National Interest: The Russian T-80 has become one of the worst tanks in the world

Operation and combat use of the T-80

T-80 tanks began to enter service with the troops in the late 70s, primarily in the western military districts and foreign groups of forces. The intense thermal resource of the gas turbine made it difficult to use these tanks in hot areas, so they were not sent to the southern military districts.

The military liked the car. During the strategic headquarters game according to the “great war” scenario, new tanks reached the Atlantic by the morning of the fifth day of the offensive (the T-80 headquarters received the nickname “Channel tanks” for this). The T-80 has demonstrated its dynamic qualities more than once. Particularly famous was the incident during one of the exercises of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, when the “eighties” performing a flanking maneuver took to the highway near Berlin and rushed along it, overtaking tourist buses. The excellent starting qualities of the gas turbine engine, which was not afraid of any frost, also caused approval in the units. In addition, the gas turbine engine provided the power reserves and weight savings required to enhance protection against the increasingly sophisticated anti-tank weapons appearing on the battlefield.

Last parade! T-80UD on the streets of Moscow, November 7, 1990

The public first had the opportunity to get acquainted with the “eighties” during military parades in Moscow on May 9 and November 7, 1990. Moreover, these were vehicles of the most modern modification - T-80UD. These same tanks reappeared on the streets of Moscow during the August 1991 coup.

The “eighties” were not exported and did not take part in hostilities as part of the Soviet Army.

According to data declared by the Soviet side at the Vienna negotiations on the limitation of conventional weapons in Europe in 1990, there were 4,839 T-80 tanks of all modifications on the European territory of the USSR, as well as in units stationed in Eastern Europe.

The first fact of combat use of the “eighty-tok” took place during the October events in Moscow in 1993. On the morning of October 4, 1993, six T-80UD tanks of the 12th Guards Tank Regiment of the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division moved to the Kalinin Bridge opposite the White House, the building of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation. At about 12 noon the tanks opened fire. 12 shells of 125 mm caliber were fired: 2 armor-piercing sub-caliber (it is not clear why?) and 10 high-explosive fragmentation. After the shelling, the tanks moved to the T. Shevchenko embankment, where they remained until the end of the day.

T-80B and T-80BV tanks were used by the Russian Army during the military operation in Chechnya in 1995-1996. First of all, it should be noted that, like almost all other armored vehicles, they were used inadequately to the situation. In this regard, Operation Desert Storm can serve as a model. Then a list of types of weapons and military equipment appropriate to the situation was selected in advance. At the same time, the emphasis was placed on the widespread use of electronic warfare, the use of high-precision weapons, air strikes, etc. It should be noted that the Iraqis had perhaps even more fanaticism than the Chechens. If the Multinational Force had resorted to the massive use of armored vehicles without adequate preparation, the outcome of the entire operation might have been different.

54.55. Tanks on the streets of Moscow, August 19-21, 1991. 56.Tank T-80UD on Kutuzovsky Prospekt. Moscow, October 3, 1993.

58. T-80UD on the Kalininsky Bridge. Moscow, October 4, 1993. 59. Moscow, October 4, 1993, 12 stitches. The picture is shocking - shooting tanks and the public idly wandering around! At first they planned an assault, then public festivities, and then they decided to combine them.

It is from this position that the use of armored vehicles in Chechnya should be considered. It is quite obvious that the tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers in service with the Russian Army and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (as, indeed, in service with any other army in the world) are not intended for combat operations in the city and in the mountains. Their use for this purpose requires both special equipment and special training of personnel. At the same time, it can be argued that the overwhelming majority of equipment and personnel involved in Chechnya were not prepared to conduct any kind of combat operations at all.

Thus, most of the tanks were not equipped with dynamic protection. As military experts stated, this was mainly due to lack of time to prepare the operation and lack of funds! On many tanks, the KDZ units were installed in a non-combat-ready state, that is, they were not loaded with explosives. And this is in conditions when the Chechens used mainly cumulative anti-tank ammunition (rocket-propelled grenades and ATGMs). At the same time, the shooting was carried out almost point-blank and from the most advantageous angles. The most vulnerable parts of the tanks were the sides, rear, MTO roof and rear part of the turret. In addition, numerous damage to the sides of combat vehicles were recorded when firing from the bottom up. All this suggests that the fire was fired simultaneously from the basement, from ground level and from the first floors of buildings, as well as from the upper floors. The density of fire from anti-tank weapons during street fighting in Grozny was 6 - 7 units for each tank, infantry fighting vehicle and armored personnel carrier. In the hulls of almost every damaged tank or infantry fighting vehicle there were numerous holes (on average 3 - 6), each of which would have been quite enough to disable the vehicle.

Damaged T-80B tank. Neighborhood of the village Tolstoy-Yurt, January 8, 1995

It should be noted that in these conditions the T-72 tank proved to be the most survivable. As for the T-80 tank, in Chechnya there were cases of an explosion of ammunition when the side of the hull was hit and the cumulative jet hit the shells. This was due to the vertical location of the ammunition in the automatic loader conveyor. In this case, the upper section of the support roller, which in this case served as an anti-cumulative screen, was below the level of the conveyor.

During the second Chechen campaign, T-80 tanks did not take part in hostilities. It should be noted that after the collapse of the USSR, almost all of the “eighty” ended up on the territory of Russia and Ukraine, while the production of the T-80UD, carried out in Kharkov, also ended up abroad. Their production continues in Ukraine under the designation T-84 and mainly for export (in 1996, a contract was signed for the supply of 360 such tanks to Pakistan). Russia is also actively offering T-80U tanks for export. The Cyprus Army has 41 combat vehicles of this type in service (contract value $175 million). The South Korean army was supplied with 80 T-80U tanks to pay off the Russian debt to this country. In both cases, supplies were made from the availability of the Armed Forces. The participation of T-80U tanks in the tender for a new main tank for the armies of Turkey (requirement of 1000 units) and Greece has not yet brought results.

National Interest: The Russian T-80 has become one of the worst tanks in the world

The war against Chechnya was a catastrophic humiliation for Russian T-80s / UNIAN

The T-80 is a prime example of how extremely armored tanks can also be incredibly vulnerable. Once upon a time, this model was considered prestigious in the circles of the Russian military establishment. But the T-80 suffered a series of humiliating defeats from the inferior armed forces of Chechnya during the first Chechen war. The tank was never able to regain its reputation, writes the National Interest.

But the plans were completely different. The T-80 was the last main battle tank to be developed in the USSR. It was the first armored vehicle with a gas turbine engine, which allowed it to reach speeds of up to 70 kilometers per hour. The power-to-weight ratio was efficient: 25.8 horsepower per ton. This made the standard T-80B one of the fastest tanks in the 1980s.

LESSONS OF MOUNTAINS, LESSONS OF LOCAL CONFLICTS

During the fighting, infantry fighting vehicles were hit by anti-tank weapons. When cumulative grenades hit the sides of combat vehicles, they were often pierced through. Representatives of the manufacturer lingered for a long time near one of these machines. They could not, did not have the right, not to study all the circumstances of the destruction of the infantry fighting vehicle. Moreover, next to the through hole above the right track, apparently one of the colleagues of the deceased motorized riflemen wrote in white paint the bitter and fair words: “Remember, here are the souls of our guys.”

