Conflicts between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic in 1994-1996/1999-2009

Archival photo from the Second Chechen War The conflict, called the Second Chechen War, occupies a special place in the history of modern Russia. Compared to the First Chechen War (1994-1996), this conflict was aimed at solving the same problem: establishing state power and constitutional order in the region, which was controlled by supporters of separatism, through military force.

At the same time, the situation that developed during the period between the two “Chechen” wars changed both in Chechnya itself and at the level of the Russian federal government. Therefore, the Second Chechen War took place under different conditions and was able, although it dragged on for almost 10 years, to end with a positive result for the Russian government.

Reasons for the start of the Second Chechen War

In short, the main reason for the Second Chechen War was the mutual dissatisfaction of the parties with the results of the previous conflict and the desire to change the situation in their favor. The Khasavyurt agreements, which ended the First Chechen War, provided for the withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya, meaning the complete loss of Russian control over this territory. At the same time, legally there was no talk of any “independent Ichkeria”: the question of the status of Chechnya was only postponed until December 31, 2001.

The official government of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI), led by Aslan Maskhadov, did not receive diplomatic recognition from any country and at the same time was rapidly losing influence within Chechnya itself. In the three years after the first military conflict, the territory of the CRI became a base not only for criminal gangs, but also for radical Islamists from Arab countries and Afghanistan.

It was these forces, controlled only by their “field commanders” and who found powerful military and financial support from the outside, that by the beginning of 1999 openly declared their refusal to obey Maskhadov. These same paramilitary groups began to actively engage in kidnapping for subsequent ransom or slavery, drug trafficking and organizing terrorist attacks, despite the proclaimed norms of Sharia.

To ideologically justify their actions, they used Wahhabism, which, combined with aggressive methods of instilling it, turned into a new extremist movement. Under this cover, radical Islamists, having established themselves in Chechnya, began to expand their influence into neighboring regions, destabilizing the situation throughout the North Caucasus. At the same time, individual incidents developed into increasingly large-scale armed clashes.

Chechen Wahhabi militants

Prerequisites for the start of the war in Chechnya

It is hardly possible to talk about these military campaigns briefly. The era of perestroika, so pompously announced by Mikhail Gorbachev, marked the collapse of a huge country consisting of 15 republics. However, the main difficulty for Russia was that, left without satellites, it was faced with internal unrest that had a nationalistic character. The Caucasus turned out to be especially problematic in this regard.

Back in 1990, the National Congress of the Chechen People was created. This organization was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former major general of aviation in the Soviet Army. The Congress set its main goal to secede from the USSR; in the future, it was planned to create a Chechen Republic, independent of any state.

In the summer of 1991, a situation of dual power arose in Chechnya, since both the leadership of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic itself and the leadership of the so-called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, proclaimed by Dudayev, acted.

This state of affairs could not exist for long, and in September the same Dzhokhar and his supporters seized the republican television center, the Supreme Council and the Radio House. This was the beginning of the revolution. The situation was extremely precarious, and its development was facilitated by the official collapse of the country carried out by Yeltsin. Following the news that the Soviet Union no longer existed, Dudayev's supporters announced that Chechnya was seceding from Russia.

The separatists seized power - under their influence, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the republic on October 27, as a result of which power was completely in the hands of ex-General Dudayev. And a few days later, on November 7, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree stating that a state of emergency was being introduced in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. In fact, this document became one of the reasons for the start of the bloody Chechen wars.

At that time, there was quite a lot of ammunition and weapons in the republic. Some of these reserves had already been captured by the separatists. Instead of blocking the situation, the Russian leadership allowed it to get even more out of control - in 1992, the head of the Ministry of Defense Grachev transferred half of all these reserves to the militants. The authorities explained this decision by saying that it was no longer possible to remove weapons from the republic at that time.

However, during this period there was still an opportunity to stop the conflict. An opposition was created that opposed Dudayev's power. However, after it became clear that these small detachments could not resist the militant formations, the war was practically already underway.

Yeltsin and his political supporters could no longer do anything, and from 1991 to 1994, Chechnya was actually a republic independent of Russia. It had its own government bodies and had its own state symbols. In 1994, when Russian troops were brought into the territory of the republic, a full-scale war began. Even after the resistance of Dudayev’s militants was suppressed, the problem was never completely resolved.

Speaking about the war in Chechnya, it is worth considering that the fault for its outbreak, first of all, was the illiterate leadership of first the USSR and then Russia. It was the weakening of the internal political situation in the country that led to the weakening of the outskirts and the strengthening of nationalist elements.

As for the essence of the Chechen war, there is a conflict of interests and an inability to govern a vast territory on the part of first Gorbachev and then Yeltsin. Subsequently, it was up to the people who came to power at the very end of the twentieth century to untie this tangled knot.

Parties to the conflict

In the new confrontation that arose between the Russian government and the CRI, the most active party was the paramilitary Wahhabi Islamists led by their “field commanders,” the most influential of whom were Shamil Basayev, Salman Raduev, Arbi Barayev and a native of Saudi Arabia, Khattab. The number of militants controlled by radical Islamists was estimated as the most massive among the armed formations operating in the CRI, covering 50-70% of their total number.

At the same time, a number of Chechen teips (tribal clans), while remaining committed to the idea of ​​“independent Ichkeria,” did not want an open military conflict with the Russian authorities. Maskhadov followed this policy until the outbreak of the conflict, but then he could count on maintaining the status of the official power of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and, accordingly, continue to convert this position into a source of income for his teip, which controls the key oil companies of the republic, and only on the side of opponents of the Russian government. Armed formations numbering up to 20-25% of all militants operated under his control.

In addition, supporters of teips led by Akhmat Kadyrov and Ruslan Yamadayev, who back in 1998 entered into open conflict with the Wahhabis, represented a significant force. They could rely on their own armed forces, covering up to 10-15% of all Chechen militants, and in the Second Chechen War they sided with the federal troops.

Important changes occurred in the highest echelon of Russian power shortly before the start of the Second Chechen War. On August 9, 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced the appointment of FSB Director Vladimir Putin to the post of head of government, publicly introducing him as a further successor to his post. For Putin, little-known at that time, the invasion of Islamist militants in Dagestan, and then the terrorist attacks with explosions of residential buildings in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk, the responsibility for which was assigned to Chechen gangs, became a significant reason to strengthen his power through a large-scale counter-terrorism operation (CTO). .

Since September 18, the borders of Chechnya have been blocked by Russian troops. The Presidential Decree on the conduct of the CTO was promulgated on September 23, although the first movements of army units, internal troops and the FSB, included in the grouping of federal forces in the North Caucasus, began at least two days earlier.

Map of the KTO territory in Chechnya

The second is Chechen. Counter attack

Continuation.
Start here and here. The Second Chechen War began more calmly and routinely than the First. Formally, the reason for military action was the appeal of deputies of the Chechen parliament of the 1996 convocation, who were gathered in the Kremlin on October 1, 1999 for a meeting with the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. During the meeting, the Chechen parliamentarians stated that the so-called president of the “Republic of Ichkeria” Aslan Maskhadov is no longer is not the legitimate leader of the republic. And they turned to the people of Russia with a request to protect the people of Chechnya from bandits and international terrorists.

On the same day, October 1, 1999, three groups of federal forces - “West”, “North” and “East” - reached the border of the rebellious republic.

Already on October 2, units of internal troops occupied the first settlement on the territory of Chechnya - the village of Borozdinovskaya, Shelkovsky district, located just three kilometers from the administrative border with Dagestan.

Just 100 years ago, Borozdinovskaya was a Cossack village, but in 1957, when Chechens were allowed to return home from Stalin’s exile, the lands of the village were given to several Chechen families. Gradually, over half a century, the Avars pushed out the original Cossack population. After the collapse of the Union, when Dzhokhar Dudayev came to power in Chechnya with his criminal accomplices, the Dudayevites simply expelled all Russians from the village, seizing houses and killing everyone who resisted the lawlessness.

