The US Armed Forces have approached today's aggravation of the international situation fully armed - with a set of the most advanced concepts of warfare, with experienced command personnel, with fundamentally improved management methods. Is the Russian army the complete opposite?
These are the conclusions of military expert Vladimir Denisov. His article, published in Novaya Gazeta, provides a comparative analysis of the construction and development of the world's two leading armies - American and Russian. Military science in our country has been ruined, the expert believes, there are no new ideas and concepts. Western experience is unreasonably ignored. The generals are preparing for the last war. In a hypothetical clash between the “wise” American army and the “unwise Russian”, the latter can be rescued either by a miracle, or by some gamer with innovative ideas and an unconventional approach to warfare. Such “analytical” calculations can cause alarmist sentiments among part of our society. But is it really so?
Prostration
In the early 90s, the Russian army found itself in a difficult situation. There has been a radical turn in strategic guidelines. Many previous ideas about the goals, means and methods of defending the country were overthrown, a number of key principles for ensuring its security were recognized as erroneous, and previous provisions on the direction and nature of military development were discarded. The new Russia has set a course for rapprochement with the West. Former adversaries suddenly turned into allies or partners, and former allies became either potential enemies or neutral countries. The state leadership made unprecedented concessions, including agreeing to completely curtail its military presence in Eastern Europe.
The sharply narrowed economic base did not allow the state to maintain a multimillion-dollar army, timely update its technical arsenal, develop and produce modern types of weapons and military equipment on the same scale, or accumulate the necessary mobilization reserves. In fact, it was necessary to create new Armed Forces, but there was no political will and material resources for this, and the country was in deep socio-economic decline. As a result, after the decision was made to create the RF Armed Forces, military reform was reduced to a reduction in troops and forces without carrying out their qualitative transformation.
The beginning of the 90s was characterized by a series of armed conflicts on the territory of the former USSR. To stop them, to stop the bloodshed, Russian military personnel were faced with the need to solve peacekeeping tasks in Tajikistan, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. And despite the rather “difficult” state of the Armed Forces, these tasks were successfully completed.
In a difficult military-political situation, a counter-terrorism operation was carried out in the North Caucasus. The Armed Forces, intended to repel external aggression, were forced, together with other security forces, to conduct combat operations with gangs on their territory. I had to relearn on the fly. Today, no one doubts that at that time Russia faced not isolated groups of ideological separatists, but a well-organized and generously paid from abroad terrorist attack on our country.
Based on the results of the CTO, conclusions were drawn. Firstly, the Armed Forces must be prepared in advance for the fight against terrorist groups, and secondly, terrorism must be fought proactively, not waiting for it to come to our home. These findings were taken into account when deciding to conduct an operation in Syria.
Petrine reform of the Russian army
The need for military reforms by Peter I was caused by the fact that by the time the new tsar ascended the throne (1689), Russia lagged behind the most advanced countries of Western Europe not only economically, but also militarily.
The basis of the Russian army at that time was the noble militia and the Streltsy army. The first arose at the end of the 15th century and consisted of nobles, as well as boyar children, who were obliged to arrive for military service on their own horse, with weapons, and accompanied by slaves at first request. The Streletsky army, created in the 40-50s of the 16th century, was recruited from townspeople and rural residents. Since military service for the Streltsy was considered lifelong and hereditary, they were usually settled on government lands and allowed to start a family and engage in trades. The recruiting conditions adopted at that time ultimately led to the fact that the combat readiness of the old military formations and the level of discipline in them were kept at a low level. The task was also complicated by the fact that the troops were subordinate to different Orders: the nobles - to the Razryadny, the archers - to Streletsky. There was also a Reitarsky order, which dealt with the regiments of the new system, formed mainly according to Western models. Naturally, such a division in control also had a negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the army.
There was also no regular navy in Russia. The existing small flotillas of medium-sized sailing and rowing ships were intended mainly to protect trade routes along the Volga, Dnieper, Don, Caspian Sea, Siberian rivers and the White Sea. Meanwhile, many countries in Western Europe and the Middle East already had large naval forces by that time. It is fair to say that for a hundred years Russia found itself cut off from the main sea routes that previously connected it with Europe. The Black Sea was in the hands of Turkey, and the Baltic Sea was closed by Sweden. Only the White Sea remained open. But it was removed from the main centers of the country and advanced Western European states.
To bring the power out of its backward state, it was also necessary to eliminate its isolation from the developed Western European states. New armed forces were needed, because the old military formations were unable to solve complex military-political problems. And the power’s fleet was still helpless. Peter I acutely felt this during the Azov campaigns, which convinced him of the need for immediate military reforms, and the uprising of the Streltsy in 1698 finally disabused him of their loyalty.
On November 8, 1699, the young king issued a decree “On the admission to service as soldiers from all free people.” Thus, conscription was introduced, which covered all tax-paying classes. Recruits were supplied from 10-15 households each. The soldiers were torn away from home and work. Military service became basic and lifelong for them. The service life of recruits then changed: from 1793 it was reduced to 25 years, from 1834 - to 20 years. In 1855-1872. 12, 10 and 7-year service periods are established successively. In 1874, conscription was replaced by universal military service.
The defeat at Narva accelerated the reorganization of the army. By 1705, on the basis of the recruiting system, principles for recruiting field and garrison troops were developed. The first included the regiments of the new formation, and the garrison regiments were served by archers and young soldiers, who, having completed their training, were sent to the field troops. By 1707, the field army numbered about 100 thousand people. This was required by the difficult military situation. The Swedish army was superior to the Russian both in the quality of weapons and in the qualifications of officers who had extensive combat experience. Therefore, in the initial period of the Northern War, Peter I sought a numerical superiority on the battlefields, but, having won a victory at Poltava (1709), he considered it possible to reduce the armed forces and stabilize the army staff.
The organization of the army was influenced by the nature and goals of military battles. First of all, the main types of troops were created - infantry, cavalry and artillery; later the need arose for engineering troops, without which the siege of fortresses, the equipment of defensive lines and fortified camps were unthinkable. They were officially created in February 1712, according to the staff of the miner company and the team of pontooners approved by Peter I. Soon the “Regiment of Military Engineers” was formed. After all these transformations, the domestic army reached the level of the armies of the most advanced countries in Europe.
During the creation of the Russian armed forces, Peter I had to face the problems of providing the army with weapons, ammunition, equipment, and food. Since the industry available in the country at that time was unable to satisfy the needs of the army, at the direction of the tsar, large arms factories were built in Tula and Sestroretsk, and factories for the production of guns and ammunition were created in the central and southern regions of the country, in the Urals and in the Olonets region .
At the end of 1708, the rearmament of the Russian army was practically completed. The infantry was equipped with the best smoothbore guns in the world, which had a single caliber, a convenient curved butt and an all-metal bayonet. Russian guns were inferior to European muskets in range, but at the same time they had a twofold superiority in rate of fire. Grenadier companies produced grenades, and each infantry regiment had a pair of three-pounder guns and four light mortars. As we can see, the Russian infantry could successfully conduct long-range and close combat, and fight in bayonet attacks.
Dragoons (cavalry) were armed with carbines, long-barreled pistols and broadswords. In addition, one of the companies of the dragoon regiment was armed with grenades. In 1723, hussar regiments were created, which were irregular detachments. They were formed from Serbs, Moldovans and Vlachs.