Losses from mine explosions during the same period in 1980 amounted to 59% of the total. Of the total number of tanks that exploded, 17% were lost forever or required major repairs. An explosion under one of the tracks not only tore it apart, but depending on the power of the charge, one or more road wheels and suspension units were torn off. The impact of the explosion on the bottom led to its deflection, concussion or death of the driver.

IF tanks have always been and will be for a long time, but their appearance is always connected with the tasks of the coming war or wars. “Who are we friends against?” - diplomats ask themselves the question, and military personnel and designers must answer it in their own way. Naturally, the lessons of recent campaigns should be used with maximum efficiency.

“Let’s remember 1994–1996, especially the New Year’s assault on Grozny,” Colonel-journalist Vladimir Matyash addressed readers of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper in 2004.

“The streets of the city were literally filled with tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, “Nonas”, “Tunguskas”, which became targets in a limited space without reliable cover for motorized rifles. In the current campaign (this was during the “Second Chechen War,” which received the official name of the “counter-terrorist operation”), tanks and artillery did not go ahead of the infantry, but, suppressing knots of resistance with fire, ensured its advancement. In turn, the competent actions of motorized rifle units excluded the possibility of bandits effectively using anti-tank weapons to destroy armored vehicles. They were simply not allowed to get within range of an actual shot. And armored vehicles have significantly strengthened their protective armor. Hence the minimum losses. Thus, during the assault on Grozny, only one tank was destroyed, which covered the evacuation of the wounded with its side.

“We have learned serious lessons from the last company,” says the former commander of a tank platoon, and now the chief of staff of a tank battalion of a motorized rifle brigade, a holder of two Orders of Courage, Major Tsimbalyuk.

After the New Year's assault on Grozny in 1995, only 5 tanks remained from this battalion. Now there are no losses in the unit, largely due to the high combat characteristics of the T-72. And yet, the officer, as they say, pointedly raised the question of the unreliability of the T-72 fire fighting equipment, the problem of detecting the enemy in difficult conditions with standard surveillance devices, and the need to install classified communications equipment on the tank. Combat operations also strongly dictate the need to equip all crew members with machine guns. Of course, designers need to modernize modern tanks, taking into account the experience of local conflicts in recent decades.

In the mountains the engine gets hot, there is not enough power, because we had to climb 1200 meters. The tracks, especially in icy conditions, do not provide reliable traction on rocky soil. It's also cold in the tank. If some heat is retained in the fighting compartment, there is none in the control compartment.

Apparently the mechanic is right. So, comrade scientists, take care to provide the soldier under the armor with more or less reasonable living conditions. And Sergeant Major Protsenko said one more thing. Installing or removing batteries on the T-72, even under normal conditions, is not an easy task. And they “sit down” quite quickly, especially in winter conditions. So, to replace the battery, you need to remove the driver’s seat, which weighs about 70 kg, and then lift the battery itself, which is no less heavy, vertically through the hatch. On the T-62 everything is much simpler, you don’t need to lift anything - the battery can be freely lowered into the landing hatch by one person...

The commander of the T-72 tank, contract service sergeant Petelnik, who also participated in the hostilities, brought out his vision of the problems:

“The militants tried to hit the left side of the turret and under the turret space, trying first to disable the aiming devices, which was sometimes successful.

The bandits also took advantage of another weakness of our machine: after firing, the gun is placed on a hydraulic stop for the next loading. Not much time passes, but it is precisely this moment of forced inaction that the enemy takes advantage of. In addition, in conditions of mountains, low temperatures, and dampness, it happened that the control unit of the loading mechanism failed. We took it out and heated it over the fire, after which everything went fine. Another problem: after the ammunition is completely used up, you have to retreat from your positions to load the container. Firstly, precious time is running out, secondly, they have to leave the position, unmasking themselves, and thirdly, the crew is forced to leave the combat vehicle, while being exposed to small arms fire. It would be nice to have an armored transport-charging vehicle, like the rocket launchers.”

Certain shortcomings of armored vehicles used in counter-terrorism operations are also characteristic of other vehicles. The imperfection of tracks, for example, fully applies to both self-propelled howitzers and infantry fighting vehicles, since they glide over mountains. Therefore, already in military conditions, the Main Armored Directorate began to modify them - lugs were attached to the tracks.

Commanders considered and continue to consider preserving the lives of soldiers to be one of the most important tasks during the counter-terrorism operation. Indeed, the losses in the current operation are significantly lower than in 1995–1996. Scientists, designers, and industrialists were shown the T-72 tank, which received nine direct hits from anti-tank weapons in battle. The combat vehicle lost mobility, but retained the ability to fire. The crew members, largely thanks to the dynamic protection, were not injured or concussed. The “seventy-two” fought for four hours. And if the “Arena” system had also been installed on the tank, neither ATGMs nor grenade launchers would have been able to take it. Almost 19% of damage to armored vehicles was caused by mines and landmines. Is it really true that since the Afghan war, scientists and designers have not developed a countermeasure against them? A reasonable question arises. Developed, and very effective. This is electromagnetic protection for both tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Alas, the same financial difficulties do not allow it to be widely implemented among the troops.

During the fighting, infantry fighting vehicles were hit by anti-tank weapons. When cumulative grenades hit the sides, they were often pierced through. Representatives of the manufacturer lingered for a long time near one of these machines. They could not, did not have the right, not to study all the circumstances of the destruction of the infantry fighting vehicle. Moreover, next to the through hole above the right track, apparently one of the colleagues of the dead motorized riflemen wrote bitter and fair words in white paint:

“Remember, the souls of our guys are here.”

Motorized riflemen managed to strengthen the sides of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles with boxes of sand, cartridges, spare wheels, using ropes and even waist belts. Having heard about this, a representative of the manufacturer immediately expressed his readiness to install special mounting brackets on armored personnel carriers. It is difficult to say how much such an improvement will improve the safety of equipment and people. And why is it necessary when special protective screens have been developed and tested. The whole question is how soon infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers will be equipped with them. However, even less expensive work to improve technology, alas, is becoming a stumbling block for us today.

It is known, for example, that the personnel of units are often located on the hull of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. Well, is it worth equipping combat vehicles with handrails, by holding on to which one could avoid falling in the event of an explosion or an unexpected collision with an obstacle? Their absence sometimes causes injuries, even mutilation, and death of military personnel.”

BTR-80 from the Chechen campaign of 1995–1996. with “reactive armor” blocks installed on it and improvised chassis armor

And here is another example “from the same opera”: during combat operations, especially in the mountains, for example in Nagorno-Karabakh, on T-55 and T-72 tanks, the crews turned off the gun stabilizers in order to protect themselves from the gun breech swinging too much , and only shot from short stops.

Another very important lesson learned during the battles with Chechen militants was related to the special vulnerability of Russian tanks due to the presence of an automatic loader on them.

Foreign tanks "Abrams" and "Leopard-2" use unitary shots with manual loading carried out by a fourth crew member. In domestic T-72, T-80, T-90 tanks, separate-loading shots with a burning cartridge case are used, and loading is carried out by an automatic loader, which made it possible to reduce the tank crew to three people (commander, gunner, driver) and at the same time significantly increase the rate of fire. The automatic loader includes a rotating ring conveyor with a vertical axis located on the floor of the tank and containing radially arranged cassettes with shells and powder charges, an elevator that lifts the cassettes to the loading line, and a chain rammer located in the turret chase, as well as a device for ejecting the combustion pan from the tank shell casings! The location of the conveyor on the floor of the tank behind relatively weak armor and the presence in the conveyor of a large mass of highly flammable combustible cartridges led in Chechnya to numerous cases of tank destruction when cumulative grenades from hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers hit the space between the rear rollers, where it is very convenient to shoot, leaning out of sewer hatch or from the cellar.

