Creation
If you try to impartially understand the advantages and disadvantages of each of the main battle tanks, the phrase that the T-72 was created as a simpler and cheaper replacement for the expensive and complex T-64 will immediately come to mind.
It turns out that the T-72 should a priori be worse, but is it so?
If we recall the experience of World War II, it was the massive, simple and unpretentious T-34s that won, and not the expensive and complex Tigers and Panthers. A highly accurate gun, complex suspension and thick frontal armor will not help you win against a large number of slightly inferior tanks. But in our comparison, a more massive tank may not be inferior in terms of performance characteristics.
Chassis
Let's start with the chassis. Those who served and had personal experience with the T-64 know the main drawback of its chassis - when “dancing” on rough terrain, the tracks very easily fly off. If the caterpillar is slightly weakened, then it easily flies off during normal turns at high speed. And it is very difficult to tow a tank on the ground due to the fact that its road wheels easily get stuck in it. It’s good when this happens during exercises, but in war it can cost the lives of the entire crew.
In addition, such a chassis design leads to additional noise and shaking with vibrations.
The T-72 does not suffer from such shortcomings, its chassis is simple and reliable, it allows you to perform any movements in any conditions, and this is confirmed by the participation of the tank in real combat operations, for example, the sands of Iraq or the mountains of Chechnya. And the fact that similar chassis are installed on the T-80 and T-90 confirms the success of the design.
In addition to the chassis, the mobility of the tank is seriously affected by the transmission and engine.
T-64, T-72 or T-80, which is better?
Tank T-64BV
Tank T-72B
Tank T-80BV
In military forums and thematic articles, it has recently become very fashionable to condemn the Soviet army and, in particular, the simultaneous presence in mass production of three main battle tanks, which have almost the same combat and technical properties, but at the same time have a different design and a different range of spare parts, which made it difficult to develop, maintain and repair them. The result of the development of all this trinity, as is known, became the main battle tanks of the T-90 “Vladimir” family, the main platform for the creation of which was the base of the T-72BM tank, the production and modernization of which continues to this day. However, the very thought of which tank of these “three heroes” is the best is intriguing. In the Internet community today, the attitude towards these three tanks is approximately the following: the main part are fans of the T-80 gas turbine tank, especially its “coolest” modification, the T-80UM1. The Kharkov T-64 also has its small share of fans. The attitude toward the Nizhne Tagil T-72 is usually reserved and contemptuous, as it is a crude and primitive iron tank of the second line. This attitude was greatly facilitated by the unsuccessful use of Iraqi T-72Ms against coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Well, let’s try to figure out why we’ll take and compare in detail the design, strengths and weaknesses of three close in time period and fairly common modifications of these tanks: T-64BV, T-72B and T-80BV.
Firepower:
The main armament of all three tanks is represented by modifications of the 125mm smoothbore gun - the launcher of the D-81 family. 2A46M-1 for the T-64BV, 2A46M for the T-72B and 2A46-2 for the T-80BV. All three guns have almost the same performance characteristics and are considered one of the most powerful tank guns in the world. So it’s impossible to give the palm to the gun of any particular tank.
The main types of shells for these guns are BOPS or armor-piercing finned sabot shells. The most powerful of them: ZBM-44 “Mango” with a tungsten core and ZBM-33 with a depleted uranium core are capable of piercing a vertically standing armor plate with a thickness of 500 mm and 560 mm, respectively, from a distance of 2000 m. ZBK-18M cumulative shells penetrate 550 mm armor plates. There are also high-explosive fragmentation shells of the ZOF-19 type, the destructive effect of which is well known to those who have seen footage of the shelling of the White House.
While the guns of these tanks are almost identical, the fire control system and the guided weapon system (CAW) differ quite significantly. The most accurate tank in terms of artillery is the T-80BV. A soft suspension that ensures a smooth ride and the presence of an automated 1A33 “Ob” fire control system allows this tank to conduct effective fire on the move at a moving target in the most difficult conditions. The gunner only needs to measure the distance to the target and keep the crosshairs on it. The digital ballistic computer, using input information sensors, calculates corrections and, through the 2E26M stabilizer, holds the gun in the desired position to fire an aimed shot. The T-64BV has the same 1A33 Ob control system as the T-80BV tank, the same 2E26M stabilizer, but its shooting accuracy is noticeably worse than that of the 80 due to the more rigid and primitive chassis. The T-72B does not have an automated control system at all. Its 1A40-1 sighting system has only a ballistic correction device, and therefore in terms of accuracy of shooting at moving targets and at long distances it is inferior to both the T-64BV and T-80BV. However, the T-72B also has an advantage: a much more advanced two-plane weapon stabilizer 2E42-1 “Jasmine”, the target tracking accuracy of which significantly exceeds the capabilities of the 2E26M stabilizers of the T-64BV and T-80BV tanks. Therefore, the T-72B can shoot accurately at a higher speed than its opponents. This is also facilitated by the soft, modern chassis.
Now let's move on to the guided weapons complex. T-64BV and T-80BV are equipped with KUV 9K112 Cobra guided missiles. This complex allows for targeted launch of missiles on the move at a range of up to 4000m. The maximum possible launch is at 5000m. The missile penetrates 700mm armor plate. The disadvantage of the complex is that the radar guidance system is not very accurate due to the large dispersion of the radio beam. The T-72B has a more advanced 9K120 Svir missile system. The complex also allows for targeted launch of missiles at a distance of 100-4000m and maximum 5000m, but at the same time it has a high-precision laser semi-automatic guidance system. The missile penetrates up to 750mm of armor. The downside is the impossibility of targeted launch of missiles on the move, but in general the T-72B missile system is more advanced than that of its opponents and allows you to crush the enemy even before he approaches the range of actual artillery fire.
Another important component of a tank’s firepower is its technical vision. There is a widespread belief that one of the main reasons for the failure of Iraqi T-72Ms in battles with coalition Abrams and Challengers is the lack of an automated control system. They say if there were T-64BV or T-80BV, they would have burned all these Abrams there. A very naive opinion. The Iraqi T-72M, in the conditions of open desert space and complete air supremacy of enemy aircraft, including “NAP” - direct air support, simply had nothing to catch there. Most of them were destroyed by aircraft or simply abandoned by the crews and then finished off by coalition troops. Those T-72Ms that managed to survive and duel with the Abrams were primarily hampered by very poor night vision and outdated shells. It is unfortunate to admit that the set of infrared night vision devices of the T-72B tank is quite bad. TKN-3 and 1K13-49 provide a maximum detection/identification range of a “tank” type target at night of no more than 600-1300m in passive or active modes. This is 2-3 times less than contemporary Western tanks equipped with thermal imagers had. I hasten to disappoint fans of the T-80BV and T-64BV. Their commander's instruments: TKN-3V and gunner's: TPN149-23 see approximately the same as the T-72B instruments - 600-1300m. The exception is a small number of the latest T-80BV. So we must assume that if the T-80BV had found itself in the specific situation in which the Iraqi T-72M found themselves in 1991, the results of night battles would not have been much better. In general, all three tanks in terms of night vision capabilities roughly correspond to the old tanks of the 50s: the T-55/62, which gave the Israeli Centurions a hard time, and the M48 in night battles in the 1967 war, and the T-10M. Apparently resting on our laurels has led to the fact that such an important parameter has not been given due attention for many years.
