BR-18 - special power howitzer 305 mm model 1939

The 12″/35 naval gun
is a 305 mm gun of the German concern Krupp, developed and produced by order of the Russian Imperial Navy and put into service in 1886. Since 1891, it was produced by the Obukhov plant and installed on squadron battleships. The following ships were armed with it: “Chesma”, “George the Victorious”, “Navarin”[1]. The guns were used in the Russo-Japanese War.

305-mm gun of the Obukhov plant, model 1895

Main battery gun of the battleship "Andrei Pervozvanny"
Classification

Main caliber gun Type

Production history

Operation history

Weapon characteristics

Characteristics of projectiles

The 305 mm gun of the Obukhov plant, model 1895, is a 305 mm (12 inch) naval gun with a barrel length of 40 calibers. It was designed and produced for the needs of the Russian Imperial Navy at the Obukhov Steel Plant. It became the first gun in the Russian fleet designed to use smokeless powder charges, and also equipped with a piston breech. These guns formed the basis of the armament of most Russian squadron battleships of the Russian-Japanese and First World Wars.

A real “Tsar Cannon”: 305 mm railway artillery system TM-3-12

The Tsar Cannon, which is one of the symbols of the Moscow Kremlin, is familiar to many as one of the iconic landmarks of the Russian capital. However, this bombard did not have to take part in hostilities, although, as it turned out during research, it was still fired at least once. One way or another, this is more of a monument that attracts tourists and has decorative value. But this does not mean that artillery systems were not created in our country, which could not only be proudly called “Tsar Cannons,” but were also widely used in combat operations. TM-3-12 can easily be classified as such systems. TM-3-12 is quite easy to decipher: marine transporter, type 3, 12-inch caliber. We are talking about a 305-mm railway artillery gun of the 1938 model. This railway super-heavy artillery system was equipped with some parts and mechanisms removed from the turrets of the battleship Empress Maria, which sank on October 20, 1916 under still unclear circumstances. It is only known that a powder magazine exploded on the ship, but what caused it could not be established. There is a widespread misconception that the guns for this artillery system were taken from the same sunken battleship, but this is not the case. The guns for creating this artillery mount were borrowed from old pre-revolutionary stocks, which were intended for unfinished battle cruisers of the Izmail type. This is exactly the information that the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, located in Moscow, has. It is worth noting that all three built TM-3-12 installations have survived to this day. One of them is located in the above-mentioned museum on Poklonnaya Gora, the second is in the Museum of Railway Equipment named after V.V. Chubarov at the former Warsaw Station in St. Petersburg, the third is located on the territory of the Krasnaya Gorka fort in the Leningrad region.

In total, three such super-heavy railway artillery systems were produced in the USSR, which were consolidated into the 9th separate railway artillery division. The division consisted of 5 separate echelons, three of which were combat, which included the TM-3-12 artillery transporters themselves, one echelon was equipped with air defense systems, and another was a mobile base. As part of the division, these installations took part in the Soviet-Finnish, as well as the Second World War. To transport and maintain a division of three TM-3-12 units, 110 units of rolling stock and 459 personnel were needed.

In October 1930, the Central Design Bureau of Shipbuilding (TsKBS-3) was formed at the LMZ - Leningrad Metal Plant, which, under the leadership of A. G. Dukelsky, began developing a series of railway transporters designed to accommodate large-caliber coastal defense guns. As part of this work, the TM-1-14, TM-2-12 and TM-3-12 installations were created. The design of the TM-3-12 railway artillery mount began in 1935 by the same design team, which at that time changed its name to TsKB-19. The final design of the transporter was ready in May 1936. The production of the units was established in the city of Nikolaev at the Marti plant. Their production was delayed for a number of objective reasons: the first installation was ready on July 1, 1938, the second on December 1, 1938, the third and last of the installations was ready on January 1, 1939.

From July 21 to July 23, 1938, the first installation was tested at NIMAP. At the same time, shortcomings in its electrical circuit were discovered and identified. In the next two installations, this drawback was eliminated; in addition, in order to facilitate the design of the conveyors, a number of parts were made of duralumin instead of steel. In January 1939, all installations passed the second stage of testing, after which their preparation for military trials began. From August 20 to August 30, 1939, all three TM-3-12 railway transporters underwent field tests, except for firing tests. By February 7, 1940, the installations were tested by firing at the Rzhev test site, after which they were officially accepted into service. According to other sources, they left for Leningrad already in January 1940.

The TM-3-12 railway super-heavy artillery system managed to take part in the Soviet-Finnish War. These artillery installations were used to bombard the powerful defenses of the Mannerheim Line, and also shelled Vyborg. The fire was fired from the Sestroretsk-Beloostrov circular railway line, well known to residents of St. Petersburg, which was put into operation in 1896. This branch was ideally suited for the operation of these artillery systems. After the end of the war, the installations were transported to the Hanko Peninsula, which the USSR received from Finland on a 30-year lease under the terms of the peace agreement. The first foreign naval base for the Soviet Union was created here.

It was here that the installations met the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. With their artillery fire, the 305-mm railway installations suppressed Finnish firing points located on nearby islands, and also did not allow Finnish Navy warships to conduct targeted fire on the Hanko Peninsula. During the defensive battles (the defense of Hanko lasted from June 22 to December 2, 1941), they fired 108 shots at the enemy, expending approximately 570 shells (according to other sources - 625). It was not possible to evacuate these bulky installations from the peninsula during the war, so before the evacuation of the base they were partially dismantled, and partially destroyed by personnel by organizing explosions.

Despite this, between June 1942 and July 1943, the Finnish repair team managed to restore the TM-3-12 transporters and return them to service. After Finland left the war under the terms of the truce, all its trophies that were captured from the Soviet Union were subject to immediate return. In January 1945, the USSR received back three TM-3-12 transporters in combat-ready condition. These 305-mm railway artillery installations became part of the 1st Guards Naval Railway Krasnoselskaya Red Banner Artillery Brigade. They remained in service until 1961, after which they were sent for conservation.

In its design, the TM-3-12 transporter was a further development of railway artillery installations previously developed by TsKBS-3 specialists, we are talking about TM-1-14 (356 mm) and TM-2-12 (305 mm). It was decided to use the TM-2-12 transporter as a prototype, but the 12-inch gun intended for installation on the TM-3-12 had a significantly longer length (52 calibers instead of 40 calibers for the TM-2-12 gun). To ensure the maximum elevation angle of 50 degrees specified in the technical specifications, the developers had to include a mechanism for lifting the gun machine into the firing position in the design of the new conveyor. At the same time, Soviet designers took into account the rather negative experience of using the electromechanical drive for lifting the machine, implemented on the TM-1-14 railway artillery mount, this time using a hydraulic drive. In addition to increasing the reliability of the machine’s lifting mechanism, this step made it possible to reduce the time required to complete this operation from 15.4 to 8.5 minutes.

The scheme for supplying half-charges and projectiles to the gun was also newly developed. First of all, a projectile trolley was introduced into the cellar car, which rolled along the rails in the aisle between the racks. The cart, loaded with a shell, rolled out onto the front platform of the cellar car. Half-charges were fed to the front platform of the car via roller tables, after which they were manually loaded into the carriage. Lifting the cokor using cranes was not entirely convenient in terms of time and camouflage. For this reason, in the design of the TM-3-12 conveyor, the length of the charging trolley was increased, equipped with a winch necessary for lifting the cocor; this winch replaced the cranes. But they decided to keep the cranes, since they were used to install support legs. The charging platform had another winch and a trolley for horizontal movement of the cocor. It is worth noting that the TM-3-12 was the first conveyor where the dispensing process became fully automatic. So, only the projectile was sent pneumatically to the TM-1-14, and half-charges were sent manually. On the TM-2-12 installation, both the projectile and half-charges were thrown, but the latter simply did not reach their place in the gun chamber, so the final delivery was still carried out manually. And only in TM-3-12 the loading was completely automatic and was carried out by throwing the charging table. This had a positive effect on the rate of fire of the installation: one shot for the TM-1-14 took approximately 40 seconds, for the TM-2-12 - 35 seconds, for the TM-3-12 - 30 seconds, which made it possible to fire up to two shots per minute.

Even before the arrival of the TM-3-12 installations near Leningrad in January 1940, the construction of turning platforms for all-round firing and railway approaches to them was underway near the city in the strictest secrecy. The main method of firing for heavy Soviet railway artillery installations was firing from the base, which was a concrete mass with dimensions of 16x16x3 meters on an iron frame. The conveyor, on rails that were embedded in concrete, drove onto such a base. After this, a support cylinder was lowered from the conveyor and bolted to the concrete base. Then the carts rolled out from under the conveyor, and it rested only on the transportable base (the same cylinder), as well as two rear rollers. The construction of such a structure usually took several weeks. At the same time, the installation was transformed from a railway one into a regular coastal one and gained the ability to conduct all-round fire, which was especially important when firing at moving targets.