However, the most important thing was that, as before, even new domestic vehicles could not fight in urban conditions. As American armored vehicle specialist Lester W. Grau reported in his article “First Round: Russians in Chechnya”, in the March issue of the Journal of Military Order, the losses of our armored vehicles in Chechnya were only in the first month of the conflict that played out in 1995, amounted to 225 cars - 10.23% of their total number!

Already on February 20, 1995, Lieutenant General A. Galkin, who then headed the Main Armored Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, held a conference at which all these sad facts were discussed, but a quick result still could not be expected, which is why, as he reports Grau, citing Russian sources known to him, our troops lost 846 combat vehicles of various types in Chechnya out of 2,221 armored vehicles deployed there (38%).

According to our domestic data, by the time major battles in Chechnya ended in May 1996, Russian troops had irretrievably lost 331 units of armored vehicles (tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles), mostly destroyed by RPG rocket-propelled grenades - perhaps the most popular weapon among Chechen militants after the machine gun Kalashnikov.

Under these conditions, the soldiers again tried to turn to “front-line ingenuity” and armor their vehicles not only with boxes of sand, but also with blocks of dynamo-reactive armor, but such “modernizations” also did not always help out. In fact, we again had a repeat of the situation at the end of 1945, when protection from the fire of German Faustpatrons had to be sought using a wide variety of available means, which did not always help to escape.

Scheme of destruction of T-72 tanks in Chechnya in 1994–1996. (according to Steven Zalogi)

Scheme of the defeat of the BMP-1 in Chechnya in 1994–1996. (according to Steven Zalogi)

Scheme of the defeat of the BTR-70 in Chechnya in 1994–1996. (according to Steven Zalogi)

Scheme of destruction of T-80 tanks in Chechnya in 1994–1996. (according to Steven Zalogi)

Scheme of the defeat of the BMD-1 in Chechnya in 1994–1996. (according to Steven Zalogi)

The diagrams of domestic tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, belonging to the famous American expert Steven Zaloga, shown here clearly show areas vulnerable to the RPG-7 and RPG-18 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers, not only on the lightly armored BMD-1 and BMP-2, but also on such machines as the T-72 and T-80! And it is not surprising that, to this day, our motorized riflemen prefer to ride on the armor of the BTR-70, and not under it. Given the 100% kill zones available on it, driving inside such a car under RPG fire is simply suicide!

However, the most amazing thing in this story with the “lessons of the mountains” is that by this time our army had already fought a lot in the mountains, and even drew certain conclusions from the combat experience gained!

We are talking about the actions of our tanks on the territory of Afghanistan, which appeared there in December 1979. And it so happened that our troops that entered the territory of this country included not only three tank divisions, but also tank regiments of divisions, and tank battalions of motorized rifles regiments The first were soon brought back to the Union, since there was no one for them to fight in the conditions of the Afghan war, but the tank battalions were left to guard the roads, accompany the columns and, where possible, support motorized riflemen with fire and tracks.

The divisions of the Turkestan Military District that entered Afghanistan were armed with T-55 tanks. But in anticipation of military operations in 1980, troops began to receive T-62 and T-64 tanks. The latter, however, did not withstand the tests at high altitudes - the two-stroke diesel engine failed, and they did not stay long in the DRA. But the T-55, T-62 and partly the T-72 fought in the mountains for quite a long time.

The specificity of the terrain and combat use, as well as the tactics of the Mujahideen, quickly revealed the main drawback of Soviet tanks: poor protection against mines and cumulative ammunition. Actually, this was not a discovery for designers and the military - even during the Arab-Israeli wars in 1968 and 1973. tanks like T-54/55 and T-62 were easily hit by ATGMs and RPGs. However, in a “correct” field war, tanks almost always had freedom of maneuver, the ability to use the entire firepower of their own and assigned units against identified anti-tank weapons. After all, the sheer variety of combat situations rarely led to a tank-RPG or tank-ATGM duel. In this regard, shortcomings in the protection of Soviet vehicles in the Middle East were compensated by a number of advantages: a low silhouette, good mobility over the sand and sufficient firepower.

Another thing is Afghanistan. Here the tanks had no other enemy than a single Mujahideen with a grenade launcher and the mines that littered the roads. There was practically no freedom of maneuver: either movement along the roads or fire from the spot at checkpoints. Even where the terrain made it possible to leave the road, this was in most cases impossible - the roadsides were densely mined by the enemy. Finally, the attack itself was carried out by the Mujahideen where the crew’s visibility was reduced to a minimum - in mountain defiles, in the green zone or among the remote duvals of villages.

All this led to the fact that the crew at the combat exit could at any moment expect a cumulative grenade on the side or a landmine explosion under the caterpillar. In such a situation, one had to rely only on armor protection, and that was precisely what failed.

The relatively thin armor of the sides, roof and stern was easily penetrated by an RPG-7 grenade. Having an armor penetration of about 400–500 mm, the grenade launcher could hit a T-54/55 type tank head-on. Despite the relatively weak armor effect, when a cumulative grenade hit the turret, as a rule, it killed one or more crew members, could disable the weapons, and undermine the ammunition load. A hit in the engine compartment made the car a stationary target, and if fuel lines were encountered along the path of the cumulative jet, ignition occurred.

It should also be taken into account that the enemy usually did not limit himself to one hit, but fired until the vehicle was completely disabled. Of course, there were happy exceptions, for example, when the T-55 turret was hit by 7 RPG grenades, they all pierced the armor, but the crew remained alive and the tank was combat-ready. Unfortunately, not everyone was so lucky. Over 11 months of 1980, 16% of tank losses occurred from RPG fire.

Anti-tank mines and land mines posed an even greater danger. Losses from mine explosions during the same period in 1980 amounted to 59% of the total. Of the total number of tanks that exploded, 17% were lost forever or required major repairs. An explosion under one of the tracks not only tore it apart, but depending on the power of the charge, one or more road wheels and suspension units were torn off. The impact of the explosion on the bottom led to its deflection, concussion or death of the driver. The use of mine trawls did not always ensure safety. Knife trawls were useless on rocky soil, and various tricks were used against the Katkovs: radio control, multiplicity of fuse activation (the landmine exploded not under the trawl, but sometimes in the middle of the column) and many other methods of mining.

Thus, already the first operations resulted in significant losses in military equipment. Strengthened protection was required, and the troops began their own improvisations: hanging boxes with ammunition, sand and rubble, spare road wheels, track tracks, tanks with water, oil and fuel on the armor.

Then the matter was put on a production basis, and most of the tanks were equipped with additional protection. Rubber-fabric screens were hung on the sides of the hull; An additional metal-ceramic block was installed on the frontal part in the form of a box-shaped structure made of armor sheets 30 mm thick, inside which 5 mm steel sheets were placed with 30 mm gaps filled with polyurethane foam. “Eyebrows” of a similar design were hung on the front of the turret to the right and left of the gun.

