodies were made of especially strong alloy steel of maraging class EP679. The design of the steps is spiral-seam: the tape was rolled up in a spiral so that the weld was equally loaded. The monoblock warhead with a power of 500 kt was attached to the instrument compartment, which housed the instruments of the inertial control system.

The R-31 was launched using the “dry” method using a powder pressure accumulator (PAD). It ensured that the rocket was pushed out of the shaft, which was closed on top with a separating membrane made of rubberized fiberglass. The rocket itself broke through the membrane, so if the launch was cancelled, the shaft remained dry and did not require any additional operations to restore it to its original state.

The stable movement of the rocket underwater, where it could be overwhelmed by the oncoming flow caused by the movement of the boat, was ensured by a cavity formation unit (CFU), which was installed on the head part. It consisted of a ring cavitator with a recharge gas generator in the form of special powder charges. At the moment the powder pressure accumulator was launched, an overload of about 8.5 g occurred, and the rocket was pushed out of the silo within one second. The UVK created a gas bubble around her body, and she remained in an upright position. The exit speed from the shaft was 35 m/s, from the water - 18.9 m/s, and the time of movement under water when starting from a depth of 45 m was 2.4 seconds.

After exiting the water, the UVK was reset and the first stage engine was turned on. As soon as it separated, the second engine was started, correcting the missile’s flight in roll and pitch. One of the most important problems in creating the R-31 was ensuring the required flight range and accuracy. Previously, they were determined by the moment of forced shutdown of the fuel supply (“thrust cutoff”), but in solid fuel rockets it is impossible to stop the engine in this way. Therefore, the designers have developed a method for forming a flight path within a given range until the fuel is completely burned out. To do this, when firing at a shorter distance, the second stage of the rocket turned in a neutral direction, in which an increase in speed gave an increase in range, that is, the effect of a “fictitious cutoff of thrust” was obtained. After the fuel burnout of the second stage, the combat stage was separated: four engines launched it onto the calculated trajectory according to the data of the on-board control system in accordance with a special program.

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Scheme of the underwater section of the R-31 (3M17) rocket movement after the activation of the powder pressure accumulator (PAA) and under the influence of the cavity formation unit (CFU). Illustration from the book “Domestic sea-based ballistic missiles and their carriers” (2006)

Diagram of flight path options for the naval ballistic missile R-31 (3M17) of the D-11 complex. Illustration from the book “Domestic sea-based ballistic missiles and their carriers” (2006)

To verify the correctness of the adopted technical solutions, Arsenal employees developed a test rocket (TMR), which corresponded in weight and dimensions to the R-31. It was equipped with a 1st stage engine with a standard combustion chamber, but the fuel charge was only sufficient to ensure it was pulled away from the stand. The standard mass was simulated by four weights, which were fastened with pyrobolts: it was envisaged that they would be fired in the air, and the IRS would not sink after splashdown, and it could be used many times. The head of the projectile contained retrievable containers with cassettes of the Mir telemetry system and a cavity formation unit, which was necessary to stabilize the rocket in the underwater section.

A special stand was built at Shkolnoye Lake at the Rzhev artillery range near Leningrad, from which testers carried out several launches of a 1:4 scale model of the rocket. At the same time, at the Black Sea Shipyard in Nikolaev, the PS-5M submersible stand was being modernized, which was a square pontoon with four hardware towers in the corners and a missile silo in the center.

In 1972, a modernized submersible stand was delivered to Balaklava. An extensive testing program was developed. The first launch of the IRS from under water took place on April 22, and it ended in complete success: the projectile dropped the shock absorbers and cavitator, the loads fell off, and the Mir armored cassettes were fired, after which the main engine turned on for a short time. In total, seventeen launches of various mock-ups were carried out in Mramornaya Bay, three of them with the stand submerged.

No less important for the development of the project were the launches of the R-31 from the NS-11 ground stand at the Nenoksa test site, located near Severodvinsk in the Arkhangelsk region. They lasted six years and, despite some emergency situations, confirmed the high reliability of the new rocket.

An interesting historical detail: at the same time, the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, under the leadership of Doctor of Technical Sciences and future academician Alexander Davidovich Nadiradze, was working on a mobile ground-based medium-range solid fuel complex “Pioneer” (15P645). Compared to the D-11, it seemed bulky, so when compared, Arsenal employees jokingly nicknamed their brainchild “October.”

