Won but failed?
Today, April 24, marks the 140th anniversary of the beginning of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878.
As often happens, there are so many myths surrounding it that the version of events taught in school tells mainly about things that never actually happened. Allegedly, the war was started by Alexander II simply because the Turks were slaughtering the Balkan Slavs who raised the April Uprising of 1876. Moreover, the king even had plans to capture Constantinople. Instead of all this, he achieved only a temporary stop to the wars in the Balkans - the Berlin Congress and the treaty adopted at it, which laid the foundations for Serbia’s conflicts with other states in the region. Contrary to the expectations of the Russian side, the conflict turned out to be cruel and bloody. Consider the stubborn defense of Plevna by the Turks, which our army unsuccessfully stormed three times and took only after a long siege. Only after its surrender did Skobelev approach Istanbul. According to the Peace of San Stefano, the Balkan countries were given independence and fair borders. And then the evil Western powers came and curtailed this independence at the Congress of Berlin, laying the foundations for all future European wars until the First World War.
In this scheme - except for the last ten words - almost everything is wrong. The widespread conclusion from it is also incorrect: “Russia’s positions in the Balkans, won in the battles of 1877–1878 at the cost of the lives of more than 100,000 Russian soldiers, were undermined in the verbal debates of the Berlin Congress... the Russian-Turkish war, although won for Russia, was unsuccessful.” But how did it really happen?
Fighting in the lower Danube and the end of the campaign
From that moment on, the Turkish flotilla on the Danube was cut into three parts: above Nikopol; on the section from Ruschuk to Silistra (above Chernavode); in the lower reaches of the river (Sulina branch). Even the Turkish ships that retained their combat capability no longer posed a significant threat. On July 9 (21), a Russian detachment (gunboat "Grand Duke Nikolai", boats "Tsarevich" and "Ptichka") left Cernavode up the Danube to reconnoiter the location of enemy troops retreating to Silistria and fought with enemy ships near the village of Budzhaki; According to reports from the crews, a fire broke out on the Turkish ship, identified as the monitor, from the fire of the 10-pound bow gun of the gunboat.
After this, the activity of the river flotillas finally moved to the lower reaches of the Danube, where the Turks had the most powerful ships, and most importantly, access to the sea through Sulin. Here the Russians needed, at a minimum, to lock the enemy in arms, not allowing him to rise higher, and, if possible, to attack the enemy and deprive him of striking power. For this purpose, on July 28 (August 9), a flotilla of Lieutenant-Commander Dikov, holding the flag on the armed steamer “Experience,” arrived from Odessa to the Kiliya Arm to help the Lower Danube detachment. On August 12 (24), “Experience”, with the support of four mine boats, placed a barrier of 20 galvanic mines in two lines at the entrance to the Georgievskoe arm.
At the beginning of September, Dikov’s detachment was reinforced by ships that came from Odessa - the schooner “Raven”, the steamer “Sister” and three mine boats. On September 27 (October) Dikov tried to attack Sulin, located at the very mouth of the branch, and from the land covered by floodplains and swamps. The steamship "Opyt", the armed steam schooners "Voron", "Duck" and "Swan", as well as a mortar barge, descended along the Sulinsky arm to the third mile, where at night the boats laid a minefield. The steamship Kartal and the gunboat Sunne came out to meet them. The fire of the schooner "Voron" (900 tons, three 153-mm cannons) forced the "Kartal" to retreat to Sulin, and the gunboat "Sunne" (200 tons, 4 guns) ran into mines and sank. Dikov's detachment went even further and entered into a firefight with the battleships Khivz-ur Rahman and Mukadem-i Khair. At 13:00, due to the creeping fog, the battle was stopped, and Dikov’s detachment retreated up the river.
The battle of Dikov’s detachment near Sulin on September 27–28, 1877. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one
The next day, Dikov’s detachment again went down to Sulin and, hiding behind a minefield, entered into a firefight with two Turkish monitors. “Hivz-ur Rahman” was hit by a 153-mm shell from the schooner “Raven” and retreated, after which “Mukadem-i Khair” also retreated to the mouth of the Danube.
At this point, attempts to storm Sulin from the upper reaches of the Danube stopped. In January 1878, Chikhachev’s detachment, which came from Odessa, made an unsuccessful attempt to attack Sulin from the sea, but this no longer had strategic significance - the Turkish fleet was inactive.
In the middle reaches of the Danube, military clashes were also sporadic. Thus, on October 2 (14), Lieutenant Dubasov’s detachment, consisting of the gunboat “Experience” and four mine boats, tried to burn Turkish ships near Silistria with six fire ships - the only case of the use of fire ships in this war. One fire-ship was sent adrift towards a Turkish patrol ship, but to no avail. On November 30 (December 12), the Nikopol monitor exchanged fire with three Turkish ships off Mechka Island near Rushchuk, and also fired at the location of enemy troops.
How “civil society” twisted the arms of an autocratic state
The official nine-volume history of this Russian-Turkish war, published before the revolution, laid the first stone in its mythology. Allegedly, Alexander II was so concerned about the massacre of the Bulgarians carried out by Turkey in 1876 that he decided to start a war. In fact, the emperor categorically did not want to get involved in a conflict over such uprisings. The reason was simple: it would not give his country any noticeable material benefits. He did not intend to seize the lands of his “Slavic brothers”. In this case, neither Russian society nor the Western powers, who feared the expansion of Russia, would have understood him. This ruler was so rational that he believed that Turkey could be pressured with threats and forced to behave in a balanced manner.
Moreover, Turkey’s cruelties did not come out of nowhere. They were associated with objective factors, namely the suppression of the Bulgarian uprising. Alexander II himself was no angel: 15 years earlier, while suppressing the uprising in Poland, according to official data, his troops killed more than 30,000 Slavic brothers. During the suppression of the April Uprising of 1876, which started the war, the Turks killed the same number. Therefore, Russia actively put pressure on Serbia so that it would not stand up for the Bulgarians. But she, despite the pressure, still started a war against Turkey in the summer of 1876.
After this, Alexander could remain out of the game, but purely theoretically. Why? The fact is that, contrary to the popular belief about authoritarian regimes, an autocratic ruler must be at least as popular as a democratically elected one. You can endure an unpleasant replacement president until the elections, but you will have to endure a monarch for the rest of your life. The kings were either extremely popular among the people and society, or their life was sharply shortened. Pre-revolutionary society was much more active than today in skillfully expressing its dissatisfaction with the authorities. Alexander II's grandfather (Paul I), great-grandfather (Peter III) - and he himself - died in a rather painful way only because they were slightly distracted and at some point did not carefully monitor their popularity. Therefore, the most important task of the III Department of His Imperial Majesty's Chancellery was monitoring public opinion. In 1876–1877, Section III regularly recorded: the people, to put it mildly, are outraged by the massacre of the Slavs by Turkey and do not understand why their state allows it.
