The most famous tank battle of World War II.

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Colleagues have long wanted to share this article with you, but once I read it, I couldn’t find it. Well, I finally found it and am posting it. This is about the real strength of the KV in relation to German tanks.

Events near Leningrad in August 1941 developed according to a very dramatic scenario. On the night of August 7–8, the German Army Group North launched an attack on Leningrad. The 41st Motorized Corps from the 4th Tank Group and the 38th Army Corps attacked the settlements of Ivanovskoye and Bolshoy Sabsk towards Kingisepp and Volosovo. Three days later, the enemy approached the Kingisepp-Leningrad highway. On August 13, German troops captured the Moloskovitsy station and cut the Kingisepp-Leningrad railway and highway. They also managed to cross the Luga River on the right flank of the front, and the city found itself between two fires. On August 14, all divisions of the 41st Motorized and 38th Army Corps, having entered the operational space, rushed to Leningrad. On August 16, Narva and Kingisepp were occupied.

On August 10, the 56th Motorized Corps attacked Soviet troops in the Luga area. On the same day, heavy fighting began in the Novgorod-Chudivo direction. The next day the Germans broke through to the Oredezh River. A threat loomed over the left flank of the troops defending the Luga sector. On August 13, the 34th and part of the forces of the 11th Army of the Northwestern Front in the area of Staraya Russa and Lake Ilmen attacked the rear of units of the 10th Army Corps. The German command began hastily transferring the 56th Motorized Corps, the SS Division “Totenkopf” and the 39th Motorized Corps, which had just been transferred to Army Group North from near Smolensk, to this direction.

On August 16, units of the 1st Army Corps captured the western part of Novgorod. There was a real threat of a breakthrough of German troops to Leningrad.

On August 18, the commander of the 3rd tank company of the 1st tank battalion of the 1st Red Banner Tank Division, Senior Lieutenant Zinovy Kolobanov, was summoned to the division commander, General V.I. Baranov. The division headquarters was located in the basement of the cathedral, which is a landmark of Gatchina, which was then called Krasnogvardeysk. Kolobanov received the task personally from Baranov. Showing on the map three roads leading to Krasnogvardeysk from Luga, Volosovo and Kingisepp (via the Tallinn Highway - author's note), the division commander ordered:

- Block them and fight to the death!

The situation near Leningrad was such that the commander of the tank company took the order of the division commander literally.

Kolobanov’s company had five KV-1 tanks. Each tank was loaded with two rounds of armor-piercing shells. This time the crews took a minimal amount of high-explosive fragmentation shells. The main thing was not to miss the German tanks.

On the same day, Kolobanov advanced his company to meet the advancing enemy. The senior lieutenant sent two tanks - Lieutenant Sergeev and Junior Lieutenant Evdokimenko - to the Luga road (Kievskoye Highway - author's note). Two more KVs under the command of Lieutenant Lastochkin and Junior Lieutenant Degtyar headed to defend the road leading to Volosovo. The tank of the company commander himself was supposed to be ambushed near the road connecting the Tallinn highway with the road to Marienburg, the northern outskirts of Krasnogvardeysk.

Kolobanov conducted reconnaissance with the commanders of all crews, indicated the locations of the firing positions and ordered two shelters to be dug for each vehicle - the main one and a spare one, and then carefully camouflaged. The crews had to maintain contact with the company commander by radio.

For his KV, Kolobanov determined the position in such a way that the fire sector had the longest, well-open section of the road. A little before reaching the Uchkhoz poultry farm, it turned almost 90 degrees and then went towards Marienburg. It was crossed by another dirt road, along which, apparently, local residents removed hay from the fields after haymaking. Unharvested haystacks could be seen all around; they stood not far from the position chosen by Kolobanov. On both sides of the road leading to Marienburg there were vast swamps. There was even a small lake with ducks swimming carelessly around it.

Digging a caponier for a tank like the KV is a very difficult task. In addition, the soil was strong. Only in the evening did they manage to hide the tank in a caponier that was open up to the tower. A reserve position was also equipped. After this, not only the tank itself, but even the traces of its tracks were carefully camouflaged.

Gunner-radio operator senior sergeant Pavel Kiselkov suggested going to an abandoned poultry farm and getting a goose, fortunately the people who worked on it, fearing the invasion of the invaders, left it, and the crew, exhausted by hard work, needed to reinforce their strength. Komroty agreed, ordering the radio operator to shoot the bird so that no one would hear:

Under no circumstances was it possible to unmask one’s position. Kiselkov carried out the order exactly; the goose was plucked and boiled in a tank bucket. After dinner, Kolobanov ordered everyone to rest.

As night approached, the military outpost arrived. The young lieutenant reported to Kolobanov. He ordered the infantry to be placed behind the tank, to the side, so that if something happened they would not come under gunfire. The outpost positions also had to be well camouflaged...

Zinoviy Grigorievich Kolobanov was born in 1913 in the village of Arefene, Vachevsky district, Nizhny Novgorod province. After finishing eight years of high school, he studied at a technical school. In 1932, according to the Komsomol recruitment, he was drafted into the Red Army. In 1936 he graduated with honors from the Oryol Armored School named after M.V. Frunze.