Dzhokhar Dudayev, 1991. Photo: Wikimedia commons

In the mid-turbulent 90s, the de facto “owner” of the village became the criminal authority Shapi Mikatov, who turned Borozdinovskaya into a real capital of the slave trade. Using the advantageous border position of the village on the administrative border with Dagestan, the bandits organized a channel for transporting kidnapped people from Dagestan and other regions of Russia to Chechnya. The “branded product” of Mikatov’s gang were Russian police and military - soldiers and officers kidnapped from military units in Buinaksk. Every criminal leader in Grozny knew: if one of his people was captured by federal forces, then he needed to buy prisoners from Mikatov and organize a prisoner exchange with the federals.

The slave business in the mid-90s turned out to be so profitable that Mikatov’s gang organized the transfer of more than 300 foreign mercenaries to Dagestan, who were supposed to capture new prisoners for sale.

True, on the eve of the war, the village of Borozdinovskaya found itself without its “owner”: Mikatov himself was accidentally shot dead during a criminal showdown at customs. And the bandits, left without a leader, chose to flee to Chechnya, surrendering Borozdinovskaya without a fight. True, already during the “cleansing” of the village, the federals discovered that during the retreat the bandits executed more than 300 hostages who were languishing in underground “zindans” for the sake of future ransom. Among the dead were both Russians and Chechens.

Treaty war

By October 4, Russian troops reached the Terek and began to clear the villages of the northern bank.

As Radio Liberty reported, federal forces also began bombing the southern regions of Chechnya: “Forests in the Vedeno and Urus-Martan districts are being attacked by air. Bombings are also taking place in the Itumkala region in the south of Chechnya. Last night, attack aircraft carried out a series of missile attacks and dropped up to ten bombs on the highway connecting Grozny with the Georgian border. Traffic here is completely stopped. Bridges were destroyed and debris formed on the road. Russian long-range artillery, within its reach, is shelling populated areas in the Nozhai-Yurtovsky and Vedeno regions. Explosions can be heard even in the regional center of Shali - this is almost the central part of the republic..."

In response, “President” Aslan Maskhadov introduced martial law in the republic.

Columns of refugees were already approaching the soldiers. In a matter of days, Chechnya fell into desolation. It got to the point that the militants of “independent Ichkeria” literally handed over their family members to the employees of the Tsentrospas Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus region against receipt.

From the memoirs of the commander of the United Group of Federal Forces in the Republic of Dagestan, General Gennady Troshev:

– To be completely frank, that fall I was tormented by doubts: is it worth sending troops into the republic, will the situation in the fall of 1996 repeat itself? Surely my comrades in arms asked themselves similar questions - generals, officers who went through all the trials of the first campaign, and sergeants, soldiers who were about to go into battle for the first time. Moreover, the only thing we had to worry about was that we, the military, would not be set up once again.

General Gennady Troshev

Everyone understood that the chaos that was happening in Chechnya could not be tolerated any longer. Otherwise, the infection of terrorism will spread throughout Russia. The invasion of gangster groups in Dagestan, the explosions of residential buildings in Moscow, Buinaksk and other cities gave our fellow citizens fear and a feeling of complete defenselessness. A firm, strong-willed decision by the country's leadership was needed. And, fortunately, it was accepted.

At the first stage of the counter-terrorist operation, the troops were supposed to liberate the northern regions of the republic - Naursky, Shelkovsky, Nadterechny... In short, everything north of the Terek River. This was followed by a concentric squeeze of bandit detachments from all sides except the south, and pushing them into the mountains while simultaneously blocking all passes to prevent the outflow of militants to Georgia.

I was appointed commander of the eastern group. We moved troops into Chechnya from Dagestan in three directions - Kizlyar, Khasavyurt, Botlikh. On the plain they met almost no serious resistance from the militants, but this did not mean at all that the units were advancing in a parade march.

One of the main tasks was to convince the civilian population of Chechnya: the army did not come to kill and rob, but only to destroy bandits. Needless to say, just a few years ago many Chechens saw us as occupiers. Therefore, in those autumn days, I had to deal not only with my direct responsibilities (that is, leading the troops), but also with “diplomacy”: meeting with the heads of village administrations, elders, clergy, and ordinary residents. And this happened almost every day.

Then (as now) some “hustlers” reproached me for being too liberal and called me a kind of “good guy.” But I am convinced that I did the right thing.

I have already mentioned that I was born and raised in these places, I know well the customs and traditions, the Chechen mentality, I know how to behave in a conversation with an old man, and how with a young man. Chechens respect someone who behaves with dignity and does not humiliate the dignity of another, who respects the morals of the mountaineers. After all, you can talk in the form of an ultimatum: threaten, intimidate, accuse. But a simple resident of a village or a village - a farmer or a cattle breeder - is not to blame for the war, so why count him as an enemy? He goes to negotiations to peacefully resolve the issue, and not to convince me that the bandit is right.

I tried to talk to everyone adequately. If a person is older than me, I addressed him respectfully - “you”. He explained clearly what the army and the federal government wanted. At the same time, he did not play around, but spoke the truth. I asked that the “negotiators” then tell their fellow villagers about our goals and attitude. If I began to dissemble, they would immediately feel the falseness of my words: after all, at such meetings there were usually elders, people wise in life, who distinguished between truth and deception... They believed me. And I immediately believed in the sincerity of their desires for peace - already at the first negotiations in the Shelkovsky district.

What issues were discussed at such meetings? Any. In the beginning, I listened to people. With one voice they said that they were tired of anarchy and lawlessness. They want normal, firm power to be established. They are disappointed with Maskhadov’s promises and don’t believe him.

Already in October 1999, the first humanitarian aid began to arrive in Chechnya. And it was we, the military, who initiated it. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the North Caucasus Military District allocated transport aircraft with food, clothing, and building materials. All this was distributed among the villages and villages of the northern regions of the republic.

Battle at Chervlennaya

On the morning of October 4, 1999, federal forces occupied the village of Chervlennaya, Shelkovsky district. True, this time it was not without a fight: the bandits who controlled the village from the Wahhabi group of Sultan Dautov, one of Khattab’s close associates, decided to organize an ambush on the soldiers of the 255th motorized rifle regiment entering the village.

From the memoirs of Pavel Savchenko, a soldier of the 255th SME:

– When we went on the offensive, even the “Czechs” looked at us in surprise and were amazed at the Russian army. But behind us was a brigade of Internal Troops - all in brand new camouflage and normal boots. Our boys say that they are saving money on motorized rifles, because anyway, in the first battle, half of them will fall. That's how they walked around - who was wearing what. After one battle I saw the corpse of a “Czech”. Dressed in a zero "hebe", he has a new RPG, machine gun, "flies". The news then showed that humanitarian aid was going to soldiers in Chechnya. During the entire time we were there, we received a pack of pasta for both of us. Is this humanitarian aid?

The first battle - for the village of Chervlennaya - I remember well. I was in the second company. On the left is the first, on the right is the third. They walked in a chain. The "Czechs" hit the first company. We had advanced about 60 meters when we saw two bandits in camouflage. They immediately ran over a hillock not far from a small grove and shot at us with a grenade launcher. I was next to the platoon commander, a grenade exploded two meters from us. Neither the lieutenant nor I was affected. We threw ourselves on all fours, and when the line passed above us, we crawled towards the second platoon. They have one killed, many wounded: there is a sniper sitting in the grove, not allowing anyone to stick their head out. Okay, an infantry fighting vehicle arrived and “processed” the hillock. The “Czechs” loomed, and we began to run towards the hillock. They threw three F-1 grenades. After that, the boys from the 2nd platoon ran over the hill and fired a full horn at the dead body.