Russian society of that time possessed an energy and ability for self-organization unimaginable today. Slavic committees immediately formed throughout the country, collecting money “to help the Serbs.” The funds were largely used to send many thousands of volunteers to the Serbian-Turkish War of 1876. Russian officers and generals at that time also had the ability to act independently. Many of them left the army and went to fight for the Serbs. General M.G. Chernyaev led the Serbian army in that conflict. Reports to the III Department report: “The peasants consider Chernyaev to be sent by God... and their faith is so great in him that he will certainly drive out the Turks throughout the entire Balkan Peninsula.”
All this greatly angered Alexander II, who saw no practical sense in the war in the Balkans. But he no longer had any choice. He understood that the monarchy could not exist without the authority of the monarch, and also realized that volunteers would not win the war with Turkey. Ultimately, thousands of them died in the Balkans. Massive Russian losses began against the will of Alexander. It was society that de facto unleashed the war that the state did not want. In the summer of 1876, the Tsar, essentially forced, began negotiations with the Austrians about their neutrality in a future conflict. By this he tried to avoid the mistake of the Crimean War, when the lack of neutrality of Vienna prevented Russia from fighting in the Balkans.
Mine boats are heading to the Danube
At the end of 1876, the massive dispatch of mine boats to the Danube began - they were supposed to operate only with pole and towed mines. The boats had to be delivered from the railway on carts, so they arrived on the Lower Danube only at the beginning of hostilities (in mid-April), and on the Middle Danube their concentration ended in early June. From the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, special detachments of sailors were allocated (Baltic - 445 people, Black Sea - 200 people), intended to staff the Danube River Flotilla. Already in November 1876, both detachments were sent to Chisinau at the disposal of the commander of the Russian army in Bessarabia.
The Turks maintained a strong Danube squadron on the Danube under the command of Admiral Mehmet Arif Pasha, the basis of which was the turret armored corvettes Lutf-yu Jelil and Hivz-ur Rahman, stationed in Tulcea. These were large seaworthy ships with a displacement of 2540 tons, protected by an armor belt up to 140 mm thick. Each of them carried two 229 mm and two 178 mm muzzle-loading guns, as well as one 120 mm breech-loading gun.
In addition, there were small river monitors "Khizber" and "Seifi" (404 tons, two 120-mm muzzle-loading guns each), as well as five armored gunboats of the "Feth-ul-Islam" type (335 tons, two 150-mm muzzle-loading guns). Both monitors and the gunboat "Semendire" were stationed in the port of Sulin at the very mouth of the Danube, the remaining ships were located higher up the river: in Machina - the paddle steamers "Kiliji Ali" and "Arkadion", in Gabrovo - the armored gunboat "Feth-ul-Islam", the wooden gunboat Akkia and the paddle steamer Hayredan. In Silistria there was the wheeled steamer "Islahat", in Rushchuk - the armored gunboats "Boportlen" and "Iskodra", the wooden gunboats "Varna" and "Shefket-Numa". In Vidin there were the armored gunboat Podgorica, the iron gunboat Sunna and the paddle steamer Nusretie. In addition, the Danube squadron had 9 transport ships and two dozen small ships.
Turkish river monitor “Hizber” of the same type as “Seyfi”, 1875. B. Langensiepen, A. Guleryuz, J. Cooper. The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828–1923
The main disadvantage of the Turkish ships was the lack of horizontal armor - only the Khizber-type monitors, in addition to the 76-mm side, carried a 32-mm armored deck.
The main bases of the Turkish squadron were located in the Sulina arm and the Machinsky branch of the Danube - out of sight of Russian observers from the left bank of the river. Together with the Danube Army of Abdulkerim Nadir Pasha and a chain of fortresses, the squadron was supposed to prevent Russian and Romanian troops from crossing the Danube and invading Dobruja and Bulgaria. Thus, the success of the land campaign depended entirely on victory in the river war.
A cruel and bloody massacre that exposed the backwardness and impotence of tsarism?
As we have already noted, it is customary to tell tales about Russia’s losses in that war. Yes, the Turks were armed with more modern Peabody-Martini rifles. In the active Russian army there were Krnka rifles, much worse. And yes, the assault on Plevna was not an easy walk. However, the famous phrase of the historian Troitsky “at the cost of the lives of more than 100,000 Russian soldiers” is based on literally nothing.
There is only one official source on losses in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878. — “Military medical report...” 1886. According to it, those killed are 22,391 people. Secondary sources citing figures up to 36 thousand do not rely on documents. Turkish losses in killed - no less than 30 thousand, died from disease - 90 thousand. The Turks lost 145,000 prisoners - more than an order of magnitude more than the Russians.
22 thousand is, of course, a lot, a lot. But these are not the hundred thousand killed, attributed to the “rotten tsarism” under the USSR. As we have already mentioned, during the reign of Alexander there were uprisings that claimed much more lives of his subjects than the “cruel and bloody war.”
In fact, there were many wars between Russia and Turkey. For example, Russian losses in killed in the war with Turkey of 1828-1829 were 15 thousand, among the Turks - 20 thousand. The ratio of losses is the same as in 1877–1878. Why doesn't anyone call that war bloody? The reason is simple: these are typical losses for such wars. The conflict of 1877–1878 was declared bloody by Marxist historians like Troitsky in order to provide an “objective basis” for the “revolutionary situation” that allegedly emerged at the end of Alexander’s reign. Do the casualty figures and the duration of the war show that it was normal? It doesn’t matter: it’s enough not to name them and not compare them with others.
And what about the thesis that was fashionable in the USSR: “Victory over such a weak enemy as the Turkish army was achieved by Russian troops at a high price and only thanks to the full exertion of all forces”? Alas, it was not confirmed either. At its peak in late 1877, only a third of the Russian army was in the Balkans. Its most modern units, with the latest Berdan guns, which were superior to the English rifles of the Turks, stood near St. Petersburg throughout the war.
First Russian victories
On April 29 (May 11) one of the most striking events of that war took place. Several Turkish ships, led by the battleship Lutf-yu Jelil, emerged from the lower reaches of the Machinsky branch. They soon entered into a firefight with Russian field batteries at Brailov. During the firefight, a 229-mm field mortar shell hit the unprotected deck of a Turkish battleship. The ship's cellars exploded and it sank almost instantly, while the Turkish squadron hastily took refuge in the Machinsky sleeve. This accidental hit made a huge impression on the Russian sailors - 229-mm mortars were considered such an effective weapon that they even tried to arm the battleship Peter the Great with them.