During Peter's military reform, a uniform military uniform was introduced. It should be noted that although in the Russian army back in the 17th century, that is, almost half a century earlier than in the most advanced countries of Europe, each regiment had its own uniform, it was not standard. This created difficulties in controlling troops during battle, and uniform unification was required. As a result, green caftans and black hats are introduced for infantrymen, and blue caftans and black hats for cavalrymen.
The success of the army reorganization depended to a large extent on the quality and speed of officer training. At first, all young nobles were required to serve as ordinary soldiers in the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky Guards regiments. After receiving the initial officer rank, they were sent to military units, service in which became a lifelong obligation for young nobles. However, such a system of training officers was not able to fully satisfy the growing needs for new officers, and Peter I founded a number of specialized military schools. In 1701, an artillery school was opened in Moscow for the simultaneous training of up to three hundred people, and a year later in St. Petersburg another one for a similar purpose was opened. To train army engineering personnel, two engineering schools were established in 1708 and 1719. In 1721, garrison schools opened to train non-commissioned officers. During the reign of Peter I, about 50 such schools were opened in Russia.
Another form of officer training was the business trips of young nobles to Europe to study military affairs. A unified system of military ranks was also introduced in the new regular army, which was finally formalized in the Table of Ranks announced on January 24, 1722. Most of the military ranks of the Peter the Great era existed without changes until 1917.
The assertions widespread among Western European and modern, liberal, domestic historians about the decisive role of foreign officers in Peter’s army are unfounded. They are true only for the first years of its existence, when the Russian government, due to a lack of its own personnel, was forced to actively use foreigners. But many of them had little knowledge of military affairs, spoke Russian poorly, and treated soldiers poorly. The betrayal of a large group of foreign officers and generals near Narva forced Peter I to take decisive measures to begin training command staff from Russian nobles. As a result, the Russian army began to receive its own qualified officer personnel - infantry, artillery, and engineers. And already in 1711, the number of foreigners in the regiments was limited to a third, and by 1720 there were only a few of them left in the Russian army.
The statements about the structure of the Russian army according to Western European models also do not correspond to reality. Peter I carefully studied the military organizations of many European countries and did not accept either the Swedish, Austrian, or Prussian systems. He created his own army, corresponding to the socio-political conditions of our country at that time. It was a truly Russian army both in its national composition and moral and combat qualities. Its warriors accepted all the best that was characteristic of the previous Russian troops and, in general, of the people themselves: perseverance, patience in hardship and misfortune, endurance, the ability to self-sacrifice, courage and courage. These remarkable qualities were fully revealed in the Northern War, by the end of which the Russian army became truly regular in all aspects: it had a uniform procedure for recruiting and training officers; well-organized organization and standard weapons; was completely supported by the state. Later, the principles of its organization were borrowed by many Western European countries.
The formation of a regular domestic navy began with a well-known historical document - the resolution of the Boyar Duma of October 20, 1696, which contains the significant phrase - “there will be sea vessels.”
Soon after the Azov campaigns, Peter I, by royal decree, introduced a special ship duty, which applied to all landowners (secular and spiritual), merchants and other trading people. By the beginning of 1700, most of the warships planned for the Azov Fleet were built. Active construction of ships for the fleet was also carried out during the Northern War, which required the creation of a new Baltic Fleet.
Initially, rowing ships were built, but soon a naval sailing fleet also appeared. Sailboats had great seaworthiness, strong artillery and were used mainly for combat in the open sea. The fleet was staffed similarly to the army through conscription. Two-thirds of the ship's crews were sailors and gunners, one-third were naval soldiers-boarders.
Officer cadres were formed from young nobles who were trained in specially created schools. The first nautical school in Russia was opened in 1698 in Azov. She trained sailors for the Azov Fleet. In 1701, the School of Mathematical and Navigational Sciences was established in Moscow, in which 500 noble children were already studying three years later. In 1715, its senior classes were transferred to St. Petersburg, and their graduates became students of the first Maritime Academy of Russia. Simultaneously with the training of officers within the country, it was widely practiced to send young nobles to study maritime affairs in Spain, Italy, France, England and Holland.
Some historians associate the successes of the Russian fleet in the Northern War, primarily with the names of foreign specialists and naval officers who were in the service of Peter I. But facts and documents refute these statements. After the Azov campaigns, the young tsar was forced to allow the recruitment of shipwrights, technicians, and engineers abroad. However, under the guise of specialists, many foreigners who were completely unfamiliar with shipbuilding arrived in Russia. When the obvious unsuitability of foreign “masters” was discovered, they were immediately sent back, and only a few of them provided real assistance in creating the fleet. In the majority, especially in the second half of the reign of Peter I, Russian craftsmen supervised ship work. The same thing happened with the officer cadres. On the eve of the Northern War, Peter I actually recruited naval officers abroad. However, many of them, having not subsequently won the tsar’s trust, were gradually replaced by Russian sailors trained in special educational institutions in Russia.
The reorganization of the Russian army and the creation of the domestic navy were accompanied by a reform of military administration. Before Peter I in Russia there were up to 20 military orders alone. In addition to the three already named (Razryadny, Streletsky, Reitarsky), Inozemsky, Pushkarsky, Oruzheyny, Bromny, Stvolny, etc. were engaged in various military affairs. All of them were independent of one another, had independent staffs, were divided into tables (departments) according to the names of cities or functional responsibilities. Such a narrow departmental division not only made it difficult to control troops, but also scattered forces and resources. In 1711, Peter I founded the Governing Senate, and under him the Discharge Table and the Commissariat were created. The first of them was responsible for recruiting the Russian army, the second was in charge of financing and providing the armies with food, uniforms, ammunition and weapons. Artillery issues were managed, as before, by the Order of Artillery, which received a special staff in 1712.
The establishment of these bodies marked the beginning of the process of centralization of military affairs. In 1719, at the final stage of the Northern War, the Military Collegium was founded; it was in charge of the field army, garrison troops “and all other military affairs that occur throughout the state.” The first president of this body was Peter’s talented associate, A.D. Menshikov. The new, collegial system differed from the previous, orderly system, primarily in that one body was responsible for resolving all military issues. In addition, the powers of the Military Collegium, like the other 11 colleges, extended to the territory of the entire state, which excluded a departmental and parochial approach to resolving military-political issues.
The management of the troops themselves also underwent changes. During the war period, it was carried out through the field headquarters, which later transformed into the General Staff. The main duties of the chief of field staff were performed by the quartermaster general. This position, introduced in 1701, was first occupied by Prince A.F. Shakhovskoy. The military campaign office was always with him. Attaching great importance to clear command and control of troops, Peter I in 1711 established the duties of the quartermaster general and the size of the quartermaster unit. The quartermaster generals were responsible for inspecting and describing the terrain and roads, troop movements, and organizing reconnaissance. They were also in charge of other staff affairs. Quartermaster positions were also introduced in regiments, brigades, and divisions. The main unit of account was the battalion, and the highest unit was the regiment. The regiment commander had a headquarters, which included three senior and eight junior officers.
The management system of the Russian navy was also subjected to strict centralization. Until the 18th century, it was managed either by the Vladimir order or on behalf of individuals. In 1700, the Vladimir Order was transformed into the Order of Admiralty Affairs. With the beginning of the construction of the Baltic Fleet, Peter I entrusted its leadership to the Governor of St. Petersburg A.D. Menshikov. In 1718, the Admiralty Collegium was formed, at the head of which Peter I put his talented associate General Admiral F.M. Apraksina. With the formation of this central institution, confusion and duplication in the management of maritime and naval affairs is eliminated. The Russian fleet received unified control, which lasted until the mid-19th century.