The artillery mount also had an additional method of firing - directly from the wheels. Since the horizontal pointing angle of a 305-mm gun on a railway mount did not exceed 5 degrees, firing was usually carried out from specially built railway branches, which were called “whiskers”. The radius of curvature of these whiskers was 500 meters. In order to change the horizontal pointing angle of the gun by 10 degrees, the TM-3-12 transporter had to drive along the branch several tens of meters forward or backward.

The ammunition of the artillery mount included both old armor-piercing and high-explosive shells of the 1911 model, weighing 470 kg, and newer ammunition. The new ammunition, which was put into service in 1928, included a high-explosive long-range projectile weighing 314 kg. The same projectile was used for firing from TM-2-12 artillery mounts. However, in this case, thanks to the significantly longer length of the gun barrel, the initial velocity of the projectile increased to 950 m/s (versus 823.5 m/s for the TM-2-12), which made it possible to confidently hit targets located at a distance of 29,632 meters .

Performance characteristics of TM-3-12:

Overall dimensions: length - 33.9 m, width - 2.9 m, height - 4.8 m. Weight in stowed position - 340 tons. Caliber - 305 mm. Barrel length - 52 caliber, 15.85 m. Barrel life - 400 shots. Rate of fire - 1.8-2 rounds/min. Maximum elevation angle of the gun, degrees. — +50°. Declination angle, degrees. — -2.5°. Horizontal guidance angle, degrees. — 5°. The mass of a high-explosive projectile is 314 kg. The initial projectile speed is 950 m/s. The maximum firing range is 29,632 m.

Sources of information: https://zonwar.ru/artileru/rail_guns/305-mm_tm3-12.html https://www.museum.ru/C8379 https://northern-line.rf/2014/09/26/superheavy -railroad-artill https://www.popmech.ru/design/45843-tsar-pushka-2-sukhoputnyy-linkor

Background to the development of the weapon

Cannon workshop OSZ

The end of the 19th century was a time of rapid development of both ship artillery systems and new types of armor. This was the period of the classic “competition between armor and projectile.” The most intense rivalry between the leading countries was in the development and production of guns of the main calibers. The leading Russian enterprise for the production of large-caliber guns at that time was the Obukhov Steel Plant (OSZ). From 1867 to 1895, the plant designed and put into production four types of 12-inch guns, the most advanced of which was the 40-caliber gun of the 1895 model.

This became possible thanks to two main solutions that were implemented in the 80s of the 19th century. Firstly, a major reconstruction of the plant was carried out and its capacity was increased. Among other things, a 50-ton hammer was installed, a hydraulic press was equipped for crimping gun blanks, a workshop for annealing guns appeared, the first open-hearth furnaces were installed, and much more.

Secondly, the Obukhov plant completely comes under the jurisdiction of the Naval Ministry (By Decree of Emperor Alexander III, the plant was transferred to the treasury on February 1, 1885), increasingly focusing on military orders, but at the same time, maintaining the commercial basis of its activities. To guide this work, a special commission is being created from representatives of the naval and military departments.

Through the eyes of front-line soldiers: 122-mm howitzer M-30

For a long time, in service with the Red Army, 122-mm field howitzers were represented by artillery systems of the “tsarist regime”, that is, guns and “Schneider”. Despite the modernization, by the 1930s these guns were already considered obsolete, and the leadership of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army set the task of creating a new divisional howitzer. This was not the first attempt that was successful, but still in 1938, developed under the leadership of F. F. Petrov in the design bureau of the Motovilikha plant, the howitzer entered its first tests, the following year it was put into service, and in 1940 its mass production began. How did his calculations evaluate the new weapon?

A good choice and its disadvantages

The standard, and even more so, the actual number of 122-mm howitzers in the spacecraft rifle division, depending on the losses of materiel and production, changed throughout the Great Patriotic War. By June 22, there were 32 of them; after losses at the beginning of the war, the number of 122-mm howitzers was reduced to 8, and 152-mm guns were generally removed from the divisional level and discontinued. Thus, it was the 122-mm M-30 howitzers that became the largest-caliber guns of the Soviet divisional artillery and remained so until the victorious May 1945.

Battery of M-30 howitzers on the streets of Berlin

We can confidently say: this happened precisely because the created F.F. Petrov's howitzer turned out to be a very successful artillery system. Both during the war and during surveys conducted after the victory, the majority of front-line soldiers noted its high combat and operational qualities. Many reports that were written indicated that the M-30 is one of the best examples of artillery pieces.

In particular, it was stated that the system gives very little dispersion even when firing at the maximum distance - problems began only when the barrel was heavily worn or when firing abnormal shots from a 122-mm howitzer of the 1910/1930 model. The good destructive power of the 122-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile was also noted. In this sense, the pre-war decision of the leadership of the GAU KA to choose a 122-mm caliber divisional howitzer, rather than switch to smaller artillery systems, even if they promised greater mobility, turned out to be completely justified.

The documents separately indicated that shells manufactured in wartime and filled “not with TNT, but with other explosives”

gave the worst effect when firing high-explosive and delayed action.
In addition, based on war experience, they were asked to add shrapnel to the ammunition load and increase the number of fragmentation-smoke shells, since “the need for the latter in battle was greater than the supply
. The artillerymen also wanted to have an incendiary 122-mm projectile.

However, with all the praise for the 122-mm howitzer, the artillerymen who drove it from Brest to Moscow and back to Berlin, often manually, also found a lot of words about the shortcomings of the system. A significant part of the comments related to mechanized traction and the consequences of switching to it from horse-drawn traction.

The appearance of powerful Lend-Lease trucks in the USSR significantly increased the capabilities of Soviet artillery. The documents specifically stated:

“As a means of traction for a howitzer, auto tractors have fully justified themselves, in particular, the Studebaker vehicle, which has a large load capacity (provides lifting of one ammunition load), maneuverability and speed ...
The best type of traction for this system is the American Studebaker tractor vehicle.” .

For this reason, they even suggested removing the charging boxes, since the transported supply of shells was still in the back of the truck.

The crew of an M-30 howitzer fires at enemy positions on the street of Budapest

However, to fully realize the capabilities of overseas technology, Soviet howitzers clearly needed modifications to the wheels and suspension mechanism - at high speeds, the springs failed, and the rubber of the wheel slopes flew off. Also, the springs often broke when trying to transport the howitzer over uneven terrain. In addition, even when the spring did not break, but simply sagged, the pin of the suspension mechanism got stuck in the hole of the combat axle, after which it was extremely difficult to get in and out. In another report, the list of failures during the transport of guns included frame rods, limber bearings, Belleville springs under the upper machine, limber booms and wheel brakes. In addition, it was also noted that when the frames are extended, the stoppers do not turn on automatically as they should, and the tie screw for the “travelling” fastening delays the extension of the frames.

To correct these shortcomings, it was proposed to increase the quality of the spring material or at least the number of sheets, as well as to replace hydraulic shock absorbers “like those used in imported cars.”

. It was recommended to replace the front end bearings with bearings from the ZiS-3 gun.

A smoke break on a howitzer stand on the street of defeated Berlin

There were also complaints about malfunctions that occurred during shooting. Some of them clearly related to the peculiarities of wartime production. For example, it has been noted that replacement packings and collars are of very poor quality, resulting in large fluid leaks. The inertia fuse leaf springs often broke. During shooting, a fluid leak was observed through the rear cover of the recoil brake cylinder. Cracks appeared at the trunk part of the frame at the welding points.

Some of the comments can be attributed directly to design flaws.

“A weak recoil brake spring and an imperfect design of the floating piston of the compensators lead to the fact that the piston, having moved away from the normal position due to the heating of the liquid, does not return when it cools. The extractor sockets quickly wear out, as a result of which automatic extraction of the cartridge case does not occur, which delays the production of the next shot ...
Too often the open part of the bronze womb of the rotary mechanism becomes dirty. It is necessary to install some kind of safety casing.”

Extraction problems were also mentioned when discussing the cases. If there were no questions about brass sleeves, then the iron sleeve quickly rusted, began to leak moisture and, as

.

The crew of the M-30 howitzer fights on the streets of Vienna

One of the reports noted the insufficient thickness of the shield protecting the crew from fragments.

The question of the need to introduce a muzzle brake for the gun turned out to be quite difficult. Some were in favor, hoping for less wear on howitzer parts. In other reports, on the contrary, it was believed that the gun did not need this part, since it would greatly unmask the position when firing, increase the impact on the crew, and so on.