Turkish armored corvette "Lutf-yu Jelil". Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2011, No. 2
However, ships in the Machinsky branch, controlled by the Turks, still posed a serious danger, so on May 4 (16), a detachment of the Danube flotilla consisting of mine boats “Ksenia” (commander - Lieutenant Shestakov), “Dzhigit” (commander - midshipman Persin) and “Tsarevna” ( commander - midshipman Bal), together with five rowboats, under fire from Turkish ships, placed a barrage of 32 galvanic mines in two lines in the lower part of the Machinsky sleeve (above Brailov). On May 12 (24), Russian ships made a demonstrative performance - in front of the Turks, they dumped sandbags into the water at the exit from the Machinsky sleeve.
Mine boat "Ksenia". Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2011, No. 1
On the night of 13 to 14 (25 to 26) May, Russian sailors won their first victory. A detachment consisting of four mine boats (“Tsarevich”, “Ksenia”, “Dzhigit” and “Tsarevna”) left Brailov for the Machinsky sleeve to attack the anchorage of Turkish ships. Near Machin, the boats found the Seyfi monitor standing in the middle of the river, and to the left of it the armored gunboat Feth-ul-Islam and the armed steamer Kiliji Ali. The boats turned into two columns and attacked enemy ships under enemy fire. “Tsarevich” hit the monitor with a pole mine in the aft part of the starboard side, and “Ksenia” - in the left side under the turret. After the second explosion, the Seyfi quickly sank.
The sinking of the monitor "Safe" at Machin on the night of May 13-14, 1877. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one
On May 27 (June 8), a detachment of ships consisting of the Romanian gunboat “Grand Duke Nicholas”, as well as the mine boats “Tsarevich” and “Ksenia”, which left Gura-Yalomitsa to the Turkish-occupied Girsov (now the Romanian city of Hirsov), met here the Turkish monitor and attacked him. The monitor considered it best to retreat, and the boats pursued him all the way to Girsov in order to determine the fire zone of the Turkish coastal artillery, after which they returned. The next day, the same ships and the boat “Dzhigit” discovered two Turkish gunboats in the upper part of the Machinsky branch, which immediately retreated, opening the entrance to the branch. After this, Russian boats laid a minefield in the upper reaches of the Machinsky branch.
Due to the spring flood, the crossing of the Danube was scheduled for mid-July. Preparations for the operation began a month in advance: from June 7 to 11 (from 19 to 23) minefields were placed on both sides of the intended crossing site (between Sistovo and Nikopol). At the same time, on June 8 (20), a detachment under the command of Captain 1st Rank M.D. Novikov, consisting of 10 steam boats, met the Turkish military steamer Ereklik at Parapan, coming from the direction of Rushchuk. The steamer opened grapeshot fire at the boats and boats with mines and in response was attacked by the boat “Shutka” (commander - midshipman Nilov). The attack was unsuccessful - the bullets broke the electrical conductors to the charge of the pole mine, and it did not explode, even when it hit the side of the ship. Deciding not to tempt fate, “Ereklik” turned around and went to Rushchuk. As a result of this operation, the Turkish ships were separated and locked in their bases (Ruschuk and Nikopol). It is interesting that the artist V.V. Vereshchagin, who received a bullet wound in the battle on June 8, was on the “Joke” as a volunteer.
Mine boat "Shutka". Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2011, No. 1
On June 11 (23), while the boats of the Upper Danube detachment were laying mines near Flamunda, the Turkish monitor “Podgorica” left Nikopol. The boats “Mina” (commanded by midshipman Arens) and “Shutka” tried to attack him, but were repulsed by grapeshot and rifle fire; The monitor also turned back.
On June 12 (24), on the fairway near Corabia (above Nikopol), the rowing boats of Captain 1st Rank M.D. Novikov placed another barrage of 23 galvanic shock mines in two lines, and from June 13 to 15 (from 25 to 27) the barrier at Flamunda was reinforced with another line of 36 minutes.
On the good Peace of San Stefano and the bad Treaty of Berlin
Okay, let's say the war was not nearly as monstrous as it was described. But have we really lost the world? After all, Alexander II said on January 9, 1878: “If it is destined, then let them erect a cross on St. Sophia!” From this phrase they like to conclude that the emperor wanted to take Constantinople. Yes, the emperor said these words. However, this quote from the diary of Minister of War D.A. Milyutin is cited, omitting the context. Alexander did not plan to keep Constantinople for himself after his occupation. At that time, the justified point of view prevailed that, having occupied Constantinople, Russia would doom itself to a war with England, which, due to the weakness of the fleet, it would not be able to win.
The Romanovs intended to occupy the city only in order to convene “representatives of the European powers to Constantinople, in order, together with them,” to determine the borders of the Balkan states, without giving Russia anything except the part of Southern Bessarabia taken away by the Crimean War. Alexander II understood why he needed, for example, Central Asia with its cotton, without which it was difficult to develop light industry. But the Balkans simply could not offer anything that Russia did not already have. The main goal of peace was to proclaim the independence of Serbia, Bulgaria and others. And it was indeed proclaimed - both by the Peace of San Stefano and the Berlin Treaty.
The Peace of San Stefano was concluded on March 3, 1878 and created a very large Bulgaria (on the map above), and also gave independence to Serbia and Montenegro. The Western powers, most notably Austria, were against a strong Slavic state in the Balkans and demanded a revision of San Stefano at the Congress of Berlin. There, on July 13, 1878, the Berlin Treaty was adopted. It also gave independence to three Slavic countries, but Bulgaria was mercilessly cut back (on the map below) and was no longer a strong player. In fact, the whole difference between the San Stefano and Berlin decisions lies in exactly how Serbia, Bulgaria and Montenegro drew their borders. For a long time it was fashionable to claim that the Treaty of Berlin gave Bulgarian lands to the Serbs, which laid the foundation for three wars between Bulgaria and Serbia.
A simple glance at the map reveals something completely different. The fact is that according to San Stefano, Bulgaria was supposed to receive many Greek, Serbian, Macedonian and even Albanian lands. This “Russian” version of the world laid so many pitfalls and time bombs in the Balkans that conflicts there would have proceeded even more vigorously than after the Berlin Congress. There were more sides to this war than in our version of history, as well as, perhaps, blood. Yes, Southern Bulgaria did not join Northern Bulgaria, but became an autonomy of Turkey. But this decision did not affect anything, and a few years later Bulgaria was reunited. There was only one thing truly fatal for the future of the Russian Empire in the Treaty of Berlin - the transfer of Croatia to Austria-Hungary. It made the conflict between this country and the Balkan Slavs inevitable.
The Russian authorities would not have been able to avoid being drawn into such a war. Any attempt to ignore the problems of the southern Slavs would lead to a huge increase in public activity and a sharp decline in the authority of the monarch, and without him the monarchy simply cannot exist. However, Croatia was transferred to Austria-Hungary back in 1876. That is, a fatal mistake was made before San Stefano, and even before the very beginning of the war.
