Last dive. Accidents and disasters of submarines in the USSR and Russia

Last dive. Accidents and disasters of submarines in the USSR and Russia

On April 12, 1970, in the Bay of Biscay (Atlantic Ocean), in a force eight storm after a fire that broke out on April 8, the nuclear submarine K-8 (project 627A “Kit”) of the Northern Fleet sank. 52 of 125 crew members were killed; K-8 became the first ship lost by the Soviet nuclear fleet. The cause of the fire was the combustion of air regeneration system cartridges. The boat was not raised.

On February 24, 1972, in the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean (1.1 thousand km northeast of the island of Newfoundland) a fire broke out on board the nuclear submarine K-19 (project 658) of the Northern Fleet. After surfacing, the boat was unable to move because the diesel generators could not be started. More than 30 ships and vessels of the Soviet Navy took part in the rescue operation. In conditions of a severe storm, it was possible to evacuate most of the K-19 crew, supply electricity and high-pressure air to the boat, and tow the damaged ship to the base. In total, 28 people died as a result of the boat fire.

On June 14, 1973, in Peter the Great Bay (Sea of ​​Japan), the nuclear-powered missile submarine K-56 (Project 675) of the Pacific Fleet, on the surface in foggy conditions, collided with the Soviet research vessel Akademik Berg. A hole formed at the junction of the first and second compartments, and chlorine from the batteries began flowing into the second compartment. 27 people died. The boat was saved from flooding by captain of the second rank Leonid Pshenichny, who managed to seal the aft bulkhead. The commander decided to throw the boat onto the sandbank, which prevented complete flooding of the first compartment. The crew of the submarine and partly of the ship "Akademik Berg", which was moving towards the exit from the bay along the entrance fairway, were blamed for the collision. The boat was towed to the base on pontoons, restored, and continued service until 1992.

On August 21, 1980, in the Pacific Ocean east of the Japanese island of Okinawa, a fire occurred on the nuclear submarine K-122 (Project 659T) of the Pacific Fleet. 14 people died. The boat surfaced, but remained without power or communication. The sailors manually shut down the reactor and used flares to attract the attention of the English gas carrier Harry, from which they were able to transmit a report about the accident to Navy headquarters. Nine hours later, the training ship Meridian of the Vladivostok Naval School arrived at the scene of the accident, and most of the crew transferred to it. The boat was later towed to the base.

On October 21, 1981, in the Eastern Bosphorus Strait near the coast of the Primorsky Territory, the Soviet diesel submarine S-178 of Project 613B sank after a collision with the cargo ship Refrigerator-13. The reason was numerous violations by both crews, as well as coastal services - both the submarine and the merchant ship arbitrarily changed course, without knowing the situation in the navigation area and failing to detect each other. The S-178, having received a hole in the left side, lay on the ground at a depth of about 30 m. The rescue operation lasted two days, the submariners left the sunken submarine through torpedo tubes. A total of 32 were killed, 27 people were saved.

On June 23, 1983, the nuclear-powered missile submarine K-429 (Project 670 “Scat”) of the Pacific Fleet sank while diving in Saranaya Bay (Kamchatka Territory). The fourth compartment was flooded through the ventilation system, the boat lay on the ground at a depth of 40 m. As a result, 16 people died (two when exiting the boat), the remaining 104 sailors were able to leave the ship. The boat was later raised and converted into a training station and scrapped in 2001–2002.

We create communication

The idea of ​​the combat use of an underwater vessel was first expressed by Leonardo da Vinci. He subsequently destroyed his project because he feared the devastating consequences of submarine warfare. The idea of ​​using a submarine in combat was popularized in Jules Verne's novel 20 Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, written in 1870. The novel describes the Nautilus submarine, which rams and destroys surface ships.

Although the most important tactical property and advantage of a submarine is stealth, until 1944 all submarines spent most of their time on the surface and were essentially submersible boats - surface ships.

Today we will remember the largest submarine disasters, because sometimes these metal monsters go under water forever...

US Navy submarine SS-109 (1927)

40 people died when the US submarine SS-109 (USS S-4) sank after it was rammed by a US Coast Guard ship off Cape Cod.

An amazing fact: the submarine returned to service a year after this accident and served actively until its decommissioning in 1936.

Soviet submarine S-117 "Pike", 1952

"Shch-117" is a Soviet diesel-electric torpedo submarine from the Second World War, belongs to the V-bis series of the Shch - "Pike" project. On June 10, 1949, renamed S-117.

Shch-117, 1930s:

By the early fifties, the S-117 was no longer a new ship, but it successfully performed the tasks assigned to it. In December 1952, in the Sea of ​​Japan, the Pike was supposed to take part in exercises. On the way to the maneuver area, its commander reported that due to a breakdown of the right diesel engine, the submarine was going to the designated point on one engine. A few hours later he reported that the problem had been fixed. The boat never made contact again.

The exact cause and place of death of the submarine are unknown. It was as if she had disappeared.

There were 52 crew members on board the boat, including 12 officers. Searches for the C-117, carried out until 1953, yielded nothing. The cause and place of the boat's death are still unknown.

US Navy submarine USS Thrasher, 1963

An American submarine sank during a training exercise off the Cape Cod Peninsula off the coast of Massachusetts, killing 129 crew members.

Mechanical failure caused the boat to quickly sink and explode. According to the conclusions made by expert Bruce Rule, who examined the death of the boat, the final destruction of the Thresher’s hull occurred at a depth of 732 m and took no more than 0.1 seconds. Its wreckage was discovered at a depth of more than 2,500 meters. The boat's hull split into six main parts - the bow section, the sonar dome, the wheelhouse, the tail section, the engine room, and the command compartment, all located within a radius of 300 meters.

Photo of the Thrasher's vertical rudder lying on the bottom:

The sinking of the Soviet submarine K-129, 1968

The diesel submarine of the USSR Navy K-129, which, according to various sources, carried from 96 to 98 crew members, went on combat duty in the North Pacific Ocean in February 1968.

On March 8, 1968, the diesel-electric missile submarine K-129 from the Pacific Fleet, equipped with nuclear warheads, was lost. The submarine carried out combat service in the Hawaiian Islands, and since March 8 it has stopped communicating. According to various sources, there were from 96 to 98 crew members on board the K-129, all of them died.

The cause of the disaster is unknown. There are a number of theories regarding the accident, including a collision with an American ship, but Washington has consistently denied this, and, according to the official US Navy report, the sinking of the Soviet submarine was blamed on a “tragic explosion on board.” Subsequently, the Americans discovered K-129 and recovered it in 1974.

The Soviet side organized a search for the missing submarine, which did not bring any results. Subsequently, K-129 was discovered by the Americans, who organized its recovery.

Submarine K-129 at the bottom:

During the rise, the submarine broke in two, but several of its compartments were delivered to one of the US Navy bases. During their examination, the bodies of six Soviet submariners were discovered. The Americans gave military honors to the dead and buried the dead submariners at sea.

American USS Scorpion (SSN-589), 1968

The keel of the US Navy ship took place on August 20, 1958. The boat sank on May 21, 1968, 740 km southwest of the Azores at a depth of 3,000 meters, 5 days before returning to base in Norfolk. 99 people died.

They searched for the sunken boat for 5 months; more than 60 ships and vessels, and up to 30 aircraft were involved in the search. A week after the search began, a German submarine, sunk during the Second World War, was discovered 100 miles from Norfolk. The search was in vain for a long time.

Soon the boat was found at a depth of 3047 meters and photographed by the Mizar vessel. The cause of the ship's death has not yet been established; the most likely version is a torpedo explosion. But there are other versions...

For almost 40 years, by mutual agreement, the United States and Russia have been carefully concealing the fact of the destruction of the American nuclear submarine Scorpion by a combat torpedo fired by a Soviet submarine, says the author of the new investigative book “Scorpion Down” published in the United States, military journalist Ed Offley.

Offley claims that the destruction of the Scorpion was the “revenge” of Soviet submariners who believed that the United States was involved in the death of the Soviet submarine K-129, which sank to the bottom after an explosion on board with its entire crew of 98 people in the Pacific Ocean in March 1968.

The tragedies of 1968 were part of an underwater “reconnaissance war,” many of the details of which are still classified, the author of the book believes.

Fragment of a boat hull. Visible deformations from excessive pressure:

Soviet submarine K-8, 1970

The Soviet nuclear submarine K-8 of Project 627A “Kit” joined the Northern Fleet on August 31, 1960.

The submarine, which was on combat duty in the Mediterranean Sea, was sent to the North Atlantic region to participate in the largest exercise in the history of the Soviet Navy, Ocean-70, in which the forces of all USSR fleets participated. Its task was to designate the “enemy’s” submarine forces breaking through to the shores of the Soviet Union. The start of the exercises was planned for April 14, the end - for the 100th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin - April 22, 1970.

The last hours of the life of K-8 and part of her crew:

The nuclear submarine K-8 was lost on April 12, 1970 in the Bay of Biscay of the Atlantic Ocean as a result of a severe fire, which led to the loss of buoyancy and longitudinal stability. The submarine sank at a depth of 4680 meters, 490 km northwest of Spain. 52 crew members were killed. While dying, they managed to shut down the nuclear reactors.

Monument to the K-8 crew:

The death of K-8 and 52 crew members was the first loss of the Soviet nuclear fleet.

Nuclear submarine K-278 "Komsomolets", 1989

The Soviet 3rd generation nuclear submarine K-278 Komsomolets was the only submarine of Project 685 Plavnik. The boat holds the absolute record for diving depth among submarines - 1027 meters (August 4, 1985). The boat had six bow 533-mm torpedo tubes with a quick loader. Each TA had an autonomous pneumohydraulic firing device. Shooting could be carried out at all diving depths.

The nuclear submarine K-278 Komsomolets sank on April 7, 1989 in the Norwegian Sea. The submarine was moving at a depth of 380 meters at a speed of 8 knots. As a result of a fire in two adjacent compartments, the main ballast tank systems were destroyed, through which the boat was flooded with sea water. 42 people died, many from hypothermia.

Russian submarine "Kursk, 2000"

K-141 "Kursk" is a Russian nuclear submarine missile-carrying cruiser of Project 949A "Antey". Laid down at Sevmash in 1990 and put into operation on December 30, 1994.

The Russian submarine Kursk sank on August 12, 2000, at a depth of 108 meters during naval exercises in the Barents Sea, in waters between Norway and Russia, after two explosions occurred on board caused by a torpedo motor fuel leak.

