The new corvette “Daring” is the first ship of the secret project 20386

On October 28, 2016, the first ship of Project 20386 was laid down at JSC Sudostroitelny. The corvettes that are to be assembled within the framework of Project 20386 are the most promising of the entire line of Project 20380. Corvette “Daring” - the first ship of the 20386 series - is a modernized warship, which took the best features from the 20380 and 20385 series corvettes.

It will differ in its displacement, different hull contours, changes in the composition of the ship's radio equipment and many other improvements.

The history of the project 20386

The history of Project 20386 began with the appearance of the earlier Project 20380. Corvettes of this series are completely new ships that are equipped with the most powerful Redut missile defense system. This system includes 9M96M missiles, as well as the S-400 MANPADS, designed specifically for the navy.

Project 20380 ships are currently part of the Baltic Fleet and are armed with one of the most powerful air defense systems. It is already very difficult to classify these warships as ordinary patrol ships, although formally they are in this class. Abroad, vessels of this type have long been classified as a separate class.

The next round of development of Project 20380 was the warships of Project 20385, which received even more powerful weapons, even compared to the corvettes of the previous project. If we compare ships in terms of combat power, then the corvettes of Project 20385 (and the corvettes of Project 20380 too) can be put on the same level as the powerful frigates of Project 11356. Despite such high combat power, the new corvettes have half the size and displacement.

Are there any plans to remake project 20386?

First showing to the public - a further evolution of what we know as the Project 20386 corvette

On January 9, 2022, a new round of the epic with the Project 20386 corvette frigate developed by TsMKB Almaz became public knowledge. This time, the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau again jumped above its head and finally turned the project into a frigate, and not just a frigate, but nothing more or less than an “ocean zone” frigate.

Let's look at the photo.

The increase in size (and therefore displacement) and new launchers are clearly visible

So what do we see? Fixed one of the shortcomings of the old project - weak impact weapons. Now, instead of the Uran missile launcher, the model has two 3S-14 launchers, capable of at least using the Caliber missile launcher, and, possibly, Onyxes and, sometime in the future, Zircons. The launcher in front of the gun is the Redut air defense missile launcher. What Admiral Evmenov said about 32 “Caliber” is some kind of mistake, obviously there are 16 missiles in strike weapons and the same number in the launchers of air defense systems.

To do this, however, the ship had to be lengthened. Moreover, which is logical, not only the bow part, where the “Calibers” are nestled, but also the stern part. The reasons, apparently, are the need to avoid constant trim on the bow and the desire to provide contours with greater speed and better seaworthiness; the ship is no longer “a near-sea zone capable of ‘occasionally’ performing tasks in a distant one,” but an “oceanic one.” Let us remember that even the Project 22350 frigate, the most powerful warship in its class, belongs to the far sea zone.

We will return to frigate 22350 later.

Background.

Those who closely follow domestic shipbuilding know in detail the story of the “corvette” of Project 20386. However, it is worth recounting it in general terms for those who missed this information.

Until recently we knew him like this

So, since Soviet times, the main striking force of the Navy has been nuclear submarines of various types. However, they are very vulnerable to foreign submarines when leaving their bases and in a number of other cases. Likewise, foreign submarines pose a greater threat to domestic surface ships and vessels.

In order to make it as difficult as possible for any enemy to operate in the near sea zone, small anti-submarine ships - MPKs - were built in large quantities in the USSR. Despite their small size and displacement, these ships turned out to be very effective anti-submarine ships in our specific conditions.

After the collapse of the USSR, the renewal of the fleet stopped; the modernization of previously built ships was not carried out. Under these conditions, the number of IPCs continuously decreased, and Russia’s vulnerability to foreign submarines grew.

Since the early 2000s, construction of Project 20380 corvettes began. These ships were the first ships capable of fighting submarines built in the post-Soviet era. It must be said that they were characterized by a number of both conceptual and design flaws, and the workmanship of the first ships was simply terrifying. There were changes in contractors, criminal cases, landings... as a result, on the corvette “Gromky”, delivered to the Pacific Fleet by the Amur Shipyard, more or less everything was working.

Russia is great, but there is nowhere to shoot

Of course, even in fully operational condition, these ships were far from ideal. Thus, they do not have radio correction for missiles, which greatly reduces the potential of the Redut anti-aircraft missile system and makes repelling an air strike problematic. They do not have a bomb launcher, which makes it impossible to fight NSBNs lying on the ground and deprives the ship of some other advantages. They have poorly placed AK-630M anti-aircraft artillery mounts. There are questions about real radar stealth and the justification of a superstructure made of composite materials. The biggest disadvantage of these ships as anti-submarine ships is that they do not have anti-submarine missiles (ASBM), which sharply reduces the potential of this ship as a submarine hunter. And they're expensive. The price of such a corvette calls into question its mass construction in quantities sufficient to cover the BMZ.

To be fair, we will make a reservation that modernizing the project could solve most of these problems, and revising the composition of the REV “in the right direction” on newly built ships could reduce their cost.

Corvette 20385, planned to replace this ship, had an enhanced composition of weapons and more powerful electronic weapons, the basis of which was a multifunctional radar complex from JSC Zaslon. It also had 16 launch cells in the Redut air defense missile launcher instead of 12, and one eight-charge 3S-14 launcher, with which it was possible to launch a wide range of guided missiles, including PLUR and missile launchers of the Caliber family.

However, since 2013, strange things began to happen in the domestic shipbuilding system. The Navy refused to continue the 20385 series. Today there is a belief in society that the reason was the impossibility of obtaining imported MTU diesel engines and gearboxes for them due to sanctions. In practice, information about the termination of construction of 20385 was announced in the media before the Ukrainian crisis. Sources of information complained about the high cost of the resulting corvette.

The backlog for the canceled 20385 corvettes in the form of an integrated tower-mast structure and MF RLC was installed on the last four Project 20380 corvettes under construction, which further increased their cost.

It seemed that since corvettes are expensive, we should either try to make them cheaper or develop a new, more widespread project to update BMZ ships, primarily anti-submarine ones. The continuation of the series in a slightly modified form was quite logical from the point of view of inter-ship unification. Instead, something completely different happened.

In 2016, the public was presented with a model of a new corvette - Project 20386. The ship was distinguished by the highest technical falsity, a huge displacement for a corvette, a weakened composition of weapons compared to 20385, and a lack of unification with previously built ships in many systems. Its design contained a lot of technical risks, and, most importantly, it was almost twice as expensive as the Project 20380 corvette, having the same offensive weapons, the same cannon, 4 missiles, more air defense missiles, and deteriorated compared to 20380 submarine search capabilities. It was impossible to compare it with 20385 at a significantly higher price.

The further history of this project and its analysis was made in the author’s article “More than a crime. The construction of Project 20386 corvettes is a mistake.”

and in a joint article with M. Klimov
“Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam”
. The latter also lists the technical risks of the project.

Since then, however, a lot has changed, and in addition, rumors that had long been circulating in the “near-fleet” about the interesting evolution of this project, the details of which were hidden from the public for some time, began to receive material confirmation.

It's probably worth mentioning them.

