Air defense breakthrough by exceeding its target interception capabilities: solutions
One of the clear examples of the confrontation between sword and shield can be considered the counteraction of air attack weapons (AEA) and anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM). From the very beginning of the appearance of air defense systems, they began to pose a huge threat to combat aviation, forcing aircraft to first climb as high as possible into the sky and then hug the ground.
To counter air defense systems, specialized aviation ammunition was developed, such as radar-guided missiles, electronic warfare (EW) equipment was improved, and finally, combat aircraft and aviation ammunition were created using stealth technologies, allowing significantly reduce their detection range of air defense systems.
One of the most effective ways to counter an air defense system is to exceed its capabilities to intercept air targets. The limitation may be the maximum number of targets simultaneously detected and tracked by the radar, a limitation on the number of guidance channels for anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAMs), or a limitation on the number of SAMs themselves in the ammunition load of an air defense system.
Increasing the stability of air defense is carried out by creating layered defense, which includes long-, medium- and short-range complexes. Due to the fact that the boundaries of short/short-range complexes are currently blurred, in the future we will say short-range.
In Russia, these are currently the S-400 Triumph / S-300V4 long-range air defense system, the S-350 Vityaz / BUK-M3 medium-range air defense system and the Pantsir-S1/S2 / Tor-M1/M2 short-range air defense system .
Long-range SAM S-400, medium-range S-350, short-range Pantsir-S1
Tasks of air defense systems of different ranges
The priority task of long-range air defense systems is the destruction of strategic aircraft, tanker aircraft, early warning aircraft (AWACS), reconnaissance and target designation aircraft of the E-8 Joint STARS type, and electronic warfare aircraft at the maximum distance from the protected object.
Also, the priority targets of long-range air defense systems are operational-tactical missiles (OTRK) and cruise missiles (CR). For medium-range air defense systems, the priority task is to destroy tactical aircraft, if possible before they launch air-to-ground weapons (air-to-ground), as well as launched aircraft weapons that pose the greatest threat to the defended object.
And finally, the priority task of a short-range air defense system is to protect the defended object and its “bigger brothers” from destruction by breached aircraft weapons.
All this distribution of roles does not imply that a long-range air defense system cannot shoot down a gliding bomb, and a short-range air defense system should not work on aircraft. The point of dividing areas of responsibility is to prevent the enemy from exhausting the limited ammunition of long-range air defense systems with decoys or the massive use of inexpensive precision-guided ammunition.
Priority targets for long-range air defense systems are the E-3 "Sentry" AWACS aircraft, the E-8 "Joint STARS" command and control aircraft, the B-1B "Lancer" and B-2 "Spirit" bombers.
Aviation in air defense
Another means of countering enemy aviation is electronic warfare, but they will have to be taken out of the equation for now, since the effectiveness of these weapons against enemy airborne weapons is not reliably known.
Considering that enemy aircraft also use electronic warfare systems to counter the air defense of the attacked object, we will assume that their action has approximately equal effectiveness for both sides. The main advantage of aviation is its highest mobility, which allows flexible concentration of available forces to attack a particular target. Air defense systems do not have such flexibility. An aircraft that has exhausted its ammunition can return to a remote base, and the air defense system, at best, can be moved to another position, since its mobility is limited by the speed of vehicles and the need to cover a certain object.
The main problem of air defense is that, using low visibility, electronic warfare equipment, a low flight profile and terrain features, the enemy can reach the point of launching/dropping precision-guided munitions in such quantities that are highly likely to oversaturate the capabilities of even layered air defense.
One US Air Force F-15E fighter can carry 28 GBU-53B/SDB II guided bombs (UAB) on seven BRU-61/A type beam holders
The United States and other NATO countries are constantly increasing the range of weapons to break through enemy air defenses. Considering that only Russia and China have powerful echeloned air defense among potential adversaries, it is not difficult to guess against whom all these preparations are being made.
The F-35 stealth fighter can carry 8 small-sized air-to-air cruise missiles in its internal compartments - MBDA SPEAR surface
Eurofighter Typhoon can carry 16 MBDA SPEAR missiles
UAVs and decoys for breakthrough
One of the promising areas for air defense breakthrough is the joint use of manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
This significantly reduces the risks for pilots, leaving them with the role of combat coordinators. In turn, UAVs can be smaller in size and less visible than a manned aircraft, and, accordingly, greater survivability in confrontation with enemy air defenses. As part of the Gremlins program, implemented by DARPA, a transport aircraft or strategic bomber will be able to produce dozens of small-sized reusable UAVs to break through enemy air defenses. In turn, Gremlin UAVs can be equipped with even smaller guided munitions, for example, JAGM missiles with a multi-mode homing head (GOS) and a range of 16-28 km.
Image of a Gremlin UAV launch from a transport aircraft and actual testing of prototypes
To increase the likelihood of breaking through air defenses and reduce their own losses, the enemy will use decoys, for example, such as the MALD missile, which is capable of simulating the radar signatures of 140 types of US and NATO aircraft, as well as jamming enemy detection and targeting radars. Almost all US Air Force strike aircraft carry the MALD missile.
MALD combat aircraft simulator missile
Presentation of air defense breakthrough using MALD simulator missiles
The problem of insufficient ammunition
Although the capabilities of long- and medium-range radars make it possible to detect hundreds of targets, they can simultaneously fire at about 10-20 targets (for one complex).
The intensity of shelling of targets can be increased by using missiles with an active radar homing head (ARGSN), however, the development of missiles of this type in Russia has been delayed, and only recently has it reached the finish line. Also, the cost of missiles with ARGSN is higher than missiles with semi-active guidance, and potentially less resistance to electronic warfare. The number of missiles on launchers (PU) is also limited. At the same time, after the air defense system is depleted of ammunition, it becomes incapable of combat for a long time, and will restore its combat readiness in about 1 hour, provided that spare ammunition is generally available (transport-loading vehicles are available).
Reloading the S-400 Triumph air defense system
Developers are trying to solve the problem of increasing the ammunition load, for example, the new S-350 Vityaz medium-range air defense system has an ammunition load increased several times compared to the S-300PM and BUK-M2/M3 complexes, which it is supposed to replace. Another way to increase the ammunition load of long- and medium-range complexes is to place several shorter-range missiles (up to four) in a transport-launch container (TPC). However, this proportionally reduces the number of long- and medium-range missiles, essentially turning the air defense system into a short-range complex.
9M96 SAM with ARGSN and 9M100 SAM with thermal guidance in the final section, in the background there is a quadruple TPK 9M100 SAM - installed instead of one “large” TPK for the S-400 air defense system
Thus, despite the fact that the main strike force of air defense systems are long- and medium-range air defense systems, the limitation of their capabilities in terms of ammunition and the number of guidance channels shows the importance of short-range air defense systems as a means of countering enemy attack ammunition.
Capabilities of domestic short-range air defense systems
What capabilities do Russian short-range air defense systems have?
Currently in Russia there are two modern short-range air defense systems, these are the Tor-M1/M2 air defense system and the Pantsir-S1/S2 air defense system. The ammunition load of the Tor-M1/M2 air defense system is 8/16 missiles, respectively, and we have not yet heard about the prospects for increasing it.
SAM Tor-M2
The ammunition load of the Pantsir-S1/S2 air defense missile system is 12 missiles and 1,400 30 mm shells for two twin 2A38M anti-aircraft guns. As test results and the actual use of the Pantsir-S air defense system in combat show, the effectiveness of anti-aircraft guns can be questioned, at least until the advent of guided 30 mm ammunition, or at least shells with remote detonation on the trajectory.
Thus, the ammunition load of two Pantsir-S1/S2 air defense systems is less than the ammunition load of one F-15E fighter armed with SDB II UAB, and the ammunition load of one Tor-M2 air defense system is comparable to the ammunition load of a Eurofighter Typhoon fighter armed with MBDA SPEAR missiles. If we take into account that two missiles may be required simultaneously to hit dangerous or complex targets, the situation gets even worse.
The disadvantages of the Tor-M1/M2 air defense missile system and the Pantsir-S1/S2 air defense missile system also include the fact that their missiles require control throughout the entire flight, and the number of simultaneously fired targets is limited to three for the Pantsir-S2 air defense system and four for the Tor-M2 air defense system . In this case, the simultaneously fired targets must be in the viewing area of the guidance radar, i.e. It is impossible to simultaneously work on targets attacking from different directions.
Problem solving options
How can air defense performance be increased?
