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RS-82
and
RS-132
(Reaktivnyy Snaryad; Russian: Reaktivnyy Snaryad; rocket) were unguided missiles used by Soviet military aircraft during World War II.
Development[edit]
Work on the design of the RS-82 and RS-132 missiles began in the early 1930s by a group led by Georgy Langemak, which included Vladimir Artemyev, Boris Petropavlovsky, Yuri Pobedonostsev and others. The 82 mm (3.2 in) and 132 mm (5.2 in) diameters were chosen because the standard smokeless powder charge in use at the time was 24 mm (0.94 in) in diameter, and seven of these charges would fit into a cylinder with a diameter of 82 mm. The first test firing took place in November 1929. RO-82 rail launchers were developed to install these weapons on aircraft.
.
An excerpt characterizing the RS-82
When Pierre returned home, he was given two Rastopchin posters that had been brought that day. The first said that the rumor that Count Rostopchin was prohibited from leaving Moscow was unfair and that, on the contrary, Count Rostopchin was glad that ladies and merchant wives were leaving Moscow. “Less fear, less news,” the poster said, “but I answer with my life that there will be no villain in Moscow.” These words clearly showed Pierre for the first time that the French would be in Moscow. The second poster said that our main apartment was in Vyazma, that Count Wittschstein defeated the French, but that since many residents want to arm themselves, there are weapons prepared for them in the arsenal: sabers, pistols, guns, which residents can get at a cheap price. The tone of the posters was no longer as playful as in Chigirin’s previous conversations. Pierre thought about these posters. Obviously, that terrible thundercloud, which he called upon with all the strength of his soul and which at the same time aroused involuntary horror in him - obviously this cloud was approaching. “Should I enlist in the military and go to the army or wait? – Pierre asked himself this question for the hundredth time. He took a deck of cards lying on his table and began to play solitaire. “If this solitaire comes out,” he said to himself, mixing the deck, holding it in his hand and looking up, “if it comes out, it means... what does it mean?” He didn’t have time to decide what it meant when a voice was heard behind the office door the eldest princess asking if she could come in. “Then it will mean that I have to go to the army,” Pierre finished to himself. “Come in, come in,” he added, turning to the prince. (One eldest princess, with a long waist and a petrified face, continued to live in Pierre’s house; the two younger ones got married.) “Forgive me, mon cousin, for coming to you,” she said in a reproachfully excited voice. - After all, we finally need to decide on something! What will it be? Everyone has left Moscow, and the people are rioting. Why are we staying? “On the contrary, everything seems to be fine, ma cousine,” said Pierre with that habit of playfulness that Pierre, who always embarrassedly endured his role as a benefactor in front of the princess, acquired for himself in relation to her. - Yes, it’s good... good well-being! Today Varvara Ivanovna told me how different our troops are. You can certainly attribute it to honor. And the people have completely rebelled, they stop listening; My girl started being rude too. Soon they will start beating us too. You can't walk on the streets. And most importantly, the French will be here tomorrow, what can we expect! “I ask one thing, mon cousin,” said the princess, “order me to be taken to St. Petersburg: whatever I am, I cannot live under Bonaparte’s rule.” - Come on, ma cousine, where do you get your information from? On the contrary... - I will not submit to your Napoleon. Others do whatever they want... If you don’t want to do it... - Yes, I will do it, I’ll order it now. The princess was apparently annoyed that there was no one to be angry with. She sat down on a chair, whispering something. “But this is being conveyed to you incorrectly,” said Pierre. “Everything is quiet in the city, and there is no danger.” I was reading just now...” Pierre showed the princess the posters. – The Count writes that he answers with his life that the enemy will not be in Moscow. “Oh, this count of yours,” the princess spoke angrily, “is a hypocrite, a villain who himself incited the people to rebel.” Wasn’t he the one who wrote in those stupid posters that whoever he was, drag him by the crest to the exit (and how stupid)! Whoever takes it, he says, will have honor and glory. So I was quite happy. Varvara Ivanovna said that her people almost killed her because she spoke French... “But it’s so... You take everything to heart,” said Pierre and began to play solitaire. Despite the fact that the solitaire had worked out, Pierre did not go to the army, but remained in empty Moscow, still in the same anxiety, indecision, in fear and at the same time in joy, expecting something terrible. The next day, the princess left in the evening, and his chief manager came to Pierre with the news that the money he required to outfit the regiment could not be obtained unless one estate was sold. The general manager generally represented to Pierre that all these undertakings of the regiment were supposed to ruin him. Pierre had difficulty hiding his smile as he listened to the manager’s words. “Well, sell it,” he said. - What can I do, I can’t refuse now! The worse the state of affairs, and especially his affairs, was, the more pleasant it was for Pierre, the more obvious it was that the catastrophe he was waiting for was approaching. Almost none of Pierre's acquaintances were in the city. Julie left, Princess Marya left. Of the close acquaintances, only the Rostovs remained; but Pierre did not go to them. On this day, Pierre, in order to have fun, went to the village of Vorontsovo to see a large balloon that was being built by Leppich to destroy the enemy, and a test balloon that was supposed to be launched tomorrow. This ball was not ready yet; but, as Pierre learned, it was built at the request of the sovereign. The Emperor wrote to Count Rastopchin the following about this ball: “Aussitot que Leppich sera pret, composez lui un equipage pour sa nacelle d'hommes surs et intelligents et depechez un courrier au general Koutousoff pour l'en prevenir. Je l'ai instruit de la chose. Recommandez, je vous prie, a Leppich d'etre bien attentif sur l'endroit ou il descendra la premiere fois, pour ne pas se tromper et ne pas tomber dans les mains de l'ennemi. “Il est indispensable