Midway. The true story of the carnage in the Pacific


Red Herring

Not everyone knows, but the attack on Pearl Harbor did not achieve its main goal: the US military fleet in the Pacific, although it suffered serious losses, was not completely neutralized. American aircraft carriers and submarines were not damaged, which means Japan never received complete freedom of action in Southeast Asia. This made a new big clash of forces inevitable. Tokyo planned to finish what they started, and Washington was eager to take revenge.

Article on the topic Aviator nicknamed “Skin”. How did George Bush fight during World War II? In early June 1942, the Japanese attacked the American naval base at Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands, off the coast of Alaska. They occupied the islands of Attu and Kiska. However, the American command did not respond to the incident by transferring additional forces. Just a month before these events, cryptographers cracked the Japanese naval code JN-25, which made it known that the operation in the Aleutian Islands was a diversion. The main blow was to be delivered to the naval base on Midway Atoll.

First clashes

On the morning of June 3, the pilot of an American reconnaissance aircraft discovered a group of Japanese fleet heading towards Midway. The Americans struck the first blow at the Battle of Midway Atoll. The course of the battle, therefore, was initially determined by US forces. True, the bomb dropped on Japanese ships did not reach its target.

By the early morning of June 4, the Japanese group reached Midway Atoll and struck it. The naval base suffered significant damage, but despite this, American fighters entered into a retaliatory battle.

The naval battle at Midway Atoll continued. Many American vehicles were shot down by the Japanese, but anti-aircraft artillery worked successfully. About a third of the Japanese bombers attacking the naval base were shot down. The Japanese lieutenant in charge of the attack reported to the imperial headquarters that the Americans had withdrawn the main forces before the Battle of Midway, and the ground defenses were not sufficiently suppressed, so another air strike was necessary.

After the first defeat of the American forces, the Japanese command was confident that luck was now on their side. Intelligence officers reported to the imperial headquarters that only one aircraft carrier had been discovered at the naval base (the rest were not within sight). But since there was a shortage of personnel, torpedoes and aerial bombs remained on deck, which they did not have time to hide in the cellars. This created the risk of a dangerous situation, because one aerial bomb that pierced the deck could cause the detonation of all ammunition.

Japanese surprise and American surprise

The Japanese attack force consisted of a carrier strike group under the command of Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo and an escorting battleship group under the command of Admiral Isoroku Yamamato .

Four Japanese aircraft carriers - Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu - carried 248 carrier-based aircraft, piloted by the best military pilots of the Land of the Rising Sun. As with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the emphasis was on surprise. But, as mentioned above, the Americans had information about the impending Japanese operation and took action.

By order of the commander of the US Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Rear Admiral Raymond Ames Spruance's 16th Carrier Task Force Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's 17th Carrier Task Force . The group included 3 aircraft carriers that carried 233 carrier-based aircraft, but unlike the enemy, the Americans could use more than 120 ground-based aircraft. Also, the US fleet had a significant advantage in heavy cruisers in the Midway Atoll area (seven versus two) and had a group of one and a half dozen submarines.

But the main thing was that the American fleet, concentrated at Midway Atoll, was waiting for an attack, while the Japanese were not ready for a “surprise”.


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Torpedo bombers from Midway

It is logical to assume that such terrible losses were caused by the imperfection of outdated “devastators”. However, the first American planes to attack the Japanese that day were completely different torpedo bombers.

More than two hours before the decks, six of the newest Avenger attack aircraft approached the Japanese formation. These strong, high-speed vehicles were much better armed and, in addition, carried the same Mark XIII torpedoes, but with increased height and release speed, thanks to a simple modification.


Six Grumman TBF-1 Avenger at Midway. “Only One Survived” by Craig Kadera

However, they were met by 28 Zeros, and only one riddled Avenger was able to reach the first ship that turned up - the heavy cruiser Tikuma - and drop a torpedo. The plane was saved from destruction only by the fact that the Japanese fighters were forced to switch to new guests.

These were even more powerful, already twin-engine army high-speed Marauder bombers, modified to carry torpedoes. But it quickly became clear that in a situation where there were eight Zeros for each, both speed and five machine guns, including three 12.7-mm calibers, were of little help.


