Historical reference.
Also on topic:
ARMORED VEHICLES
In the 19th century Attempts were made to create armored vehicles driven by steam engines, which, however, turned out to be unsuitable for such a purpose. By 1914, after the invention of the internal combustion engine, a significant number of armored vehicles entered service with the armies of the major powers. They were successfully used at the initial stage of the First World War, but after the fighting became positional in nature, the effectiveness of the use of armored vehicles decreased due to poor cross-country ability. (Subsequently, they turned out to be indispensable when hostilities unfolded in the flat areas of Russia, Egypt and between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.)
Meanwhile, the positional war on the Western Front had reached a dead end: the trenches were surrounded by rows of barbed wire barriers, and even the successfully launched offensive could not develop due to the inability to deliver reinforcements and ammunition in a timely manner across the terrain riddled with shell craters. At the end of 1914, Lieutenant Colonel of the British Army E. Swinton, drawing attention to the American tracked tractor, proposed creating a tracked armored fighting vehicle as an anti-machine gun weapon. The proposal was supported by W. Churchill, then Secretary of the Navy. The development of new weapons was carried out in conditions of increased secrecy under the guise of creating water tanks of a new design for use in the area between the Tigris and Euphrates (hence the name “tank”, English “tank, reservoir”). On September 15, 1916, at the end of the Battle of the Somme, British troops used 32 tanks for the first time. These vehicles had a huge psychological impact on the German infantry, which surrendered their positions without a fight. On November 20, 1917, at the Battle of Cambrai, British troops for the first time carried out the massive use of tanks (over 200 vehicles) to break through German positional defenses and repel an enemy counterattack.
Also on topic:
WAR
The first tank models were characterized by slow speed, clumsiness and low reliability of the mechanisms. The tactics for their use had to be developed based on experience gained during battles. A big problem turned out to be communication both between individual vehicles and tank units, and between tanks and infantry. Although by 1918 tanks had allowed armies to regain mobility, they themselves remained suitable only for direct infantry support due to their short range and limited maneuverability.
Russians don't give up: stronger than tank armor
This is an article about the people who made possible the victory in the Battle of Kursk and the tank battle of Prokhorovka, the 70th anniversary of which falls on these days. These are just some of those whose will to win was stronger than tank armor and about whom the Wehrmacht Major General, Chief of Staff of the 4th Panzer Army, participant in the Battle of Kursk, Mellenthin Friedrich von Wilhelm wrote in his book “Tank Battles 1939-1945: Combat Use tanks in the Second World War": "The extraordinary development of Russian armored forces deserves the closest attention from those who study the experience of the war... It is not only a matter of the skillful leadership of individual gifted individuals; people, mostly apathetic and ignorant, without any preparation, without any ability, acted intelligently and showed amazing self-control. The tank crews of the Red Army were tempered in the crucible of war, their skills grew immeasurably. Such a transformation must have required exceptionally high organization and unusually skillful planning and leadership... A Russian soldier values his life no more than the lives of his comrades. Neither bomb explosions nor shell explosions affect him... We also find an indication of this in Caulaincourt in his description of the Battle of Borodino in 1812... Caulaincourt cites the following remark of Napoleon: “These Russians do not surrender alive. There's nothing we can do."
Tanker of the 12th Wehrmacht Panzer Division Hans Becker recalls them: “On the Eastern Front I met people who could be called a special race. Already the first attack turned into a battle for life and death.” His compatriots, artillerymen of anti-tank guns, remembered the first hours of the war because “during the attack we came across a light Russian T-26 tank, we immediately shot it straight from the 37 graph paper. When we began to approach, a Russian leaned out waist-high from the tower hatch and opened fire on us with a pistol. It soon became clear that he had no legs; they were torn off when the tank was hit. And, despite this, he fired at us with a pistol!”
Becker's fellow countrymen will also remember the cook of the 91st Tank Regiment, Ivan Sereda, who in August 1941 near Dvinsk captured a German tank with an ax - sneaking up to it, climbing onto the armor, covering the viewing slots with a piece of tarpaulin and disabling a machine gun, and the tank lieutenant Agzam Tayupov, who climbed out to extinguish his damaged T-34, the rest of whose crew was killed in a battle near the village of Polunino north-west of Rzhev. The wounded and shell-shocked lieutenant fired back from the Germans rushing from all sides to the last bullet. Then, throwing away the machine gun, he grabbed a tank crowbar and began to hammer at the Germans with it, who were taken aback by such impudence and decided to take the hero alive. Tayupov managed to hold out until his own people arrived and, jumping on the T-34 that arrived in time, went for a new tank...
At the end of June 1941, the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht fought for two days with a single KV tank. Four Soviet tank crews against the Rous battle group, which included the II Tank Regiment, the I/4th Motorized Regiment, the II/76th Artillery Regiment, a company of the 57th Tank Engineer Battalion, a company of the 41st Tank Destroyer Battalion, Battery II/ 411th Anti-Aircraft Regiment, 6th Motorcycle Battalion! This episode was described in detail in his memoirs by the commander of the Kamfgrupp, Colonel-General Erhard Raus, who fought the entire war on the Eastern Front, passing through Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, and ended it as commander of the 3rd Panzer Army. Of the 427 pages of his memoirs, Routh devoted 12 to a two-day battle with a single Russian tank, which destroyed a convoy of trucks heading towards the Germans from the captured town of Raiseniai, an artillery battery, dozens of Germans and several of the 50 (fifty) tanks that attacked him from three sides. The Nazis managed to destroy the Soviet heroes only with the help of cunning, from the rear, from an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, after which, according to Erhard Routh, “...deeply shocked by this heroism, we buried them with full military honors. They fought until their last breath..."
Tank KV-1, shot from anti-aircraft guns
On July 3, 1941, the legendary T-28 avenger tank carried out an impressive raid through the streets of Minsk, single-handedly fighting the Nazi garrison of the city. The crew - senior sergeant-super-conscript, hero of the battles in Spain, Finnish and Khalkhin Gol Dmitry Malko, tank major Vasechkin, cadets Nikolai Pedan, Alexander Rachitsky, Fedor Naumov and Sergei (last name remained unknown) - managed to cover almost half the city, destroying 14 trucks , about a dozen tanks and armored vehicles, 3 artillery batteries and over 350 fascists. Shot at point-blank range by anti-tank guns, the “fiery tank,” already on fire, continued to move and destroy the Nazis, reaching the area of present-day Komarovka and Y. Kolas Square. Here the crew made their last stand, firing to the last bullet from their personal weapons. Some of the heroes died, N. Pedan was captured, F. Naumov was hidden and then transported to the partisans by the Minsk residents, D. Malko, wounded in the head by shrapnel, managed to cross the front line and subsequently led the T-34 into battle, liberating Belarus and Poland.
A similar feat was accomplished in the fall of 1941 by another “fire tank” T-34, commanded by senior sergeant Stepan Khristoforovich Gorobets (pictured), who on October 17 broke through the entire Nazi-occupied Tver, from west to east. Despite the gun being damaged by a German shell, during this raid the PzKpfw III tank, several motorcycles, anti-tank guns, about 20 vehicles and dozens of Nazis were destroyed by ramming (machine gun fire and tracks).
Z. G. Kolobanov and the crew of his KV-1, August 1941
The most effective tanker, Dmitry Lavrinenko, managed to fight for only 2.5 months in 1941, but during this time he managed to destroy 52 enemy tanks - a result that no one in the Red Army was able to surpass until the end of the war. The second most effective was the hero of the Finnish war, senior lieutenant Zinovy Grigorievich Kolobanov. On August 19, 1941, in the area of the Voyskovitsy state farm, Leningrad Region, 5 (instead of 11) tanks of the understaffed 3rd company under the command of Kolobanov destroyed 43 enemy tanks, losing only 1 (one) of their own. The tank of Zinoviy Grigorievich himself, having received 135 hits from German shells, did not leave the battle and set an absolute record, destroying 22 German tanks in 3 hours! From the memoirs of Z.G. Kolobanova:
“...The crew of a tank is more than a family. After all, a tank is a machine that obeys the team. This requires complete coherence and mutual understanding. Otherwise there is no way to fight. ...Wonderful, wonderful people. I understood and felt everyone: the most experienced driver-mechanic Kolya Nikiforov, the gun commander, a real master of his craft Andrei Usov, the very brave radio operator Pasha Kiselkov, the loader, a good person Kolya Rodenkov... I was often asked: was I scared? It’s awkward to answer, they might take you for a braggart. But I didn’t feel any fear. I'll explain why. I am a military man. After retiring, I worked in the national economy for 23 years. But all my life I still felt like a military man. Then the division commander gave me the order to “stand to the death.” This is not some kind of emotional formulation, but an exact order. I accepted it for execution. He was ready, if necessary, to die. And I no longer had any fears and could not have them... What does the tanker remember about the battle? Sight crosshair. Here the tension is such that time is compressed, there is not a second for extraneous thoughts. I remember how my guys shouted: “Hurray!”, “It’s burning!..” But I can’t restore any details of this battle.”
Tank crew of Lieutenant Dmitry Lavrinenko
The wounded crew of the destroyed tank of senior sergeant Ivan Lyubushkin destroyed 9 enemy tanks in one battle. From the memoirs of Marshal of the Armored Forces M.E. Katukov, who commanded the 4th Tank Brigade in the battles for Moscow: “An excellent tank commander, Lyubushkin was also an excellent marksman from a tank gun... On October 6, in a battle near the village of Pervy Voin, he personally destroyed 9 tanks and to a company of enemy infantry. Shy by nature, Lyubushkin loved to dance, and, I must say, he did it skillfully and beautifully. Here, as in shooting, he had no equal.” I. Lyubushkin himself recalled this fight like this:
“Then, under the First Warrior, I received an order to go to the left flank and take a place for a tank duel. As soon as we reached the designated point, one shell hit my car, but did not penetrate the armor. I myself sat at the cannon and commanded the crew: “Give me the blanks!” Let's see whose steel is stronger." And he started hitting. The shells kept hitting our armor, but I continued to fire. One German tank was set on fire, then a second one, followed by a third. All crew members handed me shells. I hit the fourth tank - it’s not on fire, but I see tankers jumping out of it. He sent a fragmentation shell and finished it off. Then he knocked out a tank.
At this time, some Nazi managed to hit my car in the side. This shell penetrated the armor and exploded inside the tank. The crew was blinded. Chad. Radio operator Duvanov and driver Fedorov groaned... I continue to fire, but then I hear Duvanov say: “My leg is torn off.” I shout to Fedorov—by that time he had already caught his breath a little: “Start the engine!”
