“There is no need to stir up anything there” Radiation from the sunken nuclear submarine “Komsomolets” threatens people’s lives. Why aren't they in a hurry to raise it?

To sleep better

The nuclear submarine K-278 "Komsomolets" of project 685 "Plavnik" sank on April 7, 1989 at a depth of 1680 meters, 180 kilometers south of Bear Island in the Norwegian Sea. Of the 69 people on the submarine, 42 died. It is believed that the disaster was caused by a fire in the seventh (aft) compartment of the submarine, but the authorities have still not provided a clear and unambiguous explanation of the causes of the incident.

In addition to the tragedy, the K-278 Komsomolets is known for the fact that on August 4, 1985, it set a world record for diving of manned submarines (1027 meters). The nuclear submarine withstood a similar load due to its titanium hull, which now hides on the seabed a nuclear power unit (NPU) with a 190-megawatt OK-650B-3 reactor and two KS-122 missile torpedoes of the S-10 “Granat” complex with a three-kilogram plutonium warhead .

Case pipe

In early July, as part of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), the Komsomolets submarine was studied by the Ægir 6000 remote-controlled uninhabited underwater vehicle (ROV) of the GO Sars research vessel. The ROV conducted a visual examination of the submarine, and also took samples of water and bottom soil. The purpose of the expedition, organized by the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Agency and the Institute of Marine Research (Norway) with the participation of the Center for Environmental Radioactivity (Norway) and the Typhoon Research and Production Association (Russia), was to study the radiation situation near the sunken submarine.

Research vessel GO Sars

Photo: @Straalevernet

According to preliminary data released by experts, the highest specific volumetric activity of cesium-137, amounting to 800 becquerels per liter, was observed in a water sample taken directly from the ventilation pipe of the submarine's reactor compartment. This figure is 800 thousand times higher than the natural level of radiation in the Norwegian Sea, equal to 0.001 becquerel per liter. The radioactivity level of another sample taken from the same ventilation pipe, as previously reported by scientists, was 100 becquerels per liter.

The content of radionuclides in other samples turned out to be significantly lower. For example, sampling carried out at a height of several meters above a ventilation pipe did not demonstrate a significant excess of the permissible radiation level. Such results allowed experts to assume that the radiation leak is associated with a dust cloud in the area of ​​the ventilation hole, which is easily visible in the video from Ægir 6000, and the spread of the obtained specific volumetric activity values ​​is due to the transfer of water masses. This explanation actually assumes that if the current situation in the region continues, the radioactive K-278 Komsomolets located on the seabed does not pose a threat.

Catastrophe

The stem of the icebreaker-type vessel “Akademik Berg” hit the nuclear submarine K-56 at the joint between the first and second compartments. A stream of water immediately poured into the compartments. At that moment there were 20 people in the first compartment, more than thirty in the second. Immediately after the impact, both commanders and several other people jumped out of the second compartment into the third, after which came the command of the commander of the BC-5, captain of the second rank Leonid Pshenichny, to batten down the bulkhead.

From the testimony of the captain of the ship “Akademik Berg” Ivan Marchenko :

— On June 13, 1973, at 21:30, the NPS “Akademik Berg” of TURNIF weighed anchor in Nakhodka on a voyage and headed out of the Gulf of America. The submarine was not visible at sharp heading angles. Visually observing the running lights, we thought that a boat was coming, especially since a submarine and a boat can hardly be distinguished by their running lights. At 00 o'clock the 2nd assistant S. Kuksenko took over the watch. At the same time, visibility deteriorated to 1-1.5 miles. At 00:05, visibility had already deteriorated to 0.5 miles. I left the bridge and went first to the chart room and then to my cabin to change clothes. At this moment the collision occurred. The clock showed 01 o'clock. 00 minutes... I immediately jumped onto the bridge. The boat dragged our ship behind it, turning around. After this, I immediately took control of the ship. Here, in a fever, he almost hit the 2nd assistant. The fact is that when I left the bridge, in order to check the area for the presence of schools of fish, he independently changed course by 20 degrees and did not inform me about it. Soon after the collision, the boat disappeared from our field of vision, and we thought that it had sunk. Then they received a message about her whereabouts, and went to her...

***

Seeing the silhouette of a ship approaching from the fog, the first mate on the bridge hesitated. After the collision, water poured into the compartments. After the bulkhead of the second and third compartments was battened down by order of chief engineer Leonid Pshenichny, via intercom he ordered the reactor plant operators to block the automatic protection of the operating reactor, justifying this by the fact that only while the boat was moving could it fight for its survivability. A minute before his death, captain of the second rank Leonid Pshenichny accomplished a real feat, ensuring, even after his death, the success of the fight for the survivability of the entire ship.