Army medium bomber "Martin" B-26-MA "Marauder" in torpedo configuration

However, two damaged vehicles managed to break through to the aircraft carrier Akagi and drop torpedoes, which the huge ship consistently dodged. Fortunately for them, the Japanese fighters received orders not to pursue the bombers, which were no longer dangerous, but to prepare to receive the next guests.

Bombs, torpedoes, bombs, torpedoes

On the morning of June 3, 1942, an American reconnaissance aircraft discovered the main Japanese forces approaching Midway Atoll. On the same day, nine Flying Fortress bombers bombed the transport ships of the Japanese group. Bombs fall into milk without causing damage to ships. But the Japanese realized that they had been exposed and began to take active action.

At 4:30 a.m. on June 4, 1942, the first group of Japanese aircraft headed for Midway. At 6:20 a.m. the base was bombed. It caused significant destruction, but was far from fatal. In addition, up to a third of Japanese bombers were lost to anti-aircraft fire. It turned out somewhat differently in the fighter battle. The Japanese aces turned out to be more resourceful: at least 15 of the 25 American aircraft that entered the battle were destroyed.

The command of the Japanese group planned to carry out another bombing strike and then begin landing troops. By this time, the battle had taken on a counter nature: Japanese aircraft carriers were attacked by American bombers. With US fighter forces diverted to repelling the attack on Midway, the Japanese dealt with the attack fairly easily, destroying most of the attacking aircraft.

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The world against the Japanese generals. History of the Tokyo Trial Some of the Japanese bombers were in reserve with suspended torpedoes. They were planned to be used to repel a surprise attack by American ships. Admiral Nagumo gave the order to remove their torpedoes and arm them with bombs for a new attack on the Midway base. In the midst of the rearmament procedure, Nagumo was informed that American aircraft carriers were approaching. A new order arrived: down with the bombs, bring back the torpedoes! The technicians were busy, there were not enough people, and in this situation there was no time to remove the excess ammunition from the deck into protected storage facilities. Japanese ships became vulnerable targets.

The plan of the American command was to strike the enemy aircraft carriers when, after the first raid on Midway, the aircraft would be refueled and bombs would be loaded. Therefore, when the Japanese left the atoll, 117 aircraft took off from American aircraft carriers, including 68 dive bombers and 29 torpedo bombers.

Five minutes, five minutes...

With the light hand of Mitsuo Fuchida, it has long been fashionable to talk about “five fatal minutes.” They say, if the American dive bombers appeared five minutes later, wow, what a blessing we would have given them.

There really were fatal five minutes in Japanese fate, but not the same ones at all. When Nimitz, at Naval Headquarters in Hawaii, received word that the Japanese had been spotted, he told his intelligence chief, “You were only off by five miles, five degrees, and five minutes.” The samurai began to play with the predicted scenario, now all that remained was to give them bribes - in the sense of torpedoes and bombs.

Actually, if the Americans had come in a crowd, the fairy tale would have ended here. But…

Regardless of losses

American admirals, in the full sense of the word, were ready to bombard the enemy with planes and pilots. Entire squadrons were killed by Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft guns, but the order remained the same: attack at all costs.

Captain 3rd Rank John Waldron's 8th Torpedo Bomber Squadron , consisting of 15 Devastator torpedo bombers, approached the target on a direct course without performing any evasive maneuvers. All 15 aircraft were destroyed by the Japanese, 29 of the 30 crew members were killed, and no damage was caused to the enemy aircraft carriers.

Two minutes after the death of the 8th Squadron, the attack was launched by the 6th Torpedo Squadron under the command of Captain 3rd Rank Lindsey . Of the 14 torpedo bombers, the Japanese shot down 10, the remaining four dropped torpedoes, but missed.

The first eight attacks by American aircraft did not cause any significant damage to Japanese ships, and the loss count was already counting for dozens of aircraft. But the Americans’ plan still worked: at the beginning of eleven in the morning, bombers and torpedo bombers broke through to three of the four Japanese aircraft carriers, where the aircraft were already ready for a new flight and equipped. This turned out to be the decisive factor: hits from American bombs on the aircraft carriers started a fire, the tanks of aircraft prepared for takeoff began to explode, followed by Japanese bombs with torpedoes.