... The engine started, but the gears, except reverse, did not turn on. Somehow we crawled away in reverse and took cover behind our heavy KV tank. There they bandaged the radio operator's leg and removed the spent cartridges. It would be necessary to leave the battle and make repairs, but then I saw German tanks hidden in the bushes and firing. Wow, they were very clear to me, it was a pity to leave them.
My main sight is broken, but the auxiliary sight remains. I tell the guys: “Give me the shells!” Let’s knock again.” And he started beating the bastards.
The Nazis see that our tank is still firing, and they start hitting us again. One shell hit the turret, did not penetrate, but a piece of armor inside flew off from the impact and hit me on my right leg, which was on the trigger device. The leg became unconscious. I thought that she was no longer there; Now that’s it, I’ve shot myself forever, like Duvanov. But I felt it - there was no blood, it was intact. He put his hands to the side and started shooting with his left leg. Inconvenient. Then he began to bend over and press the trigger with his right hand...
Finishing this fight in the bushes, I still lit another tank. Our other cars rushed forward, but I only had reverse gear. I left the battle. I handed over the wounded man to the orderlies, and my leg came back to life on its own, and the car was repaired in two hours. And I left again that day to fight.”
For that battle, Ivan Timofeevich Lyubushkin (pictured) received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and radio operator Duvanov received the Order of the Red Banner.
The KV tank, commanded by Lieutenant Pavel Danilovich Gudz, who became famous on the first day of the war for the first tank ram, in December 1941, on the outskirts of Volokolamsk, grappled with 18 enemy tanks, destroying 10 of them, as well as 4 anti-tank guns and several dozen Nazis ….
Lieutenant P.D. Gudz departs in his KV from the parade on November 7, 1941 on Red Square to the front.
Finally, as a kind of appendix, two letters from 1941.
Letter from tanker A. Golikov to his wife
Dear Tonechka!
I don't know if you will ever read these lines? But I know for sure that this is my last letter.
Now there is a hot, deadly battle. Our tank is hit. There are fascists all around us. We have been fighting off the attack all day. Ostrovsky Street is littered with corpses in green uniforms; they look like large motionless lizards.
Today is the sixth day of the war. We were left alone - Pavel Abramov and me. You know him, I wrote to you about him. We don't think about saving our lives. We are warriors and are not afraid to die for our Motherland. We think how much more the Germans would pay for us, for our lives...
I am sitting in a riddled and mutilated tank. The heat is unbearable, I'm thirsty. There is not a drop of water. Your portrait lies on my lap. I look at him, at your blue eyes, and I feel better - you are with me. I want to talk to you, a lot, a lot, frankly, like before, there in Ivanovo...
On June 22, when war was declared, I thought about you, I thought, when will I return now, when will I see you and press your sweet head to my chest? Or maybe never. After all, the war... When our tank first met the enemy, I hit him with a gun, mowed him down with machine-gun fire in order to destroy more fascists and bring the end of the war closer, so that I could see you sooner, my dear. But my dreams did not come true...
The tank is shaking from enemy attacks, but we are still alive. There are no shells, cartridges are running out. Pavel hits the enemy with targeted fire, and I “rest” and talk to you. I know this is the last time. And I want to talk for a long, long time, but there’s no time.
Do you remember how we said goodbye when she accompanied me to the station? You then doubted my words that I would love you forever. She offered to sign so that I would belong to you alone for the rest of my life. I willingly complied with your request. There is a stamp on your passport, and on my receipt, that we are husband and wife. This is good. It’s good to die when you know that there, far away, there is a person close to you, he remembers me, thinks about me, loves me. "It's good to be loved..."
Through the holes of the tank I see the street, green trees, bright, bright flowers in the garden. You, the survivors, after the war will have a life as bright, colorful, like these flowers, and happy... It’s not scary to die for it... Don’t cry. You probably won’t come to my grave, and will it even be a grave?
June 28, 1941
Letter from tanker Ivan Kolosov to fiancee Vara Zhuravleva
October 25, 1941
Hello, my Varya!
No, you and I will not meet.
Yesterday at noon we smashed another Nazi column. The fascist shell pierced the side armor and exploded inside. While I was driving the car into the forest, Vasily died. My wound is cruel.
I buried Vasily Orlov in a birch grove. It was light inside. Vasily died without having time to say a single word to me, without conveying anything to his beautiful Zoya and white-haired Mashenka, who looked like a dandelion covered in fluff.
So out of three tankers, only one remained.
In the dark I drove into the forest. The night passed in agony, a lot of blood was lost. Now, for some reason, the pain burning through my entire chest has subsided and my soul is calm.
It's a shame that we didn't do everything. But we did everything we could. Our comrades will chase the enemy, who should not walk through our fields and forests.
I would never have lived my life like this if it weren’t for you, Varya. You always helped me: at Khalkhin Gol and here. Probably, after all, those who love are kinder to people. Thank you, dear! A person gets old, but the sky is forever young, like your eyes, which you can only look into and admire. They will never grow old or fade.
Time will pass, people will heal their wounds, people will build new cities, grow new gardens. Another life will come, other songs will be sung. But never forget the song about us, about the three tankmen.
You will have beautiful children, you will still love.
And I am happy that I am leaving you with great love for you.
Yours, Ivan Kolosov
The letter was presented to Varvara Petrovna Zhuravleva in 1971...
The Second World War.
Also on topic:
MILITARY ENGINEERING
Military theorists, appreciating the capabilities of tanks, advocated the creation of formations of armored forces of a new type - highly mobile, including units and units of other branches of the military, capable of conducting combat operations independently, penetrating deep into enemy defenses. Technological progress contributed to the development of armored forces: more powerful tank engines, stronger armor and reliable radio communications appeared. Germany was one of the first to create armored divisions of this type, giving them a major role in the “blitzkrieg” strategy. The victories of the German forces in 1939–1943 and the Allied ones in 1943–1945 were largely the result of the decisive and skillful actions of armored forces, supported by tactical air strikes. The new tank divisions included motorized infantry, artillery and sappers, trained and equipped to operate together with tanks. Tank formations in World War II broke through the enemy’s defenses and rapidly moved into the depths, sowing panic and destroying their logistics support system. In open terrain in the Soviet Union, northern Africa and western France, armored forces became a decisive factor in the success of military operations; they proved necessary even in the mountainous areas of Italy and the Balkans.
In the countries of the Pacific basin, difficult terrain covered with jungles, including swamps, limited, but did not exclude the use of armored forces. A new type of such troops was created, consisting of amphibious tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs), for amphibious operations to capture coral islands (atolls), the reefs around which did not allow conventional landing craft to approach the shore.
Soviet Union
February 13 (according to the article January 31) 1918 Tsentrobron (Central Council for the management of all armored units of the RSFSR) was formed by order of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs based on the decision of the 2nd All-Russian Armored Automobile Congress, held at the end of December 1917 in Petrograd. At first he headed only armored vehicles (automotive armored squads), and from March 1918 he began to manage armored trains.August 30, 1918 The Central Armor Directorate was created by order of the People's Commissar for Military Affairs on the basis of Tsentrobroni. Main tasks: management of the production and restoration of damaged armored vehicles, formation of armored units of the Red Army, training and appointment of command staff and junior specialists of armored units, monitoring the correct combat use and technical condition of armored units in the field army.
January 31, 1919 The Main Armor Directorate (Glavbron) was created on the basis of the Central Armor Directorate. Main tasks: management of the armored units of the Red Army, technical management of the production of new and restoration of damaged military equipment, monitoring the use of armored units in the field army, supplying them with armored and vehicle equipment, management of the formation of armored units, training of specialists.
March 17, 1920 By order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic of March 17, 1920, in order to improve the management of the activities of armored forces on the fronts of the civil war, the Office of the Inspector of Armored Units was created at the Field Headquarters of the RVSR. The same order put into effect the states and regulations on the commanders of armored units of fronts and armies. In connection with the creation of the Office of the Inspector of Armored Units at the Field Headquarters of the RVSR, the Armor Directorate was transformed into the Armor Department of the Main Military Engineering Directorate. He supervised the formation of armored units and their logistical support.
On May 28, 1920, by Order of the RVSR No. 901/160 of May 28, 1920, the staff of the auto-tank detachment was put into operation. Therefore, May 28, 1920 can be considered the day of the birth of the tank forces of the Red Army.
September 6, 1920 The Instructions for the combat use of tanks were approved, which was essentially the first tank regulations of the Red Army
On May 16, 1921, by Order of the RVSR No. 974 of May 16, 1921, the Central Directorate of the Chief of Armor of the Red Army was created. The department consisted of the armor department, inspection, armor technical council, armor subcommittee and industrial armor.
August 31, 1922 By Order of the RVSR No. 2062/393 of August 31, 1921, peacetime staffing levels were established for all armored units. Armored car units were significantly enlarged. And the tank units were consolidated into auto-tank detachments “B” and “M”.
July 19, 1923 By Order of the RVSR No. 1657 of July 19, 1923, the Directorate of the Chief of Armor Forces was disbanded and its functions were distributed among five different departments: the production and repair of armored vehicles were transferred to the 5th Department of the Red Army Artillery Directorate; the design of new vehicles was transferred to the sections of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army; experimental work, production and repair of machines and tractors - to the Military Technical Directorate of the Head of the Main Supply Directorate of the Red Army; control over combat training and combat readiness of units is entrusted to the armored forces inspection, subordinate directly to the RVS of the Republic. A separate squadron of tanks also came under the command of the chief of artillery of the Red Army.
October 1924 The tank squadron was disbanded and a separate tank regiment was formed on its base, consisting of two battalions - personnel and training.
On June 2, 1926, the Command of the Red Army and the leadership of the GUVP VSNKh adopted a 3-year tank building program. Considerations about the quantity and quality of combat vehicles that needed to be created were based on calculations of the costs required to break through the enemy’s fortified defenses in an area of 10 km with the forces of two divisions with the possibility of developing success to a depth of 30 km and entering the operational space.
On July 18, 1928, the Revolutionary Military Council adopted as a basis the “System of tank, tractor, auto, and armored weapons of the Red Army,” compiled under the leadership of Deputy Chief of the General Staff V. K. Triandafilov. It operated until the end of the 30s in several successive editions for each five-year plan.
On July 30, 1928, the Council of People's Commissars approved the first five-year plan for the development and reconstruction of the Armed Forces of the USSR for 1928 - 32. According to him, by the end of the five-year plan, in addition to the production of 1,075 tanks, it was necessary to form an additional 3 new tank regiments. In July 1929, this plan was revised upward - by the end of the five-year plan, the Red Army was supposed to have 5.5 thousand tanks. In fact, for 1929 - 1933. industry produced 7.5 thousand tanks.