Another important aspect is the loading system and ammunition. All three tanks have automatic loaders. The most advanced AZ of the T-72B tank. It holds 22 rounds, has a compact size and higher survivability. Rate of fire 6-8 shots/min. Its disadvantage is that loading occurs in two steps, i.e. the punch moves twice: first the projectile, then the charge, but this is nothing more than an operational characteristic that does not have any effect on the combat properties of the tank. T-64BV and T-80BV are equipped with less advanced ship-type MZs with vertically standing charges, poorly adapted to the layout in the manned fighting compartment of the tank. Capacity 28 shots. The rate of fire is the same: 6-8 rounds/min. The advantage is that loading occurs in one step - the projectile and charge are simultaneously fed into the charging chamber. The total ammunition load is 45 rounds for the T-72B, 38 for the T-80BV and 36 for the T-64BV. The obvious leader here is the T-72B.
The last paragraph in this section is auxiliary weapons. For all three tanks, it consists of a coaxial 7.62mm PKT machine gun and an anti-aircraft gun with a 12.7mm NSVT heavy machine gun. This installation is mounted on the commander's observation complex. In terms of the machine gun paired with the cannon, all three tanks are absolutely equal. At the same time, the PZU-5 anti-aircraft installation of the T-64BV tank with a 12.7mm NSVT machine gun is much more advanced than the Utes anti-aircraft installation of the T-72B and T-80BV tanks. PZU-5 has remote control from the tank commander’s workplace and does not require him to stick out of the hatch for firing. Installation "Utes" of T-72B and T-80BV open-type tanks with manual drive.
Security:
Let's divide it into several paragraphs: forehead protection, side protection, stern protection, upper hemisphere protection, survivability when penetrating armor, the tank's thermal signature and the noise level produced by the tank during operation. Frontal projection protection is best on the T-72B tank. It is provided with multi-layer armor of the hull and turret, semi-active armor elements and the Kontakt-1 mounted dynamic protection complex. Needless to say, in terms of protection, the T-72B at the time of its appearance was one of the most powerful tanks in the world, and even today its armor is still quite at the level. Its disadvantage is the location of the remote sensing elements on the front part of the turret: simply on the armor itself, adjacent to it. The T-80BV is somewhat worse in this regard, which also has multi-layer armor, but does not have semi-active armor. At the same time, the elements of the emergency protection system on the turret of the T-80BV tank are located much better: in a wedge. And last on the list is the T-64BV. It has multi-layer armor and armor protection located like the T-80BV tank, i.e. wedge, but inferior to the T-80BV and T-72B in armor thickness. It also does not have semi-active protection. The protection of the turret side of all three tanks is ensured by the incredible thickness of its armor and the Kontakt-1 dynamic protection complex. Here the leaders are the T-72B and T-80BV. The protection of the hull side is most powerful in the T-72B. It is provided by the side armor itself, on-board anti-cumulative rubber-fabric screens, elements of the Kontakt-1 remote protection system placed on these screens and covering almost the entire side to the stern (with the exception of a small sector in the MTO area) and road wheels of optimal diameter that screen the lower part of the side opposite the ammunition rack in the AZ, not covered by a screen. All this allows the T-72B tank to feel quite confident in combat in the city, given its high saturation with anti-tank weapons: RPGs and ATGMs. If there are serviceable screens and serviceable remote sensing elements, this tank is almost invulnerable from fire from most of these weapons into the front and side of the hull and turret. The downside is that the elements of the T-72B DZ are attached directly to the side screen, which leads to some bending inward, but this again does not have any effect on the combat properties of the tank. However, such a design does not look aesthetically pleasing, to say the least. The second is the T-64BV. It also has anti-cumulative shields, on which special power shields are attached, on which, in turn, elements of the Kontakt-1 remote sensing device are already attached. The advantage of this technical solution is that the side of the T-64BV, unlike the T-72B, looks smooth and neat - “armored”. The downside of this tank is that its very small-diameter track roller plates poorly shield the side below the screen opposite the MZ ammunition rack. The board itself, with a thickness of 70-80mm (at the level of heavy tanks of the 2nd World War), is not able to withstand the impact of an ATGM or a rocket-propelled grenade of a modern RPG. The T-80BV tank has the worst side protection. Its side screens have no remote sensing elements at all! Only on fenders. The armor on the side itself is the same as that of the T-72B and T-64BV. The road wheels are smaller in diameter than the T-72B and leave decent open areas below the anti-HEAT shield. The rear turret protection is very poor on all three tanks and is their most vulnerable point. The rear hull protection is worst on the T-80BV, which, due to its gas turbine engine, has large air ducts. Through them, a fragment or bullet could theoretically fly into the engine. The rear armor of the T-72B and T-64BV is solid, it is better, but still leaves much to be desired. From above, all three tanks are well protected up to about half their length. Then things get very bad. Plus there is poor protection for the driver hatches. In terms of survivability, the T-72B is in the lead for the umpteenth time. Its carousel-type AZ is very compact, located at the bottom, where it is protected in front by powerful frontal armor, on the sides by side armor, screens with remote protection and road wheels, and at the rear by MTO and engine. The MZ of the T-64BV and T-80BV tanks with vertical charges have a much larger projection area and are much more vulnerable. Penetrating the side of the hull opposite the MH will immediately lead to a strike on the ammunition load with all the ensuing consequences. This is easier to do than with the T-72B: the T-80BV does not have remote sensing elements on the side screen, the T-64BV has them, but below the screen the skinny plates almost do not cover the side. At the same time, it should be noted that in the event of detonation of ammunition, the crew of all three tanks die instantly. The T-72B is no exception. Unfortunately, this Achilles heel of domestic tanks has not been overcome to this day. According to the heat signature, the T-72B has “problems” - its exhaust goes to the left side, and not back. In terms of noise level, the T-80BV is the leader by a wide margin. From the front, the noise of its engine is almost inaudible. In this regard, the Death Whisperer compares favorably with its diesel counterparts T-72B and T-64BV. In general, in terms of the overall level of security and survivability, the best tank is the T-72B. The second and third places are shared by the T-80BV and T-64BV. The location of the ammunition rack in the fighting compartment together with people, without any protection for it, is considered an anachronism today.