A second one was found in the grove. They probably wanted to take him away, but they couldn’t, they abandoned him.

The platoon commander and I walked forward and saw a UAZ and a Zhiguli racing along the road. They began to shoot at them, but the distance was too great. Then the battalion commander drove up to us in an infantry fighting vehicle and immediately began firing from a cannon. It hit the spare wheel of a UAZ and it caught fire. And yet the “Czechs” got away.

And where the first company was, the chatter of machine guns and explosions did not subside. The company found itself in the thick of it, suffered heavy losses, but could not retreat. The snipers picked off the boys one after another. About two hours later the shooting subsided, and the first was able to retreat. Then Grad and mortars began to attack the “Czechs”. They threshed for two days. On the third, we saw a motorcycle with a sidecar moving towards us from the village. They immediately opened fire to kill. And only then did they notice the white flag. There were two of them. They said that the militants had left the village beyond the Terek and asked not to bomb again.

On this day we erected a monument to the dead children and moved towards the village from both sides. The village was destroyed, there were no residents on the streets. We went further, to the bridge over the Terek, and BB arrived at our place...

***

As a result, 15 soldiers and officers were killed near the village of Chervlennaya, and 28 military personnel were injured of varying degrees of severity. In addition, the T-72 tank, the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle were blown up, and several vehicles were destroyed.

Soldiers of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment at a makeshift monument to fallen fellow soldiers, erected near Chervlennaya, October 1999. Photos from social networks

After this battle at Chervlennaya, the federal tactics changed.

Mikhail Seredin, a former Voronezh SOBR soldier, recalled:

– We approached the Chechen village within a cannon shot: so that we could reach it with artillery fire, but he couldn’t reach us. Then local elders were called to negotiations. And they clearly explained that we would now enter the village. And if someone shoots in the direction of our guys, these guns will immediately open fire back.

Wahhabis fled without a fight

On October 12, Russian troops occupied the last, 39th, village - Shelkovskaya, located on the left bank of the Terek. By this time, all three northern regions of Chechnya - Naursky, Shelkovskaya and Nadterechny - had completely come under the control of federal troops.

However, as the Chechens assured, the rapid advance of the Russian army was due to the fact that Maskhadov and his entourage decided to surrender these areas without a fight and leave the flat Chechnya for the mountainous regions of the republic, where they could wage a traditional guerrilla war.

Radio Liberty: “President Maskhadov ordered his units to leave the territory of the republic to the left of the Terek River and retreat to previously prepared positions, since the Chechen defense forces do not intend to fight in open areas. Meanwhile, Russian aircraft continue to bomb Chechnya. At night, Russian planes bombed the outskirts of Grozny and the city of Urus-Martan. During the day, aviation expanded its coverage area and launched missile and bomb attacks almost throughout the entire territory of the republic.”

The organization of federal power began in the controlled areas. At the first stage, this took the form of the establishment of district commandant's offices and the positions of military commandants. Only Russian military leaders were appointed to the positions of commandants. Thus, the deputy commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Lieutenant General Gennady Nikolaevich Troshev, became the commandant of the Shelkovsky district. The Naur region was entrusted to the commander of the 58th Army, Major General Vladimir Shamanov.

In parallel with the war, an attempt was made to create civil power in the Chechen Republic. For this purpose, members of the former anti-Dudaev opposition, which had previously been “in exile” on Russian territory, were mobilized. Such a local government body as the People's Assembly of Chechnya, the parliament convened in 1996, was restored. On September 7, the People's Assembly formed the State Council, the highest executive body of the republic, and appointed its chairman. He became a previously unknown 34-year-old Malik Saidullaev, a graduate of the Chechen-Ingush State University, who in the 90s was considered a kind of investment banker of the Chechen diaspora, helping to invest funds from Chechen teips in legal Russian businesses - from commodity exchanges to lotteries. It was Saidullaev, on behalf of the federal center, who was tasked with ensuring the loyalty of the most influential Chechen teips, starting with the Supreme Mufti of Chechnya, Akhmat Kadyrov, who refused to declare jihad against Russia, for which he was declared a traitor by Maskhadov.

Kadyrov's choice

For the federal center, winning Kadyrov over to its side meant winning the war - at that time there was no more authoritative spiritual leader in Chechnya.

Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov was born in 1951 in Karaganda, where his family was serving exile. At the age of five, Akhmat began studying Islam. He graduated from the Bukhara madrasah and the Islamic Institute in Tashkent, and in 1989 he created the first Islamic Institute in the North Caucasus and became its rector.

Nevertheless, until the very end of 1994, Kadyrov openly avoided any participation in the political life of Chechnya and criticized Dudayev for extremism. However, when Kadyrov’s worst predictions came true, he condemned the entry of federal troops into Chechnya and publicly announced that he was siding with the “fighters for the independence of Ichkeria.”

Akhmat Kadyrov. Photo: grozny-inform.ru

In 1995, he became the mufti of Chechnya and declared jihad on Russia, that is, a “holy war against the infidels.” But five years later, Kadyrov was ready to call on all Muslims to fight the Wahhabis.

As Kadyrov himself recalled, the turning point in his mind was the episode of his meeting with Boris Berezovsky at the “residence” of Salman Raduev. Shamil Basayev sat in Salman’s “reception room” and patiently waited for his turn for an interview with the all-powerful oligarch, as it seemed then.

- Why are you here? – Kadyrov was surprised when he saw the proud Basayev in the “dressing room” of Raduev’s house.

The whole of Chechnya knew about the enmity between Shamil and Salman. Moreover, if Raduev hated Basayev because of vanity and envy, then Basayev simply despised Raduev, which is even worse. And here it is for you: Shamil is languishing in Salman’s “reception room”, waiting for him to talk with Berezovsky.

Later, at the Sharia court, publicly, with an oath on the Koran, Basayev admits that he came to Raduev and Berezovsky for money.

– So did you fight for freedom or for money?! - Kadyrov asked angrily, realizing that power in the republic had been seized by criminals.

"You must be like a flea..."

Meanwhile, the militants also did not sit idly by and switched to guerrilla warfare tactics, sending several sabotage and reconnaissance groups to the federally controlled regions of the republic, which carried out several terrorist attacks. The most notorious terrorist attack of those days was the attack on the village of Ramenskaya, which claimed the lives of more than 40 people. The note left by the militants indicated that all those killed were punished for assisting the federal authorities. Moreover, this punitive action was carried out just a few hours after the village was “cleared” by Russian troops. Soon after the negotiations, Shamil Labazanov and the elders accompanying him were shot in an ambush, who agreed with the federal command on the peaceful surrender of the village of Ishcherskaya.

From the memoirs of the commander of the United Group of Federal Forces in the Republic of Dagestan, General Gennady Troshev:

“Realizing that it was useless to enter into open confrontation (so to speak, according to the classical canons of war) with federal troops, they used non-standard techniques. And they manifested themselves, in particular, in the following:

As a rule, bandit groups captured dominant heights, passes, and advantageous routes and positioned themselves on them, skillfully disguising their firepower;

Mining of the area was widely used, and the bandits resorted to all sorts of tricks - for example, they installed trip wires at the height of the antennas of moving armored vehicles, and as a result of the explosion, people sitting on the armor died;

small groups were active, consisting of a mortar crew, a grenade launcher and a couple of snipers; As a rule, snipers fired to the sound of mortar and grenade launcher shots from caves or other shelters; sniper groups often included women.