In total, 25 sailors and two civilian specialists were cut off from the world in the second compartment. After sea water entered the battery pit, a hydrolysis reaction began and toxic chlorine began to be released. This predetermined the fate of the submariners - they died before the compartment was completely flooded. None of them even had time to use protective equipment. Later, when divers were removing the bodies of the dead from the compartment, captain of the second rank Leonid Pshenichny was found at the bulkhead leading to the third compartment, and the deputy division commander, senior officer on board the nuclear-powered ship, captain of the first rank Lenislav Suchkov, was found at the bulkhead leading to the first compartment. The Ship's Charter and the Guide to the fight for the survivability of a ship define a terrible, but the only saving rule: after an emergency alarm is declared, all personnel in the compartment, regardless of which combat post they are assigned to, begin to eliminate the accident, and the compartment itself, in to avoid the spread of fire or water throughout the ship, it is tightly sealed. The Ship's Charter directly states: “... no one has the right to leave the emergency compartment on their own.” God forbid anyone should experience this for themselves, but a sailor’s life is like this - he must always be ready to fight to the end for survivability. First of all, the ship, and only then - yourself. So they fought. But the nature of the accident was stronger than the people - the hole was too huge for the submariners to be able to stop the flow of sea water into the compartment on their own. Obviously, realizing the futility of trying to stop the water, the senior officers did what they had to do - until their death, they did not allow the distraught people of the dying second compartment to escape outside. After all, behind the bulkheads in other compartments of the boat there were more than two hundred people from the main and replacement crews, as well as civilian specialists.

In the book of the military sailor and historian Vladimir Mormul , who reconstructed the events of those days, this episode is described as follows:

“When the bodies of Suchkov and Pshenichny were subsequently raised, the officers’ faces were completely covered in bruises and bruises. They were beaten by their own comrades. But they were never able to open the door - the officers remained steadfast. And literally a minute later everything went quiet in the compartment - the chlorine had done its job...”

***

In the first compartment the situation developed no less dramatically. Water flowed into the hole, but not as much as in the second compartment. However, the compartment was flooding, and no one knew what was happening in other compartments of the boat - it was necessary to act immediately! The first to get his bearings was midshipman Vyacheslav Telichko , the foreman of the team of steering signalmen, or, more simply, the boatswain of the submarine. He led the fight for survivability in the first compartment. He later said:

“We tried to seal the hole with improvised means, we pushed mattresses and blankets there, but it didn’t help much. The flow of oncoming water rushing into the compartment negated all our efforts, knocking out the plaster. Realizing that with such an active flow of water we would not last long, I ordered the bilge man to try to start the pump. It started working, but more water entered the compartment than the pump pumped out: the boat was trimmed to the bow, diving under the water. Then the water began to reach the pump’s electric motor, and to prevent a short circuit and fire from occurring, we stopped pumping. Fortunately, we had contact with the central one, they asked us to give us high-pressure air in the compartment to create an air cushion and reduce the amount of incoming water, since the first bow group of cylinders with high-pressure air pressure was damaged during the impact and the air in it was released. If we had not been helped with air, our entire compartment would have perished. Meanwhile, the water level in the first compartment continued to rise. Moreover, it came with an admixture of chlorine from the second compartment. Our compartment “shared” a hole in the boat’s hull with him. We began to feel out of breath and had a headache. We contacted the central post and reported the situation. There was only one answer: “Be strong. We're going aground..." Meanwhile, people began to lose consciousness. Everyone understood that we had 30-40 minutes to live. But there was no panic or fuss. The guys were mostly silent. The water in the compartment had already risen above the waist, breathing was becoming more and more difficult every minute, and then sudden salvation came: they opened the bow hatch above us and ordered us to leave the compartment, which immediately began to quickly fill with water.

***

Having run to the central post, the commander of the boat, captain of the second rank Leonid Khomenko, assessed the situation: the first two compartments were flooding, and communication with the second was interrupted, and the appearance of chlorine was felt through the ventilation pipes. The instantaneous flooding of the first and second compartments reduced the reserve of buoyancy and longitudinal stability to almost zero, led to a number of short circuits in the main power network and triggered the emergency protection of the reactor. The boat could only be saved by its speed (as the dead mechanic warned about), the decisive actions of the commander and the dedication of the crew. The struggle for survivability began. After the reactor was automatically shut down, the electric motors could only operate from the batteries of the third compartment, and this battery was discharged beyond possible standards while they were heading to the shore - the crew no longer had any other options.


Academician Berg. Photo: From the archives of the Navy

The situation was complicated by the fact that, due to a number of short circuits, the ship’s power network could at any moment cause new emergencies - at any second a fire could break out in any compartment, and then it would be unknown how it would all end...

The navigator determined the route to the nearest sandbank, and only after the boat touched its nose to the shore at Cape Granitny was the crew able to catch their breath. Survived.

Six months later, the Guards nuclear submarine K-56 returned to service and served until 1992, after which it was withdrawn from the Pacific Fleet and laid up awaiting disposal.

There is no threat yet

The preliminary data obtained did not surprise scientists. Russia alone has conducted seven expeditions to the K-278 Komsomolets since the accident. The last Russian dive to the submarine took place in March 2007. At the same time, a radiation leak was confirmed in the area of ​​one of the ventilation pipes of the reactor compartment, previously recorded in Russian and Norwegian expeditions.