Russian-Turkish War 1877-1878 Russian army on the eve of the warBefore the war, the Russian armed forces were in a transitional state. The implementation of the military reform begun by D. A. Milyutin back in 1862 was not completed. The creation of military districts in the 60s made it easier to recruit and manage troops. For better training of officers, military gymnasiums were founded, but there were few of them. The training of the required number of officers continued to be hampered by restrictions on access to officer ranks for persons of non-noble origin. During mobilization, the army's additional need for officers was estimated at 17 thousand people, but there was nowhere to get them. In 1874, universal, or more precisely, all-class, military service was introduced and the period of military service was reduced from 25 to six years, which made it possible to significantly increase the number of trained reserves. But by the beginning of the war, only two recruits were called up under the new law. The army's reserves were still small.
The weakness of the Russian military industry slowed down the rearmament of the Russian army, which began in the 60s. Only 20% of soldiers had improved Berdan No. 2 rifles. The rest had shorter-range rifles or even old-style muzzle-loading shotguns. The multi-system nature of small arms made ammunition supply difficult. The production of cartridges did not meet the needs, and their shortage during the war hampered the combat operations of the Russian troops. Field artillery consisted mainly of light bronze cannons. There were no long-range steel cannons or heavy guns capable of destroying enemy trenches and other earthen fortifications with mounted fire.
The combat training of the troops improved, but was also in a transitional stage. M.I. Dragomirov, M.D. Skobelev and a number of other generals called for abandoning the enthusiasm for parade ground drills and advocated bringing military training closer to the needs of the combat situation. With the support of D. A. Milyutin, they sought to train troops to operate in rifle chains instead of columns, to run and dig in under enemy fire. But among the conservative majority of generals and senior officers, routine prevailed - admiration for the external picturesqueness of military exercises, blind faith in the power of closed linear orders.
In the six years after the cancellation of the Paris Peace, almost nothing was done to restore the fleet on the Black Sea. The light ships there could only carry out coastal defense, but were not suitable for operations on the open sea. They had only two advantages over the stronger Turkish fleet - the excellent combat training of their teams and the mines they had in service.
The war plan was developed by General N.N. Obruchev and D.A. Milyutin in April 1877, that is, shortly before the start of hostilities. It had a pronounced offensive character and was designed to quickly bring the war to a victorious end by crossing the Russian army through the Balkans and, if necessary, occupying Constantinople. Obruchev’s note dated April 10, 1877 especially emphasized that the possibility of capturing Constantinople was meant exclusively “in a military sense,” as a temporary measure, but not at all for the purpose of annexing it and the Black Sea straits to Russia. The note defined the political goal of the war in the most general terms as “the destruction of Turkish rule on the Balkan Peninsula.”
The prevailing opinion in government spheres was that the war with Turkey would be easy and would end quickly. In terms of its organization and level of training of officers, the Turkish army was much lower than the Russian one. Turkish artillery was insignificant. But in terms of small arms purchased from the USA and England, the Turkish troops were not inferior to the Russians and even surpassed them. British officers played the role of military advisers in the Turkish army and supervised the combat training of the Turkish fleet. The Porte hoped for the intervention of the Western powers, who incited it to war.
The rapid concentration of Russian troops for an offensive on the Balkan Peninsula was hampered not only by financial difficulties, lack of officers and weapons, but also by external reasons. The unreliability of the position of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the fear of weakening the forces located in Poland, prompted the tsarist government not to withdraw more than a third of the troops from the Warsaw and Vilna military districts.
The tsar appointed Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, a self-confident and narrow-minded man, as commander-in-chief in the Balkan theater of military operations. Other great princes also received important positions in the army. The commander-in-chief surrounded himself with incompetent staff and court generals. The arrival of Tsar Alexander II, known for his indecisiveness and frequent changes of opinion, into the army made it even more difficult to direct military operations.
But during the war, many capable military leaders distinguished themselves and came to the fore - M. I. Dragomirs, I. P. Gurko, N. G. Stoletov, M. D. Skobelev and a number of other generals and officers who enjoyed great authority in the army.
Russia entered the war without allies. Serbia was defeated. Little heroic Montenegro continued to fight, but could not distract large Turkish forces. The success of Russian diplomacy was the conclusion of a convention with Romania on April 16, 1877 on the passage of Russian troops through its territory. In return, Russia guaranteed that Romania would gain complete independence from Turkey. A month and a half later, Romania officially entered the war with Turkey. On April 24, the tsar's manifesto was published in Chisinau, and on the same day Russian troops crossed the Romanian border. The purpose of the war was declared to be “improving and ensuring the fate” of the Christian peoples who were under the Turkish yoke.
By the beginning of the war, Russia had concentrated an army of 185,000 in the Balkans. The Turkish army in Northern Bulgaria numbered 160 thousand people.
The beginning of the war. Advance of Russian troops beyond the Danube
The first task of the Russian army was to cross the Danube. A huge mass of troops had to cross the largest river in Western Europe under enemy fire in its lower high-water course, 650-700 m wide with a steep opposite bank convenient for defense. This operation, unprecedented in its size, required long and careful preparation. The creation of the Russian Danube Flotilla brought great benefits. She blocked the access of Turkish naval vessels to the Danube with mines and successfully acted against the Turkish river flotilla.
On June 27, unexpectedly for the enemy, the advanced units of the Russian troops on rowing iron pontoons in deep darkness, under cover of artillery fire, moved across the river in the Zimnitsa-Sistovo area. After a stubborn battle, the city of Sistovo was taken. Beyond the Danube, Russian troops launched an offensive from Sistov in three directions - to the west, south and east. The Bulgarian population enthusiastically greeted the Russian army, in which they saw their liberator from the centuries-old Turkish yoke.
With the arrival of Russian troops in Bulgaria, the national liberation movement began to expand. Under the Russian army, Bulgarian volunteer regular military squads were formed. In villages and cities, popular partisan detachments—chetas—spontaneously arose. In the battles, the Bulgarians showed high morale. According to eyewitnesses, they walked into battle as if they were “on a merry holiday.” But the tsarist government was afraid of the wide scope of the popular movement and tried to limit the participation of the Bulgarians in the war.
After crossing the Danube, the 70,000-strong Russian detachment advancing to the east was supposed to pin down the Turkish forces located in the area of the Rushchuk fortress. The task of the Western detachment (about 35 thousand people) was to capture Plevna, the most important road junction in northwestern Bulgaria. The main task was assigned to the troops, who were to develop an offensive to the south in order to capture the mountain passes connecting Northern Bulgaria with Southern. It was especially important to occupy the Shipka Pass, along which was the most convenient road through the Balkans to Adrianople. Initially, this most important task was assigned to the small Advance Detachment under the command of General Gurko.