However, the measures taken did not significantly reduce the dynamics of losses, so in the early 1980s. carried out extensive research work on the deep modernization of the T-55 and T-62. In May 1982, a large group of designers and plant directors headed by the head of the GBTU, Colonel General Potapov, visited the DRA. And in March 1983, the modernized T-55M, T-55AM and T-62M were put into service. They were equipped with enhanced mine protection: a cellular frame on the bottom of the hull under habitable compartments made of a steel channel or angle 80 mm wide, covered from below with six armor plates 20 mm thick; spacer pillar-pillar in the control compartment behind the driver to prevent bottom deflection during an explosion; special fastening of the mechanic's seat on a poly-ke, welded to the side and having a gap with the bottom of the hull of 30 mm, so that the explosion energy does not act directly on the seat; a casing over the first pair of torsion bars with a 20 mm rubber mat to protect the mechanic’s feet; emergency hatch cover reinforced with 20 mm armor plate. In addition to the already introduced anti-cumulative protection measures, steel lattice screens were installed on the sides and stern of the hull and turret, which destroyed RPG grenades without detonation.

Tanks T-55M (1983; top) and T-55MV (1985) - modernization of the T-55, made based on Afghan experience

Modernized T-62M tank (1983)

Protection against incendiary weapons has also been improved. For this purpose, fine mesh protective nets and protective steel tubes for external electrical wiring were installed on the transmission roof. The modernized tanks used the new “Volna” fire control system with a guided weapon system and the 902B “Tucha” smoke grenade launch system. The mass of the modernized vehicles exceeded the 40-ton mark, so it was necessary to install a boosted engine up to 620 hp. With. engine.

The chassis has also been improved. They introduced reinforced rubber-metal hinges and track lugs, new torsion shafts, and hydraulic shock absorbers on the second pair of road wheels of T-62 tanks.

Modernization during the Afghan war gave impetus to the search for ways to further strengthen the T-54/55 and T-62 tanks, which in 1988 accounted for 36.5 and 25.7% of the USSR tank fleet, respectively. It was aimed mainly at improving security by installing dynamic or active protection and increasing firepower. These measures were, of course, forced due to the lack of more modern machines. With the adoption of the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Arms in Europe, work on further improvement of obsolete tanks was curtailed. A sharp reduction in the tank fleet was carried out primarily at the expense of the T-55 and T-62, which had been in service for more than 30 years.

Thus, neither in Afghanistan nor subsequently in Chechnya did they do anything fundamentally new to improve our tanks. But for some reason, the experience of the Afghan mountains in Chechnya “didn’t go well” from the very beginning, and our military, according to what has already become a sad tradition, was again forced to learn from their own mistakes, and pay for it with the lives of innocent people!

As already noted, most tanks immediately burst into flames after hitting the ammunition stowage area; meanwhile, our military was well aware of at least one tank, which, even when hit, practically did not burn. We are talking about the famous Israeli tank “Merkava” (Chariot), which since 1982 also had to fight in cities and in mountainous, desert areas. Major General Israel Tall, who designed it, was a participant in all Arab-Israeli troops, so before sitting down to the drawings, his group of tank officers carefully studied the statistics of the distribution of shell hits on tanks. This analysis showed that the largest number of them is on the frontal part of the turret; therefore, the frontal projection of the turret of a promising tank had to be minimized by “sinking” it into the hull. The tank had to have the highest possible level of protection, even at the expense of mobility. The country's limited human resources dictated, first of all, the need for maximum protection of the crew members: even if the tank was completely disabled, its crew must survive. Statistics showed that in the event of detonation of ammunition, the crew, as a rule, dies completely. This means that the crew members and ammunition must be protected to the maximum extent possible. Additional protection can be provided by placing the engine and transmission compartment in the front part of the hull; in addition, with this arrangement, the crew has the opportunity to leave the damaged vehicle through a hatch in the rear part of the hull - the least vulnerable to frontal fire.

Much attention was paid to the convenience of tank crews. The designers proceeded from the postulate “a tank is the crew’s home in wartime.” Tall proposed a very controversial concept of round-the-clock use of the tank, which involved placing two crews in one vehicle - one resting, the other fighting. If necessary, reserve crew seats can be used to evacuate wounded from the battlefield. Without a doubt, this concept led to an unprecedented increase in the armored volume of the hull and the size of the tank itself, unprecedented in modern tank building, and the possibility of additional transportation of people inside the tank baffled many experts, who at one time even tried to distinguish the Israeli vehicle as a special subtype of infantry fighting vehicle tanks.

Israeli tank "Merkava" Mk.2

Interestingly, the turret volume of the Merkava tank was significantly smaller than that of other main battle tanks; Due to the low landing of the crew members, it was possible to reduce the height of the tower and reduce the area of ​​its frontal projection to approximately 1 m2. The wedge-shaped shape of the turret facilitates the ricochet of projectiles when fired from the front hemisphere. A large basket is attached to the aft niche of the tower, along the perimeter of the lower part of which chains with steel balls at the ends are hung. The chains cause the grenade warheads of man-portable anti-tank weapons, such as the RPG-7, to detonate before they contact the armor.

The gun trunnions are located closer to the breech than is usually customary, thanks to which it was possible to maintain the barrel depression angle at -8.5° without increasing the height of the turret itself.

Unitary rounds for the gun are stored in fiberglass containers with an internal rubber thermal insulation coating, four rounds each. Most of the ammunition is located in the rear of the tank, with only eight ready-to-fire shells in the turret. Additional protection of ammunition is provided: from mine detonation - by a fuel tank located under the location of the containers with shots, on top - by a fresh water tank installed directly under the upper armor plate and a significant overhang of the turret niche with a “basket” attached to it. Containers are loaded through a double-leaf hatch located in the aft armor plate. The standard ammunition load of 62 rounds can be increased to 84. The loading time of the ammunition load is 15–20 minutes - three times less than that of the German Leopard 1 tanks or the French AMX-30.

During the 1982 battles with Syrian tanks, Israeli vehicles demonstrated high survivability, and this despite the fact that Soviet T-72 shells, as it turned out, pierced their frontal armor, not only on the hull, but also on the turret! At the same time, battles with Soviet tanks fully confirmed the correctness of the concept chosen by General Tull: crew protection is above all!

There is a well-known example when a battalion of Syrian T-72s, making a night march, unexpectedly came across a unit of Merkava tanks standing waiting for the arrival of tankers. A fierce night battle ensued, with Syrian tanks demonstrating their superiority over Israeli tanks due to the higher rate of fire of their automated guns and better night vision equipment. However, having quickly fired their ammunition racks, the Syrians never saw the results of their shooting, since the Israeli tanks did not catch fire or explode. Having suffered virtually no losses, the Syrians retreated, but after some time they sent reconnaissance, which discovered a truly amazing picture: on the battlefield there were enemy tanks abandoned by their crews with numerous holes in their hulls and turrets. But at the same time, not a single one of the Merkava tanks caught fire or exploded, and all thanks to its layout and excellent fire extinguishing system!

Another time, the Merkava Mk.3 tank received 20 hits from RPGs and ATGMs, but despite this, its crew was not injured.

Today there are three modifications of this tank: Mk.1, Mk.2 and Mk. Z, and the last of them has the same gun as the M1A1 Abrams and Lsopard-2 tanks. Plans for the future include arming the next modification of the Merkava, now with a 140-mm smoothbore gun.

The tank was more than modern and at the time of its creation was considered the best among tanks in the Western world in terms of protection from anti-tank fire! The latter situation was helped even by chains with balls at the ends, hung around the perimeter of the “basket” at the back of the tower - a solution that is generally accessible and simple, but which turned out to be very effective. This is perhaps the main achievement of Israeli engineers.