Most of the 118 people on board were killed instantly. 23 people managed to get out into the rear compartment, but died of suffocation the next day. In terms of the number of deaths, the accident became the second in the post-war history of the Russian submarine fleet after the explosion of ammunition on a B-37.

All stages of the operation to raise the Kursk were carried out over the course of a year. About 120 companies from 20 countries were involved in it. The cost of the work was estimated at 65 - 130 million US dollars. As a result of the operation of raising the Kursk boat, 115 bodies of dead submariners were found and buried. Three bodies were never found. A boat's potentially dangerous ammunition and two nuclear reactors were evacuated from the bottom of the Barents Sea

Chinese submarine "Min 361", 2003

The submarine was launched in 1995. Assigned to the Eastern Fleet of the People's Republic of China Navy

On April 16, 2003, during an exercise, the diesel engine of the Min 361 submarine broke down while it was in Bohai Bay in the Yellow Sea off the northeastern coast of China. The breakdown led to a sharp decrease in oxygen on board and suffocation of all 70 crew members.

This was the first time China has made public the death of its diesel-electric submarine. According to Xinhua on May 2, 2003, the boat was discovered by Chinese fishermen on April 25, 2003, when they caught its periscope with nets. The submarine was later raised to the surface and towed away.

Argentine submarine "San Juan", 2017

The Argentine Navy submarine San Juan stopped communicating on November 15 while en route from the Ushuaia naval base to Mar del Plata. At the time of the last communication session, the submarine reported an accident. There were 44 people on board.

15 days after the disappearance of the submarine, the Argentine Navy announced that the operation to rescue the 44 crew members of the San Juan submarine was being stopped, but the search for the submarine itself would continue.

The captain of the missing Argentine Navy submarine San Juan promised his mother that this would be his last voyage. That's how it happened.

As for nuclear submarines, a total of 8 nuclear submarines sank from 1955 to 2022: 4 Soviet, 2 Russian, 2 American. All of them died as a result of various accidents: three due to technical malfunctions, two as a result of fires, two due to problems with weapons, the cause of the death of one boat is not reliably known.

Russian submarine "Kursk" (2000)

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The Russian submarine Kursk sank during naval exercises in the Barents Sea, between Norway and Russia, after two explosions occurred on board caused by a torpedo motor fuel leak. Most of the 118 people on board were killed instantly. 23 people managed to escape to the rear compartment, where they waited for help to arrive, but died from suffocation a week after the start of the rescue operation.

Soviet submarine K-129 (1968)

The Soviet diesel-electric submarine K-129, equipped with nuclear warheads, sank while patrolling the Indian Ocean. There were 98 people on board, all of them died. The wreckage of the submarine was discovered north of the island of Oahu in the Hawaiian archipelago by the American submarine Halibut. There are a number of theories regarding the accident, including a collision with an American ship, but Washington has consistently denied this, and, according to the official US Navy report, the sinking of the Soviet submarine was blamed on a “tragic explosion on board.”

Last radiogram

By the early 1950s, the S-117 was already an old ship by naval standards; the boat arrived in the Pacific Ocean in 1934. Two years later, the crew completed a record autonomous voyage lasting 40 days, doubling the standard period of stay at sea. The “Pike” did not have the chance to participate in the Great Patriotic War - its only combat performance was during the war with Japan in August 1945, but it never encountered enemy ships. At the same time, despite its considerable age, in the early 1950s the boat carried out quite intensive service. In the year of the disaster, the crew of the C-117 spent 72 days at sea and made 200 dives.

In mid-December 1952, the 90th Submarine Brigade, which included the S-117, conducted exercises in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. "Pike" served as a "reconnaissance" and left Sovetskaya Gavan earlier than other ships - on the morning of December 14. The last radiogram from the boat on the shore was received on the night of December 15, the commander reported the start of the second diesel engine, which had failed a few hours earlier.

The navy raised the alarm only a day later, after the boat did not respond to several requests from the coastal checkpoint. Several minesweepers and rescue ships took part in the rescue operation, and border guards and army soldiers combed the shore. However, neither the submarine nor even the slightest hint of a disaster such as traces of diesel fuel on the water could be found. By the end of December 1952, the operation was curtailed.

Analysis of the effectiveness of the Soviet submarine fleet during the Second World War

Author: Sergey Kharlamov, historian, journalist-analyst

The material that I bring to your attention is not mine. In this case, I decided to deviate from my principle of posting only original articles on this site. The fact is that I acquired a wonderful research work, which, unfortunately, was published in a microscopic edition of 800 copies, and therefore for most those interested in military history it may go unnoticed. We are talking about the book by A.V. Platonov and V.M. Lurie “Commanders of Soviet Submarines 1941-1945.” It is a continuation of the book “Soviet Warships 1941-1945” published in 1996. Submarines". However, the authors of these works, over the years of work in the Central Naval Archive, discovered a number of new circumstances that significantly influenced the clarification of the fate of Soviet submarines, as well as the effectiveness of their combat activities. For this reason, they ask that both editions be considered as one whole, and if discrepancies are found, preference is given to the latter. In the following material I present only some of the main conclusions of respected scientists. For those who would like to get acquainted with their work in more detail, I inform you that there you will find a complete list of commanders of Soviet submarines and an analysis of their personal contribution to the Great Victory, as well as an extensive series of authentic orders and directives of the People's Commissar and the Chief of the GPU of the USSR Navy dedicated to submarine forces.

During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet navy had 267 submarines, of which 170 (59%) took part in hostilities (the Baltic submarines L-1, M-72-76 (6 units in total) are not taken into account here). At the beginning of the war, they were under repair, but soon they were mothballed and never put into operation. In addition, the “B-1” was not taken into account, which left Great Britain, but did not arrive in Polyarnoye). Of these, 81 (48%) submarines were killed by enemy weapons, 8 were blown up themselves, and another 8 were withdrawn from the fleet due to their technical condition. Now let's see how things stood with the effectiveness of the use of submarines of the main warring states.

The data presented in the table is largely conditional, in the sense that they cannot be perceived as absolute numbers. This is due, first of all, to the fact that it is quite difficult to accurately calculate the number of submarines of foreign states that participated in the hostilities. And their number needs to be known, which is clearly seen in the example of Germany, since if in 1945 all the built German submarines of the XX1 and XX111 series had gone on military campaigns, then the Allied losses would have been completely different. There are still discrepancies in the number of targets sunk. However, the given values ​​​​give a general idea of ​​the order of the numbers and their relationship to each other. This means that we can draw some conclusions.

Firstly, Soviet submariners have the smallest number of sunk targets for each submarine participating in combat operations (the effectiveness of submarine operations is often assessed by sunk tonnage. However, this indicator largely depends on the quality of potential targets, and in this sense, for the Soviet fleet it was completely not acceptable. Indeed, but in the North the bulk of enemy transports were small and medium-tonnage ships, and in the Black Sea such targets could be counted on one hand. For this reason, in the future we will mainly talk simply about sunken targets, only highlighting among them warships). The next in this indicator is the United States, but there the real figure will be significantly higher than indicated, since in fact only about 50% of the total number of submarines in the theater of operations participated in combat operations on communications, the rest performed various special tasks.

Secondly, the percentage of lost submarines from the number of those participating in hostilities in the Soviet Union is almost twice as high as in other victorious countries (Great Britain - 28%, USA - 21%).

Thirdly, in terms of the number of targets sunk for every submarine lost, we surpass only Japan, and are close to Italy. Other countries are several times superior to the USSR in this indicator. As for Japan, at the end of the war there was a real beating of its fleet, including its submarine fleet, so comparing it with the victorious country is not at all correct.

When considering the effectiveness of Soviet submarines, one cannot help but touch upon one more aspect of the problem. Namely, the relationship between this efficiency and the funds that were invested in the submarines and the hopes that were placed on them. It is very difficult to estimate in rubles the damage caused to the enemy; on the other hand, the real labor and material costs of creating any product in the USSR, as a rule, did not reflect its formal cost. However, this issue can be considered indirectly. In the pre-war years, industry transferred 4 cruisers, 35 destroyers and leaders, 22 patrol ships and more than 200 (!) submarines to the Navy. And in monetary terms, the construction of submarines was clearly a priority. Before the third five-year plan, the lion's share of allocations for military shipbuilding went to the creation of submarines, and only with the laying down of battleships and cruisers in 1939, the picture began to change. Such funding dynamics fully reflect the views on the use of naval forces that existed in those years. Until the very end of the thirties, submarines and heavy aircraft were considered the main striking force of the fleet. In the third five-year plan, priority began to be given to large surface ships, but by the beginning of the war, it was submarines that remained the most massive class of ships and, if the main focus was not placed on them, then huge hopes were pinned.

To summarize a short quick analysis, we must admit that, firstly, the effectiveness of Soviet submarines during the Second World War was one of the lowest among the warring states, and even more so such as Great Britain, the USA, and Germany. Secondly, Soviet submarines clearly did not live up to the hopes and investments placed on them. As one example from a number of similar ones, we can consider the contribution of submarines to the disruption of the evacuation of Nazi troops from Crimea on April 9-May 12, 1944. In total, during this period, 11 submarines in 20 combat campaigns damaged one (!) transport. According to commanders' reports, several targets were allegedly sunk, but there was no confirmation of this. Yes, this is not very important. After all, in April and twenty days of May the enemy conducted 251 convoys! And these are many hundreds of targets and with very weak anti-submarine protection. A similar picture emerged in the Baltic in the last months of the war with the mass evacuation of troops and civilians from the Courland Peninsula and from the Danzig Bay area. In the presence of hundreds of targets, including large-tonnage ones, often with completely conditional anti-submarine protection, in April-May 1945, 11 submarines in 11 combat campaigns sank only one transport, a mother ship and a floating battery.

Until recently, such a low efficiency of Soviet submarines during the war was not commented on in any way. More precisely, she simply did not recognize it as such. Myth-making reigned. Firstly, the success figures for torpedo attacks in official publications were overestimated. Secondly, the vast majority of this information was secret. And already in the 80s. Many experts agreed that the reason for classifying the results of the combat activities of the Soviet Navy during the Great Patriotic War lies not in the possibility of causing damage to the country's defense capability, but in exorbitantly inflated figures that do not have documentary evidence. Thirdly, it was not customary to compare the figures characterizing the success of the actions of our forces with similar figures relating to the fleets of other states. The latter was usually explained by the extremely complex, “non-standard” conditions of the situation in the domestic theaters of military operations. Indeed, there is no analogue to the situation for submarine operations in the Baltic in 1942-1944. No. But, firstly, in 1943, and for most of 1944, Soviet submarines did not operate in the Baltic. And, secondly, in addition to the Baltic, there were also the Barents and Black Seas. The situation there was also not simple, but enemy submariners and others were operating in the same conditions. On August 4, 1941, the British submarine Tygris and then the Trident arrived in Polyarnoye. At the beginning of November they were replaced by two other submarines, Seawolf and Silayen. In total, until December 21, they made 10 military campaigns, destroying 8 targets. Is it a lot or a little? In this case, this is not important, the main thing is that during the same period, 19 Soviet submarines in 82 military campaigns sank only 3 targets. So the reference to the exceptional conditions of the situation is not entirely correct, in any case, it does not explain everything.