The introduction of additional launchers with a large number of short-range missiles into long- and medium-range air defense systems does not make sense, since the performance of the air defense system will still be limited by the number of channels for simultaneous missile guidance at the target. Missiles with ARGSN and thermal seekers, which do not require control throughout the flight, can reduce the dependence on the number of guidance channels, but their cost in many cases will significantly exceed the cost of the targets they hit. The problem of depleting air defense missiles can be solved by promising short-range air defense systems based on powerful lasers, with a conditionally infinite ammunition load. However, their ability to repel a massive attack is limited by the need to keep the beam on the target for 5-15 seconds required to defeat it. In addition, apart from the mysterious Peresvet complex, there is no information in Russia about the development of anti-aircraft laser systems, so it is impossible to predict their effectiveness as part of Russian air defense.
Thus, we are returning to short-range air defense systems, the cost of which should be significantly less than the cost of air defense systems for long- and medium-range air defense systems.
The problem of breaking through air defenses by exceeding its capabilities to intercept targets is known to the Russian armed forces and defense enterprises, and work is underway to solve it.
In particular, the development of the modernized Pantsir-SM air defense system/air defense missile system is currently nearing completion. The double designation SAM/ZRPK is indicated because two versions of the complex are supposed to be implemented, with missile and gun armament - ZRPK, and only with missile weapons - SAM.
Taking into account the low efficiency of anti-aircraft guns, the purely missile version of the Pantsir-SM air defense system is of greater interest.
Estimated appearance of the Pantsir-SM air defense system
Due to the abandonment of cannon armament, the ammunition capacity of the missile defense system in the Pantsir-SM air defense system can be increased to 24 units. Presumably, the Pantsir-SM air defense system/air defense missile system will receive a radar with an active phased antenna array (AFAR), but it is not yet clear whether the AFAR will be used only in the preliminary detection radar, or in the guidance and tracking radar. In the second case, the capabilities of the complex to simultaneously fire at several targets should increase significantly. In both cases, while maintaining the current configuration of the complex, the problem of limited visibility of the guidance and tracking radar remains. The target detection range should increase from 36 to 75 km.
The destruction range should increase from 20 km for Pantsir-S to 40 km for Pantsir-SM, the maximum speed of the missile defense system will be 1700-2300 m/s, h (5-7M). Pantsir-SM will also be able to hit targets moving along a ballistic trajectory.
Another way to increase the ammunition load of an air defense system, as mentioned earlier, is to place several shorter-range missiles in one container. Considering that the Pantsir-S1/S2/SM air defense system is a short-range complex, but in the latest modification it will approach the characteristics of medium-range complexes, the appearance of such missiles on it is more than justified.
For the Pantsir-SM complex (and possibly for the Pantsir-S1/S2 complexes), a small-sized, highly maneuverable missile defense system is being developed, which has received the unofficial name “Nail”. This missile is designed to destroy UAVs, mortar mines, guided and unguided munitions. The compact dimensions make it possible to place this missile in the amount of four units in one TPK. Thus, when armed with Gvozd missiles alone, the ammunition load of the Pantsir-SM air defense system can be up to 96 missiles.
Model of the short-range missile defense system "Gvozd", placed 4 missiles in one standard TPK of the Pantsir-SM air defense system
The missiles of the existing Pantsir-S1/S2 complex are made according to a bicaliber design, the booster engine is located in a detachable first stage. After completion of acceleration and separation of the first stage, the second - combat stage - flies by inertia. On the one hand, this reduces the speed and maneuverability of the missile with increasing altitude and range, on the other hand, it is possible that the enemy will have problems detecting the second stage of the Pantsir-S1/S2 missile attack system with missile attack warning systems operating on the principle of infrared detection (IR) and ultraviolet (UV) radiation from a running rocket engine. It is quite possible that the AN/AAQ-37 system of the F-35 stealth fighter will not be able to track the second stage of the Pantsir-S1/S2 air defense missiles after the separation of the first stage.
It is not yet clear whether the design of the Pantsir-SM air defense missile system will change; it is possible that in order to obtain an increased firing range of up to 40 km, the second stage will also be equipped with an engine. If not, then the advantage of a surprise attack may remain with the Pantsir-SM. At least based on the appearance of the small-sized Gvozd missile defense system, it can be assumed that there is no engine in the second stage.
The supposed appearance of the Pantsir-SM air defense system/air defense system may indicate another feature of this complex. The images show a missile-gun version with a surveillance radar and a missile version with increased ammunition without a surveillance radar.
Image of the Pantsir-SM air defense system with a surveillance radar and the Pantsir-SM air defense system without a surveillance radar
The cost of a surveillance radar, especially if it is based on AFAR, should be a significant amount, constituting a significant part of the cost of an air defense system/air defense system. Accordingly, developers can implement several variants of the complex - with and without surveillance radar, and most likely this is possible for both air defense systems and air defense systems. In this case, short-range complexes should operate in a group similar to long- and medium-range air defense systems.
For example, in a group of four Pantsir-SM vehicles, only one is equipped with a surveillance radar. The capabilities of an AFAR radar will make it possible to track many more targets than a single air defense system can process, especially given the remaining limitation on the guidance radar's field of view. In this case, the air defense system with surveillance radar issues target designation to other vehicles, which provide tracking and engagement of targets. In addition, Pantsir-SM air defense systems/air defense systems without surveillance radar are capable of searching for targets using their existing optical-location station (OLS).
A group of four vehicles will be able to repel an air attack from all directions simultaneously, or concentrate fire on the most threatened area. Four Pantsir-SM air defense systems with only missile weapons can carry a total of 48 missiles with a firing range of 40 km and 192 Gvozd missiles with an estimated firing range of 10-15 km. The combination of 240 surface-to-air missiles and a large number of guidance channels will allow four Pantsir-SM air defense systems to repel a massive enemy fire attack, for example, an attack by a flight of four F-15E fighter-bombers with 28 GBU-53B UAB on each or a salvo of eight multiple launch rocket systems M270MLRS.
Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that the adoption of the S-350 Vityaz medium-range air defense system with 9M96 and 9M100 missiles, as well as the completion of the development of the Pantsir-SM air defense system/air defense system (especially in a purely missile version) with a 40 km range and small-sized missiles The “Gvozd” missile defense system will provide fundamentally new capabilities to Russian air defense to repel massive enemy air strikes.
The projected S-500 Prometheus long-range air defense system remains a “dark horse”, and one can only guess what capabilities it will provide to Russian air defense.
This material does not mention the interaction of air defense systems and combat aviation in the framework of solving air defense problems, but we will talk about this in the next article.
Fundamentals of the combat use of military air defense units. Modern anti-aircraft combat
Air defense of troops is carried out by units and subunits of military air defense in cooperation with fighter aircraft, formations, units and subunits of air defense troops of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, electronic warfare equipment and covered troops in a complex ground and air situation in conditions of continuous fire exposure and electronic suppression by the enemy. It is an integral part of combined arms combat and is organized in all its types, during the movement of covered formations, units and subunits and their location on the spot.
Air defense includes combat operations, formations, units and air defense units (air defense units mean: anti-aircraft missile and artillery division, anti-aircraft missile division, anti-aircraft missile (missile and artillery, artillery) battery, technical battery, control and radar reconnaissance battery, radar company, platoon, squad, crew), as well as a set of special measures carried out by all branches of the military in order to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air strikes.
The purpose of air defense in combat is to defeat the enemy in the air, repel his attacks on covered formations, units and subunits, maintain their combat effectiveness and create conditions for them to carry out their assigned tasks.
Military air defense units protect troops and objects from enemy air strikes by conducting combat operations, which represent a combination of anti-aircraft battles of anti-aircraft units and tactical actions of air defense radar units, united by a single concept and plan.
Anti-aircraft combat is an action coordinated by purpose, place and time of air defense formations, units and subunits to destroy the enemy air force or disrupt its attacks on covered troops and objects.
Air defense units depending on the combat mission; the availability of forces and means, the nature of enemy air actions, the following methods of conducting anti-aircraft combat can be used:
— concentration of fire on the most important targets for their reliable destruction;
— dispersal of fire to inflict maximum losses on the enemy air force;
- independent destruction of the enemy by batteries, platoons, combat vehicles (installations), anti-aircraft gunners.
Tactical actions of radar units - actions of radar units coordinated by purpose, place and time for the purpose of continuous surveillance of airspace, timely delivery of information about tracked targets to command (control points), anti-aircraft units and alerting troops about enemy air.