Mobility, operability, comfort:
The most spacious and comfortable: T-72B. The flat AZ of this tank provides quite acceptable space inside. If you wish, you can even go to bed in the tower, having first removed the cannon fence. There is a passage to the control department. However, the T-72B controls in the turret are placed less conveniently than in the T-80BV or T-64BV. All three tanks have the same problem - when the gun is positioned straight and its elevation angle is zero, the driver cannot leave the tank through his hatch. While in peaceful conditions it is still possible to constantly keep the turret slightly turned, in battle this is not always possible. If it is impossible to exit through his hatch, the driver of the T-72B can safely climb out through one of the two turret hatches. In the T-80BV and T-64BV tanks, the unsuccessful MZ completely blocks the passage from the control compartment to the fighting compartment. To create a passage, it is necessary to remove the cassettes from the MH. The driver cannot do this from his seat. This design and layout of the combat equipment of the T-64BV and T-80BV tanks cost the lives of more than one driver. The fighting compartment of the T-80BV and T-64BV is also much more cramped than the T-72B. To be fair, it is worth noting that in terms of internal space, even the T-72B is much inferior to Western tanks with their brutal turrets. The leader in maximum speed is the T-80BV. Powerful gas turbine engine GTD-1000TF with a power of 1100 hp. provides this tank with a speed of 70-80 km/h on the highway. Capabilities of the T-72B with the V-84-1 engine of 840 hp. and T-64BV with a 5-TDF engine of 700 hp. here it’s much more modest: 60 km/h and 60.5 km/h, respectively. At the same time, in terms of acceleration dynamics from a standstill, the T-72B is the best. The “locomotive” torque of the almost 40-liter V12 is enough to propel the 44.5-ton colossus from a standstill with good acceleration from low revs and maintain a decent average speed on rough terrain. The T-80BV has better controllability and can also drive quickly along the “intersection”, but in terms of dynamics from low speeds it is inferior to the T-72B due to the fact that its turbine does not have a rigid connection with the output shaft. On the one hand, this is an advantage - the tank will not stall, even if it hits a wall. On the other hand, the acceleration dynamics are somewhat rubbery. The T-64BV is an outsider. Turbopiston engine, albeit 700 hp. of very small volume clearly suffers from a torque deficit, especially at low speeds, and is poorly adapted to towing a 42.4-ton tank. Even the installation of a 1000-horsepower 6-TD engine on the T-64BM did not give it an advantage in dynamics and average speed over the T-72B. The controls of all three tanks are outdated - armored combat units have long gone out of fashion. At the same time, modifying them using a “robot” to change gears may well provide many advantages over the conventional, power-consuming, complex and expensive “automatic torque converter” of Western tanks. Engines. The championship is shared by the GTD-1000TF T-80BV and the V-84-1 T-72B. The first is high power, smoothness, low noise and excellent starting characteristics. The second is reliability and excellent traction. Among the disadvantages: the high cost and fear of dust of the T-80BV gas turbine engine and the difficulty in installing/dismantling the T-72B diesel engine. The worst of all is the turbo-piston 5-TDF tank T-64BV. It has good overall power, but an extremely capricious, low-torque engine that loves to “eat” oil, is unreliable and prone to overheating. Another advantage is its relatively quick replacement. Running gear. The best in T-80BV and T-72B. It is difficult to give first place to someone in particular. The T-80BV has a slightly smoother ride, the T-72B has better side protection due to large rollers and is better able to withstand mine explosions. Both hold the track perfectly. They don't bother with service. Against this background, the chassis of the T-64BV is tin. It somewhat resembles the chassis of the KV-1 “Ghost” tank, but unlike the latter, it is made much worse. The very thin plates of the road wheels, which they didn’t even bother to cover with rubber, poorly distribute the pressure on the track. Maneuvering on heavy soils, as well as running the edge of the caterpillar onto a high obstacle easily leads to the caterpillar being thrown off. At the same time, it turns out the fenders with all their contents and, if the caterpillar has flown inward, it can damage the elements of the chassis. Towing a tank with a fallen track is problematic. The road wheels get stuck in the ground. In terms of rigidity, the chassis is approximately at the level of the T-72B, but it creaks and clangs when moving much more than the latter.
Points are given on a 10-point scale. In this case, the highest 10th point is assigned if any parameter corresponds to the highest indicator in world tank building (for example, the forehead armor of the T-90M Tagil corresponds to a point of “10”, and the forehead armor of the T-26 corresponds to a point of “0”) . Let me make a reservation right away that even the latest generation tanks capable of scoring more than 200 points do not yet exist.
As a result, the T-72B is in the lead by a small margin from the T-80BV. It is also the cheapest tank of the trio. Apparently it was not in vain that its base was chosen for development.
Tank T-72B
Transmission and engine
With the transmission, everything is approximately the same for both tanks. Equally bad. Outdated manual onboard gearboxes are used, although it is high time to switch to hydromechanical transmission.
But there is a big difference between the engines. Kharkov engineers, inspired by the English L60 installed on the Chieftain MBT, whose drawings were stolen by Soviet services in the 60s, chased the specific power of their diesel engine, which in any of its modifications (5TD, 5TDF, 6TD, etc. ) with only one plus, it has a large number of minuses.
For example, they consume obscene amounts of oil, far exceeding those prescribed in the standards, causing headaches for mechanics and fuel service managers, forcing them to figure out where to get even more oil. Added to this problem is the “beautiful” splashing of black waste oil all over the rear of the tank.
The ejection cooling system and its disadvantages are known to all interested people. In cold weather, it must be started in advance and warmed up for a long time, and in hot weather it must be constantly cooled down due to overheating, for which one or two laps around the tank track in the summer were enough.
The T-72 has a lower power engine, however, it is quite enough for good mobility.
It is worth noting that there is a rather significant drawback in the form of the complexity and duration of replacing the engine, which in field conditions turns into a real headache.
But the cooling and lubrication systems are very reliable and efficient, and they have demonstrated this in practice in many military conflicts. There is also a known case during exercises when a T-72 with a broken radiator and completely leaking water drove about 2-3 kilometers “dry” and this was in the summer heat.
Armament
It is generally accepted that the shooting accuracy of the T-64 is much higher than that of the T-72. This is true, however, only due to the use of more expensive and advanced fire control systems on the first. Therefore, on the T-80 and T-90 this defect was corrected long ago, and the design of the T-64 chassis, which leads to swings, significantly reduces the accuracy of shooting on the move.
The design of the loading mechanism of the T-64 has only one advantage in the form of a larger number of initially ready-made shells for firing. Everything else is a disadvantage, because it is much more complex and unreliable compared to the T-72 automatic loader, requires periodic adjustments, in addition, it causes gas pollution in the fighting compartment, requires unnecessary actions from the crew when firing, takes twice as long to load and can deprive life of a driver.
Yes, it is the loading mechanism of the T-64, more precisely, its cassettes in the turret, that deprive the chance of escape if the hatch on the hull is blocked. This is not uncommon in battle; moreover, there is a known case of a tank being flooded during a training exercise, when there was a lot of time left, but the driver simply drowned, unable to get out through the turret.
Comparison of T-64, T-80 and T-72 tanks (from personal experience)
I am constantly reproached for an allegedly biased attitude towards Ukrainian tanks and tank builders. I assure you, I have no desire to discuss with the adherents of Kharkov. I want only one thing - so that Ukrainian armored propaganda does not fill people’s brains. I wish and strive for people to know about what was and what really is. We did not feed on myths and legends. The reader can trust or not trust my words - that is his right. Unlike some, I do not insist on my point of view. But there are facts that cannot be argued against, there are witnesses and direct participants - it’s definitely worth listening to their opinion.
The other day, the editors of the “COURAGE” website received a letter from a tank officer, in which he outlines his experience of “communication” with tanks of the T-64, T-72 and T-80 types. We give his story without any edits or changes on “COURAGE” and in this blog.
I have been following the controversy between adherents of “Ukrainian” and Russian tank building for a long time! To justify what follows a little, I’ll tell you a little about myself. I started studying at the Ulyanovsk Guards Tank School (main tank of study - T-72, additional - T-80), but due to its closure I graduated from the Kazan Tank School (main - T-80, additional - T-64), I have a diploma Honours. So I am very familiar with the subject of controversy. He served on the T-72 tank as a platoon commander, company commander, and chief of staff of a battalion in one of the tank regiments of the Volga-Ural Military District. Participated in the first Chechen campaign: was a platoon and company commander.
Now to the point. The chassis of the T-64 tank is extremely capricious and, so to speak, unusable. When turning in first gear, at high speeds and on heavy soil (wet arable land, tank ruts), there is an incredibly high risk of losing track. At high speeds, if the track is slightly loose, and when turning in higher gears, the sight of a flying track with the fenders turning out will remain forever in the memory! And if the caterpillar has flown off, then towing the tank on heavy soil and sand on rollers is absolutely impossible - the track roller plates get stuck above the balancers! Perhaps only the lazy did not talk about the notorious torsion shafts. It’s unclear what our Ukrainian opponents are proud of here!
T-64
I recently read the following expression: “the openwork tracks and chassis of the T-64 tank.” Rave! Ladies' lace and stockings can be openwork! The chassis of the tank must be RELIABLE and REPAIRABLE! And period! To be honest, I am surprised by the manic commitment of Kharkov residents to a fundamentally flawed chassis. This type is used EXCLUSIVELY on Ukrainian tanks - descendants of the first T-64. If it were really as good as they say it is, then this “brilliant” creation would probably find application somewhere else in the world. In addition to the T-64 tank, the same type of suspension was imposed on PTS and a number of engineering vehicles, which I consider a crime, given their operating conditions.