The most likely reason for the low efficiency of domestic submarines may lie in their very quality. However, in the domestic literature this factor is immediately dismissed. You can find a lot of statements that Soviet submarines, especially the “S” and “K” types, were the best in the world. Indeed, if we compare the most general performance characteristics of domestic and foreign submarines, then such statements seem quite justified. The Soviet submarine of the "K" type is superior to its foreign classmates in speed, in surface cruising range it is second only to the German submarine and has the most powerful weapons. But even when analyzing the most general elements, there is a noticeable lag in submerged swimming range, diving depth and diving speed. If we start to understand further, it turns out that the quality of submarines is greatly influenced by elements that are not recorded in our reference books and are usually subject to comparison (by the way, we also, as a rule, do not indicate the depth of immersion and the speed of immersion), and others directly related to new technologies. These include noise, shock resistance of instruments and mechanisms, the ability to detect and attack the enemy in conditions of poor visibility and at night, stealth and accuracy in the use of torpedo weapons, and a number of others. Unfortunately, at the beginning of the war, domestic submarines did not have modern electronic detection equipment, torpedo firing machines, bubble-free firing devices, depth stabilizers, radio direction finders, shock absorbers for devices and mechanisms, but they were distinguished by the great noise of the mechanisms and devices. The issue of communication with a submerged submarine was not resolved. Almost the only source of information about the surface situation of the submerged submarine was a periscope with very poor optics. The Mars-type noise direction finders in service made it possible to determine by ear the direction to the noise source with an accuracy of plus or minus 2 degrees. The operating range of the equipment with good hydrology did not exceed 40 kb.

The commanders of German, British, and American submarines had hydroacoustic stations at their disposal. They worked in noise direction finding mode or in active mode, when the hydroacoustic could determine not only the direction to the target, but also the distance to it. German submariners, with good hydrology, detected a single transport in noise direction finding mode at a distance of up to 100 kb, and already from a distance of 20 kb they could get a range to it in the “Echo” mode. Our allies had similar capabilities at their disposal. And this is not all that directly affected the effectiveness of the use of domestic submarines. Under these conditions, deficiencies in technical characteristics and support for combat operations could be partially compensated only by the human factor. This is where, probably, lies the main determinant of the effectiveness of the domestic submarine fleet - Man! But among submariners, like no one else, there is objectively a certain main person in the crew, a certain God in a separate enclosed space. In this sense, a submarine is similar to an airplane: the entire crew may consist of highly qualified professionals and work extremely competently, but the commander is at the helm and it will be he who lands the plane. Pilots, like submariners, usually either all emerge victorious or all die. Thus, the personality of the commander and the fate of the submarine are something whole.

In total, during the war years in the active fleets, 358 people acted as commanders of submarines, 229 of them participated in this position in combat campaigns, 99 died (43%).

Having examined the list of commanders of Soviet submarines during the war, we can state that most of them had a rank corresponding to their position or one step lower, which is normal personnel practice. Consequently, the statement that at the beginning of the war our submarines were commanded by inexperienced newcomers who took positions thanks to the political repressions that took place is unfounded. Another thing is that the rapid growth of the submarine fleet in the pre-war period required more officers than the schools produced. For this reason, a crisis of commanders arose, and they decided to overcome it by recruiting civilian sailors to the fleet. Moreover, it was believed that it would be advisable to send them specifically to submarines, since they know the psychology of the captain of a civilian vessel (transport) most well, and this should make it easier for them to act in the fight against shipping. This is how many sea captains, that is, people who are essentially non-military, became submarine commanders. True, they all studied at the appropriate courses, but if it’s so easy to make submarine commanders, then why are schools and many years of study needed? In other words, an element of serious damage to future efficiency was already built into it.

An entire chapter of the book is devoted to a detailed analysis of what the educational and combat training of submariners was like before and during the Great Patriotic War. This is perhaps the saddest part of the study. The authors come to the conclusion that it was the extremely low level of training of submariners, especially submarine commanders, that became the main reason for the failures of our submarines. In these conditions, on the one hand, it is necessary to recognize the unconditional courage shown by the absolute majority of submariners in literally every combat campaign. On the other hand, it was objectively difficult to expect greater efficiency from Soviet submarines than was actually the case.

In conclusion, I will provide a list of the most effective domestic submarine commanders. It is significantly different from everything that could be read in the literature so far, but this is the first documented list of our submarine aces.

VLASOV Vladimir Yakovlevich - 6 reliably sunk targets (3.736 GRT), 12.5 days at sea for one sunk target, died. LISIN Sergey Prokofievich, Hero of the Soviet Union - 5 reliably sunk targets (9.164 GRT), 18 days per target. KOTELNIKOV Viktor Nikolaevich - 5 motorboats sunk by artillery fire, 17.8 days on target. SHCHEDRIN Grigory Ivanovich, Hero of the Soviet Union - 4 reliably sunk targets (10.152 GRT) and one damaged, 31.2 days per target. MOKHOV Nikolai Konstantinovich - 4 reliably sunk targets (6.080 GRT) and one damaged, 9 days on target, died. GRESHILOV Mikhail Vasilievich, Hero of the Soviet Union - 4 reliably sunk targets (2.293 GRT) and one damaged, 64.7 days per target. TROFIMOV Ivan Yakovlevich - 4 reliably sunk targets (13.857 GRT), 41 days on target, died. KONOVALOV Vladimir Konstantinovich, Hero of the Soviet Union - 3 reliably sunk targets (6.641 GRT) and one transport (762 GRT) and one warship were presumably killed by exposed mines, 18.4 days per target. OSIPOV Evgeniy Yakovlevich, Hero of the Soviet Union - 3 reliably sunk targets (3.974 GRT) and one damaged, 16.3 days per target, died. BOGORAD Samuil Nakhmanovich, Hero of the Soviet Union - 3 reliably sunk targets (6,100 GRT), 34.3 days per target. MATIYASEVICH Alexey Mikhailovich - 1 reliably sunk target (2.414 GRT) and 4 vehicles (5.067 GRT) and two warships were presumably killed by exposed mines, one ship was damaged, 10.3 days per target. AUGUSTINOVICH Mikhail Petrovich - 6 transports (16.052 GRT) and two warships were allegedly killed by exposed mines, 21.5 days to reach the target. MOGILEVSKY Sergei Sergeevich - 2 reliably sunk targets (105 GRT), one transport (749 GRT) and three warships were presumably killed by exposed mines, 13.3 days per target. GRISCHENKO Petr Denisovich - 1 reliably sunk target, five transports (16.352 GRT) were presumably killed by exposed mines, 13.5 days per target. POLYAKOV Evgeniy Petrovich - 2 reliably sunk targets, presumably two transports (2.304 GRT) and one warship were killed by exposed mines, one ship was damaged, 41.6 days per target.

The greatest success in one attack was achieved by the S-56 commander G.I. Shchedrin. On May 17, 1943, he hit two transports at once with a four-torpedo salvo. One of them sank, and the second was only damaged - the torpedo did not explode. N.K. Mokhov must be recognized as the most objective commander; all the victories he declared were subsequently confirmed. As an opposite example, we can cite I.V. Travkin, who declared 13 victories, was approved for 7, but in fact he sank 1 transport, for which he spent a total of 50 torpedoes (a kind of record). The next most torpedoes consumed are M.V. Greshilov - 49 (16.3 per target sunk) and N.A. Lunin - 47 (23.5 per target sunk). The largest tonnage of reliably sunk targets belongs to A.I. Marinesko - 40,144 GRT (2 ships destroyed).

In general, it must be admitted that Soviet submariners fought in extremely difficult conditions. And it’s not just about the serious anti-submarine line in the Gulf of Finland. The difficulty of conducting combat operations for Soviet submariners often lay not in the objective physical-geographical conditions of the regions, not in the characteristics of the enemy’s anti-submarine warfare, but in the lack of necessary support and effective combat training. This applies to both purely technical issues (hydroacoustics, communications, noise levels of instruments and mechanisms, etc.) and operational-tactical ones (reconnaissance, control, ensuring deployment from bases and return). As for combat training, it was of low quality even in peacetime, which predetermined the low success of Soviet submarines in the initial period of the war.

The killer of the Kursk was the English boat Splendid, but it also died nearby

The Royal Navy nuclear submarine Splendid, the sixth and final in the series. (Photo from the collection "Jane's Fighting Ships")

In the Barents Sea on August 12, two nuclear submarines were lost - the Kursk and the British multi-purpose submarine of the Swiftsure type (it was reported that the S106 Splendid nuclear submarine was present in the area of ​​the Northern Fleet exercises, but whether it collided with the Kursk is still a question).

To a reasonable question - why British and not American? - I’ll answer with a proverb - a thief’s hat is on fire. Whose naval attaché suddenly rushed to our General Headquarters when stung? Whose divers and rescue apparatus began to prepare for transfer to the Barents Sea on August 14? Whose naval officers flashed on the deck of the Peter the Great in those same days? Who owns the ship that sent its ships to the site of the disaster?

The cause of the death of both boats was a collision during mutual maneuvering in order to restore lost hydroacoustic contact - a situation that is generally common for modern ultra-low-noise nuclear submarines, so, of course, there is no reason to blame the British for deliberate ramming.

During a collision with a British submarine, the ammunition on the Swiftsure type submarine detonated - up to 20 units of Sub-Harpoon UGM-84B anti-ship missiles and Tigerfish Mk24 or Spearfish torpedoes of the same types - in total from 2.6 to 6 .8 tons of explosives. In addition, it was possible that there were 2-4 Tomahawk cruise missiles in conventional equipment, but the latter, of course, did not detonate, especially since they were in the torpedo tubes and not in the compartment. It should be borne in mind that the British nuclear submarine carried out combat service near the main bases of Russian strategic submarines and therefore, most likely, most of its ammunition consisted of torpedoes.