qu’il combine ses mouvements avec le general en chef.” [As soon as Leppich is ready, assemble a crew for his boat of loyal and intelligent people and send a courier to General Kutuzov to warn him. I informed him about this. Please instruct Leppich to pay careful attention to the place where he descends for the first time, so as not to make a mistake and not fall into the hands of the enemy. It is necessary that he coordinate his movements with the movements of the commander-in-chief.] Returning home from Vorontsov and driving along Bolotnaya Square, Pierre saw a crowd at Lobnoye Mesto, stopped and got off the droshky. It was the execution of a French chef accused of espionage. The execution had just ended, and the executioner was untying a pitifully moaning fat man with red sideburns, blue stockings and a green camisole from the mare. Another criminal, thin and pale, stood right there. Both, judging by their faces, were French. With a frightened, painful look, similar to that of the thin Frenchman, Pierre pushed through the crowd. - What is this? Who? For what? - he asked. But the attention of the crowd - officials, townspeople, merchants, men, women in cloaks and fur coats - was so greedily focused on what was happening at Lobnoye Mesto that no one answered him. The fat man stood up, frowning, shrugged his shoulders and, obviously wanting to express firmness, began to put on his doublet without looking around him; but suddenly his lips trembled, and he began to cry, angry with himself, as adult sanguine people cry. The crowd spoke loudly, as it seemed to Pierre, in order to drown out the feeling of pity within itself. “Someone’s princely cook...” “Well, monsieur, apparently the Russian jelly sauce set the Frenchman on edge... set his teeth on edge,” said the wizened clerk standing next to Pierre, while the Frenchman began to cry. The clerk looked around him, apparently expecting an assessment of his joke. Some laughed, some continued to look in fear at the executioner, who was undressing another. Pierre sniffed, wrinkled his nose, and quickly turned around and walked back to the droshky, never ceasing to mutter something to himself as he walked and sat down. As he continued on the road, he shuddered several times and screamed so loudly that the coachman asked him: “What do you order?” -Where are you going? - Pierre shouted at the coachman who was leaving for Lubyanka. “They ordered me to the commander-in-chief,” answered the coachman. - Fool! beast! - Pierre shouted, which rarely happened to him, cursing his coachman. - I ordered home; and hurry up, you idiot. “We still have to leave today,” Pierre said to himself. Pierre, seeing the punished Frenchman and the crowd surrounding the Execution Ground, so finally decided that he could not stay any longer in Moscow and was going to the army that day, that it seemed to him that he either told the coachman about this, or that the coachman himself should have known it . Arriving home, Pierre gave an order to his coachman Evstafievich, who knew everything, could do everything, and was known throughout Moscow, that he was going to Mozhaisk that night to the army and that his riding horses should be sent there. All this could not be done on the same day, and therefore, according to Evstafievich, Pierre had to postpone his departure until another day in order to give time for the bases to get on the road. On the 24th it cleared up after the bad weather, and that afternoon Pierre left Moscow. At night, after changing horses in Perkhushkovo, Pierre learned that there had been a big battle that evening. They said that here, in Perkhushkovo, the ground shook from the shots. No one could answer Pierre's questions about who won. (This was the battle of Shevardin on the 24th.) At dawn, Pierre approached Mozhaisk. All the houses of Mozhaisk were occupied by troops, and at the inn, where Pierre was met by his master and coachman, there was no room in the upper rooms: everything was full of officers. In Mozhaisk and beyond Mozhaisk, troops stood and marched everywhere. Cossacks, foot and horse soldiers, wagons, boxes, guns were visible from all sides. Pierre was in a hurry to move forward as quickly as possible, and the further he drove away from Moscow and the deeper he plunged into this sea of troops, the more he was overcome by anxiety and a new joyful feeling that he had not yet experienced. It was a feeling similar to the one he experienced in the Slobodsky Palace during the Tsar’s arrival - a feeling of the need to do something and sacrifice something. He now experienced a pleasant feeling of awareness that everything that constitutes people’s happiness, the comforts of life, wealth, even life itself, is nonsense, which is pleasant to discard in comparison with something... With what, Pierre could not give himself an account, and indeed she tried to understand for himself, for whom and for what he finds it especially charming to sacrifice everything. He was not interested in what he wanted to sacrifice for, but the sacrifice itself constituted a new joyful feeling for him. On the 24th there was a battle at the Shevardinsky redoubt, on the 25th not a single shot was fired from either side, on the 26th the Battle of Borodino took place. Why and how were the battles of Shevardin and Borodino given and accepted? Why was the Battle of Borodino fought? It didn’t make the slightest sense for either the French or the Russians. The immediate result was and should have been - for the Russians, that we were closer to the destruction of Moscow (which we feared most of all in the world), and for the French, that they were closer to the destruction of the entire army (which they also feared most of all in the world) . This result was immediately obvious, but meanwhile Napoleon gave and Kutuzov accepted this battle. If the commanders had been guided by reasonable reasons, it seemed, how clear it should have been for Napoleon that, having gone two thousand miles and accepting a battle with the probable chance of losing a quarter of the army, he was heading for certain death; and it should have seemed just as clear to Kutuzov that by accepting the battle and also risking losing a quarter of the army, he was probably losing Moscow. For Kutuzov, this was mathematically clear, just as it is clear that if I have less than one checker in checkers and I change, I will probably lose and therefore should not change. When the enemy has sixteen checkers, and I have fourteen, then I am only one-eighth weaker than him; and when I exchange thirteen checkers, he will be