War was nothing new for 28-year-old senior lieutenant Kolobanov. As part of the 20th heavy tank brigade, as a company commander, he had the opportunity to participate in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The brigade in which he served was the first to reach the Mannerheim line, and his company was at the forefront of the attack. It was then that Kolobanov burned in a tank for the first time. In the battle near Lake Vuoksa, he again pulled ahead with his company, and again had to be rescued from a burning car. The third time it burned during the raid on Vyborg. On the night of March 12-13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed between the USSR and Finland. Having learned about this, the soldiers of the two previously opposing armies rushed to meet each other for “fraternization”.

Unfortunately, this very “fraternization” cost Captain Kolobanov very dearly: he was demoted in rank and, having been deprived of all awards, was transferred to the reserve.1

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Kolobanov was called up from the reserves to the 1st Tank Division, which was created on the basis of the 20th Heavy Tank Brigade, in which he fought during the war with the Finns. Since he already had combat experience, Kolobanov was awarded the rank of senior lieutenant and appointed commander of a company of KV heavy tanks. True, I had to forget about previous awards; I had to start all over again, with a clean slate.

Tankers received combat vehicles at the Kirov plant. Here, at the plant, tank crews were also formed in a separate training tank battalion. Each of them took part together with the workers in assembling their machine. The run-in distance was from the Kirov plant to Srednyaya Rogatka, after which the vehicles went to the front.2

In the battle near Ivanovsky, Kolobanov managed to distinguish himself - his crew destroyed a tank and an enemy gun. That is why, knowing about the solid combat experience of Senior Lieutenant Kolobanov, General V.I. Baranov entrusted him with such an important task - with his company to block the path of German tanks to Krasnogvardeysk.

The 41st Motorized Corps of Army Group North, advancing on Leningrad, bypassed Krasnogvardeysk. Only one of his divisions, the 8th Panzer, was supposed to support the advance of the 50th Army Corps and the 5th SS Division from Volosovo and Luga to Krasnogvardeysk. The 6th Panzer Division suffered heavy losses in previous battles and by mid-August 1941 actually existed only on paper, so participation in battles

I couldn’t mistake it for Krasnogvardeysk. The 1st Tank Division attacked Leningrad from Torosovo, towards Syaskelevo and further to the northern outskirts of Krasnogvardeysk - Marienburg. In the event of a breakthrough to Marienburg, units of this division could strike in the rear of the Soviet troops occupying the defense on the lines of the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area, and then, going out through the ancient Gatchina parks to the Kyiv highway, advance almost unhindered to Leningrad.

In the early morning of August 19, 1941, Kolobanov’s crew was awakened by the disgusting, intermittent roar of German dive bombers flying at high altitude towards Leningrad. After they passed, peace and quiet re-established itself near Voyskovitsy. The day started out clear. The sun was rising higher.

At about ten o'clock shots were heard from the left, from the side of the road going to Volosovo3. The senior lieutenant recognized the distant “voice” of the KV tank gun. A message came over the radio that one of the crews had entered into battle with German tanks. But everything was still calm for them. Kolobanov summoned the commander of the combat guard and ordered him to have his infantrymen open fire on the enemy only when the KV gun began to speak. For themselves, Kolobanov and Usov outlined two landmarks: No. 1 - two birch trees at the end of the intersection and No. 2 - the intersection itself. The landmarks were chosen in such a way as to destroy the leading enemy tanks right at the crossroads and prevent other vehicles from turning off the road leading to Marienburg.

Only in the second hour of the day did enemy vehicles appear on the road.

- Prepare for battle! - Kolobanov commanded quietly.

Having slammed the hatches, the tankers instantly froze in their places. Immediately, the gun commander, senior sergeant Andrei Usov, reported that he saw three motorcycles with sidecars in his sights. The commander's order immediately followed:

- Don’t open fire! Skip the reconnaissance!

The German motorcyclists turned left and rushed towards Marienburg, without noticing the camouflaged KV lying in ambush. Fulfilling Kolobanov’s order, the infantrymen from the combat guard did not open fire on reconnaissance.

Now all the attention of the crew was focused on the tanks walking along the road. Kolobanov ordered the radio operator to report to battalion commander Captain I.B. Shpiller about the approach of a German tank column and again turned all his attention towards the road, onto which tanks painted dark gray were crawling out one after another. They walked at shortened distances, placing their left sides almost strictly at right angles to the KV gun, thereby representing ideal targets. The hatches were open, some of the Germans were sitting on the armor. The crew even distinguished their faces, since the distance between the KV and the enemy column was small - only about one hundred and fifty meters.

At this time, battalion commander Shpiller contacted the company commander via radio. He asked sternly:

- Kolobanov, why are you letting the Germans through?! Shpiller already knew about the morning battle in the Luga and Volosovo directions and about the advance of German tanks towards Kolobanov’s position, and he could not help but be disturbed by the rather prolonged silence of the KV tank company commander.