Since the K-278 Komsomolets is located at a depth of 1680 meters, where there are practically no currents and very few marine animals, scientists consider the likelihood of radioactive substances entering the human food chain to be very low. However, current regulations in Norway (changed after the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, Chernobyl, in April 1986) set the maximum specific volume activity in food at 600 becquerels per kilogram, which is still lower than the observed maximum level of radiation from nuclear submarines.

“The pollution is thinning out extremely quickly, as can be seen in the water we sampled. No contamination was detected in all samples taken not near the ventilation pipe,” Hilde Elise Heldal, head of the expedition to K-278 Komsomolets, told The Barents Observer. The specialist emphasized the importance of regular monitoring of the radiation situation around the submarine, since the Norwegian and Barents Seas are one of the main sources of fish in Europe and are of great economic importance for Norway and Russia.

Face brick

The reaction of some Russian commentators to the Norwegian expedition traditionally turned out to be peculiar. “If you look carefully at the photographs published by the Norwegians, we clearly see how the device’s probe penetrates inside the boat, but this is unacceptable! The body plays the role of a sarcophagus, as in Chernobyl. But the Norwegians, it turns out, got inside and are now still surprised that the radiation level has increased a thousandfold,” Alexey Leonkov, editor of the Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine, told Moskovsky Komsomolets.

The former commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, who led the operation to rescue the K-141 Kursk nuclear submarine, which sank on August 12, 2000 with 118 crew members in the Barents Sea, 175 kilometers from Severomorsk at a depth of 108 meters, also noted. “It cannot be that, without any apparent reason, the background in the reactor area suddenly increased and exceeded the norm by a hundred thousand times,” the military man told Moskovsky Komsomolets. In his opinion, “the ocean itself is a good defense” and “there is no need to stir or stir anything up there so that no complications arise.” In fairness, it should be noted that Popov, who today sits in the Murmansk Regional Duma, at one time kept silent about the 23 submariners who survived the explosion of the 65-76A (“Kit”) torpedo in the ninth compartment of the K-141 “Kursk”.

Unlike military commentators, Russian scientists turned out to be more restrained. “The information about exceeding the norm by a hundred thousand times seems strange to us. The level there, as I saw [from media reports] is 800 becquerels. Usually there are 2-4 becquerels in sea water. It's definitely not for food. It is important to wait for the radionuclide analysis,” Vladimir Bulgakov, deputy general director of Typhoon, told TASS. According to him, the last expedition to the K-278 Komsomolets was exclusively Norwegian, and on the Russian side only one expert took part in it, who observed the working methods of their Scandinavian colleagues.

Doctor of Biological Sciences, leading researcher at the International Laboratory for the Study of Climate, Land Use and Biodiversity of Tyumen State University (TSU), Alexander Khaustov, in a conversation with Interfax, recalled the delayed effect of the accumulation of small doses of radiation. “Small doses bring long-term effects. That is, we do not know what the consequences are - they may appear in 15-20 years. As now in Chernobyl, calves are born with two heads - these are all long-term consequences,” the scientist noted.

K-27 - atomic time bomb

Home / Publications / Literature / Bookshelf / K-27 - a delayed-action atomic bomb

08/30/10 Text: ruspodlodka.narod.ru, Vyacheslav Mazurenko, former crew member of the nuclear submarine K-27 Photo: K-27. korabli.ukoz.ru

Today it is difficult to find a person who would not know about the great tragedy that happened in April 1986 at the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl. But how widely does our public know about nuclear accidents that occurred long before Chernobyl? I think no. We are talking about nuclear disasters on Soviet first generation nuclear submarines. Dozens of sailors died, hundreds received large doses of radiation and became disabled, but it was not customary to report this. Everything was hidden under the heading “top secret”. And first of all - your incompetence, laxity, fear of punishment. Officials from the highest echelons of power covered up their crimes, and punished, as always, the “switchman”.

I want to talk about one of the nuclear accidents, as well as about a unique submarine of that time.

Even today, decades later, complete data on the K-27 nuclear submarine project is difficult to obtain in the archive.

Work on it in the 50s of the last century was carried out under the cover of the deepest secrecy.

What kind of ship was this?

For the first time in the world, a reactor with liquid metal was installed on the nuclear submarine K-27 (645pr). So the ship’s crew had to test it. New, as they say, is always unknown. The use of liquid metal coolant (LMC) in the reactor provided a number of advantages over water-water coolants. In particular, if pressurized water reactors required a pressure of 150-200 atmospheres in the primary circuit to fully remove heat from the core, then only 12 atmospheres were enough for the reactors that were installed on the K-27. This created the reliability of systems and mechanisms. After all, not every pipe can withstand 200 atm! There were other advantages of the K-27 over nuclear submarines on which pressurized water reactors were installed. Nuclear-powered ships are designed to conduct combat operations in case of war. So, the K-27 nuclear submarine needed 15-20 minutes to move away from the pier and disappear under water, while a nuclear submarine with pressurized water reactors would need 2-3 hours for this! With modern means of observation from the enemy, this is quite enough to destroy the parking lot of a nuclear-powered submarine.