three times stronger than me. Before the Battle of Borodino, our forces were approximately compared to the French as five to six, and after the battle as one to two, that is, before the battle one hundred thousand; one hundred and twenty, and after the battle fifty to one hundred. And at the same time, the smart and experienced Kutuzov accepted the battle. Napoleon, the brilliant commander, as he is called, gave battle, losing a quarter of the army and stretching his line even more. If they say that, having occupied Moscow, he thought how to end the campaign by occupying Vienna, then there is a lot of evidence against this. The historians of Napoleon themselves say that even from Smolensk he wanted to stop, he knew the danger of his extended position, he knew that the occupation of Moscow would not be the end of the campaign, because from Smolensk he saw the situation in which Russian cities were left to him, and did not receive a single answer to their repeated statements about their desire to negotiate. In giving and accepting the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov and Napoleon acted involuntarily and senselessly. And historians, under the accomplished facts, only later brought up intricate evidence of the foresight and genius of the commanders, who, of all the involuntary instruments of world events, were the most slavish and involuntary figures. The ancients left us examples of heroic poems in which the heroes constitute the entire interest of history, and we still cannot get used to the fact that for our human time a story of this kind has no meaning. To another question: how were the Borodino and Shevardino battles that preceded it fought? There is also a very definite and well-known, completely false idea. All historians describe the matter as follows: The Russian army, as if in its retreat from Smolensk, was looking for the best position for a general battle, and such a position was allegedly found at Borodin. The Russians allegedly strengthened this position forward, to the left of the road (from Moscow to Smolensk), at almost a right angle to it, from Borodin to Utitsa, at the very place where the battle took place. Ahead of this position, a fortified forward post on the Shevardinsky Kurgan was supposedly set up to monitor the enemy. On the 24th Napoleon allegedly attacked the forward post and took it; On the 26th he attacked the entire Russian army standing in position on the Borodino field. This is what the stories say, and all this is completely unfair, as anyone who wants to delve into the essence of the matter can easily see. The Russians could not find a better position; but, on the contrary, in their retreat they passed through many positions that were better than Borodino. They did not settle on any of these positions: both because Kutuzov did not want to accept a position that was not chosen by him, and because the demand for a people’s battle had not yet been expressed strongly enough, and because Miloradovich had not yet approached with the militia, and also because other reasons that are innumerable. The fact is that the previous positions were stronger and that the Borodino position (the one on which the battle was fought) is not only not strong, but for some reason is not at all a position any more than any other place in the Russian Empire, which, if you were guessing, you could point to with a pin on the map. The Russians not only did not strengthen the position of the Borodino field to the left at right angles to the road (that is, the place where the battle took place), but never before August 25, 1812, did they think that the battle could take place at this place. This is evidenced, firstly, by the fact that not only on the 25th there were no fortifications at this place, but that, begun on the 25th, they were not finished even on the 26th; secondly, the proof is the position of the Shevardinsky redoubt: the Shevardinsky redoubt, ahead of the position at which the battle was decided, does not make any sense. Why was this redoubt fortified stronger than all other points? And why, defending it on the 24th until late at night, all efforts were exhausted and six thousand people were lost? To observe the enemy, a Cossack patrol was enough. Thirdly, proof that the position in which the battle took place was not foreseen and that the Shevardinsky redoubt was not the forward point of this position is the fact that Barclay de Tolly and Bagration until the 25th were convinced that the Shevardinsky redoubt was the left flank of the position and that Kutuzov himself, in his report, written in the heat of the moment after the battle, calls the Shevardinsky redoubt the left flank of the position. Much later, when reports about the Battle of Borodino were being written in the open, it was (probably to justify the mistakes of the commander-in-chief, who had to be infallible) that unfair and strange testimony was invented that the Shevardinsky redoubt served as a forward post (while it was only a fortified point of the left flank) and as if the Battle of Borodino was accepted by us in a fortified and pre-chosen position, whereas it took place in a completely unexpected and almost unfortified place.
History of operations[edit]
RS-82
Luftstreitkräfte biplanes
in the first half of 1916, the earliest known use of unguided anti-aircraft missiles by the Soviet Air Force against aircraft in combat with heavier-than-air aircraft occurred in August 1939, during the Battle of Khalkhin. Goal Polikarpov's group of I-16 fighters under the command of Captain N. Zvonarev used RS-82 missiles against Japanese aircraft, shooting down a total of 16 fighters and 3 bombers. [1] Six Tupolev SB bombers also used the RS-132 for ground attacks during the Winter War. The RS-82 officially entered service in 1937, and the RS-132 in 1938.
Like most unguided missiles, the RS suffered from low accuracy. Early testing showed that when fired from a distance of 500 m (1,640 ft), only 1.1% of the 186 RS-82s produced hit a single tank, and 3.7% hit a column of tanks. The RS-132's accuracy was even worse, with no hits in 134 rounds fired during one test. Combat accuracy was even worse, since missiles were usually fired from even greater distances. To further complicate matters, the RS-82 required a direct hit to disable the light German armor while causing almost no damage. The RS-132 could defeat German medium armor with a direct hit, but did almost no damage to light or medium armor with a near miss. The best results are usually achieved when firing in salvos at large ground targets.