Problems often arose not only due to the imperfection of guns and shells, but also, on the contrary, due to their high performance characteristics, unsuccessfully combined with low training of personnel. For example, in 1942, at the front, 122-mm howitzers of the 1938 model became more frequently exposed to shell explosions. An investigation conducted by the GAU revealed that this occurs when using GVMZ fuses (instant and delayed action head fuse), with explosions occurring at the moment the head of the grenade exits or when it encounters a foreign object in the barrel bore. Often the fuse was triggered by camouflage branches; in the 837th howitzer artillery regiment of the Volkhov Front and the 89th artillery regiment of the Southwestern Front, muzzle covers were not removed from the guns before firing, etc. At the same time, the GAU instructions especially emphasized that “of all the fuses in service, the GVMZ fuse is the most sensitive”

, and the troops were required to thoroughly clear the shot trajectory of markings.

Position of the M-30 howitzer near Budapest

However, complaints that the GVMZ fuse was dangerous to handle and transport due to a broken membrane still continued to be received.

Anti-tank 122 mm

To conclude the story about the 122-mm M-30 howitzer, it is necessary to say about the use of this weapon as an anti-tank gun. In general, the idea of ​​​​using a 122-mm howitzer for the needs of anti-tank defense, although it was practiced throughout the war, the effectiveness of the weapon with separate loading and aiming, as well as a low initial projectile velocity, raised reasonable doubts among the personnel: “The possibility of a second shot in case of a miss.” is almost completely excluded, because the tank has greater maneuverability and rate of fire than this weapon"

.

It is interesting that in one report it was written: “The direct shot of this system against royal-type tanks is not satisfactory (small direct shot, low initial speed) .

Judging by the red pencil highlighting in the text, this remark aroused the keen interest of the inspection officer from the GAU. Considering that the document was drawn up in the 4th Artillery Breakthrough Corps of the RGK, perhaps he was interested in when exactly the crews of the 122-mm howitzers of this formation could gain experience in fighting “royal-type” tanks.

The crew of the M-30 howitzer fires at the enemy on the approaches to Vienna

However, “cases in war are different,” and the power of the 122-mm projectile was quite enough to cause problems for any German tank during the initial period of the war. In the second half of the war, howitzers received an even more effective weapon - cumulative shells. However, by this time the Red Army also had enough specialized anti-tank systems, so few were able to use these shells against armored vehicles. But many reports recorded “good action on buildings”

.

The author found the most complete report on the use of 122-mm cumulative shells against tanks in the report of the 77th howitzer artillery brigade. On August 30, 1944, the 305th Howitzer Artillery Regiment fought with German tanks. On October 4 of the same year, at the Narev bridgehead, the role of anti-tank forces fell to the crews of the 229th Guards Howitzer Artillery Regiment, which reported 11 destroyed enemy tanks.

The brigade headquarters report stated that the best firing range for “armor-piercing” shells was 400–600 meters. At the same time, at a range of over 600 meters, the frontal and turret armor of the Tigers did not penetrate, since the shells ricocheted. However, it was stipulated that if it hits the turret, it jams and the tank loses its combat effectiveness. The Tiger's side armor was hit by shells at a distance of up to 800 meters, and from 1000 to 1200 meters it was allowed to shoot at tracks and weapons. But the 122-mm cumulative projectile penetrated the armor of a medium tank at a distance of up to 800–900 meters, and about armored personnel carriers in the report they wrote this: “Fails when fired at any range.”

.

The crew of the M-30 howitzer prepares the weapon for battle

However, in the collection of tasks for inventors and innovators for 1945, there was a desire to develop a new fuse for 76-mm and 122-mm cumulative projectiles, with greater sensitivity - for trouble-free operation when encountering any ground.

The overall result of surveys of artillerymen regarding the 122-mm M-30 howitzer was quite clear: “This system must be left in service with the artillery of the Red Army, because it justified itself with its fighting qualities during the Patriotic War"

.

Design and testing

Drawing of 12″/35 and 12″/40 naval guns

The created commission takes part not only in the development of the technical base of the plant, but also has as its task the management of the development of new types of weapons. In the early 1890s, a decision was made to increase the range and accuracy of fire by increasing the initial velocity of the projectile. According to the MTK magazine dated October 18, 1891, the Obukhov plant receives the task of designing a 12″/40 gun. Beginning in 1892, the plant designed a gun of this length and began building a prototype.

Successful firing tests of the first gun were carried out at the Okhtinsky training ground in March 1895. The created naval cannon became a weapon of a new generation. It was the first Russian 12-inch with a piston bolt, without trunnions and designed for smokeless powder charges.

Ammunition 12″/35 naval gun[ | ]

The ammunition load of 12″/35 naval guns consisted of light and heavy shells. Light shells weighed 331.7 kg and had a length of 2.6-2.8 calibers. Heavy shells weighed 455 kg and had a length of 4.2 calibers. At the same time, armor-piercing shells of both types were made of steel, high-explosive shells were made of ordinary cast iron. The shells were initially filled with black powder, but by the end of the 19th century they switched to pyroxylin. The heavy high-explosive projectile contained 24.5 kg [1].

For heavy projectiles, a charge of 147.4 kg of brown powder was adopted. It provided the projectile with an initial speed of 610 m/s. For light projectiles, a charge of brown powder weighing 153-155 kg was used and provided an initial speed of 637 m/s. Firing range at an elevation angle of +6° - 6039 m, at an angle of +15° - 10614 m. Since fighting at that time was supposed to be at short and medium distances, firing tables were compiled only up to 7320 m. At the beginning of the 20th century, guns were adopted a charge of smokeless powder weighing 68.8 kg, the ballistic characteristics remained the same [1]. At a distance of 1852 m, a light armor-piercing projectile could penetrate 280 mm thick iron armor [3].

Production

Tool production

Tests at the Okhtinsky test site

Assembly of the Petropavlovsk electronic tower

The main caliber of the "Tsesarevich" EB

The gun was produced at the Obukhov Steel Plant in two stages over 22 years from 1895 to 1916. During this time, 88 barrels were fired. In the period before the end of the Russian-Japanese War (1895-1906), 68 guns were produced. With the beginning of the First World War, the Obukhov plant produced another 20 12″/40 naval guns to replace the worn ones (1915-1916). A further 11 units were ordered and manufactured in the UK by Vickers.

Production of tower units

All guns were installed in two-gun turrets, one on the forecastle and one on the stern of the ship. Of the 17 squadron battleships (EB), only one, the Tsesarevich, received foreign-made turrets. Most of the rest were produced at the St. Petersburg Metal Plant. The greatest difference in the design of the towers was allowed for the Black Sea battleships. On them, the elevation angles of the guns of the main caliber towers reached 35°, which was supposed to facilitate the bombardment of the Bosphorus fortifications.

MZ* - Metal Plant, OSMLZ** - Society of Shipbuilding, Mechanical and Foundry Plants (Nikolaev), OSZ*** - Obukhov Steel Foundry

Heavy naval artillery systems of Russia and Germany during the First World War: working on mistakes

This material is a work on mistakes and corrects inaccuracies that I made in the article “Russian and German large-caliber naval guns of the First World War”, and also provides additional information that I did not have at the time of its writing.
In the very first lines, let me express my deep gratitude to the respected Undecim - a person whose comments are often more informative than the articles under which they are written, and without whose help this article would not have seen the light. I would also like to thank the respected Macsen_Wledig, whose comments and materials allowed me to clarify a number of issues that were unclear to me. I also thank all the other commentators who offered constructive criticism of the article.

About the Russian 305 mm/52 gun

Unfortunately, my earlier calculations of the armor penetration of our famous twelve-inch gun turned out to be somewhat overestimated.
This is connected with this. For the calculations, I took, without further ado, the data ubiquitous in sources about the maximum firing range of the guns of Russian dreadnoughts at 132 cable lengths (kbt) at an elevation angle of 25 degrees. These data were fully confirmed by information provided by one of the largest domestic experts in the field of naval artillery of his time, professor of the Red Army Naval Academy L. G. Goncharov in his monograph “Course of Naval Tactics. Artillery and armor." This work provides data with reference to the “Basic Firing Tables”, compiled on the basis of real range shooting, that at an elevation angle of 24 degrees 45 minutes. (24.75 degrees) firing range was 130 kbt.

Accordingly, I made ballistic calculations based on the firing range of the Russian gun at 132 kbt * 185.2 m = 24,446 m.

Alas, this was my mistake.

The thing is that I used the so-called international cables for the calculation (1/10 of a nautical mile, that is, 185.2 m). While the artillery one should have been used, equal to 182.88 m. With the specified amendment, based on the data of L.G. Goncharov, the estimated firing range at a maximum elevation angle of 25 degrees will be 130.68 artillery cables or 23,898 m.