The design feature of the nuclear submarine allowed it to float from a depth of up to 100 meters when any of the compartments was flooded. The reactors on the nuclear-powered ship were placed closer to the bow. This improved the boat's performance, but at the same time worsened the radiation situation in the central compartment, where the ship's command was located.

The submarine K-27 had 9 compartments. Torpedo, battery and residential, central, reactor, turbogenerator (where the author had the honor of keeping watch), turbine, electric motor and residential (there were also refrigerators), residential (steering gears were located in it).

On the nuclear boat, the light hull was made of low-magnetic steel. This was also first used on the K-27.

On April 1, 1963, the nuclear boat was launched and accepted into the USSR Navy in October of this year. During factory testing, the boat traveled about 6,000 miles, more than 600 hours under water. Not only the reactor, but also all components and mechanisms were tested.

At first everything went fine. As we are used to doing - faster, faster and reporting on the successful completion of assigned tasks. But... the first call that a liquid-cooled nuclear reactor has its technical shortcomings was made back in 1959 at a stand at the submariner training center in Obninsk. Then, in the pipeline through which the liquid metal was running, the tightness was broken and microcracks formed. Upon contact with the external environment, the metal began to oxidize, resulting in slagging of the system.

The sailors, and these were the first members of the K-27 crew who arrived here for training, had no choice but to manually dismantle the mechanisms, and each of them received a huge dose of radiation. Some of the sailors were placed in a hospital, then quietly decommissioned as civilians. None of them received any documents. They signed a 25-year agreement not to disclose what happened to them. So they passed away silently, not knowing why.

The crew in Obninsk had to experience for themselves twice what radiation exposure is. And yet, the nuclear boat was built and delivered to the Navy. But instead of three planned nuclear boats of this project (645), they built one - K-27. The boat also had other serious shortcomings, which threatened or could threaten not only with irradiation of the entire crew, but even with the death of the ship. This is the use of a light hull made of low-magnetic steel on a boat. Voyages to the Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea showed that this steel had low strength and was subject to corrosion, which led to cracks in the hull of the nuclear submarine. The K-27 was characterized by too much noise, much higher than in American and many other Soviet boats. And yet, the reactor that was installed on the nuclear submarine caused the most problems for the crew and scientists. The debate about whether to build nuclear-powered ships with a liquid liquid nuclear reactor and whether to give them priority became acute after the crew under the command of Ivan Ivanovich Gulyaev made a test trip to the Atlantic (1964) for 52 days. No surfacing! This was a world record at that time. On the one hand, there was talk about the very high cost of building the ship, its maintenance, the complexity and danger of operation by the crew. Secondly, some advantages of a boat with a liquid metal reactor. I have already written that the accidents that happened at the nuclear reactor during the campaigns and during its construction were not taken into account. Although at the same time, dozens and dozens of submariners from among the sailors, foremen and officers lost their health. The nuclear accident on May 24, 1968 put an end to this dispute. And yet! To completely close this project, the USSR will subsequently create seven more nuclear boats with a liquid liquid metal reactor! These were truly unique boats! During the war they would have no value. But they too suffered a sad fate: all of them are today withdrawn from the Russian fleet and are awaiting disposal. The sad experience of the K-27 nuclear submarine, unfortunately, did not teach anything to those who did not take into account the material costs of building these ships, nor the death of the sailors from the K-27 nuclear submarine, nor the hundreds of irradiated people who were thrown into civilian life, taking a receipt to remain silent and die in silence.

I would like to note that the Americans also worked in this direction. On one of the SeaWulf submarines they also installed a reactor with a liquid metal coolant, unlike ours, they used sodium, while we used lead and bismuth. The test was difficult for them. There was a fire. After a thorough investigation, the Americans decided to abandon this project. For the sake of the safety of the submariners themselves and the high cost.

In the Soviet Union, no one counted people's money; here they decided to continue working on the use of a nuclear reactor with liquid metal coolant on nuclear boats and the construction of other boats, in particular, the new type 705 project. Nobody paid attention to the frequent accidents of the reactor installed on the K-27, or rather, they were considered not too serious and dangerous for submariners. The authorities were of little interest to life and health! For the System, a person has always been a cog that can be changed at the least cost to the System itself.

During the 5 years of its stay in the Navy, the nuclear submarine K-27 made two combat cruises. The first, a test in the South Atlantic, lasted over 52 days. There again a serious accident occurred at the reactor, and only thanks to the special hold personnel and personally to the captain of the 3rd rank A.V. Shpakov, the crew did not receive large doses of radiation. No one talked about radioactive decays, and no one paid attention to them. The K-27 made its second voyage in 1965 to the Mediterranean Sea. This campaign lasted 60 days. And again there was an accident in the reactor compartment. And again the special bilge sailors (those who served the rector) had to eliminate it. Grisha Rain, Vasya Osyukov, young senior leader Vlad Dombrovsky, who was the commander of the reactor compartment on this campaign. And the guys lost their award only because V. Dombrovsky wore a beard! To the comments of the senior campaign Mikhailovsky A.P. to shave off his beard, because only idiots wear it, the commander of the reactor compartment answered the future full admiral: what then to do with Vladimir Lenin? From such an answer, the elder was speechless, and the only thing he could answer was to get out of his sight and not come across him again until the end of the campaign!