It is known that almost every Soviet military aircraft of World War II was equipped with RS-82 and RS-132 missiles, often using field-produced launchers. Some Il-2 Il-2s were modified to carry up to 24 missiles, although the increased drag and weight made this arrangement impractical.
M-8 missiles
and
M-13s
were used by the famous Katyusha rocket artillery.
[ citation needed
]
b MYUVYUKE 1930-U CC. ASHKKH OPNKHGBEDEMSH OEPBSHE NOSHRSH I 82-LL X 132-LL YUBKHYUZHNMMSHLH PUYERUL. shRKH YUKHAPSH ASHKH BSHAPYUMSH ME YAKSVIUMN. DEKN B RNL. vRN NOSHRSH BEKHYAE I ONPNUNBSHLH LYUYULH DHYULERPNL 24 LL. xU PYUGLEPYULH X NASYAKNBKHBUCHRYA 2 NYAMNBMSHU YUKHAPIU PUYERMSHU YULEP - 82 LL X 132 LL, YNRNPSHE YANUPYUMHKHKYAE ONRNL MU DNATSNE BPEL. eYAKKH 7 YUYEJ DHYULERPNL 24 LL OKNRMN SKNFHRE B ZHKHKHMDPHVEYAYSCH YULEPS YATSNPYUMKH, RN BMSRPEMMKHI DHYULERP ONYAKEDMEI ASDER PYUBEM 72 LL. rnKYKHMYU FE YAREMNY YYULEPSH PYUBMY 5 LL, NRYACHDU DHYULERP, HKH YUKHAP YAMYUPDYU - 82 LL. RÜYHL FE NAPUGNL BNGMHY YUKHAP PUYERSH 132 LL.
eYAREYARBEMMN, YAPYUGS BYARUK BNOPNYA N YARYUAHKHKYUZHHH PUYER. aSHKN OPNBEDEMN LMNTSN NOSHRNB ON YANGDYUMHCH RSPANPEYURKHBMSHU PUYER YUKHAPU 82 LL X 132 LL. b YNMZHE MNYAP 1929 Ts .
. VEPEG MEYAINKEIN LEYAZHEB KERVKHY-HYAOSHRYUREKE I. X. lSUHM OPNKHGBEK BNGDSMSHE YARPEKEASH rpya-82 I YAYULNKERYU s-1. ySVMNYARE RSPANPEYURKHBMSHU YAMYUP'DNB NYUGYUKYUYAE MESDNBKERBNPHREKEMNI. yPNLE RNCN, OPH RUYNL LERNDE YARYUAHKHHYUZHHH NYNKN 28-30% BEYAYU PYYERMNTSN GYUPDYU PUYAUNDNBYUKNYAE MU BPYUYEMHE YAMYUPYUDYU, Y ONYARSOYUREKEMYU YAYNPNYARE KH DUKEMNYAR E ONKERYU B PEGSKERYURE SCHRNTSN SLEMEYUKHYAE.
b YABGKH I SHCHRHL ASHKN PE'EMN OPEIRKH Y YPSHKEEBNI YARYUAHKHKYUZHHH PUYER AEG HU BPYUYEMH. bMYUVYUKE HYAOSHRSHBUKHYAE 82-LL YAMYUPDSH I YNKEZHEBSHL YARYUAHKHGYURNPNL, ME BSHUNDIKHL GYU TSYUAYUPHRSH YAMYUPDU. NDMUNEN NOSHRMSHARMSHAYASHA OPNSBYH B YUSHUSHPNHMYULHVYYANI RPSAYA JUTSH ONYUYUKHKH, I am the ONELNECHECHECHECHECHKHURNPU DNYARNIVKHBNSN ONKELENA.
GYUREL NRYARPEKKKH 82-LL PEYURKHBMSHE YAMYUPDSH I PYUGLYUUNL VERSHPEUKNOYARMNTSN NOEPEMKH B 200, 180, 160, 140 X 120 LL. PEGSKERYUR ASHK BONKME NOPEDEKEMMSHL: I SLEMEEMHEL NOPEMEMHJ SUSDYUKYUYAE SARNIVHBNYARE ONKERYU H YSVMNYARE.
DYUKEE B UNDE SHYAOEPHLEMRNB BSHYAMHKNYAE, VRN OPH PYUGLYUUE LEMEE 120 LL SYARNIVHBNTSN ONKERYU ME ONKSVYUKNYAE - YAMYUP'DSH MYUVKHMYUKH YSBSHPYUREYAYA YAPYUGS ONYAKE OPEY PYUYEMKH PYUANRSH DBKHTSUREK. NOOPEMHA PUGLUUNL ANKEYA 200 LL Nyugyuknya Yakhinl rh oeepeleyyukn peel Ffeyarh Yamyupdu Myugyud, Ryuhif Opple Susdyyvhbnyarh onkery. NAKETSVEMKHE NOPEPEMKH GYU YAVER SLEMEYEMKH RNKYKHMSH KNOYUYAREI YARYUAHKKHGYURNPYU BSHGSHBYUKN YAHKEMSHE YNKEAYUMKH KNOYUYAREI BOKNRE DN ONKNLYKH KHU B BNGDSUE. b YNMZHE YNMZHNB, ASHKKH MUIDEMSH NORKHLYUKEMSHE TSYUAYUPHRSH YARYUAHKHKHYURNPNB: PYUGLYUU 200 LL DKЪ 82-LL PUYER X 300 LL DKЪ 132-LL PUYER.
b 1935 C. I KHYARPEAHREK x-15 ASHKKH OPNBEDEMSH OSYAYKH PUYER PC-82. b 1935-1936 CC. PUYERSH PC-82 GYUOSYAYUKH I YUBKHYUZHNMMSHU OSYAINBSHU SYARPNIYARB ASSEKEMNTSN RHOYU, YNRNPSHE HLEKH ANKENNE KNANBNE YANOPNRKHBKEMKHE KH GULERMN YAMKHFYUKH YAYNPNYARE YAYULNKERYU.