On the Kursk, which went to sea for only two or three days, there were only practical torpedoes (instead of explosives in the combat charging compartments - autograph recorders, light and radio beacons, especially when it came to testing the power plants of new torpedoes), which, Naturally, they couldn’t explode. True, their solid propellant engines (if we are talking about jet torpedoes) or fuel components (if the torpedoes were hydrogen peroxide) could explode, but the power of such an explosion would not be so great. Moreover, there were a maximum of two of these very practical torpedoes, and according to published data, Dagdizel specialists tested an electric torpedo on the Kursk, in which there was nothing to explode at all.

As a result of the frontal impact (the total speed of both nuclear submarines at the time of the collision could reach 18-20 knots) and the subsequent two explosions on the Kursk, the bow end was completely destroyed (approximately up to the fencing of the retractable devices), and the British submarine simply fell apart. Large debris (in fact, these were fragments of the hull weighing up to 1000 tons) tore through the starboard side of the Kursk, tearing its light hull, tearing off the top cover of the floating rescue chamber, damaging the aft emergency signal buoy (it filled with water and therefore did not float up) and jammed the top cover of the aft rescue hatch.

After this, both the Kursk and what was left of the British nuclear submarine moved by inertia (the Kursk plowed through the ground for about 150 m) and eventually fell to the bottom at a distance of about 300 m from each other. At the moment of the explosions, 2 signal beacons automatically surfaced from the British nuclear submarine and began transmitting a coded distress signal (after which two NATO Orions appeared over the scene of the disaster). At the same time, the emergency hydroacoustic beacon turned on (by the way, the Kursk also had a similar device, but it did not work, since, firstly, it was powered by electricity from the battery of the 1st compartment, and secondly, when the submarine’s diving depth was less than the maximum, it can only be turned on manually from the central control, which, of course, no one managed to do). If we believe recent statements by Mr. Klebanov and the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Popov, then the acoustic signals of this lighthouse were recorded by Russian ships.

By the time the Kursk lay down on the ground, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th compartments were already completely flooded (there is nothing to say about the 1st compartment), as well as, possibly, the 5th and 5-bis compartments (they are part of the bow block of compartments and have a common system of general ship ventilation; it is possible that at the time of the collision the ventilation was working in the mode of mixing air between the compartments or the PVP (underwater air supply) device was working, especially since the retractable devices were The hydraulic system was torn during the collision and explosions, and no one had time to manually close the bulkhead flaps of the ventilation pipelines (up to half a meter in diameter).

The 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th compartments initially remained dry, but the personnel in them were doomed (the only escape route was the aft rescue hatch of the 9th compartment, but its coaming area was deformed , the top cover is jammed, and the hatch shaft has lost its tightness and was flooded with water). Neither deep-sea divers, nor Bester, nor LR-5 could help here. If what we were told about the records of the turbine group commander D. Kolesnikov is true, then the personnel could really try to get out of the sunken boat using the free ascent method (the individual rescue equipment available on the Kursk was an SSP wetsuit with a flotation tank and a parachute system and breathing the IDA-59M device made it possible to do this from a depth of up to 250 m). However, having found out that the aft hatch shaft was flooded (which automatically made rescue using the above method impossible), people began to wait in vain for outside help. Most likely, they were all together in the 9th compartment and lived for about 3 more days (according to unofficial data, the last entries made by D. Kolesnikov are dated August 15, this is also confirmed by the nature of the entries - the first were written in “calligraphic handwriting”, the latter - in touch, and this despite the fact that stationary autonomous emergency lamps in submarine compartments operate with continuous lamp burning for about 6 hours, and portable lamps for about a day, but battery energy can be used sparingly, and then the light will be enough for two to three days), after why they died, and, most likely, from hypothermia than from lack of oxygen (the temperature in the 8th and 9th compartments dropped to sea level within 24 hours - about 0 degrees, hence the message that the corpses were found dressed in foam rubber insulation from rescue diving suits). Probably, after their death, a local fire occurred in the 9th compartment (possibly due to the ingress of water with an oil film, which slowly filled the compartment, onto the regeneration plates in the RDU installation (emergency air regeneration unit) or into an opened jar with regenerative plates (set B -64) Maybe at the time of the fire several people were still alive and found the strength to move to the 8th compartment, where their bodies were later found by divers.

After the ACC forces carried out a detailed examination of the Kursk on November 13, and an attempt to land a rescue projectile on the aft hatch was unsuccessful, the rescue operation was stopped, or rather, turned into a reconnaissance operation.

Until August 19, ACC underwater vehicles (made up to 10 dives per day), the AS-33 nuclear deep-sea station of the GRU Directorate of Special Hydronautics (according to published data, Russia has several such stations of the 1910 project (Sperm Whale)) and deep-sea divers (about which for the sake of maintaining secrecy, our media had to tell that after 1991 they became extinct, like mammoths) work was carried out to extract from the destroyed 1st and 2nd compartments of the Kursk the equipment of the torpedo complex, the instruments of the central post and the safes with secrets located in the latter documents. At the same time, the logbook was also raised, which was only mentioned now and which, in order to preserve the legend, had to be “found” in compartment 4. At the same time, they were hanging noodles on our ears about the 60-degree list and underwater currents, which for some reason they did not allow our underwater vehicles to work, but a few days later they did not at all prevent British divers from opening the hatch of the 9th compartment.

But the main work at this time was carried out on a British submarine, from which documents, equipment and preserved ammunition or their fragments, including nuclear warheads, were also lifted. At the same time, the arrival of NATO “rescuers” in the area of ​​death was delayed by all means.

Only after both lost boats were “torn like sticky” were the British allowed into the area of ​​destruction with their “LR-5”. The latter made one dive on her boat. After making sure that there was a pile of metal at the bottom, the British temporarily left the area. True, at the same time they helped us open the aft hatch of the Kursk (its top cover was undermined by a crane from the Seaway Eagle vessel) and at the same time acted as a witness in the fact of recognition of the death of our submariners.

It is curious that already in the first days after the disaster, information penetrated into the media that initially, near the Kursk, Russian rescuers discovered a certain “underwater object”, which then allegedly disappeared (by the way, the marshal also spoke about this, but very vaguely Sergeev). Based on this, a version emerged about a collision between our boat and a foreign one, and it was argued that at first the foreign submarine also lay on the ground, but then was able to repair the damage and leave, unnoticed by Russian ships. After the American nuclear submarine Memphis arrived at the Norwegian naval base of Haukosvern (Bergen area) on August 18, many began to say that it was she who rammed the Kursk. This version seems quite plausible to the inexperienced layman, but upon closer examination it is obvious misinformation. The fact is that one of the main differences between a diesel boat and a nuclear one is that the latter never rests on the ground. While at sea, the nuclear-powered icebreaker pumps tens of tons of sea water through itself every minute (this is necessary for cooling the power plant). If for some reason the nuclear submarine ends up on the ground, then all its cooling systems will be clogged with silt and dirt in a matter of seconds, which will automatically trigger the emergency protection of the steam turbine and then the reactor plants. Of course, after this the boat will be able to float to the surface (after which you can start the emergency diesel generator and, after about four hours, put the main power supply back into operation), but under water it will not go anywhere.

As for the Memphis, this reconnaissance boat (equipped with an airlock chamber and remotely controlled underwater projectiles) actually monitored Northern Fleet exercises. But the real reason for the “American” entering the Norwegian port was the need to dock the deep-sea vehicle DSRV “Avalone” (or “Mystic”), brought from the USA by air, “on her back”. After this, Memphis went out to sea again and headed to the site of the disaster, where she continued to engage in underwater reconnaissance (she tried to get as close to the Kursk as the Russian ships on guard would allow).

After NATO left the area where the boats were lost, underwater work practically did not stop. According to a number of Norwegian sources, already in early September, from the Kursk, the ACC forces began lifting the bodies of the dead from the previously opened 9th compartment (perhaps this was the reason for loud statements by the military and government representatives with promises to “raise everyone”). In the first half of October, deep-sea vehicles of the Mir type and deep-sea divers (including from the Black Sea Fleet) worked on the boat, and, according to official reports, during the work the upper hatch of the strong wheelhouse was opened and the latter was inspected. At the same time, work was carried out in the 3rd compartment of the Kursk, from where communications equipment was removed, including the encryption equipment of the SPS post (secret government communications) and the missile complex, as well as safes with documents from the secret unit premises. Some of the bulky equipment, which was impossible to lift to the surface, was destroyed by explosive charges (it was their explosions that were recorded by Norwegian seismologists at one time).

Now the main problem was the burial of the reactor and equipment of the 1st circuit of the British nuclear submarine, which was damaged in the disaster and, judging by a number of reports, “leaked,” as well as the recovery of the remaining nuclear warheads that survived the explosion. In addition, at the international level it had already been decided to hide the fact of the collision and the simultaneous death of the Russian and British boats, so it was necessary, figuratively speaking, to “cover up their tracks.” This work was carried out in October-November by the platform vessel “Regalia” (home port - Nassau), owned by the American one (headquarters in Houston, Texas). In addition to Regalia, the company has 4 more similar platforms (“Semi 1”, “Semi 2”, “Rockwater 1” and “Rockwater 2”). It is noteworthy that of all, it is Regalia that has the most powerful deep-sea lifting device (lifting capacity up to 450 tons). Most likely it was used to lift and subsequently bury the reactor of a British submarine at great depths. At the same time, divers from the Regalia also opened the 8th compartment of the Kursk (after the disaster, it retained an air cushion and our divers could not penetrate it from the 9th compartment).

By the way, about the work at Kursk. It seems that the reports about diving work in the 8th and 9th compartments are hiding something. The bulkhead door between these compartments opens towards the 8th compartment, so the message that the divers who were in the 8th compartment could not open the door in the 9th compartment was clearly misinformation, since there was some kind of “spring obstacle” there. Everything should have happened the other way around - from the 9th compartment they tried to penetrate into the 8th. And in general, this whole October-November “raising of bodies” by “Regalia” is an ordinary misconception (the bodies from the 9th compartment were raised earlier), launched to hide the real reasons for the work of this “floating island” at the site of the disaster. In any case, we have only one documentary evidence that during this period any work was carried out on the Kursk at all - a photograph of a piece of hull plating on the deck of the Regalia (on this piece the internal thermal insulation covered with fabric is clearly visible, technological neck with a cover, emergency lamp and part of the cable route). And then, why did they refuse to work in the 5th and 5th bis compartments? Moreover, in the 5th compartment there is a power plant control room, which will certainly be full of “records” and “logs”.