The creation of new Russian armed forces also required changes to the existing system of training and education of troops and naval crews. The training of soldiers under Peter I was distinguished by its simplicity and practicality. Soldiers and sailors were required not to act mechanically, but to have a meaningful understanding of what to do, how to do it, and why to do it. Education was built on similar principles, which did not include blind obedience, but the fulfillment of military duty to defend the Fatherland. Peter I attached primary importance to the establishment of strict military discipline, the cultivation of courage, perseverance and bravery. In his instructions, he repeatedly noted that victory is accompanied by “good practices, brave hearts, and good weapons.” The new military rituals, orders and medals he introduced in the army and navy also served the purposes of patriotic education.
As we can see, the military reforms of Peter I affected all aspects of the formation and activities of the Russian army and navy of that time. This difficult process took place during the difficult Northern War. Russia's armed forces were simultaneously created, trained and fought. The most important regulations of the Peter the Great era were the “Military Charter” (1716) and the “Naval Charter” (1720). Both documents reflected the views of Peter I on the role of the country's armed forces. “Every patentee,” it is written in the addition to the “Naval Regulations,” “who has a single land army has one hand, and who has a fleet, has both hands.” Many experts believe that in terms of their theoretical and practical significance, these Peter’s regulations are incomparably higher than foreign regulations of that time. The military reforms of Peter I, which were of great importance for the Russian state, were legally enshrined in military and naval regulations.
Sources: Anisimov E. State transformations with the autocracy of Peter the Great in the first quarter of the 18th century in St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 1997. pp. 113-117. Anisimov E. Time of Peter’s reforms L.: Lenizdat, 1989. P. 177-183. Matsulenko S. Military reforms // Military History Journal. 1988. No. 8. pp. 83-86. Shishov A. Creation of the Russian regular army by Peter the Great // Landmark. 2000. No. 3. P. 28-33.
One-man theater
The United States at this time was developing its armed forces in the most favorable conditions since the end of World War II. The military development was based on the conclusions drawn from the confrontation between the international coalition and Iraq in 1991. Let us recall that it was characterized by deep envelopment of enemy positions, delivery of the main strike bypassing defensive lines, and most importantly, a sharp increase in the contribution of the Air Force to the success of combat operations.
The conflict of a new generation was the NATO war against Yugoslavia, the goals of which were achieved without the active involvement of ground forces.
The main efforts in the construction of the American Armed Forces were focused on mastering the forms and methods of conducting non-contact wars. It was believed that the task of defeating the enemy would be accomplished by missile strikes and aviation, and the task of the ground forces would only be to consolidate the success achieved.
The training of the US Armed Forces was aimed at mastering a new generation of wars - rebel wars, proxy wars (proxy wars), hybrid wars, counterinsurgency wars. Their implementation made it possible to replace unwanted governments by force if this problem could not be solved by a “color revolution.” Such wars do not require the deployment of large groups of troops (forces). Sufficiently trained special operations forces and effective fire support.
The US Armed Forces began to rapidly introduce information technology into troop command and control, mastering hybrid methods of warfare and network-centric approaches to leadership. In this regard, competition between branches of the armed forces has intensified for their role and place in modern operations and, most importantly, for the amount of funding.
The development of new concepts of combat operations was put on stream. In the development of each main interspecific doctrine, concepts of the second level (specific), then the third (comprehensive support) were developed. For each, programs for their implementation were prepared and resources were allocated. The process was avalanche-like. America could afford such a wasteful approach.
This period is characterized by complete freedom of action for the United States, although their allies were also allowed something. The global leadership of the United States resulted in a kind of status quo, in which the West essentially had a monopoly on the use of military force on the world stage. America now, without regard to the Soviet Union, replaced undesirable governments and started wars. This is what happened in Yugoslavia, Iraq, this is what should have happened in Syria.
Our country did not adequately respond to NATO aggression against Yugoslavia. But Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's turn over the Atlantic was a clear signal to the West that we have our own national interests.
Realizing this and sensing the growing power of Russia, seeing it as a geopolitical competitor to the West, the United States finally abandoned peace-loving rhetoric, openly declared itself the winner in the Cold War and took the path of direct confrontation.
Reforms to please the enemy
The acceleration of reform in the Armed Forces was facilitated by the operation carried out in August 2008 to force Georgia to peace. It became obvious that our strength would continue to be tested. Therefore, it was necessary to quickly reorient the RF Armed Forces (which to a certain extent represented a smaller copy of the army and navy of the USSR) to prepare for waging local wars and armed conflicts of a limited scale.
By December 1, 2009, under the leadership of Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov, the Russian Armed Forces were rapidly brought to a new look. There was not a single area of military development, the life of the army and navy that would not undergo the most radical reform. The number of armed forces (up to a million people) and officers was reduced (from 335 to 150 thousand), instead of the previous six military districts, four “large” ones were created, which are interspecific associations, the structure of formations and associations, military command bodies was changed, the personnel training system was rebuilt and maintenance of reserve formations, armed forces infrastructure.
The peculiarity of the reform was the speed of the measures carried out and the absence of reasonable, justified, calculated plans, which was passed off as a virtue. Military science was accused of being “unprincipled” and lacking the necessary theoretical developments to enable military development. Therefore, all transformations were carried out according to Western patterns; instead of thoughtful and well-founded concepts and plans, the basis for reform was based on the experience of building American armed forces without any comprehension and adaptation to domestic conditions. The historical experience and traditions of the Russian, Red and Soviet armies were fundamentally ignored. The imitation of the US Army reached the point of curiosity. Thus, the Americans formed brigades as units with a rigid organizational structure. Previously, their brigades, which were part of divisions, did not have permanent combat personnel. At the same time, the divisional management link was retained. We, having not fully studied the American experience, liquidated our divisions, formed brigades on their basis and switched to the battalion-brigade-army system.
The rotational principle of serving in operational and strategic headquarters was intensively introduced. Its essence was that every officer, after three years of service at headquarters, must be transferred to another position (command or teaching). The Americans, on the contrary, increased the period of service in the highest headquarters and, moreover, gave the heads of military command and control bodies the right to extend it for individual, most trained officers.
As a result of this approach to reform, even reasonable ideas without appropriate preliminary elaboration and support in practice were brought to the point of absurdity and brought harm instead of benefit. The transformation of all formations into forces of constant readiness led to the destruction of the system of training reserve formations, without which it is possible to conduct combat operations in a local war at most, but in a regional one it is no longer possible.
The central bodies of military command and staff were reduced, but at the same time the level of their competence and, as a consequence, the quality of troop leadership at all levels sharply decreased.
The lack of personnel did not allow formations and military units to carry out tasks as intended. The size of the officer corps did not correspond to the tasks facing the Armed Forces.
Groupings in strategic and operational directions could not act independently. They demanded reinforcement of combat and logistical support units. Significant sections of the state border turned out to be uncovered by troops (forces).
The military education system was brought to a critical state. A powerful blow has been dealt to military science. The creation of the Aerospace Defense Forces did not lead to an increase in the efficiency of solving air defense problems. The level of combat effectiveness of air bases, which were formed instead of air regiments and divisions, decreased significantly.
The measures taken by reformers during 2010–2011 to debug new systems and military command and control bodies did not produce results.
The situation with equipping the army and navy with weapons and military equipment was especially bad. Suffice it to say that by 2012, the level of serviceable equipment in the troops was no more than 47 percent.
In general, large-scale and radical transformations carried out in a short time led to a significant reduction in the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces.
