How Russia can easily get a new multi-purpose destroyer

What do you call the ship...

We will talk about the foundations of Russian naval literature - the classification of ships of the Russian fleet.

The classification currently adopted in the Russian Navy is somewhat reminiscent of a layer cake. Moreover, each layer is prepared according to a separate, unrelated recipe. Something came from our own long history, something remained in memory of the glorious Soviet fleet, and the most recent layer is of obvious imported origin.

All this stylistic and conceptual multi-layeredness is certainly of interest to historians and philologists. But I’m afraid that it only annoys and confuses everyone else.

Sometimes it is simply impossible to understand and explain the difference between seemingly almost identical warships, one of which is called a “destroyer,” another a “frigate,” and the third a “large anti-submarine ship.”

As a result, it has reached the point where there are almost no ships of the traditional destroyer class left in our Navy. And on this basis, some military experts even insist that Russia’s fleet is weak, that all the ships, they say, are too small, more and more frigates and corvettes, which cannot be compared with American cruisers and destroyers.

Was it possible to save the destroyers of Project 956? Need to!

What's better? Photo for memory…

...or a real combat ship in service?

The fate of Project 956 destroyers in our Navy today is no secret to anyone who is even slightly interested in naval issues. But even in the chaos of the post-Soviet years, everything could have gone differently. There were positive examples of how these ships were kept in service.

From an interview with the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Suchkov G.A., 2004:

The destroyer Besstrashny was repaired for us at Sevmashpredpriyatiya. For three years, in debt. The plant met us halfway, and we will pay it off during this year and in 2005. But we have a destroyer. And in 2000, the destroyer Rastoropny was sent for repairs at the Severnaya Verf shipyard in St. Petersburg. More precisely, they installed two, one of which was quickly written off there, and they plan to return “Rastoropny” to us in 2010. Despite the fact that in Severodvinsk the cost of repairs stood at 280 million rubles, and at the Northern Shipyards - 470 million rubles. Who is behind this?

Nowadays the destroyer Besstrashny bears the name “Admiral Ushakov” on board and is the only operational destroyer of the Northern Fleet.

Was it possible to do similar things with other ships? No one even bothered to check this.

Driven horses are shot

Two very clear examples that very well describe the difference between the approaches that were actually taken by us and others that were not ours.
Example #1:

Kaliningrad, May 13, 2022 /TASS/. Sea tugs of the Baltic Fleet escorted the destroyer Bespokoiny from Baltiysk, the main base of the Baltic Fleet in the Kaliningrad region, to Kronstadt, where it will become a floating exhibit of the maritime branch of the Patriot park, the official representative of the fleet, Roman Martov, told reporters on Sunday.

The destroyer "Bespokoiny" in the "Patriot" park in Kronstadt...

To understand all the shame and disgrace of what happened, it is necessary to emphasize that in order to extend the service life of the ships of the USSR Navy, the service life of the main cable routes is very important, i.e. year the ship was built. At the same time, all large anti-submarine ships (BOD) of Project 1155 and missile cruisers (RKR) of Project 1164 in service with the Navy have a service life longer than the destroyer Bespokoiny, which entered service with the Navy in 1992 and was sent to the park. No comments.

By the way, the former commander of the Bespokoiny, Rear Admiral V.A. Tryapichnikov, is now the head of the Navy Shipbuilding Department.

Today, three Project 956 destroyers formally (in a very problematic technical condition) remain in service with the Navy: “Bystry” in the Pacific Fleet, “Admiral Ushakov” in the Northern Fleet, and “Nastoichivy” in the Baltic Fleet (does not go to sea).

03/31/2018. The flagship of the Baltic Fleet, the destroyer Nastoychivy, is 25 years old. In the near future, the ship's crew is preparing to go to sea to practice elements of the course task (K-2). At the sea ranges of the Baltic Fleet, the crew of the "Nastoychivy" will have to carry out artillery and missile firing, conduct air defense exercises, and also practice anti-submarine missions. Department of Information Support of the Baltic Region (Kaliningrad).

However, “Persistent” was never able to go out to sea... “Restless” went to the park. Actually, the very presence of destroyers in the Baltic Fleet (as well as the “crowd” of corvettes) raises the question of the adequacy of the Navy’s operational planning for its intended purpose, because even without questions (unanswered) of combat support, these ships can be hit right at the berths by long-range enemy artillery.

Destroyers of the Baltic Fleet in Baltiysk. Waiting for Polish shells...

Example No. 2. In 2022, the modernized (since 2015) Project 956E destroyer Hangzhou of the PLA Navy entered sea trials (instead of the beam launcher of the Shtil air defense system, vertical launchers of the HHQ-16 air defense system were installed, a launcher of the HHQ-10 air defense system appeared, instead of Anti-ship missiles "Moskit-E" new anti-ship missiles YJ-12A are deployed). The second destroyer Fuzhou is undergoing a similar modernization.

Taking into account the “ship conveyor belt” deployed by the PLA Navy, the attitude towards the ships of Project 956 (two projects 956E and two projects 956ME) is indicative.

Four PLA destroyers (projects 956E and 956ME)

The Chinese have a fundamentally caring attitude even towards old ships (an example of which is our first destroyers of the very problematic Project 7U, which were part of the PLA Navy for a long time, and now some of them are preserved as a monument), but the question and the point of the article is not in them, but in the Russian Navy.

Was it possible (and was it necessary) to preserve and modernize the Project 956 destroyers?

If the result was an extremely expensive modernization of the Marshal Shaposhnikov and other much older and problematic ships of Project 1155, then in relation to the 956 destroyers the answer should have been “yes.” Yes, not all ships, but only the newest ones.

But nevertheless, such modernization did not take place.

The steam turbine (STU) main power plant (GPP) of destroyers is often “blamed” for this.

Allegedly a problem with the steam turbine main power plant

The author heard the phrase “driven horses are shot,” included in the previous heading, in 1995 at the 7th operational squadron of the Northern Fleet in response to a question about the reasons for the extremely difficult technical condition of all the destroyers of the squadron.

Destroyer "Bystry" (Pacific Fleet). Visual state of his KTU. Photo: [email protected]

Before losing their hearts, many of our destroyers managed to run very, very many miles. For example, the operating time of the boilers of the lead destroyer “Sovremenny” at the time of repair (removal from service) was about 25 thousand hours for each boiler. An even more striking example is the destroyer “Otlichny”, which covered 150,535 miles over 8 years of active operation (for comparison: the “Peter the Great” had only 180,000 miles “on log” in 17 years).

During combat service in 1986, in conditions of high water and air temperatures, the Excellent effectively won the race against two gas turbine ships of the US Navy CR URO CG48 Yorktown and EM DD970 Caron.

"Excellent" takes fuel from the BMT "Ivan Bubnov" in the Mediterranean Sea, 1986.

The above examples show that the problem was not the reel after all...

Yes, in the situation of the 90s. The issues of operating ships with steam turbine units at high parameters became very acute. Acutely both in the training of personnel (especially conscript service), and in repair and water treatment. Alas, the Navy, to put it mildly, did not use all its capabilities.

For example, in the 90s, a lot of nuclear submarines with unused cores and power plants were withdrawn from the Navy. And nothing stood in the way of “cooking” feed water for steam turbine surface ships with guaranteed supply of their needs. As a matter of fact, this is what they did on submarines (with the coastal supply system destroyed), (submarine) in order to provide the rest of the nuclear-powered ships with high-purity water.

Taking into account the large service life of the zones of decommissioned submarines, this did not require any additional costs for the fleet. However, not a single such case is known for surface ships, as if our submariners and surface officers served in different fleets...

We are not the only ones who can smoke. Pictured is a US Navy LCS frigate (with a gas turbine power plant)

Yes, the use of a boiler-turbine installation on a modern warship is an outdated solution. But quite working! And due to production reasons at the time the decision was made. Production reasons for the problematic issues of the main power plants of ships, our modern shipbuilding tasted to the fullest. Especially after 2014, the time of the actual loss of the Ukrainian enterprise Zorya-Mashproekt (gas turbine units and gearboxes). An extremely pressing issue arose not only regarding new ships (projects 11356 and 22350), but also the possibility of operating previously built ships with gas turbine units (projects 1135, 11540, 1155, 1164, 1166). Continuing active operation of the Project 1155 BOD in that situation simply “killed” their resource.

Was it technically possible to restore the KTU of the destroyers (last hulls)? Yes, of course: the steam turbine units themselves had a very significant resource, and the problematic boilers could be replaced with modern KVG-3D (as for the Indian aircraft carrier Vikramaditya), replacing fuel oil with diesel fuel. There was free money in the country in 2014...

Moreover, such a decision would encourage adequate repair and modernization of the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov TAVKR. In the current reality, with the traditional pettiness in this regard, the Navy decided to “save money” by replacing only 4 emergency boilers... Because. We left 4 others (old ones) and decided not to change the fuel from fuel oil to diesel. A year later, they decided to change all the boilers, but the first 4 were already purchased for fuel oil. We had to take the other 4 with fuel oil... Accordingly, with the entry of Kuznetsov into the Navy, we get a situation where ships of the same formation use different fuels. Considering the Navy's problems with tankers, this is an amazing solution. Saved on matches!

Baltic Fleet ships: the destroyer "Nastoichivy" and the SKR "Pylky" guarding the TAVKR, BS. 1996

At the same time, there are unreliable allegations that these ships are so outdated that their modernization makes no sense. It's worth dealing with this.

Problematic technical specifications and weak air defense

The Navy issued technical specifications for the design of a landing fire support ship to the Northern Design Bureau in 1971. That is, initially these were artillery ships with the main task of supporting the landing. In the process of development and creation, the project received high-speed and noise-proof anti-ship missiles "Moskit" and a collective defense air defense system M-22 "Uragan" (however, very controversial in terms of construction concept).

At the same time, the ships had a single surveillance radar, extremely weak anti-submarine weapons and a single helicopter in a movable hangar, which, taking into account the displacement increased to “cruising”, raised questions...
Detection of air targets was provided by the general detection radar "Fregat" (hereinafter in the series - "Fregat" -M" and "Fregat-MA(2)"), which was also a target designation radar for the M-22 "Uragan" air defense system (providing "illumination" for passive radar homing heads of missile defense systems (PRLGSN missile defense systems) assigned to hit targets with special radio spotlights). A serious drawback of the ship was the presence of only one surveillance radar (and the decimeter range, which is not optimal for detecting low-flying anti-ship missiles) and the absence of a control system.