After the completion of the Regalia, divers of the Russian Navy carried out a series of underwater explosions on the bottom of the Barents Sea on November 15 (these were again recorded by the Norwegians). They completely destroyed the wreckage of the British boat, and at the same time the bow end of the Kursk. There is no longer any material evidence of the collision between the two nuclear-powered ships. Therefore, even if the Kursk is raised next year, Mr. Klebanov will again state that “the final cause of the death of the boat could not be established.” Moreover, high-ranking officials are already saying that only the aft part of the nuclear submarine with the reactor compartment will rise, and the destroyed bow end will remain at the bottom of the Barents Sea.

Currently, the autonomy of the British nuclear submarine has already expired, and perhaps soon we will hear a message about the death of one of the boats of Her Majesty's Fleet somewhere in the South Atlantic or in the Indian Ocean. Perhaps it has already been “written off” without too much fuss. The local media will not disturb the public - in Great Britain you can criticize and disparage many things, but not the fleet. In addition, the British Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and many other officials are not at all eager to resign.

Our leaders are also not at all interested in publishing the real reason for the death of the Kursk - for concealing it, Russia received a lot of money from the West, debt restructuring, the US refusal to implement the national missile defense program, investments and much more (for fans of analysis, I advise you to look at the latest political news months, especially concerning Russian-British relations). Therefore, we will be fooled for a long time with tales about “a collision with an unknown object,” “a mine explosion from the Second World War,” or “an emergency situation with a “fat torpedo.”

They will no longer tell us the truth about the death of the Kursk. However, nothing can stop us from finding it ourselves.

Sevastopol

Website of Anatoly Astafiev

Disaster means an incident that arose as a result of a natural or man-made emergency, resulting in the death of people or any irreparable consequences in the history of a particular object, or a major adverse event (accident, natural disaster, etc.), entailing tragic consequences (destruction, death of people, animals, flora). Accidents leading to destruction, destruction of objects and loss of life were constant companions of Soviet and Russian submariners and led to a significant decrease in the operational stress coefficient. In terms of accident rates, our submarines, like American ones, continue to hold the world championship. We will not consider the accident rate of American submarines in this article.

The causes of accidents on Soviet and Russian submarines associated with the death of their personnel and the submarines themselves most fully correspond to the principle “...What do you want...”, which prevails among domestic naval officers of all ranks. When revealing some of these disasters, the author will take the liberty of naming certain specific individuals from among their culprits.

The chronology of disasters on domestic submarines at the time indicated in the title of the article is as follows:

- 12/15/1952, the diesel-electric submarine C-117 of the 7th Navy of the Pacific Fleet, with a crew of 52 people, disappeared without a trace in the Sea of ​​Japan. The commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral Georgy Kholostyakov, and the chief of staff of the fleet, Rear Admiral Anatoly Rodionov, were reprimanded;

- 11/21/1956, the diesel submarine M-200 of the Baltic Fleet "Quebec" sank from the surface in the Tallinn roadstead of the Baltic Sea, colliding with the destroyer "Statny". The death of the submarine occurred due to a fire in the power section. 28 people died, 6 people were rescued. An obelisk was erected for the victims in the town of Paldiski, Estonia;

- 08/22/1957, the diesel submarine of the Black Sea Fleet "Whiskey" sank in the Black Sea due to water entering the diesel compartment through an open air supply plug to the diesel engines and a fire. There are no fatalities;

- 09/26/1957, the diesel submarine M-256 BF sank in the Gulf of Tallinn after a fire started on it. 35 people died, 7 were saved;

- 01/27/1961, the diesel missile submarine S-80 of the Northern Fleet sank in the Barents Sea north of the Rybachy Peninsula, due to water entering through the RDP. The entire crew died - 68 people. The following were installed for the dead: an obelisk in Olenya Bay, Northern Fleet, and a monument in the town of Polyarny, Murmansk region;

- 07/04/1961, 8 submariners died from ultra-high doses of radiation on the submarine K-19 SF "Gotel-II", located in the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean. The accident occurred due to the explosion of the 1st circuit of the power plant on a nuclear missile submarine. As a result, a radiation leak occurred in the failed reactor. The dead were buried in Moscow and Leningrad;

- 01/11/1962, the diesel torpedo submarine B-37 SF "Tango" sank near the wall in the Ekaterininskaya harbor of the city of Polyarny, due to the explosion of all torpedo ammunition. 122 people died. An obelisk was erected for the victims in the town of Polyarny, Murmansk region. The fleet commander, Admiral Andrei Chabanenko, was removed from his post, but already in June 1962 he was appointed assistant chief of the General Staff for the Navy;

- 06/16/1967, on the diesel torpedo submarine SF Tango, located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, a fire occurred in the central post. 4 people died. The burial place of the dead is the Mediterranean Sea, sh. 36 degrees 20 minutes 00 seconds, d. 10 degrees 57 minutes 11 seconds;

- 09/08/1967, on the nuclear torpedo submarine K-3 “Leninsky Komsomol” of the SF “November”, located in the Norwegian Sea, 1700 miles from the base, a fire occurred in the first and second compartments. 39 people died. An obelisk was erected to those who died in the village of Zapadnaya Litsa, Murmansk region;

- 1967, the diesel submarine S-80 SF sank in the Barents Sea. 68 sailors died. This disaster did not affect the careers of admirals;

- 03/08/1968, diesel missile submarine PL-574 K-129 TF "Golf", located 350 miles northwest of the Hawaiian Islands of the Pacific Ocean, disappeared underwater as a result of a collision with an American submarine. 97 people died. The burial place of our submarine with its crew is the Pacific Ocean, sh. 40 degrees 06 seconds east, longitude 179 degrees 57 minutes east. For the admirals, this tragedy passed without consequences;

- 04/08/1970, the nuclear torpedo submarine K-8 SF "November" sank from the surface in the Bay of Biscay, 300 miles northwest of Spain, due to a fire in the 3rd and 7th compartments. 52 people died. The burial place of the dead at the point where the submarine was lost. An obelisk was also installed for the victims in the village of Gremikha, Murmansk region;

- 02/24/1972, 28 sailors died on the nuclear-powered missile submarine K-19 SF of the Gothel-II project, located 600 miles northeast of the island of Newfoundland in the North Atlantic Ocean. There was a fire in the submarine compartment. 2 people died during the rescue operation of the submarine. The burial place of the victims and the obelisk to them are in the city of Polyarny, Murmansk region;

- 06/13/1973, 27 people died on the nuclear submarine K-56 TF as a result of its collision with the research vessel Akademik Berg in Peter the Great Bay (Sea of ​​Japan). 140 sailors survived;

- 10/21/1981, 32 submariners died on the Whiskey-type diesel torpedo submarine S-178 TF, at the entrance to Vladivostok Bay, as a result of a collision with a refrigerated transport ship. There was a fire on the submarine and the submarine sank. The burial place and obelisk for the dead are in the city of Vladivostok;

- 06/24/1983, 16 people died on the nuclear-powered missile submarine K-429 TF of the Charlie-I type. The submarine sank in Krasheninnikov Bay, 4.5 miles off the coast of Kamchatka, during its dive. The 4th compartment was flooded through the ventilation system, an unclosed blow-in and exhaust ventilation shaft. 104 submariners were able to reach the surface. The burial places of the dead and the obelisk are unknown to them;

— 06/18/1984, on the nuclear missile submarine SF “Echo-II”, located in the Barents Sea, a fire occurred in the compartment. 14 people died. The burial place and obelisk for the dead is the village of Vidyaevo, Murmansk region;

- 08/10/1985, a reactor explosion occurred on the nuclear submarine K-431 TF in Chazhma Bay due to a gross violation of instructions. 11 people died. There was significant radiation contamination of the area. Sailors at the base received large doses of radiation. The commander of the 4th submarine flotilla, Rear Admiral Viktor Khramtsov, received “incomplete service compliance” and a severe reprimand along party lines. Later, the penalties were lifted, and Khramtsov was promoted;

- 10/03/1986, on the nuclear missile submarine K-219 SF "Yankee", located 480 miles northeast of Bermuda off the coast of the United States, first, a fire occurred, then an explosion in the missile silo, due to the connection of missile components fuel. 10/06/1986, 3 days later, the submarine sank from the surface. 6 people died. The burial place of the dead is at sea. The penalties did not affect the admirals;

- 04/07/1989, the nuclear torpedo submarine K-278 "Komsomolets" SF sank from an underwater position 180 km southwest of Bear Island in the Norwegian Sea, due to a fire in the compartments and depressurization of the submarine. 42 people died. The burial place is at sea and in the places of residence of the victims. No organizational conclusions were drawn from what happened. The fleet commander, Admiral Felix Gromov, continued his service and after 3 years became the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy;

— 06/26/1989, on the nuclear missile submarine K-129 KSF “Echo-II”, located in the Barents Sea, 300 miles from the base, a power generator accident occurred. There are no fatalities;

- 08/12/2000, Barents Sea, APRK "Kursk", K-141. 118 sailors died. To date, despite the abundance of various publications, the actual causes of the disaster are unknown;

— 08/30/2003, 9 members of the mooring crew of the nuclear submarine K-159 SF Project 627A “Kit” died when it sank in the Barents Sea, which occurred while towing a nuclear submarine to the city of Polyarny for disposal. One person was rescued;

— 08.11.2008, 20 people died on the Nerpa nuclear submarine during factory sea trials on it in the Sea of ​​Japan. An accident occurred on the submarine as a result of unauthorized activation of the fire extinguishing system. Freon gas began to flow into the compartments. 21 people were hospitalized with poisoning.

The author, and of course the readers, unfortunately do not know about accidents on Soviet and Russian submarines associated with the death of their personnel and the submarines themselves, which occurred from 1917 to 1952, and from 2008 to the present.

I will give only a few reasons, including personal ones, that led to accidents on domestic submarines, and, as a consequence, to the death of their personnel and the submarines themselves.

03/08/1968, diesel missile PL-574, K-129, KTOF, “Golf”, along with the crew, died. Until her death, from 01.10. until November 30, 1967, the submarine was in combat service in the northeastern part of the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, for the crew it was an unplanned trip. Since the higher headquarters checked, first, one of the division’s submarines preparing for combat service, then the second. These two boats were not ready for combat service. After which, they decided to send the third, PL-574, into combat service. The officers arrived on the boat, some 15 and some 5 days before going out to the ocean. The crew was never fully assembled. The boat reached the BS with 14 officers and 83 sailors and petty officers on board. Of the 83 sailors and petty officers, only 58 were full-time; 15 – appointed instead of those on vacation; 10 were sent for internship. Which could not but affect the preparation of the submarine and its crew for the voyage.