The combat use of air defense units is based on the following principles:
— constant combat readiness to repel enemy air strikes in any situation;
— maximum use of the combat capabilities of units;
— timely maneuver by units, fire and missiles (ammunition);
— coordination of actions with covered troops, neighbors and own aviation;
— decisive concentration of efforts on the main direction of action of formations, units and subunits;
- activity, continuity, surprise and non-standard actions, the use of military cunning (deception of the enemy);
- resistance to fire damage and electronic suppression of the enemy, the ability to conduct long and intense combat operations, full strain of moral and physical strength, the use of the moral and psychological factor c. interests of fulfilling the combat mission;
— firmness and continuity of management, persistence in fulfilling assigned tasks; comprehensive support for combat operations.
Constant combat readiness of air defense units means their ability to enter into battle in an organized manner, on time, and successfully complete assigned tasks.
This is achieved:
— knowledge of upcoming tasks and timely implementation of measures to prepare for their implementation;
— carrying out combat duty and timely transfer of air defense units to readiness to repel enemy air strikes;
— continuous reconnaissance in order to detect the enemy’s beginning to use air attack means and timely notification of covered formations, units and subunits;
— staffing and high combat training of personnel;
— readiness of weapons and equipment for immediate combat use;
— timely implementation of comprehensive support measures, as well as high moral and psychological state, discipline and vigilance of personnel.
Maximum use of the combat capabilities of air defense units is achieved by creating a rational battle formation and effective command and control, timely detection and destruction of air targets at maximum ranges, rapid transfer of fire, timely movement and maneuver to new positions.
The maneuver of units with fire and missiles (ammunition) is carried out to create in the shortest possible time the most advantageous battle formation, to concentrate efforts to cover units and subunits that are currently solving the main tasks, as well as to restore a damaged fire system or escape from possible attacks enemy and infection zones. Maneuver by units (crews) is carried out by moving them to other directions (positions) or rearranging their battle formation.
Fire maneuver consists of concentrating fire on the most important targets, distributing fire while simultaneously or sequentially destroying targets, and transferring fire to new targets. Maneuvering missiles (ammunition) is carried out by redistributing missiles (ammunition) between units (crews). The maneuver must be simple in concept, carried out quickly, covertly and unexpectedly for the enemy.
Interaction (coordination of actions) with covered troops and neighbors is one of the main conditions for achieving success in anti-aircraft combat; it is achieved by organizing and maintaining continuous and clear interaction between them by coordinating their actions on tasks, directions, boundaries, zones, time and methods of performing assigned tasks, and by mutual exchange of information about changes in the air and ground situation.
Decisive concentration of efforts on the main direction of action of covered formations of units and subunits makes it possible to successfully defeat an air enemy and make the most effective use of the combat capabilities of air defense units.
The focus of efforts is:
- in the skillful distribution of air defense assets in the combat and marching formations of the covered troops, taking into account the tasks they solve;
— in application in the direction of concentrating the main efforts of the most combat-ready and effective air defense units;
- in a bold and decisive maneuver by units and fire during the battle.
Activity, continuity, surprise and non-standard actions, the use of military cunning (deception of the enemy) lies in the constant desire to inflict maximum losses on the air enemy in any conditions, to act boldly, boldly, energetically with utmost persistence and perseverance in any situation.
This is achieved:
— comprehensive knowledge of the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses;
- the use of non-standard combat formations and methods of combat operations, skillful and timely movement, conducting covert maneuvers by units and fire;
- skillful camouflage and organization of ambushes;
- rapid restoration of combat effectiveness;
— timely replenishment of spent ammunition and missiles, fuel and other materiel;
— timely restoration of weapons and equipment.
Resistance against fire damage and electronic suppression of the enemy, the ability to conduct long-term and intense combat operations is achieved by: establishing and observing the operating modes of radar equipment, radiation communications equipment, carrying out a set of technical measures to counter the enemy’s technical means of reconnaissance and electronic protection of one’s electronic equipment; periodic change of positions, their engineering equipment and camouflage; preparation of reserve and false positions.
Full tension of moral and physical strength, the use of the moral and psychological factor in the interests of fulfilling a combat mission are the most important conditions for achieving success in battle.
This requires:
— deep knowledge of the moral and psychological state of subordinates,
- to be close to them, to combine high demands with attention to their needs and taking into account the difficulties in everyday combat life, to continuously improve educational work and combat training;
- systematically study the moral and psychological state of the enemy and help reduce it through the timely destruction of his air attack weapons.
Firmness and continuity of control, perseverance in carrying out assigned tasks make it possible to fully and effectively use the combat capabilities of air defense units and consist in granting the commander the right, based on a comprehensive assessment of the situation, to make decisions individually, give orders to subordinates and ensure their implementation.
To do this, commanders are required to:
— constant study of the situation;
— timely decision-making and persistent implementation of it;
— initiative and personal responsibility for one’s decisions;
— constant maintenance of means and controls in readiness to perform tasks;
— skillful use of automation and communication tools;
— centralization of management.
Centralization of management must be combined with the manifestation by subordinates of reasonable initiative in carrying out assigned tasks, the ability to quickly move from centralized to decentralized and mixed management.
Comprehensive and complete support for combat operations of air defense units consists of organizing and implementing measures aimed at maintaining units in high combat readiness, preserving their combat effectiveness and creating favorable conditions for them to successfully complete their assigned tasks. It is organized on the basis of orders from higher headquarters and the decision of the commander of an air defense unit and is carried out directly in all types of combat operations, as well as during the movement and location of units on the spot. Comprehensive support for combat operations of air defense units includes combat, technical and logistics support.
Based on modern conditions, two methods of using military air defense can be distinguished:
— conducting combat operations as part of a group of air defense forces in the operational direction;
— conducting independent combat operations by military units and air defense units.
The method of performing combat missions is implemented by:
— creating a group in the operational direction (for the tactical level of building battle formations);
— determination of the order and sequence of fire engagement of the air enemy;
— determining the order of maneuver (movement) to be used;
— determination of methods for conducting reconnaissance of enemy air;
— determining measures to deceive the enemy, achieve surprise and ensure survivability.
The main techniques for implementing methods for performing combat missions in modern conditions will be:
1. The use of mixed, combined air defense groups armed with different types of air defense systems and the construction of their battle formations.
The need to use combined, mixed air defense groups is caused by an increase in the area of responsibility of a separate mechanized brigade (OMB), and this leads to the distribution of forces and assets of the anti-aircraft missile and artillery division (ZRADN) over a larger territory, a change in the structure of anti-aircraft missile and artillery fire and the control system.
The composition of mixed groups in each specific case may be different depending on the tasks and characteristics of the covered object.
The methodology for determining the composition of mixed air defense groups and constructing battle formations is as follows:
— a standard outfit of enemy air attack means is determined to destroy supposed cover objects (focuses of defense) for a mixed air defense group;
- based on the combat formations of enemy aviation and the standard outfit, the density of attacks on cover targets (focuses of defense) is determined;
- the composition of mixed air defense groups is determined based on the condition - the fire performance of the mixed group must be greater than or equal to the impact density;
- mixed groups are distributed among cover objects (focuses of defense) based on the fact that a group located in one of the foci also covers neighboring foci;
- mixed air defense groups located in the centers of one battalion (covering one object) are combined into a battery. The battery commander can directly control one group and two or three groups through platoon commanders. Battery commanders are controlled, depending on the situation, either by the head of the air defense unit from the air defense control point (PU), or by the commander of the air defense unit from the command post (CP) of the division, which is an element of the reserve command post (ZCP);
2. Creation of a zone of anti-aircraft missile and artillery fire at extremely low, low and medium altitudes, to combat cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters in helicopter-dangerous areas.
The anti-aircraft missile and artillery fire zone is an area of airspace in which the fire of various anti-aircraft missile and anti-aircraft missile and artillery weapons is organized by time and place.
As a rule, to create zones of anti-aircraft missile and artillery fire, air defense systems from the zradn ombre are brought in, since they have minimal reaction time and ways to relatively effectively deal with enemy air at extremely low and low altitudes.
In order to combat enemy special operations forces (SOF), illegal armed groups, and provide cover from ground enemy attacks when creating zones of anti-aircraft missile and artillery fire, the combat formations of air defense units are built in areas where mechanized formations and military units are concentrated, located in probable directions.
In order to avoid restructuring the control system of air defense units and the creation of combined, mixed air defense groups during combat operations, it is advisable to switch to the use of mixed groups before the start of enemy air operations.
To achieve surprise in the use of air defense units (mixed groups) and ensure the survivability of air defense systems, roaming units and ambush operations must be planned and used.
3. Creation of a mobile zone of direct anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover.
The conditions of modern combat operations do not allow the creation of a grouping of air defense troops with an integral destruction zone at low altitudes, covering the entire combat area, which leads to the need to create mobile zones of direct anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover for various objects, including mobile ones.