But, as people say, no matter how much the rope twists, it will still end. This happened with our ship.

After two trips, the nuclear boat was repaired in Severodvinsk. At the beginning of 1967, the reactor core was replaced on it. As they say, flammable. In the summer - again factory, deep-sea tests. Today, in a number of memoirs, some admirals write that the unique operation of loading nuclear fuel onto the K-27 nuclear submarine went perfectly. Maybe it was ideal, but as a result of this, the water area of ​​the pier where we stood, and the boat itself from the first to the ninth compartment, was contaminated with radioactive dirt, from which we were never cleared until the end of our service.

In September 1967, the crew, loaded with provisions, was ready for their third combat campaign. This time the task was to scuba dive around the globe without surfacing.

It was necessary to test the reactor in different latitudes of the World Ocean at different temperatures and collect intelligence information about the enemy and his bases.

Having arrived at its permanent base in Gremikha, the ship went to sea again a couple of days later. It was necessary to submit tasks, conduct torpedo firing, return to the base for a few days - and go on a campaign. On October 13, 1967, when the boat was once again at sea, a nuclear reactor accident occurred. Lead leaked from the circuit. The boat returned to base. The special crews began cleaning up the radioactive alloy. It was necessary to find the cause of the accident. All this primarily fell on the shoulders of the reactor compartment crew (the reactor was in the 4th compartment), the special hold crews of the 1st and 2nd crews. The commanders of the compartment at that time were engineers lieutenant commander Gennady Aleksandrovich Agafonov (now captain of the 2nd rank) and Dombrovsky Vladislav Vladimirovich (now captain of the 3rd rank). Submariners know how cramped the compartments are, how difficult it can be to get to one or another unit in order to fix problems. The lead had to be hollowed out manually using a special hold, with a chisel and hammer in hand. Not only was it radioactive, but to this we must add the even higher temperature that was in the compartment in the area of ​​the lead spill. It was just HELL!

The boys had no protection from radioactive exposure. Just installed - work no more than 5 minutes!

The commander of the ship is Leonov P.F. and commander of BC-5 Ivanov A.A. They understood that the special hold team, even if they completed their task, would be practically lost to the crew. Her doctors are forced to prevent her from serving on the boat in the future due to her receiving a radioactive dose that exceeds the one that was prescribed for us for the year.

And this means a breakdown in combat service! Of course, no one could allow this. The system in which we lived and served was tough. The life and health of submariners were secondary for the System! Sometimes, under the lofty words and slogans about defending the socialist state, the ambitions of politicians and high-ranking military officials were hidden.

Then commander Leonov P.F. built a crew and turned to him with a request to help with the special hold. He announced that this is a voluntary matter. All the sailors then standing in the ranks (about 100 people) took a step forward!

The metal was removed, but there were some losses. Doctors forbade special hold sergeants Litvinenko Felix and Rashchupkin Valentin from going to sea, and therefore from the upcoming military campaign.

I don’t think that the other guys from this team had less x-rays - Vitya Gritsenko, Kolya Lagunov, Sasha Petrov, Valya Kulikov, Zhenya Durdenko, the same compartment commanders - Gennady Agafonov and Vlad Dombrovsky. They remained on the team, but a little time will pass, and these guys will have to be the first to bear the brunt of the nuclear accident that will happen at the reactor on May 24, 1968 in the Barents Sea.

They, like the rest of my colleagues, did everything to prevent the world Chernobyl from happening again (it was still 18 years away). But, perhaps, the body of the special room guys was already weakened when they hammered radioactive lead into the compartment for several days in October 1967.

On May 21, 1968, despite warnings from submariners, in particular special hold ones and a number of officers (and who else but them should know about this) that the reactor was not ready to go to sea, the division command ordered the ship commander to go to sea. And what had to happen happened. On May 24, 1968, at 11:35 a.m., a nuclear accident occurred on the nuclear-powered icebreaker K-27. The accident, as a result of which 144 crew members were irradiated, subsequently five sailors, four of them special hold ones (Viktor Gritsenko, Alexander Petrov, Vadim Kulikov, Nikolai Voevoda), will die in terrible agony in the hospital. In the area of ​​the reactor compartment, Ivan Ponomarenko will die a day after the nuclear accident. Having received over 1700 x-rays, Nikolai Logunov will survive. More than half of the crew died during these 36 years. Their average age was no more than 50 years! Dozens became disabled. Many still do not have any social benefits from the state. They simply try not to notice and forget. But the nuclear-powered icebreaker K-27 was not only a prototype for the navy and science. This ship gave the country it served and defended FOUR Heroes of the Soviet Union, seven admirals and dozens of doctors and candidates of science. But this is true, by the way. To this we should probably add dozens of academicians, professors and candidates of medical sciences - titles that they received during our treatment in hospitals. Not only on us, but also on the nuclear accidents of the nuclear submarines K-19, K-8. But for some reason, all this experience was not used by them during the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant!