Main battle tank "Sabra" (1999) - a deep modernization of the American M60AZ made in Israel

Aft hatch of the Merkava. The chains under the turret are designed to protect against cumulative shells

However, despite the unusualness of its layout, which sharply distinguishes the Merkava from all modern main battle tanks, there are very few technical innovations in its design, and this, first of all, speaks of its price, and also of the fact that there are various kinds of innovations are not always justified!

The main indicator of the success of this vehicle is that although Israel lost about 50 Merkava Mk.1 tanks during the Lebanon War, none of them caught fire, and the irretrievable losses amounted to only seven vehicles! Only nine crew members of the damaged tanks were killed, while losses among the crews of American M60A1 tanks were much heavier.

The 77-67 tank in service with the Israeli Army is a “hybrid” of the T-54 hull, the T-62 turret and the English 1.7 gun (the turret is turned backwards)

Here is a very impressive example of using other people’s experience in local military conflicts and... in the mountains!

The main purpose of the Arena active protection complex (APS) is to destroy enemy shells and missiles approaching tanks.

The radar station included in the KAZ detects attack shells at a distance of 50 m from the tank in a sector of approximately 270°, both launched from the ground and from the air. After detecting an anti-tank weapon, a primary selection of the target is carried out, the trajectory of its movement is determined regardless of whether it is a guided projectile or not. If the target poses a threat to the tank, at the calculated moment in time the protective element is fired, and during its flight the tracking of the target continues. Then comes the command to fire the ammunition. When detonated, it poses no threat to either the tank or the attacking infantry, but destroys incoming ammunition. The localized flow hits the target at a distance of 3 to 6 meters from the tank, depending on the conditions of its approach. The time from detection to destruction of the target is 70 milliseconds. After 0.4 seconds, the complex, which operates automatically, is ready to reflect the next cone. The commander's console displays information about the activation of the complexes and the amount of remaining ammunition.

After the battle, used ammunition is easily removed from the mines, and new ones are installed in their place. Complete reloading of the complex by the entire crew takes about 15 minutes.

Russian modernized tank T-80UM1 "Bars", equipped with the "Arena" complex (1998)

KAZ "Arena" successfully fights against any type of anti-tank guided weapons, including promising ones. Equipping tanks with active protection systems increases their combat effectiveness - depending on the conditions and type of combat operations - from 2 to 3-4 times.

Table of contents

Vulnerability of Russian armored vehicles in urban battles: the experience of Chechnya

In December 1994, the Russian army invaded the Chechen Republic and attempted to capture the capital of Chechnya, Grozny, outright.
After the failure of the first attempt, the Russian army spent two months liberating the city house by house. Lost in morale, Russian conscripts suffered heavy losses from the Chechen armed forces, and the war continues to this day. During the first month of the armed conflict, the Russian armed forces wrote off 225 armored vehicles as irrecoverable combat losses. This represented 10.23% of the armored vehicles participating in the campaign. Some of these armored vehicles were taken to the Kubinka training ground for study. Lieutenant General A. Galkin, head of the armored department, held a conference on the results of the research on February 20, 1995. The Minister of Defense was also present at the conference. The result of the conference was the refusal of the Russian Ministry of Defense from further purchases of tanks with gas turbine engines. The article goes on to describe Chechen anti-tank tactics and the vulnerability of Russian armored vehicles in urban combat. Chechen tactics of fighting armored vehicles

Chechen fighters are armed with Soviet- and Russian-made weapons, and most of them served in the Soviet armed forces. The Chechen combat group consists of 15-20 people, divided into firing cells of 3-4 people. Each cell includes a grenade launcher (armed with an RPG-7 or RPG-18), a machine gunner and a sniper. The rest of the cell's fighters are engaged in carrying ammunition (helping grenade launchers and machine gunners). Battlegroups deploy their cells into "tank hunter" teams. The sniper and machine gunner cut off the infantry, and the grenade launcher hits the armored vehicle. Teams are located on the first, second, third floors of buildings and in basements. Usually one tank attacks 5-6 teams at the same time. Shooting is carried out at the roof, sides or rear of the car. Bottles of gasoline or napalm are thrown onto the roof of the car. Chechen "tank hunters" try to trap columns on city streets by blowing up the front and rear vehicles, and then methodically destroy the entire column.

The vertical firing angles of Russian tank guns do not allow them to fight “tank hunters” when they are located in basements or on the second or third floors, and the simultaneous attack of 5-6 teams makes machine guns useless. To combat “tank hunters,” self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 and 2S6 were included in armored columns.

The first losses of Russian equipment are explained by inappropriate tactics, underestimation of the enemy and insufficient combat readiness. The Russians entered Grozny without surrounding it or cutting it off from reinforcements. They planned to capture the city on the move, without even dismounting. Due to a lack of personnel, the columns were mixed and most armored personnel carriers moved with minimal or no foot cover. These first columns were completely destroyed.

After the regrouping, the number of infantry was increased and the systematic liberation of the city began, house by house, block by block. Losses in armored vehicles were significantly reduced due to changes in tactics. Russian infantry moved level with the combat vehicle to support and cover it. Some of the vehicles were equipped with a wire mesh mounted 25-30 cm from the hull to repel cumulative and anti-tank grenades, Molotov cocktails and bundles of explosives. In order to destroy the “tank hunters,” ambushes were set up along their routes of approach.

Vulnerability of the Russian BTT

The bulk of the armored vehicles were destroyed using anti-tank grenades and grenade launchers. For each destroyed armored vehicle there were an average of 3-6 damaging hits. Favorite targets of Chechen grenade launchers were fuel tanks and engines. In the figures, the areas of armored vehicles that accounted for 90% of the damaging hits are highlighted in gray.

BMD-1 is used to transport personnel of airborne units. Therefore, it has weak armor. The BMD-1 is vulnerable to attack from the front, side, rear and above. The front part of the turret has reinforced armor and is therefore less vulnerable, but the rear part is not.

The BMP-2 is better armored. However, the roof is poorly armored and the fuel tanks are located in the rear doors, leaving the driver easily vulnerable.

The wheeled BTR-70 is vulnerable in the same places as BMD and BMP.

62 tanks were destroyed during the first month of fighting in Chechnya. Over 98% (that is, 61 tanks) were destroyed by hits in areas not covered by dynamic protection. T-72 and T-80 tanks were used in Chechnya. They were invulnerable to frontal hits, since the frontal projection was well armored and covered with dynamic protection. Tanks were destroyed by hits to the sides, rear, roof, and driver's hatch. In the initial stage of the conflict, most of the tanks participating in the battles did not have dynamic protection. They were especially vulnerable, including to frontal hits.

Conclusion

Chechen militants managed to develop effective methods for destroying Russian armored vehicles on the streets of a big city. Many of these techniques can be used by other militaries to combat Russian-made armored vehicles in urban combat. Let's list these methods:

1. The created teams of “tank hunters” must include a machine gunner and a sniper to protect the grenade launcher from infantry.

2. Zones for anti-tank ambushes should be selected in areas of the city that limit the movement of armored vehicles to narrow “channels”.

3. The location of the ambush should ensure that escape routes are cut off and vehicles are locked in the destruction area.