The mobile zone of direct anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover should be understood as an area of airspace in which it is possible to engage air attack weapons with anti-aircraft missile systems capable of conducting reconnaissance and fire while moving or from a short stop.
This tactical technique is used to cover individual missile divisions (ordn), jet divisions (readn), medium-range and long-range air defense systems, individual mechanized battalions (omb), individual tank battalions (otb), and columns of command posts on the march.
The choice of tactical techniques is determined by the appropriate commander depending on the task at hand.
Thus, at the stages of a strategic defensive operation, military air defense can be used:
during an air operation:
1) with participation in repelling massive missile air strikes, concentrated air strikes of the enemy (destruction of helicopters in helicopter-dangerous directions, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles) by attracting forces and means of air defense forces located in areas of concentration in the directions of the air enemy’s actions.
The battle formation of the zradn is being built with the aim of creating zones of anti-aircraft missile and artillery fire in these directions.
Based on the fact that air targets in a given zone, as a rule, will suddenly appear, the decision to destroy them will be made by the commander of a mixed air defense group (platoon) with an immediate report to a higher command post.
Combat operations are carried out by air defense units of the ombre brigade (mixed groups), by ambush methods and by nomadic combat vehicles (groups);
2) the operational command (OC) command post is covered by the Osa-AKM anti-aircraft missile battery (ZRB) from the OK anti-aircraft missile brigade (ZRBR).
Depending on the terrain conditions, the battery's battle formation is built in a circle or in a line of pairs of combat vehicles (BMs) to cover the command post from all directions. As a rule, the method of dispersing fire is used, and the most important (dangerous) targets are destroyed by concentrating fire from the Osa-AKM air defense system. In the future, increasing efforts by the Igla MANPADS department. Management is centralized;
3) during the conduct of massive (concentrated) fire strikes by missile forces and artillery and the conduct of systematic fire operations, OSA-AKM airborne battalion troops are involved to provide cover from enemy air strikes, horde forces, and readiness units in temporary and main position areas and when moving.
Depending on the area, the following methods are used:
— cover by creating a mobile zone of anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover;
— covering routes and positional areas with a pre-created system of anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover;
- combined.
As a rule, the method of independent combat operations is used;
4) when a massive missile air strike is carried out by an enemy air force, military units and air defense units of OK, MTR participate in the destruction of cruise missiles.
To perform this task, duty forces are involved.
The order of battle of the OK air defense units is built in accordance with the received tasks for participation in the air operation.
To destroy cruise missiles, a concentrated fire method is usually used;
5) with the beginning of the enemy’s use of manned aircraft, all forces and means are used to destroy it.
The order of battle is built depending on the terrain conditions and the assigned tasks.
To maximize the destruction of enemy air attack weapons, dispersed fire is used. The most important (dangerous) targets are destroyed by concentrated fire. In this case, maneuver to reserve positions of BM (anti-aircraft self-propelled guns (ZSU)) is carried out after each launch. The battery maneuver is carried out by platoon (in pairs of combat vehicles), after repelling an attack;
6) when covering from enemy air strikes units conducting raid operations on enemy territory, air defense units armed with air defense systems with minimal reaction time and high maneuverability, such as the Igla MANPADS, are involved.
Cover is provided from the combat (marching) formations of the covered military units and subunits.
As a rule, the method of independent combat operations is used;
in a defensive operation:
1) protection from enemy air strikes of military units and subunits of the 1st echelon during combat operations in the forward defense zone is carried out by mixed air defense groups allocated to the forward defense zone.
The battle formation is based on the formation of battle formations of mechanized (tank) units and special forces units of the Armed Forces, conducting combat operations in the following manner: ambush - strike - maneuver.
A method of independent combat operations is used;
2) covering from enemy air strikes the exit of the main forces of the operational-tactical command (OTC) of the Air Force and air defense troops into the integrated combat area, in the areas of responsibility of the OK is organized by all forces and means of air defense of the OK and means of the OTK of the Air Force and air defense troops, designed to build up the system anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover OK at high and medium altitudes.
The battle formation is built taking into account covering the exit routes of the main forces of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces.
To destroy an air enemy, as a rule, the method of dispersal fire is used;
3) to provide cover from enemy air strikes to military units and subunits of missile forces and artillery that defeat advancing enemy reserves, the OSA-AKM air defense battalion from the OK air defense brigade, distributed in the areas of responsibility of the air brigade, is recruited.
Depending on the terrain, various methods of cover are used:
— cover by creating a mobile zone of anti-aircraft missile and artillery cover;
— covering routes and positional areas with a pre-created system of anti-aircraft missile and artillery fire.
- combined
As a rule, when implementing the above methods, the method of dispersing fire or conducting independent combat operations is used;
4) protection from enemy air strikes of military units and special forces units conducting sabotage and reconnaissance combat operations behind enemy lines (impact on the control system, communications, reserves, air defense system) is carried out by air defense units of individual mobile brigades (mobbr), armed with air defense systems with minimal reaction time and high maneuverability, such as the Igla MANPADS.
Cover is provided from the combat (pre-battle, marching) formations of the covered military units and subunits.
As a rule, the method of independent combat operations is used;
5) to cover military units and subunits of the OK from enemy air strikes during combat operations for holding the tactical and operational defense zones (maneuverable defense), the OMBR (mixed groups) and the OK zrbr are used.
When constructing a battle formation, mixed groups are placed in centers of defense. Part of the forces and means are allocated for operations with units of mechanized troops operating as maneuver groups.
Air defense units operating with units of one omb (otb) are combined into a battery.
Zrdn zrbr OK are distributed in the areas of responsibility of the ombr.
Typically, the fire spreading method is used;
6) protection from enemy air strikes of military units and units of the OK during combat operations for holding a strategic defense line (combat operations in an integrated combat area, tough positional defense, joint actions of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces and Ground Forces) is carried out by all air defense forces and means OK and by means of the quality control department of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces.
From the remaining forces and means, a unified air defense system is being created together with parts and subunits of the OTK, echeloned by range and altitudes. OK air defense forces and means are located in the 1st echelon.
To destroy air targets, as a rule, the method of dispersing fire is used, but the most important is using concentrated fire;
7) to provide cover from enemy air strikes to military units and subunits carrying out blocking actions when destroying enemy landing forces in the depths of the territory of the Republic of Belarus outside the OK’s areas of responsibility, air defense units of the special military unit armed with air defense systems with minimal reaction time and high maneuverability, such as MANPADS, are involved. "Needle".
Cover is provided from the combat (pre-battle, marching) formations of the covered military units and subunits.
As a rule, the method of independent combat operations is used.
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Principles, forms and methods of combat use of enemy air defense systems
The principles of the combat use of air strikes are the fundamental rules that guide the enemy command when planning air strikes and carrying them out. In their essence and content, these principles correspond to the general military principles of strategy and tactics.
Based on the experience of using air strike weapons in local wars and conflicts, the following basic principles can be formulated.
The surprise of a strike lies in the use of high-tech weapons that are unexpected in place and time for the enemy. The implementation of this principle allows you to dramatically change the balance of forces in your favor in important areas and seize the initiative.
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Depending on the scale of hostilities, the number of air forces involved in a given direction, and the planned results, surprise can be strategic, operational, or tactical. The concept of technical surprise is also considered, which is understood as the unexpected use of new classes, types of airborne weapons or new types of weapons, forces and means of electronic warfare.
Concentrating (massing) forces in the direction of the main attack consists of using the required (maximum possible) number of air defense systems to solve the main tasks at the decisive stages of the operation (combat).
The combination of concentration of forces with surprise allows you to achieve your goals even in conditions of numerical superiority of the enemy. The implementation of the principle is possible with centralized control of the actions of the air force in interaction with other types and branches of the military.
Continuity of action consists of constantly influencing the enemy with the aim of pinning him down and exhausting the air defense system. The continuity of air force operations has a significant psychological impact on the enemy and makes it difficult to regroup troops and restore their combat effectiveness.
The implementation of the principle of continuity is achieved by the ability of airborne missiles to strike at any time of the year and day, in any meteorological conditions. To do this, the potential enemy will widely use UAVs for various purposes (reconnaissance, decoys, distracting groups).
Economical (rational) use of air resources consists of allocating the minimum required amount of air resources, as well as distributing efforts to perform both the main and secondary tasks.
Saving air force forces is achieved by correctly forming the strike composition (echelons, raid groups) with the recruitment of strike and support forces and means, and the selection of effective techniques and methods of action. The implementation of the principle is due to the significantly increased capabilities of airborne weapons to destroy targets with high-precision weapons.