There was no time to respond to the battalion commander: the lead tank slowly drove into the intersection and came close to two birch trees - landmark No. 1, identified by the tank crews before the battle. Immediately Kolobanov was informed about the number of tanks in the column. There were 22 of them. And when seconds of movement remained before the landmark, the commander realized that he could no longer hesitate, and ordered Usov to open fire...

Senior Sergeant Usov was already an experienced soldier at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Drafted into the Red Army in 1938, he participated in the “liberation” campaign in Western Belarus as an assistant platoon commander of one of the artillery regiments, and fought on the Karelian Isthmus during the Soviet-Finnish War. After graduating from a special school for heavy tank gun commanders, he became a tank driver...4

The lead tank caught fire from the first shot. It was destroyed before it even managed to completely pass the intersection. The second shot, right at the intersection, destroyed the second tank. A traffic jam has formed. The column compressed like a spring, and now the intervals between the remaining tanks became completely minimal. Kolobanov ordered the fire to be transferred to the tail of the column in order to finally lock it on the road.

But this time Usov failed to hit the trailing tank with the first shot - the shell did not reach the target. The senior sergeant adjusted his aim and fired four more shots, destroying the last two in the tank column. The enemy was trapped.

At first, the Germans could not determine where the shooting was coming from and opened fire from their guns at the haystacks, which immediately caught fire. But they soon came to their senses and were able to discover the ambush. A tank duel began between one KV and eighteen German tanks. A hail of armor-piercing shells fell on Kolobanov’s car. One after another, they hammered at the 25-mm armor of the additional screens installed on the KV turret. There was no longer any trace left of the disguise. The tankers suffocated from the powder gases and became deaf from the numerous impacts of the blanks on the tank’s armor. The loader, who is also a junior mechanic-driver, Red Army soldier Nikolai Rodenkov, worked at a frantic pace, driving shell after shell into the cannon breech. Usov, without looking up from his sight, continued to fire at the enemy column.

Meanwhile, the commanders of other vehicles holding defenses on three more roads reported by radio about the situation in their defense sectors. From these reports, Kolobanov realized that there were fierce battles in other directions.

The Germans, realizing that they were trapped, tried to maneuver, but KV shells hit the tanks one after another. But numerous direct hits from enemy shells did not cause much harm to the Soviet vehicle. The KV's obvious superiority over German tanks in terms of fire power and armor thickness was evident5.

Infantry units moving behind the column came to the aid of the German tankers. Under the cover of fire from tank guns, for more effective shooting at the KV, the Germans rolled out anti-tank guns onto the road.

Kolobanov noticed the enemy’s preparations and ordered Usov to fire a high-explosive fragmentation shell at the anti-tank guns. The combat guard located behind the KV entered into battle with the German infantry.

Usov managed to destroy one anti-tank gun along with its crew, but the second one managed to fire several shots. One of them broke the panoramic periscope from which Kolobanov was observing the battlefield, and the other, hitting the tower, jammed it. Usov managed to destroy this gun, but the KV lost the ability to maneuver fire. Large additional rotations of the gun to the right and left could now only be done by turning the entire tank body. Essentially, the KV turned into a self-propelled artillery unit.

Nikolai Kiselkov climbed onto the armor and installed a spare periscope instead of the damaged one.6

Kolobanov ordered the senior mechanic-driver, petty officer Nikolai Nikiforov, to remove the tank from the caponier and take up a reserve firing position. In front of the Germans, the tank reversed out of its cover, drove to the side, stood in the bushes and again opened fire on the column. Now the driver-mechanic had to work hard. Following Usov's orders, he turned the HF in the right direction.

Finally, the last 22nd tank was destroyed.

During the battle, which lasted more than an hour, senior sergeant A. Usov fired 98 shells at enemy tanks and anti-tank guns, all of which were armor-piercing shells7. Further observation showed that several German tanks were able to break through to the Voyskovitsy state farm from the south.

The battalion commander contacted the crew. Spiller asked in a loud voice:

- Kolobanov, how are you? Are they burning?

-They burn well, comrade battalion commander!

The senior lieutenant reported that the crew destroyed an enemy tank column of 22 combat vehicles. Its crew is no longer able to hold its position, since the ammunition is running out, there are no armor-piercing shells at all, and the tank itself has received serious damage.

Shpiller thanked the crew for the successful completion of the combat mission and reported that the tanks of Lieutenant Lastochkin and Junior Lieutenant Degtyar were already on the way to the Voyskovitsy state farm. Kolobanov ordered Nikiforov to join them. Having placed the remaining infantrymen from the combat guard on the armor (many of them were wounded), the KV with the landing party on the armor rushed to the breakthrough. The Germans did not get involved in a battle with the Russian tank, and the KV easily reached the outskirts of the state farm. Here Kolobanov met with the commanders of the approaching tanks.

From them he learned that in the battle on the Luga road, the crew of Lieutenant Fedor Sergeev destroyed eight German tanks, and the crew of Junior Lieutenant Maxim Evdokimenko - five. The junior lieutenant was killed in this battle, three members of his crew were wounded. Only the driver-mechanic Sidikov survived. The fifth German tank destroyed by the crew in this battle was attributed to the driver: Sidikov rammed it. The HF itself was disabled. The tanks of junior lieutenant Degtyar and lieutenant Lastochkin burned four enemy tanks each on that day.