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Marine ballistic missile R-31 (3M17) of the D-11 complex in a transport container bastion-karpenko.ru

Launch of the naval ballistic missile R-31 (3M17) of the D-11 complex from the ground stand NS-11 at the test site in Nenoksa bastion-karpenko.ru

One and only

In 1976, the time came to launch the R-31 from the converted submarine, for which the K-140 nuclear submarine was allocated - the second ship of Project 667A, commissioned into the Northern Fleet on December 30, 1967. The choice of this particular boat is explained by the fact that it needed to replace the emergency reactor on one side, and it was the first in the series to go for repairs.

The submarine project for the D-11 complex was assigned the index 667AM and the code “Navaga-M”. It was developed at the Leningrad design and installation bureau "Rubin" and in July 1972 was approved by a joint decision of the Navy and industry. Subsequently, he was transferred to the group of chief designer Osher Yakovlevich Margolin.

Work to modernize the boat was carried out at a ship repair facility in Severodvinsk. She began working on the slipway of workshop No. 10 on November 4th. Due to the fact that the mass of the equipped R-31 was almost twice the launch mass of the missiles that were previously on the boat, and the length was three meters longer, engineers needed to make significant changes to the layout and hull structures of the ship. The number of launch silos was reduced from sixteen to twelve, and the “extra” coamings were cut out and the strong hull was restored. The launchers were replaced with new ones, and the height of the superstructure in the area of ​​the missile deck was increased. The deputy chief designer of the enterprise, Boris Izrailevich Kantor, recalled:

“After a huge volume of dismantling operations, installation work began in almost all compartments. As part of the refurbishment, the 3rd, 4th and 5th compartments were completely remodeled with an almost complete redevelopment of the premises. As I remember now: half-highway routes with cable boxes cut out of enclosures hang like vines in the jungle, and all around there are hot works to form new premises ... "

Capt. 3rd Rank Reserve A.A. spoke about the initial journey of the K-140 submarine of Project 667AM. Samorukov:

“In April 1976, the ship received its first crew at the plant under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Alexander Pavlovich Golovkin. On the missile carrier, which was launched, the re-equipment was basically completed, but installation work on the missile system systems and paired docking work between the systems continued. <…> At that time, many major development specialists, chief designers, leading engineers, and responsible commissioners worked on the ship, who greatly helped me master all the technical intricacies. <…>

On September 14, 1976, the ship entered factory testing. On board, in addition to the crew, there was a commissioning team, leading specialists, designers of all systems, headed by First Deputy Chief Designer Evgeniy Alekseevich Gorigledzhan. In total - more than 400 people, with a regular strength of 120. With this composition, we stayed at sea for 25 days. Can you imagine what was going on inside the durable case?.. All tests were successful. This was followed by refinement of the missile system and preparation for the first launch of a solid-fuel rocket with a “dry” launch from an underwater position.”

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The Project 667AM nuclear submarine K-140 goes to the winding-free demagnetization stand (SBR); August 27, 1976 bastion-karpenko.ru

Memorable record of the chief designer P.A. Tyurin, taken on December 22, 1976 after the first launch of the R-31 (3M17) missile of the D-11 complex from the K-140 submarine of Project 667AM bastion-karpenko.ru

The R-31 missile continued to be tested on stands, including for various damages: it was even dropped from a five-meter height and shot from a machine gun, but it still took off. However, the designers did not have enough confidence that the launch in “combat” conditions would take place without problems.

The launch from the K-140 was made on December 22, 1976 in the Kandalaksha Bay of the White Sea at a depth of 50 m at a speed of 5 knots. On that memorable day, chief designer Pyotr Aleksandrovich Tyurin and other D-11 developers were at the control panel of the missile system. After the command “Start!” they felt only a slight push and no noise - the rocket left the silo so easily. Soon a message arrived: “The stake has been hit.” It was a complete success!

Senior builder of the 5th department Yuri Mikhailovich Erykalov recalled:

“I was part of the support group on board the tugboat Sadko. It was about 7 o'clock in the morning. Low clouds. We watched, peering into the twilight. But then a signal flare flashed, indicating the location of the boat under water. And after another 3-4 minutes, a bright white spot appeared on the dark surface of the sea, which quickly expanded. A few more moments, and a rocket appeared in the flames. At an altitude of about 30 meters, it seemed to freeze, and then, like the sun, a huge luminous ball lit up! This started the first stage propulsion engine. The rumble of an engine reached us, and through the clouds hanging over the sea, a rocket with a torch rushed upward. The spectacle is unforgettable! "

The successful launch of the R-31 in Kandalaksha Bay only meant the end of the first stage of state testing. In 1977, after winter lay-up and completion of the installation of the remaining launch silos, the ship was presented for the second stage. It, in turn, ended on December 26 of the same year.