XVII century: preface to the Russian regular army
The beginning of the tenth years found our army in a difficult state: there were professional military personnel, militias, worthy developments in military equipment and even the export of weapons. But the defense had to be restored from the deep devastation caused by the recent unrest. Despite the lack of money, they began to restore the army hastily, faster than anything else in the state. The fallen qualifications of the personnel were treated by a sharp modernization of individual units with the transition to advanced standards.
...All this happened four centuries ago - at the beginning of the 17th century.
***
At the beginning of the 17th century, the Russian army was represented by three main units: the noble militia, the archers and the artillery (outfit). They were different in the method of formation, social composition and quality.
Noble militia or local army - cavalry, consisting of “serving people in the fatherland,” i.e. children of boyars and nobles (hereinafter, in relation to all of them we will use the concept “nobles” for brevity) and their military slaves (“boyar people”).
Within the nobility, there were “Moscow ranks” (stewards, solicitors, Moscow nobles and tenants) and the city (provincial) nobility. Hundreds of nobles from one locality were formed, and one of the “Moscow officials” was appointed as their commander. A hundred could have more or less than 100 people. According to the same territorial principle, servile hundreds were formed, receiving commanders from the nobility. In peacetime, hundreds could unite into larger units. Those of the nobles who could not go to cavalry service served in garrisons (city service), in archers or in infantry.
The service of the nobility was lifelong and hereditary. Disability was not always a reason for exclusion from it. They entered the service at the age of 18. Entry into the service was called “layout” and was accompanied by the assignment of a salary. “Noviks” received the rank of their father, which made the career of provincial nobles very difficult.
Reviews of the militia were carried out periodically, but there were no joint exercises or coordination of hundreds in peacetime. There were no training shootings either. One half of the militia carried out field or guard service for six months, the other half carried out city (garrison) service, after which they were rotated. Formally, leave was provided only for injury or illness. The bulk of the field hundreds were concentrated in the southern districts to repel a possible invasion of the Crimeans.
For their service, the nobles received land (in the form of estates) and cash salaries. Since the time of Boris Godunov, the minimum size of the estate was determined at 100 chety (a chety is equal to approximately 0.5 dessiatines of arable land), and the monetary salary was 5 rubles. in year. Moscow officials had significantly higher salaries than city nobles. Money was paid only for field and guard services; policemen were not paid. Horse, weapons and food are your own, serf(s) and horses are at your own expense. The minimum cost of a war horse is 15 rubles, firearms - 10 rubles.
By the end of the 16th century, the local fund was exhausted. “Noviks” began to receive estates that were significantly less than the norm; cases arose when they had to wait for the estate to be settled for several years. This had a sharply negative impact on the armament of the militias. At the beginning of the 17th century, every militia member was required to have: a arquebus or carbine, a pistol and a saber, or a saadak, a pistol and a saber, but this was not carried out. But practically most of them could not fulfill the requirements.
Here is an example of what the city nobles were armed with at the review (however, it dates back to a later time): in the regiment of the governor of Lvov in 1645, out of 665 landowners, 425 had pistols (mostly one), 44 had a carbine, only 16 had a carbine and a pistol , 79 – saadak (bow with arrows), 87 – saber, 1 – spear, 6 – without weapons. It is difficult to imagine what their slaves were armed with in this case.
The number of the noble militia, together with their slaves, was about 50 thousand people. There were approximately equal numbers of nobles and serfs in it. The formation of the militia was handled by the Rank Order, and the allocation of land by the Local Order. That. the militia had a double subordination.
The Streltsy were a permanent, paid army. They were united in orders consisting of 5 hundred soldiers, led by “heads”. 4 orders were mounted and located in Moscow, one of them, “Stremyannoy”, was engaged in guarding the sovereign (stood at his stirrup). The remaining orders were infantry. There were no associations of archers larger than the orders.
Streltsy were considered “serving people according to the instrument” and were initially recruited from various categories of the country’s draft population, but gradually the Streltsy service became hereditary. The command staff (heads, centurions and pentecostals or “initial people”) was formed from nobles, for whom service in the archers replaced service in the militia and was also inherited.
The archers wore uniforms, and the commanders had insignia. Weapons (arquebus, berdysh, saber and pistol for commanders) were unified and issued from the treasury. Ammunition also came from the treasury, horses and food for them were supplied to horse orders. Horses were also given to infantry commanders. The orders carried out maneuvering training and firing exercises once or twice a week. In battle, the archers maintained formation and could shoot in lines. The Sagittarius carried out field and city service. Initially, they were assigned some police functions (policing, patrolling).
The Sagittarius received cash, grain and salt salaries. Money was given from 3 rubles a year. The salary of Moscow archers was higher than that of policemen. The archers lived as families in special settlements. Upon entering the service, the archer was allocated a courtyard space in such a settlement and 2-3 rubles for the construction of a hut. This place and the hut were inherited regardless of whether the heirs entered the service or not. They could have been sold. In general, the conditions of the Streltsy service were quite tolerable for that time.
The total number of archers is up to 25 thousand people. All of them were under the jurisdiction of the Streletsky Prikaz. There was going to be a special tax for their maintenance - “streltsy”, but it was not always enough.
The artillery (“outfit”) of the Russian kingdom aroused the respect of foreigners. “It is believed that none of the Christian sovereigns has such a good supply of military ammunition as the Russian Tsar, which can partly be confirmed by the Armory Chamber in Moscow, where there are huge quantities of all kinds of guns ...,” wrote Giles Fletcher (“On the State Russian"). There were siege, fortress and field artillery. It was all served by gunners and fighters, whose service conditions were similar to those of the Streltsy.
The total number of trunks exceeded 2 thousand. 300 - 350 guns of various calibers could be deployed on a campaign. They fired cannonballs, among which more and more were cast iron. All guns were cast and had carriages. Several cannon yards were engaged in the production of cannons (two of them in Moscow), they fully met the needs of the army and could even work for export (supplying guns to Persia).
In addition, there were up to 7 thousand Cossacks in the sovereign service, receiving cash and grain salaries. They obeyed their atamans and were used in field and garrison services.
***
In general, at the beginning of the 17th century, the peacetime army numbered, including the ranks of minor service people “according to the instrument” not listed above, up to 100 thousand people. Its weak point was the noble cavalry. The Streltsy infantry was not bad, and the artillery was good. It could operate successfully against the steppe inhabitants and Lithuanians, but was inferior to the Poles and Swedes in field battles.
In case of war, the army was supplemented by “dacha” and “staff” people, but they were used mainly in auxiliary operations. Tatar irregular cavalry and “free” Cossacks were involved in military operations.
The army went on a campaign as part of the sentry, advanced and large regiments and regiments of the right and left hands. Apparently, the largest number of the field army could reach 70-75 thousand people (without the “staff”).
The state of the army after the Time of Troubles
During the Great Famine, civil war and intervention, the population of our country decreased by about 20%. It is likely that the “ranks” that made up the army suffered the same loss, if not more. An “eternal peace” was concluded with Sweden at the cost of territorial concessions (1617), and only a truce for 14 and a half years was concluded with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1618). Vladislav Vaza did not withdraw his claims to the Moscow throne. The danger of renewed war was great. In addition, gangs of “robberies” continued to roam the country. For these reasons, there was an urgent need to restore the size of the armed forces.