4. It is necessary to use several teams, placing them at different levels - in basements, on the first and third floors of buildings. Difficulties with the use of RPG-7 and RPG-18 were caused by their jet stream, flashes of shots and low rate of fire. To reliably destroy an armored vehicle, 5-6 launches were carried out simultaneously by different teams. It is obvious that anti-tank weapons of future urban battles should be multi-charged, with minimal unmasking signs, recoil and weight, and the ability to fire from enclosed spaces. The AT-4 anti-tank grenade launcher and the Javelin portable anti-tank missile system do not meet these requirements.

5. Armored targets must be fired from above, from the flanks and from the rear. Shots at the frontal armor are ineffective and can only unmask the grenade launcher.

6. First of all, attached anti-aircraft artillery installations must be destroyed.

Lester W. Grau, trans. from English Yuri Goldaev (Red Thrust Star, January 1997. Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS)

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Comments on the article

1 Quite a sensible article for analysts from far abroad (although, considering that it was made on the basis of Russian sources...

2 “Many of these techniques can be used by other armed forces to combat Russian-made armored vehicles in urban combat.”

- Incorrect conclusion. This conclusion is valid for almost all BTT of any production.

Sincerely, V. Chobitok October 24, 1999

GROZNY. TANKS. HOW IT WAS

The metal is burnt and the black tower is empty,

The fire melted the partitions.

Let him walk forward fearlessly a day ago,

The armor was crushed by a direct blow.

Sergei Orlov, 1944

Celebrating the 10th anniversary of the start of military operations by Russian federal troops against illegal armed groups (illegal armed groups) in Chechnya, it is worth recalling the main stages of the ongoing war in the North Caucasus.

The most famous and dramatic events in modern Russian military history are the military operations of our military in Grozny in 1994–1996. A feature of these heavy assault battles was the intensive use in urban conditions by federal troops against illegal armed groups, well equipped with domestic anti-tank weapons, of our modern tanks, including T-72B1, T-72B(M), T-80B, T-80BV, and also infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

Having entered Grozny on New Year's Eve in several mechanized columns, federal troops encountered well-prepared anti-tank defense of Dudayev's troops. The unsuccessful command plan, as well as the lack of skills and experience in using armored vehicles in the city among the personnel of units and units of the Ministry of Defense, were the cause of most of the losses in the first days of the assault on Grozny. The main tactics of using tanks was to escort in narrow streets and cover with armor motorized rifle columns that were trying to immediately break through to the units of the 131st separate motorized rifle brigade (OMSBR) leading the battle in complete encirclement near the railway station and the units of the 81st motorized rifle regiment (MSR) that had retreated to them ). Units of federal forces that took up all-round defense in alleys and courtyards used tanks as stationary firing points until the ammunition was completely exhausted or the tank was damaged.

T-72A tanks of the 131st Omsbr, operating in the limited space of the station area, fired back to the last. After each shot from the tank, it was immediately exposed to fire from several RPGs from different directions. This is how the T-72A (aircraft number 533) was shot down - 4 or 5 RPG grenades hit its engine compartment. The car caught fire and exploded, but fortunately the crew managed to evacuate.

The T-72A tank (board number 537) was hit by 6 or 7 RPG grenades, the ammunition detonated immediately, and the crew of the vehicle was killed. The T-72A (aircraft number 531) had 6 hits, after the fourth (the shot was fired from an RPG) the turret tilted. The last thing to hit the turret from the tank commander's side from a distance of 100 m was an armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile. The impact tore off the hatches in the turret from the torsion bars, gunner-operator A. Stasko received a severe concussion, and the breech of the gun saved him from armor fragments. A fire started in the turret; the driver and gunner-operator managed to escape the burning vehicle, which exploded 20 minutes later. The absence of dynamic contact protection (EDP) on the tanks led to guaranteed damage to the units and crew of the vehicle when hit by several grenades from an RPG at close range.

Fire support of the 255th Guards. SMEs from the North-East group in the defensive battles for the hospital complex were supported by a tank battalion of 7 T-72A and T-72B1 tanks.

Tankers, fighting surrounded, were among the first to use the “pounce” technique, when 2 tanks, alternately rolling out from around the corner of a building, fired 3-4 shots at detected targets and went back in reverse.

An attempt to capture a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river by attack from the side of the hospital complex. Sunzha led on January 3 to the loss of two T-72B (M) tanks from the 74th Guards, which entered the city the day before, from artillery and grenade fire by militants. omsbr. After cutting off the infantry from the tanks, the latter were instantly knocked out at the bridge, adding to the irretrievable losses of the tank units storming Grozny. While covering the crews' retreat with machine gun fire, the wounded tankman, Private A. Ryabokon, died near his combat vehicle (posthumously awarded the Order of Courage).

A change in the tactics of federal forces tanks in urban environments began with the expansion of the zone of residential areas completely controlled by infantry and the transition from defensive to offensive battles. The shortage of tanks that arose due to the initial losses forced the creation of mixed armored groups, which included 2 tanks and a ZSU-23-4 or BMP-2. Assigned to specific assault motorized rifle units, the armored groups were supposed to provide constant cover for the motorized rifle units storming buildings with powerful fire. In subsequent battles, due to the different level of protection of these combat vehicles and their different maneuvering capabilities, the mixed composition of the armored group was used extremely rarely.

Two main methods of action for armored groups were used. In the first case, one tank fired in the interests of the infantry, and the crew of the second, observing the situation, could at any moment notice and repel an attack being prepared on the lead tank. After the ammunition of the first tank was used up, the second one ensured that the lead one left the position with its fire. ZSU-23-4 and BMP-2, covered by tanks due to their weak armor, fired at the upper floors of high-rise buildings.

The time interval for fire on the enemy depended on the speed of replenishing the armored group in the rear with ammunition. On average, a day a pair of tanks made from two to four trips to the assault target; when reaching the firing line, the crews tried to go at low speeds for sound masking purposes, and when retreating, they squeezed out everything that it was capable of from the engine.

The control of assault units of federal troops over individual scattered buildings and neighborhoods made each raid of a tank group a risky undertaking, because on the advance route or when returning after 15-30 minutes to replenish ammunition, the armored group could simply fall under the crossfire of anti-tank weapons of illegal armed groups that had organized an ambush on the route of movement. tanks. The lack of large-scale maps of the city's districts and streets led to limited maneuver for armored groups when moving to and withdrawing from firing lines. Whenever possible, the crews tried to change routes each time. A typical situation arose on January 10 during the battles for Lenin Square. With the task of blocking the intersection of Pervomaiskaya and Naurskaya streets, our T-72B1 (aircraft No. 430), moving to a firing position, was fired upon from an ambush when approaching the square. One of the RPG shots hit the side; the absence of the previously torn off bulwark led to a through penetration of the armor in the area of ​​​​the fuel tanks and ammunition rack. The instantaneous detonation left the crew no chance of salvation.

The second method was called “carousel” or “spinner”. The essence of the combat work of an armored group was the continuity of fire impact on the target. Several pairs of tanks, taking turns changing shifts at the firing line, ensured continuous shelling of the target, retreating in pairs to the rear to replenish ammunition.

This method was used with the support of the 876th infantry brigade, which stormed the Council of Ministers of the Chechen Republic. T-72B (M) tanks from the armored group of the 74th Guards. The Omsbr fired to suppress firing points and blocked the building, preventing the approach of illegal armed formation reserves across the bridge across the river. Sunzha. This position also made it possible to conduct direct fire at the Kavkaz Hotel and the presidential palace. During the battle, each of the vehicles received several hits from RPGs, P. Nemtsov’s tank burned down. Having expended its ammunition, the armored group consisting of two tanks and the “horseless” crew of P. Nemtsov handed over the position to two T-72B1 tanks from the tank battalion of the 276th Motorized Rifle Regiment (probably S. Novokshonov and E. Lyapustin).