It must be said that there are other data that give an even shorter firing range of the Obukhov twelve-inch gun. The source is more than reliable:

According to the source, at an elevation angle of 25 degrees, the 305 mm/52 gun fired at only 127 kbt or 23,228 m, which is significantly lower than the values ​​​​indicated by L. G. Goncharov.

But I still use the data of L. G. Goncharov for further calculations, and here’s why.

His work was written in 1932. The “basic shooting tables” from which he took data were obviously compiled even earlier. At the same time, the document showing 127 kbt was compiled on the basis of shootings in 1938. By this time, the guns should have already had some wear and tear; perhaps the composition of the gunpowder had changed, or there could have been other reasons, as a result of which the firing range decreased somewhat by the end of the 30s. We are interested in the capabilities of the Russian 305-mm/52 gun during the First World War, and not at all on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

It also became possible to clarify some points regarding the shells for our 305 mm/52 gun. High-explosive and armor-piercing projectiles mod. 1911, having the same mass of 470.9 kg. Moreover, the explosive content in the armor-piercing projectile was 12.8 kg, and not 12.96 kg, as I indicated earlier. There were no semi-armor-piercing shells. But there were two types of high-explosive shells: one (drawing No. 254) had 61.5 kg of explosives, the second (drawing No. 45108) had 58.8 kg. It is interesting that the “Album of Naval Artillery Shells,” from which this data was taken, also reports the presence of 305-mm high-explosive shells of American and Japanese (!) manufacture. Their weight is also 470.9 kg, and their explosive content is 41.3 and 45.9 kg, respectively.

About German 283 mm/45 and 283 mm/50 guns

The Germans themselves measured the caliber of their guns in centimeters in their documents.
And these guns were designated by them as “28 cm”. Nevertheless, sources often indicate 279 mm, 280 mm and 283 mm. Not knowing which option was correct, I took 279 mm for my calculations, since a reduced caliber with the same projectile mass and velocity on the armor maximizes armor penetration, and I did not want to “play along” with Russian armor. Nevertheless, 283 mm is correct. Further. The bulk of sources indicate that a 283-mm/45 gun, when firing a 302 kg projectile with an initial speed of 850–855 m/s (here the data in the sources differ slightly) with an elevation angle of 20 degrees, had a range of 18,900 m. It is these data that I took it for calculations. At the same time, for a 283-mm/50 gun when firing the same projectile, the maximum firing range is usually indicated as 18,100 m at an elevation angle of 13.5 degrees.

It is quite obvious that the flight range of a projectile, all other things being equal (elevation angle, initial speed, mass, etc.) can vary depending on the shape of the projectile, its aerodynamic quality, if you like. This aerodynamic quality is taken into account by the ballistic calculator in the form of a special shape coefficient - the higher it is, the worse the projectile flies. And it is quite obvious that the projectile will always have the same shape coefficient, no matter what weapon it is fired from. Simply because the shape factor is a derivative solely of the shape of the projectile. And it, naturally, remains unchanged, even if you launch it with a slingshot.

However, according to the calculations I made earlier, a 302 kg projectile when fired from a 283 mm/45 gun had a shape coefficient of 0.8977. And when firing from a 283 mm/50 gun - 0.707. I noted this oddity in a previous article. But I was unable to find out the reasons for such a significant discrepancy. Now, thanks to the help provided to me, I seem to have managed to figure it out.

As is known, the latest series of German battleships armed with 283 mm/40 guns were equipped with shells weighing 240 kg. According to many sources, with the start of the construction of dreadnoughts and the transition to a more powerful 283-mm/45 gun, the Germans also created a more powerful projectile for them, whose weight reached 302 kg.

However (according to data provided by the respected Undecim) between 240 kg and 302 kg projectiles there was still a certain “intermediate” 283-mm projectile.

Its mass was 285 kg, the explosive content in the armor-piercing one was 8.55 kg (3%), and in the semi-armor-piercing one (or high-explosive, it is not clear what the Germans called it) - 18.33 kg (6.43%). Such shells were received by the Nassau-class dreadnoughts and the battlecruisers Von der Tann, Moltke and Goeben. They were fired at an initial speed of 880 m/s from 283 mm/45 guns and 905 m/s from 283 mm/50 guns. And it was these shells, when fired at an elevation angle of 20 degrees, that flew to a distance of 18,900 m. The aerodynamic quality of these shells left much to be desired - their shape coefficient was 0.8849.

This is probably why the Germans switched to 302 kg shells. They were significantly longer - 3.3 calibers for armor-piercing and 3.57 for semi-armor-piercing shells versus 2.9 and 3.21 for 285 kg shells, respectively. They were also, so to speak, more “sharp-nosed” - the radius of the ogive part of the 302 kg shells was 4 versus 3 for the 285 kg shells. Thanks to this, the aerodynamic quality of 302 kg projectiles has significantly improved.

Thus, the error in the sources is easily explained - without information about the existence of 285 kg of shells, but knowing that the maximum firing range of a 283 mm/45 gun at an elevation angle of 20 degrees was 18,900 m, the authors came to the obvious, but, alas , an erroneous decision - they fired a 302 kg projectile. In fact, when firing 302 kg with an elevation angle of 20 degrees and an initial speed of 855 m/s, it covered not 18,900, but 21,000 m, which corresponds to a form factor of 0.7261. The same projectile, fired from a 283 mm/50 gun with an initial speed of 880 m/s at an angle of 16 degrees, covered 19,500 m, which corresponds to a form factor of 0.7196. As you can see, the difference is already insignificant. And it can be explained by measurement and calculation errors.

There is speculation that the new 302 kg projectile is the old 285 kg projectile, which was put on a different ballistic cap. But this is somewhat doubtful. The fact is that, according to the data I received, there were 2 types of armor-piercing 302 kg shells. Moreover, the mass of explosives in one of them was 7.79 kg of explosives (2.58%), and in the other – even 10.6 kg (3.51%). At the same time, the semi-armor-piercing (high-explosive?) 302 kg German projectile had 20.6 kg of explosives (6.82%). Thus, the 285 kg and 302 kg shells differed not only in mass and shape, but also in the explosive content in the shell, which does not allow us to talk about them as the same ammunition.

When did the transition from 285 kg projectile to 302 kg occur?

Alas, I cannot answer this question accurately. Presumably, no later than 1915. But it is possible that this happened even earlier. It may well be before the start of the First World War. Probably 285 kg of shells were unloaded from fleet ships and handed over to coastal artillery.

In order not to multiply entities beyond what is necessary, in my calculations I will not take into account 285 kg shells at all. And I will take the shape coefficient of a 302 kg projectile as the best calculated, that is, 0.7196.

About the German 305 mm/50 gun

To calculate the armor penetration of this, in every respect, outstanding German artillery system, I took the data of G. Staff - the firing range of a projectile weighing 405 kg is 19,100 m at an elevation angle of 13.5 degrees and an initial speed of 875 m/s. The shape coefficient of the projectile turned out to be 0.7009.

German 305 mm shell.
Photo source: wargaming.net However, such figures aroused criticism from readers who pointed out that in most sources the initial velocity of projectiles for this weapon is only 855 m/s.

Frankly, the figure of 875 m/s raised some doubts in my mind. But I accepted it for two reasons. Firstly, G. Staff is a respected author specializing in the German navy of the First World War. Secondly, I would not like to artificially reduce the power of German guns.

However, apparently, this approach of mine turned out to be wrong. And the following data should be used for calculations - a range of 20,400 m at an elevation angle of 16 degrees with an initial speed of 405 kg projectile of 855 m/s. In this case, the projectile shape coefficient is almost equal to what I calculated earlier and is exactly 0.7. Most likely, as one of the respected readers said, the initial speed of 875 m/s was actually achieved somewhere in testing, but “in everyday life” a smaller powder charge was used.

Taking into account all of the above, as well as the fact that, based on the results of analyzing the results of tests of Russian and German armor, I came to the conclusion that they are approximately identical (the “K” coefficient of Russian and German armor turned out to be equal to 2005), I present to you, dear readers , an updated calculation of impact angles, shell velocities on armor and armor penetration for heavy Russian and German naval guns from the First World War era.

At the same time, in order to summarize in one article all the necessary data for further calculations, I provide information about the ballistics of the guns used to calculate the above data and the shells for their guns:

conclusions

The changes made led to significant changes in the armor penetration of guns relative to those calculated earlier.
The German 283-mm/45 artillery system no longer looks like a “whipping boy” - its calculated armor penetration has increased significantly. And it is only 10–12 mm inferior to the more advanced 283 mm/50 gun. But the armor penetration of the domestic twelve-inch and German 283 mm/50 and 305 mm/50 guns has decreased slightly. The “aerodynamic quality” turned out to be, as expected, the best for the 380 mm/50 gun shells. As for 305-mm ammunition, it is almost the same for Russian and German shells, with minimal superiority of Russian (the difference is in thousandths). The 283-mm shells were the outsiders, but their lag was relatively small.