In total, on August 19, 1941, the tank company destroyed 43 enemy tanks.

Source Armor website of Vasily Chobitok.

Great tank battles. Strategy and tactics. 1939-1945

The influence of aviation and tank forces on the conduct of war

Tank troops may be an integral part of larger combined arms units or organized into a separate strike force with its own support units, including supply and repair, and used in the same way that large masses of cavalry were once used. Although the success of a battle ultimately usually depends on the infantry's ability to hold the captured territory, situations sometimes arise where armored forces can influence local battle tactics, either in cooperation with the infantry or independently. Therefore, tactical training includes both the actions of a tank platoon (from three to six tanks) and the combat tactics of large tank formations - divisions, corps or armies.

Large tank formations usually include infantry in armored personnel carriers, as well as self-propelled artillery units and the necessary auxiliary troops, such as signal troops, engineering, ambulance and supply units. Such large tank formations can be used for frontal advances, flanking attacks, or ground envelopments in the same way that large infantry formations are used for this purpose. Large infantry formations also have their own artillery and support troops. They often have their own armored vehicles. Airborne units are infantry formations transported by transport aircraft or gliders. Or they can be landed as a parachute landing (together with heavy landing equipment). When armored forces are part of an airborne force, they usually act as part of the ground support echelon.

Another type of large formation is a mechanized formation, such as a division. At its core, this is an infantry formation, but in the ratio of armored vehicles and infantry it is more likely to be a tank rather than an infantry (although there are usually fewer tanks than in a tank division) division. Such formations are usually used as separate units, performing an independent task, or as support forces for a tank formation. A type of mechanized force is one in which infantry is transported by helicopter, usually called "air cavalry". Its armored vehicles, just like in airborne formations, can be taken on board a helicopter, but more often act as part of a ground support echelon. The final variation is the triple-purpose division, consisting of a tank brigade, an infantry helicopter brigade, an airborne brigade, and support units.

Infantry in tank units is considered their integral part, and tank and mechanized units in infantry units are considered their regular units. With any type of larger unit, be it tank, infantry, mechanized, airborne or "air cavalry", the infantry in battle can pave the way for the armor, or the armor can simplify or at least make the task easier for the infantry, depending on the conditions at the time time. All of the above troops can be advanced and also come into contact with the enemy at the same time.

Thus, tank forces are guided by the same tactical principles as any type of military force involved in combat with the enemy. In combat operations in the desert, in Eastern, Western, and Central Europe during the Second World War, tank forces played a dominant role; in the mountains of Italy and Burma, this role belonged to infantry and artillery; In the Pacific Islands, the landing stages were ultimately made possible with fewer losses through the use of amphibious armored vehicles. Once one or another branch of the military dominates, others are assigned an important supporting role and the role of an interacting link.

Armored vehicles can be used more than just another type of conventional weaponry and, due to their versatility, can also be used as special types of weapons, including the most unexpected ones. However, commanders often display a lack of imagination or understanding of the technical capabilities of different weapons as they interact with each other. This had a negative impact on the armored forces, and even after fifty years there were no significant changes for the better. Commanders, as a rule, introduce tank troops into battle partially, belittle their capabilities and special use and either expect the impossible from them, or completely ignore their presence, in short, violate tactical principles that they would not even dream of violating in command of others troops. There are many examples during World War II and even in the more recent past that show that commanders still think exclusively in terms of infantry and artillery. The use of armored vehicles and many of the latest weapons has still not become second nature to them.

On the other hand, the use of air power has apparently crystallized into a fundamental concept. In addition to their use for aerial photography and reconnaissance, the use of so-called strategic bomber and tactical aircraft is envisaged. The targets of strategic bombers are the country's industrial targets, although in World War II they also included bombing areas with civilian populations. The tactical use of air power included the bombing of rear areas of fighting armies, troop concentrations, and similar targets, as well as direct interaction with ground forces that came into combat contact with the enemy, both offensively and defensively.

The Germans used tactical airpower primarily in the form of dive bombers instead of artillery during the Blitzkrieg because conventional artillery could not always keep up with the pace of advance taken by German tank forces. The US Marine Corps has also developed the provision of close air support to ground forces to a high level. Partly because of the somewhat separate branches of the military, the level of air support for ground forces by the US Air Force is somewhat lower. At times during World War II, when Army Air Corps pilots acted as ground spotters to identify targets from tanks, the results were extremely impressive. In Korea, the level of interaction was low due to the existence of many chains of command. In Vietnam, things were much better.

All armies recognize the importance of aerial reconnaissance, but sometimes bad weather interferes with it, and the command goes “blind” for a while. Ground reconnaissance by tank units is a satisfactory substitute for short-range reconnaissance, but it cannot replace aerial reconnaissance as long-range reconnaissance.