The militants showed a lot of imagination and ingenuity when organizing ambushes and in engineering positions:

to protect against air strikes and artillery fire, natural shelters were used - for example, caves, as well as equipped bunkers for 15-20 people with wired communications between them, and radio channels most often carried out radio exchanges for the purpose of disinformation;

when equipping positions, careful camouflage was used: the loopholes were covered with shields, “painted” to match the surrounding terrain, they were indistinguishable even at close range; even simple trenches were made unconventionally - without embankments (the excavated soil was hidden), and the trenches themselves were hidden by the appropriate surroundings.

Speaking about the tactics of the militants, I will give excerpts from a special notebook of one of the captured bandits. There are some interesting moments there. Here, for example, is a memo on conducting reconnaissance: how to navigate by the stars, trees, mosques; how to determine distance (by meters, steps, fingers); working with the map (symbols, scale); how to determine your location using a map and terrain; types and methods of crawling (“worm” - when an enemy is nearby; “monkey” - when to move away or advance; “on your back” - under barbed wire; “wounded” - on your side; “ghost” - if there is a stretch (arms in front of your legs) ; “crocodile” – on the water).

Actions in the mountains: “You have to be like a flea - hit and leave! If the enemy is strong, leave. If he leaves the battlefield, hit him in the back.”

So the federal troops had to face a skilled and cunning enemy, fighting both according to the classical canons of war and using partisan and sabotage methods.

Assault on Goragorsky

On October 15, federal troops began clearing the village of Goragorsky, a key settlement in the financial schemes of many Chechen teips.

The fact is that Goragorsky, located about 70 kilometers northwest of Grozny, was once built as an oil workers’ village. About a dozen four-story houses, a school and a hospital were built here. But by the beginning of the Second Chechen War, Goragorsky had gained a different kind of fame - as the area with the greatest concentration per capita of clandestine mini-oil refining plants. As they joke here, this land is so saturated with oil that it is enough to poke a stick into it for a black fountain of oily liquid to erupt.

Screenshot: yandex.ru/maps

Naturally, the oil refineries were defended as best they could: in Goragorsk there were up to 300 militants subordinate to Basayev.

Action journalist Khasin Raduev for Radio Liberty wrote:

“After stubborn fighting, the Chechens left the village three days ago and took up defense 7-8 kilometers to the south. However, at night they continue to attack Russian positions. Another such foray was undertaken last night. The Russian military, abandoning frontal attacks, decided to destroy the defenders of Goragorsky with the help of aviation, combat helicopters and artillery. Today, all day long, the village has been subjected to massive shelling from mortars and heavy guns, as well as missile and bomb attacks. According to the Chechen military, Goragorsky is almost completely destroyed..."

Completion of the first stage of the war

On October 16, the commander of the group of Russian troops in the North Caucasus, General Viktor Kazantsev, announced the completion of the first stage of the operation in Chechnya.

At a meeting with regional leaders of the Southern Federal District. Viktor Kazantsev is on the left. Photo: Wikimedia commons

According to official data, the losses of the federal forces at this time already amounted to 47 people killed, while the losses of the militants were more than one and a half thousand.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta wrote: “At this point, in fact, the war should have stopped - until spring. According to the plans of the Ministry of Defense, only artillery and aviation were to operate throughout the blockaded Chechnya throughout the winter in order to completely exhaust the militants who were left without light, heat, basic supplies and sources of fuel. And only after this the troops were supposed to move deep into Chechnya to finish off the survivors..."

But it was at this moment that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin decisively rejected the military’s plan, proposing to finish off the “terrorist gangs” as soon as possible.

However, the columnists of the Kommersant newspaper were sure that this time, too, the feds would face a new shame: “There are several ways out. First: destroy, buy or otherwise pacify the leaders of the resistance, as happened in the last century with Shamil. Second: place a soldier at every tree, on every mountain path. Third: using Comrade Stalin’s recipe, load the entire indigenous Ichkerian population into freight cars and send it by express train, if not to the Kazakh steppe, then to the Siberian tundra.

It is clear that none of these scenarios can be realized. And if so, then there was no practical sense in a campaign against Chechnya then, and there is none now.

So if anyone needs a new ground operation, it is only the Chechens themselves, led by Aslan Maskhadov. For the Ichkerian president, war is the last opportunity to regain power. The population of the republic will finally get down to business that is familiar to them, which they really love and know how to do. Ichkeria will receive new investments: the Islamic world will certainly allocate additional funds to support the Chechens. Moreover, a ground operation is Chechnya’s only chance. If there is no big war and everything is limited to regular bombing and shelling, turning off life support systems and erecting a full-fledged cordon, it simply will not physically survive. After all, there will be no one and nothing to restore the infrastructure destroyed by aviation.”

To be continued

Combat tactics on both sides

Unlike the Chechen war of 1994-1996, to conduct the second military campaign in Chechnya, the federal group much more often resorted to new tactics, which consisted of taking advantage of heavy weapons: missiles, artillery, and especially aviation, which the Chechen militants did not have . This was facilitated by a significantly increased level of training of troops, in the recruitment of which it was possible to achieve a minimal involvement of conscripts. Of course, it was impossible to fully replace conscripts with contract soldiers in those years, but in most cases the “voluntary-order” mechanism with contracts for a “combat mission” covered conscripts who had already served for about a year.

Federal troops widely used methods of setting up various ambushes (usually practiced only by special forces units in the form of reconnaissance and strike groups), including:

• waiting for ambushes on 2-4 of the possible routes of movement of militants;
• mobile ambushes, when only observation groups were located in convenient places for them, and assault groups were located deep in the area of ​​​​operation;
• driven ambushes, in which a demonstrative attack was intended to force militants to the site of another ambush, often equipped with booby traps;
• decoy ambushes, where a group of military personnel openly carried out some actions to attract the attention of the enemy, and mines or main ambushes were set up on the routes of his approach.

According to the calculations of Russian military experts, one of these ambushes, having 1-2 ATGM systems, 1-3 grenade launchers, 1-2 machine gunners, 1-3 snipers, 1 infantry fighting vehicle and 1 tank, was capable of defeating a “standard” bandit group of up to 50 -60 people with 2-3 units of armored vehicles and 5-7 vehicles without armor.

The Chechen side included hundreds of experienced militants who were trained under the guidance of military advisers from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia in the methods of various sabotage and terrorist actions, including:

• avoiding direct confrontations in open areas with superior forces;
• skillful use of terrain, setting up ambushes in tactically advantageous places;
• attacking the most vulnerable targets with superior forces;
• quick change of base locations;
• rapid concentration of forces to solve important problems and their dispersal in the event of a threat of blockade or defeat;
• use as cover for civilians;
• hostage taking outside the zone of armed conflict.

Militants widely used mine-explosive devices to limit the movement of troops and sabotage, as well as the actions of snipers.

Russian special forces in the Second Chechen War

Factors for the victory of federal forces

The success of Russian troops in the second Chechen campaign was facilitated by:

1. Successful work of the special services to eliminate the leaders of Chechen gangs, or, as they were also called, field commanders. Sh. Basayev, E. Khattab, A. Maskhadov, R. Gelayev, that is, almost the entire elite of the Chechen separatists, were eliminated, which greatly damaged the combat effectiveness of the remaining decapitated units.
2. Compared to the first Chechen campaign, the training and equipment of the Russian armed forces . Combat tactics have also changed. Instead of frontal assaults when approaching Chechen settlements, preliminary negotiations began to be held with local elders who did not want to openly clash with Russia. And often this helped to avoid unnecessary losses among both civilians and soldiers. If it was not possible to resolve the issue of taking a populated area peacefully, then heavy weapons and aircraft were used, which the militants did not have available.
3. The training of military units has increased . This was achieved through the minimal involvement of conscripts, replacing them with contract soldiers. And in general, the troops behaved much more carefully, destroying large forces of militants with minimal losses among personnel.