Scandals, intrigues, investigations

Starting from the same 2016, information circulated around the project, which for the time being remained unconfirmed.
The first was that the Uran rocket launcher would be removed from the project. This, firstly, was logical, because even small RTOs had “Calibers”, and the fact that a ship with “Calibers” and “Onyxes” would be replaced by a ship with “Uraniums” seemed somehow strange.

The same sources speculated that in 2016 prices the price of the “corvette” will reach 40 billion rubles, which will “send” it into almost the same price niche in which there is an incomparably more powerful and truly worthy warship - the Project 22350 frigate.

A little later, closer to 2022, another well-informed source informed the author that “a ship of a larger size and displacement, and a more expensive one, actually a frigate, is already being developed to replace 20386.” The source did not provide details, but as we see, he was right: at least some work is underway. In light of the fact that the 22350 series was in question and there had been no laying of ships of this project for a long time, information about their replacement with something corvette-shaped, and even for the same money, sounded scary.

NASA's date with the Moon is postponed

And again, according to the same source, at the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau, some figures have a bold idea to “crawl” into the niche of creating larger classes of ships than Almaz has always done in the past.

Finally, after the publication of the second article, the author received a short message that “6” would be different.”

.

All of the above gave reason to think that the project was actually undergoing some kind of reworking. It is possible that the appearance of the lead ship will remain more or less close to the known one, and the serial ones are planned with changes. At the same time, the project number may remain the same; in modern Russia, there is no need to look for examples of how a project was completely redone under the same number; everything has already been found.

Future options and risks

In order to make any forecasts, you need to know exactly what the shown model is.
The sign says “Corvette based on project 20386,” that is, it is impossible to guarantee that this is exactly the modified 20386 and that it is being built exactly like this, although it is impossible to deny this, especially taking into account rumors from the past that suddenly began to be confirmed en masse. Therefore, we will evaluate the project as if it were a separate project, and not the one, 20386, which began to be built at Severnaya Verf at the end of 2022 (two years after its foundation).

Firstly, this is definitely a frigate. It's big like a frigate, heavy like a frigate and armed like a frigate. Thus, this ship is already cutting off not only the renewal of the BMZ forces, like the “old” 20386, but is aiming to replace the 22350. Of course, it is unlikely that the 22350 series will be sacrificed for the sake of this project, but this is now, but when the 22350M appears at least in the drawings, then it is quite possible that, in addition to it, someone will try to push the idea of ​​a “light frigate” - which in itself, apart from 20386, is quite good, but we need to clearly imagine what this “light frigate” will do in our specific conditions .

And why should he be exactly like this?

For now, it is obvious that this ship is not an anti-submarine carrier - the dimensions of the sonar fairing do not allow one to think that its main task will be the fight against submarines, and it is better for an anti-submarine frigate to have two helicopters. Although it is possible to fight submarines using a towed sonar, helicopter and anti-submarine missile from 3S-14, there are no obvious features of an anti-submarine ship in this project.

Obviously, this is not an air defense ship - it has few missiles, it is not possible to simultaneously fire from a cannon and an air defense system, and two AK-306s installed on the superstructure behind the gas turbine flues are just some kind of anecdote.

That he has? It has 16 cruise or anti-ship missiles. This is the same amount as the first four frigates 22350. That is, we have before us a certain edition of an attack ship, but light, and obtained by processing a completely different project.

That is, it is “just a ship” - a light frigate, invented without an explicit concept of combat use. The result of blind evolution, which did not come from tasks, but just like that - faster, bigger, more expensive.

Its advantages, apparently, will be speed and range. The disadvantages are complexity, price and the fact that this is again a duplicate project in relation to frigate 22350.

Thus, such a ship, if 22350 is available now, makes no sense at all, and then, when 22350 replaces 22350M, a light frigate will apparently be needed, but a different one.

Returning to frigate 22350, it is worth saying that the abstraction from “Almaz” cannot stand comparison with it “at all.” It can be assumed that, theoretically, Diamondov’s super corvette/light frigate could have higher speed and range. But even so, it doesn't change much. Frigate 22350 has total superiority in air defense due to twice the ammunition load of missiles and a more advanced Poliment radar, it has much more advanced near-zone air defense systems, it has a more powerful sonar and is better able to fight submarines, it has a more powerful gun (130 mm), its outer two ships have 24 missile cells in 3S-14 installations versus 16, and it is already in series.

False direction

Today, Russia already has a frigate project that is in mass production - 22350. This ship is many times more powerful, and therefore more useful, than any variation of 20386. Moreover, it is mass-produced.
There is no reason for the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau to spend budget funds on ships in the same class that the country does not need. We have a gigantic, monstrous-scale hole in the defense of the near sea zone - there are no forces capable of ensuring the deployment of strategic nuclear forces, there are no forces capable of ensuring the deployment of the submarine. Old MPKs are dying, series 20380, instead of being modernized to make it cheaper, was subjected to complication (MF RLC) and then “killed”, series 20385 was completed on two ships, although its simplified version could also become the base ship of the BMZ, when there is still time to build such large corvettes there was a time.

Towards tanks with “pocket artillery”

We have huge problems with mine countermeasures. And if the difficulties in building new minesweepers are understandable (but not their design - it is inexplicable), then the complete lack of attempts to modernize existing ships no longer smacks of stupidity, but of betrayal. Our country produces neither anti-submarine aircraft nor anti-submarine helicopters.

We really have somewhere to spend money even without the “old” 20386, not to mention the “new” one. All this was true when this crazy project just started, and it is true now, when for some purpose we were shown a model of a frigate made on its basis, even more expensive.

And if, in fact, they are already building a new one under the brand of mock-ups of the “old” 20386 with “Calibers” and a corresponding increase in price, then this will have no justification at all, because one such unnecessary oversized corvette will “eat” at least three simpler ships .

The Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau has many talented designers who are capable of developing world-class ships using obviously low-tech components. There are interesting developments on ships in the near sea zone. I have experience. There is the ability to finally give the country what it has long needed - a project for a mass-produced, simple and inexpensive BMZ ship, capable of replacing the MRK and MPK. There are also such projects.

Instead, we see a long-term epic of using budgets in any available way, increasing the number of R&D at the cost of serialization, which the Central Medical Design Bureau itself contributed a lot through its leaders, and other shameful ways of obtaining public money. Alas, yesterday’s model is from the same place and has the same purpose. Responsibility for all of the above lies with the management of this enterprise.

I would like to believe that the fornication with giant and super-expensive corvettes and frigates growing out of them, expensive but weak compared to competitors already under construction (22350), will someday end, and this design bureau will again, as before, serve the country’s defense capability.

Who would finally achieve this!

Why did Project 20386 begin to develop according to a different scenario?

Although it would seem that designers should continue to increase the armament power of new corvettes, in fact, it is not advisable to do this. A number of factors speak against this:

• Corvettes with powerful and expensive weapons are too expensive for the navy;
• The construction of such ships is extremely delayed, which leads to their obsolescence even before their official release into series;
• A construction with such powerful weapons automatically takes them out of class, since the tasks of a corvette in no way include the responsibility of being a floating air defense complex;
• The high cost prevents mass production.

In addition to these, there are many more factors that stubbornly indicate that Russian designers have chosen a fundamentally wrong development path.