OSYAINBU SYARYUMNBYu mon-82
b 1937 Ts. dK ONBSHYEMKH OPNVMNYARKH MUOPYUBKCHYSCH OPHYPEOKKKH YAKHKNBNI AYUKYE, BSHONKMEMMNI HG RPSASH. schRYU YNMYARPSYZHKH ONKSVKHKYU MYUGBYUMKHE "TKEIRYU". ONGDMEE B OSYAINBSHU SYARPNIYARBUU DKЪ PC-132
NR NONPMNI AYUKYH-RPSASH NRYUGYUKHYAE KH GYULEMHKH EE o-NAPUGMSHL OPNTHKEL. oPHLEMEMKHE OSYAYNBSHU SYARYUMNBNY FEKNAINBNTSN RHOYU GMYUVHREKEMN SKSVIHKN YUSCHPNDHMYULHVEYAYKHE X SHYYAOXYURYUZHNMMSHE UYUPYUREPHYARKHYH YAMYUPDNB, SOPNYARHKN XU HGTSNR NBKEMKHE, NAEYAOEVHKN BSHIANISCH MYUDEFMNYARE YAUNDU YAMYUPDNB.
th 1942 Ts. ASHKH YANGYUMSH YAKEDSCHYKHE NYAMNBMSHE YUBKHYUZHNMMSHE OSYAINBSHE SYARYUMNBYKH: mu YAYULNKERYUU x-153. x-16 X xK-2 DKЪ YAMYUPЪDNB PC-82 X paya-82 (APNMEANIMSHE) OPHLEMKHYAE OSYAYNBSHE SYARYUMNBYKH DKHMNI 1007 LL. dKKHMYU MUOPYUBKYCHYKHU YANYARYUBKYUKYU 835 LL, VHYAKN MYUPYUBKYCHYKHU - 8. BEYA BYAYEI PUYERMNI YAHYARELSH 23 YTS. MU YAYULNKERYU yaa DK YAMYUPDNB PC-132 X paya-132 OPHLEMKKHYAE OSYAYNBSHE SYARYUMNBYKH DKHMNI 1434 LL. dKKHMYU HU MYUPYUBKYCHYKHU YANYARYUBKYUKYU 1130 LL, VHYAKN MYUPYUBKYCHYKHU - 10. BEYA BYAYEI PUYERMNI YAHYARELSH 63 YTS. MU YAYULNKERYUU xK-2 DKYAMYUP'DNB PC-132 X paya-132 OPHLEMKKHYAE OSYAYNBSHE SYARYUMNBYKH DKHMNI 1434 LL. dKKHMYU HU MYUPYUBKYCHYKHU YANYARYUBKYU 1130 LL. vHYAKN MUOPYUBKYCHYKHU - 8. BEYA BYAEI PUYERMNI YAHYARELSH 50 YTS.
pya-82 OND YPSHKNL HYARPEAHREK kYutsts-3
GDEYAE ME GP YAYUGYUMN "NYAMNBMSHE RHOSH OSYAYNBSHU SYARYUMNBNY." DEKN B RNL, VRN B bbya, YYUY, BOPNVEL, X B YUPLXX, X B blt, HGTSNRYUBKHBYUKNYAE GMYUVHREKEMNE VHYAKN ONKSYSYARYUPMSHU OSYAINBSHU SYARYUMNBNY DKЪ 82-LL X 132-LL PEYURH BMSHU YAMYUP'DNB.
oEPBNE B LHPE ANEBNE OPHLEMEMKHE MNBNTSN PUYERMNTSN NPSFKH YANYARNKNYAE B 1939 Ts. NBYUKN OEPBNE B HYARNPHH YUBHYUZHHH GBEMN HYARPEAHREKEY-PUYERNMNYAZHEB. b ECN YANYARYUB BUNDHKN 5 KHYARPEAHREKEY x-16, BNNPSFEMMSHU PEYURHBMSHLH YAMYUPYULH PC-82. 20 YUBTSSYARYU 1939 C. B 16 VYYANB YANBERYAYHE KERVHYH x. lHUYIKEMINE, I. oHLEMNB, b. TEDNYANB X r. rYUVEMYN OND YNLYUMDNBYUMHEL YUOHRYUMYU m. gBNMYUPEBU BSHKEREKH MU BSHONKMEMKHE ANEBNTSN GYUDYUMKH ON OPHYPSHRKHCH MYUKHU BNIYAY. mYUD KHMHEI TPNMRYU NMH BYARPERHKHYAE I ЪONMYAYHLH HYARPEAHREKOLH. ON YAHTSMYUKS YNLYUMDHPYU BYAE OREPN OPNHGBEKH NDMNBPELEMMSHI PUYERMSHI GYUKO I PUYAYARNMH NYNKN YHKNLERPYU X YAAHKKH DBYU ЪONMYAYKH YYULNKERYU. YANBERYAYKHE KHYARPEAHREKH-PUYERNMNYAZHSH SVIYARBNBUKH B VERSHPMYUJYURKH BNGDSMSHU ANYU X YAAHKKH OPH SCHRNL RPKHMYUDZHYURE ЪONMYAYKHU YYULNKERNB. gBEMN YUOHRYUMYU gBNMYUPEBU ME ONREPKN MH NDMNI LYUKHMSH.