It is worth noting that the combat effectiveness of the Chechen units was affected by the fact that the proportion of foreign mercenaries from the Middle East . If in the first campaign there was a high percentage of Chechens in the ranks of the Chechen Republic, then in the second war their number fell sharply due to combat losses, as well as due to the transfer of many to the ranks of the federal forces. The mercenaries fought only for money, and their fighting spirit was noticeably lower than that of the native Chechens.

Units and types of equipment used in combat operations

The start of the war was preceded, like the actions of the US and Israeli armies in similar conditions, by massive rocket and artillery shelling and air strikes on enemy territory, the targets of which were strategic economic and transport infrastructure facilities, as well as fortified military positions.

Not only the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but also military personnel of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and FSB officers took part in the further conduct of the CTO. In addition, special forces units of all Russian “security” departments, individual airborne brigades, including those assigned to the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian Ministry of Defense, were actively involved in participation in hostilities.

Second Chechen War 1999-2009 became a place where the army and special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs tested some new types of small arms, albeit in relatively modest quantities. Among them:

1. 9-mm silent assault rifle AS “Val” with a folded butt;
2. 9-mm silent sniper rifle VSS “Vintorez”;
3. 9-mm automatic silent pistol APB with stock;
4. RGO and RGN grenades.

In terms of military equipment in service with the federal forces, military experts gave the best marks to helicopters, which, in fact, reflected the Soviet experience of successful operations in Afghanistan. Among the Russian troops equipped with modern equipment that has proven to be effective, electronic intelligence units should also be noted.

At the same time, the tanks, represented by the T-72 models in modifications AB, B, B1, BM and a small number of T-80 BV, having quite successfully conquered open terrain, again suffered significant losses (49 out of about 400) in street battles in Grozny .

A shot in the side: “Khattab’s counter-offensive”

In January 2000, the assault on Grozny was unexpectedly interrupted by a series of fierce battles outside its borders.

The military was intensively preparing for the assault on Grozny, and the bulk of the combat units were concentrated near the city. The rear was weakened. Although the cities to the west and east of Grozny were occupied by garrisons, control of the territory remained rather formal. The garrisons had just settled in, there were no agents on the ground, and the soldiers did not know the area and the occupied cities well.

A mass of rear columns accumulated on the roads, in which there were many people, but few who knew how to properly fight.

The militants had several large detachments operating outside Grozny. The most powerful and famous was Khattab's group. This Saudi, whatever one may say, knew how to think at least in the short term, and during the interwar period he established a network of combat training camps in Chechnya. Supermen, of course, were not produced there, but in general the level of military skills of the Khattab cadet was not bad. Now Khattab had to lead them into battle.

In addition to Khattab, detachments of slave traders of the Akhmadov brothers and Aslanbek Arsaev also operated in the east of Chechnya. West of Grozny, Arbi Barayev’s detachment was preparing for sabotage.

It was Barayev who made the first move, setting up a series of ambushes on the roads. The militants managed to occupy Alkhan-Yurt for some time, kill people, and burn equipment. The weak protection of the columns had an effect - the prey of the Barayevites was mainly the “Urals”: ​​the rear troops had very few heavy weapons and armored vehicles, which always gave an advantage to the Russian troops.

However, this turned out to be just a warm-up before the real fight. On January 7, during the first snowfalls, fighting began south and east of Grozny.

The first collision happened almost by accident. The Akhmadov detachment got lost and went to a pipe factory near the village of Germenchuk. Information about the militants reached the military, but, as often happens, in an incomplete and distorted version, so a detachment of police and motorized rifle infantry fighting vehicles, too weak for such an operation, went to Germenchuk. All day long there was a bloody battle at Trubnoye, which did not result in any decisive results, except for the dead and wounded. And on the ninth the main events began - Khattab attacked Arghun.

Khattab

The militants infiltrated into the city itself in advance under the guise of civilians and refugees. They bypassed the checkpoints. Around the city they didn't even need that. In ambushes on the roads around Argun, Urals and armored personnel carriers began to burn. In Argun, the commandant's office, the train station and the police department were stormed. Small groups caught on the roads suffered heavy losses - or even died entirely. However, the “spirits” were unable to crush the permanent garrisons and roadblocks.

However, even in this form, the battle on January 9 turned out to be very bloody. The losses of the militants are traditionally unknown, but nothing suggests that they were heavy.

What’s especially offensive is that just a few days before this tragedy, an order was issued to strengthen the protection of the rear columns. However, either it was not brought to the attention of the performers, or they simply did not carry it out - the fact is that the “ribbons” stretched along the roads had very little accompaniment, or even were without it at all.

However, these battles unexpectedly ended with a terrible blow to the militants themselves. In addition to Argun, the small city of Shali was attacked. Geographically, it is located strictly south of Argun and southeast of Grozny. They occupied it in December 1999, and then the militants did not leave, but disappeared among the residents. During Khattab’s “counterattack,” they came out from everywhere, united with the arriving detachment of Arsaev and issued an ultimatum to the “cops,” demanding to surrender.

(Photo source)

However, the city commandant, General Bespalov, did not interrupt the broadcast with requests for help, but requested communication with the artillery. The militants started a rally with the distribution of weapons in the square not far from the commandant’s office. Bespalov fearlessly aimed the Tochka-U missile at her.

This was a critical moment - if the missilemen had missed, it could have easily resulted in “self-directed fire.”

But the “artists” assured that they would hit it where it should be. 15 minutes before Bespalov’s appearance, he ordered his men to go down lower, and at 16:00 in the square, where a crowd of militants had gathered, a “same thing and a rocket” scene played out. The square became a lair of fire: exactly how many “spirits” were killed is unknown, but there is a figure based on the count of bodies - 82. Arsaev himself was wounded.

The Shali “Tochka” greatly blurred the success of the militants near Argun - a single missile knocked out a large detachment in a quarter of an hour. And in general, the results of Khattab’s “counterstrike” look controversial. Yes, the militants achieved impressive tactical success, but in general it was only a matter of a short suspension of the operation in Grozny. After this, the Russian armed forces were able to concentrate on a general assault on the Chechen capital.

Chronology of the war

The question of when exactly the Second Chechen War began remains open among specialists. A number of publications (mostly earlier in time) generally combine the First and Second Chechen Wars, considering them two phases of the same conflict. Which is unlawful, since these conflicts differ significantly in their historical conditions and the composition of the warring parties.

More compelling arguments are made by those who consider the invasion of Chechen Islamist militants into Dagestan in August 1999 to be the beginning of the Second Chechen War, although this can also be considered a local conflict not directly related to the operations of federal troops on the territory of Chechnya. At the same time, the “official” date of the start of the entire war (September 30) is tied to the beginning of the ground operation on the territory controlled by the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, although attacks on this territory began on September 23.

From March 5 to March 20, over 500 militants, having captured the village of Komsomolskoye in the Urus-Martan region, attempted to break through the ring of federal troops who blocked and then stormed this settlement. Almost all of them were killed or captured, but the core of the gang was able to escape from encirclement under their cover. After this operation, the active phase of military operations in Chechnya is considered completed.

Second Chechen campaign 1999–2009

If the country's authorities hoped that by reaching an agreement with the militants, they would solve the problem and the battles of the Chechen war would become a thing of the past, then everything turned out to be wrong. Over several years of a dubious truce, the gangs have only accumulated strength. In addition, more and more Islamists from Arab countries entered the territory of the republic.

As a result, on August 7, 1999, the militants of Khattab and Basayev invaded Dagestan. Their calculation was based on the fact that the Russian government at that time looked very weak. Yeltsin practically did not lead the country, the Russian economy was in deep decline. The militants hoped that the Dagestanis would take their side, but they put up serious resistance to the bandit groups.

The reluctance to allow Islamists into their territory and the help of federal troops forced the Islamists to retreat. True, this took a month - the militants were driven out of Dagestan only in September 1999. At that time, Chechnya was led by Aslan Maskhadov, and, unfortunately, he was not able to exercise full control over the republic.