In this detachment, including several Bulgarian squads, there were only 12 thousand people with 40 guns. Then the 8th Corps of General F.F. Radetsky and other units moved south.
By July 12, the advance detachment had already reached the foot of the Balkans. Leaving aside the Shipka Pass, well guarded by the Turks, Gurko’s detachment crossed the Balkans and one of the neighboring passes and descended into Southern Bulgaria. Defeating the Turkish troops in parts, his detachment occupied the city of Kazailyk, and then attacked Shipka from the rear. At the same time, Shipka was attacked from the north by the troops of General Radetzky. The capture of the Shipka Pass presented great difficulties. It was necessary to overcome steep mountain climbs, fighting with the enemy hidden behind stones and thorns. Finding themselves in a difficult situation, the Turks suddenly threw out a white flag and, through envoys, agreed to surrender, but this was a trick. Having treated the reinforcements, they opened fire again and inflicted significant damage on the Russian troops. After two days of fierce attacks, the Shipka mountain pass was taken. The Turkish troops retreated in disarray. The Bulgarian population provided great assistance to the Russian army during the battles for Shipka.
The offensive initially developed successfully in other directions as well. The western detachment captured the Turkish fortress of Nikopol in battle. Russian troops advancing to the east pinned down Turkish forces in the Ruschuk area. The successes turned heads at the headquarters of the Danube Army. Court circles at headquarters imagined that the theater of war would “soon move to the outskirts of Constantinople.” The campaign turned into a triumphal procession. The war seemed to be coming to an end. However, the course of events suddenly changed dramatically.
On July 19, a large Turkish detachment under the command of Osman-nashi, having covered a distance of 200 km in six days, got ahead of the Russians and took up defense in the Plevia area. The Russian troops, whose task was to capture Plevna, were only 40 km from it (near Nikopol) and stood in complete inaction and ignorance for two days. A small detachment then sent to Plevna was driven back with heavy losses.
The concentration of significant Turkish forces in Plevna created the threat of a flank attack on the Danube Army. The second attack on Plevna, launched on July 30 by a 30,000-strong corps, was also repulsed. The tsarist generals operating near Plevna did not understand the peculiarities of the battle against enemy field fortifications. They forced the infantry to act in tightly closed columns under heavy fire. This was the main reason for the large losses of the Russian army near Plevna.
It became obvious to the government that it was impossible to immediately cross the Balkans with the main forces of the Danube Army.
In a note dated August 7, submitted to the Tsar, Minister of War D. A. Milyutin raised the question of the need for a temporary transition of the Danube Army to defense until reinforcements arrived from Russia. Milyutin demanded “thrift for Russian blood.” “If we continue to count on the boundless selflessness and courage of the Russian soldier,” he wrote, “then in a short time we will destroy our entire magnificent army.”
Shipka and Plevna
Meanwhile, the Turks concentrated a 40,000-strong army in Southern Bulgaria under the command of Suleiman Lashi. In mid-August, his troops forced Gurko's detachment to retreat beyond the Balkans with heavy fighting. After this, Suleiman Pasha attacked Shipka, trying to capture this important pass. Shipka was defended by a Russian detachment of five thousand, which included several Bulgarian squads. These forces were clearly not enough, and General Stoletov, who commanded the detachment, correctly assessed the situation. On August 17, he reported to the commander of the troops of the southern front, General Radetsky: “... The entire corps of Suleiman Pasha, visible to us in full view, is lined up against us 8 versts from Shipka. The enemy’s forces are enormous, I say this without exaggeration; We will defend ourselves to the utmost, but reinforcements are urgently needed.”* However, Radetzky, misled by intelligence, waited for the attack of Suleiman Pasha on the left flank. He considered the appearance of the Turks at Shipka as a false demonstration and did not send reserves to Stoletov.
Early in the morning of August 21, Suleiman Pasha began an assault on Russian positions. For three days, the small Russian-Bulgarian detachment held back the onslaught of the enemy, who had a five-fold superiority in forces. Shipka's defenders had little ammunition, and they had to fight off up to 14 attacks a day. Often the soldiers met the enemy with a hail of stones and drove him back with bayonets. The situation was aggravated by unbearable heat and lack of water. The only source - the stream - was under fire from the Turks, and the path to it was covered with rows of corpses, the number of which was growing every hour.
At the end of the third day of fighting, the situation of the Shipka heroes became desperate. The Turks surrounded Russian positions on three sides. The defenders' guns were out of action and they ran out of shells and ammunition. Enemy attacks were repulsed with hand grenades and bayonets. The threat of complete encirclement loomed. At this moment, the long-awaited help finally came. Radetzky himself brought a rifle brigade to Shipka. Behind it came the division of General Dragomirov. Exhausted from fatigue after a difficult march through the mountains in forty-degree heat, the arriving soldiers immediately rushed into battle. A Russian “hurray!” rang out over Shipka. The threat of encirclement has been eliminated. At night, the defenders of Shipka received water and hot food, ammunition and shells. Su-leyman Pasha's attacks continued in the following days, but were unsuccessful. Ultimately the Turks retreated. The Shipka Pass remained in the hands of the Russians, but its southern slopes were held by the Turks.
Having switched to defense in other parts of the theater, the command of the Danube Army accumulated forces for a new attack on Plevna. Guards and grenadier units arrived from Russia, as well as Romanian troops (28 thousand) were sent here. In total, 87 thousand people with 424 guns were drawn to Plevna. Osman Pasha by this time had 36 thousand people and 70 guns. Having secured significant superiority in forces, the Russian command hoped for an easy and decisive victory.
This self-confidence bore bad fruit. The plan for the upcoming assault, developed at the headquarters of the Danube Army, testified to very little sophistication in the art of war and demonstrated insufficient awareness of the location of enemy forces. The lessons of the first two assaults were not taken into account. As during previous battles near Plevna, the main forces were sent to the most powerful section of the Turkish fortifications - the Grivitsky redoubts. The attack plan was based only on the valor of the Russian soldier. A preliminary four-day shelling of Turkish positions from light guns did not produce significant results.
Despite the rain and impassable mud, the third assault on Plevna was scheduled for the royal name day - and September. Attacks on the Grivitsky redoubts were repulsed. Russian regiments attacked other sections of the Turkish positions scatteredly and also failed.
Only the detachment of General Skobelev operated successfully on the left flank of the Russian troops. Using thick fog, he secretly approached the enemy and broke through his fortifications with a swift attack. But, without receiving reinforcements, Skobelev’s detachment was forced to retreat back the next day.
The third assault on Plevna ended in complete failure. This failure and the heavy losses of troops near Plevna made a depressing impression on the army and Russian society. The war was clearly dragging on. In progressive social circles, indignation against the government grew. In the famous folk song “Dubinushka” the words appeared:
On the king's name day, to please him,
Many thousands of soldiers were killed...