This had to be done in conditions of economic devastation and with an empty treasury, so the authorities sought to replace parts of the “ranks”, mainly provincial ones, city officials, grain salaries with the issuance of land plots. This happened with the city archers, gunners and Cossacks. They were given plots of 4 to 10 plots, depending on the availability of free land in the counties. All of them, including those from Moscow, were allowed to engage in industrial and commercial activities during their free time from service under preferential taxation. Several hundred Cossacks, serfs and draftsmen who took part in the 1st and 2nd militias were promoted to nobility.
For the first 14 years after the end of the Time of Troubles, “the Moscow state grew in size and came into dignity.” By 1631, the size of the peacetime army was restored (the size of the entire population of the country was only in 1650). This year, there were 24,900 nobles and about 26,000 archers in the service (Milyukov P.N. “The state economy of Russia in the first quarter of the 18th century and the reforms of Peter the Great”).
Let us pay attention to the fact that the number of archers exceeded the pre-war (“pre-war”). This is explained by the fact that during the Time of Troubles, these “serving people according to the instrument” showed greater resilience compared to the nobility. It was they who defended Novgorod-Severskaya and Smolensk; they remained faithful to the power that is in Moscow, while the nobility was scattered among all the contenders. In addition, the Streltsy began to increasingly be entrusted with the functions of the police force: they were engaged in the fight against “robberies” and security support during the collection of taxes.
But the quality of the army of 1631 was lower than that of 1600. If the noble militia remained at the same level, the combat effectiveness of the archers decreased: due to the need to feed their families, they began to devote more time to crafts and trade.
They tried to compensate for this drop in combat effectiveness by recruiting foreign mercenaries, the number of whom reached 3 thousand. Soldier and Reiter companies were formed from them. The Inozemsky order dealt with them. They were very expensive for the treasury, and 3 thousand soldiers in an army of 90 thousand did not make a difference.
Then they decided, using foreigners as command personnel, to form from Russians “regiments of a foreign (new) system,” i.e. cavalry and infantry regiments and train them to act according to the standards of European military art. This had to be done before the end of the truce with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1632), because The Russian government was going to start a war with her for the return of lost territories and the renunciation of Vladislav Vaz's claims to the Moscow throne.
The first regiments of the new (foreign) system
By creating them, the authorities tried to solve another problem: to find a place for landless and small-placed nobles who could not carry out full service in the militia due to poverty. The number of them was increasing, and the government realized the danger of having several thousand people deprived of their means of subsistence (they were not allowed to become townspeople, peasants, or household servants) and possessing weapons.
In 1630, there was a decree on the recruitment of unplaced nobles on a voluntary basis to Moscow for “military study” from foreigners. They were going to recruit two regiments of soldiers, each with 1,000 privates. The conditions were acceptable: 5 rubles in money. per year and 3 kopecks. per day for “feed” (prices in Moscow: 10 eggs - 1 kopeck, chicken - 2 kopecks, pig - 3-4 kopecks, a couple of pies - 0.5 kopecks, a pound of black caviar - 3-5 kopecks). The treasury provided a arquebus or musket, gunpowder and lead.
But the soldiers are infantry, and service in it did not attract nobles. Then they were allowed to recruit Tatars, Cossacks and townspeople. As a result, two regiments of soldiers were quickly formed, each with 1,600 privates and 176 initial men. The company consisted of 200 privates (120 squeakers/musketeers and 80 spearmen) and 22 commanders, who were all foreigners from the drummer to the colonel. Each company had two interpreters (translators). In 1632 the number of regiments was increased to six.
In mid-1632, they began recruiting a Reitar regiment of 2,000 soldiers. Payment: 3 rubles per year for a person and 2 rubles per month for horse feed. The regiment had 14 companies led by captains. In addition, separate “shvadrones” (battalions) of reitar were formed. The service was mounted, it did not damage the dignity of the nobility, and the nobles willingly accepted it.
During the war, a dragoon regiment was also recruited from mainly Danish people. It had 1,600 men (12 companies of 120 privates each) and a battery of 12 small cannons.
The role of foreigners and the fate of the first regiments of the new system
During the Smolensk War (1632 - 1634), it became clear that the hopes placed on foreigners by the authorities were excessive.
Firstly, it turned out that many of them simply do not know military matters. Secondly, not all of them showed resilience in battle - on the contrary, at times they generated panic. Thirdly, almost all of them did not know and did not want to learn Russian and communicated with Russians only through an interpreter. Due to different ethnic origins and between them there was a language barrier; some foreigners did not know German well - the “lingua franca” of the mercenaries.
The cost of maintaining all foreigners during the war amounted to approximately 450 thousand rubles, while the noble militia - 80.5 thousand rubles, the datochny people - 8 thousand rubles, the additional corps of the prince. Cherkassky and Prince. Pozharsky - 75 thousand rubles.
If the use of foreigners to train the Russians in the new system justified itself, then trusting only them to command the regiments turned out to be erroneous.
At the end of the war, some foreigners were simply expelled from Russia, contracts with others were interrupted, but their service was paid, and the rest were left in the service. The latter were offered, in addition to a salary, an estate, rightly believing that this would strengthen their connection with the country. Most of them later became the founders of Russian families of foreign origin (for example, Leslie and Lermontov) and converted to Orthodoxy.
Mercenaries continued to be recruited, but only officers and non-commissioned officers with the presentation of patents and recommendations and demonstration of their skills in handling weapons and performing drill techniques.
At the end of 1634 - beginning of 1635, all regiments of the new system were disbanded, although the experience of using them was considered positive. There are two main reasons for the dissolution: “emptiness in the treasury” and understaffing of the command staff.
In the first experience of the formation of these regiments, characteristic features appeared in their social composition: the reiters were nobles, the soldiers were civilians from among the free drafts, the dragoons were datory people, i.e. recruits, including those recruited from serfs. Temporarily, the Reitars will, as necessary, in wartime be replenished with drafts and Cossacks, but in peacetime their social composition will be reduced to uniformity. The initial Russian people in the regiments of the new system will only be nobles.
The restoration of the regiments of the new system will take place in the 1640s. At that time the beginning of the Russian regular army would be laid. But more on that in the next part.
New vector
In 2012, a new team came to the military department under the leadership of the Minister of Defense, Army General Sergei Shoigu, and the Chief of the General Staff, then Colonel General Valery Gerasimov. They saw their main task as stopping the destructive processes in the Armed Forces, preserving those individual positive results of bringing them to a new look, restoring combat effectiveness and increasing combat capabilities. At the same time, there was a strict time limit due to the growing aggravation of the international situation.
The reform was based on clear planning of activities, strict control, and rational use of available resources in the interests of the country's defense. The development and delivery of each unit of arms and military equipment to the troops was strictly linked to the training of relevant personnel, the construction of storage facilities and living quarters for the personnel who would operate it.
First of all, self-sufficient interspecific groupings of troops (forces) were formed in the military districts. Their improvement was carried out through the balanced development of branches and branches of the Armed Forces, increasing the level of equipment with modern weapons and military equipment.
Today, the basis of troop groupings in strategic directions are permanent readiness formations. Taking into account operational expediency, some of the combined arms brigades were transformed into divisions. Note that in terms of its combat capabilities, a division is 1.6–1.8 times superior to a brigade.
A transition has been made to a new system of recruiting military personnel under contract for formations and military units of the Ground Forces, Marine Corps and Airborne Forces. In 2012, the battalions included in their composition were formed in a mixed way - conscript and contract servicemen, and the share of contract soldiers was no more than 30-40 percent. To prepare such battalions for combat operations, considerable time was required for coordination. In addition, conscripted military personnel were subject to legal restrictions on their participation in hostilities.