schRKH ZHTPSH NASHVMN OPKHBNDHKH BYAE LYUYARHRSHE YUBRNPSH, OKHYUBKHE N MESOPIUBKELSHU PYYERYUU, KH ... YARYUBKHKH RNVIS. NDMUYN S BMHLYUREKEMNTSN VKHRYUREK BNGMKHYUER BNOPNYA - ONVELS FE RNTSDU BYAE KHYARPEAHREKH ME BNNPSFYUKH PEYURKHBMSHLKH YAMYUP'DYULH KH ME YAMKKH I MHU OSKELERMN-OSEVMNE B NNPSFEMHE? mu YAYULNL DEKE SYAOEMNE OPHLEMEMHE PC-82 OH ЪONMYAYHL HYARPEAHREKL ASHKN NASYAKNBKEMN YAREVEMHEL YPYUIME AKYUTSNOPHRMSHU NAYARNREKEYARB. bN-OEPBSHU, YAPYUANRYUK TUYRNP BMEGYUOMNYARKH - ЪONMZHSH ONMYUVYUKS OPKHMYKKH PYUGPSHBSH PEYURKHBMSHU YAMYUP'DNB GYU PYUGPSHBSH 76-LL GEMKHRMSHU YAMYUP'DNB. bN-BRNPSHU, ЪONMYAYKHE HYARPEAHREKH KEREKH TsNPKHGNMRYUKEMN I ONYARNMMNI YAYNPNYARECH B OKNRMN YANLYMSRNL YARPNCH. YARPEKAYU FE MESOPYUBKELSHLH YUBKHYUZHNMMSHLH PUYERYULH I YNMRYURMSHL BGPSHBYUREKEL ON LYUMEBPHPSCHYHL HYARPEAHREKIL PYUBMNYAHKEMYU YARPEKEAE “B AEKSHY YABER, YUY B YNOEEV YS."
b UNDE YANBERYAYN-THMKЪMDYAYNI BNIMSH (1939-1940 CC.) 6 DBSULNRNPMSHU ANLAYUPDHPNBYKHYNB yaa ASHKH NYAMYYEMSH OSAYINBSHLH SYARYUMNBYULH DK PUYER PC-132. oSYAYKH PUYER PC-132 OPNHGBNDHKHYAE ON MUGELMSHL ZHEKL.
b 1940 Ts. b 1940 Ts. PUYER PC-82 X 31.68 RSHYA. PUYER PC-132.
b 1942 Ts. YUBKHYUZHNMMSHE YAMYUPDSH PC-82 X PC-132 ASHKH LNDEPMKHGKHPNBUMSH X ONKSVHKH KHMDEYASH l-8 X l-13.
ONKHTSNMMSHE YARPEKEASH URURMSHLH PEYURHBMSHLH YAMYUP'DYULH pya-82 X pya-132, OPNBEDEMMSHE B mho yub bbya yu, RYU FE YUY X NOSHR ANEBNTSN OPHLEMEMKH хK-2 MU TPNMRE, ONYUGYUKH MEDNYARYURNVMSCH SHTTEYRHBMNYARE SHRNTSN BKhDYu NPSFKH OPH DEYARBKHH OH LYUKNPYUGLEPMSHL ZHEKL BBKHDS ANKENNTSN PYUYAYAEKHBYUMH YAMYUPDNB X, YAKEDNBUREKEMN, LYUKNI BEPNЪRMNYARKH ONOYUDYUMKH B ZHEKE.
yaPEDMKHI OPNZHEMR ONYUDYUMKHI pya-82 B RYUMY RNVYKH MYUBNDYKH OPH YARPEKEAE I DHYARYUMZHKH 400-500 LERPNB, ONYUGYUMMSHI B LUREPHYUKYU NRVERYU, YANYARYUBKHK 1.1%, Yu B YNKNMMS RYU MYNB - 3.7%, OPH SCHRNL HG 186 BSHOSYEMMSHU YAMYUP'DNB ASHKN ONKSVEMN BYAETSN 7 OPILSHU ONOYUDYUMKHI. bSHYANRYU ONDUNDU Y ZHEKH -100 X 400 LERPNB, STSKSH OKYUMKHPNBYUMKH - 5-10 X 30 YANNRBERYARBEMMN, DUKEMNYARE OPHZHEKKHBYUMKH - 800 LERPNB. YARPEKAAYU BEKYUYAE NDHMNVMSHLH YAMYUP'DYULH H GUKONL ON 2, 4 X 8 YAMYUP'DNB.
oPH YARPEKEAYU BSHIAMKHKNYAE, VRN pya-82 LNFER MYUMEYARKH ONPUFEMKHE MELEZHYHL KETSIKHL RYUMYUL RHOYU Pz II Ausf.F, Pz 38(t) Ausf.C, YU RUYFE APNMELYUHME Sd Kfz 250 RNAEIN OPH OPLNL ONOYUDYUMXX. pYUGPSHB pya-82 B MEONYAPEDYARBEMMNI AKKHGNYARKH NR RYUMYU (0.5-1 LERPYU) MKHYYUYNTSN ONPUFEMH ELS ME MYUMNYAHR. MUKHLEMEEE BEPNЪRMNE NRYKNMEMHE ONKSVYUKNYAE B GYUKOE HG 4-U pyaNB OPH STSKE OKYUMHPNBYUMKH 30.