In addition, there are a number of additional principles for the use of air defense systems: the integrated use of air defense systems, electronic warfare forces and means; rational
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a national combination of centralized planning and independent combat operations; a combination of individual and group (collective) aviation defense during an attack; operational formation (battle formation) of a strike in accordance with the content of the tasks being solved, etc.
The considered basic principles are in close unity, and may also contradict each other. Their implementation requires creative application and reflects the views of the NATO command on the combat use of explosive weapons. The principles are constantly evolving and changing in accordance with the development of airborne weapons, the increase in their striking power, the emergence of new classes (types) of airborne weapons, the improvement of their performance characteristics, on-board weapons systems, and weapon control.
The change in the views of the NATO command on the conduct of military operations will be directly influenced, first of all, by new fire weapons entering service, as well as by increasing the mobility of troops.
The equipping of NATO Allied Forces with conventional high-precision weapons and the associated sharp increase in their combat capabilities led to an active search and development of principles, forms and methods of conducting combat operations that would make it possible to most fully realize these capabilities.
According to NATO military experts, the total effect of using these means can be comparable to the result of using nuclear weapons. Considering the degree to which troops were saturated with high-precision long-range fire weapons by 2000, we can conclude that the capabilities of the NATO Allied Forces to reliably simultaneously defeat the first and second echelons of opposing enemy groups throughout the entire depth of a strategic operation have increased. This meets the requirements of the new concept of “deep isolation of the combat area.”
The greater capabilities of high-tech weapons can also influence the choice of the direction of the main attack in an offensive. Thus, the entry into the army of new weapon systems that are not inferior in effectiveness to tactical nuclear weapons will lead to the fact that the main blow may not be delivered to weak and vulnerable points in the defense, as at present, but after a massive WTO strike on the main strong group enemy.
In addition, an increase in the effectiveness of weapons can contribute to an increase in the depth of echelon and a more dispersed deployment of troops (forces). In turn, this will lead
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aims to increase the role of air transportable reserves with
high maneuverability.
When considering the possibility of waging a large-scale war in Europe, the NATO command attaches great importance to its initial period and, in particular, to the reliable fire defeat of opposing enemy groups. The main role in this regard belongs to the actions of aviation.
There are the following forms of use of air defense systems: air campaign, air operation and systematic combat operations.
The main form of use of NATO air forces in the initial period of the war will be an air campaign in the European theater of war, carried out as part of a strategic aerospace (air - in a conventional war) offensive.
A strategic aerospace (air) offensive refers to actions covering several theaters of war, carried out with the aim of destroying the enemy’s military potential and suppressing his will to resist by deeply destroying important strategic objects by means of aerospace attack.
An air campaign is a combination of the first and subsequent air operations, united by a common plan and aimed at achieving important military-strategic goals in the theater of war.
The main goal of the air campaign will be to defeat the nuclear forces and troops of the enemy’s first strategic echelon, gain air superiority and create favorable conditions for the actions of ground and sea force groups.
The conditions for the start and timing of the air campaign will depend on the developing military-strategic situation. It is most likely that an air campaign will be carried out after the completion of the mobilization deployment of the bloc's armed forces and the transfer of reinforcement troops from the United States to Europe during the period of the operational deployment of ground forces, their access to the borders of Russia and the creation of strike groups. In this case, its duration will be determined by the time required for the troops to deploy, and may be 30 days or more.
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It is also possible to conduct an air campaign after the completion of the deployment of ground forces near the Russian borders. Its main task will be to create favorable conditions for conducting the first strategic operations in the theater of operations. The duration of the air campaign in this case will depend on the timing of these operations and can be 20-25 days. The transition of the ground forces to the offensive will be carried out after the first air offensive operation (AOC) as part of the air campaign.
The goal of the air campaign will be achieved by carrying out the first and subsequent air offensive operations in the European theater of operations, united by a common plan.
An air operation is a massive action coordinated in place, time, goals and objectives by NATO aviation formations, formations and units, in which heterogeneous aviation and air defense forces act independently or in cooperation with ground forces and naval forces according to a single plan and concept and under a single leadership to solve certain specific problems.
The air offensive operation is the main form of warfare of NATO's Allied Forces.
The main goal of the VNO in the initial period of the war will be to gain nuclear superiority, as well as air superiority and create favorable conditions for the deployment of offensive actions by ground forces to defeat ground forces and seize enemy territory.
The first air defense operations will most likely be carried out on several or simultaneously in all European theaters of operations and will be coordinated in terms of timing and location with the actions of fire weapons of the ground forces and naval forces. Due to the limited range capabilities of tactical aviation, it will not be able to be fully involved in striking targets on Russian territory when operating from permanently based airfields in the Central Theater of Operations. To carry out the operation in this theater, at the stage of strategic deployment, aviation will be relocated to forward airfields and to airfields in Eastern European and Baltic countries, which will take up to 30 days.
In addition, during this period the number of combat aircraft of the Air Force and Navy will be increased due to the transfer of aircraft from the United States and the mobilization deployment of European countries.
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The scope of the first air defense, depending on the theater of operations, can range from 500 to 1000 km or more along the front, and 1000-1700 km in depth. The duration of the operation is from 3 to 7 days.
Up to 70% of Air Force aircraft, up to 30% of Navy aircraft and up to 60% of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) in conventional equipment can be involved in the operation.
After conducting an air defense operation, when solving the problem of gaining air superiority, it is possible to conduct an air-ground operation, which is a form of joint actions by groupings of ground forces and the air force. At the same time, the main tasks of the air force will be isolation of the battlefield and direct air support of troops.
It is envisaged to conduct defensive air operations in cases where the enemy has pre-empted a strike or taken the initiative. Such an operation is carried out in order to repel massive enemy air strikes through the joint use of air defense forces and means and fighter aircraft.
In addition, it is envisaged to conduct special operations with the decisive role of the air force: to gain air superiority and suppress the air defense system, isolate the combat area, aerial reconnaissance, transport troops and cargo, etc.
Systematic combat operations are carried out by aviation when, due to their composition or level of training, the Air Force is not capable of conducting air operations. In the intervals between massive (concentrated) strikes, the enemy will launch attacks with limited targets on individual troop groups, airfields, bases, bridges, and provide air support for troops.
These can be either echeloned air strikes (successive strikes by single aircraft or small groups on one or more targets), or single and group strikes on important targets. To create favorable conditions for breaking through and overcoming an air defense system, the enemy often uses debilitating actions.
The main ways to achieve goals in operations are air strikes and layered air strikes. The methods are the content of one or another form of use of air defense systems and are determined by the nature of the combat mission, the composition, combat capabilities of the air defense system, the weapons used, the conditions of the situation, and the capabilities of the enemy’s air defense system.
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Each method of combat use of air defense systems is characterized by the sequence of destruction of targets (simultaneous or sequential destruction of objects in order of their importance), the number of air defense systems allocated for the strike, the operational formation (battle formation) of the air attack weapons, and the order of combat support.
The main method of offensive actions of airborne forces is an air strike (missile strike). Based on the nature of the weapons used, nuclear, missile, and bomb (rocket-bomb) strikes are distinguished. In addition, there is the concept of an electronic strike, characterized by the intensive use of electronic warfare forces and means to counter the electronic warfare systems of the enemy’s air defense system.
Methods of conducting defensive actions by aviation are air battles and battles.
Depending on the tasks being solved, the number of planned targets, the composition of the aircraft involved, the intensity, time and depth of the impact of air strikes, a distinction is made between massive, concentrated, group and single air strikes.
The main methods of action of strategic aviation are single and group strikes carried out by a flight or squadron of bombers.
The main method of using tactical aviation and SLCMs in an operation will be massive air and missile strikes. During the first VNO, 5-7 such strikes can be delivered.
A massive strike is understood as simultaneous coordinated actions of the main forces of a missile and aviation group (aviation formations) with the aim of destroying a large number of enemy targets and solving the main objectives of the operation. A massive strike can involve 600-800 aircraft simultaneously, operating in 1-2 directions.
Distribution of flight resources according to tasks during flight training: the first day (two MARU) - to gain superiority in the air;
spirit - up to 70%, to defeat troops of the first operational echelon of opposing groups of forces - up to 30%;
second day (2 MARU) - to gain air superiority - up to 50%, to defeat troops of the first operational echelon - up to 30%, to defeat troops of the second echelon - up to 20%;
third day (1-2 MARU) - to defeat the advancing troops of the second echelon fronts - up to 70%, to maintain air superiority - up to 30%.