On June 17, 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council, at the suggestion of V.K. Triandafilov, adopted a resolution that stated: “Taking into account that the new type of weapon, which is armored forces, has not been sufficiently studied both in terms of its tactical use (for independent and in conjunction with infantry and cavalry), and in the sense of the most advantageous organizational forms, it is recognized as necessary to organize in 1929-1930. permanent experimental mechanized unit." A month later, the document was approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and, among other things, it stipulated a minimum program for the production of 3.5 thousand tanks during the years of the first five-year plan.
Summer 1929. A consolidated experimental mechanized regiment was created, commanded by Comrade. Kalinovsky. This regiment included a 2-company tank battalion, an artillery battery, an armored vehicle division and a motorized rifle battalion. The experienced regiment underwent comprehensive testing in various combat training situations, after which it was disbanded.
November 3, 1929 In accordance with the resolution of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated November 3, 1929, the Directorate for Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army (UMM) was created. UMM began its activities on November 15, 1929. It was formed from the automobile department of the Military Technical Directorate of the Red Army, the mechanical traction department of the Artillery Directorate of the Red Army and the Inspectorate of Armored Forces.
May 1930 The 1st experimental mechanized regiment was deployed to the 1st mechanized brigade (in 1931 it received the name of K. B. Kalinovsky). It was equipped with new MS-1 tanks. From that day on, the construction of mechanized troops began in the Red Army, the basis of which was to be mechanized brigades.
On May 19, 1930, by decree of the Presidium of the National Economy Council (VSNX) of the USSR, a permanent engineering and design bureau for tanks was created under the Mobilization Planning Directorate (MPU) under the leadership of Assistant Head of the Ordnance Association A. Adams.
July 15, 1930. On the basis of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Infantry School named after Comrade Frunze, which was moved to Orel, the 1st armored school in the country was organized.
On February 22, 1931, by Directive of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR and the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR No. 017127/ss dated February 22, 1931, the formation of an experienced mechanized brigade began.
On April 4, 1931, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, the 22nd Scientific Testing Armored Test Site (NIABP) of the Directorate of Mechanization and Motorization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was created (military unit No. 68054).
On August 1, 1931, the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR adopted the “Great Tank Program,” which stated that achievements in the field of tank construction (an increase in tank production - 170 units in 1930, the emergence of new models of armored vehicles) created strong preconditions for a radical change general operational-tactical doctrine for the use of tanks and demanded decisive organizational changes in the armored forces towards the creation of higher mechanized formations capable of independently solving problems both on the battlefield and throughout the operational depth of the modern battle front. The new high-speed materiel created the prerequisites for the development of the theory of deep combat and operations. The plans were consistent with the name: in the first year it was planned to give the army 10 thousand vehicles. The same decree created a commission to develop the organization of armored forces (ABTV).
On March 11, 1932, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR decided to form the first two mechanized corps (MK) in 1932, allocating for their creation one rifle division each from the Leningrad and Ukrainian Military Districts. In the fall of 1932, on the basis of the 11th infantry division in the Leningrad Military District, the 11th MK was formed, which received 11 BT-2 tanks, and another 14 combat vehicles took their place in the combat formation of the 45th MK in the Eastern Military District.
May 1932 The massive formation of separate mechanized brigades began. The 2nd was created in the Ukrainian Military District, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th were received by the Belarusian Military District.
May 13, 1932 Based on the order of the USSR STO, by order of the USSR RVS No. 039 dated May 13, 1932 in Moscow, on the basis of the Faculty of Mechanization and Motorization of the Military Technical Academy named after. F. E. Dzerzhinsky and the Moscow Automotive and Tractor Institute named after M. V. Lomonosov founded the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army (VAMM RKKA). Four faculties were created: command, operational, design and industrial. The formation of the Academy ended on October 1, 1932.
On October 26, 1932, by order of the People's Commissar of Heavy Engineering G. Ordzhonikidze, the Special Engineering Trust (SPETSMASHTREST) was created as part of the Leningrad Plant named after. Voroshilov (former), , 2nd VATO plant in Moscow and Kharkov Locomotive Plant (KhPZ) named after. Comintern. The management of the trust was tasked not only with ensuring the mass production of tanks in production, but also with carrying out development work to create new, more advanced combat vehicles.
November 22, 1934. According to the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the People's Commissariat of Defense dated November 22, 1934 and NKO Order No. 067 dated November 22, 1934, the Directorate of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army was renamed the Automotive and Tank Directorate of the Red Army (ABTU).
April 9, 1936 By NKO Order No. 055 dated April 09, 1936, ABTU was subordinated to the Main Directorate of Armaments and Technical Supply, and after its abolition, to the People's Commissar of Defense.
July 26, 1937 By NKO Order No. 0114 of July 26, 1937, the Armored Directorate reports directly to the People's Commissar of Defense.
1938 In connection with the transition to new states, from 3-tank to 5-tank mechanized brigades and corps were renamed tank.
July 22, 1939 In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of July 22, 1939, a commission was created to review the organizational structure of the troops, its work was led by Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. Among other issues, the commission also considered the issue of organizing tank forces. B. M. Shaposhnikov, G. I. Kulik and K. E. Voroshilov spoke in favor of liquidation, and S. K. Timoshenko, S. M. Budyonny and M. V. Zakharov - in favor of their preservation, but with a revision of the staff structure. Based on the results of the commission’s work, it was decided to have tank brigades (of two types: BT and T-26) and tank corps. Motorized rifle (rifle and machine gun) battalions were excluded from the former, and motorized rifle brigades from the latter. The released vehicles were used to staff the auto regiments.
October 11, 1939 By NKO Order No. 0156 of October 11, 1939, ABTU was subordinated to the newly organized Military-Technical Supply Directorate.
October 23, 1939 A new plan for the reorganization of the Red Army was sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. It was stated that the actions of the tank corps showed the cumbersome nature of such formations and the difficulty of controlling them. On the contrary, individual tank brigades were more mobile and performed much better. Therefore, it was proposed to disband the directorates of all four tank corps, rifle-machine-gun brigades and rifle-machine-gun battalions, as well as reduce the staff of tank brigades. But this plan was not approved by the government.
On November 15, 1939, the NPO sent to the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars a new plan for the reorganization of the ground forces of the Red Army. Among other things, it proposed creating 12 motorized divisions of 10 thousand personnel and 240 tanks each.
November 21, 1939 By resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, the management of tank corps was subject to disbandment. Instead, 15 motorized divisions of 4 regiments were created - two motorized rifle regiments, an artillery regiment and a tank regiment. Motorized rifle brigades and battalions were to be disbanded - as had already been proposed many times.
On June 9, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense approved a plan for the formation of mechanized corps. On the same day, the first directives on the formation of new tank formations were issued: NKO Directive No. 0/3/104394, NKO Directive No. 0/3/104395, NKO Directive No. 0/3/104396.
June 26, 1940 By order of the NKO No. 0128 of June 26, 1940, the Armored Directorate of the Red Army was transformed into the Main Armored Directorate (GABTU). Order No. 0183 of NKO dated 08/01/1940 announced a new structure of the GABTU consisting of four departments (combat training, armored, auto-tractor and repair and operation departments) and three departments (mobilization planning, financial and personnel).
July 6, 1940 By Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1193-464 ss dated July 6, 1940, mechanized corps began to be created consisting of two tank, one motorized divisions, a motorcycle regiment, a road battalion and a communications battalion, and an air squadron. It was prescribed that the corps be assigned a mixed aviation brigade consisting of two short-range bomber and one fighter air regiments.
August 24, 1940. According to the order of the NKO No. 0195 of 08/24/1940, all military educational institutions that trained specialists for the ABTV were subordinate to the head of the GABTU, including: Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization (from 09/01/1940), armored , tank-technical, automobile schools, advanced courses.
July 15, 1941 The unsuccessful start of the Great Patriotic War caused an acute shortage of military equipment and weapons, as well as the highly maneuverable nature of combat operations, which confronted the Soviet command with the need to make significant changes to the organizational structure of tank forces. Therefore, the abolition of mechanized corps began, which continued until the beginning of September 1941.
August 23, 1941 The massive formation of tank brigades and tank battalions began, which for almost six months became the highest structural unit of the armored forces.
November 11, 1941 NKO Order No. 337 On the renaming of the 4th Tank Brigade into the 1st Guards Tank Brigade - the birth of the Soviet Tank Guard.
January 22, 1942 NKO Order No. 057 of January 22, 1942 “On the combat use of tank units and formations.”
March 1942 NPO began the formation of separate motorcycle battalions, whose task was primarily to conduct reconnaissance and patrolling, communicate between mobile troops, and also provide commandant service (traffic control).
March 31, 1942 The formation of the first four tank corps began, which included command and control, first two, and soon three tank and motorized rifle brigades.
May 1942 Tank armies began to be created. The need to have these associations was determined by the experience of the war. Practice has shown that in order to conduct offensive operations with decisive goals, the massing of forces and assets, including tanks, must be expressed not only on an operational-tactical scale, but also on an operational-strategic scale. To do this, as combat experience has shown, it is necessary to have such large formations in the strike groupings of troops in the directions of the main attacks in which tanks would be concentrated organizationally, which in turn would contribute to better control and interaction of forces and means in the operation. In composition and purpose, these formations were supposed to resemble pre-war shock armies, which were entrusted with the task of breaking through enemy defenses and developing tactical success into operational success. Consequently, they were supposed to be primarily an offensive weapon.
July 31, 1942 A uniform staff number No. 010/270 was introduced for all tank brigades. Consisting of two tank battalions and one motorized rifle battalion. All previously created brigades are gradually transferred to this staff.
September 8, 1942 The formation of mechanized corps began. The need to create such formations was caused by a number of reasons, the basis of which was factors of an operational-tactical nature. The experience of the war showed that it is necessary to have motorized infantry as part of tank forces, which, conducting combat operations together with tank units, could support the actions of tanks, as well as consolidate the areas, objects and lines they captured. At the same time, the formation of mechanized corps was determined by the large spatial scope of the armed struggle, and therefore combat operations could unfold in various terrain conditions. Therefore, where the use of tank corps by terrain conditions (mountainous, mountainous-forested, wooded-swampy) could be difficult, it was envisaged to use mechanized formations, since they were supposed to have more motorized infantry, which in such conditions would solve combat missions more effectively than tanks .
October 16, 1942. Order of the NKO of the USSR No. 325 “On the combat use of tank and mechanized units and formations,” regulating and improving the control of armored forces in battle, is essentially a simplified combat manual of the ABTV.
December 1942 The first two self-propelled artillery regiments are created - the 1433rd and 1434th.