Alas, lowering the initial velocity of the 405 kg German twelve-inch projectile from 875 m/s to 855 m/s played a cruel joke on it. If the previous calculation showed that this artillery system was superior to the Russian one in terms of armor penetration at distances of less than 50 cables, now we see that in this parameter the German gun is inferior to our 304-mm/52 gun even by 45 cables.

In my opinion, the data obtained can be used to simulate a possible confrontation between Russian and German heavy ships during the First World War. But, before starting it, I will be very pleased to read the constructive criticism of the materials presented above.

The floor is yours, dear reader!

Description and characteristics of the weapon

The gun barrel consisted of three fastened rows of cylinders and rings. A casing was placed on top of the barrel, into which a breech with threads for the piston bolt was screwed. The gun did not have trunnions; instead, protrusions were made on the casing to ensure its fastening to the slide. The channel included a double charging chamber and a mixed rifling system (at the beginning, at a length of 0.5 calibers, rifling with a constant steepness, then with a progressive steepness, and at the end at a length of 4 calibers, with a constant steepness). The total number of rifling was 68.

Main characteristics of the 12″/40 ship gun of the 1895 model.

One of the disadvantages of the 12″/40 gun was the long bolt opening time. The reason was to open the lock, which required manually turning the handle for 20-25 seconds. This drawback was eliminated after the Russo-Japanese War by installing an electric drive and reducing the opening time of the shutter lock to 6 seconds.

About the power of Russian “lightweight” 305-mm shells from the Russo-Japanese War

This article, alas, will not give unambiguous answers to the questions posed, but will offer the respected reader a consistent hypothesis about the explosive content in the so-called “lightweight” 305-mm high-explosive and armor-piercing shells that our fleet used in the Russo-Japanese War.

What's the difficulty?

The problem is that there are no reliable figures for the explosive content of the projectiles mentioned above, and publicly available sources give very different figures.
For example, the well-known online encyclopedia navweaps gives the following data: AP “old model” – 11.7 lbs. (5.3 kg); HE “old model” – 27.3 lbs. (12.4 kg).

If you remember M.A. Petrov’s “Review of the Major Campaigns and Battles of the Steam Fleet”, then we will see 3.5% B (11.6 kg) for high-explosive and 1.5% (4.98 kg) for armor-piercing 305-mm shells. According to V. Polomoshnov, Russian armor-piercing shells had an explosive content of 1.29% (4.29 kg), and high-explosive shells - 1.8% (5.97 kg). But, according to the “infographic” attached below, the explosive content in a Russian armor-piercing 331.7 kg projectile was just 1.3 kg!

Official documents only add to the intrigue. “Attitude of the Marine Technical Committee to the Chairman of the Investigative Commission in the case of the Tsushima Battle” (hereinafter referred to as “Attitude”) dated February 1, 1907 indicates that the weight of explosives in a high-explosive 305-mm projectile, which was equipped with the battleships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, was 14 .62 pounds or approximately 5.99 kg (in the Russian pound there was 0.40951241 kg), which approximately corresponds to a percentage of explosives of 1.8%.

But the text of this document itself indicates a completely different percentage of explosive content - 3.5%. Well, how are you supposed to understand all this?

About the density of explosives

Dear reader, without a doubt, knows that any explosive substance has such a characteristic as density, measured in kilograms per cubic meter or in grams per cubic centimeter (in this article I will indicate density values ​​in g/cubic cm).
And, of course, the explosive content in each specific projectile depends on it. After all, a projectile is, in fact, a metal “case” for explosives, in which a certain volume is provided for filling it with explosives. Accordingly, if we take two absolutely identical projectiles with identical fuses, but fill them with explosives of different densities, then the volume that these explosives will occupy will be the same, but the mass of the explosive will be different. What am I getting at?

The thing is that the same Russian shells could be filled with completely different explosives.

So, for example, high-explosive lightweight 305-mm shells that we used in the Russo-Japanese War, sometimes called “old model” shells, sometimes called “mod. 1892”, and sometimes not at all, it was initially planned to equip it with pyroxylin. Yes, in fact, that’s how it was done. But in cases where pyroxylin was not enough, they were equipped with smokeless gunpowder - these were the shells that were equipped with the 2nd Pacific Squadron. However, I came across indications that subsequently, unspent shells of this type with pyroxylin (and, perhaps, gunpowder) filling were reloaded with trinitrotoluene (TNT). This seems extremely logical. The shell itself was, in less than five minutes, the pinnacle of foundry, and it was irrational to send old shells for melting down. But giving it additional lethality by equipping it with a more advanced explosive is a very good thing.

Indirect confirmation of all this is contained in the “Album of Naval Artillery Shells,” published by A.N.I.M.I. in 1934 (hereinafter referred to as the “Album”). Let's look at this using the example of a high-explosive 254 mm projectile.

So what's up with the ten-inch?

According to the “Attitude”, fragments of which I cited above, a 254-mm high-explosive shell from the era of the Russo-Japanese War was equipped with 16.39 pounds of pyroxylin, packed in a case, and the mass of explosives together with the case was 19.81 pounds.
The Russian pound, as I already reported above, was 0.40951241 kg, from which it follows that the mass of the cover was 1.4 kg, and the mass of pyroxylin was 6.712 kg. At the same time, according to the Album, the mass of explosives in an old-style projectile is 8.3 kg. I would like to note that in 1907 the fleet received new shells of various calibers, including 254 mm. At the same time, the 254-mm projectile mod. 1907, according to the Album, had the same mass (225.2 kg), but the explosive content in it reached 28.3 kg, so no confusion is possible here.

Unfortunately, the Album does not contain a direct indication that the 254-mm projectile with an explosive mass of 8.3 kg was a “Dotsushima” one, but what else could it have been? I was unable to find any evidence that between the “Dotsushima” shells and the shells mod. 1907 there were some other shells. Accordingly, it would not be a mistake to consider that the “Dotsushima” 254-mm projectile with its 6.712 kg of explosives and the 254-mm projectile with an explosive mass of 8.3 kg indicated in the “Album” are the same projectile, but equipped with different explosives . In the first case it is pyroxylin, in the second it is TNT.

We calculate the density of pyroxylin

“Why count it?”
– a dear reader may ask. And really, wouldn’t it be easier to take a reference book?

Alas, the problem is that different publications give completely different densities of pyroxylin. For example, “Technical Encyclopedia 1927–1934.” indicates the true density of pyroxylin in the range of 1.65–1.71 g/cu. cm. But the density of pyroxylin blocks in some publications is indicated significantly lower - 1.2–1.4 g / cubic meter. see. The same saper.isnet.ru reports that the density of pyroxylin with a moisture content of 20–30% is 1.3–1.45 g/cubic. cm.

Where is the truth?

Apparently, the problem is that the density of pyroxylin given in reference books is... the density of pyroxylin, and nothing more, that is, a pure product. At the same time, pyroxylin is usually used in ammunition, whose humidity is increased to 25-30%. Thus, if the density of absolutely dry pyroxylin is 1.58-1.65 g/cc. (the most frequently given values), then pyroxylin with a moisture content of 25% will have a density of 1.38-1.42, and pyroxylin with a moisture content of 30% will have a density of 1.34-1.38 g/cc.

Let's check this hypothesis by calculating a 254-mm projectile. For TNT, the density range in the sources is significantly lower: usually 1.65 is indicated, but in some cases (Rdutlovsky) 1.56 g/cubic. cm. Accordingly, it turns out that 8.3 kg of TNT will be taken, with a density of 1.58–1.65 g/cubic. cm, volume equal to 5030–5320 cubic meters. cm. And this is the same volume that was previously occupied by the case and pyroxylin in the “Dotsushima” configuration of the projectile.

The covers were made of brass. The density of brass is approximately 8.8 g/cu. cm, respectively, a 1.4 kg case will occupy approximately 159 cubic meters. cm. Thus, the share of pyroxylin remains 4871–5161 cubic meters. cm. Taking into account the fact that 6.712 kg of pyroxylin were placed in them, we obtain the density of the latter in the range of 1.3–1.38 g/cc, which exactly corresponds to the density we calculated for dry pyroxylin with a density of 1.58, “diluted” up to 25% humidity.

Thus, for further calculations we accept the values ​​most suitable for the sources. Density of TNT – 1.65 g/cu. cm, and the density of wet pyroxylin is 1.38 g/cu. cm.