Radio illumination projector "Nut" and television target tracking of the M-22 air defense system.

The lack of only one radar was corrected only on the very last ships of the series, which were exported to China - by installing the Positive command module radar and two combat modules of the Kashtan short-range anti-aircraft complex (ZKBR) with artillery and missile defense systems.

Project 956ME destroyer with enhanced air defense - ZKBR "Kashtan" with two combat modules and one command module (additional general detection radar "Positive")

Destroyer and main threat. From the air...

However, Russian destroyers had problems with air defense, and very serious ones.

From the memoirs of an officer of the Navy Missile and Artillery Directorate, Captain 1st Rank Pechatnikov V.K.:

The concept of building a complex with no means of tracking the target still prevailed, or rather, it was pushed by the shipbuilders: they could simply place light and small-sized illumination spotlights and did not have to rack their brains with the placement of an additional location of the complex. This circumstance has constantly been the subject of rejection of the complex by naval structures. To be honest, at first I didn’t see this as a big sin, coming from a winged background where launching towards a target even in the absence of any contact with it was commonplace. Then, however, when the need arose to introduce the new 9M38M1 missile, and later its subsequent modifications, these tools became simply vital, but the logic of building the system no longer allowed for their painless integration... but the lack of its own target tracking stations within the complex... later became a big stumbling block. In addition, the lead ship of Project 956 “Modern” was launched, which should have been armed with the M-22 air defense system. We reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that by changing the ideology of building the complex in order to fully use the capabilities of the rocket, we could freeze the program for building new ships for 4-5 years. Having found out that even under the previous ideology the complex was 5-6 times more productive than the existing Volna-M, the commander-in-chief decided to leave everything as is with subsequent modernization. If we had known then that there would be no more modernizations, perhaps we would have agreed with the delay or partial armament of the ships... According to the plan, we should have accepted the air defense system into service before 1980, in which the destroyer Sovremenny was already delivered to the fleet. Of course, we didn’t have time: the complex did not want to shoot down low-altitude targets. In addition, one feature emerged: firing at a salvo of cruise missiles coming from one direction sharply reduced the probability of defeat. The main parameter of TTZ was practically not fulfilled. The missile's seeker, opening at the top point of the trajectory, began to point the missile at the target's energy center and only as it approached it did it switch to tracking the nearest target... But since the concept of further modernization had already been adopted, they decided to leave everything as it was.

Conclusions on the combat effectiveness of Project 956 destroyers

The strike complex with the Moskit anti-ship missile system was magnificent. True, for carriers such as an airplane or boat. Alas, for a ship of almost cruising displacement, an operational missile system with a corresponding “long arm” (range) was frankly asked for.

Launch of the anti-ship missile "Moskit" by the destroyer "Bystry" (Pacific Fleet)

To characterize the artillery capabilities of the ship (two highly automated AK-130 artillery systems) according to its main purpose, it is best to quote an ex-officer of the Pacific Fleet (on the “Courage” forum):

In 2000, we practiced the war in the coastal direction with the 5th Army. The ground forces spent a week building a company stronghold. After receiving the control center from the correction post, horns and legs remained from the ROP in 5 minutes. The shooting was carried out on project 956, board 778, 2 AU AK-130, the rate of fire was maximum. The ROP was located 3 km from the coast. The minimum firing range was 20 km. The chief of staff and the chief of artillery of the army were completely delighted. The ship is given 5 minutes to launch an artillery strike on a coastal target, while it continuously moves in an anti-artillery zigzag, shoots and jams. Regarding the range, I agree (it’s not enough), but there is a little reassurance in the fact that it’s hard for coastal artillerymen to shoot at a maneuvering target that can drop almost 3 tons of land mines on you in a minute...

Well, the anti-submarine weapons (4 SET-65 torpedoes in two twin-tube torpedo tubes and RBU-1000 for anti-torpedo protection) with the underbody sonar "Platina" were frankly weak.

Torpedo tubes DTA-53-956 for SET-65 torpedoes.

RBU-1000

The only helicopter for a ship of almost cruising displacement was also not a source of pride (though the larger RKR Project 1164 had the same thing).

At first glance, the conclusions for Project 956 are devastating.

However, if you look carefully, it becomes obvious that 956 is just one example of serious conceptual shortcomings of literally all ships of the 3rd generation of the USSR Navy (this was most clearly manifested during the development of the next generation destroyer, with devastating criticism by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S.G. Gorshkov of scientific Navy organizations).

SAM "Fort-M"? Several examples of not always successful shooting with them

.

According to the exercises (with practical missile firing) 2011:

According to the “Varyag”, 2 RM P-120 missile launchers were launched for it. The “Fort” air defense missile system did not work, whether it works or not is difficult to say, I had occasion to launch a cloud of RMs in Feodosia when it was tested on the Azov BOD, personal opinion is ambiguous, although coastal ones work great.

That is, we see serious systemic problems of the Navy, in which the shortcomings of individual projects are a special case.

Obviously, these problems had to be solved comprehensively (and the problem is quite technically solvable) on the scale of the fleet, and accordingly, the issue of “problem projects” is in the plane of their optimal modernization.

Export alternative

In the context of the virtually “zeroing” of the Navy’s shipbuilding program after the December 1991 event, exports became the salvation for the domestic shipbuilding industry.
Moreover, it began with the supply of large surface combat ships of new projects back in the USSR, for example, the construction of a series of Project 61ME destroyers for the Indian Navy. In the early 90s. a program began to be implemented at domestic shipyards to create export frigates of Project 11356 and Indian (with significant Russian design assistance and supplies of combat systems) destroyers of Project 15.

Launch of the ZKBR "Kashtan" missile defense system by frigate Talwar of project 11356 (first series)

The Indian customer strictly raised the question of including an effective collective defense air defense system in these ships, while the export “Reef” (our “Fort-M”) obviously did not meet the weight and size restrictions.

As a result, on the basis of the Uragan air defense system, on the basis of promising groundwork and plans for its modernization, in a short time, an essentially new Shtil-1 air defense system was created, initially with a beam launcher from the Uragan, and later with a new vertical launcher for the new missile defense systems with an increased range 9M317ME (first presented abroad at the EURONAVAL-2004 salon).

Advertising leaflet of the Shtil-1 air defense missile system with the air defense station of NPP Start (Ekaterinburg)

Here it is also necessary to note the creation by the St. Petersburg “Meridian” of the “Requirement” series of BIUS for ships of the Indian Navy. This work began in the late 80s. (i.e., even before the start of work on projects 11356 and 15), had several stages and ultimately led to the creation of the “maximum” version of the BIUS “Requirement-M” for Russian frigates of project 11356, ensuring the use of, incl. SAM with active radar seeker (ARGSN).

Subsequently, on the basis of the Shtil-1 backlog and vertical launch missiles, the Chinese Navy created (with large Russian participation) the HHQ-16 air defense system.

Air defense system HHQ-16 on the PLA Navy frigate Project 054A

The total number of foreign ships with the Shtil-1/HHQ-16 air defense system is impressive.

Indian Navy: - 3 Delhi-class destroyers, Project 15, built in India, entered service in 1997-2001. — two single-beam launchers (48 missiles); — 6 frigates of the “Talvar” type, Project 11356 (construction of the series continued), built in Russia, entered service in 2003-2004. (the first three) and in 2012-2013. — one single-beam launcher (24 missiles); - 3 frigates of the Shivalik type, Project 17, built in India, entered service in 2010-2012. — one single-beam launcher (24 missiles).

Chinese Navy: - 4 destroyers Project 956E/EM, built in Russia, entered service in 1999-2000 (the first two) and 2005-2006. — two single-beam launchers (48 missiles); - 2 destroyers of type 052B, built in China, entered service in 2004, - two single-boom launchers each (48 missiles); - 30 frigates of type 054A, built in China, entered service in 2008 (4 ships in testing + 2 under construction) - SPM of the Chinese version of Shtil - HHQ-16 (32 missiles).

There are a total of 48 ships of the Indian and Chinese navies.

Note: the far border of the affected area is different for different modifications of Shtil and can be 24, 32 and 50 km

Modernization that never happened

Beginning of 2014, there was a coup in Ukraine.
The Russian Navy receives a “knockdown” in the form of a refusal to supply gas turbine power plants for new ships and repair old ones. At the same time, the sharp aggravation of the military-political situation acutely raises the question of the real combat effectiveness of the armed forces and the Navy (Navy ships). As already indicated above, the replacement of boilers and repair of the control unit, while ensuring proper operation, made it possible to actively and intensively operate the repaired destroyers (including in the far and ocean zones).

At the same time, new equipment and weapon systems made it possible to revise the entire concept of Project 956 with the creation of effective multi-purpose ships in the process of modernization.

The presence of serial air defense systems "Shtil-1", radars ("Fregat-MA" and "Positive"), and information and control system "Requirement" made it possible to dramatically increase the effectiveness of air defense of ships. In the situation in 2014, it was a fully developed and had significant reserves for modernization and development of the air defense system, with the shortcomings of the Hurricane eliminated. We should not forget that in 2014, the new naval air defense system “Poliment-Redut” (project 22350 frigates) was in a state very far from combat capability...

The problematic issue was short-range air defense systems. All industry proposals in this regard (the Redut air defense system with 9M100 missiles, Tor-FM, Pantsir-M) had certain serious shortcomings (more details: “Corvettes that will go into battle”

), however solvable shortcomings.

Taking into account the clear priority of radio command controls for short-range air defense systems, the optimal solution would be comparative tests of the Tora-FM and Pantsir-M, which were developed independently, on various Navy ships with subsequent decision-making based on their results. In this case, one could be sure that the “Pantsir” and “Thor” would have a significantly different, much more effective appearance and capabilities today.

Removing the main task of fire support from the ships made it possible to obtain multi-purpose ships on their base with the replacement of the AK-130 stern artillery mount with UKSK missiles of the Caliber and Onyx complex (3x8, as in one of the development options of the 956 project).

Jut and stern gun mount AK-130

One of the development options for Project 956 with UKSK for “Caliber” and “Onyx” (instead of the stern AK-130) and 4 combat modules of the ZKBR “Kortik” (with the removal of the Moskit launch complex)

In the stern of it, the towed active-passive GAS "Minotaur" normally stood up, while the broadband of the GAS "Platina-M" made it possible to ensure joint operation with the BUGAS "Minotaur-ISPN". That is, the composition of hydroacoustic means turns out to be close to those expected for the promising project of the Navy 20386. In terms of the capabilities of detecting submarines, this composition of hydroacoustic means was clearly superior to the Polynom State Joint Stock Company (due to the use of a lower frequency range), except for the bow sector, but the detection range was reduced in It was easily compensated by the joint work of a pair of ships.