The classification of air strikes is based on the following characteristics (factors):
tasks to be solved;
planning authority (in whose interests the aviation group operates);
the number of airborne attack forces recruited to carry out a strike;
impact objects;
impact depth and duration of EHV exposure.
Each air strike is most typical and applicable to a specific structure of the enemy’s ground forces, has well-defined specific goals and limited spatial and temporal parameters.
Thus, massive strikes are an integral part of air operations, carried out over 2-3 hours or more than 1-2 TAK (OTAK) in 1-2 directions with the aim of continuously impacting objects at a depth of 1000-1200 km. As a rule, massive strikes are carried out at the beginning of a war with the main goal of gaining air superiority.
Concentrated strikes mean simultaneous coordinated actions of air formations and units against one or more targets in one area.
Concentrated strikes are carried out by the main forces of formations and units of the air army or TAK with the aim of simultaneously hitting several targets. For example, a strike can be delivered against army troops and facilities by 2-3 air wings (from 24 to 72 aircraft).
Group air strikes are the main method of deep fire engagement when solving the problems of isolating the battlefield and direct air support. They are applied by regular forces of aviation units and subunits (up to a squadron of combat aircraft) against one or more objects in a limited area.
Single strikes are carried out when performing direct air support missions for first-echelon divisions with forces from one aircraft to two units against one target such as a company, battery, battalion (division).
The classification of forms and main methods of combat use of air defense systems, depending on the content of the tasks being solved, the composition and number of air weapons involved, and the values of time and spatial indicators is given in Table. 2.8.
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In addition, there are ways to overcome (break through) the enemy’s air defense system. The main ways to overcome an air defense system include:
use of low and extremely low flight altitudes;
use of demonstration and distracting actions;
bypassing zones of destruction (fire) of anti-aircraft weapons;
skillful use of terrain, meteorological conditions and night time;
fire suppression of RES by airborne weapons (elements of high-precision weapons) without entering the affected areas of air defense systems, in combination with intensive electronic countermeasures of RES of reconnaissance, control and communications.
The actions of special attack helicopters include methods of striking according to a predetermined plan, from ambushes, on call, as well as independent (free) search and destruction of targets.
Depending on the content of the task at hand, the position and nature of the enemy’s actions, the state of his air defense system, as well as terrain and weather conditions, one or another method of combat use of helicopters is used.
Thus, if there is information about the enemy, helicopters carry out strikes according to a pre-planned plan. At the same time, specific goals are assigned to each attack helicopter unit, and issues of interaction with ground forces and tactical aviation are carefully worked out.
Ambush strikes are characterized by surprise and high efficiency. In this case, attack helicopters occupy sites near the attack targets in advance (at a distance of 5-15 km), then at an extremely low altitude (15-20 m), using terrain folds, they approach the attack targets and strike with airborne weapons.
Call strikes can be carried out by several groups of helicopters. With this method, groups of helicopters are positioned in a holding area, ready to take off immediately. Upon receiving a specific mission, groups of helicopters strike at designated targets. The method allows you to quickly focus efforts on the required directions during the battle.
Independent search and destruction of targets by helicopters is used, as a rule, in defense, when information about the enemy is absent or unreliable. In addition, the method is applicable when the enemy’s air defense system is relatively weak.
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The following methods of firing at targets are distinguished: from horizontal flight; from a hovering position; from the ground; from pitching up (when using bombs).
The forms and methods of combat use of airborne weapons are constantly being improved due to the development of on-board weapons systems, navigation, and weapon control.
In subsequent years, the following trends emerged in the development of forms and methods of combat use of aviation:
strengthening the centralization of planning and control of air operations (four control centers for air operations conducted by NATO air forces have been created in the Central European Theater of Operations);
integrated use of national air force groups belonging to coalition associations to conduct air operations in regional conflicts;
regular involvement of strategic aviation based in the United States for air force operations in the European theater of operations;
redistribution of the number and types of air defense systems between echelons in the attack and as part of the echelon in favor of aircraft equipped with high-precision weapons, performing the tasks of suppressing the air defense system, conducting electronic suppression of electronic warfare;
thorough preparation before the start of air operations (reconnaissance of the area, opening the air defense system, isolating the area of upcoming combat operations (air, ground, sea blockade), creating powerful coalition strike forces of the Air Force, theater equipment);
reliable suppression of the air defense system by fire and electronic influence;
intensive use of sea- and air-launched cruise missiles;
more effective use of high-tech weapons for various purposes, especially UAVs, UR, UAB, UAK, KR;
conducting active continuous exhausting actions;
increasing the intensity of flights at low and extremely low altitudes, at night and in difficult weather conditions;
reduction in the required number of aircraft and helicopters to destroy standard targets due to a sharp increase in the effectiveness of the use of airborne weapons.
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Thus, the development of forms and methods of combat use of air defense forces necessitates the search for effective techniques and methods of combating them with air defense forces and means.
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Air defense strategy and tactics in wars and conflicts of the 21st century
What is the difference between the American Patriot and the Russian Triumph?
Air defense strategy and tactics are carried out by the governments of various countries using different military means to accomplish the main task: to protect troops and the population from aircraft, UAVs, and missile launchers of enemy troops.
Israeli air defense system
The national air defense system includes 116 missile defense batteries: 28 anti-aircraft missiles, 77 Advanced Hawks, three Patriots and eight Stingers. Main airfields: Lod, Hatzerim, Ramad David and Eilat. Three Arrow (Hetz) missile defense batteries, 12 launchers with 144 Arrow-2 missiles. Arrow missile defense batteries are located in Tel Aviv, in areas south of Haifa and near the Dimon Nuclear Research Center.
The air defense includes 73 F-15 Eagle air defense fighters, incl. modifications A-38, B-8, C-16 and D-11. Two squadrons are equipped with F-15 Eagle air defense fighters. The Israeli army operates 1,300 anti-aircraft artillery guns. According to the American Center for Defense Research CDI, two types of missile defense systems were put on combat duty in Israel. The Arrow missile defense systems were intended to destroy tactical, operational-tactical and a number of medium-range ballistic missiles (BMs) at ranges of up to 100 km and altitudes of up to 50 km. "Arrow" is capable of simultaneously firing at up to 14 warheads of enemy ballistic missiles with an effective reflective surface of about 0.1 square meters. m, flying at speeds up to 4500 m/sec. The launch range of the target ballistic missiles is up to 3000 km.
The complexes located near large cities and the most important Israeli installations (south of Tel Aviv, south of Haifa and not far from the Dimon nuclear center) were unable to destroy the missile targets used by Hezbollah and protect Israeli territory from rocket fire. In addition, the Israeli Self-Defense Forces are armed with American Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems, which are capable of intercepting short- and medium-range ballistic missiles at the final stage of their flight path. None of the five Patriot air defense systems that occupied positional areas (Safet, Gedera, near Haifa, the suburbs of Tel Aviv and on the coast near Jaffa) were designed to intercept small missiles with a flight range of 10–20 km, which received the general name “ Katyusha" and form the basis of the missile potential of the Hezbollah group. According to some estimates, 11 thousand out of 13 thousand Katyushas were used for the 34-day shelling of Israeli territory.
Israel was prepared to counter the most serious threat - nuclear-tipped missiles that could theoretically be launched from Iran. But the threat did not come from there: shelling by Shiite militants deprived Israel of absolute air superiority, calling into question the effectiveness of US-Israeli missile defense.
The Arrow missile defense system, jointly created by the United States and Israel, which entered service in 2000, turned out to be not only unable to hit Qassam missiles on low-flying trajectories, but also useless in preventing a strike from a subsonic anti-ship Chinese cruise missile, the prototype of which was the French Exocet missile ", presumably type S-802. Israel's experience of defeat can serve as a sobering lesson for those NATO member states that are planning to deploy missile defense systems on their territory. An asymmetrical response may be significantly more painful than it appears at first glance.
Given the effectiveness of Hezbollah's missile weapons, as well as the presence of missiles among Palestinian extremists, the Israelis will concentrate on creating a tactical missile defense system capable of intercepting short-range missiles. A special commission headed by the new Chief of the General Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, decided to refuse further funding for the creation of the Skyguard anti-missile laser system, which was carried out by the American corporation Northrop Grumman. The Israeli government decided to build anti-missile systems to protect the population of border cities from Katyusha shells. Two Israeli arms companies are participating in the project - Israeli Military Industries (IMI) with the “Magic Shield” project and Rafael with the “Shield of David” project. Both companies are working on anti-aircraft missile systems that destroy unguided projectiles using miniature surface-to-air missiles. These air defense systems will be equipped with radars capable of detecting unguided missile launchers.