The “album” gives the following explosive content for 305-mm “Dotsushima” shells. For armor-piercing with a tip - 6 kg of explosives, for armor-piercing without a tip - 5.3 kg of explosives and for high-explosive - 12.4 kg of explosives. Taking into account the density of TNT, we calculate the volume of explosives in these shells - it turns out 3,636, 3,212 and 7,515 cubic meters. cm respectively. As far as I know, “capless” shells were used in the Russo-Japanese War; accordingly, it should be assumed that we fought with “armor-piercing” shells with a “charging chamber” capacity of 3,212 cubic meters. cm and landmines - with a volume under explosives of 7,515 cubic meters. cm.

Unfortunately, I do not know either the volume or the weight of the brass casing used to insulate the pyroxylin in 305 mm shells. But from “Attitudes” we can calculate that the mass of such a case for a high-explosive 254-mm projectile was 2.06 times greater than the mass of the case for a high-explosive 203-mm projectile, while the volume under the explosive was 2.74 times. Accordingly, one can very roughly estimate that the brass case for an armor-piercing 305-mm projectile had a mass of 0.67 kg, and for a high-explosive one - 2.95 kg, and they occupied a volume of 77 and 238 cubic meters. cm (rounded) accordingly.

In this case, the share of pyroxylin itself was 3,135 and 7,278 cubic meters. cm, which, given our accepted pyroxylin density of 1.38 g/cub. cm gives the mass of the explosive:

4.323 kg of pyroxylin in an armor-piercing projectile; 10.042 kg of pyroxylin in a high-explosive shell.

That is, taking into account calculation errors, we should talk about 4.3 kg of pyroxylin in armor-piercing shells and 10 kg in high-explosive 305-mm shells.

But why then did only 6 kg of gunpowder “fit” into the high-explosive projectile?!

And indeed - after all, almost any reference book gives the density of smokeless powder at the level of pyroxylin, that is, not lower than 1.56 g / cubic meter.
cm, or even higher. And given that smokeless powder does not require a brass case, does it mean that the projectile should contain more smokeless powder than wet gunpowder? Yes, but not so.

The thing is that most reference books give us the density of gunpowder as a substance. But the problem is that gunpowder cannot fill the entire volume of the projectile. Typically, gunpowder was produced in granules. And when these granules were poured into a vessel, they occupied only part of its volume, the rest was air. As far as I understand, it is possible to compress gunpowder to a monolithic state, but such gunpowder will burn and not explode. But to explode in a confined space, it needs some amount of air. However, I am not a chemist, and I would be grateful to the competent reader for clarification on this issue.

However, there is a completely immutable fact - along with the “real” density, that is, the density of “monolithic” gunpowder, the so-called “gravimetric” density of gunpowder is also distinguished - that is, density, taking into account the free space between its granules. And this density for gunpowder usually does not exceed one, or even lower, which is well illustrated by the table below.

Moreover, as we can see, the gravimetric density of smokeless powder is approximately 0.8–0.9 g/cube. cm.

So, taking into account the fact that the mass of gunpowder in a 305-mm high-explosive projectile was, as can be seen from the “Relationship,” 14.62 pounds or 5.987 kg, and the explosive capacity we calculated for this projectile was 7,515 cubic meters. cm, then we get a gravimetric density of smokeless powder equal to 0.796 g / cubic meter. cm, which practically coincides with 0.8 g/cu. cm for one of the types of smokeless powders given in the table.

conclusions

Based on the above, I believe we can safely say that the Russian 305 mm armor-piercing lightweight shells used in the Russo-Japanese War had 4.3 kg of pyroxylin. And high-explosive ones - either 10 kg of pyroxylin or 5.99 kg of smokeless gunpowder.

Firepower of the second 2nd Pacific squadron

As is known, high-explosive shells for 2TOE, due to the unavailability of pyroxylin, were equipped with smokeless gunpowder, and, very likely, based on pyroxylin.
Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to compare explosives with each other based on the strength of their impact. Well, there is, for example, the Trauzl lead bomb method: according to it, the work of dry pyroxylin is greater than that of TNT. Hence it seems that pyroxylin is better than trinitrotoluene. But the whole point is that dry pyroxylin of equal mass with TNT was tested, despite the fact that not dry, but wet pyroxylin is used in the shells. In this case, the limited volume of the projectile will contain more TNT than wet pyroxylin (the density of the former is higher, and pyroxylin also needs an additional cover).

And if you look at the example of the “Dotsushima” 305-mm projectile, this is what you get.

On the one hand, I came across data that the explosion force of dry pyroxylin is approximately 1.17 times greater than TNT.

But, on the other hand, the “Dotsushima” 305-mm projectile contained either 12.4 kg of TNT or 10 kg of wet pyroxylin. Assuming a humidity of 25%, we obtain 7.5 kg of dry pyroxylin, which is 1.65 times less than 12.4 kg of TNT. It turns out that according to the table, pyroxylin seems to be better, but in reality the projectile equipped with it is inferior to the projectile with TNT by as much as 41%!

And I’m not yet getting into the nuances that the energy of the explosion of pyroxylin will be spent on evaporating water and heating steam, and TNT does not need to do any of this...

Unfortunately, I do not have the knowledge to correctly compare the explosion force of pyroxylin and smokeless powder based on it. I have come across opinions online that these forces are comparable, although it is not clear whether smokeless powder was equivalent to dry or wet gunpowder. But in both cases, it must be stated that the 2TOE high-explosive 305-mm shells were significantly weaker than those that were equipped with the 1st Pacific Squadron.

If the assumption is correct that smokeless powder approximately corresponded to dry pyroxylin, then 2TOE high-explosive projectiles were approximately 1.25 times weaker (5.99 kg of gunpowder versus 7.5 kg of dry pyroxylin).

If smokeless powder should be equal in explosion force to wet pyroxylin, then 1.67 times (5.99 kg of gunpowder versus 10 kg of wet pyroxylin).

However, keep in mind that both of these statements may be incorrect.

And it is possible that the difference between the high-explosive 305-mm shells of the 1st and 2nd Pacific squadrons actually turned out to be much more significant.

Ammunition

For firing, the main types of projectiles were used: armor-piercing and high-explosive fragmentation.

12 inch shells

Operation history

The history of operation of the guns repeats the history of the service of the ships on which they were installed. Armadillos armed with twelve-inch guns took part in the battles of the Russian-Japanese War as part of the 1st and 2nd Pacific squadrons, and served in the Baltic and Black Sea fleets during the First World War. Some of the ships captured in the Battle of Tsushima, or raised from the bottom of Port Arthur harbor by the Japanese, became part of the Imperial Mikado Fleet.

TM-2-12

But some guns outlived the ships for which they were made. At the beginning of 1932, the Central Design Bureau of Shipbuilding No. 3 began designing the TM-2-12 railway gun mount (sea transporter, type 2, caliber 12). For its armament it was planned to use 12″/40 guns manufactured in England by Vickers as spare ones for squadron battleships of the “Andrei Pervozvanny” type. The Nikolaev State Plant named after was chosen as the manufacturing plant. Marty (#183). At the end of 1933, the first installation was assembled there and sent to the Marine Test Site in Leningrad for testing.

TM-2-12 was a ship's cannon mounted on a gun mount taken from the dismantled battleships Eustathius and John Chrysostom. The machine was placed on a special railway platform. The installation's gun crew included 50 people. They ensured deployment of the installation from traveling to combat position in 55 minutes. The rate of fire was 1.5 rounds per minute.

The Nikolaev plant produced only six TM-2-12 units. Of these, two railway batteries were formed (No. 7 and No. 8), stationed in the Far East. Each battery consisted of 3 railway artillery installations, a mobile base and railway traction equipment. Throughout World War II, TM-2-12 installations remained in the Far East, not taking part in active hostilities.

New in blogs

The difficult fate of specially powerful guns https://vpk-news.ru/articles/7686

Photographic and film frames depicting the battles of the Great Patriotic War very often show Soviet large-caliber guns and howitzers hitting the enemy. That is why an ignorant person may get the impression that the Red Army had no problems with heavy artillery throughout the entire confrontation with the Wehrmacht. This, however, is far from the case. I have already had the opportunity to talk more than once about a number of negative aspects in the activities of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky. But nothing can be done, we will have to remember again about one “innovation” he supported, which entailed very sad consequences for the Red Army.

Paradoxes require explanation. In my opinion, if Finnish historians had been objective in their assessment of the Winter War of 1939–1940, then a monument to Tukhachevsky with the inscription “To the Savior of Finland” would have long ago stood in the center of Helsinki. But in Suomi they are still confident that “Stalin’s empire” could not defeat its northwestern neighbor thanks to the genius of the great commander Marshal Carl-Gustav Mannerheim and the exceptional courage of Finnish soldiers.