It is often noted that tanks are vulnerable to attacks by tactical aircraft, but this is a controversial issue. This was often evident during World War II and after. If the tanks are huddled together, or immobile in a concentration position, or are caught in a narrow passage or on soft ground, the effect of an air attack can be catastrophic. But where tanks are dispersed or act decisively and aggressively, and where there is room for maneuver, armored vehicles are no more vulnerable from the air than any other troops.

A British tank officer with three years of desert combat experience was asked about this during World War II. He replied: “I don’t know if my experience is typical, but I can say that I was bombed from the air six times - four times by the Royal Air Force and twice by the Germans - and, as you can see, I am still alive.”

However, it must be said that the advent of armored vehicles in World War I raised morale among the Allies and lowered it among the Germans - even if the armor was poorly used tactically. The Allies were just beginning to assimilate, or rather apply, the principles of the tank strike force (after the Battle of Cambrai), and it was only in preparing plans for 1919 that the application of proven principles of warfare was envisaged.

The plan for 1919, should the war still continue, was to launch frontal attacks with attacking masses of heavy tanks to achieve breakthroughs, with local reconnaissance in force by groups of light tanks. The heavy tanks would be followed by masses of fast medium tanks rushing through the gaps. Formations of light reconnaissance tanks were to concentrate entirely on the task of clearing a path for supply vehicles, supported by aviation, which was also to attack German command posts and supply systems in rear areas.

This was a real lesson in World War I tactics, but it was put into practice later by the Germans. The winners retained in their memory only the actual experience of the war, the way it was fought - the actions of armored vehicles accompanied by infantry. The post-war doctrine of the French was defensive in nature. Firepower was paramount. Tactics were seen as linear - a wave of slowly moving tanks and infantry under the cover of barrage artillery fire, with a highly complex and cumbersome command and communication system. The French system did not allow one to identify enemy weaknesses or take advantage of them when they were discovered, and did not provide interaction with aircraft.

This was basically the system of tactics that was also adopted in other countries, including the United States, although intelligence and air cooperation were discussed elsewhere but in France. And the air forces of different countries fell into their own rut because of the theories advocated by the Italian general Giulio Douhet (1869–1930). His theory of warfare was that area bombing targeting enemy cities could be the quickest way to end the war.

The first opponents of these tactical and strategic methods appeared in England, most notably the late Colonel (later he became Major General) J.F.C. Fuller (1878–1966), one of the authors of the 1919 plan.

Fuller was the first to generalize the theory of the use of tank armies, and in his view, war on land was similar to war at sea. During this period, an attempt was made in England to place the Royal Tank Corps under the command of the Royal Air Force, but it was unsuccessful. Following Fuller, the late Captain B.G. (later Sir Basil) Liddell Hart added the concept of "marines on tanks" to armored infantry (a landing of infantry on tanks) as part of Fuller's idea of marines. Many years later, this concept was implemented by the Russians during World War II. In 1924, Liddell Hart went further and proposed using armored divisions with self-propelled artillery in cooperation with aircraft and paratroopers in both night and day operations, not in frontal attacks, but in a breakthrough to strike enemy headquarters in order to paralyze communications and management. These theories were accepted by the Germans, but were only discussed in other countries.

Fuller and Liddell Hart were joined by other military theorists in England and some in France and the United States. However, on individual occasions after World War I, when armored forces were used in combat, they largely followed French tactics. The experimental tank brigade proposed by Fuller in 1919 did not materialize until 1926, but, after a number of vicissitudes, continued to be supplied with wheeled vehicles, and maneuvers were inevitably arranged in favor of conventional weapons. However, control during the simulated battle was carried out by radio, which was already an achievement for tank forces, in the development of which the British were, perhaps, pioneers in 1930.

In the post-war period, attitudes towards tank forces were often associated with the preconception that tanks would work best with other types of weapons, but no one thought about how best to use them. Anti-tank forces have made a big deal about the idea that tanks can be penetrated by anti-tank guns, but they have never made the equally obvious comparison between the thin skin of a man and a rifle. Both absolute tank enthusiasts and those who considered tanks unnecessary prevented the development of optimal joint tactics.

Dwight F. Davis, then US Secretary of War, observed British mechanized troops on maneuvers in 1927. Upon returning to Washington, he advised General Charles P. Summerall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, to create such a formation “not as part of the infantry or cavalry, but as a new branch of the military.” This was done in July 1928, but, due to the complexity of its equipment and the lack of significant results, great disagreements arose, and these troops were ultimately not created due to lack of funds.

The British abandonment of their experimental mechanized forces in 1928 also poured cold water on armor advocates in the United States, but Adna R. Shaffee, then a major on the General Staff, managed to include in the 1931 budget a specific fund for new troops. General Summerall's last official order before his retirement was the creation and permanent status of mechanized forces as part of the cavalry. This force was viewed more as a technical laboratory than a tactical unit. But disagreements between the branches of the military (infantry and cavalry) and personal rivalries prevented progress in unanimity.