Over nine years of service during the intensive use - completely barbaric - of T-72 tanks in the mountains and on the plain, as well as the combat use of vehicles in the Chechen Republic, I have NEVER observed a caterpillar fly off the “seventy-two”! Naturally, I exclude the explosion of a tank by a tank mine and other combat damage. I also don’t remember replacing the torsion shafts. Towing a tank without tracks did not cause any problems at all. To “kill” the chassis of the T-72 you need to be an exceptional “dumb boy”! Even a weak track tension did not lead to the vehicle being “unshoeed”, but only to the drive wheel slipping along the track.
Of the negative aspects, I can only remember the not very convenient connection of the tracks with a finger, and not with earrings (so-called “binoculars”), like the T-80 and T-64, but this is rather a matter of taste and a purely subjective assessment.
T-64
I have also come across claims that the rubber tires on the road wheels are very unreliable and often fail. Complete nonsense! The vast majority of cars undergoing major repairs after the required mileage were left on rollers with the same tires with which they arrived new from the factory. The breakdown and destruction of the bandages occurred only as a result of a STRONG external impact. And after the introduction of the caterpillar from the T-80 tank, when the tires of the rollers roll along the rubber treadmill of the caterpillar, the T-72 chassis became “eternal”!
The same can be said about the chassis of the T-80 tank. The main problem here was the telescopic shock absorbers. But they changed quite easily and quickly. In general, of the three types of chassis, the T-80 chassis is, of course, the most beloved among the troops in almost all respects. No wonder its elements (caterpillar) were transferred to the T-90 and modernized T-72.
Now about the engine - the “heart” of the car. The T-64 engine (it doesn’t matter which one - 5TD, 5TDF, 6TD, etc.) has only one plus - good overall power and EVERYTHING! This plus is offset by a large number of minuses. First of all: ejection cooling system! After one lap in the summer heat around the tankodrome, I had to “cool down” the T-64. The use of such a system for heavy vehicles, using the example of the T-64, showed its futility. The extremely low reliability of starting a cold engine in winter forced training support officers to come to duty long before the start of classes in order to have time to start all the machines for these very classes. According to the lubrication system. If you just look at the stern of intensively used T-64 tanks, you will notice that it is literally filled with oil. Oil consumption exceeded all prescribed standards, forcing the heads of the fuel and lubricants service and unit commanders to “get out”. However, a lot has already been written in detail about the shortcomings of the T-64 engine even without me.
T-72BA
And now, in contrast, a little about the engines of the T-72 tanks. In the summer of 1996, during a regimental tactical exercise with live firing on the topic “Tank Regiment on the Offensive,” one of the tanks of my company, due to damage to the radiator at the point of going on the attack, expelled all the water. The tank continued to carry out the task until reaching the line of the regiment's nearest task (in those conditions it was, for a moment, about 25 km). That is, the car - “dry”, in the heat, in difficult conditions, at high speeds - traveled TWENTY-FIVE kilometers before “knocking”!
Of the problems, of course, first of all is the complexity of replacing the engine. Once, when I was a platoon commander, replacing the engine with me, two driver mechanics and periodic assistance from the battalion’s deputy technical engineer, with the assistance of the BREM-1, took almost a day. The power of the V-84 engine is quite adequate for a tank weighing 46-48 tons.
But of all the engines, my heart is given to the GTD-1250. I know that this will cause a barrage of negativity, but of all the problems that will be brought to my attention, I recognize only increased fuel consumption. All the rest: the difficulty of air purification, high exhaust temperature, etc. have been solved on the latest gas turbines. The main problem with the turbine is its cost. I believe that the reason for the decommissioning and refusal to develop tanks with gas turbine engines in Russia is the poverty of our state. Operation of a gas turbine engine is a song! Easy to start, impossible to overheat, easy to replace, “omnivorous”. However, the decision has already been made a long time ago, and if the Chelyabinsk people manage to make a new powerful and reliable diesel engine, I will be only happy! There have been conversations about the X-shaped engine since I was studying. Although, it should be noted, the Germans manage to create excellent MTU diesel engines using the classic V-shaped design.
T-72BA
The transmissions on all tanks are, in principle, almost the same. Onboard gearboxes have long been outdated... It’s a pity that at one time the Kharkovites first installed them on the T-64 tank, and then this solution migrated to the T-72 and T-80. The rest of the world has followed the path of development of hydromechanical transmission, in contrast to our notorious reduction in cost in exchange for quality...
There is no doubt that promising tanks and heavy vehicles should have a hydromechanical transmission. I’m glad that Russia has realized this and, in addition to the BMP-3, which is already equipped with a GMP, promising models of armored vehicles will also have a similar transmission. All sorts of exotic diesel-electric, hybrid and other transmissions are definitely not for tanks!
Firepower. Oddly enough, let's return again to the chassis: its imperfection in the T-64 leads to shaking and swaying of the tank. And if, thanks to a more advanced control system, the T-64B tank (BV and other modifications) outperforms the T-72B (M), then with the same control system of the “sixty-four” with the T-80B (BV), the accuracy of shooting on the move of the first is noticeably worse.
The loading mechanism (ML) of the T-64 and T-80 is, in principle, the same, and it can only be compared with the automatic loader (AZ) of the T-72 tank. There is only one advantage - the capacity of the rotating conveyor: 28 shots versus 22. But this is compensated by the more convenient placement of shots in a non-mechanized stowage. A typical scheme for placing ammunition in the T-72 during combat operations in the Chechen Republic was to fill the AZ conveyor and place the rounds in a tank rack in the fighting compartment in front of the MTO partition, from where they are easily retrieved and loaded into the gun, or loaded into the AZ. MH requires periodic monitoring and adjustments. AZ has no adjustments at all, everything is done at the factory once and for all. The MZ is distinguished by the unreliability and inconvenience of the trap's cable drive, the unnecessaryness of such an operation as transferring the used pallet from the shot into an empty cassette, which then still has to be removed manually, increasing the time of loading ammunition. In addition, this unnecessary operation leads to high gas pollution in the fighting compartment during intense shooting. AZ simply removes the pallet from the fighting compartment through a hatch in the turret. When loading the MZ, the need to correctly place the shot in the tray and close the cassette with a special key, which is very often lost in a shaking machine, significantly increases the time it takes to load ammunition. In AZ, the shot is recorded in the cassette automatically and does not require training of personnel in the “wisdom” of fastening shells.
T-80BV
Our Ukrainian friends often forget that the loading time of MZ is twice as long as AZ. In addition, the vertical projection of the charges standing “on the butt” in the MG is twice as large as the lying AZ charges, which, when penetrating the hull armor, increases the likelihood of a fire in the fighting compartment. The MZ drive is electro-hydraulic, which, in addition to the complexity of maintenance (addition of fluid), also aggravates the fire hazard. The electric drive of the AZ does not have such disadvantages.
Among other things, in the T-64 and T-80 tanks, due to the peculiarities of the layout, if necessary, it is almost impossible to get out of the control compartment into the fighting compartment, which in some cases cost the life of the driver. A classic situation for the T-72: after the rear of the turret is penetrated by a shell or grenade as a result of damage to the hydraulic drive for the vertical guidance of the gun, the gun barrel rests on the mechanical drive hatch. A fire breaks out in the tower, and before the powder charges ignite, in the worst case, 30 seconds, in the best - up to 15-20 minutes (there were cases when the powder charges only charred, without ignition!). In this short time, it is quite possible for the driver to get out of the tank through the fighting compartment, especially since the gun is lowered as far as possible, which means the breech rests against the roof of the turret and there is plenty of space in it! On the T-64 and T-80 there is practically no such possibility - only theoretically! The driver cannot remove 3-4 cartridges with shots and crawl through the vacant space on his own! This is a fact confirmed by blood. A very recent example: during exercises conducted in Ukraine, a T-64 tank got stuck with its bow in a stream, the driver was in a “combat-like” position. Water did not flow into the car quickly, since the hatch was closed. But the driver was never able to leave the control department and, unfortunately, died... The arrogance and disdain of the Ukrainian designers for the clearly successful solutions on the T-72, despite the remnants of authority that the Kharkov design bureau still had, did not allow the introduction of Tagil-style AZ on tanks T-80UD when deciding on its mass production in the 1980s...