Three aircraft carriers at once - Akagi, Kaga and Soryu - were put out of action. A retaliatory attack was launched on the American aircraft carrier Yorktown from the only surviving Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryu. Now the Japanese torpedo bombers suffered serious losses during the raid, but the Yorktown was damaged. Three days later he was finished off by a Japanese submarine.

On the evening of June 4, the Americans discovered and attacked Hiryu. The Japanese did not have the strength to repel a new attack: the bombers met only six covering fighters. As a result, the Hiryu suffered fatal damage.

Destruction on Midway Atoll after a Japanese bomber raid. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org

Midway 1942: a carefully prepared success

The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was very effective, but did not bring decisive success - American aircraft carriers, whose role in the war was no longer questioned by anyone, were absent from Pearl Harbor on the day of the attack and remained intact. From that moment on, they dealt Japan several painful blows, the main one being the Battle of the Coral Sea.

Heavy losses in air battles of carrier-based aircraft and the death of the light aircraft carrier Seho forced the Japanese command to abandon plans for further advance in New Guinea and, in the future, the possible capture of bases in northern Australia. Among other consequences, it should be noted the loss of combat effectiveness of the fifth aircraft carrier division of the first air fleet - the aircraft carrier Shokaku was damaged, and the squadrons based on it and its sister Zuikaku suffered heavy losses in air battles. It was impossible to quickly restore these losses: the practice of staffing squadrons of attack aircraft carriers exclusively with experienced pilots deprived aviation schools of qualified instructors, and as a result, the influx of trained pilots into combat units was very small.

As a result, the First Air Fleet approached Midway with its potential reduced by a third, but, according to the command, this should have been enough. The opinion of ordinary pilots was the same. In the end, the fifth division, whose pilots had less experience and worse training compared to the veterans of the first and second, despite the losses, managed to sink the American aircraft carrier Lexington and heavily damage the Yorktown (for some time it was generally considered destroyed). The conclusions of the Dai-ichi Koku Kantai pilots about the results of the first battle with American aircraft carriers were expressed in a saying that circulated in the cockpits of the flight crew: “if the sons of the concubines have achieved success, the legitimate sons must win.”

The Japanese combined fleet was pursuing a decisive victory that would deprive the Americans of the main force capable of effectively countering the combined sea and air offensive power of the Empire.

Far to the north, a diversionary strike was simultaneously launched - the fifth fleet of Admiral Boshiro Hosogaya was sent to conquer the Aleutian Islands.

Other people's secrets and staying ahead of the game

The headquarters of the commander of American forces in the Pacific zone was located in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Chester William Nimitz ordered the headquarters to be moved to Hawaii from the safety of the continental United States in order to be as close as possible to the theater of operations. At the end of May 1942, he was faced with two main tasks: to predict the further actions of the Japanese and to be able to finally break the protracted series of defeats.

Material losses were not so significant for the United States, which had eight times the economic potential of Japan. They could be replenished - and have already been replenished. More dangerous were the growing blows to pride, which could ultimately lead to a psychological breakdown and force the American leadership to negotiate and make peace on terms favorable to Japan.

Nimitz’s “main forces” in this situation were not battleships or aircraft carriers. His trump card was a group of military and civilian specialists - cryptographers, mathematicians and linguists, headed by a very unusual person even for the liberal in terms of subordination and authority in the United States - Commander (Captain 2nd Rank) Joseph Rochfort.

This officer, who used to walk around his office in a dressing gown and slippers, was (and was) considered the best cryptographer in the United States, and his main achievement was breaking the Japanese naval code N-25 in the fall of 1940. This success could not prevent the attack on Pearl Harbor - the Japanese changed the key, but soon the Americans broke it too, and by May 1942 there were no secrets in Japanese radio messages.

At the beginning of May, Japanese radiograms began to increasingly contain indications of preparations for a major operation in the central part of the Pacific Ocean. By May 15, there was no doubt that Midway was the target of the operation, and Nimitz decided to be proactive. The meager forces available had to be deployed in the Midway area, secretly for the enemy, to detect the enemy in advance, attack and destroy him.

In the time remaining before the expected Japanese attack, American repairmen at Pearl Harbor managed to accomplish a feat of labor: the damage to the Yorktown, which in peacetime would have required several months of repairs, was repaired in three days. The ship was fully restored to combat capability, and even received a new soda machine to replace the one destroyed by a Japanese bomb. This touch can be called purely American.