It was at this time, angry that they failed to break Dagestan, that Islamist groups began carrying out terrorist attacks on Russian territory. Horrible terrorist attacks were committed in Volgodonsk, Moscow and Buynaksk, which claimed dozens of lives. Therefore, the number of those killed in the Chechen war must include those civilians who never thought that it would come to their families.

In September 1999, a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation” was issued, signed by Yeltsin. And on December 31, he announced his resignation from the presidency.

As a result of the presidential elections, power in the country passed to a new leader, Vladimir Putin, whose tactical abilities the militants did not take into account. But at that time, Russian troops were already on the territory of Chechnya, again bombed Grozny and acted much more competently. The experience of the previous campaign was taken into account.

December 1999 is another painful and terrible chapter of the war. The Argun Gorge was otherwise called “Wolf Gate” - one of the largest Caucasian gorges. Here, the landing and border troops carried out the special operation "Argun", the purpose of which was to recapture a section of the Russian-Georgian border from Khattab's troops, and also to deprive the militants of the weapons supply route from the Pankisi Gorge. The operation was completed in February 2000.

Many people also remember the feat of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division. These fighters became real heroes of the Chechen war. They withstood a terrible battle on the 776th height, when they, numbering only 90 people, managed to hold back over 2,000 militants for 24 hours. Most of the paratroopers died, and the militants themselves lost almost a quarter of their strength.

Despite such cases, the second war, unlike the first, can be called sluggish. Perhaps that is why it lasted longer - a lot happened over the years of these battles. The new Russian authorities decided to act differently. They refused to conduct active combat operations carried out by federal troops. It was decided to exploit the internal split in Chechnya itself. Thus, Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov went over to the side of the federals, and situations were increasingly observed when ordinary militants laid down their arms.

Putin, realizing that such a war could last indefinitely, decided to take advantage of internal political fluctuations and persuade the authorities to cooperate. Now we can say that he succeeded. It also played a role that on May 9, 2004, Islamists carried out a terrorist attack in Grozny, aimed at intimidating the population. An explosion occurred at the Dynamo stadium during a concert dedicated to Victory Day. More than 50 people were injured, and Akhmat Kadyrov died from his injuries.

This odious terrorist attack brought completely different results. The population of the republic was finally disappointed in the militants and rallied around the legitimate government. Young Ramzan Kadyrov, who understood the futility of the Islamist resistance, was appointed to replace his father. Thus, the situation began to change for the better. If the militants relied on attracting foreign mercenaries from abroad, the Kremlin decided to use national interests. The residents of Chechnya were very tired of the war, so they already voluntarily went over to the side of the pro-Russian forces.

The counterterrorism operation regime, introduced by Yeltsin on September 23, 1999, was abolished by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009. Thus, the campaign was officially over, since it was not called a war, but a CTO. However, can we assume that veterans of the Chechen war can sleep peacefully if local battles are still taking place in the North Caucasus and terrorist attacks are carried out from time to time?

Storm of Grozny

On November 25-28, 1999, Russian troops blocked Grozny, leaving a “humanitarian corridor” that was nevertheless subject to periodic air attacks. The command of the federal forces officially announced the decision to abandon the assault on the capital of the Chechen Republic, placing troops 5 kilometers from the city. Aslan Maskhadov left Grozny along with his headquarters on November 29.

Grozny in the days of the assault

Federal forces entered certain residential areas on the outskirts of the Chechen capital on December 14, maintaining a “humanitarian corridor.” On December 26, the active stage of the operation to take the city under the control of Russian troops began, which initially developed without much opposition, especially in the Staropromyslovsky district. It was only on December 29 that fierce battles broke out for the first time, resulting in noticeable losses for the “federals.” The pace of the offensive slowed down somewhat, but the Russian army continued to clear more residential areas of militants, and on January 18 they were able to capture the bridge over the Sunzha River.

The capture of another strategically important point - the Minutka Square area - continued during several assaults and fierce counterattacks by militants from January 17 to January 31. The turning point of the assault on Grozny was the night from January 29 to 30, when the main forces of the armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichryssia, a group of up to 3 thousand people led by well-known “field commanders,” having suffered significant losses, broke through along the Sunzha riverbed towards the mountainous regions of Chechnya.

In the following days, federal troops, who had previously controlled just over half of the city, completed its liberation from the remnants of the militants, encountering resistance mainly from a few enemy sniper ambushes. With the capture of the Zavodsky district on February 6, 2000, Putin, by that time the acting president of the Russian Federation, announced the victorious completion of the assault on Grozny.

Fighting on the territory of Chechnya

Although Maskhadov’s government condemned the actions of the militants, it did not take any measures to prevent new terrorist attacks and stabilize the situation in Chechnya. The explosions put an end to the peaceful dialogue between Russia and Ichkeria. The leadership of the Russian Federation decided to organize a military operation, the main goal of which was the destruction of gang formations on Chechen territory. On September 18, the borders of the republic were blocked by security forces. On September 23, Russian aviation bombed the Zavodsky, Oktyabrsky and Staropromyslovsky districts of Grozny. According to the official version, the missiles were aimed at weapons warehouses and places of mass gathering of militants. In fact, at least 3 of them hit the city center. The first one hit the central market, killing 70 people. The second exploded near a mosque in the village of Kalinina, killing 41 people. The third hit the territory of a maternity hospital; according to eyewitnesses, 30 people died, more than half of them were children.

On September 30, from the side of Dagestan and Stavropol, formations of Russian troops crossed the border and entered the territories of the Shelkovsky and Naursky regions of Chechnya. By December 1999, federal troops took control of the entire lowland part of Chechnya, excluding Grozny.

Siege and assault of Grozny

On November 25, the President of Ichkeria addressed Russian soldiers participating in the counter-terrorism operation with a proposal to go over to the side of the militants with his security guarantee. After 4 days, Aslan Maskhadov left Grozny and, together with his headquarters, settled 20 km from the unsafe capital - in the city of Shali. By November 30, all routes for transporting weapons to Grozny were blocked by the federals.

On December 6, Russian aviation dropped leaflets on the streets of Grozny calling on the civilian population to leave the city within 5 days along a specially organized security corridor. All those who remain will be considered militants by federal forces with all the ensuing consequences.

On December 9, Russian troops took Shali without a fight and blocked Grozny from the south. On the 14th, the advanced detachments crossed the city limits.

On December 26, an operation of internal troops and the Ministry of Internal Affairs began, aimed at searching for and eliminating Chechen separatists in Grozny. In the next 3 days there were fierce battles, Russian units moved forward, occupying one area after another. However, there were also losses on the Russian side. On the 29th alone, several infantry fighting vehicles and tanks burned down, killing 40 personnel.

Bloody battles continued throughout January, and only on February 6, the acting President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, announced the completion of the operation and the liberation of Grozny from terrorists. Aslan Maskhadov was accused of organizing and participating in an armed rebellion and put on the federal and later international wanted list.

Battle of Shatay

The last large base of the Armed Forces of Ichkeria was stationed in the regional center of Shatoy. The number of militants was about 3,000 people, many broke through here after the fighting in Grozny.

On February 22, 2000, the assault on Shatoy began. The offensive of the federal troops led by General Troshev floundered, so desperate was the resistance of the militants. Artillery and aviation were used. The next day, the separatists undertook several reconnaissance in force, probing the enemy’s weak points. The fighting continued until the 29th. It was on this day that the Russian tricolor was hoisted over Shatoy. Two large formations of militants were able to break through the encirclement. Ruslan Gelayev’s group went in a north-western direction to the village of Komsomolskoye, Urus-Martan district. Khattab retreated to the northeast through Ulus-Kert.