On December 7, 1942, by Decree of the State Defense Committee No. GOKO-2589s, the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army (GABTU KA) was reorganized into two main directorates: the Main Directorate for the Formation and Combat Training of Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Red Army (GUF and BP BTiMV KA) and the Main Armored Forces Directorate of the Red Army (GABTU KA). The same decree created the Main Automobile Directorate of the Red Army (GAU KA).
January 3, 1943 To improve the quality and responsibility for trained crews and reduce the number of units subordinate directly to the commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army, by order of NKO No. 003 of 01/03/1943, eight training tank brigades are created on the basis of existing training and spare units . Each of them consisted of a command and control unit, two training regiments and a reserve tank regiment. As before, training cadets were trained, after which they were transferred to the reserve, where crews, platoons and marching companies were assembled, materiel was received from the factory, the companies were fully staffed and sent to the front. But unlike the previous organization, now the entire process of training tankers was under a single leadership.
January 28, 1943 Resolution No. GOKO-2791ss dated January 28, 1943 “On the formation of ten tank armies” - the beginning of the formation of tank armies of the second formation with a more optimal organizational structure.
February 1943 The State Defense Committee ordered the GABTU KA to form repair and restoration battalions and mobile repair bases.
On April 17, 1943, by Order of the NKO of the USSR No. 0274 dated April 17, 1943, the Military Order of Lenin Academy of Mechanization and Motorization named after I.V. Stalin was renamed the Military Order of Lenin Academy of Armored and Mechanized Troops of the Red Army named after I.V. Stalin.
April 23, 1943 By Order of the NKO of the USSR No. 0291, self-propelled artillery was transferred to the command of the commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army.
November 30, 1943 A new staff is introduced for all tank brigades, staff No. 010/506. Consisting of three tank battalions and one motorized battalion of machine gunners. Only T-34 medium tanks remain in the brigade. All previously created brigades are gradually transferred to this staff.
On May 30, 1944, by the General Staff Directive dated May 30, 1944, a number of rifle divisions included self-propelled artillery divisions armed with 16 SU-76 installations.
July 10, 1945 By order of the NKO of the USSR No. 0013, tank and mechanized corps, tank and mechanized brigades, are formed into tank and mechanized divisions, and tank and mechanized regiments, respectively.
Post-war period.
Armored forces fought with great effectiveness in the mountains and rice fields of Korea from 1950–1953. The initial success of the North Korean army's offensive was achieved largely due to the use of Soviet tanks and the lack of both tanks and anti-tank weapons by their enemy at that time.
Throughout the Vietnam War, South Vietnamese and American forces used tanks and armored personnel carriers on the relatively flat terrain of coastal areas. In April 1975, the North Vietnamese army launched a rapid tank assault on Saigon and captured it.
Armored forces, supported by tactical aircraft, ensured Israel's victory over the Arabs in the wars of 1948–1949, 1956 and 1967. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Israelis initially believed that they could decide its outcome in the same way, but after seeing how effective anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) ) and helicopters, began to use armored units in cooperation with infantry and artillery. Experience from World War II showed that the best anti-tank weapon was the tank itself; however, in the 1973 war, more effective means were used - high-precision guided missiles and rockets, which were used by infantry, airplanes and helicopters.
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As you know, the Red Army had 23,197 tanks in service before June 22, 1941, a seemingly impressive figure, but when tested, everything was worse than ever. We can say that during the entire reign of People's Commissar Voroshilov, the Red Army lost precious 15 years, because it was partially destroyed by sabotage rule. Those who read the transfer act in 1940 understand what we are talking about. But back to the tanks. In the last chapter, I mentioned that BT tanks were practically unusable, 50% were not used at all and they constantly broke down... but these are just the beginnings.
And there was complete industrial chaos, just like right before 1937, when all orders from above were blatantly sabotaged, as if the former head of ABTU Khalepsky had resurrected and again began to harm and crap the armed forces.
WHAT HAPPENED Where were the Red Army tanks? 13,981 tanks were in the western districts, and the rest were engaged in their armored business throughout the rest of the USSR from Vladivostok to Kushka. So I won’t take into account the tanks of the internal districts and will take a closer look at the border districts.
“Orders KO No. 12–16 of 1940 and the Manual on Accounting and Reporting in the Red Army provided for the division of all property according to quality into the following categories: 1st category - new, not used, meeting the requirements of technical conditions and fully usable for its intended purpose. 2nd category - former (in use), fully operational and suitable for use for its intended purpose. This also includes property requiring military repairs (current repairs). 3rd category - requiring repair in district workshops (medium repair). 4th category - requiring repairs in central workshops and factories (major repairs)"
It is worth immediately noting that there are simply no analogues of the 3rd and 4th categories in the German lists - in the German accounting system, tanks sent to factories for repair or modernization were not listed on the balance sheets of units. German tanks either underwent rapid repairs or were decommissioned. Therefore, including these categories in comparison, it is necessary to put a serviceable and combat-ready “unit” and one sent back in 1940 opposite each other. for repairs at the Kirov plant T-28, which the plant has been looking for for three months now - and cannot find either assembled or disassembled, or scrap and garbage.
And of these tanks, which exist on paper, but were actually handed over for repair to industrial plants, in the western border districts alone there were about six hundred - 603 units, if you take into account the Leningrad Military District. However, even with their deduction, the figure is impressive - in the western districts 2,145 linear tanks of the first category and 7,900 of the second are ready to meet the enemy. Far from being the innumerable horde as at the beginning of the chapter, but still quite a Mongol-Tatar tumen, even a little over the top ten thousand. Remember the phrase about 80 tracks per year for BT tanks? And here's what it looked like in 1941:
“To ensure the operation of the existing fleet of vehicles in 1941, as well as to establish an emergency reserve of spare parts in the Red Army, spare parts and assemblies are required; for 1941, the supply of NGOs with spare parts for tanks, tractors and cars is not enough, namely: a) tank spare parts are allocated for 219 million rubles. instead of the required 476 million rubles according to the application; b) automobile and tractor - funds allocated for 112.5 million rubles against 207 million rubles according to the annual application. The supply of automotive spare parts from the industry (per vehicle) decreases from year to year: for tanks there remains almost no increase, despite the fact that the vehicles are aging and wearing out... In 1941, plants No. 26, 48 and Kirovsky, due to the transition to production new products, the production of spare parts for T-28 tanks and M-5 and M-17 engines was stopped. Plants No. 37, 174 and 183 are reducing the production of spare parts for the BT, T-26, T-37–38 tanks and the Komintern tractor. The situation is especially bad with the supply of critically shortage tank and auto-tractor parts to NPOs. Engine parts (pistons, connecting rods, piston rings, etc.) and a number of others are not supplied by the industry from year to year.”
Here's another document.
“To the People's Commissar of Medium Engineering Comrade. Malyshev on June 18, 1941. Based on the Resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the NKSM was obliged in 1941 to manufacture spare parts and assemblies for tanks. By your orders No. 186ss and 192ss, the production of spare parts and assemblies is distributed among the People's Commissariat factories, but to date, most of the factories have not formalized contracts with GABTU KA in accordance with the order plan. According to the concluded contracts, the delivery of units and spare parts is completely unsatisfactory. BT - plant No. 183 Name Order HKSM Issued Implementation on June 1, 1941 Spare parts BT 20,300 thousand rubles. 17,318.2 thousand rubles. 3808 thousand rubles. Equipment M-17 Plan by order of HKCM Documented Execution as of June 1, 1941 285 285 0 Plan by order of HKCM Documented Execution as of June 1, 1941 Equipment M-5 100 100 57 Plan by order of HKCM Documented Execution by June 1, 1941 Equipment B-2 75 75 43 Plan by order of HKCM Formalized Execution on June 1, 1941 Checkpoint 300 300 6
Completely unsatisfactory delivery: gearboxes, gearbox gears, tracks, axle shafts, wheel assemblies and engine equipment. (...) The People's Commissariat and "Glavavtotraktorodetal" completely refuse to manufacture complex, scarce components and parts (wheels, axle shafts, balancers, cranks, final drive cover, guitars, etc.)
The concluded agreements with “Glavavtotraktorodetal” on 1.6.41 were fulfilled only by 0.3%... T-34 - plant No. 183 Order of HKCM Issued Execution on 01.06.1941 Spare parts 6000 thousand rubles. 5085 thousand rub. 1650 thousand rubles. Equipment B-2 150 150 0 Gearbox 200 200 50 Delivery of spare parts lags behind the deadlines agreed in the contracts... T-34 - STZ plant Order NKSM Issued Execution as of June 1, 1941 Spare parts 10,000 thousand rubles. 6800 thousand rubles. 5 thousand rubles The supply of spare parts is unsatisfactory in quantities and range. The plant is postponing the delivery of T-34 tracks to the end of the year, citing lack of capacity.
KB - ChTZ plant Order of NKSM Issued Execution on June 1, 1941 Spare parts 8,000 thousand rubles. 0 0 KPP 75 75 0 The contract was sent to the plant on January 23, 1941, but before the Resolution on the order plan was issued, the plant refused to sign the contract. The second contract was sent on May 17, 1941 and has not been returned from the factory to date. ChTZ did not deliver spare parts. Diesel V-2 - plant No. 75 Order of the NKSM Issued Execution on June 1, 1941 Diesel 735 735 141
The delivery of spare parts for diesel engines is going unsatisfactorily... Due to the poor supply of diesel engines, a large number of BT-7M tanks are not operational. Plant No. 75 refuses to define monthly and quarterly deliveries in the contract, which makes planning tank repairs completely impossible. The People's Commissariat did not give corresponding instructions to plant No. 75... Plant No. 174 does not meet delivery deadlines under contracts. Scarce parts are sold out very poorly: cylinders, lower halves of the engine crankcase, valve guides, drive wheel rims, lower rollers, lower roller tires, etc... Tank troops are currently experiencing a great need for spare parts and assemblies, especially for items in acute shortage. Repeated appeals of GABTU KA to the NKSM did not find a proper solution to the above issues. I ask for your personal orders aimed at providing spare parts and units for the tank forces of the Red Army, in accordance with government decisions on this issue.
Head of the GABTU of the Red Army, Lieutenant General of Tank Troops Fedorenko"
That’s how it was….. Pay attention to the date—June 18, 1941, and the state of the armored tank fleet is not just bad, but deplorable. There are no components, no spare parts, no diesel engines—and the T-34 is still a very crude tank! And if it breaks, will there be a problem?! If someone thinks that the USSR was preparing to fight like that, then it would be an inappropriate joke, the USSR could only do one thing - try with all its might to avoid war. But there were three days left before the war... REPORTS ON THE CONDITION OF ARMORED EQUIPMENT ON THE LOCAL But here’s how things stood with spare parts “on the spot” , that is, directly in the units: Here is the 6th mechanized corps of ZAPOVO.