On May 25, Rochfort's group opened a long radiogram, which listed all the combat formations of the Japanese fleet taking part in the operation, ships, ship commanders, courses, exit times - in general, a complete picture of the operation. That was enough.

American aircraft carriers, consisting of two operational formations - TF 16 and TF 17 - went to Midway. Raymond Spruance's TF 16 included the aircraft carriers Hornet and Enterprise, while the main force of Frank Fletcher's TF 17 was the newly repaired Yorktown. Three aircraft carriers carried 233 combat aircraft. The aircraft carriers accompanied 25 escort ships, including 10 cruisers. A curtain of submarines was deployed to the west and northwest of Midway.

Midway itself was to play an important role - about 130 US Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Corps aircraft were based on the island. This should have been the second surprise for the Japanese: in the main component - aviation - the Americans gained a numerical advantage.

Bells of fate

The approach of the Japanese was discovered on June 3, and the Americans struck the first blow - B-17 Flying Fortresses from Midway attacked Japanese transports, however, without achieving any hits. The direction of the Japanese advance was guessed correctly - the enemy was approaching from the northwest, but the Japanese aircraft carriers still remained undetected. The Japanese attacked Midway at five o'clock in the morning on June 4, and at about six o'clock the Catalina patrol discovered two aircraft carriers in battle formation, accompanied by escort ships.

Beginning at seven in the morning on June 4, Japanese aircraft carriers were subjected to continuous attacks from aircraft from Midway. American aircraft carriers were approaching the enemy at full speed, but the Japanese had not yet discovered them. Despite this, by order of Nagumo, 36 torpedo bombers, 36 dive bombers and 36 fighters were kept in constant readiness in case the main enemy forces were detected.

However, soon after the first attack from Midway, Nagumo decided that there were no enemy aircraft carriers nearby, and at 7:15 he gave the fateful order to rearm dive bombers and torpedo bombers with high explosives to attack the airfield, instead of armor-piercing bombs and torpedoes to attack ships. At 7:40, the American ships were discovered, and the order to rearm was canceled - newly removed torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs began to be hung under the attack vehicles again.

Meanwhile, the Japanese fleet was subjected to more and more attacks: from 7:00 to 10:00, eight waves of attack vehicles of 10-30 aircraft each came out to the aircraft carriers - five from Midway Island and three from aircraft carriers. The Americans suffered heavy losses from attacks by enemy fighters, but could not yet boast of success. At 10:20 a.m., the Japanese carriers finally completed rearming their aircraft, and the ships began turning into the wind to lift their loaded attack vehicles into the air. At that moment, they were discovered by Lieutenant Commander (Captain 3rd Rank) Clarence Wade McCluskey, who was destined to become the “hand of fate.” McCluskey controlled two squadrons of dive bombers, 30 Dontlesses under the command of Lieutenants Earl Gallagher and Richard Best.

McCluskey was lucky twice - firstly, he searched for Japanese aircraft carriers for an hour, and at 10:20 he was already heading home - the fuel supply allocated for the search was eaten. Secondly, by the time he reached the aircraft carriers, the Japanese fighters were finishing off the torpedo bombers flying at low altitude, and they could no longer quickly rise to attack the dive bombers.

The third success can be considered the random distribution of targets - due to cloudiness, five aircraft from McCluskey’s group incorrectly identified the assigned target and attacked a different aircraft carrier than the one that their commander and the pilots of twenty-five other “bombers” had identified for the attack. The decks of the Japanese ships were filled with fully fueled and armed vehicles, next to which lay bombs that had recently been removed from their hangers. Even one hit under these conditions could be fatal.

The aircraft carriers of the first division became victims of the Americans - having received several hits, the Kaga and Akagi turned into burning hulks. While McCluskey was destroying these two aircraft carriers, Max Leslie's squadron of dive bombers approached the battlefield. These 17 Dontlesses should have also arrived earlier, but Leslie got lost in the clouds along the way. Coming out of the clouds, he discovered a third aircraft carrier, the Soryu, also with a deck filled with aircraft. A few more hits - and a third huge fire blazed on the surface of the ocean.

The Japanese retaliatory strike did not solve anything. Two waves of aircraft from the Hiryu managed to reach American aircraft carriers, but both times to the same target, which ended up being the long-suffering Yorktown, which was eventually sunk by a Japanese submarine. In the retaliatory attack, Hiryu received heavy damage and was sunk by the crew.