That is why it was decided to make the new Project 20386 corvettes cheaper by reducing the number of weapons. In addition, after reducing the number of weapons on board the corvette, the speed and maneuverability of the vessel increased significantly. Corvettes are not at all designed to deliver powerful blows to the enemy. Their main tasks are the following functions:

• Patrolling territorial waters;
• Escort of transport and merchant ships;
• Protection against attacks on the main fleet in quick response mode.

Moreover, the Russian Navy is in dire need of ships of this particular class.

It was decided to make the new project to create a corvette as cheap as possible in order to increase the speed of their production. Although thoughts were repeatedly expressed that ready-made ships of previous projects should be used as a “base” for creation, it was decided to design a new ship from a “clean slate”. According to the technical specifications, it should have a small displacement and carry on board fairly light but balanced weapons.

Project 20386 – a tangle of technical and tactical contradictions

The Russian defense industry has been working in intensive mode over the past 10-15 years. The point is not that new military ships and military equipment are coming off the stocks and factory conveyors in large quantities. In fact, several projects are being implemented simultaneously, each of which represents another trial version. The trend in the shipbuilding industry continues to build small warships, which are then equipped with weapons systems of unprecedented power. The idea is good, and today no one can compete with Russian designers in this regard.

But already at the project implementation stage, another attempt arises to improve or improve the design data. This leads to a slowdown in the serial construction of ships that are so necessary for the modern fleet. In the Ministry of Defense and in the high offices of the General Staff of the Navy, the battle of points of view continues: to give preference to corvettes or to build small missile ships in large quantities.

Comparison of project 20380 and 20386 corvettes

This is what happened with the Project 20380 ships, the predecessors of the Project 20386 corvettes. These were new combat ships on which it was planned to install a powerful air defense system - the Redut system, equipped with long-range 9M96M missiles and a naval version of the S-400 MANPADS. The ships of the series that have already been built are included in the Baltic Fleet as ships with the most powerful air defense system. These are no longer ordinary patrol ships; such ships are more reminiscent of air defense cruisers, designated as a separate class in foreign fleets. The next version, Project 20385 corvettes, already received weapons comparable in power and type to those of Project 11356 frigates.

Therefore, the designers in the new Project 20386, which became an improved version of the Project 20380 corvettes, decided to reduce the number of weapons and reduce the combat load on the ship’s structure. The prevailing opinion was that the corvette is a vessel that performs slightly different tasks. Ships of this class are more typical for escort and patrol tasks, and strike functions are unusual for them. It is not practical to build a corvette at a cost comparable to that of a frigate. In addition, corvettes as a class of ships are urgently needed by fleets for operations in the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Pacific maritime theater.

Construction

In the new project, everything possible was done to avoid catastrophic delays in construction. For example, four Project 20380 corvettes took almost 8 years to build! During this time, navigation and radar equipment became obsolete, weapons systems and methods of fighting at sea advanced. To build a ship that is obviously old is extremely wasteful. Corvettes are an intermediate class of military vessels, especially since the main “feature” of this class is their low cost and mass construction. Making a ship a powerful strike combat unit is impractical, and turning such a ship into a specialized air defense system also makes no sense. For these purposes, it is necessary to build ships of other classes and in different quantities.

What will the corvette “Daring” be like?

The first ship of Project 20386, called “Daring”, is the corvette of the future. It represents a kind of intermediate class between a patrol ship and a full-fledged frigate. As a result, although formally the ship “Daring” belongs to the class of corvettes, in its characteristics it is more similar to a full-fledged destroyer.

In accordance with the development plan, the first corvette of Project 20386 must fight not only in near waters, but also confront the enemy at the far reaches of Russian territorial waters. The designers of the new ship are faced with a truly difficult task - to create a universal combat unit that can replace warships of several classes at once. So, in accordance with the technical specifications, the corvette “Daring” must confidently cope with the following combat missions:

• New ships must protect sea communications within a 200 mile zone;
• To counter the enemy who is located both at close and long distances from the Russian fleet’s bases;
• Provide with its air defense system the protection of fleet ships from sudden enemy air raids;
• Search, find and destroy enemy submarines in the zone controlled by the corvette;
• Provide cover for the attacking landing force, both through its air defense systems and conventional fire preparation.

Naturally, a ship with such a wide range of responsibilities should differ significantly from its predecessors. The designers tried to implement in Project 20386 a ship that can act as the main strike force and at the same time have the functions of a patrol vessel.

It turns out that the designers, having built in the potential of the new warship, are again stepping on the same rake. It is unlikely that it will be possible to implement such a project in a short time, especially since the cost will be quite high.

The leadership of the Russian Navy continues to adhere to its strange tactics, which is expressed in the construction of multifunctional ships produced in very limited quantities. If this option is acceptable for the construction of several huge aircraft carriers, then at least several dozen corvettes of the same series should be immediately produced. Developing a new project each time, the military industry simply does not have time to provide the Russian Navy with the required number of modern warships.

Most major maritime powers produce ships of this class in fairly large series (the USSR also did this). For example, the famous American destroyers Oliver Perry were produced in the amount of 71 warships. The Chinese are doing the same thing, spending huge amounts of money on the defense industry in recent years. In China, over 10 years, more than 20 corvettes of type 056 were built, and their production is planned to be closed no earlier than 60-80 ships of this type are produced.

Despite all the disagreements, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in April 2014 signed a contract with the Almaz MPKB to carry out design work.

youinf.ru

Corvettes of the near and far sea zone of Project 20386 are a completely new step in domestic military shipbuilding. In promising military courts, it was possible to implement the most advanced technical ideas using modern techniques and technologies.

In addition, the Corvette 20386 project was made as cheap as possible in order to increase production speed. According to the technical specifications, the Corvette has a small displacement and carries light, but balanced and powerful weapons.

The lead ship of project 20386, named Derzky, with serial number 1009, was laid down on October 28, 2016 at the Northern Shipyard in St. Petersburg. With a displacement of 3,500 tons, the Daring does not climb the wave, but cuts through it. This provides increased stability and makes it possible to use weapons in sea conditions of up to five points.

The tasks of the new corvette: ☆ Protecting communications within a 200-mile sea zone ☆ Fighting a potential enemy at any distance from their bases ☆ Searching and destroying submarines ☆ Providing air defense for ship formations ☆ Providing air defense and fire support for landing operations.

The developers of Project 20386 ships classified them as corvettes, but in fact (in terms of armament power and tasks performed) the new ship is more reminiscent of a destroyer.

Performance characteristics of the Corvette Daring. Project 20386

Design features of the new cruiser "Daring"

Since the new corvette “Daring” is a multifunctional combat ship, its design will have many non-standard solutions:

• It is planned to use the latest gas turbine unit as a power plant, which will be partially powered by electricity. This is a whole complex consisting of two Russian gas turbine diesel engines, each of which will develop up to 27,500 l/s. In addition, each of these engines will be assisted by a specially designed electric motor that develops power up to 2,200 hp. Such power plants have been used in the automotive industry for a long time. They are known as hybrid engines;
• The superstructure of the new military corvette of the Russian Navy is planned to be made of durable polymer-composite materials of the new generation, which will significantly lighten the weight of the warship;
• Fundamentally new cargo hatches will appear, which will be located in the surface parts of the sides. This will help the ship realize the full potential of the technology. Already now the ship is often called a “ghost corvette”;
• The ship will receive completely new hydraulic systems, a new control system, life support and electrical equipment.