The further fate of the nuclear submarine K-27 is as unhappy as the fate of its crew.

After the accident, she stood at the pier for another 13 years, initially in Gremikha, then in Severodvinsk. At first, as always happens with us, no one knew what to do with her. But it was a combat nuclear submarine, there were reactors with an active zone. This means that it was necessary to ensure its survivability. To do this, a coastal support vessel was moored to her, which for 13 years supplied the nuclear-powered ship with steam from its boilers, heating her life support systems. And this is all thanks to the submarine sailors, in particular, officers G.A. Agafonov, V.F. Tkachenko, V. Timonin, midshipmen F. Litvinenko, I. Naboka and many others, who, without sparing their health after May 1968, eliminated nuclear accident on the ship, measures were taken to ensure that radioactivity did not spread outside the boat. In January-February 1973, they, together with scientists, conducted an experiment to launch an intact starboard reactor. During this, they managed to bring the reactor to 20% of its nominal power.

Some hotheads from the military command, delighted by this, wanted to attempt to go to sea (they couldn’t go out while sitting in their office) K-27. But then, nevertheless, reason and the explanation of the ship’s officers did not allow this to be done.

In August 1981, a team of 10 people consisting of acting. the commander of the boat, captain 2nd rank Ivanov Alexey Anatolyevich (I would like to note that this officer came to the boat when it was being built in 1958), the boatswain, midshipman Gennady Aleksandrovich Petukhov, midshipman Ovtin, Filshin V., Kavun I. and the rest of the sailors (let forgive me for not being able to give their last names) began to tow the boat into the Kara Sea to Stepovaya Island. There, on the third of September, it was sunk at a depth of 33 meters in violation of IAEA requirements (and who took these requirements into account then)! Instead of the required 3000-4000 - thousand meters!

Even then, my ship, which had been given several years of service, did not want to go to the bottom. The initial attempt to scuttle it was unsuccessful.

The half-submerged submarine stood upright, turning into a giant float. After all, the length of the ship was 109 meters, and the depth was 33 meters! After many hours of trying, the boat slowly, as if in reproach to those who sank it, went to its eternal rest.

The last to leave the boat was Captain 2nd Rank Alexey Anatolyevich Ivanov, who had given her over 23 years! He went from a young lieutenant to the commander of a warhead-5, two combat campaigns. He didn’t leave her after the accident either. After treatment in the hospital, he returned to serve on the ship. Or he could, like others, leave and continue serving in a “warmer” place. According to the recollections of eyewitnesses who were present during the flooding, her acting. The commander cried as she slowly faded into oblivion. And one can understand him... these were the tears of a real submarine officer who loved the fleet and the ship to which he gave all his youth, all his best years and health! And to whom I said goodbye forever! Well, the nuclear submarine K-27 continues to lie on the bottom for more than 24 years, and no one can say what will happen next to it, with the reactors, with hundreds of containers loaded with nuclear waste. How will they behave when sea water approaches them?

Flowers and berries

In the future, the nuclear reactor and K-278 Komsomolets torpedoes promise to cause a lot of trouble. A visual examination of the sunken submarine showed serious damage to the front part of the hull—nuclear torpedoes are located there. Possible solutions to the problem could be raising the submarine or reliably isolating radiation sources from the external environment.

The head of the international public organization Bellona Foundation, Norwegian ecologist Frederik Hauge, reminded The Barents Observer that back in the 1990s, the Komsomolets Foundation, organized by the St. Petersburg central design bureau of marine technology "Rubin" (developer of Russian nuclear submarines) and the Dutch companies Mammoet and Smit International (with with their participation, the K-141 “Kursk” was lifted), and the K-278 “Komsomolets” was considered difficult to accomplish. “At that time we came to the conclusion that it was technically impossible to raise the submarine. Cables about 1,700 meters long will be too heavy,” the scientist said.

Hauge agreed with Elise Heldal that radiation contamination from the K-278 Komsomolets would have virtually no effect on the human food chain. Meanwhile, the ecologist drew attention to a much more serious and current threat posed by another Russian nuclear submarine - located at a depth of 248 meters in the Barents Sea north of the Kola Bay in the fishing grounds of the K-159 submarine of Project 627A “Whale”. On August 30, 2003, a rusted Soviet submarine allegedly sank due to a storm while being towed from a sump in the closed city of Ostrovnoy (Murmansk region) for planned disposal in the city of military glory Polyarny. Nine people died as a result of the incident.

Nuclear submarine K-159 before towing for scheduled decommissioning

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It is curious that Western countries allocated about $200 million to Russia for the dismantling of the K-159 and other 15 nuclear submarines from the sump. According to the head of the K-159 towing operation, captain of the second rank Sergei Zhemchuzhnov, who was later accused of the incident with the nuclear submarine (in 2005, the criminal case against the military man was dropped due to lack of evidence), foreign “money had to be used as quickly as possible by reporting to Moscow on cleaning the Northern Fleet bases."