About tank protection. As a practitioner, I trust real-life examples more than theoretical calculations. But here, as you know, there is nothing to compare: the T-64 did not take part in battles (except for fairly episodic battles in Transnistria), but the T-72 and T-80 FIGHTED!
T-80BV
All three of the above tanks used and are still using dynamic protection of the “Contact” type. There are still many such vehicles in service in our army, in Ukraine, and around the world. Only the layout of the boxes differs on different modifications. And here adherents of Ukrainian tank building are trying to turn disadvantages into advantages. Let me remind you that the fastening of boxes with DZ elements on T-64BV tanks along the sides of the hull is carried out on the load-bearing frame along the rubber-fabric screens, and on the T-72 and T-80 - directly on these screens. It is claimed that this increases the rigidity of the structure and does not lead to separation of the protective parts. This is complete nonsense! When operating tanks in Chechnya, it was precisely thanks to the flexibility of the screens that it was possible to keep the side screens intact when they came into contact with obstacles. I assure you that for a colossus weighing over forty tons and with a power of 700 - 800 (or more) hp. it makes no difference whether to roll up a flexible rubber-fabric screen or a “liquid” lattice truss from thin corners. Here flexibility is an advantage, not a disadvantage. In addition, repairing rubber-fabric screens is much easier.
The placement of emergency protection elements on the turret is apparently optimal on the T-80BV and T-64BV - here the Tagils took the path of simplification. However, the level of security of both the T-72 and T-80 was sufficient to conduct combat in conflicts like the Chechen one. I repeat, we are talking about the mounted dynamic protection “Contact”. I’ll write about later versions - “Kontakt-V”, “Relikt” and Ukrainian samples - another time.
Of course, you can argue endlessly about the advantages of certain samples, but it will be like an argument about whose beloved girl is better - a subjective and purely emotional assessment. Objectively and soberly assessing whose combat vehicle is better: the Russian T-72 and T-80 or the Ukrainian T-64, we must admit that the T-72 is most adapted to the conditions in which it was operated and fought.
In the near future, I want to talk in detail about the combat use of T-72 and T-80 tanks in various armed conflicts, as well as about those cases and examples that I personally witnessed and participated in. And now I would like to write a few general words. I will take the liberty of asserting that the overwhelming majority of losses of our tanks in all conflicts on the territory of the former USSR occurred as a result of their incorrect use, poor training of crews and improper management of the actions of units and subunits. Losses of Soviet-made tanks in conflicts on the territory of other states, in addition to the above reasons, are also caused by the use of old models against more modern opponents, lack of interaction with other branches of the military, and incorrect planning of operations and actions of troops by the command.
The first operation against Iraq in 1990-91. (“Desert Storm”) happened when I was still a cadet at the school. Thanks to my teachers at the departments of tactics, operation, weapons and shooting, at the department of combat vehicles - they conveyed to us all aspects of battles, pointed out the strengths and weaknesses of all participants in battles on both sides of the front, analyzed with us the techniques and methods of combat, methods of managing units and planning actions, analyzed the features of weapons and military equipment, as they say, “in the heat of the moment”! I would like to note that, as a rule, panic about our tanks arises only among people not directly associated with the Armed Forces.
I understand that everything I wrote concerns tanks that have been in service for a long time, but now tank building has stepped far forward, and with my publication I seem to be somewhat “behind the times.” But everything that is being introduced now (I emphasize - almost everything) existed in prototypes and, at least, in concepts even during my studies at the school, i.e. more than twenty years ago. The notorious “Armata” promises to become something new for me. We're waiting...
The idea of unified platforms has been in the air for a very long time. But only now, when there are all the prerequisites to determine the specific appearance of the cars of the future, has it become possible to begin designing and producing cars of a new generation. It may be good that we missed the stage of saturating the troops with vehicles such as the T-80UD, “object 187”, T-95. But there are often opinions that literally demand that the Ministry of Defense either adopt the T-90AM(SM), then finish the development of the T-95 and hastily accept it, then put it into production “object 640” - “Black Eagle”, or use the experience of the Ukrainians with their Oplot tank (in my opinion, a stronghold of inertia, stagnation and Ukrainian chauvinism!), then almost copy the M1A2SEP from the Americans!!! Why, dear comrades?! These are all tanks (some of them, of course, good) from yesterday and today. Now there is a great opportunity to give the Army a fundamentally new machine, the machine of the future! Provide it with great modernization potential for years to come!
Unfortunately, the specter of “big” wars is becoming increasingly clear, and in the future the intensity and power of conflicts around the world will only increase. And Russia, unfortunately, cannot avoid participating in them... We do not have much time left to saturate the troops with modern models of military equipment and prepare the troops for their use.
Protection
There is hardly any point in arguing about armor protection, since it is tested in practice and does not depend on fancy numbers and tests.
The T-72 has seen through many military conflicts, some very successfully, some not. But even during the assault on Grozny, where many tanks were lost due to poor command and coordination, the frontal armor remained virtually invulnerable.
All those who like to show off a lot of photos of the T-72 with a torn off turret can only be advised to look for similar photos, which are appearing more and more on the Internet, of Ukrainian T-64s and their advertised modern Bulat modifications.
Mounted reactive armor "Contact" is more successfully located on the turret of the T-64, providing better protection, and on the hull of the T-72 due to the fact that it is attached to flexible screens, while in the T-64 directly to the power frame , which allows you to avoid many damages when hitting obstacles and simplifies repairs.
The article on comparing the T-64 and T-72 has come to an end, so all that remains is to draw conclusions.
Tanks T-64, T-72, T-80. How they appeared and why (32 photos)
In this regard, the history of tank building, no matter how much we argue and sort things out among ourselves, is our common history, we created it and must objectively evaluate the facts and events that took place. Today, for many objective reasons, KMDB cannot develop promising tanks, but its contribution to the common cause is undoubted.
Almost all tanks were born not by order from above, but from the proactive work of a specific design bureau. This was the case with the T-34, and the T-64 was created in the same way. At the same time, a lot depended on the personality of the chief designer; it was he who determined what the future tank would be like. I had to work with three chief designers and I can compare and evaluate their activities. Morozov was a genius, the creation of tanks was the meaning of his life. Koshkin was the same genius, who, by the way, came to Kharkov from Leningrad.
I can assume that if Morozov had not returned from evacuation, the T-64 tank would have been born not in Kharkov, but in Nizhny Tagil. Such people knew and were able to form teams capable of creating masterpieces of design thought. You can also give the example of Korolev, thanks to whose genius and organizational talent Soviet space was born.
The tank is created not only by the tank design bureau; under the leadership of the chief designer, dozens of design, scientific and production organizations of various profiles and purposes are working on it, without which it is impossible to create the vehicle. The engine, armor, weapons, ammunition, sighting systems, electronics and much more are being developed in specialized organizations. The head design bureau ties all this into a single whole and ensures that the specified characteristics are fulfilled.
In the mid-50s, the tendency to curtail work on light, medium and heavy tanks began to dominate in the Soviet Union and the concept of creating a single tank was adopted. The military is developing tactical and technical requirements for such a tank and its development is entrusted to the KMDB.
One may wonder: why did they choose this design bureau?