After the third failure of the Russian army near Plenna, Turkish troops attempted to go on the offensive and break into Northern Bulgaria. On the night of September 17, the main forces of Suleim na Pasha's army again attacked Shipka, but to no avail. After September 17, the Turkish command did not launch decisive attacks on Shipka, but kept the Russian detachment under continuous fire in the hope that it would not withstand the defense in winter conditions.
Experiencing severe hardships, Russian troops and Bulgarian militias held the Shipka Pass for four months. Hot food and water were delivered to forward positions at night, and during snow storms the supply was stopped. The number of frostbite cases sometimes reached 400 people per day. When a snowstorm arose on Shipka and the shooting died down, St. Petersburg newspapers wrote: “Everything is calm on Shipka.” This stereotypical phrase from the reports of the commander of the troops on Shipka, General Radetsky, served as the title for the famous painting by V.V. Vereshchagin. The Russian troops suffered their main losses at Shipka from cold and disease. From September to December 1877, the Russians and Bulgarians lost 700 people killed, and 9,500 people were frostbitten, sick and frozen.
“The Shipka Sitting” is a glorious page in the history of the military partnership of the Bulgarian and Russian peoples. At the top of the mountain there now stands a monument-tomb with the image of two warriors bowing their heads - a Bulgarian and a Russian.
The successful defense of Shipka prevented the invasion of the Turkish army into Northern Bulgaria and the inevitable massacre of the Bulgarian population in this case. It greatly facilitated the successful blockade of Plevna and the subsequent passage of the Russian army through the Balkans.
In three assaults on Plevna, the Russians lost 32 thousand, the Romanians - 3 thousand people, and the set goal was not achieved. The commander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, was completely at a loss and believed that the Russian army should return across the Danube. On September 13, at the military council, D. A. Milyutin insisted on a different decision - to hold on to the same positions and wait for reinforcements to arrive.
To develop a plan for further action, General E.I. Totleben, who was considered the greatest authority on issues of serf war since the time of the defense of Sevastopol, was summoned from St. Petersburg. Having ascertained the situation on the spot, Totleben came to the conclusion that Plevna should be besieged and taken by famine. In the absence of heavy artillery capable of destroying Turkish fortifications with overhead fire, launching a new assault on Plevna was clearly hopeless.
A 50,000-strong Turkish army was surrounded in the Plevna fortified camp. Provided with an abundance of cartridges and guns, the Turks had food supplies for only 21 days. It could be expected that they would try to break through the blockade ring. Therefore, Russian troops, night after night, built new and re-equipped old fortifications. In case of a breakthrough, reserves for a counterattack were prepared in advance. These preparations were very timely. When the supplies of food and fodder in Plevna were depleted, Osman Pasha's army broke through the Russian positions, but was driven back by the reserve that arrived in time. On November 28 (December 10) she capitulated. 43,338 people were taken prisoner, led by Osman Pasha.
The fall of Plevna was a major victory. Türkiye lost its best army and its only talented commander. During the war, a decisive turning point occurred, achieved, however, at the cost of the lives of tens of thousands of Russian soldiers. The monument to those killed near Plevna, erected in Moscow, reminds us of this. In Bulgaria, the day of the fall of Plevna is celebrated as a significant date in the history of the country.
Military operations in Transcaucasia. Siege and assault of Kars
Military operations in Transcaucasia also became protracted. The commander-in-chief of the Caucasian army (over 100 thousand people with 276 guns), Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, showed neither skill nor energy in carrying out his duties. More than a third of the troops were stationed in different parts of the Caucasus in case of uprisings, which Turkish emissaries tried to stir up among Muslims, and for the defense of the sea coast. For military operations, a 60,000-strong Active Caucasian Corps was created under the command of General Loris-Melikov. On the very first day of the war, he was launched on the offensive against the 70,000-strong Turkish army. At first, the advance of the Russian army was successful. On May 16, one of the detachments stormed the Ardahan fortress. Another detachment occupied Bayazet and besieged Kars. But the tsarist generals, due to poor intelligence, exaggerated the enemy’s forces and acted so slowly and indecisively that the Turkish command managed to bring up large reinforcements. The siege of Kars had to be lifted, and the Russian garrison in Bayazet was surrounded and with great effort repelled Turkish attacks, until a Russian detachment sent to the rescue broke through the encirclement and opened the way to retreat. Holding Ardahan, the Russian army went on the defensive. Turkish troops landed in Abkhazia, but were driven out from there.
Only with the arrival of strong reinforcements in October 1877 was it decided to launch a new offensive on Kars and Erzurum. A major role in its preparation was played by the new chief of staff of the Caucasian Army, General N. N. Obruchev, and the commander of one of the detachments, General A. N. Lazarev. On October 15, Russian troops attacked the Turkish army of Mukhtar Pasha at the Aladzhin Heights from three sides and defeated it. Having lost about 20 thousand people, the Turks retreated in disarray. But the subsequent attempt by Russian troops to take Erzurum by storm ended in failure. An outstanding success of the Russian army was the capture of Kars in November, which was considered an impregnable fortress. The French military agent General de Courcy, leaving the Caucasus, told the Russian commander-in-chief: “I saw the Kara forts, and the only thing I can advise is not to attack them, there is no human strength for that. Your troops are so good that they will march on these impregnable rocks, but you will put them all down and not take a single fort.” The strengths of the Kara fortress were the absence of an advantageous artillery position for the attacker, the mutual defense of the forts and a wide front of fire in front of them. The garrison of Kars numbered 30 thousand people. with 122 guns. According to the plan of Obruchev and Lazarev, Russian troops began to prepare for the assault. It was decided to carry it out at night, when the Turks had to fire at random. Local Armenian guides undertook to show the passages to the forts. On the night of November 18, with a sudden attack, Russian troops captured all the most important fortifications of Kars in a few hours. Most of the garrison (18 thousand people, including five pashas and English officers who led the defense of the fortress) were captured. The night assault on the Kara fortress was an outstanding achievement of Russian military art.
But Kars was far from the Turkish capital. His fall could not force Turkey to accept Russian peace terms. Operations in the Balkans were of decisive importance.
The final stage of the war
The fall of Plevna radically changed the military situation. An army of almost 100,000 with 394 guns was freed up for further action. Russian victories caused a new upsurge in the national liberation struggle of the Balkan peoples against the Turkish yoke. Serbia declared war on Turkey and moved its troops on the offensive. The Montenegrins occupied the port of Antivari.