In an interview with Kommersant, the military man said that the two-hundred-ton SSP-200 pontoons, with the help of which the submarine stayed afloat, were manufactured in the 1940s, were intended for lifting ships, not towing, and were attached to a rusty “hull, the strength of which is in some places it was comparable to the strength of ordinary foil.” “A structure made from such parts can hardly be considered reliable. But since I am not a navigator by training, in this case I relied on the opinion of the specialists who prepared the project and monitored the preparation of the nuclear submarine for the transition,” Zhemchuzhnov argued.

K-159, as noted in the presentation of the Kurchatov Institute, poses a serious current danger to the radiation situation in the Barents Sea. The reason for this lies, in addition to the relatively shallow location of the submarine and the unsatisfactory condition of its hull, in the structure of the nuclear submarine itself, where there are virtually no reliable protective barriers between spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and the marine environment.

1958 March 2 Enlisted in the lists of Navy ships;

1958 The main crew was formed. The crew was trained and became part of the 150th DnOPL of the 339th BrSRPL BelVFl;

1958 June 15 Laid down in the workshop of Shipyard No. 402 in Severodvinsk as a CRPL;

1961 The 246th reserve crew was formed;

1962 April 1 Launched (taken out of dock). It was part of the 339th BrSRPL BelVFl of the Northern Fleet;

1962 May 8 - June 10 Mooring tests;

1963 January 10 - February 22 Complex mooring tests of the power plant were carried out under the leadership of the energy section of the Government Commission;

1963 June 22 - 26 Factory tests;

1963 June 29 - October 30 State tests;

1963 On October 30, the State Commission signed an act on the completion of state tests. Came into operation. Beginning of trial operation. It was part of the 14th BrPL of the Yokanga naval base of the Northern Fleet, based at Gremikha Bay;

1964 April 21 - June 12 Made the 1st autonomous cruise to the BS (commander - Capt. 1st Gulyaev I.I., senior - V.A.L Kholostyakov G.N.) lasting 52 days in the Central Atlantic region. The nuclear submarine went on a 40-day autonomous voyage, during which the crew, including the leader of the voyage, Vice Admiral G.N. Kholostyakov, who were on board. and representatives of naval departments, appealed to the command to extend the voyage period to 50 days. Having reached the territory of equatorial waters on May 17, 1964, the crew of the nuclear submarine conducted 2-week intense tests of the ship's equipment, and in particular the nuclear reactor at medium and full speed, which were successful. For the first time in the history of the Russian submarine fleet, records were set for continuous diving at distances of 1000 miles, 5000 miles, 10,000 miles and beyond! On June 12, 1964, she carried out excellent torpedo firing, setting a diving record - over 50 days without surfacing. During 1240 running hours, the submarine covered 12,425 miles (12,278 miles under water). For the successful completion of tasks in the first autonomous cruise, the commander of the submarine Gulyaev I.I. awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union;

1965 June Completed the tasks of the combat training course (commander - cap. 2nd r. Leonov P.F., senior - NSh 11th DiPL cap. 1st r. Mikhailovsky A.P.) and transferred to Zapadnaya Litsa;

1965 July 16 - September 13 Made the 2nd autonomous campaign to the BS (commander - cap. 2nd r. Leonov P.F., senior - NSh 11th DiPL cap. 1st r. Mikhailovsky A.P.) lasting 60 days in the Mediterranean sea. Returned to Zapadnaya Litsa. The hike covered approximately 15,000 miles. Two days after returning from the campaign, the nuclear submarine moved to its permanent base - Gremikha;

1965 September 7 Became part of the Red Banner Northern Fleet, included in the 14th BrPL (from 04.1966 - 17th DiPL) of the Yokang naval base of the KSF, based at Gremikha Bay. Classified as a subclass of experimental CRPL;

1965 October (presumably) Moved to Severodvinsk to the Sevmashpredpriyatie PA to carry out inter-trip repairs and recharge of reactors;

1967 January - February Reactors were recharged;

1967 October Moved from Severodvinsk to Gremikha;

1967 October 13 While at sea, an alloy was thrown into the gas system of the 1st circuit of the starboard reactor. Its cause was slag deposits (oxides of the lead-bismuth alloy), which blocked the passage for the coolant, which began to flow into the gas system. As a result of this accident, two pumps were filled with frozen alloy. We had to disable the starboard PPU, interrupt the trip and return back to base. The reasons for this leak remained unknown, as well as who exactly was to blame;

1968 May 21 Went to sea to practice combat training tasks and test nuclear power plants (commander - Capt. 1st Rank Leonov P.F.). There were 147 people on board. Almost entirely the first crew, and a significant part of the sailors from the second crew, this is 39 people. The entire team of special hold crews, KGDU officers and control officers, as well as other specialists. The command of the second crew also went to sea, commander Novitsky G., first mate Tomko E., assistant commander of the ship Salnikov L.;