“Report on the state of military units of military unit 9090 Regarding combat vehicles - there are no spare parts for the final drive chassis for the T-28 tank. The BT tank does not have tracked drive wheels or axle shafts. For other brands of combat vehicles, the supply of spare parts is 60–70%. For auxiliary machines, the supply of spare parts is extremely insufficient. In the 4th quarter of 1940, 10% of the need was received; in the 1st quarter of 1941, the situation did not improve. There are no rotating units, such as engines, gearboxes, rear axles for all brands of cars. There is absolutely no supply of tires for M-1 vehicles, as a result of which 30–40% of M-1 vehicles are in parts without rubber. BA-20 armored vehicles are not fully equipped with gusmatics. Due to the lack of critically scarce spare parts, it is not possible to timely restore vehicles with average and current repairs.”
Here is the 8th mechanized corps of KOVO.
“ Report on the condition and material security of the 8th Mechanized Corps as of May 1, 1941. 7th Motorized Rifle Division. The repair facilities are 22% complete. There are no stationary workshops or machines at RVB. The division is provided with 1% spare parts for the repair of combat and wheeled vehicles. There are no spare parts in NZ for combat and wheeled vehicles. Trucks and wheeled vehicles are provided with rubber by 60%; armored vehicles at 100%. Of the available trucks, 200 vehicles are on blocks due to lack of tires. Average tire wear is 70%.”
Here is the 9th mechanized corps of KOVO. “The supply of spare parts is unsatisfactory; there are no spare parts in NZ at all. There are also no spare parts on the current supply, with the exception of a certain number of random slow-moving parts.”
As we can see, even average percentages of supply do not convey the full picture - as a rule, the spare parts that are most in short supply are also the most in demand. Returning to the example with the Formula 1 steering wheel: even if you have a tall stack of several hundred spoilers and wings in your garage, this will give a fairly high “overall” percentage of spare parts availability, but will not change the fact that you cannot use the car due to the lack of a single steering wheel. In the case of older types of tanks, such parts were spare parts for the engine group and tracks.
For example, inspecting the progress of the formation and combat training of the 20th Tank Division of the 9th Mechanized Corps at the end of March 1941, the GABTU commission noted:
“In the 39th Tank Regiment, tanks were received after a major overhaul from repair bases and entered into the combat training fleet. The tanks are not equipped with tools, accessories and spare parts... The regiment is completely missing the most necessary spare parts, which makes it impossible to repair minor damage. The lack of spare fuses leads to attempts to install “bugs”. On 25% of tanks, the tracks are badly worn out and require replacement. ” Moreover, this state of affairs was more the rule than an ugly exception to it. This is about the 58th tank regiment of the 131st motorized rifle division of the 9th mechanized corps of the Kyiv Special Military District. “The combat vehicles available in the regiment are assigned to the combat training fleet and, in most cases, were received after a major overhaul from repair bases. The machines are not equipped with tools, accessories and transportable spare parts... Up to 30% of the existing vehicle fleet requires changing track tracks. Four tanks are damaged but cannot be repaired due to a lack of spare parts. One damaged tank requires changing the sloth crank; it cannot be restored using the regiment’s resources.”
And this is the 37th light tank brigade of the same Kyiv Special Military District. “The condition of the material part is most unsatisfactory. Of the available machines, 20% worked for 100 engine hours, 10% for 50 engine hours. The chassis of all cars is completely worn out... Zap. There are no parts. There is absolutely no repair base.” And then June 22 came, and the leisurely correspondence from Pontius to Pilate regarding orders for repairs and funds for scarce spare parts immediately lost relevance. The units went on alert, mercilessly abandoning faulty equipment at permanent deployment points. For example, the 125th Tank Regiment of the 202nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 12th Mechanized Corps of the Baltic Special Military District took out 49 T-26s on alert, and left 16 vehicles in service. The 28th Tank Division of the same 12th Mechanized Corps, rising on alert, withdrew 210 BT-7s from the parks and left 26 vehicles faulty in the parks, withdrew 56 and left 13 T-26s. 3rd Tank Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps of the Leningrad Military district withdrew 32 out of 40 T-28s from the parks (and another 17 vehicles were left behind on the march due to damage to the brakes); the 21st Tank Division of the 10th Mechanized Corps of the same Leningrad District set out on a campaign with 160 of 177 T-26s, 24- I tank division of the same corps withdrew 232 BT-2 and BT-5 on alert and left 49 vehicles of these types in the parks, both T-26 divisions were also left there. The 10th Tank Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps of the Kiev Special Military District withdrew alarm 37 and left 1 T-34 tank in the park, withdrew 44 and left 17 T-28s, withdrew 147 and left 34 BT-7s, withdrew 19 and left 3 T-26s.
It is interesting that, explaining the reasons for abandoning the equipment, the acting division commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sukhoruchkin, indicated in the report: “... some of the BT-7 tanks did not have crews, since they were supernumerary, and therefore could not be alerted.”
It turns out that only 10–25% of old-type tanks were left in parks. Please note - this is equipment that was not able to go out on alarm at all... and the bulk of the breakdowns and malfunctions occurred after several hours of collisions. And how many vehicles with worn out tracks and units broke down during marches and remained on the side of the roads, never entering the battle? According to eyewitnesses, many tanks broke down during marches without seeing the enemy, and these were the vast majority. After all, that is why the Germans encountered on their way not destroyed Soviet tanks, but abandoned and incapable vehicles. The main reasons are the lack of fuel and lubricants, partial ammunition and spare parts. CONCLUSION
Thus, the Red Army in June 1941 could not wage any offensive war; the only thing the army could do was wage a defensive war. Despite all the difficult situation of the armored vehicles of the Red Army, there is no way to explain the summer defeat, here, as I already wrote, the human factor, the factor of treason, tried
Armored Division
- the highest tactical formation of armored forces of a permanent organization in all armies. It includes several tank and motorized infantry battalions, self-propelled field artillery divisions, armored cavalry or airmobile reconnaissance units, engineering, as well as other combat support and service units, including communications, quartermaster, artillery-technical and medical, most of whose vehicles are not armored . For the period of hostilities, brigades are formed. Their composition is determined by the task at hand, the conditions of the front-line situation and the terrain. In brigades from tank and motorized infantry units, battalion or company tactical groups are created with a predominance of tanks or motorized infantry. The armored forces also include armored cavalry regiments, although their main tasks in battle are reconnaissance and security.
Armored forces are usually used in masses, supported by infantry and artillery. They are designed primarily to perform offensive missions, but are also capable of successfully carrying out deterrent operations and mobile defense. To make the best use of their firepower and mobility, effective command and control are essential. The main factors limiting the use of armored forces include dependence on terrain and weather conditions and the need to periodically refuel and replenish ammunition.
Iron fist of the Red Army. Creation of armored forces
On the eve of World War II, the Soviet country had the most powerful armored forces in the world. Matching them were the capabilities of the domestic industry, which had proven its ability to carry out the most ambitious plans and managed to provide the army with tens of thousands of vehicles. Tank power, numbering several times more armored vehicles than all other armies of the world combined, was consolidated into large strike formations - corps and divisions, tactics for their use were developed and a certain amount of combat experience was gained. All of them did not last long, burning in the flames of the battles of the first months of the Great Patriotic War, but they left a noticeable mark on its history. This paper makes an attempt to consider the short history of mechanized corps of 1940-1941. formations, their structure and experience in combat use, the fates of the tank and motorized divisions that were part of them are traced, based on archival materials, combat reports, summary reports, forms of units and formations, eyewitness accounts and combat participants.
T-27 wedges at the 1934 May Day parade on Red Square. The slightly open armored caps are clearly visible
The first tanks appeared in the Red Army during the Civil War. These were captured vehicles, captured in battle and then used against their former owners. They were first used in battle during the Soviet-Polish War on July 4, 1920, when in the Polotsk area the offensive of the 33rd SD was supported by 3 Ricardo tanks (this name was given to the English Mk.V in the Red Army) of the 2nd armored detachment. By the end of 1920, the Red Army already included 55 automobile and 10 auto-tank detachments, armed with British Mk.V, French Renault FT.17 and armored cars. In May 1921, by order of the RVS, the Office of the Chief of Armored Forces of the Red Army was created, to which armored trains were also subordinated, the number of which was in the range of 105-120 units. In total, the Armored Forces of the republic had about 29 thousand personnel in 208 detachments. During the post-war transition to peacetime states, the Armored Forces were disbanded in the summer of 1923. Detachments of armored vehicles were transferred to the cavalry, and tanks and armored trains to the infantry and artillery, respectively.
In the same year, all auto-tank detachments were consolidated into a Separate Tank Squadron (the name itself suggests that many military experts saw great similarities between tanks and warships and the methods of their use). In 1924, the squadron was transferred to the regimental system. The tank regiment consisted of 2 tank battalions (line and training) and service units, a total of 356 people, 18 tanks. In subsequent years, several more three-battalion tank regiments were deployed. A period of searching for the most effective organizational forms of tank forces began, which lasted for 20 years, until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. And during the war and after it, the organizational structure of the armored forces repeatedly underwent numerous changes.
The development of armored forces was hampered by the lack of their own models of armored vehicles. Thus, by 1927, the tank fleet of the Red Army was represented by only 90 vehicles of the captured brands “Ricardo”, “Taylor” and “Renault”.
But the captured vehicles were already quite worn out, and since there were no new arrivals from abroad, the question arose about creating our own models of armored vehicles. For this purpose, in April 1924, the Military Technical Directorate (VTU) of the Red Army was created. On November 22, 1929, the VTU was transformed into the Department of Mechanization and Motorization of the Army (UMMA). It was headed by Army Commander 2nd Rank (since 1935) I.A. Khalepsky. Later, his position began to be called - Head of the Armored Directorate (ABTU) of the Red Army. This Directorate did a lot to create the tank forces of the USSR, although the fate of Khalepsky himself was sad - in 1937 he was arrested, and in 1938 he was shot.
Back in 1927, under the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army M.N. Tukhachevsky, a 5-year plan for the development of the armed forces until 1932 was developed, but, oddly enough, tanks were not initially mentioned in it. However, at that time it was not yet clear what they would be like and how quickly the industry would master their production. The error was corrected, and the final version of the plan planned to produce 1,075 tanks over the five-year period.
On July 18, 1928, the Revolutionary Military Council adopted as a basis the “System of tank, tractor, auto, and armored weapons of the Red Army,” compiled under the leadership of Deputy Chief of the General Staff V.K. Triandafilov, known as a staunch supporter of the “armor business.” It operated until the end of the 30s in several successive editions for each five-year plan.