Japanese losses amounted to 4 heavy aircraft carriers, a heavy cruiser, 250 aircraft and about 2,500 people, including the elite of carrier-based aviation. The Americans lost a heavy aircraft carrier, a destroyer, 150 aircraft, and 307 people. At the same time, a significant part of the downed pilots were saved - the search and rescue service of the US Navy was much better organized than that of their opponents.

The Japanese losses turned out to be irreparable: from that moment on, they lost their advantage in the quality of flight personnel, without having an adequate replacement. The advantage in air combat began to shift to the Americans until it reached its peak in 1944-45, when Japan, as a desperate measure, was forced to use suicide bombers - kamikazes.

The debate about whether the outcome of the battle could have been different will obviously continue for years and years to come. But the answer why he was like that is obvious. Order beats class, and surprise is more important than numerical advantage.

These old truths of war were confirmed in the waters off Midway, not for the first time and not for the last.

The author's opinion may not coincide with the position of the editors

Japan lost the ability to advance

Night has come. The aircraft carriers Soryu and Kaga had sunk by this time. "Akagi" and "Hiryu" were sunk by the Japanese themselves, since it was not possible to return them to base. Having lost the aircraft carriers, the Japanese group curtailed the operation and took a reverse course. Due to deteriorating weather, American aircraft were unable to launch new attacks on Japanese ships.

The Japanese fleet in this battle lost 4 aircraft carriers, one heavy cruiser, 248 sea-based aircraft and more than 2,500 personnel. American losses included one aircraft carrier, one destroyer, 150 land- and sea-based aircraft and 307 personnel.

The main result of the battle for Midway Atoll was Japan's loss of initiative in the war. There was still enough strength to conduct the defense, but the offensive fervor had faded. At the very least, Japan lost the opportunity to effectively use the fleet far from its native shores.

Turn around, hut...

Fortune watched the Japanese for quite some time with obvious interest. Even in their early, poorly planned attacks, the Americans had every chance of hurting the samurai very much if they had been a little luckier. But time after time, bombs fell past, and torpedoes passed away from the Japanese ships. One group of dive bombers flew past, another remained at the decisive moment to smoke bamboo on the Yorktown, and even the burning B-26 missed the bridge of the flagship Akagi.

But Fortuna gets tired of watching a monotonous movie, and then she turns away...

Nautilus attack

A few hours after the battle of the aircraft carriers at the Battle of Midway, the American submarine Nautilus fired several torpedoes at the Japanese forces. The submarine's report states that it attacked the Japanese aircraft carrier Soryu, but in fact the torpedoes hit the Kaga. At the same time, two torpedoes flew past, and one did not explode at all. True, Bill Brockman, captain of the third rank, commander of the Nautilus, was sure all his life that he sank the Soryu. This is how the Nautilus submarine entered American history.

Japanese retaliation

To retaliate in the Battle of Midway Atoll (1942), the Japanese managed to assemble eighteen bombers on the Hiryu. The Americans scrambled twelve aircraft to intercept. Five Japanese dive bombers were shot down, but seven scored three hits on the carrier. Only five dive bombers and one fighter returned.

The decision was immediately made to re-attack at the Battle of Midway. The Japanese scrambled several torpedo bombers and fighters. On the Yorktown they immediately learned about the impending attack. Only one group of Japanese aircraft in full force and three fighters from other groups emerged from the battle alive. Yorktown was seriously damaged and was towed to Pearl Harbor.

Carrier Battle

The Americans calculated that enemy aircraft would return to the aircraft carriers by about nine o'clock in the morning. In order to attack the forces of the Imperial Navy when they received and refueled aircraft, an order was given for all American aircraft to take off in full combat readiness. However, the Japanese fleet, having completed receiving several aircraft, changed course. The American command miscalculated.

Despite the seemingly failure in the Battle of Midway (the date of the battle of aircraft carriers is June 4, 1942), the Americans launched more than six attacks, and by the evening two Japanese aircraft carriers had already sunk.

Reasons for Japan's defeat

There are many reasons for the defeat of Japanese forces, but they are all interconnected. Firstly, the command set two goals that contradict each other, namely the capture of the island group and the destruction of the American fleet. These missions require the same air forces, but with different weapons.