The corvette "Daring" received new hull lines, which allowed it to improve its seaworthiness. The ship turned out to be very stable. It does not “climb” the wave, but cuts it, so it can go out into the open sea with waves up to 5 points.

The engine problem was solved with a new series

582 3 min.

The 20386 series of corvettes, on which modular weapons technology will be used for the first time, will load the St. Petersburg Northern Shipyard and the Kaliningrad shipbuilding plant. According to the most conservative estimates, the series will bring both shipyards 100 billion rubles in income: the cost of one ship exceeds 20 billion rubles. For the series, the problem of the power plant has been solved: the ships will be equipped with two M90FR gas turbine engines with a capacity of 27.5 thousand hp each. pp., which are already produced by the Rybinsk NPO Saturn. Previous series were supplied with engines from Germany, which is why they cannot be completed today.

Photo: Evgeny Pavlenko, Kommersant

On Friday, the “Daring” corvette, the lead ship of Project 20386, was laid down at the Northern Shipyard. The long-term shipbuilding program until 2050, signed by the Russian President, provides for the construction of more than ten Project 20386 corvettes, said Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for Armaments Viktor Bursuk. “The ship has a completely new hull - it allows you not to climb onto the wave, but to cut it. The ship will be equipped with a gas turbine unit, which will allow it to reach high speed. The gas turbine will be produced by Rybinsk. The corvette is automated, which allows reducing the crew size by about a third. In fact, this is our first ship in which the principle of modularity will be applied,” said the deputy commander-in-chief.

The principle of modularity was revealed by the general director of Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau JSC, which designed the corvette, Alexander Shlyakhtenko. “If there is an anti-submarine combat mission, we install a submarine search system and install the appropriate systems. The strike mission implies the presence of missiles for a ground target or for a surface target. It will be possible to pack even a helicopter or landing equipment into the ship. We think that this ship will live for quite a long time, because it has special transformer rooms where the latest weapons under development can be installed,” said Mr. Shlyakhtenko.

According to the general director of Almaz, the Kaliningrad shipbuilding plant is also being considered as a potential contractor for the order: presumably, the series will be divided between the St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad plants. The decision to locate the construction of part of the corvette series in Kaliningrad seems logical, since the factories have similar production capabilities. There are no plans to lay down a second corvette in the near future either at the Northern Shipyard or at Yantar: first, shipbuilders must test the operation of the systems and make adjustments if there are errors.

Mr. Shlyakhtenko noted that the corvettes of Project 20385, which preceded the new series, will apparently now be built only for export. The two corvettes that preceded the Daring, the Gremyashchy and the Provorovny, were laid down in 2012 and 2013. Their construction was delayed due to sanctions imposed on Russia and the subsequent refusal of the German manufacturer to supply MTU engines. Both corvettes have not yet been launched.

Construction and testing of the Daring will take five years; the Navy plans to receive the lead corvette of the series in 2022. Its length will be 109 m and its width will be 13 m. The corvette will reach a speed of up to 30 knots, its displacement will be 3.4 thousand tons. Corvette superstructures will be made from composite material by the St. Petersburg Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard. As an interlocutor familiar with the terms of the order for the corvette told Kommersant, its cost “slightly exceeds 20 billion rubles.” Thus, even if the number of ships in the 20386 series does not exceed ten, which will be equally divided between the two factories, the income of each shipyard from construction will be 100 billion rubles.

Editor-in-Chief of the Arms Export magazine Andrei Frolov notes that the modular principle of ship armament is not new in global shipbuilding, but in the case of Russia, the construction of such a ship indicates a step forward. The main problems in construction will be related to the modular principle of its armament. “The ship concept makes great demands not on shipbuilders, but on weapons manufacturers, so that it can be modular,” the expert noted.

The power plant that is going to be used on the new corvettes is typical for frigates twice as heavy. “The M90FR engines seem large for a ship with a displacement of 3.4 thousand tons. Speed ​​30 knots is moderate. Frigates travel at the same speed with the same turbines. Apparently, the power will not work on the speed of the ship, but on the operation of the generator and providing energy to the ship’s equipment,” believes Mr. Frolov.

German Kostrinsky

Armament of the first corvette of project 20386

The armament of the corvette “Daring” significantly exceeds the potential of its foreign “colleagues”. For example, the American USS Montgomery, which is considered the newest ship of the same class, has a significantly weaker combat potential. If these two ships had met one on one, the American ship would have had little chance of surviving.

The first corvette of Project 20386 will be equipped with the following weapons:

• A universal automatic artillery mount A190 of 100 mm caliber, which will be installed in a new flattened turret;
• On board the ship will be installed two Uran or Uran-U missile systems, which are intended to destroy enemy ships at a distance of 130 to 260 km. It is possible that this will be the Caliber missile system, whose missiles are capable of hitting surface ships at a distance of up to 375 km. In order to reduce the visibility of these complexes, they are hidden in the stowed position of the ship behind special shields, which are located in the central part of the ship's superstructure;
• The Redut air defense system launchers are located in the bow of the corvette. They serve to destroy air targets, both at medium and short distances;
• In the middle part of the hull, special launchers of the Package-NK complex will be installed on board. This complex is designed for anti-torpedo protection of a corvette;
• At the stern, on both sides of the sides, there will be automatic six-barreled artillery mounts designed to repel attacks by pirates, saboteurs, and also shoot floating mines.

Although the exact composition of the armament of the Derzkiy corvette is unknown, the designers have repeatedly stated that the principle of modular configuration will be implemented on the warship. A special compartment designed for modules will contain containers with a variety of weapons and equipment.

In addition, the ship’s KA-27 helicopter and several unmanned aerial vehicles of the Horizon helicopter type will be placed on board the Derzkiy corvette.

Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam

The topic of the need and feasibility of building large series of ships has been raised repeatedly by many authors and specialists. The world experience of shipbuilding clearly speaks in favor of this. However, what is happening in our Navy resembles an orgy with a complete lack of adequate military and technical justification (and its replacement with various “advertising tricks” (and other “techniques”), such as “innovation” and “modularity”, etc.) .

Corvette 20386. There is an error in the image, there are two rapid-fire mounts with an AK-306 cannon. But everything else is correct.

This summer, one of the authors (A.T.) published an article “Worse than a crime. The construction of Project 20386 corvettes is a mistake.”

, which caused a significant resonance (including among specialists). Then, on its basis and based on the results of the discussion, an appeal (A.T.) was sent to the administration of the President of the Russian Federation with a request to understand the feasibility of Project 20386 and to resume production and modernization of a series of corvettes of Project 20380 already mastered by industry and the fleet. Briefly, the main theses :

1. The huge price of Project 20386. The construction cost of the head ship is known - more than 29 billion rubles, which is 70% more expensive than the serial corvette of Project 20380 and close to the cost of a modern frigate of Project 22350.