Height 776. Feat of the Pskov paratroopers

On February 29, 2000, the 6th company of the 2nd battalion of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 76th Guards Airborne Pskov Division entered into an unequal battle with superior militant forces at height 776 at the Ulus-Kert - Selmentauzen line.

The day before, the commander of the 6th company received an order to occupy the top of Ista-Kord. The paratroopers set out on February 28 and the next day occupied Hill 776, located 4.5 km from their destination. A reconnaissance group went to the mountain and came across a detachment of militants numbering about 20 people. The scouts were forced to retreat back to Hill 776, where, together with two platoons of the 6th company, they took the battle. After Major Molodov was wounded and killed, Guard Lieutenant Colonel Evtyukhin took command. The third platoon was stretched out heavily on the slope, was fired upon by bandits and destroyed. By the evening of February 29, the Russian side had lost 31 fighters, a third of the total.

By 3 o'clock in the morning on March 1, Major Dostavalov's group of 15 people was able to break through to the surrounded paratroopers. The officer came to the rescue, violating the orders of the command. This allowed us to hold out for another 2 hours, but by 5 a.m. the militants occupied the heights. After the death of Evtyukhin, Captain Romanov called artillery fire on himself. The heights were pierced by rocket and bomb strikes, but some militants managed to escape.

In this battle, 84 military personnel were killed, including 13 officers. Separatist losses amounted to about 500 people. 22 paratroopers were subsequently nominated for the title of Hero of Russia, 21 posthumously.

Battle for Komsomolskoye

This episode of the Second Chechen War was the last major battle. On the night of March 5, 2000, about 600 militants from Ruslan Gelayev’s group broke into Komsomolskoye, which was blocked by the federals. It is worth noting that this village is the homeland of the field commander, which gave him a considerable advantage.

In the morning, the Rosich and SOBR detachments began clearing the village, during which an 8-hour fierce battle ensued. Having underestimated the enemy's numbers and training, the Russian army lost 14 personnel. But by March 8, they managed to destroy 22 militants from the elite Borz formation. The Borz fighters were particularly cruel and hated Russian soldiers.

Regular cleansing operations continued until March 24, when only 20 militants remained in the ruins of Komsomolskoye, continuing to resist federal troops. Gelayev with a group of about 100 people was able to escape to the Duba-Yurt area.

Guerrilla war 2000-2009

Many militants managed to escape from the besieged capital of the Chechen Republic; their leadership announced the start of a guerrilla war on February 8. After this, and until the official end of the offensive of the federal troops, only two cases of long-term large-scale clashes were noted: in the villages of Shatoy and Komsomolskoye. After March 20, 2000, the war finally entered the guerrilla stage.

The intensity of hostilities at this stage steadily decreased, periodically escalating only in moments of individual cruel and daring terrorist attacks that occurred in 2002-2005. and committed outside the conflict zone. The hostage takings in the Moscow “Nord-West” and in the Beslan school, and the attack on the city of Nalchik were staged as a demonstration by Islamist militants that the conflict was far from ending soon.

The period from 2001 to 2006 was more often accompanied by reports from the Russian authorities about the liquidation by the special services of one of the most famous “field commanders” of Chechen militants, including Maskhadov, Basayev and many others. Ultimately, a long-term decrease in tension in the region made it possible to end the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic on April 15, 2009.

Guerrilla fighters pose for a website of Chechen Islamists

Move away: breakthrough from Grozny

The cordon around Grozny was quite thin. According to an unkind tradition, there were not enough people, so the strongholds scattered around the perimeter of Grozny only somehow blocked the gaps between positions with fire. There were also few night vision devices, and there was no shortage of illumination ammunition.

Small groups of militants moved back and forth relatively successfully. True, now it was necessary to arrange a breakthrough of a crowd of thousands of people.

The exit location was chosen around the village of Kirova. This suburb had the least dense cordon. There was a gap of one and a half kilometers between the two motorized rifle support columns.

Subsequently, much was said that the militants were deliberately lured into the field. In the classic memoirs of General G. Troshev “My War,” for example, the following is written:

“As part of this plan, disinformation was broadcast: with the help of false radio traffic, the bandits were given the idea that there were gaps in the encirclement where they could get through. At the junctions between regiments, combat activity was reduced to a minimum. Human intelligence also began to work, “suggesting” to field commanders ways to escape the ring. In parallel with these events, in several directions we were preparing unique “corridors” for the enemy.”

Gennady Nikolaevich did a lot to defeat the militants in the second war, but here it is impossible to agree with him. Talk about a planned lure of militants to mines looks, frankly speaking, an attempt to pass off reality as wishful thinking. If the “Wolf Hunt” operation, which was talked about so much later, had really been planned, only isolated “Wakhs” would have left Grozny, and not large detachments led by their leaders. In reality the following happened.

The most obvious route for the militants to break through was the southwest, to Alkhan-Kala. This is a village southwest of Grozny, from where you can quickly and calmly go to the mountains. Of course, it was impossible to get between the strongholds during the day, but the night gave every reason to hope for a successful breakthrough.

Meanwhile, the Russians were preoccupied with covering the empty space between the shelves. The banks of the Sunzha were lined with mines, partially placing them in the riverbed.

On the night of February 1, a column stretched from Grozny to the junction between the regiments. The first mine explosions at strong points were simply not heard - they were far away, and besides, they were concealed by the sounds of nearby combat. However, observers soon noticed a crowd walking across the fields. After that, everything that could shoot began to shoot at the militants. The panic began. At first they sent prisoners to the mines, whom the militants took with them, but in the end the minefields were simply overcome by a wave of people. Someone tried to cross the Sunzha, but mine explosions began again in the cold water. Among those who were blown up on the shore was Shamil Basayev. They carried him out, but many were not so lucky.

There was no transport in Alkhan-Kala. The pursuit was not carried out as vigorously as it should have been, so many of the militants still managed to get out of there after a few hours. All this time, the local hospital sawed off the legs of those who were maimed by mines. Among others, Shamil Basayev lost a limb. Those too seriously wounded and those who could no longer walk from fatigue were killed or captured in the coming days. It is believed that up to three hundred militants were captured in Alkhan-Kale - apparently, this is the most massive captivity of the Chechen wars.

Unfortunately, the Russian military, it seems, was themselves stunned by the enemy’s unexpected flight and were unable to exterminate the terrorists retreating to the mountains.

The persecution and shelling nevertheless continued almost all the way to the mountains - judging by the diary found later on the militant’s corpse, shelling and battles with heavy losses among the “rebels” continued all the time while the defeated “Wakhs” were retreating to the mountains. And the memoirist himself died, just a short distance from reaching the saving mountains. But in the end, large columns of militants were able to break away from pursuit. It was not possible to shut down their main forces.

However, even what actually happened was a huge and unexpected success. The assault on Grozny in 1994-95 became the bloodiest for the Russian army. The current battle turned out to be the biggest bloodletting for the militants. The exact losses of the “Wakhs” are unknown.

Vladimir Shamanov, with a sweeping gesture, announced the destruction of three thousand insurgents at once. This seems overly optimistic: more modest estimates give about one and a half thousand dead militants - and, given the losses of “spirits” in the battles on the outskirts of Grozny and during the pursuit, this no longer looks like a stretch. Several hundred more abreks were captured.

The names and surnames of the majority of the field commanders killed in this battle can tell little. However, among the dead there were plenty of first-rate scoundrels. For example, Hunkarpasha Israpilov, one of Basayev’s most valuable subordinates, was blown up in a minefield. He managed to take part in both major terrorist attacks of the first war at once - in the raid on Budyonnovsk he was one of the henchmen, and in the attack on Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye his role was no less than that of Salman Raduev.