It must be said that the tests did not always go well. Despite the positive results of the first launch from the K-140, several failed launches followed, and the missiles not only did not reach the battlefield, but also fell near the ship. Designer Evgeny Gorigledzhan suggested that the cause of the failures was the wrong choice of the rigidity of the rocket shock absorbers. The results of an analysis of the movement of the P-31 in the launch shaft and an inspection of the destroyed shock absorbers found in the superstructure of the boat confirmed his hypothesis. The error, which was not detected during firing from the PS-5M and NS-11 stands, delayed the completion of flight tests by almost two years.

In September 1979, the State Commission highly appreciated the D-11 complex and recommended it for adoption. However, it remained only in trial operation and only on the K-140 boat. Captain 3rd Rank Samorukov recalled:

“The SSBN [strategic missile submarine cruiser] K-140 Project 667AM went into first combat service (CS) on September 14, and returned on December 2, 1980. At the end of the post-cruise rest, in two stages - again BS from April 2 to June 17, 1981 d. All combat missions took place in the Atlantic in patrol mode along a route within reach of targets - since our D-11 complex made it possible to launch missiles in a circular sector (±180 degrees), the tactics of carrying BS were changed. After the deployment of Pershing missiles in Western Europe, our SSBNs were retargeted, and the BS began to pass through the Greenland Sea near the ice edge.”

The decision to convert the remaining Project 667A submarines to the new complex was cancelled. Until 1988, the K-140 made eight long-distance missions.

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Project 667AM nuclear submarine K-140 on a long voyage; March 1987 podlodka.info

Launch of the R-31 (3M17) missile of the D-11 complex from the K-140 submarine of Project 667AM bastion-karpenko.ru

In 1990, an order was issued to dispose of the D-11 complex by shooting the entire stock of missiles located on the boat and warehouses. Three full ammunition loads of thirty-six “products” were produced for it; During practical shooting, twenty were used, sixteen more remained. Sukhorukov said:

“From July to September, preparatory work was carried out: they were preparing materiel and missiles. They had to be unloaded, the “heads” had to be re-docked into practical ones. There were not enough containers, there was no lift, since it was drowned in February 1984 <…>. We had just left the Kola Bay - a wave hit, and the lift ended up overboard at a depth of 267 m. Therefore, we went out for the first shooting on September 15, 1990. On September 17, the first missile was launched, the next day a salvo of two missiles was launched, but one missile did not come out. The next time we left was on September 28 with six missiles on board. The next day we launch one missile, and on September 30, two more, one in a salvo. On October 1, according to plan, we have a three-missile salvo, for the first time from the 3rd, 2nd and 1st silos. <…>

The firing interval was set at 26 seconds. When the PAD was activated, the silo's pressurization pipe ruptured, powder gas was released into the compartment, and then, with the release of the rocket, the silo was filled with water. Water streams into the bulkhead, spraying onto operating instruments under a pressure of 4.5 atm (we shot from a depth of 45 m). But the missile attack continues, irreversible processes have already begun on the second missile (in the second silo). I decide not to report until the end of the attack, so as not to worsen the situation, I take everything in the compartment under my control. <…>

But after 26 seconds the second rocket does not come out - the connector did not undock. I wait another 26 seconds - the third rocket doesn’t come out either. After this, I report to the central post to the commander of BC-2 to quickly record the arrays, because the system needs to be turned off. I am reporting the situation that we smelled of gunpowder and took a sea shower, we need to surface and fix the leak. After two unsuccessful attempts to fire in series, we made a decision: shoot the remaining missiles one at a time. <…>

But, despite all the difficulties, the tasks assigned to the crew were successfully completed: out of 16 missiles, 10 were successfully fired, and six were destroyed on the shore due to malfunctions.”

The disposal of the unique D-11 missile system has been completed. Officers and midshipmen were presented with government awards.

On December 17, 1990, K-140 left for Severodvinsk. Today, the submarine’s laying board, its tactical number, a bell, a jack and several remote controls are reminded of the submarine, which paved the way for a whole direction in naval rocket science, which was handed over to the museum by the crew.

Project 667AM nuclear submarine K-140 in Severodvinsk; 1998 Photo from the personal archive of A. Karpovich svpg.ru

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