But how then to explain the two phenomena? Firstly, three months before the start of the Winter War, the Red Army defeated Japanese troops on the Khalkhin Gol River. The losses of our and Japanese troops amounted to 6,515 and 25,000 people, respectively. But in the Winter War, the Red Army lost 71,214 people in killed alone, and the Finns lost 48,243 people. I note that one and a half times more Japanese planes and tanks took part in the battles at Khalkhin Gol than there were in the entire Finnish army in 1939–1940.

Moreover, the training and weapons of the Finnish infantry were much worse than the Japanese. There is no need to talk about readiness for self-sacrifice and the ability to conduct hand-to-hand combat. Finally, the Finns had not fought with anyone for 20 years, and most of the soldiers were called up from the reserves, and units that had been fighting in China for many years fought on Khalkhin Gol.

Other figures are even more paradoxical: in 1939–1940, Soviet divisions managed to advance from the border to Vyborg in 2.5 months, and in June 1944 - in 11 days! That is, our troops in 1944 moved seven times faster. At the same time, during the Winter War, Finland and the USSR fought one on one, and in June 1944, the Red Army fought on a 3,000-kilometer front from the Barents to the Black Sea. And almost simultaneously with the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, the grandiose Operation Bagration began in Belarus.

Photo from the author's archive

How can such paradoxes be explained? There is no doubt that the command of the Red Army made a lot of mistakes in the Winter War. But, of course, the main reason for the failures of the Red Army was the lack of artillery systems capable of coping with the Finnish “millionaire” pillboxes (it took a million Finnish marks to build one) on the Mannerheim Line.

The 203-mm howitzer B-4, the most powerful Soviet artillery system adopted at the beginning of the war between the USSR and Finland, could penetrate the wall of such a fort only if two of its shells hit the same point. True, the Red Army also had a 305-mm cannon of the 1915 model. The weight of its projectile was 377 kg versus 100 kg for the B-4. However, for completely unknown reasons, 30 fully combat-ready 305-mm howitzers stood idle throughout the war in the Belarusian Military District.

Why did the USSR fail to create a single weapon of special power in the 20-30s? Let me start with the fact that by January 1, 1918, the Obukhov plant produced the first batch of four 406-mm howitzers with a projectile weight of 883 kg. Their readiness ranged from 75 to 35 percent.

In the Archive of the National Economy, I studied a thick volume of correspondence from the early 20s, devoted to one question: whether to complete the howitzers or not. In the end, someone ordered them to be scrapped...

In 1931, the Art Directorate issued two tasks: KB-2, where German engineers worked, to design a 305-mm howitzer on a conventional carriage, and a triplex (400-mm mortars, 305-mm howitzers and 203-mm collapsible-type guns, transported on caterpillar carts). In addition, engineer Chernyavsky, on his own initiative, prepared a triplex project (400 mm mortar, 305 mm howitzer and 203 mm cannon on a conventional carriage). In 1932, the Art Directorate reviewed all the projects and at the plenum of the AU it was decided to “approve the project of the combined 400/305/203-mm system for further development and production of a prototype, and reject the other two projects of KB-2 and engineer Chernyavsky.”

Needless to say, if full-scale work on the project of the Art Directorate or Chernyavsky had begun in 1931–1932, then by 1939 the Red Army would have received several dozen guns of special power. New 305-mm howitzers and 400-mm mortars would have smashed the Finnish “millionaire” pillboxes to smithereens in a week; the outcome of the Winter War would have been completely different, both militarily and politically.

Incompetence plus falsifications However, Tukhachevsky and Co., due to their incompetence, completely thwarted all plans for creating special-power artillery. At first, these figures demanded that the new guns fire beltless projectiles, that is, polygonal, rifled or sub-caliber projectiles. Dozens of the most exotic ammunition of all three types with calibers from 203 to 368 mm were tested.

It is easy to object: the development of science and technology is impossible without errors and misconceptions. Holy truth! But most of these errors and misconceptions are revealed at the stage of preliminary design, at various technical meetings and councils. However, Deputy People's Commissar for Armaments M. N. Tukhachevsky (education - infantry school), Deputy People's Commissar of Heavy Industry and Head of the Main Mobilization Directorate I. P. Pavlunovsky (three classes of a parochial school), People's Commissar of Heavy Industry S. Ordzhonikidze (dropout paramedic) patronized the technical adventurers like Kurchevsky and Bekauri.

If at councils and meetings honest specialists pointed out the unreality and absurdity of projects, then they were immediately labeled as “enemy of the people.” The test results of prototype guns were falsified, and often the tests were not carried out completely. Thus, at least 20 samples of Kurchevsky’s dynamo-reactive gun were launched into series without conducting a full set of tests - factory, field and military.

A typical example: all types of beltless projectiles, which were continuously tested in the USSR from 1920 to 1938, were tested on the Volkovo Field near St. Petersburg back in 1865–1875. I have personally read hundreds of reports of such tests from both the 19th and 20th centuries. And if we discard the falsifications, the result is completely identical. Why was it necessary to spend hundreds of millions of people's rubles without first eliminating a single incurable disease of polygonal, sub-caliber, rifled and other beltless projectiles?

By the way, sub-caliber shells were intended for ultra-long-range shooting, and no one even thought about anti-tank sub-caliber shells until the Germans used them at the front at the end of 1941. And one more interesting fact: the first to discover the identity of the tests of 1920–1938 and 1865–1875 was not me, but one smart artilleryman, who at the end of 1937 sent a detailed report on these striking coincidences to the People's Commissar of Defense, and a copy to the NKVD.

In 1934, Tukhachevsky and Co. demanded that all new guns of special power be mounted on one self-propelled gun. Shooting also had to be done from it. The self-propelled gun itself existed only in the sore heads of the designers.

At the Art Directorate conference in December 1934, projects for a 203 mm cannon and a 305 mm self-propelled howitzer were considered. Two independent projects of the latter were developed by the pilot plant named after. Kirov.

In the end, it turned out that the weight of the system reached 106 tons, and the length exceeded 12 meters. The dimensions did not allow the self-propelled vehicle to be transported by rail; the vast majority of bridges could not support its weight. If he were stuck off the road, there would be nothing to pull him out...

Only after the elimination of Tukhachevsky, work on the creation of OM guns began in full swing, and in order to scare bureaucrats and hacks, they were given the name “Stalin’s order.”

In the summer of 1937, a commission consisting of prominent Soviet artillerymen visited Czechoslovakia. There she was presented with samples of a 210 mm cannon and a 305 mm howitzer. The gun barrel was lined, and the howitzers were fastened. Both systems have horizontal wedge bolts and separate cartridge loading. I can’t resist the author’s remark: on the commission’s report, some fool from the Art Directorate emphasized “separate-case loading” and wrote in a sweeping manner: “This is a minus - you need a cap.”

The fact is that all German artillery systems, including those of special power, even the 800-mm Dora cannon, had cartridge loading.

Because of these rag caps, the production of Soviet analogues - 210 mm Br-17 cannons and 305 mm Br-18 howitzers was delayed for almost a year. Wedge valves had to be replaced with piston ones, etc. I note that if the caps provided some kind of penny savings, then the OM guns were obviously piecemeal - well, 20, well, 30 units, and the money spent on converting the guns was in no way compensated by the savings in the production of caps .

At the end of 1939 - 1940, the design of purely domestic systems began: 450-mm howitzers Br-23 and 500-mm howitzers with projectile weights of 1060-1500 kg. Both systems were dismountable: carts weighing 20–26 tons were transported behind tractors at a speed of 25–30 km/h.

By the summer of 1941 But, alas, the war did not want to wait. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the special power artillery of the RVGK included the 281st howitzer artillery regiment OM (30 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model), stationed in the Oryol Military District, 15 separate divisions and two separate batteries (305-mm howitzers, 280-mm mortars), as well as one (524th) heavy cannon artillery regiment (24 152-mm Br-2 cannons), 1st and 6th separate heavy cannon batteries (two 152-mm Br-2 cannons each). The RVGK also had high-power artillery at its disposal - 33 regiments armed with 792 203-mm B-4 howitzers.

On June 22, 1941, the Red Army had 25 280-mm Schneider mortars of the 1915 model and 47 280-mm Br-5 mortars. 280-mm 48 mortars were in service with eight separate artillery battalions of special power. Another 24 mortars and four 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model were in warehouses, factories and training grounds.

It should be noted that the shells for the 280-mm Schneider and Br-5 mortars were the same, but the charges were different. The shells were only of the old type, that is, short-range. By June 1941, there were about 7 thousand 280-mm shells and 7.5 thousand 305-mm shells for howitzers of the 1915 model.