PEGSKERYURSH YARPEKEA pya-132 ASHKKH EYE USFE. SYAKNBH YURYU ASHKH RE FE, VRN H OPH YARPEKEAE PC-82, MN DUKEMNYARE OSYAYU - 500-600 LERPNB. BEPNЪRMNE YPSTSNBNE NRYKNMEMKHE ON DUKEMNYARKH PC-132 OPH STSKYU OKYUMKHPNBYUMKH xK-2 25-30 OPHLEPMN B 1.5 PUGU ASHKN BSHYE, VEL DKЪ PC-82, YU DKЪ STSKNB OKYUMH PNBYUMKH 5-10 -OPYURKHVEYAYKH YANBOYUDYUKN.
dK ONPYUFEMH KETSINTSN X YAPEDMETSN MELEZHYNTSN RYUMYU YAMYUPDNL PC-132 RPEANBUKNYAE RNKEIN OPILNE ONYUDYUMKHE, ONYAINKEYS OPH PUGPSHBE YAMYUPDYU BAKHGH RYUMYU, ONYAK EDMKHI YASYYARBEMMSHU ONBPEFDEMKHI ME ONKSVIUK. NDMUYN DNAKHREYA OPOLNTSN ONOYUDYUMKH ASKN NVEME KH NVEME YAKNFMN - HG 134 BSHYARPEKNB PC-132, YADEKYUMMSH B ONKKHTSNMMSHU SYAKNBKHU KERVKHYULKH I PUGKKHVMNI YAREOEMECH ONDC NRNBYKH, ME ASHKN ONKSVEMN MH NDMNTSN ONOYUDYUMH B RYUMY…
nRLERHL, VRN SYAPEDMEMHE PEGSKERYURRNB YARPEKEA PEYUYRHBMSHLH YAMYUPJULH, OPNBEDEMMNE YAOEZHYUKHYARYULH mho yub bbya AEG SVERY YAREOOEMH ONDTSNRNBKEMNYARH KERVKHYNB, VHYAKYU I MYUPЪDNB B GYUKOE X STSCKNB OKYUMKHPNBYUMHЪ ЪРСПЛНБХУУ, MEKEGЪ OPKHGMURE YNPPEYRMSHL OPH NZHEMYE PEYUKEMNI SHTTEYRKHBMNYARKH PC OPH DEYARBKHH OH MYUGELMSHL ZHEKL.
nRPHZHYUREKEMSHI FE NOSHR ANEBNTSN OPHLEMEMKH PC MU TPNMRE NAZYAMYERYA TSKYUBMSHL NAPUGNL ONBSHYEMMSHLH (600-700 LERPNB) DUKEMNYARLH OSYAYU YAMYUPDNB X ME HYAONKE GNBYUMHEL BYAETSN YNLOKEYRYU PC B NDMNL GYUKOYE.
xMFEMEPMN-REUMHVEYAYKHI YANYARYUB MEINRNPSHU YARPNEBSHU YUBHYUVYUYAREI, OSHRYUYAE ONBSHYAHRE ANEBSC SHTTEIRKHBMNYARE xK-2, OPNBNDHK YANAYARBEMMSHLH YAHKYULH DNPUANRYS LRSPLN BHYU, NAEYAOEVHBYU ONDBEYAYS MU YAYULNKER SBEKHVEMMNTSN VHYAKYU PC. MUOPHLEP, B MYUVYUKE 1942 TsNDYU MY yaEBEPN-GYUOYUDMNL TPNMRE DBU YAEPHIMSHU hKYU ASHKH NANPSDNBYUMSH LEYARMSHLH SLEKEZHYULH OND ONDBEYAYS 8 PC-82 X 8 PC-132 X GYUREL XIAOEMN HYAO SHRYUMSH B ANYU. yPNLE SCHRNTSN, B YARPNEBSHU VYUYARU HLEKHYAE BYUPHYUMRSH "TSNPAYURSHU" I ONDBEYAYNI 24-U PC-82. MYALNRP MU ONBSHYEMKHE ANEBNI SHTTEYRKHBMNYARKH DNPUANRYUMMSHU RYUHL NAPYUGNL LRSPLNBKHYNB, NR SYARYUMNBYKH MU xK-2 SBEKHVEMMNTSN VHYAKYU PC, BBHDS GMYUVHREKEMNTSN YAM KHFEMKH YAYNPNYARKH ONKERYU LYUHMSH, BYAINPE NRYUGYUKHYAE.
b YUPYAEMYUKE xK-2, MYUPЪDS I PEYUYRHBMSHLH YAMYUPYULH pay-132, KHLEBHU APNMEANIMSC ANEBSC VYUARE, YUY YAPEDYARBN ANPEASH I MELEZHYNI APNMEREUMKHYNI Y SHRNLS BPELEMH OPN VMN SIPEOKHKYA PEYURKHBMSHY YAMYUPЪD pntya-132 I SKSVIEMMNI, OH YAPYUBMEMHCH I pay-132 XKH PC-132, YSVMNYARECH YARPEKEASH.