Of course, the 53 cm torpedo tubes had to be replaced with “Package” ones, and this was absolutely possible.

It is interesting to compare such a frankly “budget” modernization of the destroyer (technically, it could have been made much better) with the modernized BOD “Marshal Shaposhnikov” of Project 1155 ( “Defective modernization of “Marshal Shaposhnikov”

).

Modernization of the BOD "Marshal Shaposhnikov". Photo: https://forums.balancer.ru/

Table. Comparison of a hypothetical version of the modernization of Project 956 destroyers and Project 1155 BOD (Marshal Shaposhnikov):

It is easy to see that the modernized multi-purpose 956 looks much more balanced and stronger armed than the modernized 1155 project. The “956 mod” option, with the replacement of only one air defense system (i.e. 36 UVP Shtil-1 missiles), but the placement of a second helicopter, is seen as more preferable.

It must be emphasized that technically such modernization was absolutely possible, all of these weapons were serial, there were no problems with supplies. Accordingly, “Burny”, “Bystry”, “Admiral Ushakov”, “Persistent” and “Restless”, and possibly the newest one at the Pacific Fleet, “Bezboaznenny” (1990), could find a second life. At the same time, it was definitely necessary to remove the destroyers from the Baltic, with the formation of homogeneous formations of ships in the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet.

That is, for relatively moderate costs (the obvious cost of such modernization is much less than what was achieved at Shaposhnikov), the Navy could receive in 2017-2018. 5-6 relatively modern and fully combat-ready “first ranks” with the possibility of their maximum active use (including in the far and ocean zone) for 10 years (until 2027-2028). Unlike ships with gas turbines (projects 1155 and 11540), new boilers and a significant service life of the steam turbine made it possible to sail intensively without frantically counting the remaining life of the gas turbine.

Time, alas, has passed

And if the fleet is still trying to save the ships of Project 1155, then the destroyers have already been given up.
The time for their modernization has been lost. Taking into account the fact that a series of new ships of Project 22350 has already begun, there is no point in investing in these old ships today. If we hypothetically assume that a decision will suddenly be made now, then its implementation, taking into account the specifics of budget financing, will begin no earlier than 2022, ship repairs will take 3-4 years (in fact, much more), i.e. the ships will come out of this repair with modernization in the years 2024-2025... At the same time, the newest 956th was accepted by the Navy in 1993, i.e. at the time of 2024 he will already be 31 years old. Ten years after an average repair is at least 41 years for the ship, but this already requires a clear replacement of the main cable routes (which sharply increases the cost and time of repairs). The situation was completely different in 2014, when, if a timely decision was made, 4-6 destroyers could actually get a second life, and a very active one at that. Even “Burny” (in service with the Navy since 1988), leaving the factory after 3 years (2017), could well have served for another 10 years, until 2027, without any large-scale replacement of the main cables. And this is even more true for the five newer ships (“Ushakov” (“Fearless”), “Persistent”, “Bystry”, and, possibly, “Fearless”).

Main lessons from the 956 project

First.
The fleet needs, if not the most innovative, but actually working and effective technical and tactical solutions. Chasing pie in the sky often ends in nothing. Second. Real combat effectiveness should be at the forefront of the development and use of the fleet.

Third. In a situation where the fleet sends relatively new ships to the park, society has a logical question: are our admirals playing with boats? The Navy, which requires huge funding for new ships, is able to ensure their normal operation, modernization during service and effective use in combat?

A worthy death for ships

Well-deserved, efficient and well-served ships should go to patriotic parks.
Ships that you can be proud of, such as the SKR Smetlivy. This ship is truly part of the History (with a capital H) of the USSR Navy, the great confrontation of the Cold War. What they did with the destroyer “Restless” is stupid, not funny and shameful. At the same time, a worthy result of his service could be found for him.

Dismantling of Project 956 destroyers at SRZ-35, Rosta village

And this is not cutting to pieces, but, for example, testing modern Navy weapons on it. And an example here, for us, alas, is the US Navy, which does not just use old ships as targets, such shootings have a pronounced research character, all reports on which, of course, are strictly kept secret by the US Navy (with a minimum of details for the media).

US Navy SINKEX tests with weapons sinking a Spruance-class destroyer

Such events have not been carried out in our fleet for many decades, despite the fact that new anti-ship missiles with a sharply reduced mass of warheads are being adopted, the issues of the real effectiveness of which are acute for large ships.

Last thing. Two recent photographs.

Two destroyers of projects 956E (modernized) and 956ME at the exercises of the PLA Eastern Fleet, October 2022 (source: Live Journal dambiev

).

And the “newest” destroyer of the Pacific Fleet “Bezboaznenny” (accepted by the Navy in December 1990). "Fearless" at the last berth (October 2020).

Only the single and older “Bystry” remains in the Pacific Fleet’s operational inventory.

Can we draw any conclusions from all this? The question is open...

Historically unjustified step

Let me start with the fact that 30 years ago there were no frigates or corvettes in the Soviet Navy at all. Simply because it was an enemy classification of ships adopted in NATO countries, which our sailors had absolutely nothing to do with. Because we had our own with cruisers, destroyers, patrol ships, large and small anti-submarine ships.

There were no “frigato-corvettes” in the Russian Imperial Navy. In any case, after his departure from the era of sailing ships. Here is the official classification of warships of the Russian Empire fleet, developed on the eve of the First World War:

“When drawing up the shipbuilding programs of 1911 and 1912. The Naval General Staff also developed a new classification, approved in June 1915: battleships, battlecruisers, cruisers, destroyers, destroyers, submarines, minelayers, minesweepers, gunboats, river gunboats, training ships, transports, messenger ships, yachts, hydrographic vessels, port and serf ships, blockers.

As you can see, there were no traces of any frigates or corvettes in the Russian Imperial Navy of the post-sailing era, much less in the Soviet Navy.

But after the country was once again destroyed in 1991, there were many who wanted to keep up with the West, supposedly “at the forefront in all respects.” And not in the sense of maintaining a powerful fleet, most of which was quite successfully sold for pennies on needles, but only in its reclassification in the NATO manner. This is where the current “Westernized” systematization of the main part of the modern surface ships of the Russian Navy came from.

The result of this seemingly innocent verbal balancing act was a by no means harmless understatement of the combat capabilities of the Russian fleet. Which began to look somehow very pale, especially almost without the destroyers, which were always considered its basis.

In search of the best destroyer for the Russian Navy

A huge problem for the Russian Navy, in addition to the shortage of large surface ships and the almost complete absence of aircraft carriers, is its aging.
Built during the USSR, the ships are gradually exhausting their service life, which can be extended through modernization, but, alas, not indefinitely. Thanks to the successful Project 22350, we were able to create a frigate that meets all modern challenges. But what about larger ships, destroyers and cruisers? In what direction should the shipbuilding program for the Russian Navy develop next? Destroyers are one of the most versatile and multi-purpose warships, designed to combat enemy ships, submarines and aircraft, and protect naval groups and their formations. These days, the line between a destroyer, a heavy frigate and a light cruiser has become very blurred. If desired, the Russian Navy can include large anti-submarine ships of Project 1155, patrol ships of Project 11540, and modern frigates of Project 22350. But the only “chemically pure” destroyer we have is Project 956 “Sarych”. These destroyers were created to destroy enemy ships and support amphibious assault forces, air defense and anti-submarine defense. Of the planned 25, only 21 Sarych were built, but after the collapse of the USSR, funding for the fleet was sharply reduced, the necessary repairs to the ships were not carried out, and as a result, most of them were scrapped or sold. Today, only 6 Soviet destroyers of the 3rd generation remain in the Russian Navy, “scattered” across the Northern and Pacific fleets, with only 3 ships in service, 2 in reserve and one undergoing repair and modernization. For their time, the Sarychs were formidable destroyers, capable of performing a wide range of missions. Given the acute shortage of large surface ships, it is necessary to use their inherent potential for modernization, which will increase their combat capabilities. However, there is no need to experience unnecessary illusions: Project 956 belongs to the 3rd generation, objectively inferior to its direct rival in the destroyer Arleigh Burke, which belongs to the 4th generation. It is not even entirely correct to compare them, although it is necessary due to the lack of alternatives. So, what is next?

As an alternative to the Sarych, Russia designed the promising nuclear-powered destroyer Leader, which was supposed to replace several classes of ships at the same time: the destroyers of Project 956, the BOD of Project 1155, and the heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers of Project 1144 Orlan. The total displacement of the “Leader” was supposed to be nearly 20 thousand tons, 2 nuclear reactors were responsible for the unlimited cruising range, and the missile armament consisted of 64 universal launchers for “Caliber”, “Onyx” and “Zircon”. Remarkable characteristics, but the head of USC Rakhmanov stunned everyone with his statement about big problems with this project:

In the form in which it was planned before, it most likely will not be implemented, at least not so quickly. But here everything depends on the decision of the customer - the Ministry of Defense.

What went wrong? Apparently, the main problem was the excessive complexity of the project, into which they tried to cram all imaginable functionality so that just one ship could perform the tasks of a BOD, a destroyer, and a heavy missile cruiser at the same time. The pursuit of versatility led to an increase in cost, which even according to preliminary estimates should have reached 100 billion for 1 ship. A clear overkill for a serial destroyer. And then, there are serious doubts that the Russian Navy needs such a “nuclear Yamato”.

Yes, unlimited range and powerful missile weapons are great, but who are the Leaders designed against? Against the US Navy AUG as an “aircraft carrier killer”? Apparently, yes, but for some reason everyone forgets to mention that the real chances of any naval group (CAG) against an aircraft carrier strike group are very small. The presence of an AWACS aircraft based on the Nimitz will allow the Americans to see our KMG long before we can, since we do not have our own AWACS aircraft, and the AWACS helicopter has a much smaller radius. And then the carrier-based aircraft of the US Navy will be able to launch several over-the-horizon massive missile strikes, which our fleet will not be able to repel, even if it sees it, and may not even see it at all. The conclusion is simple: without its own aircraft carrier, which has an AWACS aircraft on board, as well as a fighter wing for air defense, there is nothing special to catch against the US Navy AUG. Consequently, no matter how many “Leaders” we rivet for 100 billion, they won’t be of much use without an aircraft carrier as a pair. Let us remember that the Orlans were also designed to operate in conjunction with an aircraft carrier. So why do developers of such complex and expensive projects as Leader forget about this? (By the way, those who are against the construction of aircraft carriers for the Russian Navy, for the reasons stated above, either do not understand what they are saying at all, or they understand, but are engaged in outright sabotage. Without aircraft-carrying ships, the ocean-going fleet is, in principle, meaningless.)