On July 30, 1928, the Council of People's Commissars approved the first five-year plan for the development and reconstruction of the USSR Armed Forces for 1928-32. According to him, by the end of the five-year plan, in addition to the production of 1075 tanks, it was necessary to form an additional 3 new tank regiments. In July 1929, this plan was revised upward - by the end of the five-year plan there should have been 5.5 thousand tanks in the Red Army. In fact, for 1929-1933. industry produced 7.5 thousand tanks.
By 1932, the Revolutionary Military Council already envisaged having in the armored forces: 3 mechanized brigades (ICBs), 30 mixed tank battalions (32 light and 34 medium tanks each), 4 heavy tank battalions (35 tanks each) of the Main Command Reserve (RGK) ) and 13 mechanized cavalry regiments.
Machine-gun double-turret T-26, known as tanks of the 1931 model. They were adopted by the Red Army by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated February 13, 1931.
Twin-turreted T-26s with partially welded turrets. The T-26s produced by Leningrad were primarily supplied to Leningrad Military District units.
The appearance of our own armored vehicles in large quantities made it possible to begin creating new organizational structures for tank forces. On June 17, 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council, at the suggestion of V.K. Triandafilov, adopted a resolution that stated: “Taking into account that the new type of weapon, which is armored forces, has not been sufficiently studied both in terms of its tactical use (for independent and in conjunction with infantry and cavalry), and in the sense of the most advantageous organizational forms, it is recognized as necessary to organize in 1929-1930. permanent experimental mechanized unit.” A month later, the document was approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and, among other things, it stipulated a minimum program for the production of 3.5 thousand tanks during the first five-year plan.
In pursuance of the decree, an experienced mechanized regiment was formed in 1929, consisting of a battalion of MS-1 tanks, a BA-27 armored vehicle division, a motorized rifle battalion and an air detachment. In the same year, the regiment took part in the exercises of the Belarusian Military District (BelVO).
In May 1930, the regiment was deployed to the 1st mechanized brigade, which later received the name of K.B. Kalinovsky, the first commander of the brigade. Its initial composition was a tank regiment (two battalions), a motorized infantry regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery division and specialized units. The brigade was armed with 60 MS-1, 32 tankettes, 17 BA-27, 264 vehicles, 12 tractors. In 1931, the organizational structure was strengthened. Now the 1st ICBM included:
1) strike group - a tank regiment, consisting of two tank battalions and two self-propelled artillery divisions (due to the lack of self-propelled guns, they are equipped with towed 76-mm auto-thrust guns);
2) a reconnaissance group - a battalion of tankettes, an armored vehicle division, a machine-gun battalion and an artillery battalion;
3) artillery group - 3 divisions of 76 mm cannons and 122 mm howitzers, an air defense division;
4) infantry battalion in vehicles.
The number of personnel was 4,700 people, weapons: 119 tanks, 100 wedges, 15 armored vehicles, 63 self-propelled anti-aircraft machine guns, 32 76-mm cannons, 16 122-mm howitzers, 12 76-mm and 32 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 270 cars, 100 tractors.
T-26 battalion during field exercises. A close-range tank of the 1932 model with cannon and machine gun armament, distinguished by the installation of a 37-mm gun in the right turret. The riveted structure of the towers and the arrangement of inspection slits are clearly visible.
A two-turret T-26 model 1931 overcomes a ford. White stripes on the turrets served to quickly identify the identity of the tank and indicated the vehicle of the second company. The same intermittent red stripes were applied to the tanks of the first company, black - to the third company.
At the same time (1932), 4 tank regiments of three battalions were formed: 1st in Smolensk, 2nd in Leningrad, 3rd in the Moscow Military District, 4th in Kharkov, 3 separate territorial tank battalions. In the cavalry formations, 2 mechanized regiments, 2 mechanized divisions and 3 mechanized squadrons were created. However, this was all just the beginning. In the spirit of the then upsurge, much more ambitious measures were envisaged.
On August 1, 1931, the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR adopted the “Great Tank Program,” which stated that achievements in the field of tank construction (an increase in tank production - 170 units in 1930, the emergence of new models of armored vehicles) created strong preconditions for a radical change general operational-tactical doctrine for the use of tanks and demanded decisive organizational changes in the armored forces towards the creation of higher mechanized formations capable of independently solving problems both on the battlefield and throughout the operational depth of the modern battle front. The new high-speed materiel created the prerequisites for the development of the theory of deep combat and operations.” The plans were consistent with the name: in the first year it was planned to give the army 10 thousand vehicles. The same decree created a commission to develop the organization of armored forces (ABTV), which at a meeting on March 9, 1933 recommended that the Red Army have mechanized corps consisting of mechanized brigades, tank brigades of the RGK, mechanized regiments in cavalry, tank battalions in rifle divisions.
Along with changes in the organizational structure of the ABTV, views on the use of tanks also changed. In the 1920s, the main principle of the combat use of tanks was their close interaction with the infantry. At the same time, already in the “Temporary Instructions for the Combat Use of Tanks” of 1928, the use of tanks was also envisaged as a so-called freely maneuvering group of the forward echelon, operating out of fire and visual contact with the infantry. This provision was included in the Field Manual of the Red Army in 1929.
Twin-turret T-26s of the 11th Mechanized Corps on Uritsky Square in Leningrad during the celebration of the 14th anniversary of the October Revolution.
Demonstration of one of the first T-26s in Naro-Fominsk.
At the end of the 20s, thanks to the works of V.K. Triandafilov and the chief inspector of tank forces (1st deputy chief of the UMMA) K.B. Kalinovsky, the “Theory of the offensive of modern armies in modern war” was formulated (better known as the “Theory of deep combat and operations”), the essence of which was expressed by solving two problems:
1. Breaking into the enemy’s front with a simultaneous strike to its entire tactical depth.
2. Immediate introduction of mechanized troops into the breakthrough, which, in cooperation with aviation, must advance to the entire depth of the enemy’s operational defense until his entire group is defeated.
At the same time, this military doctrine, with all its progressiveness, was an obvious reflection of the prevailing sentiments and the “proletarian strategy of destruction” proclaimed by Stalin and Voroshilov, without suggesting a different picture of events, which played a tragic role a decade later.
The death of Triandafilov and Kalinovsky in a plane crash in 1931 interrupted their fruitful work.
From the beginning of the 30s, a new stage in the development of the theory of using ABTV began. These problems were discussed on the pages of the magazines “Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army”, “Armored Journal”, “Military Thought” and others. S.N. Ammosov, A.E. Gromychenko, P.D. Gladkov, A.A. Ignatiev, P.A. Rotmistrov, I.P. Sukhov and others took an active part in the discussion. Its result was the creation of an official theory, enshrined in the manuals for the combat use of ABTV in 1932-1937. and in the Field Manuals of the Red Army 1936-1939. They provided for three main forms of combat use of tank forces:
a) in close cooperation with infantry or cavalry as their direct support groups (tank groups of NPP, NPK);
b) in tactical interaction with rifle and cavalry units and formations as their long-range support groups (DPP tank groups);
c) in operational cooperation with large combined arms formations (army, front) as part of independent mechanized and tank formations.
Large-scale tasks required new organizational structures. A major step was the emergence of qualitatively new, more powerful tactical formations - mechanized corps, which made it possible to implement the put forward requirements. On March 11, 1932, the Revolutionary Military Council decided to form two mechanized corps of the following composition: - mechanized brigade with T-26; - 3 tank battalions; - rifle and machine gun battalion (SPB); - artillery battalion; - engineer battalion; - anti-aircraft machine gun company. - mechanized brigade on BT (same composition); — rifle and machine gun brigade (SPBR); - reconnaissance battalion; - engineer battalion; - flamethrower battalion; - anti-aircraft artillery division; — technical base; — traffic control company; - air squad.
Machine-gun T-26 during driving lessons.
Practical training in driving tanks on simulators is conducted by Senior Lieutenant G.V. Lei (in the center) and N.S. Gromov. May 1937
In April 1932, the Defense Commission under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, based on a report from the Revolutionary Military Council, adopted a resolution on the formation of mechanized corps. The first mechanized corps was deployed to the Leningrad Military District on the basis of the 11th Red Banner Leningrad Rifle Division (SD) in the fall of 1932. The 11th MK included the 31st, 32nd ICBMs and the 33rd SPBR. At the same time, in the Ukrainian Military District, on the basis of the 45th Red Banner Volyn Rifle Division, the formation of the 45th MK (133, 134 ICBMs, 135 SPBR) began.
In the same year, 1932, the formation of five separate ICBMs began - the 2nd - in the Ukrainian Military District; 3, 4, 5th - in BelVO; 6th - in OKDVA; two tank regiments, four mechanized cavalry divisions, 15 tank and 65 tank battalions for rifle divisions.
Due to the aggravation of the situation in the Far East, the 11th mechanized corps, or rather one 32nd ICBM (the 31st ICBM and the 33rd SPBR remained in the Leningrad Military District), was transferred to the Soviet-Mongolian border in Transbaikalia, where it included 20 -th ICBM, formed in 1933 in the Moscow Military District and then transferred to the Kyakhta area - which became the location of the entire 11th MK.
By January 1, 1934, the Red Army had 2 mechanized corps, 6 mechanized brigades, 6 tank regiments, 23 tank battalions and 37 separate tank companies of rifle divisions, 14 mechanized regiments and 5 mechanized cavalry divisions. All of them were staffed at 47% of staff levels.
The crew is servicing the T-26. Despite all the picturesqueness of the photo, reminiscent of socialist realist sculptures, the repairs are not carried out with fake tools - most of the work on the materiel required the use of pood-sized crowbars and sledgehammers. Summer 1934
A T-26 overcomes a copse during a training exercise. The tank belongs to the 1st company of the 1st battalion. Summer 1936
In 1933, the development plan of the Red Army for the 2nd Five-Year Plan was adopted, which provided for having 25 mechanized and tank brigades by January 1, 1938 (reformed from tank regiments). Therefore, in 1934, two more mechanized corps were formed - the 7th in the Leningrad Military District on the basis of the 31st ICBM and 32 SPBR, the 5th MK in the Moscow Military District was reorganized from the 1st ICBM, leaving the name of K.B. Kalinovsky. The following year, 1935, the mechanized corps were transferred to new states, since experience showed that they were inactive and poorly controlled due to a lack of communications equipment. Low reliability of equipment and poor training of personnel led to the failure of a large number of tanks on the march. The number of corps units was reduced, and supply and technical support functions were transferred to brigades, which was very significant for supporting the activities and covering all the operational needs of combat units.