By June 1941, almost all combat-ready high-power and special-power artillery units were concentrated in our western districts. In total, these units had 517 203 mm B-4 howitzers, 17 280 mm Schneider mortars and 39 280 mm B-5 mortars. Interestingly, the Navy also had 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model. They were armed with four-gun battery No. 911 near Vladivostok. For it, the fleet had 1,788 high-explosive 305-mm howitzer shells.

It is impossible not to mention such an interesting fact here. In the 20-30s, the army command conducted experimental firing from 305-mm howitzers of the 1915 model with shells from 305-mm naval guns. As a result, Tables for firing naval shells of the 1907 model and the 1911 model from a 305-mm howitzer were created. A special reduced charge was selected for it: for a projectile of the 1907 sample - 28.46 kg, and for a projectile of the 1911 sample - 24.3 kg of belt gunpowder.

coincidence that the author gives boring data about shells. Unfortunately, domestic military historical literature has long been talking about a shortage of ammunition both in the Red Army and in the USSR Navy. In fact, during the entire war, the fleet did not shoot even a third of the shells from 130 mm to 406 mm caliber of the total resource, and the OM artillery always had a surplus of ammunition. Another thing is that they were not delivered to the units on time due to the sloppiness of individual military leaders.

And let's be honest - we had a surplus of incompetent generals. Thus, during the Finnish War, orders were given to conduct “harassing fire” along the roads from 280-mm Schneider mortars, and during the Great Patriotic War, to fire from long-range guns: “Fire in the direction of the enemy until the shells are completely used up.” And this quote is not from Suvorov-Rezun, but from top secret documents.

The length of the article does not allow us to talk about the shortage of artillery tractors and their poor technical condition. As a result, it was precisely due to the lack of vehicles and only in rare cases due to enemy influence that 75 203 mm and nine 280 mm howitzers were lost during the summer-autumn campaign of 1941. In this regard, in August 1941, a decision was made to send all OM guns to the rear. The production of special-power guns was practically stopped, and the ammunition for them was significantly reduced.

Replenishments Information about the availability and production of tanks, aircraft and field guns ceased to be a secret back in Brezhnev times, but data about OM artillery has not yet been published. Therefore, I risk boring the reader with the table.

In August 1944, two artillery divisions of special power were formed as part of the artillery of the RVGK. Each of them was armed with four 211-mm captured mortars (21 cm Mrs.18). Unlike our 203-mm howitzers, they were wheeled rather than tracked and were much more mobile. However, the best assessment of the 21-cm mortar is that our generals classified it as a special-power system, and the B-4 as a high-power system. In addition, Mrs.18 in combat position was much lighter than the B-4.

In December 1944, on the basis of four separate divisions of 152-mm Br-2 cannons and four separate batteries of 210-mm Br-17 cannons, three separate regiments of special power were formed (18th Guards, 1st and 2nd). Each of them consisted of three two-gun batteries Br-2 and one two-gun battery of 210 mm cannons. By the end of 1944, these regiments left for the front.

In total, by 1944, the Red Army had nine 210-mm Br-17 guns. They were brought into combat readiness precisely in 1944. Then, for the first time, shooting tables were published for them and 4.2 thousand 210-mm shells were produced. It is curious that in the first half of 1945, 210 mm shells were not fired.

Only three 305-mm howitzers of the 1939 model (Br-18) were manufactured. They went to form the 233rd separate artillery division of special power, which was located in the Moscow Military District at the end of the war. Apparently, these guns were not combat-ready.

In 1944–1945, 16 captured 211-mm K.38 guns were included in the special-power artillery. (Perhaps this is what our generals called other types of 21-cm German guns.) These guns fired 120-kg shells at a range of 33.9 km. The weight of the K.38 in the stowed position is 25.3 tons. The system in the stowed position was transported on three carts.

RVGK artillery composition 06/1/1943 01/1/1944 06/1/1944 01/1/1945 05/1/1945 152 mm Br-2 34 36 28 28 28 203 mm B-4 653 659 665 766 760 280 mm mortars 48 48 48 48 48 305 -mm howitzers 29 30 30 29 29 210 mm guns — — 8 8 8 211 mm captured guns — — — 16 16

Four separate OM artillery battalions were armed with 211-mm K.38 cannons. Each of them had four guns. Moreover, two OAD OM never made it to the front.

Combat examples The intensity of the use of weapons of special power in combat conditions is best evidenced by the consumption of shells. Thus, during the entire war, 39.4 thousand shells for the Br-2 guns were used (including lost). Of these, 8.1 thousand - in 1943, 9.9 thousand - in 1944 and 6.4 thousand - in 1945.

The first thousand 280-mm shells were expended in 1943, another 4.7 thousand in 1944 and 8.45 thousand in 1945.

305-mm howitzers were used for the first time since 1917 in battles on the Karelian Isthmus in June 1944. Five OM divisions were deployed there, armed with 280 mm Br-5 mortars and 305 mm howitzers. In June 1944, about five hundred 305-mm howitzer shells were expended on the Karelian Isthmus.

As a result, it took only 11 days to break through the Mannerheim Line and reach Vyborg. The matter was decided by 305-mm howitzers and gunfire from the Baltic Fleet, as well as heavy KV and Churchill tanks.

OM artillery turned out to be extremely effective in the assault on cities converted by the Nazis into fortresses - Berlin, Poznan. Our supercannons especially distinguished themselves during the capture of Konigsberg, which back in the First World War was the most powerful fortress of the German Empire.

I note that the fortifications of the capital of East Prussia turned out to be so powerful that it was not always possible to penetrate them even with 280 mm and 305 mm shells. Thus, the OM division of Lieutenant Colonel S.S. Maltsev (six 280-mm Br-5 mortars) fired at Fort No. V. It was hit by 73 280-mm concrete-piercing shells, but there were only two through holes. Nevertheless, by 12 noon on April 6, the fort stopped returning fire.

The action of the 203-mm B-4 howitzers and 122-mm A-19 cannons on the forts turned out to be ineffective. Thus, 120 203 mm shells and 240 122 mm shells were fired at Fort No. IV. The result is potholes in brick and concrete walls.

For more than a day, the 329th OM artillery division (six 305-mm howitzers) shelled fort No. VIII. 78 hits were recorded. However, there were only five through holes. At the same time, only the right caponier of the fortification was completely destroyed.

Facts from the reports on the capture of Koenigsberg may raise doubts in some minds about the effectiveness of the Soviet OM artillery. But here it is worth recalling that the same German artillery in 1941–1943 showed similar results.

Thus, during the entire siege of Leningrad, the 305-mm tower installations of the Krasnaya Gorka fort never failed, although the Germans fired hundreds of heavy shells at them. In Sevastopol, the tower installations of batteries No. 30 and No. 35 withstood fire from German guns of all calibers and attacks from the Luftwaffe for eight months. The Germans managed to disable the towers with the help of two-ton shells from 615-mm mortars.

Needless to say, the very first shells of Soviet 450–500 mm howitzers would have destroyed the Königsberg forts. But alas, as already mentioned, all these howitzers remained in the project or in prototypes. Nevertheless, the existing OM artillery made a huge contribution to the capture of Koenigsberg and saved the lives of thousands of Soviet soldiers.

During the Berlin operation, high-power and special-power RVGK guns were again successfully used in breakthrough areas. So, for example, in the 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front there was the 1st OM cannon regiment (two 210-mm Br-17 cannons and six 152-mm Br-5 cannons), the 34th OAD OM (six 280-mm mortar Br-5) and the 322nd OAD OM (six 305-mm howitzers).

The Second World War confirmed that howitzers and mortars of special power are the most effective weapons when storming reinforced concrete fortifications, as well as in street battles in cities with large stone houses. Even aviation could not compete with them in this, at least until guided bombs were adopted.

Alexander Shirokorad

Used literature and sources

Bibliography

• Akhmetshin A.D. and others. Obukhov plant. 150 years to the glory of the Fatherland. 1863-2013. - S.-P.: Beresta LLC, 2013. - 424 p. — ISBN 978-5-905225-69-7
• Bragin V.I. Guns on rails. - author's edition. - M.: 2006. - 472 p.
• Shirokorad A.B. Naval artillery of the Russian Navy 1867-1922 - Marine collection, No. 2. - M.: 1997.
• Shirokorad A.B. Encyclopedia of domestic artillery. - Mn.: Harvest, 2000. - 1156 p. — ISBN 985-433-703-0

Links

• Article “Russian naval artillery in 1904-1917.”
• Article on wunderwafe.ru about the 12″/40 gun
• Article “Iwami or squadron battleship of the Borodino type in Japanese”
• Article “305mm RYAV guns and a little later”
• Obukhov Steel Mill
• Essays on the history of the military industry. Gun factories
• Article “Railway guns in Vladivostok”
• "Article 305-mm railway artillery mount TM-2-12"
• Artillery of the Russian fleet in 1877-1904.