No, we are not against the Leader, it is an excellent ship, but in the nuclear-powered version it is needed to replace the Orlans as the flagships of the Northern and Pacific fleets only in cooperation with a couple of aircraft carriers, light or medium. Then it will really be useful. But let's return directly to the destroyers. We have already figured out that the nuclear-powered half-destroyer-half-cruiser “Leader” is not entirely suitable as a replacement for the “Sarych” and the BOD. Here we objectively need a simpler and more massive ship. Let's look at direct competitors.

Probably the best destroyer in the world today is the American Arleigh Burke. This is the largest production surface ship with a displacement of over 5 thousand tons since the end of World War II: 68 have already been built, 6 more are being built, and a total of 89 destroyers of this type are planned for the US Navy. And no wonder. With a total displacement of 9.6 thousand tons, a maximum speed of 32 knots, the Arleigh Burke has 32 universal launcher cells on the bow, and 64 on the stern, which, if necessary, can be re-equipped with anti-aircraft, anti-ship or cruise missiles for a specific combat task. Destroyers of this type are carriers for the Aegis system and an integral part of the unified US missile defense system. These are indeed very good ships; their functional analogue, called the Kongo class, is in service with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. In essence, the Arleigh Burke is the U.S. Navy's versatile workhorse, proven and reliable. All sorts of “wunderwaffes”, like “Zamvolt”, turned out to be unclaimed, and out of the planned 33 “super destroyers” in the series, the Americans canceled 29, which allows us to draw some parallels with our nuclear “Leaders”.

This gives grounds to draw some conclusions. Against nearly 9 dozen “Arly Berks”, which are part of the 11th AUG of the US Navy, the Russian Navy needs its own massive and relatively inexpensive destroyers, a pair of nuclear-powered “Leaders” as flagships to replace the aging “Orlans”, as well as 2 aircraft carriers each, light or medium, on gas turbine or nuclear power (nuclear is more reliable), as part of the Northern and Pacific fleets, respectively. But what kind of destroyers should these be? Several options are possible.

"Mini Leader"

The displacement of the half-destroyer-half-cruiser of Project 23560 reaches almost 20 thousand tons, it is equipped with 2 RITM-200 nuclear reactors of 175 MW each, as well as 64 universal launchers for “Caliber”, “Oniks” and “Zircons”. Great, but all this costs, as we indicated above, 100 billion rubles apiece, and will not give a decisive advantage over the AUG of a potential enemy without its own aircraft carrier. However, nothing prevents us from simplifying and reducing the cost of this project. Instead of 20 thousand tons, make the displacement 9.5-10 thousand tons, replace the nuclear power plant with a gas turbine unit. The number of launch cells will decrease slightly, but will remain comparable to Arleigh Burke. But the complexity and cost of the project will decrease by 2-2.5 times. According to the plans of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the minimum number of ships of Project 23560 was supposed to be 8 pieces, the maximum - 20. At a price of 100 billion, it was a bit expensive, which led to the abandonment of the project in this form. But if you put the “Mini-Leader” into the series, then instead of 8 pieces at the same price you can get the desired 20 normal destroyers, and instead of 20 - 50 pieces. This is already serious. Any enemy will have to reckon with such a fleet, and these destroyers will be more than enough to guard the much-needed aircraft carriers and UDCs of the Russian Navy.

"Super frigate"

Another possible way to close the gap in destroyers is to increase the Project 23500 frigate. In fact, such plans are already known.
Version 22350M should have a total displacement of 8 thousand tons versus 5.4 for its predecessor, a maximum speed of 30 knots, as well as 48 universal cells for the Caliber, Onyx and Zircon missiles. It's not even a frigate anymore, but almost a destroyer. But still, it is inferior to the Arleigh Burke in size and armament. If we add another 1-1.5 thousand tons of displacement and two dozen cells for missiles to the 22350M project, our “super-frigate” will turn into a ship comparable in power and combat capabilities. The keel of the lead frigate of the modernized version should take place in 2023, when the new boathouse at the Severnaya Verf shipyard is ready. Thus, we have at least two options for how we can close the gap with destroyers. The main thing is to understand what kind of navy we are building and why. It is possible to combine them in any variants: 2 nuclear-powered “Leaders” as future flagships in conjunction with 4 light or medium aircraft carriers, divided into the Northern and Pacific fleets, a dozen “Mini-Leaders” and the same number of “super-frigates” for security promising AUG. This is quite realistic for the capabilities of our shipbuilding industry and can radically increase the capabilities of our Navy.

Not by height, weight or fat!

Meanwhile, this classification, borrowed from NATO abroad, which, by the way, is very much loved by pro-NATO Ukraine, which doesn’t even have decent ships, only “casts a shadow over the fence.” Because initially there was no rational basis for its introduction in the Russian fleet.

I'll explain why. During World War II, the displacement of a ship classified as a light cruiser was approximately 7-8 thousand tons. A typical representative of this class was, for example, the Soviet cruiser Kirov.

© Photo from the archive

Soviet cruiser "Kirov".

Currently, the so-called large anti-submarine ships have almost the same tonnage - a unique class invented in the USSR Navy and which does not exist anywhere else in the world.

Does anyone need to be convinced that the combat power of these two ships of the same weight category is much higher than that of the modern Admiral Panteleev? So why is it then just a BOD and not a light cruiser?

We see an even less intelligible downgrade in other divisions of the naval personnel of the current Russian Navy.

For example, during the Second World War, a standard destroyer, which was then considered large, had a displacement of about 2,000 tons. Now the Russian Project 20380 corvette has a similar displacement. According to the current classification, it turns out that it is not a destroyer, but a ship of a lower rank. But a typical wartime corvette had very limited combat capabilities and barely reached the tonnage mark of 1,000 tons!

And in the era of the sailing fleet, a three-masted warship, used mainly for reconnaissance and messenger services, was even called a corvette.

© mil.ru

Large anti-submarine ship "Admiral Panteleev".

Armament: "Caliber" and "Pantsir-M"

It is well known that our sailors have a tendency to have full-fledged, powerful artillery of the largest possible caliber on board a warship. The Soviet destroyers of Project 956 are the clearest example of this. The weight of an onboard minute salvo of these ships, armed with a pair of unique AK-130 gun mounts, turned into 6 tons of steel and explosives. This is somewhat less than what the German battle cruiser SMS Seydlitz could bring down on the enemy in The Battle of Jutland (Skagerrakschlacht), but exceeds the power of the main caliber of the Fuhrer’s “pocket battleships” during the Second World War. As an air defense system on Project 956 destroyers, these guns played a secondary role, but were ideally suited to demonstrate superiority in an artillery duel with any contemporary from then to the present. In addition, the AK-130 inspired the Marines when landing from large landing ships of projects 1171 and 775, which at that time did not provide helicopters for landing, and soldiers and equipment were thrown to storm enemy positions in the surf on the beach. In short, nothing new (in comparison with the realities of World War II).

The naval thought of the admirals of the late USSR was forced to recognize the need for a second helicopter on the new universal destroyer (project 1155.1), but still did not want to sacrifice the ship’s superiority in artillery over modern Western analogues. And (predictably) a single AK-130, the pride of the then military-industrial complex and the Navy, was installed in the hull of the BOD taken as a basis. Two 130 mm barrels significantly surpassed the fire performance of a pair of single-barrel AK-100s of the previous project.

Respecting the sailors’ commitment to naval traditions, being a supporter of the evolutionary style of achieving perfection and harmony in building a balanced fleet, I propose to install a main caliber gun on the new destroyer (similar to that installed on the Project 22350 frigate “Admiral Gorshkov class frigate”) A -192M. In terms of artillery power, our destroyer will still not be inferior to its foreign counterparts, but will significantly save in weight and dimensions (compared to its predecessors) to accommodate the main armament of a twenty-first century destroyer - missiles.

And at the turn of the first quarter of the 21st century, what do we have to offer to arm the destroyer of the thirties? At the moment, there are no options or alternatives - the Caliber family of missiles and the 3S14 universal ship-based firing system. The belated, long-awaited development at the modern technological level of a set of missiles for various purposes and a single universal vertical launcher. Anti-ship missiles 3M14, anti-submarine 91R1, KR for firing at ground targets, supersonic 3M55 Onyx and hypersonic Zircon 3M22 are on the way - it would seem an impressive and formidable arsenal. But I’ll ask a “non-salary question”: where are the missiles for long-range air defense, for destroying the warheads of ballistic missiles, for removing reconnaissance satellites from low Earth orbits? Or will the subsonic Hawkeye with not the most powerful and advanced radar remain a nightmare for the new destroyer, on which there are practically no energy limitations for placing a detection and guidance locator with weight and dimensions that are an order of magnitude greater than the capabilities of the opponent?

Firstly, the versatility of the UKSK 3S14 should be similar to that of the MK 41 launcher for the entire large-sized range of ship missile weapons.

Secondly, a line of missiles compatible with the UKSK 3S14 launcher should be developed for the upper hemisphere of the ship’s defense with the tasks mentioned above. This is needed not only for the hypothetical destroyer discussed in the article, but also for all future upgraded first-rank ships carrying this launcher.

For the four ships of the first series, we will limit ourselves to the number of 80 launchers (10 universal modules). Of these, we will place 48 of them, according to the classics, in front of the bow superstructure of the ship, and 16 each - on the right and left sides of the superstructure in the center of the ship near the exhaust devices of the propulsion system. If the designer or customer has any objective reasons, we can go ahead and reduce the launch capacity to 64. In any case, the number of UKSK launchers will be less than on American destroyers, but we will not blindly copy foreign experience and unjustifiably inflate the dimensions and displacement of the ship. I am impressed by the domestic approach in this matter in the course of the development of the 22350 frigate project, which initially has only 16 launchers, and only from the fifth hull their number will be increased to 24 or, in other words, the ammunition will increase by a third. But from a ship with twice the displacement we have the right to demand twice the power. In addition, we will not give up 48 UVP of the Redut anti-aircraft missile system (32 launchers between the gun mount and UKSK and 16 launchers between the exhausts) for 9M96 and 9M100 anti-aircraft guided missiles. By the way, why not, during the discussion, raise the question of the possibility of placing four 9M96 missiles (hull diameter 240 mm) and up to nine 9M100 missiles (hull diameter 125 mm) in special transport and launch containers for the UKSK, if a transport-launcher is installed in the UKSK silo? launch tube (diameter 720 mm) with anti-ship missiles 3M55 “Onyx” (diameter 670 mm)?