British experiments were soon adopted in Soviet Russia, but the same obstacles (as in England and the USA) in the form of complexity of organization existed there too. In Germany, where tank forces were prohibited by the Versailles Peace Treaties of 1919, tank tactics were developed using mock-ups or models of tanks (for example, using cars). The Germans recognized the importance of the Allied plan of 1919 and studied it, developing their promising tank tactics. Speed and independence of action of tank forces was the main goal of the Germans, but, as in other countries, the use of auxiliary wheeled supply vehicles led to the clumsiness of tank formations. However, the creation of a force in which all vehicles were tracked was impossible in light of the restrictions under the peace treaty and taking into account the industrial capabilities of Germany.

The initiators, France and Britain, were also followed by Japan and Italy. France finally formed light mechanized divisions, but tactically they had to act as a component of the cavalry, and in fact they included cavalry. The French also had units of heavy French tanks, which were supposed to act as an integral part of the infantry formations. The British made a distinction between tank units, which were to accompany the infantry, and other units of faster tanks for reconnaissance. The Germans came to the conclusion that they had found the role that tank troops were called upon to perform, namely, to carry out a breakthrough.

The Spanish Civil War was an opportunity for both Germany and Russia to test weapons and tactics (although Russia's skirmish with Japan on the Mongolian-Manchurian border was of greater significance in this regard). Both countries sent volunteers to Spain, as Italy and, to a lesser extent, France later did. The armored forces gained considerable prominence during this war, much of it to their detriment. Distorted reports about the battle of Guadalajara on March 8, 1937 (on this day, the Italian expeditionary force, 40 thousand people, 120 tanks, 200 guns and 90 aircraft, broke through the Republican front, but later, by March 22, was defeated. - Ed.) ,

had a huge influence on military thought around the world. This battle, and the later Battle of Brunete (July 5–27, 1937), were misrepresented as purely combats between air forces and armored forces, or between armored forces and anti-tank forces. As a result, almost every country other than Germany and Russia accepted the view that the days of tanks were numbered. Even as early as 1939, Brigadier General Henry J. Reilly, in the article “Proving Ground in Spain,” published in the journal Army Artillery, wrote: “The Battle of Firant-d'Ebro convinced both sides that independent tank forces were an illusion and that The tank's role is more modest, but extremely important in supporting the infantry advance." However, at Bilbao and in later battles, the tactic of striking with the lead armored detachment along a narrow front, but in depth with close air support, which Franco used with the help of the Germans, turned out to be extremely successful.

The tactics used in the Spanish Civil War predated those used by the Germans in their attack on Poland in September 1939. There, tank troops were assigned the leading role among all other branches of the military, including aviation, which was subordinate to them. The Germans dominated the air and outnumbered the infantry by a ratio of three to one (one and a half to one - Ed.)

and four to one in armored vehicles. Deep, rapid breakthroughs were carried out by tank forces, supported by dive bombers equipped with wailing sirens. At the same time, these tank groups carried out envelopments and encirclements, and heavy German bombers attacked the rear.

The Polish campaign was a brief dress rehearsal for the invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg and France, which took place the following year, 1940. There the scenario repeated itself, but with a fundamental difference. This time the French and British armored forces outnumbered the Germans. But French and British armored forces were largely distributed among infantry divisions to provide direct infantry support—a principle that remained the basis of French doctrine. The German tactics of a massive tank attack on a narrow sector of the front and with Stuka dive bombers acting as artillery fully justified itself, and the campaign was soon completed (May 10 - June 22). (The complete defeat of the Allies, who lost 84 thousand killed and 1 million 549 thousand prisoners against 45.5 thousand killed by the Germans. - Ed.)

From France the war spread to the Libyan desert. There, tactics involved moving artillery forward under the protection of armored vehicles, infantry and anti-tank guns. The Germans developed a system of luring the British with light tanks, pushing them forward into range of the heavier-armed German tanks, which then tried to attack the British from the flanks. Or British tanks came under fire from deadly German 88-mm guns, which combined the functions of both anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns. Later, the British began to use similar tactics. Each side kept a tank reserve in reserve, which was used to attack the flanks of the opposing side. Tactical air support was used by both sides, but seemed to be used with greater success by the Germans because they had closer cooperation with the Luftwaffe than was demonstrated by the RAF and ground forces.

The US armored force under the command of General Schaffee, formed a year before the United States entered the war, owed its existence in part to the German invasion of Poland. The existing infantry and cavalry with tanks and their accompanying units were combined into a new force, but the problem arose from the two different tactical concepts employed. These concepts developed in the years after the First World War. During this period, any change affecting the basics of infantry and cavalry meant a complete change in tactics and the nature of transport in each branch of the armed forces. Cavalry resisted mechanization from the start until General Douglas MacArthur, when he was Chief of Staff of the US Army, decreed that the traditional role of infantry and cavalry would remain unchanged with the advent of armor.

The National Defense Act of 1920 assigned tanks to the infantry and abolished the tank corps that existed in World War I, relegating tanks to the category of “fighting vehicles.” A similar legislative ploy occurred in France. In the United States, the cavalry view of mobility prevailed in relation to armored divisions, these divisions were formed in a new way, and the role of infantry as escort forces was embodied in the creation of separate tank battalions. This largely coincided with the final formation of the British Army structure in the form of armored divisions and army tank brigades.