In the summer of 1989, a journalistic article edited by Alexander Zdanovich (then special correspondent of the KGB of the USSR) appeared in the “Collection of the KGB of the USSR” about the death on 04/07/1989 of the nuclear submarine pr. 685 “Komsomolets” as a result of a fire on it, not far from Bear Island in the Arctic Ocean. In the article, Zdanovich wrote that the sailors who survived afloat in the icy water, holding hands, sang a song: “...Our proud “Varyag” does not surrender to the enemy...”. This could only be written by a correspondent who had not been to sea, who had not recognized or experienced the force 5 storm of the Norwegian Sea, almost zero water temperature, and so on.

One of the main culprits in the collapse of the Russian Navy, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Fleet Admiral Felix Gromov, and the former commander of the 1st Submarine Flotilla of the Northern Fleet, Rear Admiral Mikhail Motsak, were involved in the death of the Kursk APRK and its crew. F. Gromov, in 1994, when accepting the Kursk into the Fleet, canceled his own order, according to which mooring and sea trials were combined with state ones. Although, there was a categorical ban on combining these tests. During the tests, the submarine was not tested at the working diving depth, its target designation and guidance systems, individual systems of navigational equipment, hydroacoustic complex and many other systems and mechanisms, rescue vehicles AS-32 and AS-34 were not checked for docking with the built underwater hull, The torpedo firing complex with 650-mm hydrogen peroxide torpedoes was not tested, and control firing was not carried out from it. The K-141 crew, before the disaster, had not been fully trained in the combat use of torpedo weapons, and in fact did not test the submarine’s hull and its systems by immersion to working depth. Although, according to reporting documents, the submarine performed deep-sea tests. At the beginning of 1999, the command of the Northern Fleet, despite the prohibition of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to reduce the training time for submariners in training centers, illegally reduced the training of the K-141 crew at the Navy training center in the city of Obninsk. APRK "Kursk" did not carry out practical torpedo firing either in 1998, or in 1999, or in preparation for the campaign in the Mediterranean Sea. However, the Northern Fleet command deliberately and illegally reported false information to the Navy General Headquarters about the readiness of the submarine and its crew to go on combat duty. The main headquarters, once again, also deliberately and illegally, did not notice these shortcomings. In August 2000, the command of the Northern Fleet, led by Admiral Popov, bypassing the command of the Navy (Commander-in-Chief Kuroyedov), illegally conducted an exercise in which the Kursk anti-aircraft missile system participated. The exercise did not have a “...Plan for a tactical exercise...” or a “Plan for the assembly and voyage of ships...”. Why were Gromov, Kuroyedov, Popov and Motsak not prosecuted and not given the deserved punishment in connection with the death of the Kursk APRK and its crew?

The deception of “peaceful” naval admirals continues and will continue in the future from one accident, submarine disaster, to another. They cannot act differently in order to preserve their “admiral’s chairs” and career prospects. Numerous accidents and deaths of domestic submarines have not taught them to respect the creation and operation of emergency rescue forces and means of the Navy designed to save submarines and their crews. Because, at the head of the Russian Navy, as a result of behind-the-scenes admiral games, there have been, and probably will continue to be, incompetent and thieving admirals for a long time - the faithful “fosterlings” of Gorshkov’s nest. The leadership of the USSR Navy categorically refused to acknowledge the facts of long-term tracking of our submarines by foreign submarines and turned a blind eye to the technical backwardness of our Navy in general, not only the submarine fleet. Although the US Navy has periodically made it clear that our submarines are being detected by demonstrating their attacks on them. It’s not for nothing that our nuclear submarines received nicknames on the pages of the English magazine “Janes”: “Roaring Cow”, “Hulking Hippopotamus”, “Chicken” (nuclear submarine pr. 627, 658, 659). And so on. There were reasons for this. The main reasons for the lack of combat readiness of ships, submarines, vessels of the Navy, accidents and disasters on Soviet and Russian submarines, the death of their crews is the situation prevailing in the country and in the Navy, the highly classified spirit of irresponsibility, mismanagement, theft, chaos, embezzlement and fear for their admiral and officer shoulder straps of “peaceful” admiral naval commanders, as well as naval officers.

ETERNAL MEMORY TO HEROES!

Losses of RKKF submarines 1939-1945

RED BANNER BALTIC FLEET.

01/03/1940.
“S-2” (commanded by captain-lieutenant I.A. Sokolov) exploded on a minefield laid in December 1939 by the Finnish minelayer “Louhi” in the South Kvarken Strait 1 mile east of Market Island (Aland Sea). 50 people died. In the summer of 1999, it was found at the bottom by Swedish divers. 06/23/1941. "M-78" (commander senior lieutenant D.L. Shevchenko). During the transition from Libau to Ust-Dvinsk in tandem with the M-77 near Vindava, it was torpedoed in the area at the coordinates 57°28′N; 21°17′ E German submarine "U-144" (commander-Lieutenant Gerdt von Mittelstadt). 16 people (the entire crew) were killed, including the commander of the 4th Submarine Division, Lieutenant Commander S.I. Matveev. In 1999, it was found by a joint Latvian-Swedish expedition at a depth of 60 m.

06/23/1941. "M-71" (commander-lieutenant L.N. Kostylev). Was under repair in Libau. Blown up by the crew due to the danger of being captured by the enemy.

06/23/1941. "M-80" (commander-lieutenant F.A. Mochalov). Was under repair in Libau. Blown up by the crew due to the danger of being captured by the enemy.

06/23/1941. “S-1” (commander-lieutenant commander I.T. Morskoy). Was under repair in Libau. Blown up by the crew due to the danger of being captured by the enemy. The crew, led by the commander, left the city on the S-3 submarine.

06/23/1941. "Ronis" (commander-lieutenant commander A.I.Madisson). Was under repair in Libau. Blown up by the crew due to the danger of being captured by the enemy.

06/23/1941. "Spidola" (commander senior lieutenant V.I. Boytsov). Was under repair in Libau. Blown up by the crew due to the threat of capture by the enemy.

06/24/1941. “S-3” (commander-lieutenant commander N.A. Kostromichev). At about 11 p.m. on June 23, without completing repairs and unable to dive, she left Libau. The crew of the submarine “S-1” (40 people), led by the commander, and workers (about 20 people) were taken on board the boat. At about 6 o'clock in the morning the next day, it was intercepted by topedo boats "S-35" and "S-60" and sunk after an hour and a half artillery battle. At least 10 people were captured (2 from the S-3 crew and 7 from the S-1 crew). The body of the boat commander, Lieutenant Commander Kostromichev, washed up on the island of Saarema, where he was buried. The losses of the crews of the two submarines amounted to 72 people.

06/25/1941. "M-83" (commander senior lieutenant P.M. Shalaev). Since June 22, the boat has been on base patrol near Libau. On June 25, as a result of an air attack, the periscope was damaged and was forced to return to base when street fighting was already underway in Libau. Having received damage for the second time and unable to escape, it took an artillery battle, and when the ammunition ran out, it was blown up by the crew.

06/27/1941. "M-99" (commander senior lieutenant B.M. Popov). Torpedoed near Utö Island at 59°20′N/21°12′E. German submarine "U-149" (commander-lieutenant Horst Höltring). 20 people died (the entire crew).

06/28/1941. “S-10” (commander captain 3rd rank B.K. Bakunin). Killed by a Wartburg-1 barrage mine west of Palanga. There is evidence that in 2022 it was discovered at the bottom in the territorial waters of Lithuania. 43 people died.

07/01/1941. "M-81" (commander-lieutenant F.A. Zubkov). While sailing with a detachment of ships in the wake of the Irtysh mother ship from Kuivaste to Paldiski, it hit a mine in the area of ​​the Laine Bank in the Muhuväin Strait. 13 crew members were killed, 3 people were saved. Raised in 1965. The crew is buried in Riga.

07/21/1941. "M-94" (commander senior lieutenant N.V. Dyakov). Torpedoed by the German submarine “U-140” (commanded by Lieutenant Commander Hans Jürgen Heirigel) in the Soela Väin Strait south of the Ristna lighthouse. The torpedo hit the stern of the boat, and since the depth at the place of death did not exceed 20 meters, the M-94 sank stern with a trim of 60° so that the bow of the boat remained 3-4 meters on the surface and remained in this position for about two hours . The M-98, which was traveling in pair, removed three people from the bow, including the commander, and eight more managed to leave the boat through the conning hatch. 8 people died.

08/02/1941. “S-11” (commander-lieutenant A.M. Sereda). When returning from a trip, she was blown up by a magnetic bottom mine in the Soela Väin Strait. 45 crew members were killed. Three people managed to get out of the boat through the torpedo tube. Raised in 1957. The remains of part of the crew are buried in Riga.

con. 08.1941. “S-6” (commander-lieutenant commander N.N. Kulygin). It was blown up by a mine of the German Wartburg barrier 55 miles east of the Swedish island of Sandhamn. 48 people died. Found in 2011.

08/28/1941. "Shch-301" ("Pike") (commander-lieutenant commander I.V. Grachev). It was blown up by a mine during the breakthrough from Tallinn to Kronstadt in the area of ​​​​Cape Yuminda. Sank after part of the crew was removed. The mines were laid by the submarine "Vesihisi" or the minelayers "Riilahti" and "Ruotsinsalmi", according to the Soviet side, it was blown up by a floating mine. The total crew losses were 34 people.

08/28/1941. “S-5” (commander captain 3rd rank A.A. Bashchenko). She was blown up by a mine during the breakthrough from Tallinn to Kronstadt in the area of ​​Vaindlo Island while traveling as part of the Detachment of the Main Forces. At least 14 people were rescued, including the commander of the 1st brigade of the Red Ban Baltic Fleet submarine N.G. Egipko. 33 crew members and part of the headquarters of the Red Ban Baltic Fleet submarine brigade were killed on the submarine. Found and examined in 2012.

25-28.08.1941. "M-103" (commander senior lieutenant G.A. Zhavoronkov). She died in a mine 8 miles north of the island of Vormsi with her entire crew (20 people). In 1999 it was discovered at the bottom.

09/10/1941. “P-1” (“Pravda”), (commander lieutenant commander I.A. Loginov). Killed by a mine 6.2 miles south of Kalbodagrund lighthouse. 55 people died. Found at the bottom in 2008, examined in 2011.