Currently, the opposite picture is observed: in each regiment and brigade of three battalions, two are staffed by contract soldiers and only one by conscripts. On the basis of battalions staffed only by contract soldiers, reinforced tactical units have been created in combined arms brigades and regiments - battalion tactical groups (BTG), which can be used in the shortest possible time and without additional coordination. In a number of cases, they were transferred to the operational subordination of commands in tactical directions. This made it possible, if necessary, to move away from rigid organizational structures, create groupings depending on the situation and the tasks being solved, increase the efficiency of management and ensure flexibility of use.
Particular attention was paid to the development of high-precision weapons. On a planned basis, full-fledged groups of carriers of long-range cruise missiles of various types were formed, capable of using weapons against targets at distances of up to four thousand kilometers.
In order to ensure efficiency and continuity of fire impact on the enemy, reconnaissance and strike systems and reconnaissance and fire complexes were created. In essence, this is the introduction of network-centric control methods, which are based on the integration of reconnaissance information and information control systems with weapons systems. The result was a reduction in the time parameters of the cycle for solving a fire mission - from target detection to its destruction. The increasing effectiveness of fire impact was greatly facilitated by the increasingly widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles.
Particular attention was paid to the development of electronic warfare, improving means of countering high-precision weapons, as well as the aircraft control system. A unified automated system for controlling troops and weapons at the tactical level was developed.
Taking into account the improvement of air-space defense systems, including the progressive spread of missile technologies, the vector for the development of the country's aerospace defense was set. The creation of the VKS was of great importance in this regard.
The system of mobilization deployment and mob training was improved. Decisions were made to create a mobile reserve, territorial troops, and organize the preparation of government bodies at all levels for functioning in wartime.
Requirements for the training of headquarters and troops (forces) were increased. When training military command and control bodies, much attention was paid to developing in commanders and commanders the ability to take quick and comprehensively justified actions. The skills of making non-standard decisions, forecasting the development of the situation were strengthened, and the willingness to take justified risks was encouraged. Suvorov's principles of command and control, combat operations, and approaches to troop training were purposefully introduced.
Due attention was paid to the study of new generation wars, including hybrid ones, which were already being waged by Western countries with might and main against undesirable states and governments. In this regard, the example of Libya is particularly clear.
The readiness of command and control bodies and troops (forces) to operate as part of interspecific groupings created in strategic directions was tested at annual exercises. Their scale testified to the development of issues of repelling large-scale aggression and combating a high-tech enemy.
During operational and combat training activities, issues of conducting military operations in the form of strategic operations, army operations in a war against regular armed forces, as well as combat operations against terrorist groups were worked out.
And at headquarters and scientific institutions, intense work was going on to analyze the essence of modern wars. The formula “war is a complex of military, as well as political, diplomatic, economic, and information measures” has acquired new meaning. Military measures faded into the background, giving way to non-military means. Commanders and staffs had to urgently master and practice practical skills in the use of non-military methods. And soon it was needed.
Speech on the topic: “Modern Russian Army”
Speech at a school-wide meeting on the topic:
"Modern Russian Army"
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (in official documents) or the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (unofficial abbreviation) is a state military organization of the Russian Federation designed to repel aggression
, directed against the Russian Federation, for
the armed defense
of the territorial integrity and inviolability of its territory, as well as to carry out tasks in accordance with international treaties of Russia.
Military uniforms are officially equipped with stripes with the inscription “Russian Armed Forces.”
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation were created on May 7, 1992 on the basis of the former Armed Forces of the USSR.
This is what the emblem of the Russian Armed Forces looks like. And these are two sides of the banner of the RF Armed Forces.
Conscription age: from 18 to 27 years.
Duration of conscription service: 12 months.
Employed in the army: 900,000 people (this is the number of armed forces + reserves + armed formations). In reserve: 2,500,000 people.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. In peacetime, the head of state exercises general political leadership of the Armed Forces, and in wartime he directs the defense of the state and its Armed Forces to repel aggression.
The current Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation is Hero of the Russian Federation, Army General Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu.
The armed forces consist of three branches of the armed forces, two separate branches of the military and special forces.
Types of armed forces: ground forces (ground forces) - 5 branches of the military, aerospace forces (VKS) - 3 branches of the military, navy (navy) - 7 branches of the military.
Separate types of troops: strategic missile forces (Strategic Missile Forces) and airborne troops (Airborne Forces).
Special forces are an integral part of the armed forces; a set of military formations, units, divisions, institutions providing logistics support and technical support for troops and forces (navy and aviation) for logistics services. Consists of railway, pipeline, road troops, information operations troops, medical service, logistics; topographic service, special purpose units.
Geographically, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are divided between four military districts and one unified strategic command. The Joint Strategic Command “North” is actually the fifth military district, geographically located beyond the Arctic Circle.
As of 2022, the Russian army ranks second in the ranking of the strongest armies in the world.
The Russian army has been and remains a serious force that every state in the world reckons with. Now we will get acquainted with the most advanced military vehicles, which are the pride of our army.
Tank T-90. The main battle tank of the Russian army. Armed with an anti-tank gun with increased firing accuracy, a coaxial machine gun and an anti-aircraft machine gun, which is controlled remotely.
Small missile ships of the Sivuch project. It is in service with the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Type: hovercraft. The main strike system of ships of this type is 8 missiles. As a self-defense complex, ships of this type are equipped with an anti-aircraft missile system. The vessel has a crew of up to 68 sailors. Cruising speed is 100 km per hour.
PC-24 "Yars". Solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile with a multiple warhead. Maximum target range:
11,000 km.
"Pantsir-S1". Effective against airplanes, helicopters, ballistic and cruise missiles.
The Borei-class nuclear submarine weighs 14,700 tons and has a capacity of 16 Bulava ballistic missiles, each carrying 6 to 10 warheads to a range of 8,300 km. They are certainly a force to be reckoned with.
Mi-28N "Night Hunter". The main attack helicopter of the Russian army. The helicopter is designed to search and destroy tanks and other armored vehicles, as well as low-speed air targets and enemy personnel in conditions of active fire resistance.
Stealth submarine "Varshavyanka". The first of six diesel-electric stealth submarines was launched from a shipyard in St. Petersburg last year. Its developers claim that the clever technology makes it virtually undetectable after diving.
MiG-35. Multifunctional supersonic fighter. Effective both in air combat and in striking ground targets. It reaches a speed of 2,400 km/h. Capable of destroying sea and ground targets from a long distance.
Buk-m2. An anti-aircraft missile system, which is designed to protect troops and objects from attacks by airplanes, helicopters and cruise missiles. The maximum range of the zone is up to 50 km, and the height of damage is up to 25 km.
The Russian Concorde is the largest and most powerful supersonic aircraft and variable-wing geometry aircraft in the history of military aviation, as well as the heaviest combat aircraft in the world, having the highest maximum take-off weight among bombers. Among pilots he received the nickname “White Swan”. Carries up to 40 tons of weapons on board. A total of 16 such vehicles are in service.
But the main wealth of our army is people. It is they who, through their work, perseverance, endurance, and intelligence, make our army modern, capable of protecting their country and its citizens.
If someone decides to choose a military profession, then the following information is for you. Currently, there are 26 military higher educational institutions and 9 of their branches in the Russian Federation, which graduate about 2 thousand officers per year.
I congratulate everyone who is about to serve in the Russian army on the upcoming holiday. I hope that you will fulfill your military duty with honor!
Syrian experience
First there was Crimea. Well-equipped and highly trained Special Operations Forces ensured security and order on the peninsula and prevented the destabilization of the situation by fascist nationalists and its development according to the Odessa version.