The need for assault groups to have tank support led to their intensive use in urban battles. According to the memoirs of the tank platoon commander of the 133rd Guards. from Captain V. Baglai, during the battles near the tram depot his tank crews had to literally live for six days in their cars. The infantry refueled the tanks, supplied ammunition and food, after which the armored group immediately went out to suppress the firing points.

In these battles, as additional protection from RPGs and heavy machine guns, the crews of tanks and light armored vehicles of the federal troops began to intensively attach shell boxes, nets, and additional spare parts to their armor.

The large number of tank losses in Grozny was aggravated by the lack of dynamic contact protection (EDP) or explosives in it. For example, 20 T-72A tanks of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade and 7 T-72A tanks of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment, as well as T-72 (172M) and T-72A of the 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the North Caucasus Military District did not have contact dynamic protection, and on 14 T-72B1 tanks the KDZ “snuffbox” blocks were empty. T-72B1 tanks belonging to the 276th Motorized Rifle Regiment and T-80 tanks from the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment entered the battle for Grozny with empty KDZ blocks. Conducting an intense battle on the narrow streets of the city, hiding from return fire, tank crews pressed vehicles against buildings or drove inside houses, demolishing bulwarks and crushing CDZ blocks. There was practically no time for repairs in a combat situation. The lack of new blocks made it impossible and pointless to install explosive plates brought from the rear.

Technical support consisted of the evacuation of damaged armored vehicles using BREM-1, BTS and KET-L to collection points for damaged vehicles (SPPM), where they were sorted and sent to repair battalions for restoration. To evacuate equipment in Grozny, 2 regimental evacuation groups and 3 evacuation departments operated. A regimental evacuation group under the command of Senior Lieutenant I. Shargorodsky and individual BREM-1 armored vehicles from tank units worked in the interests of the Northern Group. Having BREM-1 (aircraft No. 455), BTS (aircraft No. 604) and 2 KET-L vehicles based on the Ural, during 3 months of fighting in Grozny, it managed to evacuate 98 units of armored vehicles without losses on its part. In tense moments, instead of evacuation tractors, tanks with damaged weapons were used. One of the episodes of such an evacuation from the railway station by a T-72B1 tank of a T-80B tank was filmed by television journalists and shown on January 8, 1995 on Central Television. This plot, voiced in a very original way, gave rise to the myth about the widespread use in Grozny of a stern-to-stern hitch, called “push-pull”, as an ideal protection against grenade launcher fire in urban environments. As a permanent tractor-tow truck in the 133rd Guards. OTB (Vostok group) used a T-80BV with the barrel torn off at the ejector. The damaged equipment was evacuated to the battalion location, and from there it was transported to Chervlenaya station for major repairs.

In the West group, the evacuation was carried out by BREM-1 under the command of warrant officer R. Korobaev. On January 9, 1995, this vehicle was fired at from a grenade launcher and caught fire, but thanks to the clear actions of the crew, it was extinguished. Later, she was lost while preparing a pontoon crossing across the Sunzha, when she fell from the pontoon under mortar fire and sank. During the fighting in Grozny, a separate repair and restoration battalion of the “West” group repaired 80 armored vehicles and sent them to units and more than 100 were transported to the loading station.

All damaged and destroyed vehicles and armored vehicles, regardless of their ownership and the nature of the damage, were subject to evacuation to the “storage” of the Northern group, located on the territory of the Cannery. Evacuations from streets controlled by federal troops took place during the daytime. On average, 3-4 units of armored vehicles were delivered to the SPPM per day. The northern evacuation group evacuated 10 combat vehicles from the area of ​​the Railway Station. This number included several serviceable T-80 tanks abandoned by the crews, a vehicle with a driver who died from a sniper’s bullet, a damaged captured T-72A with a white turret, and a BMP-KSh (aircraft No. 301).

The peak of evacuation of armored vehicles reached its peak at the end of the assault on government buildings and the presidential palace, when 23 units were evacuated from Lenin Square within 24 hours. On Lermontov Street, it was blown up by a BREM-1 anti-tank mine, and the second road wheel of the vehicle was knocked out. During the night the car was restored by the crew. If it was impossible to transport the damaged tank, gas welding was brought to the site, and with its help, structural elements that interfered with its implementation were removed. There were cases of militants mining damaged equipment, then demining was carried out by pulling the vehicle from its place with a tractor.

With a shortage of armored vehicles, restoration of damaged vehicles in the repair battalions proceeded in emergency mode. To make up for losses, equipment repaired in combat conditions was sent to the battalions storming Grozny. The damaged tanks of the Dudayevites, nicknamed “white crows” for their characteristic white turrets, were also repaired. Several of them, after repair, entered one of the tank battalions of the Northern Group of General L. Rokhlin. In total, the group of federal troops consisted of 7 captured vehicles with white turrets.

During the seizure of the territory of the military camp of the Shali tank regiment, 10 faulty T-72A tanks without rubber bulwarks and mounted dynamic protection were found in the pits and in the parking lot. After repair, this equipment also joined the federal group. Most of the tanks, which received an average of 7 to 12 hits from RPGs during the entire battle in Grozny, were restored in repair battalions several times. For example, the T-72B1 tank (board number 221) 276 MSP had 2 through holes from RPGs during the battle near the hospital complex on January 16, 1995, and after ongoing repairs it was damaged a second time on January 21, 1995 near the Council of Ministers building by five RPG grenades. The first hit the starboard side above the 4th roller, the second, third and fourth hit the left side, and the fifth hit the turret above the barrel, damaging the AZ. The tank was sent for major repairs. Tank T-80BV from the 133rd Guards. During the fighting in Grozny, the brigade received 18 hits from an RPG and 1 explosion from a landmine. Having undergone repairs several times and replacing 4 crews, the tank ended the battles in Grozny as a tractor after damage to the barrel. Upon returning to the battalion's permanent location, it was sent for major repairs. The tank commander, senior sergeant A. Popkov from the North Caucasian Military District (presumably the 141st brigade), from November 30, 1994 to January 7, 1995, participating in street battles for Grozny, replaced 4 T-72 tanks, of which 1 was damaged, and 2 burned out.

As a rule, the restoration of tanks was carried out by repair units of units conducting active combat operations. The bulk of the malfunctions occurred in the turret equipment (sights, fire control system, etc.), gun barrel (penetration), and less often in the engine and chassis. Holes from cumulative ammunition were welded and also sealed with rags and wooden wedges. Refilling the T-72 and T-80 with fuel did not cause any problems, since both the diesel engine and the turbine are structurally adapted to operate on various grades and mixtures of kerosene, diesel fuel and gasoline.

The basis of the ammunition of tanks conducting continuous battles in the city was shots with high-explosive fragmentation shells. In addition to them, there were 1–3 rounds with armor-piercing sub-caliber shells in case of encounters with enemy tanks.