The Leningrad Design Bureau dealt with heavy tanks, and this was not its profile. Morozov began the development of a new medium tank on his own initiative while still in Nizhny Tagil. Returning to Kharkov in 1951, he continued this work (object 430). In Nizhny Tagil, the unfinished project was continued by the new chief designer Kartsev (object 140).
In two design bureaus, preliminary and technical designs were developed, which were reviewed by the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. Based on the results of the review, in June 1955, technical specifications for a promising tank were developed, prototype tanks were manufactured, and tests were carried out in Kubinka in 1958.
Object 430 successfully passed the tests, but object 140 failed. Work on this tank was curtailed and UVZ concentrated its efforts on creating the T-55 and T-62 tanks. Despite successful tests, the 430 object was not put into service because it did not provide a significant increase in performance characteristics compared to the T-54 tank.
On an initiative basis, object 430 is fundamentally redesigned, a new smooth-bore 115-mm gun with separately loaded rounds is installed. Based on the results of consideration of this project, in February 1961, a resolution was adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers on the development of a new tank weighing 34 tons, with a 115 mm caliber gun, a loading mechanism and a crew of 3 people. Thus, the development of the T-64 tank (object 432) was launched; the implementation of the project was entrusted to the KMDB.
The T-64 tank was revolutionary at that time and became the founder of a new generation of Soviet tanks. There was a lot that was new in it, but the main ones were an automatic loader and a crew of 3 people, a chassis and a never-before-used engine. All these innovations became problems for this tank, and especially the engine, which led to the appearance of the T-72 and T-80 tanks.
To reduce the internal volume and weight of the tank, Morozov used a low, opposed two-stroke 5TDF diesel engine with a horizontal cylinder arrangement, specially designed for this tank. The use of this engine made it possible to create a low engine and transmission compartment with an ejection cooling system. Work on this engine began back in 1946 on the basis of the German aircraft engine Junkers Jumo 205.
The use of this engine entailed serious problems associated with its development in production. It was previously known that attempts by England and Japan to master this engine in production ended in failure. Nevertheless, the decision was made, and the development of such an engine was entrusted to Charomsky, a well-known specialist in the creation of aircraft engines.
At the Malyshev plant in 1955, a special design bureau for diesel engineering was created, Charomsky was appointed chief designer, and a plant was subsequently built to produce these engines.
Continuing the history of the formation of the T-64 tank, it should be noted that this path was thorny with unexpected turns. At the end of 1961, the technical design for object 432 was developed and defended, and in September 1962, the first prototypes of the tank were manufactured. In October 1962, the tank was demonstrated to state leaders in Kubinka. Compared to other tanks, it was seriously different, and, despite the mixed reaction of the military, its further development was approved.
Externally, the tank looked very impressive, like an elegantly dressed woman with a pleasant appearance. I was told how, when considering the first versions of the tank, Morozov drew a line on the drawing with his own hand and cut off the protruding ends of the first fuel tanks on the fenders. With the words that everything in the tank should be beautiful.
A pilot batch of tanks was manufactured at the Malyshev plant to be submitted for state testing. The car was fundamentally new in almost everything, and during factory testing a large number of defects and shortcomings in the engine and its systems, the loading mechanism and the chassis were revealed. For this reason, a number of tactical and technical requirements were not met.
After testing and fine-tuning the design and eliminating the comments, the tank was finally submitted for state testing in 1963. However, these measures turned out to be insufficient, the technical specifications were not completed and the tank did not pass the full cycle of tests and was not accepted for service.
Despite this, a decision was made to launch it into mass production in 1964 according to the documentation of the chief designer. The tanks were sent to troops for accelerated operation, defects were identified and eliminated. The design was further refined and in October 1966 it was submitted for repeated state tests. It successfully passed them and was put into service in December 1966.
It should be noted right away that mass production of the tank began against the will of the military and this naturally did not make them supporters of this vehicle. In addition, the military opposed the introduction of a fundamentally new vehicle into the army, since this required serious changes in the technical and organizational support of tank forces.
In 1964, the T-64 tank underwent a deep modernization. It featured a 125 mm cannon and modified many of the tank's systems. It successfully passed military tests and was put into service as the T-64A tank in May 1968.
This was a new generation tank and was very different from all previous ones. It turned out to be too new for its time, and any innovation requires effort and time to fine-tune. The advantages and disadvantages of the T-64 have already been analyzed and described in detail. But I would like to dwell on some.
My personal impressions of the tank. I was trained on T-55 tanks and once in practice at a tank repair plant I managed to climb into the then classified T-64. I was struck by two things - the gunner's sight and the loading mechanism.
The TPD -2 -49 sight seemed perfect, how different it was from the simple sight on the “fifty-five” and amazed with its “non-tank” design and characteristics. I didn’t know then that years later I would have to lead the development of the most complex sighting systems for a promising tank.
The MZ rammer was also hit. Everything worked so quickly that I could not understand how a rigid rod was made from two flexible chains. Much later, I came across Morozov’s invention, which so easily solved a difficult problem.
The most problematic parts of the tank were three components - the engine, the loading mechanism and the chassis. If you look at the T-64, T-72 and T-80, it is precisely in these components that they differ from each other. Everything else is almost the same - layout, gun, weapons, sights, electronics. It is difficult for a non-specialist to distinguish them.
The T-64 engine caused the most problems and work on its development took a very long time. It was created from scratch; there was neither technology nor experience in developing such engines. In the process of fine-tuning it, a lot of problems arose and to solve them it was necessary to involve specialists in metals, ceramics, and oils. Conduct research on the dynamics of the piston group and sometimes search for the necessary solutions through trial and error.
The chief designer of the engine, Charomsky, developed it and obtained acceptable results on prototypes of the engine. During work the power is 580 hp. It turned out to be not enough and a new 5TDF engine with 700 hp had to be developed. Given the existing problems, this created new ones and many people got the impression that it was impossible to resolve.
In addition, Charomsky did not want to work on fine-tuning the engine; in 1959 he retired and returned to Moscow. Instead, Golinets, a passionate lover of women, became the chief designer; this was no longer the chief designer and was on a completely different level. Under his leadership, work on the engine slowed down significantly.
When the T-72 was put into service in 1973, an enraged Morozov, returning from Moscow, blamed Golinets for the failures and very quickly he was removed from his post for “moral corruption.”
Despite all these problems, the engine was still completed, and during the development of the Boxer tank, a modification of this engine with a power of 1200 hp was already used. The problems were solved, but time was running out and the tank could not get back on its feet.
Completely unexpected problems also arose. As I was told, at the beginning of the military operation of the tank, one unit was stationed in a coniferous forest and after some time the tanks began to break down. It turned out that pine needles clog the ejection cooling system with all the ensuing consequences. We had to urgently refine the design and introduce nets on the roof of the MTO, and return all the tanks from the army to the factory and modify them.
Why did the T-72 have a new automatic loader? The choice of the MZ option was determined by the ammunition. At the beginning of development it was unitary. As a result, we achieved and made it separate with a partially combustible sleeve and pan. For a long time we were looking for an option to place it in a mechanized installation. At one meeting, someone suggested placing it like a bent arm at the elbow. This is how the cabin-type MZ appeared.
By accepting this option, the emergency evacuation of the mechanic-driver was limited. The problem was solved by making a hole in the cabin. But this was only possible when the gun was positioned “on course.” There was also a problem with the pallet trap; when it flew out of the gun at high speed, there were cases of the pallet not being caught and the sensor fixing it in the trap constantly broke, which led to the loading process stopping. This problem was also eventually resolved.
Under these far-fetched pretexts, the military did not accept the Ministry of Health. On the T-72, they did something primitively simple: they threw out six shots and put the shells and cartridges on top of each other in the conveyor. They didn't make a trap at all. The pallet was simply thrown outside. And this despite the fact that according to TTT the tank should not depressurize in battle. At that time, there was a serious demand for combat under conditions of the use of nuclear weapons.