The Russian army appeared before the world from a completely different perspective and caused sincere surprise among Western experts. It turned out that she can act firmly and politely, quickly and decisively, secretly and effectively, and solve strategic problems with small forces. Previously, in the West it was believed that only “exceptional races” were capable of this.
The next exam was Syria. The Russian Armed Forces are faced with a completely new type of conflict. Its main feature was that the states that were opponents of Syria carried out secretive, inconspicuous actions against it, without being drawn into a direct armed conflict. Well-trained and equipped military formations of terrorists and the Syrian opposition, whose actions were coordinated from abroad, were used as manpower.
Russia entered Syria when it, as a state, stood on the edge of the abyss. I came in completely legitimately, at the invitation of the legitimate government of the country. In the shortest possible time, she deployed a minimal group in a remote theater of operations and reversed the war. It acted with utmost efficiency, both in terms of the ratio of the results achieved to the resources expended, and in comparison with the effectiveness of the International Anti-Terrorism Coalition, led by the United States. Under the leadership of Russian military advisers and with the support of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the Syrian army liberated most of its territory.
The world saw a completely different - a renewed Russian army, which is capable of effectively conducting combat operations in a remote theater of operations with small forces, delicately delivering strikes with high-precision weapons, optimally combining the actions of the Aerospace Forces, Navy and Special Operations Forces.
High efficiency of fire destruction of terrorist targets was achieved through network-centric control methods, competent use of reconnaissance and strike systems and reconnaissance and fire complexes. The bulk of fire missions to defeat the enemy were carried out by artillery and aviation. Precision weapons were used to destroy the most important terrorist targets. It is clear that firing missiles at every group of militants is a very costly business.
During the special operation, virtually all formation commanders and formation commanders of the Armed Forces gained combat experience. Staff teams of formations and formations also passed through Syria, developing invaluable skills in planning and directing combat operations of troops and fire defeat of the enemy. Now commanders and commanders personally know what is needed in war, what and how to teach personnel.
Most tasks, primarily combat ones, were solved under special conditions, in an unconventional, creative manner. In addition, the tasks themselves differed significantly in content: combat, humanitarian, peacekeeping and military-diplomatic. The command of the Russian Armed Forces group and military advisers to the Syrian troops used many original methods and techniques for conducting combat operations and the joint use of various types of weapons and military equipment.
The Syrian operation provided vivid examples of military cunning, audacity, unpredictability in actions, swiftness in the offensive and steadfastness in defense, flexibility in planning and at the same time rigid adherence to the strategic line.
REGULAR ARMY
REGULAR ARMY, standing army and navy (forces), which, unlike irregular troops, have a legally established staff organization, standard weapons, recruitment system, procedure for military service, training and education of personnel, uniforms, and also a centralized management and supply system. R. a. in the main took shape in the 17th–18th centuries, when most Europeans. states made the transition from mercenary armies to recruiting national. armies on the basis of conscription (see art. Recruitment of the armed forces).
In Russia, dept. elements of R. a. (a single staff organization, uniform uniforms and weapons, state support, etc.) had a streltsy army created in 1550. The beginning of the construction of the R. a. was formed in the 17th century. regiments of the new system (soldiers, reiters and dragoons). However, these troops were collected only during the period of preparation for the war. actions during the war, and then dispersed to their homes, which did not allow having trained reserves. They will graduate. form of creation of R. a. occurred during the military reforms of Peter I, which were based on the recruiting system (see Recruitment). The decree of November 8 (18), 1699 introduced the recruitment of “all free people” into the troops, as was practiced in the 2nd half. 17th century, but its significant difference was that people were recruited into the regiments for lifelong service. They were in a barracks position and were required to undergo daily training following the example of the Moscow and Butyrsky regiments, formed in 1642 from “elected” (selected) streltsy units. The decree of November 19 (29), 1699, provided for the involvement of volunteer people in the army, which significantly expanded the contingent of those called up for service. Finally, the decree of 20.2 (3.3). 1705 finally established the recruitment system: they began to recruit soldiers annually, including serfs - 1 person each. from 20 yards. In total, from 1699 to 1725, 53 recruitments were carried out and approx. 300 thousand people Military service extended to the entire population, with the exception of persons of clergy rank. The service of the nobles was considered state. duty and lasted for life (from 1736 in peacetime it was limited to a 25-year term, from 1762 it became voluntary). To receive an officer rank, they had to serve a certain period of time as a soldier in the Preobrazhensky or Semenovsky regiments (see Preobrazhensky Life Guards Regiment, Semenovsky Life Guards Regiment). In order to achieve unity in resolving issues of organizing and supporting the army, the Military Collegium, the highest body of the military, was created in 1717–20. management. A unified education system was also established; issues of military service were regulated by the Military Regulations of 1716 and the Naval Regulations of 1720. Thus, to the end. 1st quarter 18th century the process of creating R. a. in Russia was mainly completed (see Imperial Russian Army).
In peacetime, maintaining massive armies turned out to be economically difficult. point of view, therefore in the 2nd half. 19th century in Europe countries, as well as in Japan, there was a transition to a personnel system for organizing R. a. In Russia, this system was introduced during the military reforms of 1860–70. This transition made it possible to significantly reduce the number of R. a. in peacetime and in the future, due to a sharp increase in the contingent of those liable for military service, create a large number. prepared reserves, allowing in the event of war to quickly deploy millions of armies.
Regular fleets in the West. appeared in Europe in the 17th century. The first regular formation of Russian. The Navy was created at the end. 17th century Peter I of the Azov Fleet to fight Turkey for Russia's access to the Azov and Black Seas. The decision of the Boyar Duma on October 20(30), 1696, which determined: “There will be sea vessels...”, marked the beginning of the construction of the fatherland. regular fleet. In the 18th century The Baltic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet were created in Russia, and later the Pacific Fleet and the Northern Fleet.
American view of the Russian Armed Forces
The Americans closely monitored the actions of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria. Through the success of the Russian army they saw their problems. The main drawback of the American armed forces, according to their experts, is that they were not prepared to fight a strong enemy. Since the end of the Cold War, combat training has focused primarily on counterinsurgency. The US Armed Forces have forgotten how to fight a strong army and conduct large-scale combat operations. According to American experts, their armed forces need to adapt to modern threats. To do this, the training of command and control bodies, troops and forces must be urgently reoriented and carried out taking into account the strengths of the Russian army.
As a strength of the RF Armed Forces, US military experts noted a new system of views on the conduct of modern wars, which provides for flexibility in determining the purposes of using the RF Armed Forces, rational forms and methods of action depending on the tasks and conditions of the situation.
Another strength of the Russian army is the ability to create and train formations and associations of the regular army from the local population, as well as to use irregular formations and formations of local residents (people's militia) to achieve goals.
The Americans highly appreciated the ability of Russian advisers to organize and conduct combat operations with flexible formations of Syrian troops - combined battalion tactical groups. Their composition is determined based on the assigned task, which makes it possible to more fully realize the combat capabilities of the troops (forces).
The effectiveness of the fire destruction system, including reconnaissance, target designation and destruction means (primarily operational-tactical aviation of the Russian Aerospace Forces), as well as the widespread use of UAVs, which makes it possible to effectively control the battlefield, timely detect enemy targets and promptly destroy them, are emphasized.