aNEBYU VYUYARE YAMYUPYU pntya-132 NAEYAOEVKHBUKYU YAYBNGMNE OPNAHRKHE (OPKH OPILNL ONOYUDYUMHH) APNMH YAPEDMKHU X RFEFKSHU MELEZHYKHU RYUMYNB.
oPH PUGPSHBE pntya-132 BAKKHGH RYUMYU MU PUYAYARNMHH 1 L NR METSN OPKH STSKE LEYARYU B 30 YKHMERKHVEYAYNI SCHMEPTSKHH NAYNKYNB ASHKN DNYARYURNVMN DK OPNAHRKH MELEZHYNI RYUMY NBNI APNMH RNKYHMNI DN 15 LL. OPH STSKE LEYARYU B 60 PUGPSHB pntya-132 MU PUYAYARNMHH DN 3-U LERPNB NR RYUMYU NAEYAOEVHBYUK OPNAHRKHE NAYNKYULH RYUMINBNI APNMH RNKYKHMNI 30 LL, PUGLEPSH OPNANHM OPH SCHRNL HLEKH BEKHVKHMSH, PYUBMSHE B YAPEDMEL (20-25)U(35-80) LL.
oPKH OPILNL ONOYUDYUMKHH pntya-132 B ANPR, MYUOPHLEP, LRSPPLNBNTSN NPSDKH StuG IV (HKH B ANPR KHYARPEAHREK RUMYNB Jgd Pz IV/70) 30-LL APNM OPNAKHBUKYUYAE, Yu NPSDHE, NANP SDNBYUMKHE KH SHCHYKHOYUF BMSRPKH RYUMYU, YUY OPYUBKHKN, BSHBNDHKHYAE KH YARPN. oNOYUDYUMHE pntya-132 B LNRNPMSCH VYuYARE Pz. IV OPHBNDHKN Y ONREPE RYUMYU.
th YANFYUKEMKHCH, MEYALNRP MU SBEKHVEMHE YSVMNYARH YARPEKEASH pntya-132, KH SHTTEYRKHBMNYARE OPH YARPEKEAE ON RYUMYUL X DPSTSNI APNMEREUMHYE B PYYYAPEDRNVEMMSHU ANEBSHU ONP JDYUU, Y YNRNPSHL MELJSH ONBYAELEYARMN OEPEKKH Y SHRNLS BPELEMKH, ASHKYU BYAE FE MESDNBKERBNPHREKEMNI. MUHKSVIKHE PEGSKERYURSH pntya-132 DUBUKH OPH YARPEKEAE ON YPSOMSHL WINDOWS YUDMSHL ZHEKL - LNRNLEUUMHGHPNBYUMMSHE YNKNMMSH, F.D. YANYARYUBSH, YAYKYUDSH, AYURUPEKH ONKEBNI KH GEMKHRMNI YUPRHKKEPKHKH KH R.D.
pYUGPSIEMKH B llrn MELEZHYNTSN RYUMYU Pz Kpfw 38(t) OPILSHL ONOYUDYUMHEL pya-132
Options [edit]
- RS-82
and
RS-132
- earlier high-explosive fragmentation warheads (HE-Frag) - RBS-82
and
RBS-132
- armor-piercing warhead (APW) - ROFS-82
and
ROFS-132
- later high-explosive fragmentation warhead (HE-Frag) - M-8
– Improved RS-82 with a much larger warhead (0.64 kg (1.4 lb) explosive) and rocket motor for the BM-8 Katyusha [
link
] - M-13
- Improved RS-132 with a much larger warhead (4.9 kg (10.8 lb) explosive) and rocket motor for the BM-13 Katyusha.
Device
The projectile consists of a head warhead and a reactive part (powder jet engine). The warhead is equipped with an explosive charge, which is detonated using contact (AM-A) or non-contact (AGDT-A) fuses. A jet engine has a combustion chamber in which a propellant charge is placed in the form of cylindrical blocks of smokeless powder with an axial channel. On the outer part of both ends of the chamber there are centering bulges with guide pins screwed into them. An igniter made from black gunpowder is used to ignite the powder charge. The gases formed during the combustion of powder bombs flow through the nozzle, in front of which there is a diaphragm (grid) that prevents the bombs from being ejected through the nozzle. Stabilization of the projectile in flight is ensured by a tail stabilizer made of four stamped steel feathers. The projectile head is blunt, with cuts on the ogive.
Technical characteristics (RS-82) [edit]
- Case diameter:
82 mm (3.2
in
) - Wingspan:
200 mm (8 in) - Length:
600 mm (24 in) - Weight:
6.8 kg (15 lbs) - Explosive weight:
0.36 kg (0.8 lb) - Splintering Radius:
7 m (23 ft) - Top speed:
340 m/s (1,115 ft/s) - Range:
6.2 km (3.9 mi) - Spread:
16 arcmil
Technical specifications (RS-132)[edit]
- Case diameter:
132 mm (5.2
in
) - Wingspan:
300 mm (11 in) - Length:
845 mm (33 in) - Weight:
23.0 kg (50 lb) - Explosive weight:
0.9 kg (2 lb) - Splintering Radius:
10 m (33 ft) - Top speed:
350 m/s (1,150 ft/s) - Range:
7.1 km (4.4 mi) - Spread:
16 arcmil