Tankers of the 133rd Guards. During the period from January 9 to 11, the Cobra KUV was used for the first time in urban battles; out of 5 guided missiles fired, only 2 hit the target. In the future, guided missiles were not used by tank crews; preference was given to high-explosive fragmentation and armor-piercing sub-caliber projectiles. The latter are capable of breaking through a five-story block house from the end to the fourth entrance. The crews varied the quantity and placement of ammunition in the ammunition rack independently.

On the afternoon of January 12, an armored group of senior lieutenant S. Novokshonov operated in Grozny on T-72B1 tanks. After the tank commander (board number 441) E. Lyapustin took up a firing position, a tank with a white turret was discovered near a building they were shelling at night at a distance of 500 m. With the seventh shot of a high-explosive fragmentation shell, it caught fire. After federal troops occupied the area near the building of the Council of Ministers of the Chechen Republic, the fact of the destruction of an illegal armed formation tank was officially confirmed by the command of the “North” group.

Throughout the assault on the capital of Chechnya, the enemy actively used anti-tank mines to mine the advance routes of armored groups. In the second phase of the operation, militants began to use landmines against tanks in the battles for the southern and southeastern parts of the city.

During the fighting on Noya Bauchidze Street on January 27, a T-72B1 (aircraft No. 437) of platoon commander Senior Lieutenant S. Novokshonov was sent to evacuate a stuck T-72B1 tank (aircraft No. 422) of the 2nd tank company. A minute later, contact with him was lost. As a result of the search for the missing tank, a 2-meter crater and pieces of the vehicle scattered in different directions were found. The tank's turret flew 70 m, the engine 20 m, the rollers, tracks and sides flew over one-story houses and lay on a parallel street. The most likely cause of the tank's death was a powerful landmine, the effect of which was enhanced by the vehicle's detonated ammunition.

During the assault on Grozny from December 31, 1994 to April 1, 1995, our losses amounted to 1,426 people killed and 4,630 wounded, 96 soldiers and officers were captured by militants. The irretrievable losses of military equipment amounted to approximately 49 tanks, 132 infantry fighting vehicles, 98 armored personnel carriers, 51 vehicles based on infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers (according to the statement of the head of the Main Armored Directorate of the RF Ministry of Defense, Colonel General A. Galkin, during the first month and a half of fighting in Chechnya, irretrievable losses of armored vehicles amounted to 225 units, 62 of them were tanks).

According to the recollections of tankers and veterans of the battles for Grozny, tank losses were distributed approximately as follows: the 276th Motorized Rifle Regiment irretrievably lost 7 T-72B1, the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment - 6 T-80B and T-80BV (raises doubts), the 133rd Guards. detachment - 11 T-80BV, 324th MRR - 4 T-72B1, 255th Guards. SME – 1 T-72A, 74th Guards. Omsbr - 4 cars. In total, as veterans of the tank battalion of this brigade recall, their losses, excluding irrecoverable ones, amounted to 23 T-72B(M) tanks. It turns out that 50 tanks from the above-mentioned units of the Russian Defense Ministry were irretrievably lost during the assault on Grozny from December 1994 to 1995. Irreversible losses of tanks of the 245th motorized rifle regiment T-80BV, 693rd motorized rifle regiment and 503rd motorized rifle regiment T-72 (172M) and T-72A in the battles for Grozny are still unknown.

The tanks remaining in the units fought in Chechnya until July–August 1995, after which, instead of armored vehicles that had finally exhausted their service life, new ones began to arrive from the Ministry of Defense storage bases (of course, not the T-80U and not the T-90S).

From the memoirs of the tankers who participated in the battles for Grozny, we can conclude that they have no complaints about the durability of the armor protection and the effectiveness of the guns of the T-72 and T-80 tanks, which they had to fight in in 1995-96. Things were much worse with the BMP-1, BMP-2, BMD-1 and BMD-2. This class of armored vehicles accounted for the bulk of the irretrievable losses of vehicles and crews - up to 70% of the total. In 95% of cases, being hit by a grenade from an RPG-7 resulted in penetrating the armor of these vehicles. A direct hit from mine fragments from a short distance also resulted in penetration of armor, damage to fuel tanks and, as a result, fire of the vehicle and explosion of ammunition.

Thus, on January 2, while a BRM-1K (board number 494) and an BTR-80 from the 276th Motorized Rifle Regiment were moving to the Grozny-Severny airport along Pervomaiskaya Street, three blocks from the hospital complex, the BRM-1K was fired upon and hit by a direct hit grenades from an RPG into the starboard side next to the landing hatch. The cumulative jet, having passed inside along the entire hull of the BRM-1K up to and including the engine compartment, seriously wounded a motorized rifleman in the turret and set the vehicle on fire (later the ammunition detonated from the fire). While providing emergency medical assistance to a soldier from the BRM-1K, the BTR-80 was hit by a second grenade, but despite the fire in the fighting compartment, the vehicle remained on the move and was able to return to the hospital complex with two crews. Ultimately, the fire destroyed the car.

The predominance in the Joint Group of BMP-1s with the 2A28 “Grom” cannon, which is not capable of conducting effective fire on the upper floors of buildings, as well as the weak high-explosive effect of its ammunition, practically excluded the use of these combat vehicles in assault fire support groups in urban combat. The main task of the BMP-1 was to strengthen checkpoints and supply ammunition to assault groups, and due to weak armor, these vehicles were dug in at checkpoints and protected with concrete slabs.

For the first time in a combat situation in Grozny, BMP-3s were used. Their debut came on January 1-2, 1995, when there were heavy battles between the North-Eastern group and militants for control of the hospital complex. Federal troops defending there were subjected to constant mortar and sniper fire from across the river. Sunzha, from the territory of the military camp and from the nearby high-rise buildings of the Military College and the 12-story Parliament building. As a result of mines hitting ammunition stored in the building and on the ground, the motorized rifle battalion of the 74th Guards, which stood nearby in a column, was almost completely destroyed. omsbr on BMP-3 and several tanks. According to the recollections of front-line soldiers of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 11 BMP-3s remained in combat-ready condition after the mortar shelling.

In total, during the battles for the capture of the center of Grozny, from 31 vehicles of the tank battalion of the 74th Guards. The Omsbr has 4 T-72B (M) tanks left in combat-ready condition. The acute shortage of tanks during the battles for areas adjacent to Noah Bauchidze Street forced the use of the remaining BMP-3s in service for fire support of assault units advancing from the northeast to Minutka Square.

Armored personnel carriers, which have high maneuverability and good speed characteristics, were assigned the functions of communications, reconnaissance and convoy vehicles. In one of the reports from the battle site on the central heating center on January 25, 1995, an armored personnel carrier-80 from the “West” group was shown, the lower frontal part of the hull resembled a colander, so abundantly it was dotted with through holes from heavy machine gun bullets.

In connection with the constant “reform” (and in reality, reduction) of the Russian Armed Forces, most of the armored vehicles from Chechnya, instead of major repairs, were sent for recycling (“into waste”). Highly paid journalists from the central media, who are not always able to distinguish a tank from an enamel pan, started talking about the colossal, many thousands of losses of our armored vehicles in the battles for Grozny.

Concluding the article, it should be noted that the main burden of providing direct fire support to assault units and fighting enemy tanks in Grozny in 1994-95. fell on tanks, self-propelled artillery and mortars with virtually zero air support. The selfless actions of tankers in urban battles with a 10,000-strong group of illegal armed groups, which included at least 60 armored vehicles and 80 artillery systems, made it possible to significantly reduce the losses of the assault units of the federal troops during the capture of Grozny.

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