Also, the Japanese did not have enough concentration of forces to carry out a successful attack. Some researchers and experts believe that Japan would have been better off saving its decisive striking force—aircraft carriers. The history of the battle at Midway Atoll was also affected by planning deficiencies. The plans were rigid and complex, losing any meaning if the enemy behaved non-standardly.

The Japanese planned their failure in advance themselves. The command of the strike group was placed at a disadvantage. The Americans did not make any really serious mistakes during the Battle of Midway. There were, of course, insufficient training of personnel, shortcomings in tactics, but still these were not deliberate mistakes, but a normal part of any conflict.

Medal "For the Defense of the Hawaiian Islands"

It would have to be printed in large quantities - by the spring of 1942 the garrison there had been significantly increased. The army had more than 62 thousand people on the island, and the total number of American troops - according to various sources - ranged from 100 to 150 thousand. The island was defended by coastal artillery with guns up to 406 mm inclusive. And of course, basic aviation. Even when striking “peacefully sleeping airfields” and the fleet taken by surprise in the harbor (December 1941), acting in conditions of complete surprise, the Japanese lost 29 aircraft shot down and more than a hundred aircraft received varying degrees of damage.

What losses were expected during a raid on a base ready for battle, with radar-guided air defense fighters - the Japanese could only roll the dice... But it is unlikely that the result would have inspired them.

In any case, a close blockade was hardly possible, and the prolonged presence of aircraft carriers within the reach of the B-17 bomber (Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress) also did not bode well. At Midway, however, these vehicles never achieved a hit, but sooner or later statistics would have taken their toll.

Aircraft carriers are not the most suitable tool for a blockade.

They run out of everything very quickly - fuel supplies, bombs, planes...

Pearl Harbor is also a base for American submarines.

The elephant has longer...

The readiness of the American admirals to exchange pieces was explained simply: they knew that their native shipyards were preparing reinforcements for them. Even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, eleven new Essex-class heavy aircraft carriers were laid down. A week after the beating of pots in Pearl Harbor, two more were added to them. Light aircraft carriers of the Independence class were about to enter service. And besides them, new battleships, cruisers, destroyers and much more stood on the stocks.

Considering that the war was going on at a considerable distance from the shores of the main part of the United States, Nimitz and his comrades had to “stand a day and hold out a night.” At the same time, they were approximately equally satisfied with both versions of the Japanese plans.

Attack of the last aircraft carrier

At the time of the attack on Yorktown, information arrived about the discovery of the last Japanese aircraft carrier. The Americans no longer had any torpedo bombers left, so it was decided to create a strike group of several dive bombers.

The air group was led by Lieutenant Earl Gallagher. The Japanese did not have time to react to the attack when the Americans dropped four bombs, causing explosions and numerous fires in the holds. Somewhat later, several more bombs were dropped on the fleet of imperialist Japan, but there were not a single hit.

The hopelessly damaged Hiryu was scuttled by the decision of Japanese Admiral Yamaguchi at dawn on June 5th. Aircraft from the Midway naval base continued to attack the Japanese, but they were unable to locate the main forces. Japan withdrew the fleet to the west; in addition, bad weather accompanied the Japanese - their ships were not visible to the Americans.

On June 6, US aircraft again attacked Japanese heavy cruisers. One cruiser was sunk, the second managed to reach the port with significant damage.

Myths about the battle

There are several myths about the Battle of Midway. Here are some of them:

  1. The Japanese faced fatal bad luck. In fact, they helped this “bad luck” themselves.
  2. The headquarters did not transmit information to the command of the strike group in a timely manner, and one of the aircraft carriers was not at all equipped to receive information messages. In fact, there were no technical problems.
  3. The Japanese lost their best pilots. Of course, there were losses, but they were still relatively small. There were personnel left in Japan to conduct other operations, but since the strategic initiative was lost, their knowledge and experience were no longer needed.

Strategic Implications

After defeat at the Battle of Midway, Imperial Japan was forced into a purely defensive position and lost all initiative. Irreversible changes have occurred in both the tactics and strategy of warfare at sea.

The Battle of the Aircraft Carriers, as part of the major naval battle of Midway, clearly showed that aircraft carriers were now taking over the dominant role in the Pacific Ocean.

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