2. Weak weapons. Despite a significant increase in displacement (from projects 20380 and 20385), the new “innovative” project 20386 lost the Caliber complex (standardly installed on project 20385). The use of "Caliber" is possible only with a planned "container-modular" launcher, temporarily installed instead of a helicopter (!) and with a halving of ammunition from the project 20385. Also, under the pretext of "reducing the cost", hydroacoustic weapons have been significantly simplified (with the abandonment of the sonar "Zarya" and replacing it with an older one with worse performance characteristics GAS MG-335M). Taking into account the importance of anti-submarine missions, incl. to ensure the deployment of strategic nuclear forces, such a weakening of the armament of the “promising” Project 20386 corvette has no reasonable explanation (especially taking into account its significantly increased displacement and cost).

3. Due to the new type of main power plant of the corvette 20386 (gas turbine with partial electric propulsion), not only is there a technical difference with other ships in the near zone, but their joint use for their intended purpose is also significantly complicated. In this case, partial electric motion gives little benefit, because The power of electric motors on Project 20386 is small for an effective search stroke (about 18 knots), and the inevitable transition to turbines sharply increases noise, operating costs and reduces cruising range.

4. For the sake of Project 20386, the laying of industrially developed corvettes of Projects 20380 and 20385 has already been stopped, and this will have very serious consequences for both the fleet and industry in the coming years.

5. The “modularity concept” on which Project 20386 was “justified” failed in a number of countries (including the USA). At the same time, “for some reason” we ignore their successful experience in this area, for example, the MEKO concept, and all “modularity” for us has come down to stuffing combat systems into 20 and 40 foot containers (with a significant reduction in their performance characteristics). In the end, if this concept needs to be tested, then it can be done on any cheap cargo ship (and not on a special expensive “corvette-subfrigate”). So where is the real verification of “our modules”?

6. High technical risk of project 20386. Here we can note the problem of stabilizing the radar beam due to significant and random deformations of the composite superstructure. The need to install a radar on the superstructure is extremely controversial. After all, these are not only problems with beam stabilization, but also a significant reduction in the detection range of low-flying targets (from project 20385 with the same radar, but on a mast). The reason for placing the AN/SPY-1 radar canvases in the USA is obvious - their mass and problems with the stability of their first carriers of the Ticonderoga missile launcher. But after the new radars have already been successfully placed on the mast of Project 22350, “lowering” them (and the detection range of low-flying targets) on Project 20386 is beyond common sense. Here the question already arises about the “unofficial name” of the 20386 project - “KhBZ” (“I want to be a Zumvolt”), the 20386’s imitation of this unsuccessful US Navy project is too obvious (especially considering that version 20386 with a “wave-piercing” nose ( as on the Zumvolt) existed).

Project 20386 corvette and US Navy destroyer Zumvolt (a version 20386 with a reverse bow tilt existed).

The “advantages” of the Project 20386 ship in terms of seaworthiness, speed and range are stated. However, the increase in seaworthiness is insignificant compared to the 20380 project, and begins to clearly manifest itself only in rough seas, where both projects are on the verge of losing their combat effectiveness. The speed of 20386 was achieved by gas turbines (diesel on the Corvettes 20380). At the same time, taking into account the significant increase in displacement of 20386, the use of turbines on the original 20380 could provide an even more significant cost effect. Range? But it is needed primarily by long-range ships. At the same time, the Project 22350 frigate, with a cost close to Project 20386, has incomparably higher combat capabilities. At the same time, a significant range on project 20386 is achieved through a combined installation and the use of electric motors on an economical propulsion. The problem is that due to the low power of these electric motors, the range of speeds of the Navy corvette does not correspond to them (for example, the task of searching for submarines), and in most cases the corvette 20386 will have to “stand under the turbines” for this - with a sharp increase in noise and operating costs (and reduced range).

For the near sea zone, as a replacement for the Project 1124 MPK, Project 20386 ships are completely redundant. The main thing is that we need in the near zone a mass carrier of our most effective sonar system today, the Minotaur (and with a long towed antenna). To carry out combat missions in this zone, you do not need a long range and autonomy in terms of reserves 20386. The increased speed does not make sense, due to the limitations of towed sonars, and in a combat situation the ships will sail with them (exposed)! But we need a lower price, and the maximum possible anti-submarine capabilities for the lowest possible price (to ensure mass construction).

In fact, the ship of Project 20386, although called “corvette,” is a “small frigate” in terms of its displacement, seaworthiness and range. And most importantly, it’s a frigate (and a “full-size one”) and at the same price, but it’s armed worse than the Project 20385 corvette! This is such a “corrupted underfrigate”.

In response to an appeal to the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, a response from the Navy was received, the main provisions of which are given below.

Should comment on this response from the Navy

Navy: The Project 20380 corvette was created in the early 2000s and, taking into account the trends of modern military shipbuilding, is gradually becoming obsolete.

A comment. It is appropriate to compare our “experience” with the corvettes of the project line: 20380 - 20380 with the Zaslon radar - 20385 - 20386, with the American - a huge series of destroyers of the Arleigh Burke type, created a decade and a half earlier than our 20386, and continuously improved (in within several subseries). We, having not completely eliminated the shortcomings of the serial 20380, are seizing on new projects!

Navy: Further modernization of the corvette 20380 in terms of REV has already led to a significant increase in its cost.

A comment. This is a well-known fact, and it is associated, first of all, with the installation of the new Zaslon radar complex (RLK) instead of the Furke and Puma radars. The question arises as to why this was done, given the availability of the serial Pozitiv-M radar (which satisfies the performance characteristics of a corvette) and has an order of magnitude lower cost (from the Zaslon radar). In addition, it is completely incomprehensible why the Zaslon radar, with a sharp increase in cost (from the Furke radar), did not eliminate the most critical shortcoming of the air defense of corvettes - the absence of a radio correction channel for missiles? Or is the information correct that the installation of the Zaslon radar on corvettes took place only “for the sake of the Zaslon radar itself (more precisely, its manufacturer)?

Screenshot of the advertising brochure for RLC "Zaslon". A solution to the problem of the lack of a radio correction line for missile defense systems, critical for Project 20380 and 20385 corvettes, has not even been announced and is not planned!

Navy: The construction restriction 20385 was a forced measure (sanctions).

A comment. However, they are being completed (two buildings of project 20385) with a domestic Kolomna diesel power plant. At the same time, there is a prospect of increasing its capacity, however, in the current announced plans of the Navy, the plant is left without an order (diesels for Navy surface ships). If the problem for the Navy is to reduce the speed of the 20385 corvettes (with the Kalibr complex), then a possible solution for the placement of the Caliber was indicated - its placement on inclined launchers (similar to the Uran complex) based on the “original” project 20380.

Navy: Project 20386 corvette is a further development of ships in the near sea zone. This ship project will be the main base platform for the next few decades. When developing the project, the best achievements in military shipbuilding were used.

A comment. These are meaningless, “advertising” phrases; the Navy could not provide a sane answer to a single specific tactical or technical question regarding the obvious problems of Project 20386. With Project 20386, a strong regression in the level of development is obvious: with a significant increase in displacement and cost, in terms of armament and combat qualities, Project 20386 is significantly inferior to the previous Project 20385.