09/23/1941. "M-74" (at the time of death it was under conservation). Sunk during a German air raid at the exit from the middle harbor of Kronstadt. In 1942 it was raised and put into storage, but on December 2, 1944 it was sent for dismantling.

beginning 10.1941. "Shch-319" (commander-lieutenant commander N.S. Agashin). It was blown up by a floating mine 16 miles west of Palanga. 38 people died. Found and examined at the bottom in 2012.

05.10.1941. Floating charging stations, former Bars-class submarines: “B-7” “Krasnoarmeyets”, originally “Leopard” and “B-8” “Tovarishch”, originally “Tur”. Sank as a result of German field artillery fire in Oranienbaum. In 1944 they were raised and scrapped.

10.1941. “S-8” (commander-lieutenant commander I.Ya. Brown). She died on a Wartburg barrage mine 10 miles southeast of the Nesby lighthouse (southern tip of the island of Öland). 45 people died. Found at the bottom and examined in July 1999.

10/12/1941. "Shch-322" (commander-lieutenant commander V.A. Ermilov). Killed by a Corbetta barrage mine northwest of Paldiski. 37 people died.

10/30/1941-11/01/1941. "Kalev" (commander-lieutenant B.A.Nyrov). Missing. On October 29, she went on a combat mission with the task of landing a reconnaissance group in the Tallinn area and laying a minefield. Didn't get in touch again. It was probably blown up by a Yuminda mine. 41 people died.

09.11.1941. “L-1” (“Leninets”), (commander captain 3rd rank S.S. Mogilevsky). Was under repair. Stood on the Neva in Leningrad. Damaged during shelling and sank due to damage to her pressure hull. In 1944 it was raised and scrapped.

06-10.11.1941. "Shch-324" (commander captain-lieutenant G.I. Tarkhnishvili). She died on the Apolda mine in the western part of the Gulf of Finland. Found in 2015. 39 people died.

11/14/1941. “L-2” (“Stalinets”) (commander-lieutenant A.P. Chebanov). She was on her way to lay mines as part of the fourth convoy to Hanko. It was blown up by a mine near Keri Island in the Gulf of Finland. 50 people died, 3 people were saved. Found at the bottom in 2006 and examined in 2012.

11/14/1941. "M-98" (commander captain-lieutenant I.I. Bezzubikov). Missing. She probably died in a mine near Keri Island in the Gulf of Finland while guarding the fourth convoy to Hanko. 18 people died.

04/24/1942. "Shch-411" (unfinished). Sank in the Neva in Leningrad as a result of damage received from enemy artillery fire. Raised. After the end of the war it was put into operation.

06/13/1942. "Shch-405" (commander captain 3rd rank I.V. Grachev). She died while crossing the extreme point of the Brumbar-1 mine line northwest of the island of Seskar in the area of ​​Nagaev Bank while moving on the surface to Lavensaari. 39 people died.

06/15/1942. "M-95" (commander-lieutenant L.P. Fedorov). She died on the Rukajärvi-B barrage mine off the north-eastern coast of the island of Gogland (Suursari). Found at the bottom and examined in 2015. 20 people died.

mid-July 1942. “Shch-317” (commander-lieutenant commander N.K. Mokhov). She died on a mine at the Seeigel barrier between the islands of Gogland and Bolshoi Tyuters. 41 people died.

02-11.09.1942. "M-97" (commander-lieutenant N.V. Dyakov). It was blown up by a Nashorn barrier mine southwest of Porkkalan-Kallboda. The entire crew (20 people) died. In 1990 it was discovered on the ground and examined in 1997.

02.10.1942. "Shch-320" (commander captain 3rd rank I.M. Vishnevsky). It was blown up by a Zeeegel barrier mine north of Bolshoi Tyuters Island. 40 people died. Found in spring 2022.

11-13.10.1942. "Shch-302" ("Perch"), (commander-lieutenant commander V.D. Nechkin). Missing. Probably died on the Seeigel, Nashorn or Juminda mines. 37 people died.

10/14/1942. “Shch-311” (“Kumzha”), (commander captain 3rd rank A.S. Pudyakov). It was blown up by a Nashorn-11 barrage mine and, in a damaged state, was destroyed by a Finnish aircraft SB-10 (commander Lieutenant Erki Palosuo) of the Lelv-6 squadron. 40 people died.

10/21/1942. “S-7” (commander captain 3rd rank S.P. Lisin) was torpedoed by the submarine “Vesihiisi” (commander lieutenant commander O. Aitola) 10-15 miles north of the Soderarm lighthouse in the Åland Sea. 42 were killed, 4 people were saved, including the commander. In 1993 it was found at a point with coordinates 59°50.7′N/19°32.2′E. and examined at a depth of 30-40 m by Swedish divers.

10.1942. “Shch-308” (“Salmon”), (commander captain 3rd rank L.N. Kostylev). Missing. Perhaps she became a victim of torpedoes from the Finnish submarine Iku Turso (commander Lieutenant Commander E. Pakkola) during the transition to the Serda-Kvarken Strait near the island of Utö on October 27, 1942, or was sunk by a strike from the anti-submarine ship Schiff-47 on October 19, 1942 in the Utö area. She could have died on the way home from injuries sustained as a result of this strike. Possibly destroyed off the island of Taikesaari by depth charges and artillery fire from the Finnish patrol boat VMV-2 on October 20, 1942. It is possible that a submarine could be blown up by a Nashorn, Juminda or Seeigel mine. The entire crew of the boat (40 people) died.

after 10/29/1942. “Shch-304” (“Komsomolets”), (commander captain 3rd rank Ya.P. Afanasyev). She died on a Nashorn barrage mine along with her entire crew (40 people).

05.11.1942. "Shch-305" ("Lin"), (commander captain 3rd rank D.M. Sazonov). Rammed by the Finnish submarine "Vetehinen" (commander-lieutenant commander O. Leiko) northeast of Simpnas in the Åland Sea. 39 people died.

12-16.11.1942. "Shch-306" ("Haddock"), (commander-lieutenant commander N.I. Smolyar). It was blown up by a Nashorn barrier mine in the Gulf of Finland. Found in 2015. 39 people died (the entire crew).

05/01/1943. "Shch-323" (commander captain 2nd rank A.G. Andronov). Exploded by a bottom mine in the Leningrad Sea Canal. 39 people died, 5 people were saved. In 1944 it was raised and scrapped.

05/23/1943. "Shch-408" (commander-lieutenant P.S. Kuzmin). After a long pursuit, she was sunk by a group of Finnish ships, including the minelayers Riilahti and Ruotsinsalmi, and by aircraft in the area of ​​the Vaindlo lighthouse. According to the official Soviet version, she was forced to surface and engage in artillery battle with five German patrol boats. (40 people died).

05/29/1943. "Shch-406" (commander captain 3rd rank E.A. Osipov). It was blown up by a Zeeegel barrier mine north of Bolshoi Tyuters Island. 40 people died. Found in spring 2022.

after 01.08.1943. “S-12” (commander captain 3rd rank A.A. Bashchenko). Missing. Perhaps she died on the Nashorn minefield north of Naissar Island, or was blown up by a mine from the Walross minefield. 46 people died.

after 08/12/1943. “S-9” (commander captain 3rd rank A.I. Mylnikov). She died on a Zeeegel mine in the area of ​​Bolshoy Tyuters Island. 46 people died.

07-09.09.1944. "M-96" (commander-lieutenant commander N.I. Kartashev). Missing. It was probably blown up by a Zeeegel barrier mine in the Narva Bay. 22 people died.

01/04/1945. “S-4” (commander captain 3rd rank A.A. Klyushkin). Most likely, she died with her entire crew (49 people) as a result of an accidental collision with the destroyer “T-3” at 51°56′N/19°39′E. or rammed by the German destroyer T-33 at the Brewsterort lighthouse in Danzig Bay on January 6

For Podplav!

Diesel submarines

№	Fleet	Tact. number, project	Causes of the disaster	Causes of the disaster	Disaster area	Death toll	Note commander
1	Pacific Fleet	S-117 (former Shch-117) head Pike of the V-bis series	December 15-16, 1952	Not installed	Sea of ​​Okhotsk	52	Marine torpedo, cap 3rd rank Krasnikov
2	KBF	M-200 Type M XV series	November 21, 1956	Collision with the em "Statny" loss of longitudinal surface stability	Suurup Strait Baltic Sea	28	Rank 3 coastal torpedo cap Shumanin
3	KBF	M-255 Project A-615	1956	Fire	Baltic Sea	7	Coastal torpedo cap 3rd rank S.F. Savkin
4	KChF	M-351 Project A-615	August 22, 1957	Water entering the diesel compartment through an open flap. Fire. Sank	Near Balaklava Bay	—	Coastal torpedo cap 3rd rank Belozerov
5	KBF	M-256 Ave. A-615	September 26, 1957	Navigation accident, loss of longitudinal surface stability	Baltic Sea	28	Coastal torpedo cap 3rd rank Yu.Vavakin
6	Pacific Fleet	M-252 Pr.615Vii series	October 1959	Navigation accident, grounding, hull flooding	Japanese Sea	7	Torpedo, coastal Cap 3rd rank Borovkov S.N.
7	KSF	S-80 Project 644	January 27, 1961	Water supply through RDP	Barencevo sea	68	Missile, naval cap 3rd rank A.Sitarchik
8	KSF	B-37 Project 641	January 11, 1962	Fire and explosion of rack torpedoes in the 1st compartment	Barencevo sea Polar	?	Torpedo ocean cap 2nd rank Begeb
9	KSF	S-350 Project 633	January 11, 1962	Explosion of stacked torpedoes near a moored boat nearby	Barencevo sea. Polar	—	Torpedo naval cap 2nd rank Oleg Abramov
10	Pacific Fleet	K-129 Project 629A	March 8, 1968	Presumably, loss of buoyancy when large masses of water enter the 5th diesel compartment when the RDP float valve fails to operate	Pacific Ocean	97	Missile, cruising Cap 1st rank V. Kobzar
11	Pacific Fleet	S-178 Project 613V	October 24, 1981	Loss of buoyancy due to a collision with a vehicle and the entry of a large mass of water into the hole	Japanese Sea	32	Torpedo naval Cap3ranga B.Marango