Finishing the missile and artillery armament of the ship, we will opt for two Pantsir-M anti-aircraft missile and gun systems. Traditionally, all Russian warships have 30-mm machine guns, and now they will also have the ability to hit surface and air targets in automatic mode. It would not be bad to have a 30-mm sub-caliber projectile with a tungsten core and a projectile with a programmable fuse in the ammunition load by that time, but the effectiveness and correctness of the decisions made will be tested by time and operation.

Battleship in miniature

Meanwhile, one modern Russian corvette has such weapons, the striking power of which is quite comparable not only with the corvettes of World War II, but with a good dozen destroyers of that time! To be more precise, it is simply incomparable, especially due to the Uran anti-ship missiles and the near-strategic Caliber cruise missiles. But then why is it just a “Corvette”?

The fire missions that this imaginary “corvette”, that is, a nominally small ship, is capable of performing, were perhaps not even capable of being handled by a battleship from the Second World War.

So the question arises - why so belittle, in the sense of classification, and even without any reason, our modern “corvettes” of this project, recognizing in advance the priority of NATO “destroyers” over them? Just because they are “thicker and heavier”? But should this be the main criterion for the class of ships?

© mil.ru

Russian "corvette" project 20380/20385.

Soviet destroyers of the Second World War

Click for ENGLISH language A destroyer is a multi-purpose fast ship designed to combat enemy submarines and ships.
A destroyer can also be used for reconnaissance and patrol services in the interests of the escorted squadron, artillery support during landings and for laying minefields. The main weapons are torpedoes (against large ships), depth charges (against submarines), artillery - against comparable and smaller ships. The tactics of combat use of destroyers consisted of hitting large enemy ships with torpedoes at high speed, making it difficult to destroy them with naval artillery fire. The Soviet Union built destroyers of Project 7, which was replaced by Project 7-U (Improved), and the leaders of the destroyers of Project 38 (Minsk, Baku and Tbilisi) and Project 1 (Leningrad, Moscow and Kharkiv") .

Battles in the Arctic
(mainly actions of destroyers)
Battles in the Black Sea
(mainly actions of destroyers)
Battles in the Baltic
(mainly actions of destroyers)

KBF: Soviet destroyers of Project 7-U (Storozhevoy type) are moving with bearing. Ruski razarac tip 7-U.

Photo. Soviet destroyer of project 7 "Grozny" Soviet development project 7 Soviet leader of destroyers of project 1 "Kharkov". Rusky Torpedoborec.

The leader of the destroyers of Project 20I "Tashkent" of the Black Sea Fleet in 1941. "Tashkent" was laid down on January 11, 1937 on the slipway of the Italian company Odero Temi Orlando by order of the USSR. In May 1939, the leader was transferred to the Soviet Union and in October of the same year joined the Navy. During the war, he actively participated in escorting convoys and transporting various cargoes, conducted up to hundreds of live firing exercises and chalked up 13 aircraft and a torpedo boat. She was sunk by German aircraft in the port of Novorossiysk on July 2, 1942.

Soviet destroyer of the Black Sea Fleet 'Frunze' (formerly 'Bystry').

The captured destroyer of the Black Sea Fleet 'Flying' is a former Romanian Italian-built destroyer 'Regina Maria'. On August 29, 1944, the destroyer was captured by Soviet troops in Constanta.

Project 7 destroyer "Reasonable" RKKF. Svetskiyat destroyer project 7.

The ocean is ahead. My commander is calm - Recklessness and risk are not in his honor. Behind is a caravan, I am a convoy ship, And I must bring my transport home. But I’m cramped in the ranks, and I want a fight, I’m shaking with fever from forecastle to quarterdeck. But an order is an order! I am a convoy ship. This means I don't belong to myself. We've been sailing for three days now, the sun is warming the deck. Not a military campaign, but a luxurious cruise. And the transport relaxed, leaned on the railing, What can you take from civilians? But I'm not a tourist. I know what this silence is worth. I am ready every moment to recognize their patrol. The devices are ready, I am a convoy ship, I know what it means to expose your side. Well, he croaked: “Polundra!” The acoustician gave the bearing. A little to the right of the course, the noise of the propellers cut into the night. Have fun, guys, don’t give in to sadness, I’ve been waiting for this moment and I can help you! We'll catch up with her. But why? What's happened? Why “stop the car!” and I’m lying in a drift? Why am I not free? Why am I in a convoy? Why don't I belong to myself? The base salutes us with the thunder of hundreds of guns. We identified ourselves, I guess, I was walking like a sheep. I never chased an enemy at sea, nor did I stand up to the end in a fierce battle. Who will save my honor? Who will wash them with blood? Commander, I ask you to look into my eyes. And he said in response: “You are a convoy ship. We’ve reached it, so you’ve proven everything!” Alexander Rosenbaum

Soviet fleet of World War II

Cruisers Battleships Submarines Hunters Minesweepers Minzags Patrol boats Boats

Start

?>

"Fat" Anglo-Saxon fleet

Yes, indeed, the displacement of standard US Navy ships, of almost all classes, is significantly greater than our accepted standards. But do not forget that in this world everything is relative.

And the solid dimensions of the American Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, with a displacement of under 10,000 tons, are dictated, first of all, by the need to have large internal volumes to accommodate fuel, crew and all the material supplies necessary for a long transoceanic voyage. Which inevitably follows from the ultimate task of the American fleet - maintaining military control over the whole world.

However, the Americans will almost certainly get overextended on this global mission. They themselves talk about the threat. Up to and including Trump.

As for the considerable number of missile cells on the same Arleigh Burke (almost a hundred), another question is - is this really better than dispersing the same number of launchers on a larger number of smaller ships? At the very least, this is not a fact.

© navy.mil

Well-fed American sailors.

The Russian Navy does not have the task of controlling the entire planet. Therefore, there is no urgent need to build ships capable of loading with French fries and hot dogs in the quantities required by gluttonous “sailors” to cross the Pacific Ocean. There is no doubt that if the US Navy were deprived of such an imperial function, its ships would quickly lose weight. And the sailors probably too.

Zarya, Zvezda or Poliment-Redoubt?

So, the anti-submarine highlight of the new destroyer will be the permanent deployment of two anti-submarine helicopters in a stationary hangar. Probably, the Zvezda-2 SJSC (as on the predecessor of the Project 1155.1 BOD “Admiral Chabanenko”) in our time, and especially in the thirties, will no longer be relevant. On the other hand, this latest version of the complex was modernized on an operational ship, and, unfortunately, our military-industrial complex currently cannot offer anything worthy to a ship of the first rank with an emphasis on countering the underwater threat in the thirties and beyond.

"Zarya" harmoniously fit into the capabilities and tasks of the Project 22350 frigate. One of the arguments against the bulky "Polynomial" and its next-generation classmate "Zvezda" sounded something like this: why such powerful and long-range acoustics on an anti-submarine ship if a low-noise submarine will detect its approach by the noise of the propellers much earlier than the GAK is detected in active mode and a timely evasive maneuver is performed?

Here, it would probably be appropriate to provide a criterion for the effectiveness of defense from a different “habitat.” The effectiveness of air defense is assessed not by the number of aircraft shot down, but by preventing an airborne attack on a protected object. Thus, the very potential possibility of detecting an underwater enemy at twice the distance by a new destroyer will force it to choose more cautious tactics, and, perhaps, to abandon the attack of a protected object until better times.

Agree, it would look strange in the long term if (having eliminated the main drawback of Soviet destroyers and BODs - the lack of a clear collective defense air defense system) the first Russian ships swung to the other extreme - weakening the anti-aircraft defense, in conditions of at least an unabating threat from under water.

A logical addition to the destroyer’s anti-submarine weapons will be two launchers of the Paket-NK anti-submarine defense and anti-torpedo defense complex placed on board.

It is quite rare (for obvious reasons) that radar weapons are discussed on the pages of VO, but then suddenly an article recently appeared about a promising radar system for surface ships (“The effectiveness of the air defense of a promising destroyer. An alternative radar complex”). Unfortunately, it is hard to believe that something like this will be implemented in ten years in metal and semiconductors, interfaced and tested with existing missiles and control systems, and adopted by the navy...

Therefore, the recognizable phased array of the Poliment-Redut complex, which has become the hallmark of frigates of the Admiral series, will most likely migrate to the newest destroyer. Perhaps in the next modification, to increase the power, range and number of targets fired, the number of rows and columns of PPM in the phased array canvas will increase.

Using a creative approach to increasing the combat capabilities of a destroyer (compared to a frigate), I will propose installing not four, but five existing phased array antennas on the ship. Purely arithmetically, the number of simultaneously fired targets increases from 16 to 20 and guided missiles - from 32 to 40. The assigned sector for each phased array will be reduced from 90 degrees to 72, and maintaining the ability of each of the arrays separately to “look” into the neighboring sector by 9 degrees will create in a circular manner, five separate sectors measuring 18 degrees each, with the potential to double the number of targets fired, which will amount to 25 percent of the circular destruction zone. This point is especially important in terms of considering a salvo of anti-ship missiles from a single carrier ship with a typical ammunition load of up to eight anti-ship missiles. Unfortunately, when the radiation pattern is “bent” from the normal at angles of up to 45 degrees, we inevitably encounter some loss of the accuracy of the beam characteristics, but this must be perceived as a necessary evil from phased arrays.

Installing a radar from a frigate on a larger destroyer makes it possible to assume the placement of the electrical center of the antennas 2-3 meters higher above the water surface, which will entail an increase in the detection range of air targets at low and extremely low altitudes. By increasing the inclination of the antenna panels by 5 degrees from the vertical, we will thereby reduce the size of the dead crater above the ship with expanded capabilities for combating ballistic targets and reconnaissance of satellites in low Earth orbits. We will not delve further into secondary issues of retrofitting and fitting out the future ship.