Navy: Project 20386 is multifunctional, has balanced weapons (including modular ones) and is capable of solving problems both in the near zone and occasionally in the far zone.

A comment. The obvious critical shortcomings of Project 20386 weapons are noted above. The Navy could only provide general phrases as an answer. Apparently, the Navy simply does not have any arguments or facts to support reasonable objections to criticism of Project 20386.

Navy: The high cost of the lead corvette of Project 20386 is primarily due to the accompanying research and development work for its creation.

A comment. The indicated cost of the Project 20386 corvette is taken from the annual report of Severnaya Verf JSC. Taking into account the fact that the R&D work for Project 20386 is being carried out by TsMKB Almaz JSC, it is obvious that the real cost of the lead corvette of Project 20386 is much higher than the figure of 29 billion rubles indicated in the Severnaya Verf report.

Navy: In the future, the cost of Project 20386 corvettes is planned to be reduced due to their large serial production.

A comment. The question arises: why does the Navy need defective ships (Project 20386) at all, and at a price close to the price of the much more powerful frigates of Project 22350? What kind of mass series can we even talk about? And where are the guarantees of a “price reduction” if the cost of the previous corvettes (Project 20380) only grew during the construction process?

The main problem with Project 20386 is that, with weak combat capabilities, it disrupts the replacement of worn-out and outdated ships of the Navy in the near zone. It was the understanding of this fact that brought to life the original appeal (A.T.)

So, there are simple technical and tactical “inconvenient questions” regarding project 20386:

1. Why does the new project 20386 have extremely weak weapons despite a significant increase in its displacement and cost?

2. What is the “logic of choice” based on: either “Caliber in a container” “or a helicopter” for this project, if the ship needs them together and almost simultaneously (especially taking into account its significant displacement)?

3. What is the “feasibility” of building Project 20386 at a cost close to the serial frigate of Project 22350 (which has incomparably greater combat capabilities)?

4. “Feasibility” of introducing a hybrid power plant, taking into account the fact that the installed low-power electric motors are not able to provide even a search speed of 16-18 knots?

5. Is it “feasible” to use an extremely expensive radar missile system on a close-range ship (and one that does not have a radio correction channel for missiles) and “golden” missiles at the cost?

6. What prevented us from working out the “modular concept” on any experimental vessel in advance and at minimal cost (and, with an allegedly “successful” result, convincingly presenting it to specialists and society)?

7. How can the close zone be ensured (primarily in anti-submarine terms) if, due to the very high cost of new corvettes, their series is obviously insufficient to solve the Navy’s problems? Moreover, the chief designer of project 20386 himself (!) directly writes about this in his latest book (link below)!

8. Why, given the extreme importance of the anti-submarine defense task (including in order to support the strategic nuclear forces), and the installation of an extremely expensive (and dubiously justified) radar system, hydroacoustics on project 20386 was “cut down” for “savings”?

The Navy actually avoided answering them (because obviously there is nothing to answer). In response to the unsubscribe, the author sent another appeal. The text of this appeal can be found here

. It must be said that after nearly four months of waiting, no response was received to this repeated appeal. A little later, the Navy drew up a new reply, signed by the Chief of Naval Shipbuilding V. Tryapichnikov, even more meaningless, but more about it below.

A question arises for the author and chief designer of this project, I.G. Zakharov. In his previous publications on topic 20386, the above-mentioned pressing issues of the project were carefully avoided. At the same time, he understands everything, but does the exact opposite! Zakharov I.G.:

The need to create and maintain small corvettes in the fleet is a result of the increasing cost and increasing capabilities of multi-purpose corvettes. ... the number of naval personnel in the Navy may be reduced by more than 60% ... The current situation can only be turned around by concentrating efforts on solving more clearly defined priority tasks, one of which is the creation of a junior class corvette and, therefore, of lower cost. Thanks to these ships, it will be possible to maintain the required number of surface ships in the fleet

Perhaps this time he will find civil courage and give an explanation for Project 20386. At the same time, not forgetting about the problems with Project 20380:

• “justification” for the use of the Fourke radar (given its capabilities to issue target designations that obviously do not meet the requirements of the Redut air defense system);

• the absence (until now!) of a radio correction channel for missiles on corvettes and the point in using missiles with a 40 km range without a radio correction channel (!);

• here: what kind of SAM capture range does he personally hope to get from the stealthy newest American anti-ship missiles LRASM, and in general whether the Redut air defense system (in the configuration adopted for a corvette - with autonomous missiles with ARGSN) is capable of effectively repelling an attack on such targets (especially taking into account the fact that in all tests it only worked on targets with an EPR one or two orders of magnitude larger than LRASM)?

• justification for the use of the extremely expensive Zaslon radar (with an obvious “reduction” in project 20386 to “save” hydroacoustics).

It is obvious that the real reasons for the “decisions on Project 20386” have nothing to do with technology and “military considerations.” Among specialists in the field of shipbuilding and the creation of naval weapons, information has long been circulating, which briefly boils down to the following: beginning of 2013, the Commander of the Baltic Fleet reports to the Chief of the Navy V.V. Chirkov. about the complete incapacity of Project 20380 corvettes, and at the same time I.V. Zakharov, coordinated with V.V. Chirkov. TTZ for the new Project 20386 corvette (and bypassing Navy specialists). Navy specialist, 01/03/2015:

It is known that the TTZ was passed on 20386, when Mr. Zakharov, the main enemy of our fleet, on behalf of Almaz, brought the TTZ to the Central Research Institute of VK, signed it with the boss and then immediately with the Commander-in-Chief. Naturally, no one from the institute read anything inside. Then. We read it later and...

This is a photo from a bookmark. The mortgage section then lay there for two years, and no one did anything with it. In fact, construction began in 2018.

Navy specialist 11/16/2006:

Criticism of the 20380 project... no one is interested in how these, without a doubt, excellent missiles will actually fly, in the absence of a radio correction line and disgusting target designation from the Fourke... So to speak, according to the “fire and forget” scheme. About what!!!!!!! About the goal? or about a rocket? ... the developers of the air defense system diligently avoid all the sharp corners, like: How will your missile defense system see the target if there are target designation errors in the area of ​​1 degree?... The answer is - It will see... etc.

... if we take as a lemma the statement of I.G. Zakharova: We will not fight with anyone, period The corvette is needed to display the flag, period, then of course everything is fine. What if there is war tomorrow...

Hex? However, these same people named all the problems of Project 20380, which the fleet subsequently encountered (and which have not been completely resolved to this day!), not just before they arose, but even before they began to be embodied in hardware! Those. at the time of making “controversial decisions” on corvettes in the late 2000s, their erroneousness and catastrophic consequences were immediately clear to specialists.

Navy specialist 10.10.2011:

From my point of view, which has been expressed here many times (and how many times can it be repeated): there are no real opportunities to bring to fruition the Redoubt air defense system on the corvette 20380 N E T The reasons have already been repeatedly indicated and there is no point in listing them again. Well, okay... the main ones 1. This is not an air defense system. Not a complex. this is a launcher + command module + rocket. There is no information subsystem. 2. “Furke” has no chance of providing “Redoubt” with the information required for accuracy. 3. The only chance of work is according to Puma through Sigma.