The Russian army faced an even more difficult transition through the Balkans. The Chief of the German General Staff, Moltke, stated that Russian troops would not be able to cross the Balkan ridge fighting in winter conditions, and allowed Prussian military observers with the Russian army to go on vacation. Bismarck folded up a map of the Balkan Peninsula and said that he would not need it until spring. British military experts thought so too. But it was impossible to postpone the transition through the Balkans until spring. There was neither housing nor food supplies for the wintering of Russian troops in Bulgaria. In a few months, the Turkish army would have recovered from its losses, and England and Austria-Hungary could prepare to move against Russia. D. A. Milyutin insisted on an immediate transition to the offensive in order to take advantage of the frustration of the Turkish army after the fall of Plevna and prevent the intervention of the Western powers.
The Russian army at that time had 314 thousand people with 1343 guns against 183 thousand Turkish troops with 441 guns, which gave almost double superiority in strength.
On December 12, at a military council with the participation of the Tsar, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, D. A. Milyutin and other generals, it was decided to launch the main blow in the direction of Sofia and Adrianople with the right flank of the Russian army, i.e., the troops of General Gurko through the Western Balkans. The remaining troops of the Russian Danube Army were supposed to go to the Balkans through the Troyan and Shipka mountain passes.
The main forces of Gurko's 60,000-strong detachment moved through the Churyak pass on December 25. The best dressed and shod healthy soldiers were selected for the campaign. Only four guns were left in the batteries. The shells were taken out of the charging boxes and carried in their hands, tied in hoods. The guns were assigned to the companies. They were dragged along with straps. On steep mountain climbs, we took several dozen steps, placed a stone or log under the wheels and rested. On icy roads they made cuts on the ice and stones. The descent was even more difficult. On December 26, after the rain, a snowstorm broke out and frost hit. The glare of the snow and blizzard caused many people to have inflamed eyes. The clothes were frozen. The Bulgarians cleared the road, provided food and pack horses, and showed the way. The transition of General Gurko's troops through the Balkans took six days and took place day and night, often in complete darkness.
Having thrown back the advanced detachments of the Turks, Russian troops entered Sofia on January 4, 1878, where huge Turkish warehouses of food and ammunition were captured.
On the same day, another Russian detachment began crossing the Balkans under the command of General Kartsov (6 thousand people with 24 guns). This detachment moved along the steep slopes in the area of the Troyan Pass. The Turkish positions at the pass were first skillfully bypassed by a column sent forward, and as soon as it appeared in the rear of the Turkish redoubt, Russian troops from the front struck with bayonets. A skillful maneuver made it possible to overcome the difficult pass with minor losses. The task of Kartsev’s detachment was to support the passage of General Radetsky’s troops across the ridge.
Battle of Shipka - Sheinovo January 8-9, 1878
The 54,000-strong detachment of General Radetzky was located north of Shipka against the 23,000-strong army of Wesselp Pasha. The main forces of the Turks concentrated at the southern exit from the Shipka Pass in a fortified camp near the village of Sheinovo, surrounded by redoubts, trenches and artillery batteries. It was decided to bypass Sheinovo. For this purpose, General Skobelev's column of 16,500 bayonets was allocated with the task of crossing the Balkans west of Shipka. Another column of 18 thousand bayonets was supposed to move to Sheinovo through the passes located east of the Shipka positions.
The offensive began on January 5. The troops of the left column crossed the Balkans and approached the Turkish redoubts. More difficult was the passage of General Skobelev's column through the Balkans. She had to move for three kilometers along an icy, sloping cornice above the abyss, and then followed a descent with a steepness of 45°, along which the soldiers slid down on “natural sleds.” On January 8, the left column began an attack, but Skobelev’s column had not yet finished descending from the mountains and was not ready to enter the battle. The non-simultaneous actions of individual columns complicated the battle and led to unnecessary losses. On January 9, Radetzky launched a frontal attack on the Turkish fortifications, but was only able to occupy the forward trenches. The outcome of the battle was decided by the attack of Skobelev’s column. Its success was ensured by good preparation of the attack. The rifle chains moved in dashes, which took place while the lying riflemen supported those running forward with fire. Having approached the Turkish redoubts at 300 steps, the companies rose up and went on the attack. The Turkish redoubts were taken. Sheinov's garrison was completely surrounded and capitulated along with the Turkish troops entrenched on the southern slope of the Shipka Pass. In total, over 20 thousand people were captured. The path to Adrianople was open.
By mid-January 1878, an army of almost 160,000 was concentrated beyond the Balkans, twice as large as the forces of the Turks, who were retreating in disarray to Philippopolis (Plovdiv). Mass desertion reduced the Turkish troops by another 18-20 thousand people. Fleeing from the threat of encirclement, the Turks left Plovdiv without a fight. The three-day battle south of this city completely upset the remnants of the Turkish army. On January 20, Russian troops solemnly entered Adrianople without a fight, greeted with enthusiastic greetings from the Bulgarians and Greeks. The roads to the south of the city were clogged with fleeing Turkish troops. The Russian cavalry, pursuing the retreating, reached the coast of the Sea of Marmara. Large Russian forces began to concentrate near Constantinople and near the Dardanelles. The defeat of the Turkish army was complete.
During the offensive of the Russian army, the Bulgarian population everywhere armed itself and seized the lands of Turkish landowners. In Northern Bulgaria, their lands, livestock and other property had previously been transferred to the Bulgarians. The tsarist authorities saw this as a military measure, but objectively, the liquidation of Turkish feudal land ownership in Bulgaria during the Russian-Turkish War was a social revolution that cleared the way for the bourgeois development of the country.
An obviously senseless war
Although the Peace of San Stefano was not noticeably better than the Peace of Berlin, Russian society greeted it with colossal indignation. A legitimate question arises - why? The answer is simple. What society wanted from the state was not abstract independence of the Balkan Slavs, but a situation where Turkey would no longer be able to carry out massacres on the peninsula. The Russian masses of that time perfectly understood those features of the Ottoman Empire, because of which, until the very end of its existence, it calmly slaughtered Christians in large numbers. They also understood that this was its integral, immanent property.
The only way to prevent the massacre was to completely remove Porto from the Balkans. Society would be content only when Turkey was completely deprived of its possessions in Europe, as well as the straits through which it could return there.
However, this was not destined to come true. Before the war, Alexander II did not understand that the Ottoman Empire could not become a herbivore and would continue to use its traditional methods of treating Christians, regardless of the promises of the sultans. Because of this, back in the summer of 1876, during the Serbian-Turkish War, he concluded the secret Reichstadt Agreement with the Austrians. According to it, in the event of the defeat of the Turks, Austria-Hungary received Turkish Croatia, and Russia received the return of part of Bessarabia lost after the Crimean War (again, Alexander II did not want acquisitions in the Balkans). Russia agreed that the creation of a large Slavic state in the Balkans was inadmissible. In return, the Austrians promised not to interfere with the Serbs and Montenegrins taking part of their lands from the Turks.