To increase mobility, T-26 tanks in hulls were replaced in February 1935 by faster wheeled and tracked BTs. Now the mechanized corps consisted of a command and control unit, two ICBMs, an SPBR, a separate tank battalion (reconnaissance) and a communications battalion. According to the staff, it was supposed to have 8,965 personnel, 348 BT tanks, 63 T-37, 52 chemical tanks (as flamethrower tanks were called then) OT-26. A total of 463 tanks, 20 guns, 1444 vehicles. These measures made it possible to increase the mobility of mechanized corps, but did not solve the problems of unit management.
Separate mechanized brigades began to include: - three tank battalions; - rifle and machine gun battalion; — combat support battalion; — repair and restoration battalion; - motor transport company; - communications company; - reconnaissance company.
According to the staff, the brigade had 2,745 people, 145 T-26s, 56 artillery and chemical tanks, 28 armored vehicles, 482 vehicles and 39 tractors.
Without the participation of tanks - the embodiment of the power and strength of the Red Army - in the 30s. Not a single holiday was missing, from revolutionary celebrations to honoring frontline workers. In the photo - the T-26 battalion of the Leningrad Military District in front of the Winter Palace on November 7, 1933.
A two-turret T-26 overcomes a barrier of logs. May 1932
By 1936, the ABTV had grown qualitatively and quantitatively - and if in 1927 they had 90 tanks and 1050 vehicles, then in 1935 there were already more than 8 thousand tanks and 35 thousand vehicles.
In 1936, the ABTV tank fleet of the Red Army consisted of the following vehicles: - reconnaissance amphibious tank T-37 - the main tank of the service for supporting all mechanical formations and a means of infantry combat reconnaissance; - combined arms tank T-26 - the main tank of the quantitative reinforcement of the RGK and the tank of combined arms formations; - operational tank BT - tank of independent mechanical units; - T-28 - a high-quality reinforcement tank for the RGK, designed to overcome heavily fortified defensive zones; - T-35 - a tank for high-quality reinforcement of the RGK when breaking through particularly strong and pre-fortified zones; — chemical tanks;* — sapper tanks; — control tanks and teletanks with radio control. * That was the name given back then to flamethrower vehicles and tanks designed for conducting chemical warfare to contaminate the area with chemical agents and degas it.
Stalin's repressions brought great harm to the development of armored forces, causing enormous damage to command and technical personnel. The following were arrested and shot: commander of the 45th MK divisional commander A.N. Borisenko, commander of the 11th MK divisional commander Ya.L. Davidovsky, commander of the 8th ICBM divisional commander D.A. Schmidt, ICBM commander of the Ural Military District commander M.M. Bakshi, head of ABTV OKDVA division commander S.I. Derevtsov, first chief of ABTU RKKA I.A. Khalepsky, who replaced him in this post divisional commander G.G. Bokis and many, many others.
In 1937, the 3rd five-year plan for the development and reconstruction of the Red Army for 1938-42 was adopted. They provided:
1) maintaining the existing number of tank formations - 4 corps, 21 tank brigades, as well as three separate MBBRs on armored vehicles (formed in 1937 in the Trans-Baikal Military District for operations in desert-steppe conditions, then redeployed to Mongolia, each had 80 BA Based (1939) 7th MBBR - Dzamin-Ude, 8th - Bain-Tumen, 9th - Undurkhan).
2) the creation of eleven training tank regiments instead of training brigades.
3) transition to reinforced tank platoons with five vehicles instead of the previous three.
4) establish the regular number of tanks at the following level: light tank brigade - 278 BT tanks, tank brigade - 267 T-26, heavy tank brigade - 183 (136 T-28, 37 BT, 10 chemical tanks), T-35 brigade - 148 (94 T -35, 44 BT and 10 chemical), tank regiment - from 190 to 267 tanks.
5) introduce a tank battalion of two companies (T-26 and T-38) into each rifle division, and a tank regiment into the cavalry division.
6) eliminate the division of names into mechanized and tank units, retaining one name - tank.
7) transfer light tank brigades (including those within tank corps) to a new organization: - 4 tank battalions of 54 line and 6 artillery tanks each; - reconnaissance; - motorized rifle battalions; — support units.
In 1938, all mechanized corps, brigades, and regiments were renamed tanks with a change in numbering - for example, the 32nd ICBM of the ZabVO turned into the 11th TBR. By the beginning of 1939, the Red Army had 4 tank corps (TK) - the 10th - in the Leningrad Military District, the 15th - in the Western Military District, the 20th - in the Western Military District, the 25th - in the KVO. The corps had 560 tanks and 12,710 personnel.
Machine gun T-26 model 1931 with one turret at BelVO exercises in 1936
T-26 of the Narofominsk brigade during summer exercises in 1936.
In August 1938, OKDVA tank crews had to go into battle. During the conflict in the area of Lake Khasan, the 2nd ICBM took part in battles with the Japanese (formed in April 1932 in Kiev, in 1934 transferred to the Far East, in October 1938 transformed into the 42nd LTBR).
In the summer of 1939, the 6th and 11th tank brigades of the ZabVO took part in the conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River as part of the 1st Army Group. They played a major role in the encirclement and defeat of the Japanese 6th Army, showing high fighting qualities. There were also losses - the 11th TBR lost 186 tanks in battle, 84 of them irretrievably. For these battles, the 11th TBR was awarded the Order of Lenin and was given the name of brigade commander Yakovlev, who died in battle. The 6th TBR became the Red Banner.
Fighting 1938-1939 showed shortcomings in the organization of troops. On August 8-22, 1939, these issues were discussed by a special commission chaired by the deputy NGO G.I. Kulik. It included S.M. Budyonny, B.M. Shaposhnikov, E.A. Shchadenko, S.K. Timoshenko, M.P. Kovalev, K.A. Meretskov and others. She decided:
"1. Leave the tank corps, excluding the rifle and machine-gun brigade from its composition. Exclude the rifle and machine gun battalion from the tank brigade.
2. In an offensive when a breakthrough develops, the tank corps must work for the infantry and cavalry. Under these conditions, tank brigades operate in close connection with infantry and artillery. A tank corps can sometimes act independently when the enemy is upset and unable to defend itself.”
It was recommended to use tank brigades armed with BT tanks for independent actions, and brigades of T-26 and T-28 tanks to reinforce rifle troops. It is not difficult to see in this the strengthening in the leadership of the Red Army of the role of the “cavalrymen” of Stalin’s encirclement, who replaced the eliminated command cadres. Be that as it may, soon the next military campaign made it possible to test the capabilities of tank forces almost in full accordance with the original purpose and almost in testing conditions.
Presentation of the Order of the Red Banner to the Armored Command Improvement Courses. Leningrad, 1934
The T-26 model of 1933 became the most popular version of the tank, produced in the amount of 6065 units, including 3938 equipped with the 71-TK-1 radio station with a handrail antenna. On the remaining tanks, signal flags remained the means of communication.
In September 1939, the following took part in the campaign against Western Ukraine and Western Belarus: as part of the Belorussian Front - the 15th Tank Corps (2nd, 27th LTBR, 20th MSBR) under the command of division commander M.P. Petrov, 6 -I light tank brigade of Bolotnikov settlement and other units; as part of the Ukrainian Front - the 25th Tank Corps (4th, 5th LTBR, 1st MSPBR) I.O. Yarkin Regiment, 23rd, 24th, 26th Light Tank Brigades.
The campaign showed that corps commanders had great difficulty in directing the actions of tank brigades, and their mobility left much to be desired. This was especially true of I.O. Yarkin’s formation, whose tankers lagged even behind the infantry and cavalry, due to the lack of management of the command they found themselves in their rear, and sometimes with a concentration of their vehicles they clogged the roads and blocked the path of other units. The need to “unload” cumbersome associations and transition to more “manageable” and operationally mobile forms was obvious. Based on this, the Main Military Council on November 21, 1939 recognized the need to disband the directorates of tank corps and rifle and machine-gun brigades. Instead of corps, a more flexible structure was introduced - a motorized division (the obvious influence of the experience of the German “ally” in the Polish company - Wehrmacht formations quickly proved their effectiveness). In 1940, it was planned to form 8 such divisions, and in 1941, the next 7, which were supposed to be used to develop the success of a combined arms army or as part of a cavalry-mechanized group (front-line mobile group). Tank corps directorates and corps units were disbanded by January 15, 1940. At the same time, tank brigades were preserved. Back on August 22, 1939, NKO K.E. Voroshilov sent a report to Stalin, in which he proposed forming 16 tank brigades equipped with BT tanks, 16 T-26 RGK TBRs with 238 tanks each, 3 T-28 RGK TBRs with 117 T- 28 and 39 BT, 1 TBR T-35 RGK from 32 T-35 and 85 T-28. These proposals were approved and a tank brigade was adopted as the main unit of the armored forces. The number of tanks in the state was later changed - in a light tank brigade - 258 vehicles, in heavy tanks - 156. By May 1940, 39 tank brigades and 4 motorized divisions were deployed - 1, 15, 81, 109.
Winter 1939-1940 The tank crews faced another test - the Soviet-Finnish war, where they had to operate in the most unsuitable conditions for tanks. The outbreak of war interrupted the ongoing reform and liquidation of the corps. The 10th Tank Corps (1, 13 LTBR, 15 SPBR), 34th LTBR, 20th Tank Brigade and other formations fought on the Karelian Isthmus. The 20th brigade was transferred from Slutsk to the Leningrad Military District in September 1939 and consisted of 145 T-28 and 20 BA-20; from December 13, 1939, new heavy tanks were tested in it - KV, SMK and T- 100. The brigade's losses in battles amounted to 96 T-28s.
The total losses of the Red Army on the Karelian Isthmus in the period from November 30, 1939 to March 10, 1940 amounted to 3,178 tanks.
By May 1940, the Red Army had 39 tank brigades - 32 light tanks, 3 equipped with T-28 tanks, one (14th heavy tank brigade) with T-35 and T-28 tanks, and three armed with chemical tanks. 20 cavalry divisions each had a tank regiment (64 battalions in total), and rifle divisions had 98 separate tank battalions.
But the transformations did not end there. On the contrary, in 1940 a new radical restructuring of the organizational forms of ABTV began. In June 1940, the USSR NGO reviewed the experience of using tanks at Khalkhin Gol and the combat operations of German tank forces in Europe. The new leadership of the NPO, headed by S.K. Timoshenko, decided to quickly catch up and overtake the Wehrmacht in terms of the quantity and quality of armored forces. Their main striking force was to be tank divisions, united in mechanized corps.
T-26 at UkrVO maneuvers in the summer of 1935. The white top of the turrets with a red star, introduced during these exercises, meant that the tanks belonged to one of the sides.
T-26 overcomes a gap in a brick wall.