These assessments especially correlate with the information published in the article by K. Chulkov (“Version on the Neva”, 06/01/2017):

Apparently, the “Tower” in the document refers to the integrated antenna-tower mast complex (IBMK), which connects all navigation, weapons control, electronic warfare and reconnaissance equipment of a warship into a single unit... The Gremyashchiy and Provorny corvettes of the 20385 series were built at the Severnaya Verf, the lead developer was the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau, which decided to order “towers” ​​for the corvettes of this series from Leninets, despite the fact that the enterprise had previously been in the maritime field was not present and did not have the relevant experience... But let’s return to the document “Scheme of special relations for the Tower”. According to the agreements with Almaz and Severnaya Verf, the document says, payments from the value of the agreement without VAT follow Lysenko - 1%, .... As you know, Eduard Lysenko is the deputy head of the FSUE TsMKB Almaz.

Note: today the former Deputy Director of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau for armaments E. Lysenko has been fired, leaving behind a long “trail” of extremely strange decisions and “preferences”. This concerned not only the armament of corvettes (although he bears personal responsibility for them, especially for problems with their air defense), but also for other ships. For example, it was he who “justified” (in quotes) the supposed “inexpediency” of modernizing the Navy’s massive Project 1265 minesweepers for the Mayevka complex (“Mayevka” did not come up with the trawls; Lysenko preferred ancient and useless trawls).

Today, however, the situation with the 20380 corvettes has changed.

According to information from the Pacific Fleet, Project 20380 corvettes have significantly “increased” their combat effectiveness. The Uran missile system perfectly hits targets at a distance, the A-190 cannon, which was previously the talk of the town, accurately and reliably hits targets, both sea and air, as well as ground, the Fourke radar also showed itself well when monitoring air goals. The hydroacoustic system works well, and the electronic warfare systems have shown themselves to be excellent.

Summarize. Despite the sharp deterioration of the military-political situation since 2014, Project 20380 corvettes are still of limited combat capability (and the main questions remain regarding the Redut air defense system)! However, the industry carried out a lot of hard, but effective work to fine-tune the project and eliminate many of its shortcomings. At present, the prospects for quickly bringing corvettes to a combat-ready state are quite real. Obviously, the key issue regarding air defense systems is the introduction of a radio correction channel for air defense missiles (including on all previously built ships with the Redut air defense system).

However, instead, a scam was launched with a new project (and with the transfer of key shortcomings of 20380 to it, for example, the lack of radio correction for missiles), which is also many times more expensive.

The question arises: is it possible to “completely” eliminate the shortcomings of the 20380, or are its modernization reserves supposedly “exhausted”? Yes, project 20385 obviously completely selected the reserves of project 20380 in terms of loads. However, there are “internal reserves”:

• the use of simple and lightweight inclined launchers for the Caliber complex, structurally similar to the launchers previously used on the Nakat small rocket ship;

• replacement of heavy launchers of the “Package” complex with light ones, similar to the Western Mk32, ensuring the storage of spare ammunition in a common cellar with the aviation one;

• for the use of boats (including unmanned ones) in difficult conditions - reduce the installation height of the boats to the level of the upper deck (with the installation of modern launching and lifting devices), which is possible on newly built ships, provided they are equipped with light torpedo tubes of 324 mm caliber and moving them to a place more convenient for recharging.

Of course, it is necessary to solve the “SAM problem”, ensuring radio correction of the SAM. Taking into account the short ranges of acquisition of the ARL seeker for missiles of stealth targets of the LRASM type, it is obviously necessary to install a second radar of the Puma type, giving it the functions of controlling the air defense system. Perhaps it makes sense to develop a series of missiles with a reduced cost due to the abandonment of the expensive ARLGSN - using them as radio commands. When repelling a “dense” raid with a short time interval of stealth weapons, a radio command air defense system with a good multi-channel radar has a decisive advantage over air defense systems with autonomous missile defense systems with ARLGSN, clearly controlling the situation, the actual shelling and destruction of all targets. Formally, there are such ones - “Pantsir-M” and “Tor-2M”, but their placement on the corvette means a complete reworking of its design, and the possibility of using simple radio command modifications of the 9M96 and 9M100 missiles with a standard launcher from under the “Puma” is probably easier and more expedient.

In order to reduce the cost of the corvette, it is advisable to unify the “new” 20380 radars with the first two hulls of the Project 22800 small missiles (i.e., install the Pozitiv-M radar). The successful creation of the Almaz Central Maritime Design Bureau and Project 22800 small missile ship showed that ships can be built here quickly and at a reasonable cost. The capabilities of the Project 22800 radar are quite sufficient to solve problems in the near zone (including for the Project 20380 corvette).

To summarize:

1. Project 20386 does not have any serious military or technical justification. The Navy, which received it, “to put it mildly,” from the “back door,” does not have and is not able to bring any serious and noteworthy arguments in its favor. Its serial construction is impractical.

2. The industry has done a lot of hard and largely successful work to fine-tune the 20380 project, and has mastered its serial construction (even at the “problematic” Amur Shipyard).

3. Project 20380 ships began to sail reliably (including in the far and ocean zones).

4. It is necessary to continue the series of corvettes of Project 20380(5), with the unconditional complete elimination of their shortcomings (including the modification of the first ships of the series).

5. In order to reduce the cost, it is advisable to unify the radar systems of projects 20380 (new hulls) and 22800 (the first two hulls of the series) and use (in the future) unified control racks for various weapon systems.

6. The use of products of the “Caliber” complex must be ensured from inclined launchers of all corvettes (including the first hulls). First of all, this concerns anti-submarine missiles (the OVR corvette should not be “game” for submarines, but a “hunter” for them!), as is done, for example, on the Chinese OVR corvettes of Project 056.

7. It is necessary to place promising robotic systems and modern boats on board Project 20380 corvettes.

8. Finding “internal reserves” for reducing the displacement of Project 20380 ships to carry out its modification (with the elimination of shortcomings), for example, replacing the heavy launch complex “Package” with light pneumatic torpedo tubes.

The construction of Project 20386 ships must be stopped and money should not be spent on such technical adventures in the future.

Afterword 2022

This article was supposed to be published on New Year's Eve in one major publication and was written specifically for it. However, taking into account the significant resonance of the previous series of articles by the authors, measures were taken to prevent its publication in the media.

The negative consequences of the cessation of construction of the Project 20380 (20385) series of corvettes are also beginning to be realized by managers. In August 2018, A.V. Shlyakhtenko, General Director of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau, gave an interview to TASS, in which he stated:

This year there are no plans to lay down corvettes 20380 and 20385 at the shipbuilding and Amur shipyards. However, the Almaz Central Maritime Design Bureau is convinced that these surface combat ships, due to their limited cost and sufficiently powerful weapons that allow them to solve a wide range of combat missions, including in remote sea and ocean zones, are the basis for the formation of the surface fleet... Therefore, their construction must be carried out continuously and at the maximum possible pace. We hope that the decision to lay down new ships of this class will be made by the government customer in the near future.