Without fries, but with "Calibers"

For the Russian surface fleet, intended primarily to protect the territory of its own country and the coasts of allied countries, relying on their coastal bases (as in Syria, for example), such ocean dimensions in most cases are simply unnecessary. Well, the question arises - why then “butt accordion”?

So the lean “corvettes” with a displacement of 2,000 tons are leaving our stocks, that is, full-fledged destroyers in the old way. Slender “frigates” - under 5-6 thousand tons, and these are most likely not even destroyers, but quite light cruisers from the times of the unforgettable Valentin Pikul. And also small missile ships (SMRs), which with their tonnage of under 1,000 tons are quite comparable to destroyers and even wartime destroyers.

And this despite the fact that all these ships, without a single exception, equal in size to previous destroyers, and sometimes even light cruisers, carry on board such a reserve of firepower that they cannot even be compared with their classmate predecessors.

Soviet destroyer level 10 Khabarovsk. Not the same cake as before.

Date: 12/08/2016 | Posted in Reviews, Destroyers | |

Immediately after patch 0.5.12, I went to the WoWS forum.

A field of thousands of graves with small Khabarovsks appeared before my eyes. Extremely crooked figures bent over the graves. Here and there screams, sobs and groans were heard: “My Khabarovsk is dead...”, “They killed Kenny Khabarovsk, you bastards,” “This was my favorite ship...”

Tears fell to the ground in a continuous rain. A scorching cold wind blew from the mountains, dark with sorrow. In the distance, above the mountains, towered the all-seeing eye of the balance department. It was, as always, unperturbed and remained calm. He didn't care.

It was a graveyard of nerfed ships.

TTX

Artillery Main Corps

The 130 mm guns of Khabarovsk should be very familiar to you after Udaly. They have the same rapid fire rate: 12 v/m, 5 s reload time. They also rotate well: 9 seconds at 180 degrees. And the ballistics remain the same - they are also above all praise.

But this is where the similarities end and the differences begin.

First: Khabarovsk has 1 more rear turret, which gives us 2 more guns in the broadside. The direction of your turn ceases to matter. If you want, turn around with your ass, or if you want, turn around with your nose, at most you will lose only 50% of the power. And it will be much more pleasant to leave.

Second: the base firing range is 11.2 km. Let us remember that Udaly had 12.1 km. Yes, now the top ship in the line has a shorter firing range than the previous one, with identical guns. L - logic.

The Khabarovsk main battery is the main, and practically the only, way for this ship to cause damage in battle. Of course, the main battery is not bad, but during a long game you constantly feel a certain randomness, which concerns, first of all, its landmines. Either they don’t want to cause direct damage (because the enemy is bristling with armor), or they simply stop setting fire.

Let me give you a clear example. I met Friedrich (9th German LK) in battle and, joyfully rubbing my hands, I already imagined how soon I would turn him into a well-fried Bavarian sausage.

At first everything was fine. “Sosis” caught fire as if it had been previously dipped in gasoline. From the very first salvos, I put 2 fires on it and began to think that it was worth leaving it for slow cooking and switching to another target. Not so. A tasty morsel of German meat was used on the strap.

It doesn’t matter, I thought, and began to water this LC, intending to bring it to the Well Done degree of frying. And indeed, another fire broke out while the belt was still in working order, and after that... that’s it. More than a hundred hits in different parts of this damn German barge resulted in only modest direct damage and not a single(!) fire.

Such “randomness” of the Khabarovsk Civil Code is terribly infuriating. Sometimes it happens that you set fire to a destroyer 11 km away with the first salvo, and sometimes some fucking battleship can withstand fifty hits, and it doesn’t give a damn.

Or here's another picture:

15 fires per battle is an excellent result, somewhere on the level of level 10 cruisers. But they do little damage - only 32,000. Why?

Because the same Moscow and Zao have the ability to control fires due to their high chance and firing range. They leave the target that has caught the strap alone for a while, and then they are guaranteed to set it on fire, if not from the 1st or 2nd salvo, then at most from the 5th salvo. With Khabarovsk, everything is completely different - he practically cannot control the enemy’s fires, and therefore the damage from them is quite random.

Of course, all these are just special cases in the vast ocean of statistics, and for you everything may be completely different. But when driving Khabarovsk you must be prepared for such cases.

Torpedoes

Two five-pipe 533 mm devices firing on both sides. Range 10 km, speed 56 knots.

Torpedoes don’t seem to be bad, but their use is very situational. Just like on most cruisers. The fact is that it is advisable to launch such torpedoes from a maximum distance only at an advancing target. For example, into a battleship coming towards you from 11 km. Then the chances of putting his mighty nose on a strong electric proletarian underwater dick will be maximum. But if such a LC is turned sideways towards you, or even retreats, don’t waste time. You'll have time to shoot more.

But it is possible to launch torpedoes not from maximum distances, the attentive reader will say.

No you can not. As soon as Khabarovsk crosses the line 8-9 km from a cruiser or battleship, he suddenly becomes ill. The Soviet padded jacket stops warming, playing the accordion, intoxicating alcohol, and attracting women. In this state, Khabarovsk, greatly saddened and depressed, is forced to go to the bottom.

Yes, Habu-Habu, theoretically, can be transformed into a camouflage, and calmly fire torpedoes without shining. But an individual who does this runs the risk of receiving approving glances, even from such kings of perversion as the Japanese. And I’m not talking about Japanese destroyers at all.

Pulling a cockroach with your mouth.

Karaoke handjob.

And these are some of the most harmless Japanese TV entertainments.

But, let's return to Khabarovsk. The icing on the cake for our ship is pumping. Yes, yes, at 10k.

For just 20K experience and 1.5K credits you can unlock “top” torpedoes. And this is the most useless waste of credits and experience in the game. Since the “top” torpedoes lose both speed (53) and range (6), in return they receive only damage - 19500 instead of 15100 “stock”.

Why are they so needed? I found only one explanation. They are intended exclusively for morons (I can’t call such individuals anything else), who right from the start, press their sneakers to the floor towards the nearest enemy battleship, and get fucking killed by it. In this case, yes, these torpedoes are vital in order to be guaranteed to take any LC in the game with one launch.

But, if you still prefer more traditional tactics, then forget about these torpedoes. The stock ones are of no use in every battle, and you will be able to use such stubs a little less often than ever.

Air defense

What is air defense? Even taking into account that universals participate in the air defense aura, this does not add strength to it. It may be possible to shoot down one random airplane from the passing ones, but I wouldn’t count on more.

An interesting detail: the official World of Warships wiki believes that there is no air defense in Khabarovsk at all. He thinks correctly.

Vitality

22500 HP is the highest amount at the level. For this we should thank the by no means modest size of our sub-cruiser.

In fact, Khabarovsk doesn’t really need this amount of HP. If he had 15 or even 10K HP, he would still remain playable, since he plays mainly from maneuver.

What really distinguishes Khabarovsk from all its classmates, and brings it even closer to the class of cruisers, is the armored belt. As much as 50 mm of armor will give you additional protection from all land mines up to 300 mm inclusive. They will not be able to penetrate such armor and will only deal damage from non-penetration.

On the other hand, such an armored belt perfectly cocks almost any armor-piercing projectiles, trapping them inside the body.

True, in battle, you are unlikely to remember all this. Just play with maneuver, trying to avoid being hit - then no armored belt will simply be needed.

Maneuverability

I'll start with the good.

Magnificent, no, the most magnificent top speed! 43 knots give you a guarantee that no ship in the game will keep up with you. Moreover, if an aircraft carrier crap throws torpedoes at your stern, you can simply get away from them!

It's silly to describe the benefits of having better top speed in a game. You can easily change flanks. You can catch up with any fleeing ship. You can hide from any persecution. Etc. etc., this list can be continued for quite a long time.

However, if we talk about other maneuvering characteristics, then Khakhabarovsk is not doing so well.

You know, it's kind of like American muscle cars. Neither I, nor most likely you, have ever been behind the wheel of a classic American muscle car of the 60s, but that can hardly stop us from thinking a little about them. So the Haba is as unstoppably powerful and fast as those 7 liter American rockets , but at the same time just as uncontrollably tight.

A changeover of 6.1 seconds is the worst result at the level, especially considering that the American and Japanese have this figure in the region of 3.

The circulation radius is 760 meters, and this is also the worst result. I often hear from Shimakoz owners that their barges are tight and do not turn. I wonder what they would say after trying Khabarovsk?

Nevertheless, even such tight characteristics do not prevent Khabarovsk from surviving battles at 12-13 km. Just keep in mind the rule: there must be at least 12/10 km between you and the nearest cruiser/battleship, respectively.

Disguise

Ships can see our destroyer from 10 km, planes from 4.9 km.

There is no point in hiding Habu. Any destroyers will still overexpose you, so suddenly approaching the point and at Stakhanov’s pace will not be possible to slash the hidden Japanese with a hammer and sickle.

Standard camouflage is quite enough to ensure that in case of unforeseen troubles, you have time to hide before the onset of the absolute and all-pervasive small northern fur-bearing animal.

Builds

It’s difficult to call the configuration options that Khabarovsk has builds.

All the variability that is really available to you is the choice between rudders and camouflage in the last slot, and the choice of 3 perks, depending on your preferred goals. For a fundamental fight against destroyers, take camouflage (mod) and vigilance (perk), in all other cases - rudders with a quartermaster.

Perks

1 lvl. BOP. Removes 0.5 seconds from cooldown. Mast hev.

2 lvl. And with the last of my strength , I won’t even explain anything.

3 lvl. The Superintendent will give additional smoke and afterburner. Vigilance will allow you to see torpedoes earlier.

4 lvl. UOP. Increases firing range to 13.4 km. The most must-have. The explosives technician raises the chance of fire to 11%. From the same series.

5 lvl. Disguise. Anything would be useful, but, alas, it is not available to the average player.

Modernization

1 slot. Vitality of main battery.

2 slot. Accuracy , because there is nothing else. 3 slot. Rammer , for the same reason. 4 slot. SBZZH , because, look 2 perk.

5 slot. the steering wheel .

6 slot. Steering wheels/Casking. See above.

Tactics

The variability when using Khabarovsk is the richest.

You will be able to prove yourself in almost any Special Olympics discipline in combat. Do you want to fight for points? Please! Go through the ass and sink an enemy aircraft carrier? Why not. Shoot enemy battleships from afar? And nothing is impossible here.