The Russian air defense system deployed in Syria was analyzed very carefully. Western experts called the strength of the Russian Armed Forces their ability to prevent the use of American aviation due to the ability to deploy effective air defense at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. In addition, according to their estimates, an effective electronic warfare system is capable of completely disorganizing the control system of the US Armed Forces at the operational and tactical levels. The presence of experienced and capable command staff of the Russian Army was especially noted.
The presence of strengths in the RF Armed Forces somewhat discouraged US specialists. And there were reasons for this.
Firstly, the development of the US Armed Forces has always been carried out in accordance with the principle of superiority over any potential enemy in all elements: in equipping with weapons, in training personnel, in control systems, communications and reconnaissance, fire destruction, logistics, etc. Secondly, the American armed forces have always fought under the dominance of their aviation. And the fact that the strong air defense of the Russian Armed Forces is able to “ground” US operational-tactical aviation puts Pentagon specialists at a dead end regarding the methods of conducting combat operations by ground groups without air support. The Americans' recognition of the superiority of the Russian Armed Forces in certain elements destroys their faith in their own capabilities.
The received assessments and conclusions prompted the headquarters of the US Armed Forces to search for new forms and methods of action of troops on the battlefield, allowing to nullify the superiority of the Russian Armed Forces even in individual elements, and to accelerate their implementation in the training of command and control agencies and troops of the American army. New concepts for the use of troop groups were developed.
By the way, the Americans' penchant for developing concepts has become their real bane. Each newly released strategic-level concept required the development of three to five subordinate concepts, for the development of which lower-level concepts were released. Financial resources are allocated for each, fortunately, the astronomical military budget (more than $700 billion) allows it. Therefore, the pipeline for developing new concepts never stops. Each concept with a truly American scope is presented as another “breakthrough in military affairs.” For example, specialists of the US Armed Forces declared the inclusion in it of such a component as operational art a great success in the development of military science. But it must be said that in the USSR such a division was introduced back in the pre-war period (before the Great Patriotic War): strategy covered issues of preparing the country and the Armed Forces for war and waging war in general, operational art - preparing and conducting operations, and tactics - conducting combat actions by tactical formations.
At the same time, we must pay tribute to the flexibility and efficiency of the Americans in responding to the growth in the combat capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces. Indeed, even in peacetime, the strategic management bodies of rival countries (general staffs/command staff, headquarters of the armed forces) conduct an intellectual confrontation between themselves that is invisible to the average person.
For example, according to the concept of interservice operations, the United States conducted military operations according to the following scheme. First, strikes from high-precision sea- and air-based weapons, without entering the enemy’s fire zone, destroyed its air defense system in the theater of military operations. Further, aviation carried out strikes on targets with impunity. And only then (in Yugoslavia it didn’t come to this) the ground forces entered the battle.
Taking into account the views of the Americans, Russia created special security zones in the Crimea and the Baltic, concentrating in them high-tech weapons, air defense, electronic warfare and others. Relevant organizational measures for the formation of such zones were promptly carried out, and exercises were held. In addition, the Navy’s strikes with high-precision weapons from the Caspian Sea on targets in Syria have convincingly shown that it will be impossible for the ships and aircraft carriers of the potential aggressor’s high-precision weapons to approach our shores with impunity; they will all end up in the affected area.
That is, previous approaches to conducting military operations turned out to be unsuitable. The Americans immediately tensed up and released a new concept - multi-domain operations of ground forces. According to it, the main role should now be given not to the Air Force and Navy, but to the ground forces. It is they who break into the territory where air defense and air defense systems are located, crush them and thereby provide the Air Force and Navy with the opportunity to operate in a given theater of war, and also create conditions for the transfer and deployment of the main forces to the theater of war.
This is precisely the scenario envisaged for the Kaliningrad special region. This is why the question arises about the additional deployment of US ground forces in Poland and the Baltic states. Perhaps in the future the question will arise about the use of Ukrainian territory.
Building a powerful military force in the post-war period
The victorious conclusion of the Second World War did not lead the allies to military friendship and understanding, and the usual military confrontation began. But tension increased sharply after America showed the whole world, and especially the Soviet Union, a nuclear baton in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To restore balance, Soviet scientists and military specialists needed to create their own nuclear bomb in a short time, and they successfully completed the task. A protracted, exhausting arms race began with the participation of two opponents, the USSR and the USA.
The post-war construction of the Soviet army and navy was based on the best advanced military developments of scientists and in the interests of protecting the state. While the United States placed its main emphasis on nuclear strike potential, the construction of aircraft carriers, submarines and heavy bombers to deliver atomic charges, the Soviet Union chose a defensive military doctrine. The army was rearmed, receiving advanced small arms (Kalashnikov assault rifles), anti-tank systems, the latest tanks, and jet aircraft from the MiG and Tu design teams. Political workers strengthened friendship, military camaraderie and naval brotherhood. Our country built the first submarines with nuclear reactors, which were equipped with ballistic missile launchers with nuclear warheads.
Both opposing sides increased their nuclear missile potential, constantly modernizing delivery systems and increasing the flight range of missiles with warheads. Submarines, cruisers and destroyers with nuclear weapons on board were constantly on duty in the depths of the sea and on the water. US Navy carrier groups patrolled all oceans, and tensions reached a peak in the early sixties when the Cuban Missile Crisis broke out, bringing humanity to the brink of complete destruction. Then the forces of reason won, but the confrontation between the NATO bloc and the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact persisted and constantly developed. This continued until the end of the eighties.
The collapse and restoration of the power of the Russian Army and Navy
Irreversible processes of history in the late eighties and early nineties led to the collapse of the USSR, the Warsaw bloc and, as a consequence, the army. The state changed its course of development, rapidly became impoverished, the army, navy and air force degraded: ships and submarines did not sail, planes did not fly, military equipment was sold for scrap, soldiers walked around ragged and hungry. The Chechen events of the nineties showed the full depth of the fall of the Russian Armed Forces - the country was practically unprotected from any external and internal threats.
V.V. Putin, who came to power at the beginning of the 2000s, was the first to understand the danger of further degradation and took the first important steps to restore the power of the army and navy. The real driver of the return of the Russian Armed Forces to its former power was S.K. Shoigu, who headed the Ministry of Defense in 2008. His energy, the latest developments of designers, and the labor of workers at factories of the Military-Industrial Complex are gradually increasing defense potential and rearming all types of troops in accordance with the challenges and requirements of the time.
Thanks to the contract system, the Russian army has become compact, mobile, highly professional, equipped with the latest high-precision weapons, allowing for non-contact combat. Nuclear and diesel submarines, surface ships for various purposes, of the latest or modernized series are leaving the stocks. Airplanes and helicopters of new generations and modifications are taking to the skies, carrying increasingly powerful and accurate weapons. New tanks, armored vehicles, air defense and radar defense systems are being built, and soldiers are receiving individual electronic means of tracking, communication and combat. Instead of political studies, interaction between the army and navy has been established with traditional religious associations, which are represented in the units by military clergy.
Today's Russian Army and Navy have become modern, powerful, well-equipped military branches in military and everyday life, but the main thing is that the Armed Forces have regained the love of the people, on which the fighting spirit of the Russian army of all times has always rested. Today, young boys and girls are striving to join the military ranks, there is again a big competition for military institutes, parents proudly send their sons and daughters to serve the Motherland.
Here on this: on people's love, on reciprocal love for the Fatherland, on the memory of the glorious exploits of their ancestors, the Army of the Moscow Kingdom, the Russian Imperial Army, the Red (Soviet) Army stood, and today the Russian Armed Forces and the Navy stand and will stand . This is what the ancestors and great commanders of the Russian land bequeathed to us.