What about the Navy? The “answer” (or rather its complete absence) is in the reply from the head of naval shipbuilding V. Tryapichinkov...

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy V.I. Korolev and his predecessor Chirkov V.V. at the model of the corvette of project 20386. Chirkov, while still the Commander-in-Chief, “pushed through” another useless project - 22160. And then he went to work for the management of the USC.

In just three years, “Daring” will remain alone on the slipway for an indefinitely long time, as a monument to how such adventures end.

Radio equipment of the corvette "Daring"

At the moment, it is planned to install on the Derzkiy corvette radio equipment identical to that located on the Project 20385 corvettes. Since these systems can be improved over the course of several years, it is possible that more advanced radio equipment will be installed on the new corvette. Now the proposed set of radio weapons looks like this:

• Combat information and control system "Sigma";
• Radar station "Furke-2";
• Target designation radar;
• Two navigation type radars;
• Navigation aids;
• Communication complex "Ruberoid";
• Electronic warfare equipment;
• OGAS "Anapa-M";
• Station "Minotaur-M".

To protect against standard means of detecting the enemy and his anti-ship missiles, the “Brave” complex of fired jammers is used. The operation of this complex reduces the chances of hitting a ship by 70%.

After images of the Daring ship appeared in the public domain, many were struck by its external similarities with the American Freedom-class littoral combat ship, which is also equipped with a modular weapons system. In a few years, it will be possible to compare the characteristics of these two ships and check which country has a more promising corvette.

Little “Saucy” monster: the new stealth corvette can scare any enemy ship

The laying of a new ship is always a holiday, both for shipbuilders and sailors. It seems like there are no tangible steel sides or superstructures yet, no 3,400 tons of displacement, no formidable “Calibers”, “Redoubts”, “Packages”, even the crew has not yet been assembled, but the ship already exists. The newest corvette of Project 20386 received the name “Daring” and managed to evoke respect among “friends” and alarming foreboding among “strangers” due to its declared potential.

Corvette “Daring” is a continuation of the line of multi-purpose surface combatants of the second rank in the near sea zone of Project 20380, the first of which were laid down in the early 2000s. Currently, the Navy has four corvettes of this class, all in the DKBF (Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet) - Steregushchiy, Soobrazitelny, Boykiy and Stoikiy. Four more are under construction at the Severnaya Verf shipyard: Zealous and Strict (modernized project 20380), as well as Gremyashchiy and Provorny (project 20385).

“Perfect” is being built at the Amur Shipyard in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. In total, within the framework of the GVP-2020 (State Armaments Program), the Russian Navy should receive 20 corvettes of this type (3-8) for each fleet.

Of the announced and most popular projects of this series of corvettes (20380 and 20385), there is also project 20382 with the code “Tiger” - an export version, characterized by simplified armament. 20383 – project of a border patrol ship. Well, Project 20386, which will be “Daring”, is the best development of this series of corvettes, which will be distinguished from its “brothers” not only by improved seaworthiness and powerful engines, but also by enhanced armament, stealth and low noise.

And if the purpose of most corvettes is to conduct combat operations against a naval enemy in the near sea zone, to protect sea communications and maritime economic activity, then the “Daring” will be capable of operating in the far sea zone. In fact, in terms of its propulsion and combat capabilities, this corvette is close to destroyers.

The Project 20386 ship must hit surface combat ships and vessels with cruise missiles of the ship's missile system, search for and destroy enemy submarines with torpedoes of a small-sized anti-submarine system, ensure the combat stability of ships and vessels from enemy air attacks with an anti-aircraft missile system, provide artillery support for landings and naval operations landings with an artillery installation.

This is a kind of small (in terms of dimensions) monster, capable of performing a wide range of combat missions even far from its native shores - autonomy for 30 days and the ability to travel almost 5,000 nautical miles without refueling allow this. Speed ​​matters too - 32 mph versus 27 for its predecessors.

“Daring” is equipped with a combined gas turbine installation with partial electric propulsion. The installation includes two domestic gas turbine engines with a capacity of 27,500 horsepower and two main electric motors with a capacity of 2,200 horsepower. Thanks to innovative technologies, this corvette will become a fundamentally new ship for the Russian fleet. The superstructure will be made of lightweight and durable composite materials.

The use of large-size closing lapports (cargo hatches) on the surface of the side will also be new, allowing for a more complete implementation of Stealth technology. It is no coincidence that the ship has already been nicknamed the “invisible corvette.”

To accommodate a large complex of transportation vehicles and ship devices on the ship, compact and powerful drives, hydraulic systems, new materials and control systems were used. Innovative solutions are also used in the electrical power system, life support system, environmental protection and many others.

Another of the “daring” features is improved seaworthiness due to new hull lines. A ship with a displacement of almost three and a half thousand tons does not “climb” the wave, but cuts through it. Such stability will allow the ship’s weapons to be used in sea conditions of up to force five.

The Project 20386 corvette has a powerful arsenal, significantly exceeding the “caliber” of ships of the same class US NAVY (for example, the newest USS Montgomery, which crashed into the Panama Canal lock on October 29 of this year and has already received the nickname a leaky trough).

“Daring” will be equipped with a universal automatic 100-mm artillery mount A190 in a new “stealth” turret “flattened” from the sides. On board there will be two quadruple installations of the Uran or Uran-U ship-based missile system for attacks on surface enemies at a range of 130 to 260 kilometers (or, most likely, with Kalibr anti-ship missiles with a greater range of hitting targets). For zero visibility in the stowed position, these complexes will be hidden behind shields in the central part of the superstructure.

In the bow of the ship there is a block of vertical launchers of the Redut air defense system with anti-aircraft guided missiles for hitting air targets at short and medium ranges. Launchers of the Paket-NK anti-submarine (anti-torpedo) complex will be installed on the side in the middle part of the corvette’s hull behind the lapports. In the aft part of the superstructure - also on the side - there will be two 30-mm six-barreled AK-306 assault rifles, designed to repel attacks by saboteurs and pirates, as well as to shoot floating mines.

The exact composition of the weapons of Project 20386 is unknown, however, it was announced that the planned implementation of the modular principle of acquisition (in the aft part of the ship there is a compartment that can be used to accommodate interchangeable containers equipped with various equipment, headquarters equipment, missile launchers, etc.) and capabilities basing on board, in addition to the ship's Ka-27 (Ka-31) helicopter, drones, probably the Horizon.

It is possible that the radio-technical armament of the new ship will be identical to that located on the Project 20385 corvettes. And it, in addition to the Sigma combat information control system (combat information and control system), also includes the Furke-2 general detection radar (radar), Target designation radar for guided missiles "Monument-A" in a radio-transparent radome combined with the foremast structure, two navigation radars, hydroacoustic complex "Zarya-2" with an antenna in the bow bulb, hydroacoustic station "Minotaur-M" with an extended towed antenna, OGAS "Anapa-M", automated communication complex "Ruberoid", electronic warfare and navigation equipment.

To protect itself from enemy detection equipment and its anti-ship missiles, the ship is equipped with four ten-barreled PK-10 launchers (the Bold jammer complex). This entire complex of radio-technical weapons reduces the probability of hitting a ship by almost three times.

Author: Victor Sokirko