Hezbollah air defense
Hezbollah's air defenses include 23mm ZU-23-2 automatic cannons in fixed positions in the Bekaa Valley, southern Lebanon and southern Beirut. Some sources report that Hezbollah also has 57 mm anti-aircraft guns. In addition, anti-aircraft machine guns are used - 12.7 mm DShK and M2NV, 14.5 mm KPV (as part of ZPU-1, ZPU-2 and ZPU-4). The radical Islamists also had at their disposal 25–30 UAVs with GPS control of the Ababil type, capable of carrying a combat charge of 40–50 kg over a distance of up to 450 km.
Georgia's war with South Ossetia in August 2008
Georgian air defense did not need to use its own radars, but received information from third-party US and NATO sources that were not available for destruction. The strengths of the Georgian air defense system included high mobility of air defense systems and its echeloning (presence of short-range and short-range air defense systems, MANPADS, ZA); the presence of professionally trained combat crews of the Buk-M and Osa-AKM air defense systems (already during the military operations, competent organization and skillful tactical use of Georgian air defense systems were noted); discrepancy between the frequency range of the Georgian air defense systems of Soviet production and the operating range of the seeker of the air-to-radar missile system of Russian aviation (the existing seeker letters are mainly designed to operate on the frequencies of the NATO air defense systems, beyond their means); the presence in the Osa-AKM air defense system of an optical missile guidance channel, as well as the lack of standard electronic warfare equipment for individual and group protection on Russian aircraft in the operating frequency range of this air defense system; the presence of a passive warning and target designation system from RTR equipment of Ukrainian (“Kolchuga”) and American (“SkyNet”) production. To identify the opposing group of troops, electronic reconnaissance equipment and Hermes-type unmanned aerial vehicles were widely used.
Given the superiority of Russian aviation, Georgian air defense used tactics similar to those that the Yugoslavs used in defense against NATO air raids: temporary focal activation of air defense systems and organization of ambushes on the intended flight routes of Russian aviation with mobile anti-aircraft systems "Tor-M1" and "Buk". At the same time, the tactics of using short- and medium-range air defense systems included working from ambushes, alternately with the inclusion of electronic missile guidance systems directly at the far border of the detection zone, automated control in air defense groups, target designation from electronic reconnaissance complexes and air traffic control radars. It was difficult to counter this tactic with anything.
The weak side of the Georgian air defense system was the low noise immunity of the Buk-M1 and Osa-AKM air defense systems, which did not allow them to conduct combat operations in conditions of active and passive interference, as well as due to the relatively low spatial characteristics of the Osa air defense system's affected areas -AKM" (range up to 10 km, altitude up to 5 km).
Russian air defense in the southern Caucasus in 2008
The most effectively used units of the Osa-AK air defense system were capable of combating small-sized and low-speed air targets at night. In anti-aircraft battles, Russian military air defense systems shot down a Su-25KM attack aircraft and three Israeli-made Hermes UAVs. The most effectively used against the enemy were the Igla MANPADS and the Strela-10 and Osa air defense systems. The planning of the first air strikes and the execution of special flights were carried out without taking into account and a detailed assessment of air defense capabilities. Space control of combat areas, command posts, launch sites, identified radar positions, and air defense systems of the Georgian Armed Forces was practically not carried out. Russia did not use electronic warfare in suppressing Georgian air defenses. During the first day there was no advantage of aviation, there were no air controllers in the troops, which allowed the Georgian MLRS and artillery to fire unhindered on Tskhinvali for 14 hours.
All this required the immediate intervention of representatives of the Air Force High Command in the management of aviation operations and the development, together with the command of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, of appropriate recommendations for the crews of airplanes and helicopters. The use of combat aircraft was carried out at maximum speed and at altitudes that precluded the use of MANPADS and Georgian anti-aircraft artillery. Taking into account the recommendations developed at the beginning of hostilities, aviation flights began to be carried out bypassing areas covered by air defense systems (Buk, Osa-AKM), or over areas where they were suppressed, as well as at altitudes of more than 3.5 thousand. meters and speeds that provide optimal conditions for overcoming air defense countermeasures. Exits to targets from directions not covered by air defense systems and repeated attacks from different directions in accordance with the terrain and smoke screens were widely used. Flight along different routes to the target and back was mastered using demonstrative and distracting groups of airplanes and helicopters. The pilots tried to eliminate repeated approaches from the same course and flights along the same route to the target and back. A combat flight using electronic warfare and self-propelled guns was carried out, as a rule, under the cover of specially designated groups of aircraft (helicopters), and, if possible, engine operation at maximum speed and afterburner was excluded. When there was a threat of the use of air defense systems, anti-aircraft and anti-missile maneuvers were carried out with the simultaneous shooting of expendable electronic warfare equipment, and in areas of possible use of MANPADS and when a missile launch was detected when approaching the target of an attack and exiting an attack, shooting PPIs in series of several rounds with a minimum interval between shootings was widely used .
Coverage of military transport aircraft from attacks from the sea was also reliably organized by the air defense forces of the naval group of the Black Sea Fleet when carrying out transportation with calls to unloading airfields from the sea.
SAM "Patriot". Photo from www.army.mil
Tactics and actions of Libyan air defense in 2011
Air defense systems are integrated by the Senezh command and control system. According to CSIS, there are 3 anti-aircraft missile brigades, 5 anti-aircraft missile regiments. According to IISS - 4 S-200 brigades (each has 2 batteries with 6 launchers each, 4 anti-aircraft artillery divisions and radar) and 5 air defense regions, which include 5-6 brigades with 18 S-75 launchers in each, 2 -3 brigades with 12 S-125 launchers in each and ~3 brigades with 20–24 Kvadrat and Osa launchers in each. Most of the anti-aircraft artillery, MANPADS and light air defense systems are part of the ground forces. The Libyan air defense system, as of the end of 2010, included more than 900 units of anti-aircraft missile systems Strela-1/2/10, ZSU-23–4 “Shilka”, ZPU-2, S-60, S-200 ( all Soviet-made) and 24 Crotale (Italy).
After the Libyan events in February 1982, Operation Prairie Fire on March 24–25, 1986, and Operation Eldorado Canyon USA on the night of April 14–15, 1986, the Libyan leadership did not draw proper conclusions. The command of the Libyan Armed Forces was unable to prepare the country's air defense to repel a NATO missile and air strike. First of all, it was necessary to unite and clearly coordinate the actions of disparate troops and forces of ground air defense, naval air defense and fighter aircraft of the Air Force, and to carry out the necessary organizational measures and exercises for this. After the first air strikes by NATO troops, some combat assets of the Libyan air defense, in particular, mobile air defense systems of the SA-6 (“Square”) and SA-8 (“Wasp”) types, escaped fire damage after the first strike directed against stationary air defense systems.
However, in general, Libya's air defense system and early warning radar were destroyed, as Vice Admiral Bill Gortney said. He also reported that there was a “significant decrease in the activity of Libyan air target detection radars.” The activity of the Libyan air defense was reduced to setting up barrage fire with barrel systems.
A characteristic feature of the construction of the Libyan anti-aircraft missile defense was the presence of different types of radars in it: Soviet and Italian. Information from them was collected, summarized and reflected by means of automation of various industries, which were not initially interfaced with each other, since they were not combined into a single reconnaissance and target designation system (AI guidance), operating according to a common plan.
Decentralized delivery of information to air defense command posts from the nearest radio engineering units was not organized. There were also shortcomings in the engineering equipment of the ZRDN positions, the same thing happened in the radio engineering units. The lack of protection for the cables of the radar equipment and indicator cabins entailed their unjustified destruction by fragments from the PRR. The timely transfer of the radar, communications equipment and control center of the Tripoli RTB to operation from standard power supply systems was not carried out when the city’s industrial power grid was disconnected (for blackout purposes). The engineering equipment and camouflage of the positions, located mainly in desert areas, were weak. At the same time, high humidity and air temperature, solar radiation affected not only the stability of the electronic equipment, but also the personnel.
There were shortcomings and vulnerabilities in the construction of military service groups and the Libyan air defense command and control system. Intelligence means were used thoughtlessly. The absence of both centralized notification of troops about the air situation and decentralized issuance of the necessary data from radar companies to the closest air defense and air defense units did not allow the commanders of the latter to timely set tasks for destroying targets. The implementation of the capabilities of fire weapons was also limited by the incompleteness of the communication system for collecting information, warning and combat control. Violations of the requirements of covert command and control of troops and counteraction to foreign technical intelligence, non-compliance with the conditions of electromagnetic compatibility of electronic zones made it easier for the enemy to fire suppression of air defense systems.