Shortly after the United States entered World War II, a force of self-propelled anti-tank guns was created. But during the war, tank destroyers began to approach tanks in appearance, as well as in tactics, or were used in the same way as conventional artillery, so that after the war the command of self-propelled anti-tank guns merged with the command of armored forces.

The tactics of American armored forces during the war depended largely on the theater of war and the experience of senior commanders in their use. The theoretical concept placed more emphasis on mobility than on armor thickness, yet in practice armored forces trained to operate mobile were subordinated to the actions of slow-moving assault units. In society towards the end of the war, American tanks were much criticized for their relatively thin armor. (The frontal armor of the Sherman, 76–51 mm, was thicker than that of the T-34, 45 mm, but significantly inferior to the frontal armor of the Tigers and Panthers, 100 mm and more. - Ed.)

But this criticism was the result of a paradoxical discrepancy between tactical instructions and actual combat use. With the exception of a few brilliant examples of practice (following theory) by Generals Wood and Patton, tanks were increasingly used primarily to accompany infantry. Indeed, after 1943, the standard corps in the US Army consisted of two infantry divisions.

However, there are three important American contributions to armored tactics. The first was to use small communications aircraft to detect enemy armored vehicles, their dispositions and camouflaged anti-tank guns, as well as artillery positions. The second contribution was the use of jeeps (often called "peeps" in the military), which also allowed for ground reconnaissance and were also used to supply hot food in battle and urgently evacuate the wounded. The third contribution was the use of armored vehicles in amphibious landings, although the British contribution in this latter area was much greater.

The tactics used by the Germans on the Russian front were at first the same as those they had previously used in Poland and France. It was successful locally, but failed overall. The spaces of Russia were extremely vast, and the Russians were numerous. Russian soldiers had great endurance, which allowed them to cover vast distances on foot in order to avoid being captured by pincers. In addition, they were accustomed to life in nature. So the Russians could be cut off from their supply bases for a long time, while the Germans' supply problems increased as they advanced. In addition, the Russians, using guerrilla tactics, often succeeded in cutting off the motorized support units of the Germans from their armored forces. As a result, the Germans considered it necessary to armor the truck cabs and add armored vehicles to their columns to protect their rear from partisan attacks.

There was another factor that was often overlooked when analyzing the German failures in Russia in comparison with their earlier victories. Before the start of the Russian campaign, the Germans weakened their tank divisions, reducing the number of tanks in them (however, the striking power of the German tank division was not reduced due to the larger number of medium tanks Pz Kw III and Pz Kw IV. - Ed.)

and increasing the number of infantry operating with them (and the number of tank divisions. -
Ed.).
This was done partly to make the Russians believe that Germany had many more tank divisions than they actually had, and partly because of internal political controversy over the role of tanks versus assault guns, and partly because the inability of tank production to make up for losses.
In 1939, most German tank divisions had an average of 324 tanks, by the summer of 1941 - 196 tanks. By 1945, this number had fallen to a hundred, only partly due to losses. The Germans in 1941 used only 2434 (incorrect - Ed.)
of their 5264 tanks, the Russians - 24 thousand. In three months, the Russians lost 17,500 tanks, and the Germans - 550. (According to W. Müller-Hillebrand, “German Land Army , 1939–1945", after two and a half months of fighting in German tank formations on the Eastern Front, out of 3,387 tanks (plus 350 OKH reserve tanks, reserve battalion tanks and assault guns), 702 tanks were completely out of action and 542 tanks were under repair. Soviet the losses are overestimated, however, it should be noted that during a retreat, not only destroyed but also damaged tanks are lost, which the advancing side can repair many times. According to other sources, our losses in three months amounted to about 10 thousand tanks. -
Ed.)
By the way, Interestingly, both England and the United States reorganized most of their armored divisions following news of these changes from the Germans. This was done due to the belief that the changes the Germans made were dictated by their experiences, when in fact the Germans did exactly the opposite.

The Russians ceded territory in exchange for time. Their armor was used defensively and not effectively, but they learned quickly, and when they went on the offensive at Stalingrad, they had plenty of new, modern tanks and were using the same tactics that the Germans had used in the invasion of France, and quite extensively. The Russians' main tank formation was a tank corps, the equivalent of a Western or German armored division. The corps formed tank armies, and tank troops were never assigned to infantry armies as a special strike force, but acted independently under the direct control of the Supreme Command.

Perhaps this was due to the fact that personal initiative was generally not approved of in the Red Army. Operations often consisted of subordinate commanders being given maps on which the exact roads their units and even individual vehicles were to follow were marked with colored lines, and they were expected to strictly follow orders. The connection was poor, and once the set pace of the heavy nature of the movement was unchanged. The situation improved somewhat in the summer of 1943, when all tanks were equipped with radio communications, but this actually tightened rather than loosened controls.