Nevertheless, it’s probably worth giving some general advice. The first thing that would be nice to do at the start of the battle is to capture points. Only not by direct capture, but by support of capture.

Yes, at the point you can easily shoot any destroyer, but besides it (them), there will probably also be a couple of cruisers that can easily fight back. Therefore, it is worth supporting the allied destroyers, being directly behind them. Then you will definitely not catch the first blow, and, if something happens, you will be able to escape quickly enough. Well, if the enemy decides not to appear, you will have time to grab your % capture.

On some maps there is the possibility of alternative tactics. Usually on such maps there is a point located in the black man’s ass very, very far away. And, if you are sure that the enemy has not disappeared next to it, you can turn on the afterburner right from the start and reach and capture such a point in splendid isolation at breathtaking speed.

In the mid-game, look for something to do to your liking: chase destroyers at points, burn battleships, catch cruisers on board. Khabarovsk can do almost anything.

If the end of the battle is close enough, it’s time to find a tasty single target and cut it in half. Was there an enemy aircraft carrier glowing somewhere out there?

Anti-class

Destroyers

Any destroyer in the game can handle Khabarovsk 1v1. In some cases, we can even talk about three destroyers at the same time.

The fact is that “classmates” absolutely cannot do anything to us. 127-128 mm artillery will make your 50 mm armored belt just a little ticklish. Yes, the superstructures are not equipped with such armor and will take damage, but even the very presence of an armored belt makes Khabarovsk much more durable than its colleagues, and this is if you do not remember the wild HP reserve.

The only serious danger comes from torpedoes. As we have already found out, you can’t call Khaba nimble, and at short distances you still have every chance of choking on matzo and taking a damn torpedo on board. But in this case, the blame will lie solely in your hands; you cannot forget about anti-torpedo maneuvers on any of the ships.

If you remember such little things, and exercise reasonable caution, without climbing out to 10 shimakazes at once, then Khabarovsk will become the best destroyer of destroyers in your hands.

Yes, there are some unpleasant cases when you simply cannot detect an enemy destroyer due to the fact that it overexposes you. But this doesn’t happen very often, and besides, you still turn such a ship off from the battle, so at least you complete your task.

Cruisers

Hypothetically, any level 10 cruiser will turn you into dust.

In practice, everything will not be so clear. In close combat, for obvious reasons, Haba-haba really won't stand a chance.

But if we talk about the maximum combat distance, then some cruisers begin to have very serious problems with ballistics. So it’s quite possible to exchange fire with some Des Moines or Minotaur from 13 km away. Under no circumstances should this be done with Zao, Ginden and Moscow.

First of all, when you see a cruiser, evaluate its ballistic capabilities and, based on this data, make a decision whether to get into a fight or not.

It happens that a cruiser, busy in a firefight, turns up your side at 8-9 km. In this case, don’t hesitate and load your armor-piercing guns - you need to have time to bite off as much as possible.

In general, although cruisers pose a big problem, Haba has something to counter them with - excellent speed, maneuverability sufficient for long-range combat, and camouflage “in case something happens.”

Battleships

Everything you need to know about battleships - you'll be around them for a loooong time.

Yes, Khabarovsk can take almost any battleship “to Solyanoye”, but it will do so much that by the time the battleship runs out of health and has another 30,000 HP, your children will have great-grandchildren, go to school and learn to speak the most popular fence word with the letter X. But, after cutting this damn armored vehicle, you can, with a clear conscience, go buy an iPhone 390s+ and wash it all on a permanent lunar colonial base.

For greater comfort and safety, during such a long process, I recommend using smoke. How come I never mentioned smoke? Apparently Khabarovsk needed them so much that I forgot about their existence through the battle.

If we add a little seriousness, then Khabarovsk really does a good job of burning enemy LKs, showing them the banner “IN FIRE, BURN”, but at the same time it does not deal much direct damage.

Except for the case when the battleship substitutes its side. Then Khabarovsk literally cuts down the enemy superstructures with its armor-piercing weapons, leaving just a bare deck, which will soon sink from the sight of its own helplessness. AP shells from the Hub can cause literally hellish damage to the side. Remember this in those moments when enemy LCs near you begin to maneuver.

Aircraft carriers

As a destroyer, Khabarovsk is absolutely defenseless against an enemy aircraft carrier. All you can count on is your speed and timely maneuvering. It’s not so easy to catch Khabarovsk in the focus of air groups, but if Avik knows how to play, which at level 10 has some probability, then sooner or later your Amur town will hit the bottom.

But don't be upset. As a rule, Aviks begin to focus on destroyers only when they get close to such a tender and vulnerable carcass of the Avik leader. And in this case, there are not illusory chances that the air button itself will soon rake the healing Soviet trynduls.

As a conclusion

I skated in Khabarovsk exclusively after the nerf, so I can’t say how much it affected him.

But I can say what impression this ship left as a whole, and it is very mixed.

Khabarovsk has its own strengths. This is not a bad ship, at least because it is the best anti-destroyer in the game. In addition, he can show himself very worthy in the fight against Aviks and battleships. And the cruisers, if something happens, have something to answer.

But he is always missing something. In the fight against destroyers - camouflage, in the fight against cruisers - range, in the confrontation with LK - powerful land mines or the chance of arson.

At the moment, before the Germans came out, Khabarovsk has the best win percentage and average damage among its classmates, which makes it the best tier ten destroyer. But I definitely can’t call it an imbecile or an excellent ship.

Therefore, I understand the cries and howls that are still in the thread about Khabarovsk. Apparently, it was once a destroyer that had enough of everything.

Author of the publication

offline for 4 weeks

Bes

Comments: 8542Publications: 388Registration: 06/11/2016

The mythical “unseaworthiness” of the Russian fleet

As for the now popular “expert” opinions about the “inability” of such a thousand-ton ship to operate in distant seas, which supposedly deprives the same RTOs of the right to be classified as destroyers, I dare to recall an indisputable historical fact. The Russian Second Pacific Squadron, sent to the Far East during the Russo-Japanese War, included destroyers of the Rezvy and Sokol type (later reclassified as destroyers), whose displacement did not exceed 300 tons. Which, by the way, is exactly three times less than the current RTO. But this did not prevent them from making a transoceanic sea crossing, and then taking part in the largest Tsushima naval battle.

© Photo from the archive

The destroyer of the Russian Imperial Navy "Buiny" took part in the transoceanic crossing and the Battle of Tsushima.

New concept of a promising destroyer DDG(X) for the US Navy

Possible exterior of the DDG(X) ship

In the early thirties, the US Navy plans to receive the lead destroyer of a new project known as DDG(X). Full development of this project will begin in the near future, but for now the fleet is developing requirements and determining the general appearance of the ship. A new version of the concept project, showing the main wishes and ways to fulfill them, was shown a few days ago.

Wishes and approaches

On January 11-13, the 34th National Symposium of the Surface Navy Association was held in the United States.
During this event, various issues of the further development of the surface forces of the US Navy were considered, incl. promising projects of ships and vessels. In particular, the head of this program, Captain David Hart, gave a report on the future destroyer DDG(X). The program manager noted that the promising destroyer is intended to replace existing and planned ships of the Arleigh Burke type. According to current plans, the latter will be built at least until the end of the twenties, and their operation will last until the sixties. However, at the beginning of the next decade, the Berks will begin to be supplemented with promising DDG (X) destroyers.

For all its advantages, the destroyer Arleigh Burke is not without its disadvantages. This ship, as a surface platform, has limited reserves of volume and carrying capacity for the installation of new equipment or weapons. In addition, there are restrictions on energy supply. All this makes it difficult to carry out new modernizations with obtaining all the desired capabilities and creating a significant reserve for the future.

Destroyer DDG(X) and its equipment

It is assumed that the DDG(X) will be an evolutionary development option for the existing Arleigh Burke ships. It will take into account all the shortcomings of its predecessors, and also use well-mastered ideas and the necessary number of new solutions. The revolutionary approach with the massive introduction of new ideas and components was wisely rejected, remembering the results of the failed Zumwalt project.

As part of this evolution, it is proposed to create a surface platform with the necessary characteristics and reserves for modernization. It will initially be equipped with existing and new components, assemblies and samples. In the future, as necessary and promising products become available, upgrades of various scales will be carried out.

Another proposal aimed at simplifying the project will be implemented as part of the development work. The maximum testing of components and assemblies is planned to be carried out on ground stands. Marine carriers will receive the most developed and ready-made equipment, which will no longer require complex and time-consuming development.

Work plan

The Navy expects to begin development of the DDG(X) preliminary design before the end of the current fiscal year.
Over the next few years, the final version of the project will be created, according to which the first ships of the series will be built. The contract for the lead destroyer is scheduled for FY2028. Soon after its signing the groundbreaking will take place. It will take several years to build, and in the early thirties it will become part of the Navy. Plans for the next ships in the series remain unknown. In addition, it is not specified when the modernization of destroyers will begin with the replacement of electronic and missile weapons, installation of lasers, etc. Perhaps these issues will only be resolved by the mid-thirties or later.

USS Daniel Inouye (DDG-118) is one of the last Arleigh Burke-class destroyers built.

The volumes of the planned series and the timing of its construction have not yet been announced. Perhaps the Navy does not yet have such plans and is still dealing with more pressing issues.

Surface platform

The report on DDG(X) outlined all the main features of the future ship.
Specific samples of equipment and capabilities proposed for use in the basic version of the project and in its further development are also named. In addition, a hypothetical image of a destroyer was shown. Externally, the concept is vaguely similar to modern American ships, although there are characteristic differences. A hull with an elongated, flared bow, a traditional stem and sides without open openings was used. It is planned to construct two superstructures. One will traditionally house the bridge and the necessary electronic equipment, and the other will house a hangar for a helicopter. A significant part of the systems and assemblies are planned to fit inside the housing.

The project has new requirements of the SWAP-C type (Size, Weight, Power, Cost), associated with the need to create a stock of characteristics for further upgrades. The ship must have compartments for mounting all necessary products and a reserve of 5% in area and 10% in weight. It is necessary to use an integrated energy system with a power reserve of 20% above the design load. The cooling system should immediately have a power reserve of 20% and the possibility of increasing it to 40%.

The DDG(X) project requires the ship's visibility to be reduced by two or more times compared to the current Burks. It is also necessary to improve performance characteristics and increase survivability. The design must take into account the issues of working at high latitudes.