Nuclear submarines

№	Fleet	Tact. number, project	Date of incident	Causes of the disaster	Disaster area	Kolic number of dead	Note
1	KSF	K-19 Project 658	June 4, 1961	Depressurization of the 1st circuit	North Atlantic	8	Missile cruiser Cap 2nd rank N. Zateev
2	KSF	K-3 Project 627 "Leninsky Komsomolets"	September 8, 1967	fire in the second compartment, regeneration fire	Norwegian Sea	39	Torpedo, cruising. Cap 2nd rank S.Gorikov
3	KSF	K-8 Project 627A	July 4, 1970	fire, loss of longitudinal surface stability when large masses of water enter the hull.	Bay of Biscay	52	Torpedo, cruising Cap 2nd rank V. Bessonov
4	KSF	K-19 Project 658	February 24, 1972	fire in compartments 8 and 9	Atlantic Ocean	28	Missile, cruising Cap 1st rank V. Kulibaba
5	Pacific Fleet	K-56 Project 675	June 13, 1973	The entry of large masses of water into the second compartment due to the hole resulting from collision with the Akademik Berg transport	Japanese Sea	27	Missile cruising commander 2nd rank cap Leonid Khomenko
6	Pacific Fleet	K-429 Project 670A	June 24, 1983	Loss of buoyancy due to the entry of a large mass of water into compartment 4	Kamchatka, Avacha Bay Pacific Ocean	16	Multipurpose cruising Cap 1st Rank V. Suvorov
7	KSF	K-131 Project 675	June 18, 1984	Fire in compartment 8	Barencevo sea	14	Missile cruiser Cap 1st rank Selivanov
8	KSF	K-219 Project 667a	October 6, 1986	Fire, loss of buoyancy	Atlantic Ocean	6	Missile cruiser Captain 1st Rank I. Britanov
9	KSF	K-278 Project 685 "Komso" Well done"	April 7, 1989	fire in compartment 7, loss of surface buoyancy and longitudinal surface stability, depressurization and entry of large masses of water into the pressure hull	Norwegian Sea	42	Multi-purpose Cruiser Cap 1st rank E. Vanin
10	KSF	K-141 Project 949	August 12, 2000	Explosion of rack torpedoes	Barencevo sea	118	Missile cruiser Cap 1st rank Lyachin G.P.,
11	KSF	K-159 Project 667A	August 30, 2003	Loss of surface buoyancy during towing	Barencevo sea	9	Missile cruising, commander, cap 2nd rank Lappa Sergey was withdrawn from combat

So:

1. During the period under review, from 1952 to 2003, the following were built and included in the Navy: - 251 nuclear submarines - 29 diesel submarines of type M pr. A-615 with a closed-cycle propulsion system. — 225 diesel submarines pr.613 and modifications — 26 diesel submarines pr.611 and modifications — 58 diesel submarines pr.641 and modifications — 23 diesel submarines pr.629 and modifications

2. For those killed or involved in a serious accident (K-129, K-3, K-8, K-429, K-219, K-278, K-141, K-159, K-56, K-131 , K-19, S-80, S-178, S-350, B-37, S-117, M-200, M-256, M-252, M-351) tactical numbers were:

With number - 1 (K-129, K-19, K-219, K-141, K-159, K-131, S-178, S351, S-117, M-351) - 10 pl (40% The number 9 also appears )

With the number - 2 (K-129, K-429, K-219, K-278, M-200, M-252, M-256) - 7pl (More than 40% have the number 9 )

With number - 5 (K-159, K-56, S-350, M-252, M-255, M-256, M-351) - 7 pl

With number - 8 (K-8, K-278, S-178, S-80) - 4pl

With the number - 9 (K-19, K129, K-219, K-429, K-159) - 5pl.

Note: - With the number 5 , which is in the tens place, there are 7 cases of accidents. At the same time, 80% of accidents in submarines of type M. - - With the number 9 , which is in the ones category, only submarines of type K. - The most unfortunate combination of numbers is 1,2 or 9 - 10 cases. — The most successful combination of numbers is 3,4,6,7.

3. Time periods of maximum disasters: - diesel submarines - 1956-1962 - the time when there was the largest number of submarines in the Navy and the time of development of submarines with a new power plant. - nuclear submarines - 1967-1973 - the time of development and the beginning of the cyclic carrying of BS, - 1983-1989 - the time of the greatest wear and tear of the material part of the 1st and 2nd generation submarines and the maximum number of submarines carrying BS.

4. Time periods of minimum disasters: - diesel engines are already well developed and reliable. - 1962-1981 - nuclear submarines - 1973-1983 - the period of transition from the 1st generation submarines to the 2nd generation submarines, more modern and reliable. - 1989-2000, the period of cessation of BS, with the exception of rare trips to sea or autonomous navigation.

5. Disasters by fleet (d/a/total): Pacific Fleet: 4/2/6 KSF: 3/9/12 Baltic Baltic Fleet: 3/-/3 KChF: 1/-/1 Total: dpl - 11; apl - 11; Total-22

6. The main causes of accidents that led to the death of submarines: - fire with the subsequent entry of a large amount of water into the pressure hull, loss of surface longitudinal stability. — 3 cases of violation of navigation rules, which led to a collision with surface ships.

7. Frequency of disasters and serious incidents at the Pacific Fleet. 7.1. March 8 - death of rpl pr.629A "K-129". 7.2. 1973 June - collision of the submarine pr.675 "K-56" with the ES "Akademik Berg". 7.3. 1978 June - a prolonged shot from the main caliber gun on the cruiser Project 68 bis "Admiral Senyavin". 7.4. 1983 June - destruction of the submarine pr.670A "K-429".

In addition, 1981 October 24 - the death of the submarine pr. 613 B "S-178".

The interval of incidents is almost 5 years; moreover, there is a coincidence in the dates of clauses 7.2 and 7.3.

Possible causes of accidents and disasters: 1. Unsatisfactory professional training of submarine commanders and crews. The vicious system of selection and training of command personnel - primarily submarine commanders - is a prerequisite for all accidents and incidents. In the mid-70s, a situation arose when many senior assistant commanders of missile submarines did not want to hand over the submarine to independent control, so that they would not be appointed submarine commanders. For fear of responsibility. So, on February 1, 1978, out of 21 first mates of the 2nd flpl of the Pacific Fleet, 19 people did not want to be allowed to independently control the ship. The question is, who then commanded the submarines?

2. Technical errors in the design, construction and operation of nuclear submarines and the imperfection of their weapons. They were systemic in nature, since they took place on many ships, as evidenced by the results of inspections of ships and submarines based on observations that led to serious accidents and disasters.

3. Acceptance from industry of submarines with significant defects and malfunctions of systems and mechanisms, to please the command of the USSR Navy and the leadership of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry.

4. Violation of the requirements of governing documents for training submarine crews and allowing them to go to sea.

5. The death and accidents of M-type submarines of Project A-615 occurred due to an imperfect power plant, which caused an explosion of the gas mixture and a fire.

6. The main reason for the death of surface ships is violation of the rules for storing and using ammunition.

7. It is difficult to explain why at pl. type “K”, injured in accidents and disasters, the numbers 1, 2, 5 and 9 were repeated in tactical numbers.

It is advisable to change tactical numbers on submarines serving in the Russian Navy, eliminating these numbers.

8. In the USSR Navy and the Russian Navy: - there are no specialists engaged in constant comprehensive analysis of the state of mechanisms and ammunition, the organization of power supply, emergency situations, submarine and submarine disasters, and capable of summarizing statistical material from the post-war period to the present and making recommendations to prevent possible emergency situations. — perhaps the Russian Navy Command is not interested in conducting a thorough analysis so that data incriminating the former leadership of the Navy does not become public. It does not take into account that the ship’s l/s will make mistakes that are repeated in a certain sequence and frequency, which are fraught with serious accidents and disasters.. - except for the analysis of navigation accidents and incidents in the General Staff of the USSR Navy, there are no other materials that would be brought to the l/s pl and nc.

Recently, a lot of materials have appeared in the open press and on Internet sites devoted to accidents and disasters of Soviet submarines. The authors analyze the individual causes of these accidents, since they are not able to make a complete analysis due to lack of access to materials. In addition, some of the information is misinformation. To conduct a reliable analysis and identify the objective causes of disasters, it is necessary for such a study to be carried out by a special commission. It should consist of professionals - submariners with extensive practical experience, not in active service and capable of revealing the true causes of accidents, using both archival documents and cases that are not reflected in these documents, but remain in the memory of the direct participants in these events. All commanders know that the draft logbook of the CP watch log, in which records of all actual events and incidents were made, differed as black and white from the final logbook and report on combat service, which were handed over to the archives,

In addition to official materials, many of which are still classified as secret, a significant amount of information from the Navy leadership was hidden or communicated only to a narrow circle of people.

I did not intend to give a full analysis of these cases for the same reason. I simply collected and summarized cases of accidents and disasters, trying to find some inexplicable pattern. Some might say that there is a lot of mysticism here. Maybe you are right. I hope that someday these phenomena will be explained, and they will receive scientific confirmation and objective justification. If you, after reading these conclusions, can answer me, I will be grateful to you. I think I'm not the only one who needs this.

Appendix: 1. The names of the commanders of the lost ships:

S-117 - Captain 3rd rank Krasnikov, M-200 - Captain 3rd rank Shumanin M-255 - Captain 3rd rank S. Savkin M-351 - Captain 3rd rank R. Belozerov M-256 - Captain 3rd rank Yu. Vavakin M-252 - Captain 3rd rank S. Borovkov S-80 - Captain 3rd rank Sitarchik B-37 - Captain 2nd rank Begeba S-350 - Captain 2nd rank O. Abramov S-178 - Captain 3rd rank B. Marango K-129 - Captain 1st rank V. Kobzar K-19 - Captain 2nd rank N. Zateev K-3 - Captain 2nd rank S. Gorikov K -8 - Captain 2nd rank V. Bessonov K-19 - Captain 1st rank V. Kulibaba K-56 - Captain 2nd rank L. Khomenko K-429 - Captain 1st rank V. Suvorov K-13 — Captain 1st rank E. Selivanov K-219 — Captain 1st rank I. Britanov K-278 — Captain 1st rank E. Vanin K-141 — Captain 1st rank G. Lyachin K-159 — Captain 2nd Rank S. Lapa

2. Disasters of surface ships. 2.1. BOD "Brave" pr.61 (KChF) August 30, 1974 raid of Streletskaya Bay, Black Sea, cause - explosion of the starting engines of anti-aircraft guns and other ammunition, 24 people died 2.2. Cruiser "Admiral Senyavin" pr. 68 bis (Pacific Fleet) June 13, 1978 Sea of ​​Japan. A prolonged shot from the main caliber gun of the bow turret killed 24 people.

2.3. Battleship "Novorossiysk" former "Giulio Cesare", KChF October 29, 1955. Sevastopol Bay, the cause has not been established. Exploded and sank while standing on barrel No. 3 (39 years after the death of the battleship Empress Maria on October 20, 1916 in the same place.)

610 people died