The military turned a blind eye to the reduction in ammunition from 28 to 22 and the depressurization of the tank when firing. The main thing was to prove that MZ is not suitable.
Problems with the chassis. Over the years there have been many debates about which chassis is better and which is worse. I can immediately say that the main criterion when choosing the type of chassis for the T-64 was its weight. We must not forget that according to the TTT, the weight of the tank should not exceed 34 tons and from the very beginning there were problems with the engine; its power was insufficient. Therefore, Morozov, knowing what cross-country ability is for a tank, chose this chassis option and defended it all the time.
Naturally, this type of chassis had shortcomings, they were treated, but the weight requirement was strictly observed. A dilemma constantly arose between performance and weight, since adopting a different chassis increased the weight of the tank by two tons. On the T-72 and T-80 they did this, on the T-64 they left a lightweight chassis. Of course, with such restrictions on weight and dimensions it was difficult to achieve satisfaction of all requirements, but the main one believed that this had to be tolerated. Kostenko mentions in his book that Morozov, in communication with him, agreed that, apparently, he was wrong, but this is already part of history.
This is how three types of chassis appeared: Kharkov, Tagil and Leningrad. Many tests were carried out, and according to their results, the Leningrad chassis turned out to be the most effective. KMDB also took it as a basis in their subsequent modifications of tanks and in the development of the promising Boxer tank.
Solving these problems took time, and 11 years passed from the start of development of the tank to its adoption into service. During this time, both supporters and opponents of the development of the tank appeared. The reasons for this were technical, organizational and opportunistic. The tank was of a new generation and its development naturally required considerable effort.
On the one hand, the military wanted to get a new tank with improved characteristics, on the other hand, they were alarmed by the complexity of the tank and the inevitable changes in the structure of tank forces and the training of tank crews when it was introduced. This was further compounded by technical problems and they delayed the adoption of the tank for service.
In addition, they were unhappy with the launch of the T-64 tank into mass production without completing state tests in 1964 and believed that this tank was being forced on them. The commander of the tank forces, Marshal Poluboyarov and then Marshal Babajanyan, the heads of the GBTU and the Kubinka training ground, over time began to lean towards a version of a simpler tank, as they imagined the T-72.
The leadership of the defense industry saw what a colossal amount of work had to be done in organizing the production of this tank. Constant problems with organizing production, especially of a new engine, also did not arouse much enthusiasm among them. Only the iron will of the “Stalinist People’s Commissar” Ustinov, who relied on the T-64 as a single tank for the army, forced everyone to implement the assigned tasks.
There were also opportunistic reasons. The launch of a single tank into serial production obligated UVZ and ZKZ to conduct their development on this basis. Naturally, they did not feel any pleasure from this and, through their lobbyists among the military, industry leaders and the government, they tried to prevent this from happening and promoted their tank projects.
In August 1967, a decree was issued by the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers on equipping the army with new T-64 tanks and developing capacities for their production. The production of this tank was to be carried out at three factories - in Kharkov, Nizhny Tagil and Leningrad. Considering the limited production capacity of 5TDF engines, its installation in peacetime was envisaged at all factories, and during a special period, UVZ was supposed to produce a “reserve” version of the T-64 tank based on the existing V-2 engine.
KMDB developed this version of the tank (object 439). In 1967, prototypes of the tank were manufactured and tested and the tests were successfully carried out. Technical documentation for this tank was transferred to UVZ to organize mass production.
In parallel, at LKZ, from the beginning of the 60s, work was carried out to install a gas turbine engine on the T-64 tank (T-64T tank). Samples of such a tank were manufactured and tested. In October 1968, a decision was made to create the T-64 tank with a gas turbine engine (object 219). This work was of little interest to anyone, since there was no suitable turbine.
Regardless of the decisions made, work was carried out at UVZ and LKZ on the basis of the T-64 tank to create their own versions of the promising tank. At this stage, with serious support from the military, lobbying began for the UVZ project (object 172), which later became the T-72 tank. As Kostenko wrote in his book, the process of developing this tank was long, thorny and had an almost detective character. It was truly a detective story - with forgery of government documents!
At the stage of development of the T-64 tank, due to difficulties in its development, both technical and organizational confrontation began. There were fewer supporters, and serious opposition began to mature. Despite the adoption of a resolution on the production of the T-64 at all factories, UVZ, under the guise of a mobilization tank, tried to create its own version as opposed to the T-64.
By that time, the documentation for the reserve version of the tank (object 435), which was developed and tested at KMDB, was transferred to UVZ. It was carefully analyzed, comments received during testing were evaluated and ways to eliminate them were worked out.
The main emphasis was placed on a simplified version of the tank and the maximum use of already existing or used components and systems in a failed attempt to modernize the T-62. This was reminiscent of the work of aviation designers Tupolev and Myasishchev. The first created aircraft based on its own groundwork and the experience of competitors, while the second created everything from scratch and did not always achieve success.
Taking into account the T-64's problems with the engine, engine and chassis, they installed a used V-45 engine with a power of 730 hp. with a fan cooling system, an automatic loader with a conveyor ammunition rack and a more powerful chassis. The comments on the T-64 were taken into account, the design was simplified to the limit, often reducing the performance characteristics of the tank, and higher reliability was ensured.
The first samples were created by converting the T-64, then they began to produce their own prototypes and prototypes. It was prohibited to make changes to the T-64 documentation. There was an incident with me in the early 70s, then a letter came from UVZ with a request to eliminate the discovered error in the drawing. My boss forbade me to do this with the words: “We will solve this issue ourselves.”
The military supported this work, up to two dozen tanks were manufactured, and factory and military tests were carried out. This is how the “Object 172” tank appeared, not as a new tank, but as a mobilization version of the T-64.
As a result, two unified tanks appeared, developed according to the technical specifications for the T-64 tank. In accordance with directive documents, serial production of the T-64 should be organized at three factories, and the T-72 did not fit into this. On this issue, two groups have formed in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Defense Industry, the Central Committee and the Military-Industrial Complex.
The top party and state leadership and ministers supported the T-64, while lower leaders in the GBTU, military-industrial complex and the Central Committee focused on the T-72. Basically, the behind-the-scenes struggle between these two groups was resolved in the most unexpected way, creating problems for many decades.
In pursuance of the decree on mass production of the T-64, a decree was prepared to create production facilities for this purpose. This resolution was prepared by military-industrial complex employee Kostenko.
I had to meet with him several times behind the Kremlin wall during the development of the Boxer tank, and he always tried to delve deeply into the issue at hand.
Kostenko was part of a group of people defending the idea of putting the T-72 tank into mass production. In his book “Tanks (Memoirs and Reflections)” he describes this episode in detail.
This group set a goal in the document being prepared, by distorting its essence, to indirectly carry out a decision on the serial production of the T-72. Let's give the floor to Kostenko:
“And yet, supporters of “object 172” appeared in the Ministry of Defense, and in the Ministry of Defense Industry, and in the State Planning Committee (in the military-industrial complex and the Central Committee too). There were few of them; in each “office” they could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Thus, a group of like-minded people gradually formed, in which everyone acted within the limits of their personal capabilities and official authority, without advertising “object 172”.
They also chose the time for its signing, when their opponents went on vacation: Ustinov (Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee), Zverev (Minister of Defense Industry). Dmitriev (deputy head of the defense industry department of the CPSU Central Committee) and Kuzmin (head of the armament department of the ground forces of the military-industrial complex). How about.