Another “hero” of Budyonnovsk, the formal commander of the defense of Grozny, Aslanbek Ismailov, also died there. Also among those killed was Umar Edilsultanov, the organizer of the video-camera murder of several captured soldiers in the Dagestan Tukhchar in 1999, who personally cut their throats.

In short, despite the absence of “media” people, the list of field commanders buried on the outskirts of Grozny turned out to be impressive.

Russian losses were also very heavy. According to official data, 386 soldiers and officers were killed during the assault. Not all of these victims were justified, but this is certainly not close to the level of 1995.

(Photo: Yuri Kozyrev)

Grozny turned into a half-empty heap of ruins. The city had to be rebuilt almost from scratch.

Results and truce

In the period after the active military operation, the Russian leadership relied on the massive recruitment of civilians and former Chechen fighters to their side. The most prominent and influential figure among the former opponents of the federal troops during the First Chechen War was the Mufti of the Chechen Republic of Ichryssia, Akhmat Kadyrov. Having previously condemned Wahhabism, in the current conflict he actively showed himself during the peaceful transition of Gudermes to the control of the “federals”, and then headed the administration of the entire Chechen Republic after the end of the Second Chechen War.

Under the leadership of A. Kadyrov, elected President of the Chechen Republic, the situation in the republic quickly stabilized. At the same time, Kadyrov's activities have made him a central target for militant attacks. On May 9, 2004, he died after a terrorist attack during a mass event at the Grozny stadium. But the authority and influence of the Kadyrov teip remained, as evidenced by the election of Akhmat Kadyrov’s son Ramzan to the post of President of the republic, who continued the course of cooperation between the Chechen Republic and the federal government.

Causes of the war

The First Chechen War was formally ended with the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements . The hostilities between the Russian army and the armed forces of the ChRI ceased, but the situation in Chechnya could hardly be called peaceful. During the 3-year interwar period, such criminal businesses as drug trafficking, kidnappings and murders, oil theft, and counterfeiting flourished in the republic. Also, bases for training terrorists were created near the Russian borders. The leadership of Chechnya had no influence on the gangs. This situation did not in any way contribute to a quiet life for residents of the southern regions of the Russian Federation.

Total number of deaths on both sides

Official statistics on losses following the Second Chechen War have caused many criticisms and cannot be considered fully accurate. However, the information resources of militants who took refuge abroad and individual representatives of the Russian opposition reported completely unreliable data on this matter. Based primarily on assumptions.

Mosque "Heart of Chechnya" in modern Grozny

Grozny in our time

After the end of active hostilities in Chechnya, the need arose to restore the republic practically from ruins. This was especially true of the capital of the republic, where after several assaults there were almost no entire buildings left. Serious funding from the federal budget was allocated for this, sometimes reaching 50 billion rubles a year.

In addition to residential and administrative buildings, social facilities and urban infrastructure, much attention was paid to the restoration of cultural centers and historical monuments. Some of the buildings in the center of Grozny in the area of ​​Mira Street were restored in the same form as they were at the time of construction in the 1930-1950s.

To date, the capital of the Czech Republic is a modern and very beautiful city. One of its new symbols of the city was the “Heart of Chechnya” mosque, built after the war. But the memory of the war remains: in the design of Grozny for its 201st anniversary in the fall of 2010, installations with black and white photographs of these places destroyed after hostilities appeared.

With iron and blood: general assault

Those fighting in Grozny received some respite. It was used to prepare for the push into the city center. For the offensive, six assault squads were formed, which were supported by mortars and armor. They used smoke, explosives and engineering equipment much more actively than in the first war. They tried to use armored vehicles not separately from the infantry, but together with it. Finally, the general offensive had to be preceded by a full-fledged artillery preparation.

On January 17, a general assault began. Those who saw this described something amazing in the spirit of the First World War - the artillery barrage was very powerful. However, the artillery, of course, could not suppress all the firing points. In the depths of the city, the troops quickly began to suffer losses.

Problems with training continued to make themselves felt. Sometimes this led to some tragicomic stories. For example, at one point intelligence called for shelling on a group of militants. While the gunners were processing the request, more than 20 minutes passed, the “Mujahideen” moved to a new position... and came under direct attack from artillery that successfully missed the old coordinates. It was much less fun when the gunners mistakenly covered their own.

Strangely, the assault was very sparingly supported by aviation: sometimes the military generally complained about “clear skies” and a complete lack of air support.

On the first day, the attackers received an unexpected slap in the face. One of the commanders of the operation, Major General Malofeev, died. It was located in the western part of Grozny. When one of the assault squads got stuck, Malofeev personally led the attacking company. Why he did this is difficult to say. Later they talked about a conversation with the command in a raised voice, after which the general, apparently, decided to command the attack personally. In the building where he entered with his people, the vanguard was cut off by fire, Malofeev was killed by a bullet in the head, and the signalman with him died. The bodies were found only a few days later - the dead were covered with rubble, the battle was raging around, and the militants managed to announce the capture of the general. Later, the soldiers who went with him were accused of cowardice, but this is a dubious accusation. The detachment, led by Malofeev, fell into a bag of fire, and it was only by luck that many other people did not die along with it.

Despite such offensive and tragic episodes, the assault proceeded according to the principle “we have a howitzer, and you don’t.” The army, equipped with tanks and artillery and having seemingly endless ammunition, simply crushed the enemy.

The storming of Minutka Square in the east of Grozny was most difficult. The 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (about 400 bayonets in two battalions) was transferred there to help. This regiment suffered several terrible stories in the first war, and here it also suffered seriously, losing 19 people killed literally in one night. However, a stream of army and “vesh” battalions was moving from the east to Minutka.

Although the militants acted inventively and persistently, there was nothing to counteract. Even the spontaneous surrender of individuals and small groups began. It is clear that the core of Basayev’s or Israpilov’s detachments would not have gone into captivity. But the youngest and least concerned militants voted with their feet. Often they did not even consider themselves militants.

Destroyed houses on Minutka Square (photo source)

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For example, on January 22, while trying to get out of Grozny, one such figure was detained, with whom journalists were able to communicate. He told the press that he simply lived near Minutka Square due to a lack of work in his native village, did not participate in hostilities and was only on duty at night, for which he was given a machine gun, but the money promised for this was never paid, so he is considered a militant can not. Be that as it may, this pacifist left the ranks of the belligerents, and then the investigation and the court dealt with his fate.

Minutka Square became the zone of the most ferocious fighting. However, attacks from different directions exhausted the militants, who were forced to plug holes here and there. The insurgents had few reserves, and a hail of artillery shells rained down on Grozny, which constantly found new victims. On the night of January 25, detachments advancing from the north crossed Sunzha in the area of ​​Turgenev and Darwin streets. There they fortified themselves in the large buildings of two schools that stood close together.

Literally the next night there was a desperate counterattack by the Basayevites. Only one person radically influenced the course of the battle - machine gunner Rais Mustafin. This guy was loaded like a mule before the battle - he had two thousand (!) rounds of PKM cartridges with him and during the battle he fired almost everything.

Left alone, he almost got captured, but he successfully threw a grenade into the crowd of “spirits” who were discussing what to do with him, and crawled out through the ventilation pipe to his own.

While this battle was going on, reinforcements made their way to the schools, so the militants had to retreat through the private sector under the fire of AGS-17.

By the end of January, militant leaders realized that something had to be done. The ring tightened, the number of wounded grew, and, of course, additional ammunition did not appear in the encirclement. The Russians had their own problems. Many conscripts have already reached the end of their service time. No one, of course, wanted to risk death at the moment when it was time to go home, only because the military bureaucracy works slowly, and commanders do not want to release soldiers with combat experience. However, if the Russian units were simply exhausted, then a visible catastrophe loomed before the militants. On the thirty-first of January, assault groups burst into the ill-fated Minute, and literally within a matter of hours the events simply began to gallop.