1968 May 24 While checking the parameters of the power plant at full speed in a submerged position, the AR-1 automatic control rod spontaneously reached the upper limit switch, and the power of the LB reactor began to decrease rapidly in 60-90 seconds. fell from 83 to 7%. The accident was accompanied by a sharp increase in gamma activity in the reactor compartment (up to 150 r/h and above), the release of radioactive gas from the gas system into the reactor compartment with its subsequent spread to other compartments. All crew members (124 people) were overexposed. The KrPL surfaced and the transition from the test site to the base was carried out while the PB reactor was operating. The submarine was placed at the pier in Gremikha Bay. The SKR "Bars" (project 50) was moored to the submarine, through the TCP of which a steam pipeline was transferred to the submarine. At the SKR, the Aquarius supplied high-frequency air from the coastal station; the main boilers of the SKR supplied high-frequency air to the boat circuit so that the metal coolant did not cool down. In total, during the accident and immediately after it, 4 submariners died in the hospital (Petrov A., Gritsenko V., Voevoda V. and Kulikov V.). Ponomarenko I. later died while keeping watch on the ship. For the period 1968-2003. over thirty sailors who took part in the liquidation of the accident passed away;

1968 June 20 The necessary operations to cool the PUF and freeze the alloy were completed. All submarine mechanisms were taken out of action and mothballed;

1969 - 1970 The 246th crew was reorganized into the 426th crew. Confusion is possible and the crew could originally have been 426;

1968 - 1973 She was laid up in Gremikha Bay. Until 1973, various experimental work was carried out at KrPL. The possibility of using a nuclear submarine with one restored reactor on the starboard side, the option of cutting out the emergency compartment and replacing the liquid metal PPU with water-cooled units of the VM-A type were studied;

1974 By this time it was based in Severodvinsk. Presumably part of the 299th ODnPL BelVMB;

1979 February 1 Expelled from the Navy;

1980 October 1 Crew disbanded;

1981 May Docked at the Zvezdochka Shipyard (Severodvinsk). The cavities of the PPU equipment and its pipelines were filled with a special composition, which, after hardening, prevented the washing out and release of radioactive materials from the reactor. The free volumes of the compartment and the water-lead protection tank were filled with bitumen. In total, about 270 tons of bitumen were poured into the compartment, which completely closed the reactors. This achieved complete exclusion of water from reaching contaminated equipment and subsequent contamination of the environment in the area where the nuclear submarine was sunk. The mothballing of the reactor compartment made it possible to bring the levels of penetrating radiation on the surface of the light body to background values;

1982 September Towed to a specially designated landfill (72 degrees 31'N 55 degrees 30'E) of the Kara Sea off the north-eastern coast of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago in Stepovoy Bay and sunk at a depth of 33 m;

2011 Information appeared in the media that the lifting and dismantling of the K-27 is planned for 2014. The head of the North-West Center for Radioactive Waste Management (SevRAO) Valery Panteleev spoke about this in an interview with RIA Novosti;

2011 An interdepartmental seminar “Review of scientific and technical problems and the search for their solutions during the recovery and further handling of the K-27 nuclear submarine” was held. A plan of further actions for the period 2015-2020 has been determined;

2015 Presentation “Problems of ensuring environmental safety of Arctic waters, islands and coastal areas” was held. The further action plan for the period 2016-2022 has been adjusted;

2015 Development of technical projects USP project 23570 and GPU-6000/300 and a preliminary design of load-handling devices for lifting the nuclear submarine K-27 . By 2016, it was planned to identify a builder plant, develop a design documentation for the USP in the scope of “ship in construction”, lay down the USP of project 23570 in the 4th quarter of 2016, carry out the KIRO nuclear submarine K-27 ; by 2017 - preparation for the lifting of the K-27 , construction of USP project 23570; by 2022 - testing and delivery of project 23570 USP, lifting of the K-27 ; by 2022 - transfer of the nuclear submarine K-27 to the Gremikha branch of OJSC SevRAO; by 2022 - unloading of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and dismantling of nuclear submarines. However, the plans were never implemented;

2020 August 3 The Rosatom State Corporation expects to raise six of the most radiation-hazardous objects from the bottom of the waters of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation in eight years - sunken parts of an icebreaker, nuclear submarines K-27 and K-159 , reactors with spent nuclear fuel;

2021 March The Rosatom State Corporation announced a tender, which refers to work on preparation for disassembly and the actual disassembly of spent removable parts (SRF) of a decommissioned nuclear submarine (NPS) of Project 645 (“product 64”) in Gremikha, Murmansk region. Also, cassettes with irradiated VHF fuel assemblies will be prepared for transportation for reprocessing and containers with spent nuclear fuel will be delivered to the storage site of the federal state unitary enterprise of the nuclear fleet. The starting price of the tender is about 500 million rubles. Anatoly Grigoriev, head of international technical assistance projects at the Rosatom State Corporation, explained that we are talking about the removable parts of the K-27 , which were reloaded in 1967. After unloading, the cores were placed for storage at Gremikha. Various options, technologies and methods for creating a vessel for lifting flooded and sunken objects are currently being studied. Subsea research, design and construction of the recovery vessel is expected to continue until the end of 2026. The lifting of the K-27 , along with design and dismantlement, will take four years, approximately from 2028 to 2031.

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