In other words, society provoked the state to war, expecting it to resolve the issue of bullying the Balkan Slavs once and for all. But the state never thought of doing anything like that. Having concluded a secret agreement, the authorities did not even bother to hint to the public about its contents. Moreover, in San Stefano, Alexander II, who was gradually drifting towards depriving Turkey of lands in the Balkans, pretended to forget about the Reichstadt Agreement. He gave Bulgaria borders that made it an “unacceptable” large Slavic state in the Balkans. In addition, they gave her clearly non-Slavic Greek lands - only to open access to the Mediterranean Sea.
It’s difficult to say what the emperor was thinking about. It is clear that at the end of the Russian-Turkish war the Austrians recalled Reichstadt, and San Stefano had to be abandoned, otherwise Russia would have lost face. Most likely, Alexander wanted to correct his mistaken reluctance to dismantle the Ottoman Empire in its European part. It was obvious that without pacifying the Balkans, Russia would be forced to get into war over and over again to solve local problems. Actually, this is what happened in the First World War. It’s just that this did not reach Alexander II as quickly as it did to General Chernyaev and the illiterate peasants, who, according to reports from the III Division, wanted to expel the Turks from the entire Balkan Peninsula.
It’s hard to blame the king for anything. This mistake of his is generally typical of Russian rulers. And after 140 years, attempts to solve political problems rationally - without taking into account the fact that opponents are completely irrational - lead only to the accumulation of tension in the region and subsequent massacre on a large scale. The Franco-Russian Alliance of the late 19th century, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the treaties of the end of the Soviet era, the Minsk agreements and a number of other modern documents clearly show: this disease in our country is extremely chronic and systemic.
Crossing the Danube
The Lower Danube detachment was the first to take action, with the goal of diverting the attention of the Turks from the direction of the main attack. Early in the morning of June 10 (22), Russian troops began crossing the Danube at Galati and Brailov, where the Danube turns sharply to the Black Sea. At the same time, a detachment consisting of the gunboat “Grand Duke Nikolai”, the boats “Tsarevna” and “Ptichka” made a diversionary exit to the Turkish batteries. As a result, the Galati detachment (two regiments) successfully crossed the Danube, occupied Budzhak and captured the Budzhak Heights.
On this day, the main forces of Zimmerman's 11th Corps were crossing at Brailov. On June 11 (23), the boats “Tsarevich” (commander – Lieutenant Shestakov), “Ptichka” (commander – Midshipman Arkas) and “Tsarevna” (commander – Midshipman Bal) carried out reconnaissance near Machin and discovered that the city had been abandoned by the Turks. On June 13 (25), Zimmermarn’s corps occupied Galati, 14 (26) – Tulcea and Isaccia, 15 (27) – Brailov. On June 26 (July 8), Girsov was occupied by an attack from the north, after which the entire Machinsky branch came under Russian control. By the beginning of July, Russian troops occupied the entire Northern Dobruja, reaching the Cernavode-Constanza line. The Turkish Danube squadron was blocked at the mouth of the Danube - a difficult-to-reach area between the Kiliya and Sulina arms.
Fighting on the Danube in 1877. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one
On the night of June 14 to 15 (from 26 to 27) the main Russian forces began crossing the Danube at Zimnitsa opposite the city of Sistova. The first to cross the river on iron rowing pontoons was the detachment of General M.I. Dragomirov. The Turks had about 4,000 people at the crossing site and were unable to provide serious resistance - all their forces were diverted to other areas and the defense of fortresses. A Turkish ship (according to some sources, the armored corvette Khivz-ur Rahman) came out from Nikopol to the crossing, but the demonstration of an attack by the boats Peter the Great, Experience and General Admiral forced it to turn back.
By the end of June 15 (27), 30,000 people had already been transported to the southern bank of the Danube. Construction of a pontoon bridge across Ada Island began and was completed in three days. Two weeks later, all four Russian corps were already on the Bulgarian coast.
Crossing of Russian troops across the Danube at Zimnitsa and its support. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one
On the night of 16 to 17 (28 to 29) June, the barrier at Parapan on the main fairway of the Danube was reinforced with another 25 mines, placed in a checkerboard pattern. Now the Turkish ships had no chance of breaking through from Ruschuk up the Danube. On June 18 (30), a team of guards sappers from rowboats set up a barrage of 42 galvanic mines in three lines near Vardin Island, and on June 19 (July 1) the barrage at Flamunda was reinforced by laying new mines from boats. During these days, the Russian flotilla suffered its first setback: on June 17 (29), near Turnu Severin, the steamer Ada was overtaken by a Turkish monitor and scuttled by its crew to avoid capture.
On June 23 (July 5) Byala was taken, and two days later - Tarnovo. On July 2 (14), Russian troops reached the Khankioi Pass, and on July 5 (17) they occupied the Shipka Pass. The corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener began the siege of the Nikopol fortress - on the morning of July 3 (15), Russian troops began bombing, and in the afternoon they occupied several redoubts covering the fortress. The assault was scheduled for the next day, but never began - early in the morning of July 4 (16), the Turkish garrison threw out a white flag. On the same day, on the Osma River near Nikopol, the river gunboats Podgorica and Iskodra, partially damaged by field artillery, with their boilers disabled, were discovered. The gunboats were repaired, included in the Russian Danube Flotilla and renamed Nikopol and Sistovo.
Turkish river armored gunboat "Feth-ul-Islam". Iskodra and Podgorica belonged to the same type. Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2011, No. 2
We counted and shed a tear
The war of 1877–1878, despite a number of mistakes and delays, was won by the Russian army quickly (faster than any other in the 19th century) and with small losses, sharply inferior to the losses of the enemy. It did not show any “backwardness” of tsarism compared to the most advanced powers. The ratio of Russian and Turkish casualties was much better than that of the British and spear-wielding Zulu at the Battle of Isandlwana in 1879.
However, valor on the battlefield had limited meaning. The agreements concluded before the war imposed obligations on Russia under which it could not end the war in a reasonable way. As a result, the Balkan states were granted independence, but with chaotically cut borders and an unresolved Turkish presence on the European continent. This naturally led to many wars, the subsequent involvement of Russia in the conflict with Austria-Hungary and the First World War. What can I say? You should remember about mistakes, otherwise you will have to repeat them all the time.
Reaction of major European powers to the successes of Russian troops
England expressed its dissatisfaction most of all, which already at the end of January sent a fleet into the Sea of Marmara, threatening an attack in the event of a Russian invasion of Istanbul. England demanded that Russian troops be withdrawn from the Turkish capital, and also begin to develop a new treaty. Russia found itself in a difficult situation, which threatened to repeat the scenario of 1853-1856, when the entry of European troops violated Russia's advantage, which led to defeat. Taking this into account, Alexander 2 agreed to revise the treaty.
On February 19, 1878, in a suburb of Istanbul, San Stefano, a new treaty was signed with the participation of England.