Tanks, cavalry and artillery on Uritsky Square during the reception of the May Day parade of 1936 by the commander of the Leningrad Military District. The formation of the companies corresponds to the accepted transition to reinforced tank platoons of five vehicles instead of the previous three.
“Stakhanov crew” of the BA-6 armored car of the 2nd company of the 2nd battalion of the 18th Turkestan Mountain Cavalry Division, awarded the Order of the Red Banner. TurkVO, 1936
Inspection of the T-26 after the march. By the beginning of the war, tankers often wore cloth budenovkas instead of shock-absorbing helmets.
Flamethrower tank OT-26. The “chemical battalions” of the mechanized corps each had 52 flamethrower tanks, which were necessary to break through enemy defenses. By the end of 1939, three separate brigades of “chemical tanks” with 150 vehicles each were formed.
The two closest BT-5 tanks in the 1936 photo have welded turrets (the first is a commander’s tank with a handrail radio antenna), the next two have riveted turrets.
Foreign military attaches observe the BT-5 during the Kyiv maneuvers. 1935
Cleaning the BT-7 gun after firing.
Tankers of the Krasnograd camp named after. Frunze LenVO welcome the Chelyuskinites who have arrived to visit. Summer 1934
Comintern tractors tow guns at the May Day parade 1937.
To be continued…
Types of armored vehicles and their applications.
Designing an armored vehicle is a search for the optimal balance between armor protection, speed and mobility, load capacity, range, specific pressure of the tracks on the ground and firepower. The best option is considered to be a highly mobile vehicle with reliable protection for the crew, low fuel consumption and (especially in the case of tanks) accurate and powerful weapons. With the inclusion of fire support helicopters in the armored forces, this branch of troops gained the opportunity to launch air strikes, including against enemy tanks.
Motorized infantry and engineering troops are armed with armored personnel carriers that are capable of moving where tanks can pass. Today's artillery is self-propelled, has armor protection and has sufficient speed and mobility to accompany fast-moving tank columns and provide them with direct fire support. Armored vehicles have been created to perform tasks such as evacuating damaged armored vehicles from the battlefield, building bridges and transporting materiel in battle. All armored vehicles are air transportable, some of the vehicles are amphibious. However, the heavy weight of tanks and other types of armored vehicles limits their strategic mobility—almost all tanks can only be transported by ships or very large aircraft.
Tank park of the Red Army on the eve of the Second World War
To this day, the total number of tanks in the Red Army on the eve of the war cannot be accurately estimated. For a long time, in Russian literature it was talked about in one phrase: “The Soviet Army had tanks of various types in service, of which 1861 were T-34 and KV tanks. The bulk of the vehicles were light tanks of outdated designs.” Only recently have figures begun to appear that actually estimate the number of tanks that the Red Army had, but they also differ due to differences in data in different archival sources (one of the reasons for this is the well-known domestic attitude to the presentation of information and objectivity in reporting).
Major General L.G. Ivashov (“VIZh” No. 11'89) gives the figure 23457 tanks, of which 30% are combat-ready.
The publication of the General Staff “The classification of secrecy has been removed...” (M., 1993) determines their number at 22,600 units (heavy - 500, medium - 900, light - 21,200). These data are questionable in some respects - firstly, for many years the number of KV tanks at the beginning of the war has been textbook - 636, but there were also heavy T-35 tanks, of which about 60 were produced. In total, the number of heavy tanks is significantly more than 500 Secondly, 1225 T-34s (also an established figure) plus several hundred T-28s (in the 3rd TD - 38, in the 8th - 68, in the 10th - 61, etc.) do not equal 900. The percentage of serviceable tanks is set at 27. But in general, we can say that the classification of secrecy in this book has not been removed.
The most trustworthy is the “Summary statement of the quantitative and qualitative composition of tanks and self-propelled guns located in military districts, repair bases and NPO warehouses as of June 1, 1941.” N.P. Zolotova and S.I. Isaev (“VIZH” No. 11'93). According to it, the Red Army had 23,106 tanks and self-propelled guns in service. Of these, 18,691 or 80.9% are combat-ready. But this number is not final either - from May 31 to June 21, 1941, 206 new tanks were shipped from factories (KV - 41, T-34 - 138, T-40 - 27).
Combat-ready vehicles here include tanks included in the 1st and 2nd categories according to the Manual on Accounting and Reporting in the Red Army:
Category 1 - new, never used, meeting the technical requirements and fully suitable for use for its intended purpose.
2nd category - former (in use), fully operational and suitable for use for its intended purpose. This also includes property requiring military repairs (routine repairs carried out by the unit itself).
| Groups of troops, repair bases, warehouses | Total tanks and self-propelled guns | Of them combat-ready | Needs renovation | Combat ready, in % |
| Len VO | 1857 | 1543 | 314 | 83,1 |
| PribOVO | 1549 | 1274 | 275 | 82,2 |
| ZapOVO | 2900 | 2192 | 708 | 75,6 |
| KOVO | 5465 | 4788 | 677 | 87,6 |
| ODVO | 1011 | 743 | 268 | 73,5 |
| ZKVO | 877 | 717 | 160 | 81,8 |
| SAVO | 363 | 288 | 75 | 79,3 |
| DVF | 3201 | 2963 | 238 | 92,6 |
| ZabVO | 2496 | 2074 | 422 | 83,1 |
| ArchVO | 26 | 25 | 1 | 96,2 |
| MVO | 1173 | 949 | 224 | 80,9 |
| PriVO | 443 | 335 | 108 | 75,6 |
| ORVO | 321 | 199 | 122 | 62 |
| HVO | 305 | 220 | 85 | 72,1 |
| SKVO | 157 | 133 | 24 | 84,1 |
| Ural Military District | 53 | 48 | 5 | 90,6 |
| Siberian Military District | 216 | 199 | 17 | 92,1 |
| NPO repair bases | 677 | 0 | 677 | 0 |
| NPO warehouses | 16 | 1 | 15 | 6,3 |
| Total in the Red Army | 23106 | 18691 | 4415 | 80,9 |
The authors stipulate that there is no reliable information revealing the state of the Red Army tank fleet as of June 22. But of all the data encountered, these seem to be the most plausible, although they contradict many established indicators, especially the qualitative condition of Soviet tanks (you must agree that the difference between 27% of serviceable and 80.9% is quite large).
The total number of tanks here includes vehicles of mechanized corps, tank regiments of cavalry divisions, tank battalions of airborne corps and rifle divisions. When assessing the number of vehicles in the western direction, it should be taken into account that the tank forces of KOVO, PribOVO, OdVO, LenVO and ZapVO were initially replenished with equipment transferred from the rear districts.
How did the German command assess the state of the ABTV of the Red Army? Before the war, the main command of the Wehrmacht determined the number of tank divisions at 7, plus 38 tank (motorized) brigades. The unreliability of this information was caused by the fact that the formation of mechanized corps continued, and the standard equipment was absent. After the start of the war, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, G. Halder, made the following entry in his official diary: “The number of tanks available to the enemy is presumably 15,000 vehicles. This corresponds to 35 tank divisions. Of these, 22 were found at the front. In the Far East - 5 tank divisions. 8 are missing (about 3 presumably in the north, including one - 6 TK, transferred from the Moscow area). Not counting the three divisions mentioned in brackets, the Russian command has 5 tank divisions, which it can use as an operational reserve” (entry dated July 2, 1941). “The number of enemy tank troops turned out to be greater than expected” (07/25/1941). In general, the Germans’ ideas about the size of the tank forces opposing them in the western districts were quite reliable and one can only wonder how they risked starting a war by moving their 3,329 tanks, most of them light, against this armada.
Our entire huge tank fleet was lost in the battles of the summer and autumn of 1941. The total losses of Soviet tanks also remain in question. Figures from different sources, including reports from units and formations, submitted in the turmoil of the retreat vary significantly, so we present here the official data of the General Staff, published in 1993.
Losses of armored and mechanized forces in 1941
| Name | Consisted on June 22 | Received 22.06-31.12 | Resource | Losses | % losses to the resource |
| Tanks, thousand units | 22,6 | 5,6 | 28,2 | 20,5 | 72,7 |
| including: | |||||
| - heavy | 0,5 | 1 | 1,5 | 0,9 | 60 |
| - average | 0,9 | 2,2 | 3,1 | 2,3 | 74,2 |
| - lungs | 21,2 | 2,4 | 23,6 | 17,3 | 73,3 |
| BA, tractors, other BTT | 13,1 | 10,8 | 23,9 | 3 | 12,5 |
Losses of armored vehicles during the 1941 operation.
| Name of operation, duration (days) | Tank losses in the operation | Average daily losses |
| Baltic defensive operation, 06/22-07/9/1941 (18) | 2523 | 140 |
| Belarusian defensive operation, 06/22-07/9/1941 (18) | 4799 | 267 |
| Defensive operation in Western Ukraine, 06/22-07/6/1941 (15) | 4381 | 292 |
| Defensive operation in the Arctic, Karelia, 06.29-10.10.1941 (104) | 546 | 5 |
| Kiev defensive operation, 7.07-26.09.1941 (82) | 411 | 5 |
| Leningrad defensive operation, 07/10-09/30/1941 (83) | 1492 | 18 |
| Battle of Smolensk, 10.07-10.09.1941 (63) | 1348 | 21 |
| Moscow defensive operation, 30.09-5.12.1941 (67) | 2785 | 42 |
The highest level of tank losses was during defensive battles in Western Ukraine, where the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front tried to stop the advance of Army Group South towards Kyiv. Due to the unfortunate location of the covering armies, the main blow of the German group fell on the junction of the 5th and 6th armies. The command of the Southwestern Front, led by Mr. M.P. Kirponos, failed to organize and carry out a counterattack, although he had every reason to hope for success - more than five times superiority in tanks, the presence of a large number of vehicles of new brands (758 KV and T-34). But due to incompetent leadership, the lack of a well-functioning logistics system, and German air supremacy, all efforts went to waste.
A large amount of equipment was simply abandoned when the Soviet troops retreated. Thus, in the warehouse in Dubno alone, German troops captured 215 tanks, 50 anti-tank guns and much other property. In the 10th Tank Division of the 15th MK, 140 tanks were left behind during the retreat (for comparison, combat losses amounted to 110 vehicles). In the 8th Panzer Division of the 4th MK, the crews destroyed 107 tanks, 10 went missing, 6 got stuck in a swamp and were abandoned. Knowing all this, one can no longer be surprised at the average daily losses of the Southwestern Front of 292 tanks. There was no such level of losses even in the largest tank battles of the war - for example, in the Battle of Kursk, this figure ranged from 68 (in the Oryol offensive operation) to 89 (in the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation).
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