The personnel of the units had little knowledge of the weapons and tactics of the NATO air enemy, the capabilities of their equipment, and did not have the proper moral and psychological stability. According to Russian experts, with proper air defense training, even in the presence of outdated S-75 and S-125 systems, it was possible to carry out a capture and a full salvo with the entire ammunition load of the air defense system. Omissions in the organization of radar reconnaissance and the issuance of information, the low readiness for the combat use of RTV forces and means were one of the reasons for the failure of the air defense troops to fulfill the tasks assigned to them during the first strike by American aircraft on March 19, 2011 and the insufficient effectiveness of air defense when new attacks followed. .
On the one hand, they did not disclose the position, they tried to work according to instructions, the air defense losses also, apparently, were very small, most of the air defense survived and retained the material part. On the other hand, there was no active protection of objects and oneself from impact. The operation of jamming systems on the Libyan side was not recorded. There was practically no chance of repelling the attack. The capabilities of these air defense systems did not allow working in such an environment with interference. They were also not equipped with external guidance systems, which precluded the use of external radars.
Ukraine in the 2014–2015 civil war
The basis of the Ukrainian air defense forces is approximately 30 divisions of anti-aircraft missile systems of various types, including the S-200, S-300 and Buk M 1 systems.
The air defense systems in the hands of the DPR militias are of Ukrainian origin (seized from warehouses, taken from disintegrated units, captured from SBU offices and from disarmed airborne units), which does not allow one to reliably determine which system is being fired from. Without proper experience in overcoming such a focal air defense system, built on the massing of MANPADS in the area of strategic points (in essence, the DPR militias are creating a mini-air defense district in the area of the held city). These air defense units are not a sufficient panacea for airstrikes, but in the absence of a comprehensive strategy to overcome this air defense system, resistance leads to systematic and extremely painful losses.
If in the first days of June the militia had old Strela-2 MANPADS (adopted into service in 1967), then already on July 2, on the streets of Lugansk, a column of LPR militia forces was captured, which, in addition to three BMP-2s, included a combat short-range air defense system "Strela-10". Air defense "Strela-10 M²" (several units, height reach - no more than 5 km; as a result, the fight against high-altitude targets is difficult for the militia). At the same time, production of Strels ceased in the early 2000s, and their shelf life under optimal conditions does not exceed 10 years; MANPADS were not produced on the territory of Ukraine. As a result, half of the “lethal” losses of strike aircraft occurred on July 23 – after the Boeing crash, the Ukrainian Air Force relied on the passivity of air defense and did not take basic safety measures. The effectiveness of the militia's air defense is objectively not very high.
The Ukrainian Air Force lost an An-30, IL-76 and from 1 to 3 Mi-24 helicopters, a Su-24 bomber, which was shot down while retreating after an air strike on Gorlovka (the building of the local Ministry of Internal Affairs was hit - 2 killed, 7 wounded). The pilot managed to eject and after a short search was caught by local militias. As is easy to see, after the losses suffered, flights over areas controlled by the militias are accompanied by the systematic shooting of heat traps.
War in Syria
The territory of the SAR is divided into two zones: Northern and Southern Air Defense. The Syrian command, analyzing the experience of combat operations in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Lebanon, is making significant efforts to strengthen its air defense system. First of all, modern air defense systems and electronic warfare systems are purchased. However, for now the weapons in service are outdated anti-aircraft missile systems, which cannot effectively counteract modern Israeli-American air attack weapons.
Air defense troops in Syria, like in the USSR, are a separate type of armed forces. They consist of 10 divisions (33–36 brigades). In service there are up to 53 S-75 air defense missile divisions (up to 318 launchers), up to 40 S-75 divisions (up to 160 launchers), 8 S-200 divisions (48 launchers), up to 5 Kvadrat regiments (up to 25 batteries, up to 100 launchers), 3–6 divisions of “Buk-M1” and “Buk-M2” (18–36 launchers, 9–18 PZU), 61 “Osa” air defense systems, up to 100 “Strela-1” air defense systems, up to 60 ““ Strela-10", 36 air defense missile systems "Pantsir-S1". Of all this equipment, the most modern are the Buk air defense missile system (especially the Buk-M2) and the Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system.
The significant potential of Syrian air defense was the most important factor preventing NATO intervention against Syria, while it already has a Turkish RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft (and possibly an F-16C fighter that crashed in 2013 near the Syrian border) and an American combat drone. Traitor." However, in a civil war, air defense is unfortunately useless. Parts of the Syrian Armed Forces loyal to Assad demonstrate a very high level of combat, moral and psychological training. This is also facilitated by the fact that Alawites and Christians are fighting for their physical survival.
Russian air defense group in Syria
The Russian Federation is not only deploying anti-missile systems in Syria on the lines of contact with Turkey, but air defense has in fact ensured blocking of airspace in Crimea, Kaliningrad, near the Baltic borders and in the north. In November 2015, in the area of the group’s combat operations, together with the Syrian Armed Forces, a joint air defense system was deployed consisting of: Pantsir-S1 air defense missile system, Buk-M2E medium-range air defense system, long-range air defense system S-200 air defense system, small air defense system range S-125 "Pechera", long- and medium-range air defense system S-400, air defense system "Osa". On November 25, 2015, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the Russian Federation would transfer the S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile system to the Khmeimim air base in Syria. Designed to destroy air attack and reconnaissance weapons (including aircraft using stealth technology) and any other air targets in conditions of intense fire and electronic countermeasures.
The S-400 Triumph has characteristics that erase the former Western advantages over Soviet anti-aircraft missile systems. First, it is a truly networked system that can process data from a variety of active and passive sensors and radars. In the past, Soviet air defense systems relied on only one fire control radar; if it was destroyed, the entire battery would be disabled. But with the S-400 things are different. In addition, the main missile of this 40N6 complex has a very high-quality radar homing head, capable of searching for and hitting targets independently after losing contact with ground systems. It can also detect radar countermeasures and destroy them. Smart sensors have the ability to analyze targets and threats based on their behavior. Therefore, this missile is much more difficult to deceive, it is more difficult for it to interfere, and it is almost impossible to defend against it. Thus, for purely practical reasons, after the deployment of the S-400 in Syria, the United States significantly reduced the number of flights in the western regions of the country.
conclusions
1. “Rocket Rain” revealed serious shortcomings and shortcomings in the organization of Israel’s missile and air defense. The Eilat missile defense system and Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems - products of military-technical cooperation between the United States and Israel - turned out to be unable to hit Qassam missiles on low-flying trajectories and useless to prevent a subsonic anti-ship missile strike.
2. One of the difficult results of the military campaign for the Israeli side is the inability of Israeli missile defense to protect its own territory and the loss of the high status of modern Israeli air defense weapons. The experience of military operations in the Gaza Strip has shown that it is impossible to defeat the partisan movement with aviation alone, even with weak air defense.
3. Following the results of the war with Georgia, it is necessary to develop new radar stations for detecting and identifying unmanned aerial vehicles and other small air objects and targets, since the radars currently in service with the Russian army cannot cope with this task.
4. The problem of Russian air defense, unfortunately, is as old as the world. Seven nannies have a child without an eye. Wherever our “wise” leaders pushed air defense. It seems strange to either the Air Force or army commanders, but the commander of the Aerospace Forces is not a rocket scientist, not a pilot, but a motorized rifleman.
5. The time has come to update the requirements for the tactical and technical characteristics of Russian air defense systems, the need to redirect part of the forces and resources to the development of tactical missile defense weapons to destroy missiles with low-flying trajectories with anti-aircraft missile systems that destroy unguided projectiles using miniature surface-to-air missiles .
6. Development work should be continued in order to create highly effective weapons that will have quality indicators and will not be surpassed by foreign analogues for 10–15 years. Conduct modernization of anti-aircraft missile systems and complexes, reconnaissance assets in order to extend the service life and their integration into a unified aerospace defense system in the state and in the armed forces, endowing them with the functions of non-strategic anti-missile weapons in theaters of military operations.
7. It is necessary to equip air defense weapons with electro-optical devices, television systems, thermal imagers in order to ensure the combat effectiveness of air defense systems and air defense systems in conditions of intense interference, which will minimize the dependence of air defense systems on the weather and improve the modeling of hydrometeorological processes and phenomena, separation of high and medium pressure.
Anatoly Tsyganok
Anatoly Dmitrievich Tsyganok - retired colonel, candidate of military sciences, corresponding member of the Academy of Military Sciences, laureate of the A.A. Candle.