Mk 41 universal launcher

It should be possible to change the body to obtain new capabilities. Thus, during a future modernization, a Destroyer Payload Module section with additional weapons may be added in the center of the hull.

Due to the new power plant and related systems, it is necessary to improve the driving characteristics. The Navy wants to increase cruising range by 50% or more (from Arleigh Burke's original 4,400 miles) and patrol duration in a given area by 120%. Fuel efficiency should increase by a quarter.

It is curious that a recent report indicates the desired advantages of the ship over existing models, but does not name a number of key characteristics. In particular, the dimensions and displacement, characteristics of the power plant, running parameters, etc. are unknown or not even determined.

Combat potential

The Navy wants to get a multi-purpose ship, similar in basic capabilities to the Arleigh Burke.
It must solve air and anti-submarine defense missions, as well as carry out strikes against various targets. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure an increase in all the main characteristics in comparison with today's ships. The main means of surveillance and detection is planned to be the multi-purpose radar AN/SPY-6(V)1 AMDR, the active phased arrays of which will be located on both superstructures. In the first version of the project, it is proposed to use AFAR with a height of 14 feet, and during modernization they will use 18-foot ones, with an increased number of receiving and transmitting elements. The next step will be the use of a new generation FPA type radar. The ship will also receive an AN/SPQ-9B surveillance and fire control radar, which will later be replaced by the promising FXR.

Launch of an SM-6 missile from a Mk 41 launcher on an Arleigh Burke class ship

The concept version of the DDG(X) carries two Mk 41 launchers of 16 cells each - one on the nose, the second between the superstructures. The number of missiles can be increased due to the DPM section with the Mk 41 installation. In addition, a new unified launcher for containers of larger diameter is expected to appear in the future. In place of the 16-missile Mk 41, it will be possible to place 12 cells of this type.

It is noteworthy that in terms of the number of cells in the launcher, the promising destroyer from the report is seriously inferior to the existing Arleigh Burke ships. At the same time, there is enough space in the hull and on the deck for additional installations. Perhaps the presentation did not reveal the full potential of the design even in its intended form. Accordingly, real ships will receive a larger number of launchers and in this regard will not be inferior to the current pennants.

The ship in its basic configuration will be able to use the entire range of missile weapons compatible with the Mk 41. These can be strike, anti-ship, anti-aircraft and other missiles. The future installation will remain compatible with these weapons, and will also be able to use future hypersonic or other missiles.

Near-field defense will initially be provided by two RIM-116 RAM anti-aircraft missile systems with 21 missiles each. In the future, they may be supplemented or replaced by promising combat lasers with a power of 600 kW. In addition, they want to introduce a 150-kilowatt laser.

Surface future

Recently published data on the DDG(X) destroyer project is of great interest. In this case, first of all, it is necessary to pay attention not to the expected increase in characteristics, proposed components, etc., but to the main approaches used in shaping the appearance of the ship.

Anti-aircraft missile system RIM-116 RAM

The US Navy has extensive experience building and operating Arleigh Burke destroyers. They also suffered a high-profile and expensive failure with the “revolutionary” Zumwalt project. Taking into account this experience, it was decided to use an evolutionary approach in the new DDG(X) program, eliminating overly complex and bold ideas and solutions.

At the same time, “modesty” in the early stages of the project does not exclude further development with the gradual introduction of more complex samples and ideas. However, the Navy intends to be cautious in such processes and will not rush if such acceleration threatens the project and/or shipbuilding program.

The proposed approach looks sound and, apparently, allows the US Navy to count on obtaining all the desired results - at least during the design and construction of the first version of the destroyer. A recent report shows that the DDG(X) could become a fairly successful modern ship with broad combat capabilities. And in the future it is possible to carry out the desired upgrades with understandable consequences.

Overall, the DDG(X) project in its current preliminary concept form gives the Pentagon some reasons for optimism and allows it to make realistic plans for the future. Whether such ships will be able to repeat all the successes of the existing Berks is a big question. However, we can assume that they will easily surpass the unsuccessful Zumwalt series and make a real contribution to the development of the fleet. However, the real results of the new project will appear only in 10-12 years, and until then all tasks will fall on the Arleigh Burke destroyers - with all their advantages and disadvantages.

By and large

And if we count the modern Russian Navy not according to NATO, but according to a more understandable and convenient traditional classification, then we will get a completely different picture than the one that the “New Russian” mentality, which is excessively oriented to the West, paints for us.

In my opinion, the “destroyer” class should be taken as a basis. Firstly, because he is truly Russian and Russian. And what we habitually call “destroyers,” meaning NATO fleets, are actually designated as “destroyer,” that is, “fighter.” Agree that there is no identity with our “destroyer”.

Of course, they may object to me that the concept of “destroyer” is now very outdated. Indeed, those times when the main equipment of destroyers was mine and torpedo armament have long since sunk into eternity.

However, this class of ships still remains a historical asset of the Russian fleet, and loyalty to naval traditions should be encouraged. And, secondly and most importantly, the destroyer, by its very nature - a universal middle-class warship, was and will be the basis of the Russian Navy. And to assign many other classifications to this most massive class of combat units, separating warships that are very similar in functionality and purpose with imported designations such as “frigate” and “corvette,” means creating unnecessary confusion.

Another thing is that in each ship class there may be some kind of “subclasses”, depending on the size of a particular serial destroyer and the set of its weapons.

These differences are not so significant as to be distinguished as a separate class, but are quite sufficient to preserve, already within the framework of the general “destroyer” class, time-tested and proven “specific” names. Such, for example, as a “large anti-submarine ship” or “patrol ship”. And at the same time, BOD and TFR must have some kind of international and at the same time our own conceptual equivalent for a better understanding of what we have. And this is exactly the “destroyer”.

© mil.ru

Project 22350 frigate “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov.”

Taking into account all the above adjustments and in order to get rid of inappropriate Western influence, the general classification of surface ships of the Russian Navy of the main combat classes may look like this:

Class: aircraft-carrying ships, subclasses: aircraft carrier, heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser;

Class: cruisers, subclasses: heavy nuclear missile cruiser, missile cruiser;

Class: destroyers, subclasses: long-sea zone destroyer, near-sea zone destroyer, large anti-submarine ship, patrol ship.

Thus, ships of the following subclasses and projects can be considered representatives of the “destroyer” class in the modern Russian Navy:

• large anti-submarine ships, project 1155 (“Admiral Panteleev”, “Admiral Vinogradov”, “Admiral Kharlamov”, “Admiral Levchenko”, “Admiral Tributs”, “Marshal Shaposhnikov”, “Severomorsk”, “Vice Admiral Kulakov”); project 11551 (“Admiral Chabanenko”);
• destroyers of the far sea zone, project 956 (“Admiral Ushakov”, “Bystry”, “Nastoichivy”); project 22350 (“Admiral Gorshkov”, “Admiral Kasatonov”, “Admiral Golovko”); project 1135 (“Ladny”); project 1135M (“Inquisitive”); project 11356 (“Admiral Grigorovich”, “Admiral Essen” and “Admiral Makarov”); project 01090 (“Sharp-witted”); project 11540 (“Fearless”, “Yaroslav the Wise”);
• near-sea zone destroyers/patrol ships/MRKs, project 20380 (“Steregushchiy”, “Soobrazitelny”, “Boikiy”, “Stoikiy”, “Sovershenny”, “Gromkiy”); project 20385 (“Thundering”); project 11661K (“Tatarstan”, “Dagestan”); project 22160 (“Vasily Bykov”, “Dmitry Rogachev”); project 21631 (“Grad Sviyazhsk”, “Uglich”, “Veliky Ustyug”, “Green Dol”, “Serpukhov”, “Vyshny Volochek”, “Orekhovo-Zuevo”, “Ingushetia”); project 22800 (Mytishchi, Sovetsk, Odintsovo and Kozelsk).

Instead of a heart - a fiery engine

Comparing the overall dimensions of the hulls of the American "Arleigh Burke" series 2A and the Soviet project 1155.1 "Admiral Chabanenko" of comparable displacement, we can come to the conclusion that the former is better seaworthy. While inferior in length to its Soviet counterpart, the American sits deeper in the water and is somewhat wider. When planning to build a ship for a truly distant sea zone, and even more so when planning to use it in an order with an aircraft carrier that is 8-10 times heavier, such a characteristic as seaworthiness cannot be neglected. Digitizing Soviet drawings and processing them using computer programs for a new project (let’s call it 1155.2) will not take much time and money. Just for the general idea, I will voice the main dimensions of the hull of the future Project 1155.2 destroyer proposed for construction:

— displacement, t (standard/full) – 7000/9000; - length, m (waterline/maximum) - 145/160; — width, m (at the waterline/maximum) — 17.8/19; — draft, m (hull/hydraulic) – 5.5/8.

Naturally, the new hull must be adapted to stealth technology and no portholes. In the front and rear parts of the hull it is necessary to provide proportionate side keels, in the central part - non-retractable active stabilizers. “And instead of a heart - a fiery engine” in the literal sense of the word (as it was a hundred years ago), the M90FR gas turbine engine was created and designed in Russia under the import substitution program. Yes, those long-awaited afterburning turbines that are installed on the Project 22350 frigates. The power plant of the Project 11552 destroyer will be created according to the COGAG scheme using gas turbine engines of the Rybinsk NPO Saturn 4*27,500 hp. With. with a total capacity of 110,000 hp. With. It will be even slightly more powerful than the Arleigh Burke with four LM2500 from General Electric of 25,000 hp each. With. each. But can this fact be attributed to the shortcomings of the future ship? But there is unification across the fleet, prospects for industrial growth and exports to China and India. With such energy, future ships will easily withstand the given pace of movement with the flagships of the KUG and AUG nuclear-powered "Orlans" and the newest nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. We can say with confidence that the maximum speed of 32 knots, cruising speed of 18 knots and economic speed of 15 knots will be confirmed during sea trials. For the first series of Russian destroyers, a cruising range of 5,000 nautical miles at 18 knots could be considered quite decent. Although there is an opinion that on long voyages it is almost necessary for a detachment of warships to be accompanied by a high-speed tanker or a universal supply vessel. And if we add an ocean tug and a hospital ship, then the result is a convoy or caravan, but not an attack mobile autonomous formation of ships in the form of a KUG or AUG. With all this burden, the ocean crossing can be forced to be carried out by an RTO or an MPC. But this is not what we expect from a universal destroyer. The declared autonomy of the ship must be unconditional.