They falsified a government document in such a way that:
“Reading this, anyone not intimately privy to the essence of the matter could not (even after reading the full text of the resolution) imagine that the purpose of this resolution was to ensure in 1969-1971 the creation at UVZ and ChTZ of production capacities that would allow from January 1, 1972 begin serial production of new tanks “Object 172”.
He especially admires how beautifully they did everything:
“The first, second, third page - but now I got to the place where there was a point about the mob variant of the tank. This point has disappeared from the text! Instead, a new one appeared, which formally changed the essence of the resolution. The new paragraph stated that the Ministry of Defense Industry was released from the task of organizing serial production of the T-64 at UVZ.”
So in May 1970, a decree “On measures to create capacities for the production of T-64A tanks” appeared, and in fact on the preparation of mass production of the T-72 tank. Through the efforts of a number of high-ranking officials and military personnel, a decision was made that contradicted the general line in tank building approved by the government for the creation of a single T-64 tank. This document, contrary to the interests of the state, allowed the launch of two almost identical tanks into mass production.
In 1972, an initial batch of T-72 tanks was produced, factory and military tests were carried out, and in August 1973 the tank was put into service. This was the first not entirely clean blow to Morozov, which did not allow him to realize the idea of creating a single tank.
In parallel with the work on equipping the T-64 tank with a V-45 engine, work was carried out at LKZ to install a GTD-3L with a power of 800 hp on this tank. Gas turbine engines were installed on converted T-64s. Tests have shown that the chassis cannot withstand significant changes in dynamic loads, and LKZ began to develop and test their own version of the chassis.
As a result of the test cycle, the fundamental possibility of creating a tank with a gas turbine engine was proven. Based on the results of this work, in June 1969, a decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers was issued on the creation of a gas turbine power plant for the T-64 tank. The organization of serial production of the T-64 tank with a gas turbine engine was envisaged at LKZ.
In 1972, comparative military tests of three tanks T-64, T-72 and T-80 were carried out. The tests showed approximately equal characteristics of the tanks, but no decision was made about their future fate.
By the mid-70s, the epic with the T-72 began to subside, but another one was unfolding, with the gas turbine T-80. With the appointment of Ustinov as Minister of Defense, the positions of Romanov and Ryabov in the country's political elite are strengthened and, with their support, the push for a tank with a gas turbine engine begins.
At this time, the efforts of the KMDB were focused on creating the fighting compartment of the T-64B tank with a fundamentally new fire control system “Ob” and a complex of guided weapons “Cobra”, which made it possible to obtain a serious lead over other tanks in terms of firepower.
Considering that the T-80 was seriously behind the T-64B in all respects, they decided to seriously “strengthen” it in a very original way. When carrying out factory tests of the T-64B (I was a participant in these tests), the turret is removed from one tank and placed on the T-80 hull, and all other tests are carried out by two seemingly different tanks, the T-64B and T-80B.
Based on the test results, two tanks were put into service in 1976. So, in addition to the already crushed T-72, the T-80B also gets a start in life, and even with the most advanced weapon system at that time. This was the second blow to Morozov, after which he retired.
Realizing that with three tanks “you can’t live like this any longer,” Ustinov organized in 1976 the most powerful military tests of three tanks, “cockroach races,” as they were called. According to their results, the T-64 and T-80 were approximately equal, and the T-72 lagged behind them. I read the test report several times; I was surprised by Venediktov’s unfounded dissenting opinion that the T-72 deserves a better rating.
Based on the test results, the decision was made at the very top to promote the T-80 in the same original way. We decided to make one from two tanks T-64B and T-80B. In December 1976, the military-industrial complex decided to create a single, improved T-80U tank. The head of the tank, LKZ, is developing a hull with a gas turbine engine with a power of 1200 hp, and KhKBM is developing a fighting compartment with a new weapon system. This tank was planned to be put into mass production in Leningrad, Omsk and Kharkov.
Work on the 6TD engine in Kharkov was practically prohibited, and by decree of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, the construction of a plant in Kharkov for the production of a new gas turbine engine for the T-80U was launched. Construction of the plant without completed documentation for the gas turbine engine was a gamble. The plant was practically built, they had already started ordering the most complex equipment, which cost incredible amounts of money. As a result, the gas turbine engine was never developed, everything was thrown away, and no one was held accountable for the senseless use of funds.
Joint development of the LKZ and KhKBM tank T-80U based on the existing gas turbine engine with a capacity of 1000 hp. and the new Irtysh sighting system with laser-guided Reflex weapons was successfully completed, and after testing in December 1984, the tank was put into service.
After the death of Ustinov in 1984 and the departure of Romanov, who promoted the idea of a gas turbine tank, from the political Olympus, priorities began to change dramatically. Everyone suddenly saw the light: there is no point in promoting a tank with a problematic gas turbine engine if it has a 6TD engine of the same power!
Back in 1976, based on a 6TD with a power of 1000 hp. A project to modernize the T-64B tank (object 476) was developed, but it was postponed because it was ordered to work on the T-80U. The problems that arose with the gas turbine engine forced the adoption of a resolution in June 1981 on the development of the T-80U tank with the 6TD engine. This is “object 476” with the “Leningrad” suspension.
Tests of this tank were successfully carried out in Kubinka. In September 1985, the T-80UD tank with a 6TD engine with a power of 1000 hp was put into service. (object 478). After almost ten years, we finally returned to a tank with a two-stroke engine!
With this, the long-term epic of promoting a tank with a gas turbine engine has come to an end. It turned out that there are no technical prerequisites for this yet. The T-80UD tank was mass-produced in Kharkov, about 700 tanks were produced in total. As the head of GBTU Potapov recalled, a draft resolution was prepared and approved on the phased transition of all factories to the production of T-80UD, but the Union collapsed, and the tank ended up abroad.
The T-80UD and T-72 tanks unexpectedly had to prove their advantages in other conditions. In 1996-1999, Ukraine supplied 320 T-80UD tanks to Pakistan, while its main enemy, India, operated T-72 tanks. Reviews in these countries about the tanks were far from being in favor of the latter.
In conclusion, it should be noted that if in the period 1968-1973. There was an intense competition between the T-64 and T-72 tanks, then in 1975-1985. — T-64 and T-80. It so happened that after 1973 the T-72 faded into the background. All new developments somehow bypassed UVZ; modifications of these tanks mainly implemented what had already been tested on the T-64 and T-80. Why this happened is not entirely clear to me, but it happened.
According to many estimates, the T-64, T-72 and T-80 tanks and their modifications are tanks of the same generation, with approximately equal performance characteristics. They are equipped with the same weapons, but are not standardized in terms of production and operation. It can take a long time to figure out which one is better, but there is no doubt that Morozov laid down their concept.
Decades have passed, and the controversy about this generation of tanks does not subside. In these disputes, we sometimes cross the line where objectivity ends. Therefore, all of us, especially my colleagues from Nizhny Tagil, need to take a more balanced, objective approach to tank assessments. I, too, sometimes allowed myself harsh judgments, not always objective. This does us no credit. We did a common cause, we have something to be proud of!
With all the costs of developing these tanks, they, of course, had to be developed, manufactured and tested. Based on the test results, draw objective and honest conclusions and leave one in mass production, as intended. But the leaders of the state, industry and military did not have the courage to stop and make decisions in the interests of the state and the army.
The time has long come to create a new generation of tanks, taking into account the experience of creating the previous generation of tanks and the unfinished project to create the promising Boxer tank. Now the Armata tank project is reaching the finish line, and there is something to discuss, but there is still little information.
The purpose of this article was not to study the characteristics of tanks; this has already been done a long time ago. The main attention was paid to the process of creating this generation of tanks and the circumstances influencing the adoption of fateful decisions. I wanted to show how complex and controversial the development of tanks was: after all, their advancement was influenced not only by technical characteristics, but also by other considerations that were far from technology.