The Russians were not dismayed by heavy losses and used military cunning. Concentration at the suspected attack site usually took place after dark. Diversionary attacks and setting up false positions were commonplace. The Russians often laid mines immediately after their successful tank attack in order to prevent counterattacks. The artillery preparation was not stereotypical. She did not follow a certain pattern and was always thorough. Infiltration before attack was widely used. Even forest fires were used for tactical purposes.

Because subordinate commanders were afraid to deviate from plans, the Russian army sometimes accomplished the impossible in swamps, mud, blizzards or extreme cold. For example, one day the Germans hoped that a river in a deep gorge would serve as protection for one of their flanks. The Russians crossed this gorge together with armored vehicles, connecting the tanks with a thick towing rope. Thus, seven tanks were in the air at the same time. Russian tanks with rotating tracks were lowered from one side of the gorge and dragged to the other, where they were winched by advanced groups that crossed to the opposite bank with the necessary equipment.

Improvisation, the ability of which distinguishes Russian troops, fit perfectly into the logic of their actions, but was often disastrous in its surprise for the Germans. This was partly due to the fact (the experience of all countries speaks to this) that soldiers without the skill of driving a car often become the best tank drivers. People accustomed to caution and restrictions when driving cars on police-patrolled highways face difficulties in assessing and making the most of mobility on rough terrain (but not Russian tractor drivers behind the levers of a tank! - Ed.).

This can also explain the control of armored vehicles by the North Koreans in 1950–1953. And this can explain why armored vehicles were so often used illiterately in the past from the point of view of command. The German assessment of the American combat use of armored vehicles during World War II was in this sense that the Americans were clearly tied to the roads and tried to avoid forests and dense undergrowth. The Chinese in the Korean War had the same opinion regarding the American tendency to organize all attacks in exactly the same predictable pattern. And, at least to the casual observer, the armored forces in Vietnam were also, to a large extent, clearly tied to the roads.

As in other armies, the Russians had small reserves or did without them at all, but tried to suppress them with masses. The tanks took infantry on board and attacked in waves along a wide front. The goal was to break through with significant forces behind enemy lines. Then their actions could be considered effective. Russian tanks often did not engage in battle with enemy armored vehicles and artillery (primarily anti-tank), leaving their destruction to their self-propelled artillery units and attack aircraft.

Both the Russians and the Germans used ski soldiers in winter operations, 4–5 per tank. Sometimes an armored sleigh was pulled behind the tank on a trailer, transporting infantry for an attack in the winter. In any case, the infantry accompanying the tanks did not operate at the pace of foot soldiers, but moved in one way or another at the speed of an armored vehicle, becoming what Liddell Hart once called "tank marines."

In the early days of World War II in the United States, armored forces were widely advertised. These advertisements were spectacular, and many (both military and civilian) had no doubt about their success. Later, in other theaters of war, where room for maneuver was limited and the commander was still committed to frontal attacks and the use of firepower, the same people sharply changed their minds, concluding that armored vehicles were not needed or, at best, would henceforth be suitable only for small-scale operations. groups or together with infantry. The courage was gone, and firepower again became of primary importance. Almost like in the First World War, everything happened again - the industrial power of one side opposed the industrial power of the other.

The war in the Pacific required the use of completely different tactics. Coverage in operations at sea called “Operation Silence” in the First World War, which, although planned, never materialized, was long forgotten, and only the fiasco at Gallipoli was remembered (the Dardanelles operation, unsuccessful for the Allies, 02/19/1915-09/01 .1916. - Ed.).

However, the invention of the amphibious tank by J. Walter Christie in 1923 gave impetus to the development of amphibious landing technology for the US Marine Corps. Roebling's floating tractor from the 1930s was converted into an LVT, or tracked amphibian, for World War II amphibious operations. These vehicles, together with the shallow-draft landing craft, were originally designed for use in the landing of troops in Norway (the operation was not carried out) and, in conjunction with tactical support from the air (aviation) and sea (naval artillery fire), formed the basis for the tactics developed by the corps Marine Corps. This tactic was later also used by the US Army in a number of amphibious landing operations, which made a major contribution to land warfare in the gradual creation and expansion of coastal beachheads.

Night combat using armored vehicles was used in World War II, by the Allies several times and by the Russians many times. Typically, such attacks were carried out on moonlit nights, so that tanks and infantry steadily stayed on their intended course. The Russians made extensive use of searchlights in night operations and openly used the lights of tanks and vehicles. Today, most armies have developed active and passive night vision devices for use on tanks in night combat. (At the end of the war, in particular in the battles near Lake Balaton in March 1945, the Germans advanced at night, using night vision devices mounted on tanks. - Ed.)

Military thought in the United States after World War II was moving back to where it had been since World War I, although propaganda continued to be paid to extol "mobility." In fact, a parallel could be drawn with the way in which the 1919 plan was abandoned after the end of the First World War because it was eclipsed by the operations that led to its adoption. Armored forces in the United States after World War II were considered unnecessary, partly due to wishful thinking and propaganda by air force partisans, and also due to the development of the atomic bomb.

...about the real strength of the KV in relation to German tanks and the heroism of the Russian soldier...